Title | Use and effects of chemical agents on Australian personnel in Vietnam-Royal Commission (Hon. Mr Justice P. Evatt) - Final report, dated 31 July 1985 - Report - Volume 1 - Introduction and exposure |
Source | Both Chambers |
Date | 22-08-1985 |
Parliament No. | 34 |
Tabled in House of Reps | 22-08-1985 |
Tabled in Senate | 22-08-1985 |
Parliamentary Paper Year | 1985 |
Parliamentary Paper No. | 288 |
System Id | publications/tabledpapers/HPP052016002538 |
The Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia
ROYAL COMMISSION ON THE USE AND EFFECTS OF CHEMICAL AGENTS ON AUSTRALIAN PERSONNEL IN VIETNAM
Commissioner: The Hon. Mr Justice P. Evatt, DSC, LLB
Final Report-July 1985
Volume 1: Introduction and Exposure
Presented 22 August 1985 Ordered to be printed 19 September 1985
\I
Parliamentary Paper No. 288/1985
I
ROYAL COMMISSION ON THE USE AND EFFECTS OF CHEMICAL AGENTS ON AUSTRALIAN PERSONNEL IN VIETNAM
Commissioner: The Hon. Mr Justice Phillip Evatt DSC, LLB.
A Judge of the Federal Court of Australia
FINAL REPORT
July 1985
VOLUME 1
Australian Government Publishing Service Canberra 1985
© Commonwealth of Australia 1985
ISBN 0 644 04339 3
1SBN 0 644 04340 7
Set of Volumes Report Volume One
Printed by Canberra Publi shing and Printing Co .. Fyshwick . A.C.T.
ROYAL COMMISSION ON THE USE AND EFFECTS OF CHEMICAL AGENTS ON AUSTRALIAN PERSONN E L IN VIETNAM
Commissioner: The l-Ion. Mr Justice Phillip Evatt DSC
Secretary: Mr B. D . Meade
31 July 1985
Your Excellency,
G.P.O. Box .:lX --12 Sydney. N.S .\V . 200 1 Telephone: (02) 2.)'! (, 222
In accordance with Letters Patent issued to me on 13 May 1983, 27 June 1984, 3 August 1984 and 23 April 1985, I
have the honour to present to you the Final Report of my inquiry. I believe that the Report complies with those Letters Patent and that my task is therefore completed.
Yours sincerely
JUSTICE PHILLIP EVATT Royal Commissioner ·
His Excellency the Right Honourable Sir Ninian Stephen, A.K., G.C.M.G., G.C.V.O., K.B.E. Governor-General and Commander-in-chief Government House
CANBERRA A.C.T. 2600
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Volume 1
Table of Contents. Report
Senior Appointments
Part-time Consultants
Abbreviations
Acknowledgements
Prologue
CHAPTER I - INTRODUCTION
1. Letters Patent and Appearances 2. Concern Over Chemicals 3. History of Chemical Use
4. The Vietnam Conflict
5. Use of Herbicides in Vietnam
6 . Geography of Vietnam
7. Use of Insecticides in Vietnam
B. The Controversy in the United States
9. The Controversy in Australia 10. The Commission's Approach Endnotes
CHAPTER II - STANDARD OF PROOF IN THE DETERMINATION OF FACT$ IN ISSUE
1.
2.
3.
Introduction Relevance of Repatriation Legislation Relevance of Epidemiological Studies Endnotes
v
viii
ix
X
xii
XV
xvi
1
9
11 16 21 31
33 34 46 57 66
1
5
17 27
CHAPTER III - ASCERTAINMJ<:N'l' OF THE CLAIMS
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
Introduction Written Submissions from Persons Seeking Leave to Appear VVAA's Case Monsanto's Case
Submissions from Individuals Informal Sessions 6 . 1 Introduction 6.2 Locations and Methods The Issues Endnotes
CHAPTER IV - EXPOSURE
1.
2.
3.
Chemicals Used 1.1 'Colour-coded' herbicides Why were Herbicides Used? 1 . 2 Other Herbicides
Tordon Borate Chlorate Distillate-Creosote Hyvar X(Bromacil) Paraquat(Gramaxone) Diquat (Reglone) Evidence at Formal Hearings 1.3 Insecticides Exposure Models
Dr Donald Crosby Dr Hermann Poiger Dr Ian Munro Professor Bo Holmstedt Dr Frank M. Dost
2,4-D and 2,4,5-T F'ood Inhalation Sprayers Evidence of John Bamford Direct Aerial Exposure
3.1 HERBS Tapes Analysis 3.2 Spray Drift and Volatilisation 3.3 C Co 5 RAR - August, 1969
3.4 Participation in Helicopter Spraying John Farquhar McMahon Clive Francis Cotter John Cecil Rhodes Michael John Haxell 3.5 Evidence of veterans
vi
1
3
4
6
7
7
11 20 22
1
7
33 34 38 42 43 46 47 58 64 88 88 92 99 101 104 107 112 112 113 113 116 117 123 132 137 137 138 139 142 144
4.
s.
6 .
7.
8.
Nui Dat Incidents 4.1 Rubber trees
William Orril Rodgers Raymond Arthur Daniel Ronald Bruce Harris Stanford Radley Freeman 4.2 Dam/water Supply 4.3 Perimeter Spraying
4.4 Holt/Lugg Trials Indirect Exposure S.1 Transit Through Defoliated Areas S.2 Exposure via Food
S . 3 Exposure via Water
S.4 Exposure via Soil SAFETY PRECAUTIONS 6.1 Instructions Manual of Army Safety, 1970
Current Instructions Personnel Engaged in Spraying 6.2 Observance DISPOSAL OF SURPLUS CHEMICALS
146 146 147 148
152 1S5 1S9 161 164 181 190
194 199 204 208
214 ?.20 220 27.1
224 227
7.1 Disposal of the 'colour - coded' 7.2 Disposal of surplus Australian 7.3 Insecticides 7.4 Lack of VVAA Contribution
CONCLUSIONS
herbicides 227 herbicides 228 229 230
8.1 Insecticides 8.2 Herbicides 8.3 Pesticides Generally 9. RECOMMENDATIONS I<;NDNO'I'r:S
233 234 235 238 240
APPr:NDIX 1
vii
TABLE OF CONTENTS - REPORT
1_ -- INTRODUCTION and EXPOSURE
Prologue
1 Introduction
II Standard of Proof
III Ascertainment of Claims IV Exposure
VOLUME 2 - TOXICOLOGY and GENERAL HEALTH
V Toxicology and Safe Doses
VI Health Effects General
VOLUME 3 - BIRTH ANOMALIES
VII Health Effects. Reproductive Outcomes and Birth Anomalies
VOLUME 4 - CANCER
VIII Health Effects, Cancer
VOLUME 5 - MENTAL WELL-BEING
IX Health Effects. Mental
VOLUME 6 - MORTALITY CLASS ACTION VVAA and SECTION 47
X Mortality
XI Class Action
XII Status of VVAA XIII Interim Report and S.47
VOLUME 7 - BENEFITS and TREATMENT
XIV Benefits and Treatment
VOLUME 8 - CONCLUSIONS. RECOMMENDATIONS and EPILOGUE
XV Conclusions and Recommendations Epilogue
VOLUME 9 - EXHIBIT LISTS AND BIBLIOGRAPHY
viii
ROYAL COMMISSION ON THE USE AND EFFECTS OF CHEMICAL AGENTS ON AUSTRALIAN PERSONNEL IN VIETNAM
SENIOR APPOINTMENTS
Senior Counsel Assisting and Principal Investigator:
John Coombs QC. LLB.
Secretary:
Bryan D. Meade.
Junior Counsel and Investigators:
Max Kimber LLB. LLM. Graham Ellis AlA. AIAA. B.Com. LLB. AASA.
Solicitor to the Commission: John McCorquodale MA. LLM.
Associate to the Commissioner:
Gregory Harris BBS. LLB.
Project Officer. Legal:
Michael Wilde LLB.
ix
PART - TIME CONSULTANTS
PRINCIPAL CONSULTANT AND ADVISER TO THE COMMISSION Professor J.D. MATHEWS B Sc, MB, MD, PhD, l''RACP.
SENIOR CONSULTANTS
Birth and Reproductive Outcomes -Fiona STANLEY MB BS, MSc, MFCM.
Neurotoxicology - Norman ALDRIDGE BSc, PhD.
Carcinogenesis - Philippe SHUBIK BM, BCh, PhD, DM.
Genetic Toxicology - Ian MUNRO BSc, MSc, PhD.
Background Adviser - Alvin YOUNG PhD.
CONSULTANTS
ADENA, Michael Anthony BSc(Hons), PhD. ANDREWS, John Gavin MD, FRANZCP, FRCP. ARMSTRONG, Bruce Konrad MB BS, PhD, MRACP. AXELSON, Nils Olav Evert MD. BARSOTTI, Deborah Ann BA, PhD. BLACK, Allan BSc(Hons), PhD, MB BS. BOMAN, Bruce, MB BS, MRANZCP. BRUSICK, David Joseph BS MS, PhD. CHEW, Wee - Lek BSc(Hons) PhD. CROSBY, Donald Gibson BA, PhD. DAUM, Susan M MD. DAVIES, William BSc(Hons) MAPS. DONOVAN, John Windeyer MB BS, PhD, FFCM, FRACMA. DOST, !''rank Norman BS, DVM, MS. DOULL, I MD, PhD. ELLARD, John MD, BS, DPM, FRACP, l''RANZCP, FRCP, MAPS. FERGUSON, David MD. FETT, Michael Jacob MB(Hons) BS(Hons) BMSc(Hons), MPH. F'RAUMENI, Joe MD. HALL, Wayne Dennis BSc, PhD. HARDELL. Lennart MD. HATCH. Maureen PhD. HAY, Alastair Watt Macintyre BSc, PhD . HOLMSTEDT, Bo Roland MD.
X
JACOBS, Patricia Ann BSc, DSc. KAHN. Colin Nicholas (Brig.) KEANI!:, Ter-ence M. PhD. KIMBROUGH, R D Renate MD.
LARSSON, Kar( Sune DDS, PhD. LEVINSON, John M, MD . McCONNELL, Ernst MS, DVM. McMICHAEL Tony MB BS. PEARN. John MD, AM, BSc, PhD, DCM, FRACP. POIGER. Hermann PhD. QUINN, James T MB, MD, DPM. MRC. Psych. REGGIANI, Guiseppe MD. RICHARDS, John Alan BE, PhD. SMIEEC, F'IREE. RIEDEL. Dieter MSc, PhD. RODGERS, William Orril (Brig.) MB BS, Dep TMH, FRACP. ROGERS, Lesley Joy BSc, PhD.
SCHNEIDERMAN, Marvin Arthur MS BS . PhD, SMITH, Allan Herries BSc, BMSc, MB, ChB, PhD, MCCM(NZ) SPRAGG, Griffith Silas MB, BS, DPM, FRANZCP. STEIN. Zena Athene. BA, MA, MB, BCh. STEWART, Bernard William BSc, MSc, PhD. STREIMER. Jeffrey Harry MB BS, MRANZCP. TAYLOR, James Selwyn MD. TEPE, Susan PhD. TUCHMANN - DUPLESSIS, H MD, PhD.
xi
2,4,5 - T 2.4 - D AAAS
AAT AATTV AATTVA
ABS ACT AFIP AFV All'' AIM ALSG AMF AOWG ARC ARVN ATF AVADSC
AVHS B(a}P BASF AG BHC BHK CARO CIA CICV CIH CNS COMAFV COMUSMACV
DA DAY DBP DDT DEET DMO DMP DMSO DNA DSM DVA Dow EEG EPA FAO
FARELF
ABBREVIATIONS
2,4,5 trichlorophenoxyacetic acid 2,4-dichlorophenoxyacetic acid American Association for the Advancement of Science Administrative Appeals Tribunal Australian Army Training Team to Vietnam Australian Army Training Team Vietnam Association Australian Bureau of Statistics Australian Capital Territory Armed Forces Institute of Pathology Australian Forces Vietnam Australian Infantry Force(s} Accuracy in Media, Inc. - see Exh. 498
Australian Logistics Support Group Australian Military Forces Agent Orange Working Group Administrative Review Council Australian Regiment Vietnam Australian Task Force Australian Veterans and Defence Services Council Aus t ralian Veteran's Health Studies Benzpyrene Baden Aniline and Soda Factory Ltd Benzene Hexachloride Baby Hamster Kidney Central Army Records Office Central Intelligence Agency Combined Intelligence Centre, Vietnam Commonwealth Institute of Health Central Nervous System Commander. Australian Force Vietnam Commanding Officer U.S. Military Assistance Command Vietnam Determining Authority Dayton, Ohio Dibutyl Phthalate dichloro- diphenyl - trichloro-ethane Diethyl-m- Toluamide Departmental Medical Officer Dimethyl Phthalate Dimethyl Sulphoxide deoxyribo Nucleic acid Diagnostic and Statistical Manual Department of Veterans' Affairs Dow Chemical Company Electro Encephalographic Environmental Protection Agency (U.S.} Food and Agricultural Organisation
(U.N.} Far East Land Forces
xii
FDA FOI FORS FWMAF HIDAL
HQAFV HQARV !ARC ICD
ICPEMC
JECFA
JMPR
JSP(AS)
JTC JWTC LDO LMO MACV MASF MATTs MCPA
MO MRI NAS NASA
NCI NFLSV
NH & MRC
NIEHS
NIOSH
NLF NOEL NRC
NSAM
NTP oc PAB PAH
PAVN PTSD R and R
RAAF RAAMC
Federal Drugs Association (U.S.) Freedom of Information Act Field Operational Research Section Free World Military Assistance Forces Helicopter Insecticide Dispersal Apparatus
Liquid Headquarters Australian Forces Vietnam Headquarters Australian Regiment Vietnam International Agency for Research on Cancer
International Classification of Diseases International Commission for Protection Against Envi ronment Mutagens and Carcinogens. Joint Expert Committee on Food Additives
(U.N.) Joint Expert Committee on Pesticide Residues (U.N . ) Australian Joint Service Publication,
Pesticides Manual Jungle Training Camp Jungle Warfare Training Centre Local Dental Officer
Local Medical Officer Military Assistance Command, Vietnam Military Assistance Service Fund Mobile Advisory Training Teams Multi-chlorinated phenoxy acids
Medical Officer Mid-West Research Institute National Academy of Sciences (U.S.) National Aeronautics and Space
Administration (U.S . ) National Cancer Institute National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam
National Health and Medical Research Council National of Environment Health
Sciences (U.S.) National Institute of Occupational Safety & Health (U.S.) National Liberation Front No Effect Level
National Research Council (Canada) National Security Council of the United States National Toxicology Program (U.S.) Officer Commanding
Para - aminobiphenyl Polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons Peoples' Army of Vietnam
Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder Rest and Recreation Leave Royal Australian Air Force Royal Australian Army Medical Corps
xiii
RAASC RANZCP
RAR RAR - NZ
RGH RNA RR'I' RSI. RVN SAC SCES SCR SEER
SFO SMO SMR STL STS SVN 'I' AOR 'I'CDD TIFA U.N. U.S.EPA
USAF' USDVA
WAA vvcs VVRC
VVRDB WHO ZUR cadodylic acid dab defense
loc stat
picloram ppm ppt
Royal Australian Army Service Corps Royal Australian and New Zealand College of Psychiatrists Royal Australian Regiment Royal Australian Regiment and New Zealand Combined Battalion (ANZAC) Repatriation General Hospital Ribo Nucleotide Acid Repatriation Review Tribunal Returned Services League of Australia Republic of Vietnam Scientific Advisory Committee (Australia) Sister Chromatid Exchanges Service Classification Record The Surveillance Epidemiology and End Result Program San r'rancisco Senior Medical Officer Standardised Mortality Ratio St. Louis Soft Tissue Sarcoma South Vietnam Tactical Area of Responsibility
Todd Insecticide Fogging Apparatus United Nations United States Environmental Protection Agency
United States Air Force Department of Veterans ' Administration (U.S.) Vietnam Veterans' Association of Australia Vietnam Veterans' Counselling Service Vietnam Veterans Royal Commission - this Royal Commission Vietnam Veterans' Registration Data Base World Health Organisation
Zurich hydroxydimethyarsine oxide p - dimethylaminoazobenzine Department of Defense Location statement
4 - amino- 3,5,6- trichloropicolinic acid Parts per million Parts per trillion
xiv
AGKNOWLEDGEMENTS
To recognise appropriately the many people who
assisted this lnquiry would take more time and space
can be afforded. Many people have made submissions
given evidence. Many others have also given time
effort. The Commissioner records his gratitude to all.
have than and and
Mr Derek Volker. the Secretary of the Department of
Veterans' Affairs and his officers whilst scrupulously observing the independence of the Commission have rendered every assistance and support.
Professor J D Mathews. Principal Consultant, and
Dr Fiona Stanley, Senior Consultant on Reproductive
Outcomes. deserve special mention. They have given time unstint ingly and performed an educative role behind the scenes that has been of inestimable value.
Mr Bryan Meade, the Secretary. has
Commission with great skill and cost
staff selection has been magnificent. administered efficiency.
the His
The secretarial staff richly deserve mention by name.
Ms Valerie Majkus. the Commissioner's personal secretary. has been tireless. Ms Liz Pearce. Ms Sally Miller and
Ms Lesley Diskin contributed cheerfully and efficiently. The team which put the final work on paper Ms Ma j kus.
Mrs Gladys Stahl and Ms Tricia Mohan amazed the
Commission. not only with their competence and their
capacity to work 12 hour days 7 days a week at the word
processors. but especially with their unfailing good
humour under great pressure. Judi Franklin has kept track of our documents despite persistent unrecorded removal from the stacks by Counsel.
Final proof-reading Mr Michael Brown and
commendation.
by Mr
Associate Jeff Rose
Greg also
Harris. deserves
Of its legal team the Commissioner merely says that he got
the professional competence he expected and in full
measure.
XV
"NOTHING IS MORE IMPORTANT TO THE SOUL Ofo'
THE AUSTRALIAN PEOPLE THAN THAT THEY
RECOGNISE CONVINCINGLY THE SACRIFICE Ofo'
THOSE WHO SERVED THIS COUNTRY IN VIETNAM."l
xvi
PROLOGUE
No grievance should ever arise in the
Commonwealth but when complaints are
freely heard. deeply considered. and
speedily reformed. then is the utmost bound of civil liberty attained that wise men look for.
John Milton. Areopagitica
Although Agent Orange was but one of the chemical agents
about which this Royal Commission was concerned. it was
that which. in the main. triggered the Inquiry; that which
undoubtedly has been the greatest cause of anxiety to
Vietnam veterans and their families regarding possible
effects of such chemical agents on them and their
children; and that which has occupied the greatest portion of the Commission's investigative time and deliberations.
The tragedy of the Agent Orange controversy is that
Vietnam veterans were doubly vulnerable.
First. they were raised in the era of environmental
upsurge. when pollution in general and chemicals in
particular were "to blame". The "natural" was better than the "unnatural" and use of the "artificial" or "synthetic"
was said to be heinous. greedy and usually capitalistic
xvii
and multi-national as well. This bias is convincingly if
somewhat over - aggressively rebutted by Edith Efron in "The
l
. 2
Apoca ypt1cs".
Second, conflict had taken its toll on many of them, as it
had on their fathers and their shell - shocked
grandfathers. But their forebears came home heroes, the
conquerors of Kaiser- Bill. Hitler and Tojo: their
wounds, visible and invisible, could be worn with pride.
We sent the cream of our youth, with strong value systems
and a belief in themselves and those values. to Vietnam.
We trained them to kill men. They learnt by necessity to
kill women and children. They saw in the co- incidence of
contest and village home-life (which is guerilla warfare)
and in like fighting like, the futility of the conflict
and of their participation in that conflict.
When they returned to Australia they were ostracized by
many and any sense of purpose in their sacrifice
evaporated.
Is it any wonder that they felt poisoned?
xviii
ENDNOTES
l.
2.
With respectful acknowledgement to the
inscription on the empty tomb of an unknown
soldier of the Vietnam War. Arlington Cemetery, Washington DC, USA.
Efron, Edith, "The
Schuster. NYC 1984.
xix
Apocalyptics". Simon &
CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
1. LETTERS PATENT AND APPEARANCES 1
2. CONCERN OVER CHEMICALS 9
3. HISTORY OF CHEMICAL USE 11
4. THE VIETNAM CONFLICT 16
5. USE OF HERBICIDES IN VIETNAM 21
6. GEOGRAPHY OF VIETNAM 31
7. USE OF INSECTICIDES IN VIETNAM 33
8. THE CONTROVERSY IN THE UNITED STATES 34
9. THE CONTROVERSY IN AUSTRALIA 46
10. THE COMMISSION'S APPROACH 57
ENDNOTES 66
I
INTRODUCTION
1. LETTERS PATENT AND APPEARANCES
On the 13th May 1983. by Letters Patent the
Governor-General appointed me a Commissioner to inquire
into the use and effects of chemical agents on Australian personnel in Vietnam.
The Letters Patent which are entered on Record in Register
of Patents No 18, p 167. were in the following terms: -
THE SECOND, By the Grace of God Queen
of Australia and Her other Realms and
Territories, Head of the Commonwealth: '1'0
THE HONOURABLE PHILLIP GEORGE EVATT DSC,LL.B.
GREETING:
WE DO by these Our Letters Patent issued in Our
name by Our Governor-·General of the Commonwealth of Australia on the advice of the Federal
Executive Council and in pursuance of the
Constitution of the Commonwealth of Australia. the Commissions Act 1902 and other enabling
powers, appoint you to be a Commissioner to
inquire, for the purposes of the exercise and
performance of the powers and functions of the
Parliament and Government of the Commonwealth. into the following matters. namely -(a) the use of chemical agents in the course of
hostilities in Vietnam during the period
commencing on 31 July 1962 and ending at the
1-1
expiration of 11 January 1973, insofar as
they may have affected Australian personnel;
(b) the effects on Australian personnel of
exposure to the chemical agents used; and
(c) the operation and administration of the
Repatriation Act 1920, the Repatriation
(Special Overseas Service) Act 1962 and any other relevant Acts, as applicable to claims by Australian personnel of chemical-caused disabilities: AND, without restricting the scope of your
inquiry, We direct you to inquire particularly
into the following matters, namely -(d) the conditions in which Australian personnel served in Vietnam; (e) the nature, scale, purpose and manner of use
of chemical agents; (f) the periods during which chemical agents
were used, the locations of use, their
subsequent spread and the location from time to time of Australian personnel; (g) the extent to which adequate safety
precautions were taken and the extent to
which adequate action was taken when any
possible harmful effect of chemical agents became known; (h) the toxic properties, resulting from use
separately or in combination, in relation to humans of each of the chemical agents used,
with particular emphasis on, but not limited to, any direct or indirect carcinogenic,
mutagenic, teratogenic or neurotoxic
properties and the extent and duration of
exposure necessary to affect humans; (i) evidence relating to the effects of any
exposure to chemical agents on the mental
and physical health and well - being of
Austral ian personnel and any effects on the mental and physical health and well-being of their spouses; (j) evidence relating to the extent to which
exposure to the chemical agents used has
resulted in congeni ta 1 anomalies among the children of Australian personnel;
I-2
(k) notwithstanding any limitations contained in paragraph (a). the nature and extent of the
safety precautions taken, during the
disposal at any time by or on behalf of
Australia of surplus chemical agents that
were in Vietnam during the period commencing on 31 July 1962 and ending at the expiration
of 11 January 1973:
AND We declare that in these Our Letters Patent -
( 1) the expression "Australian personnel" means any persons, including members of the
Austral ian Defence Force. who were engaged in performing defence service or any other
function for or on behalf of Australia in
Vietnam, whether as employees or otherwise; (m) the expression "chemical agents" includes
any herbicides (including defoliants).
insecticides or chemical irritants; and (n) the expression "Vietnam" means the areas
specified in the First and Fifth Schedules
to the Repatriation (Special Areas)
Regulations in force under the Repatriation (Special Overseas Service} Act 1962:
AND We require you to make such recommendations arising out of your inquiry as you think
appropriate, including recommendations regarding the legislative or administrative changes, if
any. that are necessary or desirable and the
adequacy of present assistance available to
Australian personnel: AND, in particular. We require you to make such
recommendations as you consider appropriate in relation to assistance which any Government
Department may be able to give relating to the
health problems of Australian personnel and the power of a Department to grant, and the adequacy
of the present method of granting, assistance.
with a view to ensuring that Australian personnel receive the full benefit of all available
assistance: AND We direct that, in making your inquiry, you
have regard to any other matters which may appear to you to be relevant to any of paragraphs (a} to
(k) (inclusive):
I-3
AND We further
inquiry, you have the Defence Force reports relating chemical agents:
direct that. in making your
regard to the records kept by
and to published studies and
to the use and effects of
AND We require you as expeditiously as possible to make your inquiry and, not later than 30 June
1984 or such later date as We may be pleased to
fix, to furnish to Our Governor-General of the
Commonwealth of Australia a report of the results of your inquiry and your recommendations.
WITNESS His Excellency the Right Honourable Sir Ninian Martin Stephen, a member of Her
Majesty's Most Honourable Privy Council, Knight of the Order of Australia, Knight
Grand Cross of The Most Distinguished Order of Saint Michael and Saint George, Knight
Grand Cross of The Royal Victorian Order,
Knight Commander of The Most Excellent Order of the British Empire, Knight of the Most
Venerable Order of the Hospital of Saint
John of Jerusalem, Governor-General of the Commonwealth of Australia and
Commander-in-Chief of the Defence Force
Dated this thirteenth day of May 1983.
(Signed
Governor-General
By His Excellency's Command,
(Signed} Prime Minister
These Letters Patent in this script were varied by Letters
Patent dated 27 June 1984. By Letters Patent dated 3
August 1984 the Letters Patent of 27 June were withdrawn
and the initial Letters Patent were confirmed but varied
so as to require reporting by 30 April 1985.
1-4
By Letters Patent dated 23 April 1985 the reporting date
was extended to 31 July 1985.
Mr J S Coombs Q.C., Mr M Kimber and Mr G Ellis were
appointed by the Federal Attorney-General pursuant to s
6FA. of the Royal Commissions Act 1902 (Cwlth) to assist
the Commission.
At its first formal hearing on 14 July 1983 leave was
granted to the following Counsel and Solicitor to appear
for certain chemical companies and associations, namely:
(a) Mr A. Shand Q.C. with Mr D. Officer for Dow Chemical
(Australia) Ltd and for The Dow Chemical Company, an
American Company;
(b) Mr B.S.J. O'Keefe Q.C. with Mr J.M. Stowe for Monsanto
Australia Limited;
(cj Mr McPhee Q.C. with Mr K. Haynes for ICI Australia
Limited and for Imperial Chemical Industries PLC
(London);
I - 5
(d) Mr A. Mcinnes Q.C. with Mr A. Hill and Miss s. Ward
for the Vietnam Veterans Association of Australia
(VVAA) which was claimed by Mr Mcinnes to be, "an
Australia-wide organization of nine thousand members
having a very real interest in the matter before the
Commission";
(e) Mr Lonnie, Barrister and Solicitor of the Supreme
Court of Western Australia on behalf of some four
hundred Vietnam veterans resident mainly in Western
Australia, some three hundred and fifty of their wives
and some four hundred of their children. being members
of the class forming the plaintiffs in the Agent
Orange class action commenced in U.S.A. against
several chemical companies. This class action is
discussed fully later in this Report.
On 12 October 1983 the Commission received a communication
from the Solicitor instructing Mr Shand Q.C. that Dow
Chemical (Australia) and The Dow Chemical Company
no longer wished to take an active part in the proceedings
before the Commission. Thereafter those two companies did
not take any active part in the proceedings other than
lodging a written b . . 1 SU mlSSlOn which dealt with one
chemical only, namely Tordon SO-D which is a registered
trade mark of The Dow Chemical Company of a mixture of
I-6
picloram and 2.4-D, stated to have been developed for use
as a commercial herbicide and to have been registered in
Australia for some twenty years before 1983.
In addition. the Commission received from The Dow Chemical
Company of Michigan. U. S.A. under cover of a letter dated
4 October 1984 signed by Mr Charles c. Carey, Staff
Counsel. Legal Department. a copy of a document entitled
"Final Report on Propellant Combustion Product
Analyses" 2 prepared by liT Research Institute, Chicago,
Illinois in preparation of The Dow Chemical Company's
defence in the American Agent Orange class action.
I t is convenient now to indicate that shortly after the
commencement of the taking of formal evidence on 16
January 1984 the legality and representative status of
WAA began to cause concer·n to the Commission. This
problem is discussed in detail later.
Further, the Returned Services League of Australia Inc .⢠(RSL). had at about the t i me of the announcement of the
Royal Commission made a deliberate decision not to seek
leave to appear before it. The reasons for this decision
(other than media announcements in May- July 1983 3 ) are
unknown but the decision was a disappointment. It had
I-7
been hoped that the Commission would receive full
assistance and helpful advice from this organization in respect of a 11 rna t ters raised by the Terms of Reference
and particularly those raised in paragraph (c).
The RSL, then called the Returned Soldiers and Sailors
Imperial League of Australia, was formed during World War
I following a meeting of soldiers in Melbourne on 6 June
1916. Shortly thereafter. a meeting was held in Sydney.
Membership was open to soldiers and sailors who had seen
service in New Guinea in the early years of that war and
later extended to soldiers and sailors who had fought at
Gallipoli and elsewhere overseas. Boer War returnees were also permitted to join.
In the mid 1920s the name of the organization was changed
to the Returned Soldiers, Sailors and Airmen's Imperial
League of Australia with branches in all States. the name
"The Returned Services League of Australia" being adopted
in 1965.
In 1983. membership of the RSL included veterans who had
seen overseas service in the Boer War. World War I. World
War II, Korea, Malaya and Vietnam. Full membership is now
also open to servicemen who served only on Australian
soil.
I-8
The present total membership of the RSL is some 270,000
including 12,000 Vietnam veterans. 4
Over the years the RSL has had very extensive experience
in assisting veterans with claims for repatriation
benefits and has been a powerful lobby group in respect of
pension rights and the like.
The Commission regrets the non-appearance of this
organization. A document over the signature af the
National President of the RSL, Sir William Keys OBE, MC,
dated 25 November 1983, was forwarded to the Commission
wherein certain suggestions were put forward. This
document although not purporting to be a formal submission
to the Commission, has been accepted and marked Exhibit
1003.
2. CONCERN OVER CHEMICALS
The establishment of the Royal Commission by the newly
elected Labor Government following its election in early March 1983 after some 7 years in Opposition was a response
to increasing controversy over the use of chemical
substances by the United States and its allies, including
I-9
Australia, in South Vietnam. The controversy had reached
its Australian peak during the 1983 election campaign. The VVAA for some years immediately before the election had
been vocal in criticism of what it described as the
Liberal/National Parties ' Coalition Government's
. . . . . . . 1 . 5
procrast1nat1on 1n recogn1z1ng 1ts "JUSt c a1ms."
During the late 1960s and the early 1970s the use of
chemicals in Vietnam had become a matter of intense
political, media and public interest in Australia as well as overseas. It focused at first on riot control agents
and pesticides but amongst pesticides, herbicides came to
be singled out for attention.
Such interest ranged from serious professional concern at
possible environmental and health hazards, through
allegations of chemical warfare, to less responsible
allegations and hysteria. It continued spasmodically
through the mid 1970s until late 1978 when Agent Orange
become a focus of particular interest. Agent Orange, a
50-SO mixture of two commonly used phenoxy herbicides,
2, 4-D and 2, 4, 5-T, was widely used as a defoliant during
the Vietnam conflict. The history of the controversy, both
in the United States and in Australia, is dealt with later
in this Chapter.
I-10
3. HISTORY OF CHEMICAL USE
Chemicals have been used for the control of unwanted
vegetation and for the control of insects for many
decades. As early as 1896 a French viticulturist observed
that wild mustard was selectively killed by a newly
discovered fungicide, Bordeaux mixture . 6
F'or insect control the spraying of toxic liquids using
pumping equipment driven by engines and even thousands of
feet of hose was accepted practice as early as the 1920s
but the expense of such practices led to a drive to
develop aeroplanes as a means of dusting or spraying spans
of trees.
In Troy, Ohio, a 1921 infestation of sphinx caterpillars
inspired the conducting of a series of experiments. These
involved the use of a Curtiss Jn 6 aircraft flying 25 feet
above the treetops at a speed of 80 miles per hour whilst
a crank on a 32 gallon hopper dissipated toxic dust
containing lead arsenate, over and into the trees below.
Six days after the dusting 99\ of the destructive
caterpillars had been killed, the total time taken to
apply the dust being less than 1 minute. The age of the
I-ll
aircraft as a delivery vehicle for agricultural chemicals 0 7
had arr1ved.
In 1926 F.W. Went discovered the first plant hormone,
auxin. This was a naturally occurring hormone but was
identified with indole-3-acetic acid, a chemical which had then been in use as a synthetic product for some time.
A number of other chemical compounds had physiological
properties similar to those of auxin. In the 1940s
related compounds, namely, chlorinated phenoxy-acetic acids were found to possess similar auxin activity but
were selective in their operation, (i.e. they killed some
vegetation and not others), and, accordingly, they proved
extremely useful.
These compounds were 2,4-D and 2,4,5-T. The former became
the most widely used commercial herbicide in the world and
the latter was also widely used, particuarly as a killer
of brush and woody plants which were resistant to
8
2. 4-D. A third important compound also widely used in
the Vietnam conflict was picloram. This herbicide was
discovered later than 2.4-D and 2,4,5-T and is chemically
unrelated to them. However, it resembles them
9
possessing auxin capacity and in its selectivity range.
1-12
in
A general plant k i.ller, cacodylic acid was also used for
military purposes in South Vietnam but this compound does not have the same degree of selectivity exhibited by the
other three.
It is · no surprise that as crop-dusting technology
developed, military interest in its use was awakened. A
study in 1933 10 reveals not only intense interest in
lethal and non-lethal chemical spraying but also that
basic principles for aerial chemical delivery had been
ascertained. These included low altitude, low speed
delivery tactics and also involved assessments of wind.
temperature and convection effects. Guidelines later used
for Vietnam defoliation flights were already foreshadowed.
Nor was military interest to remain theoretical. Hai lle
Selassie complained bitterly to the League of Nations of the "fine death dealing rain" which issued from special
sprayers on groups of . 11 a1rcraft. He was referring to
the Italian 581 bombers whose mustard gas sprayings were
credited with saving the Italians from disaster during the . . . 12
annexat1on of Abyss1n1a.
I-13
During World War II the post mustard- gas attitudes to
chemical warfare substantially prevented the use of
aeroplanes for the delivery of chemicals. Nonetheless,
there was widespread use of DDT by aircraft spraying in a
potent tropical battle against malaria and other
. b d . 13 1nsect- orne 1seases.
In the latter stages of World War II the US Army Airforces
Board conducted experiments and considered as a practical
application of aerial sprays their use for the killing or
14
damaging of food crops.
In Korea the vegetation and tactical situation were not
conducive to the use of aerially sprayed herbicides.
However, 15 place. chemical spraying for mosquito control took
Again, during the Malayan insurgency, primarily in 1953
and 1954, the British used helicopters and occasionally
fixed - wing aircraft, to spray food crops in isolated
gardens tended by the insurgents. Interestingly the
British used sodium arsenite at first but the danger posed to the indigenous population was politically unacceptable
and later a mixture of trioxene and dieselene was used. 16
I -14
Meanwhile during the 1950s and beyond research continued
in the United States into large capacity spray systems.
anti - crop chemicals. aerial delivery techniques and into the military advantages of defoliation in the improving of . . b ' l ' 17 VlSl 1 lty .
At the same time the Special Aerial Spray Flight Unit of
the Tactical Air Command (TAC) was conducting substantial
spray missions, dispensing vector controlling substances
rather than herbicides. but acquiring skills applicable to either herbicide or insecticide delivery. The Unit had its origins in successful anti-malarial campaigns in the
latter days of World War I I . After that war this Unit
sprayed well over a thousand insecticide missions largely
in eastern United States. The spray planes flew special
missions in times of disaster and also tested new
equipment and insecticides. For example, the Unit dealt
with a plague of grasshoppers i n Kearney, Nebraska and
. . l . . 18
also 1nfestat1ons of black f y 1n Ma1ne.
In August 1960 a preliminary conference was held at
Langley in the USA with representatives of the us
Department of Agriculture, TAC, the Army and the Navy in
attendance, to consider the acquisition of spray equipped
C123 aircraft. Although the original planning related to
I-15
vector control, the secondary capacity of the Cl23 as
equipped to deliver vegetation controlling chemicals
l
. 19
became extreme y 1mportant.
4. THE VIETNAM CONFLICT
Following the Japanese surrender on 2nd September 1945 the
British went back into India and Burma. the Dutch back to
Indonesia and the French back to Indo-China. The Truman
Doctrine linked the defence of Europe with collective
security in Asia and stated: 'It must be the policy of the
United States to support free peoples who are resisting
attempted subjugation by armed minorities'.
The post-war climate included the Cold War between Russia
and the West leading to the Berlin Blockade in 1948 and
the Communist takeover in China in 1949. In 1950 the
United States found itself fighting in Asia in the Korean
War. Convinced that the Communists were seeking world
domination, the United States responded by effecting
treaties: in Europe - NATO; in the Middle East - CENTO and
in South-East Asia - SEATO.
France had controlled the Indo- China peninsula since the
19th century. However, an increasing number of Vietnamese
I - 16
wanted no French rule.
people was Ho Chi Minh
had built up a force
The unofficial leader of these
(real name Nguyen That Thanh) who of Viet Minh ( tr. League for the
Independence of Vietnam), particularly in
his support was strongest. Ho was
the north where
a Vietnamese
na t i o na 1 is t : he was also a communist and he believed
Communism was the best alternative for the Vietnamese
people.
The conflict between French colonialism and Vietnamese
nationalism culminated in the Battle of Dien Bien Phu.
Although they were modern and well-trained, the French
forces had been in trouble in the 1950s due to the Viet
Minh blocking their supply lines. Unknown to the French,
the Viet Minh were building up their supplies and fire
power. assisted by substantial aid from Communist China .
Further support came from the many hundreds of willing
helpers, who correctly anticipated that this was to be the
crucial confrontation. A ring of heavy artillery
surrounded Dien Bien Phu and, at 5pm on 12 March 1954, the
Viet Minh commenced firing some 200 pieces of artillery
simultaneously. The French were taken by surprise,
reinforcements were too late and 55 days after the first
attack the Viet Minh overran Dien Bien Plu. It marked the
end of French rule.
I-17
Indo - China had already been divided into the three states
of Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam. Now, Vietnam was
partitioned; the North, where Ho Chi Minh's forces were
strongest. became a Communist state. When a staunch
anti-communist called Ngo Dinh Diem was appointed Prime
Minister of South Vietnam on 7 July 1954, the Americans
gave him support in an effort to prevent South Vietnam
becoming Communist, like the North.
regime were corrupt;
out of touch with a
more importantly,
great number of
Elements of Diem's
his government was
the people. These
people knew that Ho had been the hero against the French
and that he was advocating independence.
At this time Ho was planning his strategy to gain power in
the South. The establishment of a National F'ront for the
Liberation of South Vietnam was announced in Hanoi in
December 1960 with the express aim of ridding the South of
western influence and re-uniting Vietnam .
Elements of the Viet Minh guerilla forces had remained in
the South following the withdrawal of the French. Raids,
previously spasmodic, were stepped up with support from
the North which had the backing of Communist China.
Headquarters were established in the South and these
I-18
forces. which came to be known as Vietcong (tr. Vietnamese
Communists), began to grow by recruiting and training
people from within the villages with the object of
resisting Government forces by the use of guerilla
warfare. Trained and equipped by the Americans, the South
Vietnamese troops endeavoured to locate the guerillas.
However. they were found to be lacking in both their
knowledge of guerilla tactics and enthusiasm.
From the early 1960s the United States, concerned about
the situation then prevailing in the South, sent
increasing numbers of troops to advise and train the South
Vietnamese forces. However, the Vietcong already
controlled large parts of the country and were supported by secure supply lines from the North through Laos, known
as the Ho Chi Minh trail.
When Diem was removed in a coup on 2nd November 1963 by
General Duong Van Minh it seemed only a matter of time
before South Vietnam would fall to the Communists.
Fearing this, President Johnson. who had become President
of the United States following President Kennedy's
assassination, made the decision in 1965 to overtly use
American troops to support South Vietnam against the
I-19
Vietcong. Australia also supplied troops thereby backing
America's support for South Vietnam in a decision best
summed up by the now famous words of the then Australian
Prime Minister, Harold Holt - "All the way with LBJ".
This decision to send troops to Vietnam was not popular
either in the US or in Australia where conscription added 'fuel to the fire'. However, at the time, it was thought
by the US and Australian Governments to be the only way to
save South Vietnam. Furthermore, there was then a fear
that what was happening in Vietnam might occur in other
countries, such as Thailand or Indonesia or the
Philippines, if the United States did not take a strong
stance.
The soldiers who went to Vietnam were well trained and
well equipped and, even though most were too young to have
any combat experience, they learnt quickly. However. as
the r'rench had discovered, they found it a frustrating
conflict in many ways such as the difficulties of
dist i nguishing between innocent villagers and Vietcong. Although it may have been difficult to cope with the
Vietcong on the ground, the allied forces did have command
of the air. Hence the use of aircraft both for bombing
and t he application of chemical agents.
1 - 20
The Commission's function is not to detail the history of
the conflict and the participation of Australian troops in
that conflict. To the extent that such aspects are
relevant to the Terms of Reference they are dealt with in
the succeeding chapters of this Report. It is therefore
sufficient to indicate that the Australian troops
commenced leaving Vietnam in October 1971 and the last
battalion, 4RAR, left on 8 December 1972. The last
American soldiers, eleven marines bearing the American
Embassy flag, departed just before 8 am on 30th April
1975. The Vietcong victory parade was held in Saigon on
7tll May 1975, the twenty-first anniversary of the defeat
of the French at Dien Bien Phu. Ho Chi Minh did not live
to see the victory - he died of a heart attack, aged 79,
on 3rd September 1969.
5. USE OF HERBICIDES IN VIETNAM
When President John Kennedy took office on 20 January 1961
the problem of insurgency in South Vietnam confronted him.
During that year a substantial stepping up of the Vietnam
operation was i_n train. A proposal that a military
"hardware research and development" team go to Vietnam to
explore the feas ibi 1 i ty of the use of various "techniques
and gadgets" received approval. Aerial defoliation was
I-21
later to become one of these as yet unspecified techniques 20 and gadgets.
On 11 May 1961, when the National Security Council of the
United States (NSAM) met, US objectives in Vietnam were
stated to be "to prevent communist domination of South
Vietnam; to create in that country a viable and
increasingly democratic society, and to initiate on an
accelerated basis a series of mutually supporting actions
of a military, politic a 1. economic, psychologica 1 and
covert character designed to achieve this (sic)
. . 21
ob]ectlve."
Defoliation itself was first associated with a decision to
"apply modern technological area - denial techniques to
22
control the roads and trails along Vietnam's borders."
By July 1961 the use of chemical plant killers for
clearing fire breaks along the borders was well in train
and within a few days all the components needed for
extensive defoliation testings were en route to Saigon. 23
The first defoliation test mission was flown along a road
north of Kontum on 10 August 1961 by a Vietnamese Airforce helicopter and the first fixed - wing spray mission was
flown by a C47 aircraft exactly 2 weeks later.
I-22
The South Vietnamese President. Diem. became and remained
a staunch supporter of the defoliation program. It was he
who initially proposed the destruction of crops with
defoliants notwithstanding American apprehension about the politically controlled area of chemical, biological and d . l . l 24 ra 10 og1ca weapons.
The situation in South Vietnam (SVN) continued to
deteriorate with the decline in popularity of the Diem
Government. 'rhe Vietcong controlled provincial capitals
within 55 miles of Saigon as well as most of the Mekong
Delta, and morale amongst SVN troops was at a low level.
In October 1961, a proposal that a major defoliant program
be embarked upon was put forward. The proposal was that
US aircraft conduct this defoliant program although the
aircraft would carry SVN markings and the pilots would
wear civilian clothes. The proposal was also expressed as
one involving the use of hired commercial planes and
pilots presumably to be supplied by the US Central
. ( ) 25 Intell1gence Agency CIA .
The proposal had four goals:
I-23
(a) To strip the Cambodia/Laotian/North Vietnamese border
of foliage to remove protective cover from Vietcong
reinforcements.
(b) To defoliate a portion of the Mekong Delta known as
Zone D where the Vietcong had numerous bases.
(c) To destroy numerous manioc groves which the Vietcong
used as food sources.
(d) To destroy mangrove swamps within which the Vietcong
took cover.
The scope of
the outset
the plan changed from time to time but from
contemplated the use of 2,4-D, 2,4,5-T and
cacodylic acid.
The us Government
responsibility for the public statement that
1 i ves tock or humans.
wished Diem himself to assume
program and to issue a specific
the spray would not be harmful to
Reservations were expressed on the
basis that defoliation alone would be of little use unless
the South Vietnamese forces were able to capitalize on the
resulting lack of cover.
1-24
William P. Bundy, the acting Secretary of Defense for
International Security Affairs recommended that President Kennedy himself be asked to give the final clearance for
26
the program.
Various Departments expressed views about the defoliation
program and in particular its possible propaganda
ramifications but in the result President Kennedy accepted
the joint recommendation of the Departments of State and
Defense on 30 November 1961. and personally approved the
d f 1
. . 27
e o 1at1on program.
This decision, made amongst others at a time of intense
international pressure on many levels, must have seemed at the time to be of little moment. By comparison with the
failing Bay of Pigs, invasion, the Soviet resumption of
atmospheric nuclear tests and the confrontation .over
continued Western presence in Berlin, the defoliation
decision must have seemed the least likely to produce a
raging controversy in the long term.
As well. the President made his decision in the knowledge
that the herbicides to be used had been widely accepted
internationally fo .r agricultural use. Indeed their
outstanding effectiveness had forestalled some gloomy
I-25
earlier predictions of famine and had greatly increased
world farm output.
The wide acceptance of the phenoxy herbicides was a
funclion not only of low application rates but also of
t heir low mammalian toxicity. Their world-wide use (inter
alia in the USA, Scandinavia, Argentina and Australia) had been uneventful for 15 years or more. Production of
2,4 - D, for example, grew from 14,000 pounds in 1950 to
36,000,000 pounds in l96o. 28
Their continuous use in Australia now spans 40 years.
Nonetheless the United States Government's continued
desire to be seen simply as a supporter of the Government
in Vietnam in the herbicide operation is clearly displayed
by its policy directives and perhaps reflects a desire to
d i s l ance itself from possible chemical warfare
allegations. These directives are referred to in detail
in Chapter IV.
It seems that there were five specific features of the
Vietnam conflict which led
herbicides. These were:
I - 26
to the decision to use
(a) Vietnam was covered by jungle.
(b) The Vietcong and the North Vietnamese forces relied
heavily on guerilla tactics involving hit and run
where concealment was an essential component of their
strategy.
(c) Those forces relied substantially on concealed roads,
concealed pathways and encampments that were. because
of the topography. invisible from the air and even
from the ground at close quarters.
and North Vietnamese forces relied (d) The Vietcong
substantially on locally grown food as a component of their war effort.
(e) The United States and other allied forces relied upon
conventional and heavy fire power tactics, avoiding
hand to hand combat notwithstanding the effectiveness
of such tactics when used by Australian troops in both
Malaya and Korea. Conventional tactics are of course
of less effect in the jungle warfare context.
The defoliation program (which came to be known as the
"Ranch Hand" program) had three substantial purposes:
I-27
(a) Offence the removal of vegetation from enemy
controlled or heavi ly infiltrated areas, supply routes and communication lines so as to permit air strike or
ground operations.
(b) Crop destruction so as to remove food sources and
h i nder the establ i shment of permanent camps and large
scale military offensives.
(c) Defoliation for defensive purposes by clearing the
perimeters of allied bases, supply routes and supply
depots and by establishing lines of vision from areas
to be defended.
Although the program never quite lived up to expectations
and indeed was regarded by some observers as a failure, it
nonetheless developed into a massive operation during
1965. 1966 and 1967. In 1962 the Washington Post had
described the defoliation project as "a flop". The
Comb i ned Intelligence Centre, Vietnam (CICV), an
intelligence operation under both Military Assistance _CPmmand, Vietnam (MACV), and Vietnamese Joint General
Staff control. favourably evaluated the defoliation
program noting that in 1965 herbicides had destroyed
enough food to feed about 245,000 people for one year. It
I - 28
also repo.rted that Vietcong prisoners had said that the
herbicide program was a greater problem than any other
weapon used against them. This was confirmed by former
11 . d · f h v·
29
a 1e pr1soners o t e 1etcong.
On the other hand, the program seems also to have led to
uncommitted farmers joining the Vietcong upon destruction
of their farms and Vietcong propaganda was already
stressing the alleged toxic nature of the spraying
materials. For example the National Front far the
Liberation of South Vietnam (NFLSV) Central Committee
published the following statement :
In the past few years, thousands of persons were
killed and hundreds of thousands of others
affected by US toxic chemicals. Recent
prel i minary investigations by the NFLSV Medical Committee and Liberation Red Cross showed that in some localities the number of persons killed by
US chemical poisons had increased 30\. 56\ of
the local population got i ntestinal diseases by
eating poisoned food, and 75\ of them became
consumptive. More barbarous still, US poison
substances have killed fetuses and seriously
affected milk secretion of many mothers and
rendered them unable to feed their babies ....
Moreover from 50-60\ of the draught animals lost vigor and stopped breeding whilst poultry were completely killed . 30
Bearing in mind that 2 , 4-D and 2,4,5-T had been in
continuous and world-wide agricultural use since the
middle 1940s and that. whatever its long-term effects may
I-29
be. it was producing no acute ill-effects on the air crews
exposed to it or upon regular army troops in the allied
camps. such propaganda was to say the least exaggerated.
That such propaganda was res or ted to, perhaps indicates
something about the effectiveness of the defoliation
program.
However. propaganda was not the sole cause for concern
about the safety of herbicides. As early as 1964 the Dow
Chemical Company (Dow) had been forced to cease production
of 2,4,5-T because of TCDD contamination 31 problems. In
1968 a study by Bionetics Research Laboratories funded by
the National Cancer Institute suggested that 2,4,5-T was . 32 . .
teratogen1c. The Un1ted States press publ1shed these
reports and at the same time allegations of increased
occurrences of birth defects in areas sprayed by Agent
Orange were appearing in the media of South Vietnam .
In early 1970 additional experiments confirmed that
exposed pregnant (female!) mice did deliver some malformed
offspring. In that year 2.4,5-T was suspended from
certain applications in the United States. In Vietnam,
however. the last fixed-wing mission actually occurred on
1 January 1971 whilst the last helicopter mission under US
I-30
control was on 31 October 1971. All other allied
herbicide ceased in the same month. 33
It is important to observe that from the mid 1960s on as
the Ranch Hand defoliation program expanded, so did the
level of concern and public comment from the scientific
and the pseudo-scientific community as to the efficacy of
the program and the safety of the particular herbicides
being employed. Issues relating to the use of herbicides
and the exposure of Australian personnel are dealt with in
Chapter IV of this Report.
6. GEOGRAPHY OF VIETNAM
The Republic of Vietnam, with a .population of about 20
million people and a varied terrain, lies between 8 and 17
degrees North latitude and between 105 and 110 degrees
East longitude. The coastal and deltic plain is bordered
by the South China Sea and the Gulf of Siam and consists
mainly of swampy and mangrove-covered areas with salty,
brackish water, freshwater swamps and jungle.
inland are foothills, mountains and plateau areas.
Further
The climate has two distinct seasons, the dry and the
wet. From about April-May until September the wet monsoon
I-31
blows westerly out of the Gulf of Siam and across South
Vietnam to the South China Sea. In September or October
the wind changes and blows easterly out of the South China
Sea with some southerly element bringing the dry.
Temperatures are fairly constant at about ao°F (±10°)
but with a humidity of between 80 and 90\. Annual
rainfall averages between 50 and 60 inches.
The Australian Tactical Area of Responsibility (TAOR)
under the First Australian Task Force (1 ATF) was the
Phuoc Tuy province which is towards the south. The first
Australian Logistic Support Group (1 ALSG) provided
support and was based on the southern coast at Vung Tau.
Headquarters (HQARV) was based in what was then known as
Saigon. now Ho Chi Minh City.
Both Phuoc Tuy province in general and Vung Tau in
particular had substantial indigenous populations living ⢠in villages of varying size. Many diseases were endemic in Vietnam: they included malaria, mono - nucleosis
(glandular fever). a range of venereal diseases including
some with a degree of anti-biotic resistance (e.g.
lympho-granulomar-venereum) and worm diseases. Tropical
rashes were common.
I-32
Australian troops serving in Vietnam were prophylactics against diarrhoea as well provided with as for water
sterilization. Immunization regimes included tetanus, smallpox. typhoid, poliomyelitis, hepatitis B and bubonic
plague.
An anti-malarial regime including mite repellents,
personal insect repellents and aerosol insecticides became
essential.
7. USE OF INSECTICIDES IN VIETNAM
Aircraft insecticide missions authorities as imperative
were
and
regarded by medical
all missions were
recommended by the Australian medical authorities and
authorized by the Commander. 1 ATF. The Senior Medical
Officer during the establishment of the 1 ATF camp within Phuoc Tuy province. at Nui oat, was Brig William Rodgers,
who gave evidence at the Exposure hearings of the
Commission. His evidence is dealt with fully in Chapter
IV of the Report.
The aircraft spraying was substantially performed by the
us Air Force. The insecticide chosen was malathion, which
I-33
is more fully considered in the Exposure chapter of this
Report.
The spraying, whether done by Australian troops or
Americans. was monitored by Australian medical authorities
who ensured that the insecticide was reaching its target
and measured biological indicators to gauge effectiveness.
In addition to malathion, pyrethrins and DDT were used but
allegedly always with the permission of a hygiene officer
or an NCO according to rules for personal protection.
8. THE CONTROVERSY IN THE UNITED STATES
The North Vietnamese and the Vietcong had from the
earliest days of the defoliation program denounced it as chemical warfare. They had also widely disseminated
allegations about health effects in general and birth
d f
. . 34
e ects 1n part1cular.
From 1965 some Americans (substantially though not
exclusively people otherwise opposed to the war) became
increasingly vocal their opposition to the defoliation
program. This opposition was expressed particularly by
I-34
scientists concerned with the long-term ecological
consequences of a massive defoliation program.
For example, in 1966 Arthur Galston, Professor: of Biology
at Yale University tried to persuade the American Society of Plant Physiology to protest to President Johnson about
the herbicide progr:am. 35
In February 1967 Doctors John Edsall and Matthew Meselson
were the driving force behind an anti-chemical petition to
President Johnson signed by over 5000 scientists including 17 Nobel Prize winners. 36
On 13 September 1967 the American Association for the
Advancement of Science (AAAS), over the signature of
President Don Price, wrote to the Secretary of Defense,
Robert McNamara, outlining the Academy's concerns and
recommending thorough scientific investigation.
A direct result of this initiative was the commissioning
by the Department of Defense of a comprehensive report on
herbicides from the Mid-West Research Institute (MRI) . . 37
based 1n Kansas C1ty.
I-35
That 1967 report was prepared independently of Government
and came to the following conclusions about the
defoliation program:
(1) The direct toxicity hazard to people and animals
on the ground is nearly non-existent;
(2) The destruction of food and wildlife habitat will probably affect wildlife's survival more than any toxic effects of the herbicides;
(3) The application of Orange and White alongside of
rivers and canals or even the spraying of the
water surface itself at the levels used for
defoliation. is not 1 ikely to ki 11 the fish in
the water:
(4) Food produced from land treated with herbicides
will not be poisonous or significantly altered in nutritional quality; if residues of a more
persistent herbicide such as picloram should
carry over to the next growing season, it would
retard plant growth rather than concentrate some toxic residues in the crop;
(5) Toxic residues of these herbicides (Orange, White and Blue) will not accumulate in the fish and
meat animals to the point where man will be
poisoned by them: and
(6) The primary ecological change is the destruction of vegetation and the resulting ecological
succession in the · replacement of this
vegetation.38
This authoritative report, containing as it did good news,
received little publicity and therefore did little to
allay the fears.
In response to further agitation by the AAAS, the
Department of State sent Dr Fred Tschirley, a Department
I-36
of Agriculture specialist to Vietnam. He conceded that
the conditions then prevailing made a thorough
investigation difficult. 39
Meanwhile, the North Vietnamese and their then Chinese
allies were promoting an international clamour to stop the use of herbicides. Even the allied South Vietnamese were
b
. 40
ecom1ng restless.
The us Embassy in Saigon felt it necessary to make a
statement in September 1968 referring to the work of an
inter-agency committee which had recommended the
continuation of the program on the basis of the saving of
SVN and us lives. 41
Nonetheless, the AAAS continued to agitate although its
membership was by now far from united.
Doctors Egbert Pfeiffer and Gordon Orians, members of
AAAS, visited Vietnam and gave a full account of their
mission describing the devastating effect of defoliation
on Vietnamese ecology whilst conceding the military value . 42
of the exerc1se.
1- 37
Up to this point the opposition was confined to ecology.
There was however:, a reliable scientific basis for: some
concern on health grounds.
Before the defoliation program began, the chemical
industry was well aware of the existence in 2,4,5-T of the
contaminant dioxin, TCDD. It was also aware of the highly
tox i c nature of this compound.
An accident in the Monsanto works at Nitro, West Virginia,
i n 1949 had been studied by Dr Ray Suskind, Head of the
Department of Environmental Health at the University of
Cincinatti. Those exposed to TCDD in that event were the
subject of interest.
As early as 1952 Monsanto had warned the Army at Edgewood
43
Arsenal of the toxic by-product. A Hercules internal
memo of July 12, 1965, revealed knowledge within the Dow
empire of the toxicity of TCDD.
Dr Suskind's investigations ultimately indicated that
although initial symptoms of fatigue, irritability, loss
of libido and appetite and some liver function test
anomalies appeared, there were no long-term signs or
symptoms other than persistent chloracne. Chloracne is a
I-38
quite distinctive skin disorder, said to be the hallmark
of exposure to TCDo . 44
There had also been accidents involving exposure of
workers to dioxin in Ludwigshafen, FRG in 1953 and in
Amsterdam in 1963. 45 Little was commonly known about
the aftermath of those events.
What caught the media's imagination however, was a study
funded by the National Cancer Institute which suggested
that 2,4,5-T was teratogenic in rats and mice. It should
be noted that this study involved the application of
dosages of between 4.6 mg/kg body weight (bw) to 113 mg/kg
bw to pregnant female rats and mice in the early days of
h
. . 46
t e1r pregnanc1es.
The report of this study in the US national press in 1969
coincided with rumours and media reports from South
Vietnam suggesting a dramatic increase in birth defects in
rural areas and citing US herbicide use as the cause.
Photographs of human babies w.i th gross deformities were . . . l . 47
also 1n w1de c1rcu at1on.
The Executive Office of Science and Technology on 29
October 1969 announced restrictions on the use of 2,4,5-T, . 48
to areas remote from populat1on.
I-39
A Defense team under Dr Robert Cutting found no support
for suggestions of malformation amongst the
Vietnamese. 49
An independent Commission appointed by AAAS consisting of
Arthur Westing. John Constable, Matthew Meselson and
Robert Cooke. (respectively, a Professor of Botany at
Wyndham College in Vermont; Professor of Surgery at
Harvard Medical School; a Harvard University Geneticist
and a Graduate student in Ecology in Yale), reported an
i ncrease in stillbirths, spina bifida, cleft palate, just
over half of which were said to come from Saigon (which of
course was not sprayed). As will be seen 50 later, the
material upon which the views of this Committee were based
was inadequate for conclusions to be drawn and in any
event suggested increases to stillbirth and malformation
rates much lower than those known to be universal where
records are properly kept.
Whatever the validity of the process, the combination of
the Bionetics Research Laboratory Report (1968) 51 and
the Vietnamese material was sufficient to lead to the
cessation of herbicide use in Vietnam. Agent Orange was
banned in April 1970 and in February 1971 the herbicide
program was officially abandoned. 52
I-40
In September 1971 all stocks were returned to the us to
find thems'elves ultimately, perhaps even incredibly,
disposed of by shipping to Johnston Island, where they
were later (1977) destroyed by high temperature
incineration.
Between 1970 and 1978 at an ecological level the debate
bubbled away. The US Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA) sought to have 2,4,5-T withdrawn from the market and
Dow was significantly successful in court actions brought
against it because of the lack of any scientific evidence
of harmfulness. 53
At the United Nations the "ecological" warfare debate
continued. 5 4
In March 1974 The National Academy of Science published
its report, "The Effects of Herbicides in South
V . 55
1etnam". This report took up the Vietnam data about
birth defects and other health consequences including
chromosomal damage but the whole question of health
effects and birth defects remained quiescent.
In particular there were no claims on the U.S. Veterans'
Administration for chemically caused disabilities. Nor
I-41
were there claims in respect of birth defects. More
particularly known to be
there were
consequent
no claims for
upon TCDD
porphyria cutanea tarda and chloracne .
the disabilities
exposure. namely,
Tha of the Agent Orange controversy should be
contrasted with the normal epidemiological process.
Epidemiological progress is often made by the observation
of a particular syndrome or set of symptoms and signs
associated with a particular exposure.
observer to deduce cause and effect:
leading a trained
to be tested by
proper scientific inquiry. It involves an intuitive but
deductive leap from a number of particular cases to an
hypothesis for testing.
The Agent Orange controversy was this process in reverse.
One man ascribed his cancer to being sprayed with Agent
Orange. Others then ascribed a huge range of other
disabilities to the same cause.
In June 1977 one Maude de Victor, a counsellor employed in
the Chicago office of Veterans' Administration (US),
received a telephone call from the wife of Charles Owen .
Owen and his wife were convinced that his cancer had been
caused by a chemical which he had sprayed in Vietnam. He
I-42
had been a member of the US Airforce for about 24 years.
Shortly after his contact with Ms de Victor, Owen died .
Ms de Victor, herself a cancer sufferer in remission,
pursueo Mrs Owen's claims to appeal following Owen's death
and the initial refusal of a pension.
She "called up" information from a computer terminal about
cancer victims who had served in Vietnam. She found what
seemed to her to be a large number of cancers.
She also closely questioned veterans about their herbicide
exposure. Between June and October 1977 she became
convinced not only that Owen was correct about the cause
of his cancer but also that Agent Orange caused a wide
variety of disabilities amongst Vietnam veterans and she prompted such veterans to file claims for compensation,
the first in October 1977.
Her usage of computer facilities to ascertain details of
cancer cases was not iced by her superiors and, since she
was neither medically nor in any other way qualified to
look at individual files for general or research purposes,
her order for the files was cancelled. This she took as
evidence of a cover-up and she began a personal
I --43
56
crusade. Not surprisingly, the Veterans'
Administration responded by requiring medical support for
the veterans' claims.
Maude de Victor approached the local television channel
and over the next few months Bill Kurt is put together a
documentary called, "Agent Orange - Vietnam's Deadly F'og",
first played in Chicago on 23 March 1978 and thereafter
receiving national coverage.
The history of the Agent Orange controversy in the United
States from this point on is dominated by the conduct of a
class action in that country. The history of that
litigation and the issues involved are dealt with fully in Chapter XI of this Report.
So successful was the Kurtis film that the US national
press took up the cry and a veri table flood of "Agent
Orange claims" resulted.
In April 1978 the VA called together a group of
consultants to advise on the herbicide question and a
number of meetings were held between July and September of
that year so as to evaluate the current knowledge about
phenoxy herbicides . Brochures were prepared for the
I-44
guidance of doctors and staff setting out the biological
act ions of ·the herbicides used during the conflict and a
spec i al registry was established for veterans who believed
that they had been exposed to Agent Orange.
F'ree. elaborate medica 1 examinations were 57 Vietnam veterans. More than 150,000
availed themselves of this opportunity.
offered to such
veterans have
The results of
all these examinations have been retained in what is known as the "Agent Orange Registry".
By October 1978 publicity, which had reached a very high
pitch. resulted in a Congressional hearing before the
Medical Facilities and Benefits Sub- Committee of the
Veterans Affairs Committee of Congress.
In April 1979 an inter-departmental committee, called the
Advisory Committee on Health-Related Effects of
Herbicides, was chartered. It met quarterly from June
1979. This Committee includes representatives nominated by
Government, Veterans' organisations and the academic
community.
However. the concern of the Press. of veterans and of
Congressmen has continued unabated until the present day.
I - 45
9. THE CONTROVERSY IN AUSTRALIA
In August 1978 the magazine, "Rolling Stone", published
within Australia, included an article by Howard Kohn
called, "The Poison Harvest: Agent Orange, A Vietnam
Legacy".
This article reported much of the Kurtis film, quoted Ms
De Victor and emphasized the us cases.
The birth defect story was taken by the Sydney Sun Herald
of 29 October 1978 under the heading, "Vietnam War Victims
Are Still Being Born".
The first public claimant of the Agent Orange syndrome in
Australia was Bernard Szapiel. a publicist, who stated in
a press interview reported in the Heidelberg (Victoria)
"Voice", 25 April 1979,
after reading newspaper that he had diagnosed himself
58
reports. The Brisbane Sunday
Mail of U March 1979 published a highly emotive report
quoting the American lawyer, Victor Yannacone.
From November 1979 on, the Australian newspapers more or
less continuously ran stories under such headlines as.
"Agent Orange Got Me Says Vietnam Veteran"; 59 "Soldiers'
I-46
Babies Death at Birth"; 60 "Agent Orange Father An Angry
61
Man"; "Agent Orange Ruined My Life"; 62 "The Agent
Orange 63 Horror"; "Life Hell For Agent Orange
V . . 64
1ct1m"; "Spraying To Kill"; 65 "Shock Report On
A 0 B b
. 66
gent range a 1es"; "Orange For Danger. The Deadly
Joke"; 67 "Agent Orange Cause Deformity"; 68 "Veterans
Tell Of
70 Hades"; Ill d D f . 69 ness an e orm1 ty"; "The Agent Called
"Agent Orange Veteran Faces .Life of
71 72
Agony"; "Agents of Deformity and Death".
In December 1979 the first meeting of Australian Vietnam
veterans concerned with the Agent Orange question took
place. This was in Melbourne and it was attended by
Bernard Szapiel. Clyde Holding (now the Federal Minister
for Aboriginal Affairs but then the MHR for Melbourne
Ports), a representative of 73 the RSL and John Evans who
later became "scientific adviser" to WAA.
On 10 January 1980 a meeting was held in New South Wales
at the Castle Hill RSL and at that meeting John Evans
spoke as did the Queensland lawyer. Bill McMillan. There
was media coverage.
Shortly after a similar meeting was held at the Park Royal
Hotel in Brisbane and during the months that followed
I-47
meetings occurred in Adelaide. Perth and Darwin. These
were also given substantial media coverage emphasizing
Agent Orange. The idea of a national body was mooted.
On 23 March 1980 "Sixty Minutes" sensationally reported on
national TV an "epidemic" of birth deformities supposedly
caused by Ranch Hand herbicides.
In May 1980 a meeting of "representatives" from
Queensland, Victoria. Australian Capital Territory (ACT)
and New South Wales was held at West Pennant Hills, an
outer suburb of Sydney. Phillip Thompson of NSW and Holt
McMinn of Victoria (later resident in ACT) who was
described at that meeting as the "National President",
were present.
As Mr Thompson has been active in Vietnam veterans'
affairs since at least 1980, a brief reference to the
roles he has played within various Vietnam veterans'
a s s o c i a t i on s i s rna de . During the early part of 1980 he
was a committee member of the Vietnam Veterans'
A
. . 74
ssoc1at1on of New South Wales.
In the latter part of 1980 and early 1981 Thompson held
himself out as President of the Vietnam Veterans'
I-48
Association of New South Wales. On 5 March 1981 Mr McMinn
as "National President" of WAA wrote to Mr Thompson
referring to hi.m as "President, Vietnam Veterans'
Association of Australia, New South Wales Branch". The
minutes of a so-called "National Congress of WAA" held in
Canberra on 2 and 3 May 1981 lists those attending. In
addition to two representatives with voting rights from the New South Wales Branch, namely, Messrs Elphick and
Bratt, Thompson's name is shown as "President, New South Wales Branch but present representing Northern Territory
Branch (i.e .⢠claiming proxy voting rights for two absent
Northern Territory delegates)". At this meeting 14
"representatives" voted and elected Thompson "National
President" of WAA. the vote being 10 for. . 75 4 aga1nst.
He has held himself out as National President of VVAA
since May 1981 claiming to have been re-elected each year
at so-called "Nationa 1 Congress" meetings. It is clear
that he is the person who actively instructed Counsel
appearing on behalf of VVAA before the Commission. It was
he who frequently gave media interviews on behalf of WAA
during the currency of the Commission.
John Evans and the Queensland lawyer McMillan were also
present at the May 1980 meeting of the "National Congress"
I-49
of VVAA. McMillan was promoting the US class action and
encouraging Australian veterans to become involved in it.
His motives were suspected by, inter alia, John Evans and
Phillip Thompson. and an alliance developed between these two.
As appears
76 ·the later, 1980 meeting agreed to meet
aga i n in 1981 but no positive formal decision was taken as
t o the form tha t any national body of Vietnam veterans
wo uld take. No minutes of the 1980 meeting have been
produced to the Commission.
In or about August 1980, 77 Thompson with the assistance
of Evans, put together a brief for the opinion of Mr
T.E.F . Hughes QC wherein action against the Commonwealth
was suggested.
Although Hughes advised that common law action was
possible against the Commonwealth in the High Court, a
claim pursuant to the Repatriation legislation was put in
t rain. This application was made in 1980 by a New South
Wales cancer victim, Colin P. Simpson. whose widow pursued
the claim after his death . The application alleged that
Simpson's cancer resulted from exposure to toxic chemicals
during service in Vietnam. The widow ultimately succeeded
I-50
by the
(l920)78 operation which the
of s 47 of
Repatriation the Review
Repatriation Act Tribunal in its
determination pointed out placed a heavy onus on the
Commonwealth to disprove her entitlement to the claim
79
beyond reasonable doubt.
After a meeting between Thompson and the then Minister for
Veterans' Affairs, Mr Adermann. in a VIP room at Sydney
Airport in early 1980, the Commonwealth Institute of
Health (CIH), an academic institution within the
University of Sydney (and constituting that University's
School of Public Health). was commissioned by the then
Government to investigate Agent Orange claims . A special
independent unit known as the Australian Veterans
Herbicide Studies was set up within the Institute to
conduct the investigations. Thompson had at that time
promised veteran co- operation with that unit.
During 1981 the scope of the investigation was broadened
so as to enable an examination of all aspects of Vietnam
service and the title of the unit was accordingly changed
to the Australian Veterans Health Studies (AVHS). The
unit originally intended to conduct three studies, a birth defects study, a mortality study and a morbidity study.
I - 51
This program had been agreed to in principle by the then
Coalition Government.
The study into birth defects was carried out and the 1983
report thereon is discussed in detail later in this
80 Report.
The mortality study which commenced in 1981 was finalized
tn 1984 during the currency of the Commission. This
. 1 d. . 81 report 1s a so 1scussed later here1n.
A protoco1 82 for the morbidity study was prepared late
. . 83 .
1n 1982 and a p1lot study was conducted 1n 1982/1983.
The pilot study report dated July 1983 was not published
in print-run form until about March 1984 but a copy of the
report was made available to the Commission shortly after
July 1983.
Before the change of Government in March 1983 the
Coalition Government varied its decision in respect of the
morbidity study.
Instead of the full morbidity study as advised by AVHS,
only a neuro- psychiatric study was authorized, the
question of a full morbidity study being left to be
I-52
considered after the completion of that study. Although
the neuro-psychiatric study had been put in train before
the commencement of this Commission, limited progress had
been made by that time. On the setting up of the
Commission. the study was effectively put on "hold" by
AVHS.
I n e a r 1 y J u 1 y 1 9 8 3 , the Co mm i s s i on , a f t e r cons u 1 t a t i on
with experts in various fields, decided that a full
morbidity study should be conducted if a proper and
thorough inquiry was to be carried out. Accordingly. a
request was made to the Government that such a study,
under the control of the Commission, be funded.
some twelve months of prevarication and delay,
request was refused. Correspondence between
After
this the
Government and the Commission in this regard is set out in
Chapter VI of this Report.
Reverting to the 1980 meeting between Mr Adermann and
Thompson, certain information had been offered to the
Minister which resulted in Dr Fleming. a doctor within the
Department of Veterans' Affairs (DVA) and John Evans
getting together and discussing the basis upon which John Evans supported chemical claims. This produced, in August
I-53
1980, a document later called by some the "Fleming
84
Report". This document is discussed in Chapter XIV.
Meanwhile members of the various veterans' associations
throughout Australia had fallen out and disputes developed
between VVAA and the DVA over various matters including
the "Fleming 85 Report". Doubt also arose as to VVAA's
future co-operation in the epidemiological studies to be
conducted by AVHs. 86
Senator Messner became Minister for Veterans' Affairs on 3
November 1980. Early in 1981 he went to the United States
to investigate the Agent Orange question.
Although lobbying by Vietnam veterans for a Royal
Commission began as early as December 1980, it would
appear that within the various Vietnam veterans'
associations within Australia dissension had developed not
only between associations but between members within
particular associations. Such conflict was in respect of at least three contentious matters. namely;
(a) Australian Vietnam veterans' support for and
participation in the U.S. class action claiming
damages against chemical companies arising out of the
use of chemical agents in Vietnam;
I-54
(b) the possible liaison and co - operation of a proposed
body of Vietnam veterans with the RSL; and
(c) whether further: support should be given to the
epidemiological studies being carried out or to be
carried out by AVHS during 1981- 1982.
Documents produced to the Commission by WAA which are
relevant to these topics and which throw significant light
on the degree of dissension and on the factions then
within veterans associations within
discussed later in this Report. 87 Australia are
A meeting of a so- called "national congress" of WAA which
was held in Canberra on 2 and 3 May 1981 discussed
proposals as to the aims and objects of a proposed
national association. Draft Articles of Association for a suggested corporate structure for that association were
considered by so- called "representatives" from certain
States. Further, questions of ways to give assistance to
veterans generally and to members particularly (especially
with their DVA claims) were canvassed as were ways of ·
acting as a lobby group seeking public acceptance of the
Agent Orange thesis and the setting up by the Government
of a Royal Commission.
I - 55
However. the mooted national association was not in fact
then, nor at any time since May 1981. incorporated or
registered under any Federal or State legislation. Any
such incorporation or registration would have required the
filing of a constitution and/or rules. An examination of the minutes of the 1981 meeting and other documents
furnished by VVAA show that in fact no rules have ever
been agreed to by those persons said to
national association.
make up the
Accordingly, membership of such a
it is difficult to see how an association known as
"Vietnam Veterans 1 Association of Australia" could have
validly functioned since May 1981. This problem is
discussed later in Chapter XII.
Tn any event, lobbying for a Royal Commission was carried
out by Thompson throughout 1981 and 1982. An
investigation by the Senate Standing Commit tee on Science
and the Environment which produced a report in November
1982 entitled "Pesticides and the Health of Australian
88
Vietnam Veterans" did · not result in any decrease in
such lobbying and it continued right up until the 1983
elections. Indeed, certain members of Vietnam veterans 1 associations campaigned against sitting Coalition
Government candidates in marginal electorates. It is
claimed by Thompson that he and his Vietnam veteran
I-56
friends were instrumental in bringing about the change of government.
10. THE COMMISSION'S APPROACH
'l'his Commission embarked upon its task with little
relevant experience to guide it.
At the very outset Counsel Assisting sought advice and
guidance from WAA' s scientific adviser, John Evans. A
full day was spent in conference with him in the presence
of Senior Counsel for VVAA. A large body of literature
was referred to and lists of documents upon which VVAA
would rely were provided. At the same time a lengthy
presentation of Evans' views was given. He had. of
course, already given evidence before the Senate Standing
Committee on Science and the Environment and the
Commission was in general terms aware of his opinions as
to certain chemical agents and their possible effects.
'l'he Commission also sought the assistance of veteran
groups in the United States.
At that time the lawyers appearing for the Vietnam
veterans in the US Class Action advised against sharing
I - 57
material with the Commission. However statements of
relevant documents filed by the e xperts and Plaintiffs in other that action were obtained from the us
Department of Justice.
As welL the data bases of the Department of Health, of
DVA and of the Sydney University's School of Public Health
(CUI) were searched. Access to "Medline" (the world-wide
computerized medical data service) was obtained and thus,
h opefully, all literature relevant to the issues became
available.
Additionally, contact was made with the World Health
Or ganisation (WHO), The International Toxicology Forum, US
Ve terans' Adm i nistration, and relevant health authorities
in the us. Canada, the UK, Sweden and New Zealand.
The US Government made available to the Commission the
full resources of the Agent Orange Working Group (AOWG), an Inter- Departmental Committee formed under the auspices
of t he Administration and answerable directly to the White
House.
Having gathered the material the Commission embarked upon
a comprehensive self-education program. This involved
1 - 58
reading closely a large amount of scientific and other
material frdm all over the world. Extensive consultations were held with appropriate experts including
epidemiologists. toxicologists, physicists, physicians and
chemists. The result was a plan of action, summarized in
the Opening Address of Counsel Assisting on 6th December
1983. 89
It became apparent to the Commission that a deal of
scientific research had been and was being conducted in
Vietnam on health consequences of herbicide exposure in
general and birth defects in particular. This research
had culminated in a symposium held in Ho Chi Minh City in
January 1983. Although participation in that symposium by
some Australians was contemplated, that participation in
fact did not take place. The symposium was, however.
attended by a number of Americans with some scientific
qualification and, in particular, John Constable and
Samuel Epstein who have been most active politically in
the Agent Orange controversy in the United States.
In view of the relevance and significance of the
Vietnamese studies. one of the Counsel Assisting, Max
Kimber. was sent to Vietnam in December 1983. At the
conclusion of that visit it was clear that a thorough
1-59
examination of the scientific basis of the Vietnam studies
was essential i.f the Commission's work was to be credible
and complete. This was particularly so in a context of
ill - informed and at times sensational public commentary.
Accordingly, the Commission travelled to Vietnam in early
March 1984 with Counsel Assisting and a panel of
scientific advisers to make a detailed examination of all the relevant studies . A report from those scientific
advisers forms part of Exhibit 1422. This visit also
enabled thorough understanding of the cross-examination of
reviewers of the Vietnamese data, in particular, Dr
Alistair Hay.
In view of the vast amount of research being undertaken in
the United States on matters relevant to the Commission,
an advance party consisting of
John Coombs Q.C . , and the
Senior Counsel Assisting,
Commission's principal
scientific adviser, Dr. John Mathews, was sent to the
United States in late February 1984.
This trip was proposed because it was not possible for
some experts to come to Australia to give evidence and, in
any event, / to bring all the experts to Australia would be
much more expensive than to v i sit them. Dr. Alvin Young,
I - 60
for example, was
consult with the
evidence. This is
permitted by the U.S. Government to
Commission, but not to give public
a general U.s. Government attitude to
its scientific employees.
The on-going literature review also revealed that reliable
scientific research work was continuing on various
industrial and ace identa 1 exposures to relevant chemical agents (and, particularly, the contaminant dioxin)
throughout Europe as well as the U.S. Accordingly, Graham
Ellis, one of the Counsel Assisting, was sent to interview 13 scientists in Europe; to obtain from them the most
up-to-date research papers written on the numerous
industrial and accidental exposures; and to make an
assessment as to the possible value and feasibility of
bringing a small number of those scientific experts to
Australia to give evidence. Ellis was also directed to
attend, en route to Europe, the opening day of the U.S.
Vietnam veteran Class Action in New York City on 7 May
1984.
Subsequently, in September and October 1984, the
Commission visited Amer lea and Europe. Evidence from Dr
Lennart Hardell of Sweden and Dr Alan Smith of New zealand
was taken in San Francisco as both were at that time
I-61
located at the University of California, Berkeley.
Hearings were also conducted in St Louis, Missouri, and in
Dayton, Ohio.
In England an informal hearing with Sir Richard Doll was
held at Oxford whilst evidence was taken at formal
hearings in Zurich, Switzerland (Dr Larsson) and Rome,
Italy (Dr Bruzzi). In Rome the Commission was also able
to hold an informal discussion with Professor Pocchiari in
the presence of Counsel Assisting and Counsel representing
Monsanto and VVAA.
The balance of the time of the visit was devoted to
consultations with appropriate experts in many fields both
in America and Europe.
The formal hearings of the Commission were divided into
various topics. The first of these hearings was a four
week session on the topic of Exposure which commenced in
January 1984. Chapter IV of this Report is devoted to
that topic. It is important to note that the various
chapters of this Report dea 1 not only with the evidence
presented at the forma 1 hearings but also with the other
work of the Commission in those areas.
I-62
Subsequent topics (and their location in this Report)
include Toxicology, (Ch V); Cancer (Ch VIII); Birth
Defects (Ch VII); Mortality (Ch X); and Health Effects (Ch
VI).
A consideration of the Terms of Reference relating to the
conduct of DVA and current repatriation legislation, not
being appropriate for formal hearings, was dealt with by
way of investigation with both DVA and VVAA having the
opportunity to contribute. The results of this
investigation are contained in Ch XIV of this Report.
In the course of the Inquiry it became apparent that the
Vietnam Veterans Counselling Service was playing a
significant role in meeting the needs of Vietnam
veterans. Accordingly, a session was held involving
counsellors from each State attending the Commission on 12th and 13th December 1983. This topic is also discussed
in Ch IX and XIV.
Obviously, the health of Australia's veterans of the
Vietnam conflict could be adversely affected by a variety
of factors.
of whether
health of
In order to reach a conclusion on the issue
chemica 1 agents were having an effect on the
such veterans it was necessary to consider
I-63
whether there were other explanations. One such
explanation was that of Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder
(PTSD) or war neurosis. Formal hearings on this topic
were held in September 1984 and Chapter IX of this Report
is directed to that topic and the alleged neurotoxic
effect of chemical agents.
In addition to the formal hearings of the Commission.
informal hearings were held throughout Australia. The
results of these informal hearings are dealt with fully in Chapter VI of this Report which represents a useful
picture of the feelings of many Vietnam veterans .
In the course of these informal hearings and throughout
the life of the Commission many inquiries were received in
relation to the United States Class action. Accordingly, a Chapter of this Report deals with the history and issues
involved in that litigation and its subsequent
settlement. 90
As indicated earlier, the legality and representative
status of WAA caused concern to the Commission. Chapter XII deals with these and other related matters. including
the role played by its "scientific adviser", John Evans.
I-64
The conclusions and recommendations of the Commission are
contained in Chapter XV.
I-65
ENDNOTES
1. Exhibit 934.
2. Exhibit 1926.
3. See, for example, Sydney Morning Herald 19 March
1983. 16 & 17 May 1983; I llawarra Mercury (NSW)
17 May 1983; Canberra Times 3 July 1983; The Age
(Melbourne) 4 July 1983.
4. Exhibit 1003.
5. For example: "The Case for a Royal Commission",
Debrief December 1982.
6. Buckingham "Operation Ranch Hand". u.s.
Government Printer 1982 pp 195.
7. Downs et al, "The origins of Crop Dusting"
Agricultural History Vol 39, No 3 (July 1965) pp
123-135.
8. NAS Report supra, 11-1.
9 . Ibid.
10. Air Corp to Chemical Warfare Technical Committee,
"Dispersion of Chemicals from Aircraft, October 2, 1933".
11 . A speech to the League of Nations quoted in Time,
13 July 1936, p 6 referred to in Buckingham,
supra.
12. Neal, Edward J.,"Gas stopped Ethiopians" AAP
dispatch 1936, Buckingham supra.
13. Schreuder et al "Spraying of DDt from Airplanes"
The Air Surgeons Bulletin Volume 2 No 3, March
1945 pp 67-68, quoted in Buckingham, supra.
14. Report, Army Airforces Board, Orlando FL "Marking
and Defoliation of Tropical Vegetation" 18
December 1944.
15. P 4, Buckingham, supra.
16. "The Accomplishments of Air Power in the
Malaysian Emergency", Maxwell, Air University, May 1963, p 57.
I-66
17. Wright Patterson AFB, "Engineering Study on a
Large Capacity Spray System for Aircraft" 3 June 1952.
18. r.umpldn. John I. and Konopnicki, Mary "Military
Air Spray Operations. 1946-1960". Discussed by Buckingham. supra.
19. Minutes. Cl23 Aerial Spray System Preliminary
Planning Conference, 29 August 1960 .
20. Rostow, Walt W .⢠Memo to the President, 12 April
1961.
21. NSAM No 52 May 11. 1961.
22. NSAM No 52 Memo Task Force Draft. Subject: "A
Program of Action to Prevent Communist Domination of South Vietnam". pp 4 and 5.
23. Status Report on the Presidential Program for
Vietnam as of 21 July 1961, 15 August 1961.
24. Reference Book for the meeting with the Secretary
of Defense, 8 October 1962.
25. Message 23 September 1961. referred to in Joint
Chief of Staff Minutes 2343/197, 14 February 1963.
26 . Bundy, William P. Memo, to SECDEF, Subject:
Defoliant Operations in Vietnam, 14 November 1961.
27. NSAM No 115, Subject: Defoliant Operations in
Vietnam 30 November 1961.
28. Peterson, G. E.. 1967 "The Discovery and
Development of 2,4-D" Agricultural History Volume 41. pp 243-253.
29 . Ch I I I & IV. Buckingham. supra.
30. Collins C.V. "Herbicide Operations in S.E. Asia,
July 1961 - June 1967". H.Q . Pacific Air Forces,
San Francisco, 1967.
31. Exhibit 906.
1-67
32. Bionetics Research Laboratories, Inc. 1968.
Evaluation of carcinogenic, teratogenic and
mutagenic activities of selected pesticides and industrial chemicals. Submitted under contracts PH 43-64-57 and PH 43 - 67-735 with the National
Cancer Institute . Available from National
Technical Information Service, Document Number PV-223-159.
3 3. NAS supra.
34. Collins, C.V. "Herbicide Operations in
South-East Asia", supra, Chapter 1.
35. Hay, Alistair "The Chemical Scythe", Chapter 7
refers to a personal interview on 11 January 1979. 36 . Petition to President L.B. Johnson, 14 February
1967.
37. Exhibit 101.
38. Ibid p 207.
39. Exhibit 206 pp 779-786 .
40. A Technology Assessment of the Vietnam
Defoliation Matter. DOD, 8 August 1969, p 48.
41 . Ibid p 49.
42. Pfeiffer and Orians, "Mission to Vietnam" ,
Scientific Research 9 June 1969, 23 June 1969. 43. Presidential Scientific Advisory Committee's
Report to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. May 9, 1963 .
44 . Exhibit 1550.
45. IARC Working Group Report, Lyon, Conference June
1978.
46. US National Technical Information Service
Document Nos PB-223-159, 160, 161.
47. u.s. NAS. "The Effects of Herbicides in South
Vietnam" Part B. Working Papers: Economic
Stress and Settlement Changes. Thomas, William L. Washington, NAS, 1974: Exhibits 703, 903.
Chapter 7, p 53, quoting the Newspapers Tin Sang, and Chinh Luan.
I-68
48. Statement by Lee Du Bridge, 29 October 1969,
Office of Science and Technology.
49. Cutting et al "Hydatidiform Moles and Stillbirths
in RVN 60-69" US Government Printing Office 1970.
50. See Ch VI I "Birth Defects."
51. Bionetics
supra 32. Research Laboratories, Inc. 1968.
52. DOD Background Report on Herbicide Operations in
South Vietnam, April 1971.
53 . See 1980 Pre-Hearing Brief FIFRA Docket No 415 et
seq.
54. Swedish Prime Minister, Olaf Palme, June 6, 1972,
Plenary Session UN Conference on the Human
Environment.
55. Exhibits 703 and 903, supra .
56. Yannacone, Victor personal communication to
Senior Counsel Assisting, March 1984.
57. Shepard, Barclay: personal communication to
Senior Counsel Assisting, October 1984.
58 . Although a force in the controversy and present
at early VVAA meetings, Szapiel's original claim for a pension (which was granted) (See File
MSS2883) never mentioned chemicals or Agent
Orange. He ascribed his incapacity, namely
nausea, nervous tens ion, giddiness. lack of
energy, to heavy combat engagements on Operation "Capital" when his best friend was killed. A
determination had been made on 27 November 1978, four months before Mr Szapiel's self-diagnosis!).
59. The Australian, 14 December 1979.
60. Sunday Telegraph (Sydney), 16 December 1979.
61. The Australian, 17 December 1979.
62. Melbourne Sun. 20 December 1979.
63. Sunday Telegraph (Sydney), 23 December 1979.
64. Sunday Sun. 23 December 1979.
I-69
65. Penthouse, January 1980.
66. The Australian, 3 January 1980.
67. Melbourne Herald, 5 January 1980.
68. Adelaide Advertiser, 7 January 1980.
69. The Age (Melbourne), 8 January 1980 .
70. The Sun (Melbourne), 9 January 1980.
71. West Australian Daily News, 10 January 1980.
72. Sunday Times, 13 January 1980.
73. See Ch XII "The Role of John Evans."
74. Exhibit 1962. (See application for registration by
an as soc ia t ion of that name under the Chari table
Collections Act 1934 (NSW) lodged in August
1980. It is interesting t o note that the
Certificate of Registration dated 7 August 1980 issued under that Act shows the full name of the
registered association as "Vietnam Veterans '
Association". Search of the public records under that Act shows no change of name as late as 9 May
1985).
75 · See Ch XI I "Status of VVAA."
76. Ibid.
77 . Either as a Committee man or as President of the
New South Wales Vietnam Veterans Association.
7fJ · Section 47 of the Repatriation Act 1920 is set
out and discussed in Ch II "Standard of Proof." .
See also Ch XIII.
79. 5 January 1982, Repatriation Tribunal
Determination, Reasons for Decision. 80. Exhibit 1248. See Ch VII.
81. Exhibit 1761. See Ch X.
82. Exhibit 901.
I-70
83 . Exhibit 1927.
84. Exhibit 893.
85. See Press Release by Mr Adermann dated 30
September 1980. See also Ch XII "Status of VVAA."
86. See statements of
September 1981 and Messner's statement out in Ch XII.
Phillip Thompson dated 8
25 October 1981 and Senator
dated 18 September 1981 set
87. See Ch XII "Status of VVAA."
88. Exhibit 1448.
89. Transcript at pp 16-71.
90. See Ch XI.
I-71
CHAPTER II
STANDARD OF PROOF IN THE
DETERMINATION OF FACTS IN ISSUE
1. INTRODUCTION
2. RELEVANCE OF REPATRIATION LEGISLATION
3 . RELEVANCE OF EPIDEMIOLOGICAL STUDIES
ENDNOTES
1
5
17
27
CHAPTER II
STANDARD OF PROOF IN THE
DETERMINATION OF FACTS IN ISSUE
1. INTRODUCTION
The Executive direction "to inquire" creates a context
different from party and party litigation. In
investigative Royal Commissions, of which this is one,
there is no party who will "lose" if he fails to discharge
the "onus" upon him to prove something to some defined
standard.
As well. in such inquiries,
a wlda-ranqinq manner and
produced by those
the Tribunal informs itself in
from many sources other than
l
given leave to appear. In
the present Inquiry a huge pool of background information
is available in addition to the oral evidence and the
documents tendered.
Further, the context may suggest in such an inquiry that
the Executive wishes to know not only that which is found
to be probably so, but also that which may possibly be so .
II-1
In the Communism Commission (1949) Mr Justice Lowe said:
[I) should not treat the matters investigated
before (me) merely as a piece of litigation
between par.t.ies in which findings should be made on the evidence in favour of one party or the
ol:her.. but as matters in which the Executive
desires to know, not merely what I find proved by
the evidence, but also what the evidence does not
satisfactorily determine and which I think may
nevertheless be possibly true.2
I t was such considerations that led Hallett to say, "For
mos t inquiries it is satisfactory that the standard of
proof should be flexible". 3
But to say that the standard of proof is flexible is not
t o say that it is irrational nor that a Tribunal such as
t his can be guided by anything other than standard common
law rules. For these rules have their own flexibility.
Professor Wigmore in his "Treatise on the Law of Evidence"
said:
Tn civil cases it: should be enough to say that
the extreme caution and the unusual positiveness of persuasion required in criminal cases do not
obtain. But it is customary to go further, and
here also to attempt to define in words the
quality of persuasion necessary. It is said to
be that state of mind in which there is felt to
be a "preponderance of evidence" in favour of the
demandant's proposition. Here, too, moreover, this simple and suggestive phrase has not been
II-2
Such
allowed to suffice; and in many precedents sundry other phrases- "satisfied", "convinced", and the lik:e have been put forward as equivalents and
their propriety as a form of words discussed and
sanctioned or disapproved, with much waste of
judicial effort."4
a statement clearly countenances a degree
flexibility in the civil requirement.
of
Dixon J (as he then was) said in Briqinshaw v. Briqinshaw
(1938) 60 CLR 336 at 361. "No doubt an opinion that a
state of fact exists may be held according to indefinite
gradations of certainty".
In the Bread Industry Commission (1949) Judge Stretton
said. "A Royal Commissioner may inform himself by whatever means he chooses. He does not act as a judicial officer.
deciding the matters in issue between contending parties
and arriving at the decision to which he is led by a
preponderance of probability. His function is that of an
inquirer seeking truth. Insofar as the rights of persons
may ultimately be affected by legislative or other action
taken upon his findings, he will impose upon himself the
5
duty to be satisfied only upon convincing proof."
The Commission holds that the standard of proof of any
fact in this Inquiry is the normal civil standard. It
II-3
must feel. as Dixon J. put it, "an actual persuasion of
i t s occurrence or existence before it can be found"
6
The
a ff irmative of an allegation must be made out to the
Co mmission's reasonable satisfaction.
That great common lawyer continued:
But [easonable satisfaction is no t a state of
mind t hat is attained or established
independently of the natu[e and consequence of
t he fact O[ facts to be proved. The seriousness
o f an allegation made. the i nherent unlikelihood o f an occurrence of a given description, or the
g[avity of the consequences flowing from a
pa rticular finding are considerations which must affect the answer t o the question whether the
i ssue has been proved to the reasonable
satisfaction of the Tribunal. In such matters,
'[easonable satisfaction' should not be produced by inexact proofs, indefinite testimony, or
indirect inferences. (emphasis added) 7
Later His Honour said:
It is often said that such an issue as fraud must
be proved 'clearly', 'unequivocally', 'strictly' O[ 'with certainty'.... This does not mean that
some standard of persuasion is fixed intermediate between the satisfaction beyond reasonable doubt [equi[ed upon a criminal inquest and the
[easonable satisfaction which in a civil issue
may , not must, be based upon a preponderance of
p[obability. It means that the nature of the
1ssue necessa[ily affects the process by which
reasonable satisfaction is attained.a
It will be seen then that the Commission regards the civil
standard as having some flexibility and it will apply the
II-4
principles set out above in deciding all questions of fact in this Inquiry.
2. RELEVANCE OF REPATRIATION LEGISLATION
It follows, however, from the
standard, that the con text in
very
which
flexibility of the
this Inquiry takes
place must not be left out of account. A number of the
issues which are posed
material, are issues
by the evidence and the background
of causation which arise in
consequence of allegations of untoward health consequences
resulting from exposure to chemicals during the war-like hostilities in Vietnam.
Those people who might have been exposed were members of
the Forces, as defined in the Repatriation (Special
Overseas Service) Act, 1962. Untoward health consequences
resulting from an occurrence that happened during a period of service overseas would entitle such a member to
repatriation benefits as last mentioned statute thereof which apply
Repatriation Act 1920
a result of the operation of the
and in particular ss 6 and 7
particular provisions of the
to claims brought by Vietnam
veterans. In those circumstances the repatriation context cannot be ignored.
II-5
Those sections are as follows:
6 (l) Upon the incapacity or death of a
member of the Forces whose incapacity
or death has resulted from an
occurrence that happened during a
period of special service of the member (including the contracting of a disease during such a period), the Commonwealth is, subject to this Act, liable to pay
to the member, to the dependants of the
member or to both, as the case may be,
pensions in accordance with Division l of Part III of the Repatriation Act as
applied by the next succeeding section.
7 ( l) Subject to this Act, the provisions of
Division l of Part III (other
sections 24, 42, 44 and 54)
sections 114. 114A, 119. l20A, 120B 121 of, and the Schedules to,
Repatriation Act extend relation to-(a) members of the Forces
meaning of this Act; and
to and
within
(b) the dependants of those members.
than and and the
in
the
Pr lor to l January 1985 the procedure for making a claim
was contained in ss 24AA and 24AB of the Repatriation Act 1920 which was as follows:
24AA. (l) A claim for pension -(a) shall be in accordance
approved form; and
with the
(b) shall be accompanied by such
available to the claimant
considers may support the claim.
II-6
evidence as he
24AB
( 2)
( 1)
Sub--sec t ion ( 1 )
impos i nq any onus of proof on a
claimant. (emphasis added)
Where a claim for pension is lodged
with the Department. the Secretary
shall cause an investigation to be made into the matters to which the claim
relates.
(2) Subject to any direction of the
Commission under sub-sect ion ( 2) of
section 27, the Secretary shall, after
completion of an investigation under
sub- section (1) in relation to a claim,
cause the claim to be submitted to a
Board for its consideration and
determination.
(3) A claim submitted to a Board or to the
Commission for its consideration and
determination shall be accompanied by-(a) any evidence furnished by the
claimant in support of the claim;
and
(b) all the records and other
documents relevant to the claim
that are under the control of the
Department, together with a report of the results of the
investigation in relation to the
claim carried out under
sub-section ( 1) .
Subsequent to 1 January 1985 the relevant section has been
s25. Relevant sub- sections of that section read:
25 (1) A claim for pension -
(a) shall be in accordance with a form
approved by the Commission;
11-7
(b) shall be accompanied by such
evidence available to the claimant as he considers may support his
claim; and
(c) shall be made by forwarding the
claim to the Secretary at an
address of the Department together with any evidence in support of
h i s claim referred to in paragraph
(b) .
(2) Sub- section (1) shall not be taken to
impose any onus of proof on a claimant
or to prevent a claimant from
submitting evidence in support of his
claim subsequently to the mak i ng, but
before the determination, of his claim . (emphasis added)
Pr i or t o 1 January 1985 s 24AB obliged the Secretary of
the De partment to cause an investigation to be made into
t h e matters to which the claim relates. When that
i nve stigation was concluded, the claim together with the
e v i dence furnished by the claimant, the relevant
d e partmenta 1 records and a report of the results of the
inv e stigation was to be submitted to a Repatriation Board
or to the Commission as the case may be for determination
wh e ther the incapacity arose out of or is attributable to
his war service (s. 27(1)). An appeal lay to the
Co mmission from any determination by a Board (s . 28).
Co rrespond i ng provisions after 1 January 1985 are ss 28
and 29 which are as follows :
II-8
28 (1) Where a claim is made for a pension in
29
accordance with sub- section 25(1), or an application is made for an increased pension in accordance with sub- section 26(1) or for a pension under
sub-section 26(2). the Secretary shall cause an investigation to be made into
the matters to which the claim or
application relates.
(2) The Secretary shall. upon completion of his investigation in respect of a claim
or application, cause the claim or
application to be submitted to the
Commission for its consideration and
determination.
(3) A claim or application submitted to the
Commission under sub- section (2) shall be accompanied by -
( 1)
(a) any evidence furnished by the
claimant or applicant in support
of the claim or application; and
(b) all the records and other
documents relevant to the claim or application that are under the
control of the Department,
including any evidence or
documents relevant to the claim or obtained in the course
of the investigation of the claim
or application under sub- section ( 1) .
It is the duty of the Commission -
(a) in considering a claim or
application submitted to it, to
satisfy itself with respect to. or
to determine. as the case
requires, all matters relevant to
the determination of the claim or
application; (b) to assess, from time to time. the
rates of pensions of members of
the Forces and their dependants,
Il-9
and determine the dates of the
commencement and those pensions; cessation of
(c) to determine, in such cases as the
Commission deems proper, that
payment of pension shall be
suspended and fixing the date of
any such suspension; and
(d) to determine the date
re-commencement of a pension has been suspended.
of
that
(2) In this section, 'pension' does not
include service pension.
Hea ring and determination of claims lodged with the
Co mmi ss ion between June 1977 and 31 December 1984 were
d ete rm i ned by the Board, the Commission or the
Re pa t riation Review Tribunal (after March 1979) in
acco rdance wi t h s47(2) or s107VH(2), as the case may be,
wh i ch sub-sections were effectively in the form as amended
r e spec t ively by s 12 of Act No. 56 of 1977 (which
amendment came into effect on 16 June 1977) and s 26 of
Act No. 18 of 1979 (which amendment came into effect on 28
March 1979).
Prior to 1 January 1985 that section read:
47 (1) The Commission, or a Board, in hearing.
considering, determining or deciding a claim or application, and the
Commission, in hearing. considering or deciding an appeal -
Il-10
(a) is not bound
legal forms or
and
by technicalities, rules of evidence;
(b) shall act according to substantial
justice and the merits and all the
circumstances of the case, and,
without limiting the generality of the foregoing. shall take into
account any difficulties that, for any reason, lie in the way of
ascertaining the existence of any fact . rna t t e r , cause or
circumstance. including any reason attributable to -(i) the effects of the passage
time, including the effect of
passage of time on
availability of witnesses; or
of
the the
( i i) an absence of. or a deficiency in,
relevant official records,
including an absence or deficiency resulting from the fact that an
occur renee that happened during
the service of a member of the
Forces was not reported to the
appropriate authorities.
(2) The Commission or a Board §hall grant a
claim or application, and the
Commission shall allow an appeal,
unless it is satisfied, beyond
reasonable doubt, that there are
insufficient grounds for granting the claim or application or allowing the
appeal. as the case may be. (emphasis
added)
This standard and onus ot proof was carried over to claims
reviewed (prior to l January 1985) by the Repatriation
Review Tribunal (s107VH(2) of the Repatriation Act) and
since 1 January 1985 by the Veterans Review Board
(s107VG(3)) .
I I - ll
Am e ndments made to s47(2) by s21 of Act No 97 of 1984
wh i ch came into effect on l January 1985 are not relevant
to the present discussion. Those amendments did not alter
re l e vant words in s47(2). But radical amendments were made
to s47(2) on 6 June 1985 by sl6 of Act No 90 of 1985,
whi c h apply to determinations made after 6 June 1985 of
c laims lodged on and after 15 May 1985 (see s69 of Act No
90 o f 1985). The June 1985 amendments are discussed later
i n th i s Report in Chapter XIII.
Anyone considering the question of both the standard and
t h e o nus of proof required in the determination of a claim
fo r a pension under the Repatriation Act lodged between
June 1977 and 15 May 1985 unhindered by authority might
we l l have thought that the key words in s47 were the words
" i nsufficient grounds" in ss(2).
Th e June 1977 amendment to s47(2) has been described as "a
pi ec e of legislative legerdemain" (sleight- of - hand). 9
Obviously, if there are no grounds, then there must be
i nsufficiency and the Board or Commission would clearly be
s atisfied beyond reasonable doubt that there are
i nsufficient grounds for granting the claim. But it was
i n claims where there were some apparent grounds that
difficulties arose.
II-12
This was particularly so in cases of claims of incapacity
or death r.esulting from a disease of unknown aetiology,
such as cancer. In such cases mere speculation as to the
cause of the disease sometimes tended to be accepted as a
"sufficient ground." There were those who were of the
view that as a consequence of s47(2) of the Act prior to 6
June 1985
presently,
granted.
read in
s25(2)),
conjunction
such a claim
with s24AA( 2),
should always
(or
be
This, so it was argued, was because the claimant bears no
onus of proof at a11 10 and the Board or the Commission
could never be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the
disease was not caused by or aggravated by overseas
service. Accordingly, so it was said, the Commission could
never be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the claim
should be rejected.
But s47(2) prior to 6 June 1985 did not provide that the
Commission disprove any fact necessary to establish
entitlement. The Board or the Repatriation Commission was directed to grant a claim unless a certain state existed,
namely, that there were insufficient grounds for granting
the claim. Where the determining body was satisfied
beyond reasonable doubt that any fact necessary to
I I-13
e s t ablish entitlement did not exist then the claim would
not be accepted.
In this Commission's view, mere speculation alone could
n e v e r be a ground (within the meaning of s47(2)) for
gran t ing any claim. As a consequence, the body determining
a c laim for incapacity or death resulting from a disease
o f u n known aetiology where there is no evidence at all as
to t he possible causes of the disease would necessarily,
as a ma tter of law. be required to determine that there
we re insufficient grounds for granting the claim.
BuL this Commission,
p r ovided for under
considering an appeal
prior t o 6 June 1985,
like any of the determining bodies
the Repatriation Act or any Court
from a decision of such body was.
bound by the decisions of the High
Co u rt o f Australia in The Repatriation Commission v. Law
(1981) 147 CLR 635 and The Repatriation Commission v .
0' Brien ( 1985) 59 ALJR 363. In the joint judgment of Gibbs
CJ, Wilson and Dawson JJ in the latter case at pp 367 and
368 those Justices indicate that the exposition contained
i n the join t judgment of Keely and Fitzgerald JJ of the
F'ederal Court of Australia appealed from should be
a ccepted, (subject to two qualifications). as reflecting a
proper understanding of the legislative intent with
II - 14
respect to the granting of pension claims under the
Repatriation Act. That Federal Court judgment is reported in (1984) 1 FCR 472.
The views (if any) expressed in this Report on "cause and
in respect of chemical-caused incapacity are
expressed after consideration of all the material before
the Commission but in the knowledge that science is a
progressing discipline. They are expressed in an effort to
be helpful to those charged with the administration of the
repa tria tion sys tern and conscious that on a case to case
basis this Commission's findings (given as they are on
general propositions and allegations) may be less helpful
than one might have hoped. In view of the so-called
sunset clause inserted into the amending Act No 90 of 1985
( s72), such
enunciated by
case in mind.
views are expressed with the principles
the High Court in Law's case and O'Brien's
So, where an allegation of relevant outcome has been made
by WAA. the Commission, if it is not satisfied that such
allegation has been proved in accordance with the civil
standard. may observe, (when it feels it is able and
should), that circumstances are such that it is satisfied
beyond reasonable doubt that the allegation is
II-15
. . . lll
tanc 1tu ; or as having no reasonable hypothesis to
s uppor t or that it is satisfied beyond reasonable
do ubt that there are insutf icient grounds for accepting
. 13
the allegat1on.
However, in situations where the Commission does make such
o bse rvat ions, iL must be remembered that those
obs e rva tions are to be qualified by the phrase "on the
material available and the evidence before the
Co mmission".
I t should be added however that such material and evidence
i s qu ite comprehensive. I t must also be remembered that
neither individuals, nor DVA nor the Commonwealth of
Au stral i a were represented before the Commission (although
DVA had observers present throughout the Commission ' s
public hear i ngs) so that any expressed views of this
Co mm ission are not of course binding on parties to any
c la i m brought under the Repatriation Acts.
Fur t her, the Commission considers that it should have
r e gard to the sections of the Repatriation Acts relevant
t o the question of the onus and the standard of proof when
c onsider i ng what recommendations it might make.
II-16
3. RELEVANCE OF EPIDEMIOLOGICAL STUDIES
Another important influence or contextual rna t ter bearing
upon standard of proof is the epidemiological nature of
the causation aspects of this Inquiry.
The case for WAA. in a nutshell. is that exposure to
chemical agents in Vietnam has and is causing illnesses
amongst veterans and birth defects amongst their
children. This is classically an epidemiological case.
Epidemiology is concerned with the patterns of disease
occurrence in human populations and the factors that
influence those patterns. The results of an epidemiologic
investigat i on may show a statistical association between a disease and an exposure or risk factor. The usual
criteria for inferring that such an association is causal include the following:
(a) The statistical strength of the association;
(b) The occurrence of a dose response relationship (the
response is proportional to the dose of risk factor or
exposure);
I I-17
(c) Observation that a decrease in an exposure is followed
by a decrease in the frequency of the disease;
{d) The temporal sequence of the relationship (i.e., the
risk factor or exposure almost always precedes the
outcome or disease);
(e) The consistency or reproducibility of the association;
(f) The specificity of the association; and
(g) The biological plausibility of the association.
Support for a causal association is the stronger as more
of these criteria are met.
The relationship of the risk factor and the disease are
expressed in a number of ways: absolute risk, relative
risk, odds ratio, and attributable risk.
That these are different things is important and that
absolute risk and relative risk are very different things
is critical in the standard of proof context.
II-18
By way of example, the annual incidence of lung cancer
amongst white Americans who smoke is approximately 1 per
1000 persons. That is if you are a smoker you have one
chance in 1000 of contracting lung cancer. However, the
proportion of lung cancer attributable to smoking is close
to 85\. The relative risk of developing lung cancer is 10
. . k . k 14 t1mes greater 1n smo ers than 1n non-smo eis.
Thus, even though a white American smoker does not have a
50.1\ or greater probability of acquiring lung cancer, it
is more probable than not that smoking is a cause of lung
cancer.
Toxic tort litigation has not reached proportions in
Australia similar to those pertaining in the United
Statâ¬s. Accordingly the very difficult problems that
small absolute risks combined with even substantially
increased relative risks have not yet exercised our
appellate courts.
Three American cases give important insights into the
difficulties of applying routine standard of proof notions to epidemiological cases.
II-19
In Green v American Tobacco 15 Company relative risk was
disregarded in favour of an emphasis on absolute risk.
The case was based upon a claim by Mr Green that he had
contracted lung cancer as a result of smoking the
defendants company's cigarettes for 56 years and that the
defendant, the manufacturer, should be held 1 iable on the
grounds of a breach of implied warranty of fitness of the
product.
The Court ruled in favour of the defendant. Although
there was much conflicting epidemiological and laboratory
testimony from numerous experts the trial judge found and
the Court of Appeal later affirmed that the plaintiff died
from lung cancer caused by smoking the named cigarettes.
However the Appeal Court ruled that the manufacturer was
not liable because the majority of persons who smoke
cigarettes do not develop lung cancer and because persons who have never smoked cigarettes may acquire the disease.
A powerful dissenting judgment pointed to the absurdity
that if a manufacturer had manufactured a million cans of
tinned meat, and one tin contained botulism, and that
killed only 4 or 5 people, would he have escaped
liability? Why then should the manufacturer of cigarettes escape because his product only kills a sma 11 proportion
of those who choose to smoke the manufacturer's cigarettes.
II-20
The Court in that case seemed t o rule that the plaintiff
was a "special case" rather than accepting the deductive
logic of statistical inference.
In another case, Bethlehem Steel Company v The Industrial
A . d c . . 16 cc 1 ent omm1 ss 1on , 10 employees working in Bethlehem
Steel San Francisco Ship Building Yard claimed that they contracted kerato conjunctivitis whilst working. The
Company did not dispute that there was a epidemic of the
disease amongst its employees 280 cases in 13,000
employees but argued that there was an epidemic
throughout the San Francisco area.
Th i s was rebutted since statistically there would have had
to have been 14,000 cases amongst the 700,000 living in
Sa n Francisco i.f the epidemic was city-wide.
Ophthalmologists' evidence was tha t there were
cons i derably less. The Court on appeal ruled in favour of
the employees.
A third case was Reyes
. 17
v Wyeth Laboratories . A young
child living in Mission, Texas, developed poliomyelitis 2
weeks after receiving a vaccine from the County Health
Department. The father. as plaintiff. alleged that the
illness was the result of the vaccine.
II-21
Eight epidemiological and laboratory experts called by the
defendant gave evidence that the virus which caused her
illness was probably the epidemic "wild" virus strain and not a vaccine virus strain. Those witnesses included
experts from the American Academy of Pediactrics and the
Co nference of State and Territorial Epidemiologists.
The sole witness for the plaintiff was the attending
phys i cian. He testified that it was probable that the
c h i ld acquired poliomyelitis from the vaccine. The child
recovered damages and was successful in the Appeal Court.
In this particular case the evidence of the attending
physician was accepted and indeed it seems that the trial
judge refused even to thoroughly instruct the jury on the
no t ion of relative risks and the relative risk of the
vaccine causing the disease as opposed to the risk of the
wild strain which was epidemic at the time . Rather, he
l eft the question baldly as "Whose evidence do you
accept?" 18
The difficulty may be expressed in this way. If 100
people in every 10,000 1 i ving within a certain area get
the disease, purple foot, in any event, whereas if 150 of
every 10,000 people who work in tin factories within that
II-22
ar:ea get pur:ple foot, the odds are still 2:1 against any
tin factor:y employee's fac tor:y exposur:e. How
disease being caused
can it then be said
by his
that on
tin the
balance of pr:obabi l.ities his tin factory exposure caused
his purple foot?
Logically, he ought to be compensated
r:isk of suffering purple foot - namely,
if his damages total $10,000 then
recover only $3333.3 in a successful
employer. the owner of the tin factory.
for the increased
33 1/3\. So that
perhaps he should
action against his
The Commission raises these matters at this stage simply
to "flag" what it per:ceives as a vexed problem in this
Inquir:y as well as toxic tort litigation generally.
Epidemiology has laid down bases or rules which can be
used to derive biological inferences about the
relations hip be tween a factor and a disease. These were
stated by Professor Alfred A.S. Evans in a formal way as
follows:
1. The prevalence rate
significantly higher of
in
the disease should be
those exposed to the
hypothesized cause than in controls not so exposed
II-23
(the cause may be present in the external environment
or as a defect in host responses).
2. Exposure to the hypothesized cause should be more
frequent among those with the disease than in controls
without the disease when all other risk factors are
held constant.
3. Incidence of the disease should be significantly
higher in those exposed to the cause than in those not
so exposed, as shown by prospective studies.
4. Temporally, the disease should follow exposure to the
hypothesized causative agent with the distribution of
incubation periods on a log-normal-shaped curve.
5. A spectrum of host responses should follow exposure to
the hypothesized agent along a logical biologic
gradient from mild to severe.
6 . A measurable host response following exposure to the
hypothesized cause should have a high probability of
appearing in those lacking this response
exposure (eg, antibody, cancer cells) or
before
should
increase in magnitude if present before exposure; this
II-24
response pattern should occur infrequently in persons
not so ·exposed.
7. Experimental reproduction of the disease should occur
more frequently in animals or man appropriately
exposed to the hypothesized cause than in those not so
exposed ; this exposure may be deliberate in
volunteers. experimentally induced in the laboratory,
or demonstrated in a controlled regulation of "natural
experiment" exposure.
8. Elimination or modification of the hypothesized cause
(or of the vector carrying it) should decrease the
incidence of the disease (e.g. control of polluted
water. removal of tar from cigarettes. killing
mosquito larvae).
9. Prevention or modification of the host's response on
exposure to the hypothesized cause should decrease or
el i minate the disease (eg, immunization. drugs to
lower cholesterol. specific lymphocyte transfer factor
in cancer).
10. All of the relationships and findings should make
. . . . . 19
b1olog1cal and ep1dem1olog1c sense.
II-25
The mere statement of these criteria points up the
futility of generalization such as that contained on page 9 of the initial submissions of VVAA which baldly states:
The submission is that a very large
toxic chemicals were used in Vietnam. these could cause illnesses.20
number of
Any one of
Accordingly, the Commission, when deciding questions of
fact, will apply the principles referred to in respect of
the civil standard of proof, remembering that such
standard is flexible. So that, in reaching a decision as
to whether a particular issue has been proved to the
reasonable satisfaction of the Commission, it may be that
such dec is ion might reflect relevant epidemiological
findings in accordance with the epidemiological principles
referred to.
II-26
ENDNOTES
l.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
See The Bread Industry Commission Report 1949 pp 5 and 6.
Communism Commission Report, 1949, p 7.
Hallett. L R. Royal Commissions and Boards of
Inquiry. Some Legal and Procedural Aspects. The Law Book Company Limited, Sydney, 1982, p 164.
Wigmore "Treatise on the Law of Evidence" 2nd Ed . (1923) Vol 5, section 2498
Bread Industry Commission Report. (1949) p 5
Briqinshaw v. Briginshaw (1938) 60 CLR 336 at 361.
Ibid. at p 362
Ibid at pp 362-3.
The Repatriation Commission v. O'Brien (1985) 59 ALJR 363 per Brennan J. at p 369 .
10. The Repatriation Commission v. Law (1981) 147 CLR
635 per Murphy J. at p 640.
ll. Law's case (1980) 147 FLR 57 at 68 (Full Court of
the Federal Court of Australia)
12. O'Brien's case (supra) per Brennan J at p 369.
13. Ibid per Gibbs CJ, Wilson and Dawson JJ at pp 367.
14. Exhibit 1959 pp 1197 - 1224.
15. 409 F 2d 1166 (1969)
16. 135 p 2d 153 (1943)
17. 498 F.2d 1264 (1974).
18. Shades of Hocking v. Bell Privy Council- (1947)
75 CLR 125; High Court (1945) 71 CLR 430, and the
old adage, "Hard cases make bad law".
I I-27
19. Evans, Professor A.S., Causation and Disease:
The Henle-Koch Postulates Revisited, 49 Yale J. Biology & Med, 1976 pp 175-195.
20. Exhibit 1040 at p 10.
II-28
CHAPTER III
ASCERTAINMENT OF THE CLAIMS
1. INTRODUCTION
2. WRITTEN SUBMISSIONS FROM PERSONS
SEEKING LEAVE TO APPEAR
3. VVAA's CASE
4. MONSANTO's CASE
S. SUBMISSIONS FROM INDIVIDUALS
6. INFORMAL SESSIONS
6.1 Introduction
6.2 Locations and Methods
7. THE ISSUES
ENDNOTES
1
3
4
6
7
7
11
20
22
CHAPTER III
ASCERTAINMENT OF THE CLAIMS
1. INTRODUCTION
The Commission was aware that there were some 45,000
Australian personnel who had served in Vietnam during the
relevant period and that VVAA claimed only some 9,000
members some of whom were not veterans but family members
or friends.
It was essential that the Commission hear from as many
veterans and their families as possible. Accordingly,
arrangements were made for advertisements to be placed in
newspapers throughout asking any person who
considered that he or she could assist the Inquiry in any
way to lodge written submissions with the commission.
In addition, a "procedure" document was designed to give
guidance to those seeking leave to appear before the
Commission in respect to such matters as observer status,
leave to appear, the mode of evidence, style of hearings
and the like.
I II-1
This document provided, amongst other matters. for the
following:
(a) Leave to appear.
( i) Leave to appear will not be granted prior to the
applicant for leave filing a written submission
to the Commission;
(ii) All applicants for leave to appear will be
required to satisfy the Commission that:-(a) they have a peculiar or material interest to
advance not being an interest merely shared
with a substantial section of the public;
(b) they are the object of some allegation in
existence before or emerging during the
course of the Commission;
(c) they are likely to, in any way, be
prejudiced by the report of the Commission;
and
(d) their needs cannot be met by Counsel
Assisting the Commission.
I II-2
2. WRITTEN SUBMISSIONS FROM PERSONS SEEKING LEAVE TO
APPEAR
The object of requiring a written submission from all
those who sought leave to appear was to obtain in advance
not only an indication of the interest of the person
seeking leave to appear but more importantly what he would
seek to establish. As was said on 14 July 1983 when the
Commission was formally opened:
Any person or organisation claiming to have the
kind of special interest above referred to, will
be pr esumed to have sufficient interest to
prepare A CASE. (emphasis added) This will be a
pre - requisite of actual appearance. Accordingly any leave granted today is conditional only .
Such a case will be in the form prescribed and
will summarise the position of the interested
party or group . It will also provide a statement
of the evidence it is proposed to place before
the Commission through Counsel Assisting, and the names of witnesses. It should also include all
reference works or papers to which the party
would wish the Commission to have regard.
(emphasis added).
This was of course a tall order. Because it was a tall
order and because there was a huge amount of research to
be done in advance. (if hearings on this complex topic
were to be meaningful) a period of almost 5 months was
allowed for the procedures to be complied with.
III-3
3 . VVAA' s CASE
As VVAA had been most active in seeking this Commission
and because the Commission had been led to believe that
the Government had agreed to it primarily as a result of
views expressed by VVAA's scientific adviser, John Evans,
the Commission keenly looked forward to the receipt of
VVAA's written case.
However, the receipt of the
least, an anti-climax. The
submissions was, to say the
l
67 page document submitted
over the signature of Senior Counsel for VVAA was a
farrago of generality, hyperbole, mis - statement,
mis - spelling and bald assertion.
No indication of any statistical or other scientific basis
for the generality of the claims appeared. By way of
example, no distinction was drawn between acute and
chronic , or even between immediate and delayed effects of
chemical agents. Indeed, questions of dose, absolutely
critical to any intelligent analysis, were simply ignored.
As a result of this non-statement of a case on behalf of
VVAA the Commission was forced to speculate as to what
case there might be and indeed felt obliged to instruct
III-4
Counsel Assisting to put together the best case that could
be made for veterans generally.
Although some five months had been allowed for the
preparation of a written case, i t s actual receipt rai sed
doubts as to whether t hose advising VVAA had understood
the Commission's need for particularity.
The lack of particularity was also of concern to Counsel
for Monsanto . During a formal hearing of the Commissi o n
on 15 February 1984 he said, supporting the tender of
letters requesting particulars. 2
MR O'KEEFE: We received a statement from the Vietnam Veterans Association in which there were a large number of highly extravagant
and exaggerated statements made. We asked
on 12 January for details of the matters to
support those statements. There was a
silence; no reply, not even an
acknowledgment. We asked again on 24
January: again, no reply. We asked on 31
January: still to date no reply. With
great respect, there has to be some
definition of a case that is being made and
it cannot just be made in the most
extravagant and broad terms; indeed, with
respect, terms that are internally
inconsistent one with the other, without
there being some definition or alternatively some inference drawn from the absence of
such definition.3
The commission itself gave a clear indication of its
concern by saying:
II I - 5
THE COMMISSIONER (to Mr Mcinnes): I do not pretend to have read this letter (seeking
particulars) through in detail but just
glancing at it, it brings out the generality
of your submissions which I do not want to
talk about at this stage. However I am
aware and I do not mind saying this
that the generality of your submissions. of your prior submissions, have been discussed between Mr Coombs and myself on more than
one occasion.4
In fact, Senior Counsel Assisting had spoken personally to
Senior Counsel for VVAA shortly after the receipt of
VVAA' s submission on 25 November 1983 regarding the lack
of particulars and requested details of the general
allegations. No additional particulars were forwarded on behalf of VVAA despite many requests. In normal
circumstances. the leave that had been granted to VVAA to
appear would have been withdrawn immediately but it was
felt that in the circumstances, to do so would have
achieved little but complaints made publicly by that body
or its officials that they were not being given a fair go.
Such a course could also have brought about a position
where veterans generally were not represented before the
Commission.
4. MONSANTO's CASE
Written submissions as to Exposure dated 15 February 1984
were filed on behalf of Monsanto Australia Limited in
II I-6
accordance with the procedures laid down in the document
referred to above. Such submissions were exhibited . 5
5 . SUBMISSIONS FROM INDIVIDUALS
Pursuant to the advertisements placed in newspapers
throughout Australia, the Commission received in excess of
150 written submissions. Each of the submissions received
before the formal hearings began was carefully studied.
The particulars referred to in these submissions were kept
well in mind throughout the formal hearings of the
Commission and during the preparation of this Report.
6. INFORMAL SESSIONS
6.1 Introduction
The Commission had become aware that throughout Australia
there were many veterans and/or members of their families
who wished to contribute but for various reasons were not
anxious to forward written submissions.
As stated, there were some 45,000 Australians who served
in Vietnam: each with his or her own experiences; each
with his or her own story to tell. Even if only a small
III-7
percentage wished to contribute orally, to call such
people as witnesses would have been prohibitive both as to
time and cost. For example, if 5 per cent of Australia's
Vietnam veterans were called as witnesses and each took
but one day of the Commission's time then that task alone
would take eight years. Hence, some efficient means had
to be established whereby veterans were provided with an
opportunity for being heard.
A number of concerns were evident: some Vietnam veterans,
still serving in the armed forces, believed that their
careers or entitlements might be affected if
contributed. As one such veteran put it:
I have been reluctant to reveal any information
as to how I feel emotionally, physically and
mentally to the Vietnam involvement. As I am
still a serving member with pensionable age fast approaching I have felt threatened that any
disclosure of how I feel may have an adverse
affect on my career prospects. I trust any
information as discussed in this paper is in the
strictest confidence.
Others, receiving pensions or other benefits,
they
were
concerned that information provided to the Commission
might find its way into the repatriation system. Some
veterans were concerned that there might be adverse
consequences if their employers found out that they served
in Vietnam since it might be thought that they would be
I II-8
more likely to be sick and thereby absent from work more
often. Even if these fears were without foundation the
fact was that they existed and had to be overcome.
More common concerns resulted from such factors as the
need to deal with personal health details or recall
unpleasant experiences. It was also apparent that many
veterans were reluctant to speak of their experiences in
Vietnam due to the widespread unpopularity of Australia's
involvement in that conflict. Some veterans didn't relish
the prospect of cross-examination and the publicity which
may accompany giving evidence in a normal courtroom
environment.
Yet it was important to gather information from individual
veterans for a number of reasons. Among the allegations
with which this Royal Commission had to deal was the
that official records were lacking or suggestion
inaccurate. Such documentary material is frequently
useful when investigating
years previously due to
matters which occurred some
the understandable loss of
memory. While the recollections of one veteran might not
be reliable, purely because he is endeavouring to recall
in 1983 or 1984 something which occurred between 1962 and
III-9
1973, if veterans have similar recollections then the
per s uasiveness of such evidence improves with the number
of veterans.
Also , by virtue of paragraQh (g) of the Terms of
Re ference, the Commission was required to investigate and
report on "the extent to which adequate safety precautions
we re taken". Clearly, an adequate answer to this aspect
o f the inquiry was not to be found on merely considering
the documentation outlining the safety precautions which
should have been observed: a consideration of the
experiences of a large number of veterans better enables
the Commission to decide
precautions were observed.
c onsidered in Chapter IV.
the extent to which these
This aspect is specifically
F'ur thermore, with regard to the prevalence of the health
effects alleged to be related to the use of chemical
agents it is necessary to consider the incidence or rate
of occurrence as any individual case proves little , if
anything, due to the range of alternative possible
causes. For example, to call evidence from a veteran
suffering from lung cancer does not establish that such
cancer is attributable to Vietnam service as the cancer
might be related to his smoking habits. However, to
II I-10
continue the example, if the incidence of lung canc er is
twice as high in Vietnam veterans when compared with the
incidence in a section of the general population with
comparable smoking habits then some conclusion might b e
possible. Of course, this example is a n
oversimplification.
However, the morbidity study which was sought by the
Commission6 would have addressed issues of this nature .
In the absence of the study, the only informat i on
available on the general health of large numbers of
veterans is that which can be gleaned from the r e sult of
the Informal Sessions and from DVA records . Whilst the r e
are a number of reservations which bear on the extent to
which valid conclusions c an be drawn, the program of
Informal Sessions has yielded useful information whi c h
would not otherwise have been available .
6.2 Locations and Methods
Informal Sessions enabled individual veterans, their wive s
and families an opportunity to contribute on the i r
experiences with the repatriation system and their
involvement with various veterans organisations. including
(but not limited to) VVAA . Of course, by virtue of a
III - 11
Government grant, VVAA had legal representation throughout
this Commission up to and including the preparation of its final written submission . Absence of the chosen legal
representatives after that time has not disadvantaged VVAA.
However. the rna jori ty of Vietnam veterans are not members
of that body and the Informal Sessions provided a
convenient and relatively inexpensive means of obtaining
the views of many Vietnam veterans who were not members of
that association.
By conducting Informal Sessions Vietnam veterans were
given an opportunity to be heard: to air their concerns
and grievances to an independent inquiry which did not
adopt a "put it in writing and send it to Sydney"
approach. The importance of this aspect should not be
underestimated, given the concern amongst many Vietnam
veterans that their plight is not adequately known and
understood. Veterans in remote areas obtained a better
appreciation of the issues with which the Commission was
dealing and how it was going about its task.
A number of people sought to contribute their experiences
of chemical products in an agricultura l environment.
Although the Terms of Reference are directed towards the
II I -12
usage of chemical agents in the Vietnam conflict, a
special format was designed to assist those who wished to
make a submission and many such submissions were received.
Gosford was used as the pilot area in early October,
1983. Subsequently, Informal Sessions were held
throughout N.S.W. in the latter part of 1983 and early
1984. With minor modifications based on the experience
gained, Informal Sessions were then conducted in each
other State and Territory of the Commonwealth throughout
1984.
In order to decide on locations, information was gathered
from the Vietnam Veterans' Counselling Service and WAA.
Other factors which influenced the schedule of locations
included population, the location of army bases and the
existence. of local veterans' organisations. A total of 58
locations were involved:
Adelaide Albany Albury/Wodonga Alice Springs
Armidale Ballarat Bathurst Beg a
Bendigo Brisbane Broken Hill Bunbury
III-13
Grafton Hobart Ipswich Kalgoorlie
Karratha Kempsey Launceston Lismore Melbourne Mil dura Mount Gambier Mount Isa
Cairns Canberra Carnarvon Coffs Harbour Coolangatta/Tweed Heads Dalwallinu Dandenong Darwin Derby Dubbo Esperance Frankston Fremantle Gee long Gerald ton Gosford Goulburn
Newcastle Orange Parkes Perth Port Augusta Port Macquarie Rockhampton Sale Surfers Paradise Sydney Tamworth Taree Tennant Creek Toowoomba Townsville Wagga Wagga Wollongong
The program of Informal Sessions involved advance media
publicity followed by localised interviews . Information was provided to the print media, often together with a
photograph of the person conducting the sessions. This
served to assist veterans to identify ' the Commission's
representative. The newsroom of each radio station was
also provided with information and normally an on-air
interview was used to reinforce the message. If the
station's format and facilities permitted, a talk-back
session was included. This proved to be a particularly
effective means of stressing the independence of the
Commission, indicating the topics on which information was
sought and reassuring veterans that the Commission wanted
to hear what they had to say. Similarly television news,
III-14
current affairs and variety programs were used to
publicise the work of the Commission in general and the
Informal Sessions in particular.
Interviews were subsequently conducted and contributions
were received in three particular areas: experience of
chemical agents in the Vietnam conflict, health effects
experienced since and how the various Government
departments and agencies have handled their complaints and
problems.
Wherever possible, Informal Sessions were held in a room
within the local council chambers or Courthouse in order
to stress the independence of the Commission. As a number
of veterans of the Vietnam conflict are critical of the
Government and/or the RSL, Government offices and RSL
clubs were avoided wherever possible in case such a
location deterred responses.
Initially, appointments were not made although this became essential as the response increased. However, every
effort was made to accommodate those who arrived without an appointment. A toll free number was installed to
enable appointments to be made by the veterans throughout
Australia for the cost of a local call. It is important
III - 15
to note that whenever the numbers wishing to contribute
exceeded the time available then the sessions were
extended in order to meet the demand for them.
Obviously it was not always possible to hold the sessions
outside normal working hours although this was done on
many occasions by scheduling evening, lunch- time or
weekend appointments. Those veterans who were unable to
attend the sessions for reasons such as distance or
employment were encouraged to contribute a submission
e ither in writing or by using the toll - free phone number.
Guide! ines and format sheets were forwa-rded upon request.
Every effort was made to overcome obstacles which hindered
contributions: those who had difficulty putting their
thoughts on paper were interviewed over the phone;
veterans serving prison sentences were visited whenever
the Commission became aware that they wished to contribute.
No - one was refused attendance at Informal Sessions merely
because their information related to an experience with
chemical agents in an agricultural environment . Clearly ,
such experiences were useful in a number of areas: the
extent to which precautions were taken and their
effectiveness; the type of exposure involved (being either long-term or intense for a short duration due to seasonal
III-16
factors) and the health effects experienced by those who had had an association with chemical products whose
ingredients coincided with those being cons ide red by the Commission.
Although the response rates were low in some areas. they
were generally excellent. It is believed that there were
a number of reasons for this: media co- operation, local
support and the efforts of those assisting the Commission .
Media
list co-operation was such that it
all the organisations which
is not possible to
contributed to the
success of the Informal Sessions program. Many letters of
appreciation have been forwarded from the Commission. In
outlining but a few examples it is hoped that those not
mentioned will that the list does not pretend
to be other than a summary:
(a) the Brisbane Courier Mail which, through their
reporter Ken Blanch, printed numerous articles in
relation to the Brisbane Informal Sessions; (b) Radio 2GO, Gosford which agreed to participate in the
initial pilot stage; (c) Radio 4AY, Townsville which scheduled 78 thirty-second
announcements free of charge to assist in publicising
the sessions in that city;
III-17
(d) Radio 2UE, Sydney which devoted almost a full hour
between 9 and lOam to a talk-back session which gave
many listeners the opportunity to ask questions and/or
give their views; and
(e) the TV Channel 0 in Brisbane which devoted a half-hour
episode of the program "Meet the Press" to the work of
the Commission.
Such support was of inestimable value.
Local people and groups provided significant help. Again,
a list of but a few examples is set out:
(i) The co-operation and assistance of the Wagga
Wagga ex-Vietnam Association in general and David
Gardiner in particular both in respect of the
Wagga Wagga Informal Sessions and a subsequent
visit which the Commission made to speak with the members of that body.
(ii) Ted Warner, secretary of the local branch of the
VVAA in Sale, who assisted by scheduling a large
number of appointments for Informal sessions in
that city which ultimately occupied four man-days.
III-18
(iii)
{iv)
Col and Joan Evans of the Vietnam Veterans'
Family Group Western Australia who made an
important contribution to the success of the WA
program.
Bob Coombs in Taree who assisted both by
including a special segment in his weekly
"Diggers Talk" program on Radio 2RE and in
encouraging attendances.
(v) The efforts of Jim Simons who caused special
sessions to be located in Ipswich by virtue of a
telephone call to Counsel Assisting in the course
of a talk-back session conducted with Haydn
Sargent
assisted Ipswich.
on radio
with the
4BC in Brisbane and then
appointment schedule for
(vi) Ray Jones, MLA for Cairns, who encouraged a
(vii)
considerable number of non-veterans to
participate, especially with regard to the usage of chemical agents on the local railway system.
Brigadier-General Ross Buchan, the National
President of the Australian Army Training Team
Vietnam (AATTV) Association, who encouraged his
members and serving members of the armed forces
to participate in Canberra Informal Sessions .
III-19
The Commission also wishes to acknowledge the co-operation
and assistance received from local councils who
accommodated the Commission in so many areas.
In Chapter VI of this Report a brief resume of the
responses gathered from both the written submissions
forwarded to the Commission pursuant to the advertisements
referred to above and from the informal discussions
between the Commissioner and/or Counsel Assisting and some
2,000 veterans throughout Australia is set out.
7. THE ISSUES
From the above written submissions and information gleaned
before the end of 1983. issues for determination became
apparent, although VVAA's claims were not as clearly
defined as had been hoped.
A time-table for the calling of evidence during formal
sessions was drawn up. Evidence relative to the topic of
exposure, i.e., how Australian personnel may have been
exposed in Vietnam to chemical agents, either directly or
indirectly, was programmed for th& fortnight commencing 16 January 1984 . Thereafter. forma 1 hearings in relation to
the subject matters of toxicity, birth defects, morbidity,
II I-20
mortality, neuropsychology were arranged for varying
periods throughout the year.
111-21
ENDNOTES
l. Exhibit 1040.
2. Exhibit 1167.
3. Transcript at p 1678.
4 . Transcript at p 1678.
5 . Exhibit 1168A & B.
6. See Ch VI .
III-22
'Fair is foul, and foul is fair:
Hover through the fog and filthy air.'
- Macbeth, Act I Scene I
CHAPTER IV
EXPOSURE
1. CHEMICALS USED 1.1 'Colour-coded' herbicides Why were Herbicides Used? 1.2 Other Herbicides
Tordon Borate Chlorate Distillate- Creosote Hyvar X(Bromacil)
Paraquat(Gramaxone) Diquat (Reglone) Evidence at Formal Hearings 1.3 Insecticides 2. EXPOSURE MODELS
Dr Donald crosby Dr Hermann Poiger Dr Ian Munro Professor Bo Holmstedt Dr Frank M. Dost
2,4-D and 2,4,5- T F'ood Inhalation Sprayers Evidence of John Bamford 3. DIRECT AERIAL EXPOSURE
3.1 HERBS Tapes Analysis 3.2 Spray Drift and Volatilisation 3.3 C Coy 5 RAR - August, 1969
3.4 Participation in Helicopter Spraying John Farquhar McMahon Clive Francis Cotter John Cecil Rhodes Michael John Haxell 3.5 Evidence of veterans 4. NUl DAT INCIDENTS
4.1 Rubber trees
William Orril Rodgers Raymond Arthur Daniel Ronald Bruce Harris Stanford Radley Freeman 4.2 Dam/water Supply 4.3 Perimeter Spraying 4.4 Holt/Lugg Trials 5. INDIRECT EXPOSURE
5.1 Transit Through Defoliated Areas 5.2 Exposure via Food 5 . 3 Exposure via Water
5.4 Exposure via Soil
1
7
33 34 38 42 43 46 47 58 64 88 88
92 99 101 104 107 112 112 113 113 116 117 123 132 137 137 138 139 142 144 146 146 147 148 152 155 159 161 164 181 190 194 199 204
6. SAFETY PRECAUTIONS 208
6.1 Instructions 214
Manual of Army Safety, 1970 220
Current Instructions 220
Personnel Engaged in Spraying 221
6.2 Observance 224
7 . DISPOSAL OF SURPLUS CHEMICALS 227
7.1 Disposal of the 'colour- coded' herbicides 227
7.2 Disposal of surplus Australian herbicides 228
7.3 Insecticides 229
7 . 4 Lack of VVAA Contribution 230
8 . CONCLUSIONS 8.1 Insecticides 233
8.2 Herbicides 234
8 . 3 Pesticides Generally 235
9 . RECOMMENDATIONS 238
ENDNOTES 240
APPENDIX I
CHAPTER IV
EXPOSURE
l. CHEMICALS USED
l.l 'Colour-coded' herbicides
A large number of chemical agents were used in Vietnam.
Hence, Australian servicemen were potentially exposed to:
Herbicides:
2,4,5-trichlorophenoxyacetic
-dichlorophenoxyacetic
cacodylic acid and
acid
sodium
acid (2,4,5-T); 2,4
(2,4-D): picloram:
cacodylate: diquat:
paraquat: bromocil: borate chlorate and creosote .
Other chemicals in these herbicides included the
contaminant 2,3,7,8-tetrachloro-dibenzo-p-dioxin
(TCDD). Some of these chemicals were used in
combination and with solvents such as distillate
(dieseline) and kerosene.
IV-1
Insecticides: Baygon; Diethyl-toluamide; malathion; diazinon;
lindane; chlordane; dieldrin; pyrethrins; dibutyl
1
phthalate and DDT (dichloro-diphenyl-trichloro-ethane) . Other chemicals included in these
insecticides were contaminants, emulsifiers and
surfactants (surface-acting or wetting agents).
Public attention has focused on the 'colour coded'
herbicides, namely Agents Orange, Blue, Green, Pink,
Purple and Orange II. These compounds were so named due to
the colour of a band painted, for identification purposes,
on the 55 gallon (US) drums in which these formulations
were supplied. Pages I-3 to I-7 of the Report of Young et
1
al, which became Exhibit 906, contains a useful
description of the nature and composition of these
herbicides:
1. Herbicide Orange
Orange was a reddish-brown to tan colored liquid soluble in diesel fuel and organic solvents, but
insoluble in water. One gallon (US) (gal) of
Orange theoretically contained 4. 21 pounds ( lb) of the active ingredient of 2,4-D and 4.41 lb of
the active ingredient of 2,4,5-T. Orange was
formulated to contain a 50:50 mixture of the
n-bu tyl esters of 2, 4-D and 2. 4. 5-T. the
percentages of the formulation typically were:
n-butyl ester of 2,4-D free acid of 2,4-D
n-butyl ester of 2,4,5-T
IV-2
49.49 0.13 48.75
free acid of 2,4,5-T inert ingredients (e.g. butyl alcohol and ester moieties)
2. Herbicide White
l. 00 0.62
White was a dark brown viscous liquid that was
soluble in water but insoluble in organic
solvents and diesel fuel. One gal of White
contained 0.54 lb of the active ingredient of
4 - amino - 3,5,6-trichloropicolinic acid {picloram) and 2.00 lb of the active ingredient of 2,4 - D.
White was formulated to contain a 1:4 mixture of
the triisopropanolamine salts of picloram and
2,4-D. The percentages of the formulation were:
triisopropanolamine salt of picloram triisopropanolamine salt of 2,4-D inert ingredient (primarily the solvent triisopropanolamine)
3. Herbicide Blue
10.2 39.6
50.2
Blue was a clear yellowish- tan liquid that was
soluble in water, but insoluble in organic
solvents and diesel fuel. One gal of Blue
contained 3.10 lb of the active ingredient
hydroxydimethyarsine oxide (cacodylic acid). Blue was formulated to contain both cacodylic
acid (as the free aci.d) and the sodium salt of
cacodylic acid (sodium cacodylate). The
percentages of the forumlation were:
cacodylic acid sodium cacodylate surfactant sodium chloride water
antifoam agent
4.7 26.4 3.4 5.5 59.5
0.5
** It should be noted that cacodylic acid and
sodium cacodylate contained arsenic in the form of the pentavalent, organic arsenical. This form of arsenic is essentially
non-toxic to animals as can be noted by the
LD 50 value for white rats.
[The LDso
species is
population toxicity.]
of a substance for a particular
the dose at which 50% of the dosed
will die. It is a standard measure of
IV-3
Of the total formulation, 15.4 percent was
arsenic in the organic form. only trace
quantities were present in the inorganic form.
The term Herbicide Blue was first applied to
powdered cacodylic acid in 1961 through 1964.
This first Herbicide Blue contained 65 percent
active ingredient cacodylic acid and 30 percent sodium chloride and was mixed in the field with
water.
4. Herbicide Orange II
Orange II was the code-name of a formulation
similar to Orange with the difference being the
substitution of the issocytl ester of 2,4,5-T for the n-butyl ester of 2,4,5-T. The physical,
chemical and toxicological properties of Orange II were similar to those of Orange. Orange II
was produced solely by one chemical company.
Approximately 950,000 gal of Orange II were
shipped to South Vietnam during 1968 and early
1969. How much Orange I I was returned to
Johnston Island from South Vietnam in April 1972 was not determined.
5. Herbicide Purple
Purple was first formulated in the mid - 1950s time period. It was used in the Camp Drum, New York, defoliation test in 1959. The formulation was a
brown liquid soluble in diesel fuel and organic
solvents but insoluble in water. One gal of
Purple contained 8.6 lb of the active ingredients 2,4-D and 2,4,5-T. The percentages of the
formulation were:
n-butyl 2,4-D n-butyl 2,4,5-T iso-butyl 2,4,5-T The physical, chemical
proper ties of Purple were
described for orange.
6. Herbicide Pink
50 30 20
and toxicological
similar to those
Pink was a formulation of 2,4,5-T used
extensively in early RANCH HAND operations and in the defoliation test program of 1963 and 1964 in
Thailand. It was a mixture of the n-butyl and
IV-4
iso-butyl esters of 2,4,5-T. No data were
available on the physical, chemical, or
toxicological properties of Pink. However,
Darrow et al reported that it contained 8.16 lb
active ingredient per gal. The percentages of
P i nk formulation were:
n-butyl 2,4,5 - T iso- butyl 2,4,5 - T
7. Herbicide Green
60 40
Green was a single component formulation
consisting of the n - butyl ester of 2,4,5-T. It
was used in limited quantities in the 1962 - 1964
period.
Agent Green was thus used before Australian operations
officially commenced in South Vietnam and, accordingly, this herbicide is not dealt with subsequently in any
detail.
Military Assistance Command Directive (MACV) 525-1 dated 12 August 1969 contained the following definitions:
( l) Agent ORANGE . An oil-based herbicide which is a systemic defoliant effective against
broadleaf vegetation, achieving maximum
effect i n four to six weeks. with a duration
of approximately twelve months.
( 2) Agent WHITE. A water - based herbicide which
is a systemic defoliant effective against
broadleaf vegetation, achieving maximum effect in six to eight weeks, with a
duration of approximately twelve months.
( 3) Agent BLUE. A water-based herbicide which
is a nonsystemic desiccant used primarily
against grasses, taking effect in 24 to 48
hours and killing the leaves in two to four
days.
IV-5
Table 1. taken from Table 2 on page I-9 of Exhibit 903.
s ets out the number of US gallons (1 US gallon .83
Imperial Gallons 3.785 litres) of military herbicide
procured by the US Department of Defense and disseminated
in South Vietnam during the period January 1962 to
December 1964.
Military Herbicide
Blue Green Pink Purple
Total
TABLE I
Gallons of Formulation
5 200
8 208
122 792 145 000
281 200
Ta ble 2. taken from Table 3 on page I-10 of Exhibit 906,
s e t s out estimated number of (US) gallons of military
herbicide procured by the US Department of Defense and
disseminated in South Vietnam during the period January
1965 to February 1971.
TABLE II
Herbicide Craig2 NAS Report3 westing4
(1974) (1974) (1976)
Orange 10 645 904 11 266 929 11 712 860
White 5 632 904 5 274 129 5 239 853
Blue 1 144 746 1 137 470 2 161 456
Total 17 423 554 18 936 068 19 114 169
IV-6
These estimates have been obtained by examining records of
quanti ties supplied and quanti ties used. Comparison with other records was also possible, notably records of the
herbicide flight missions (dealt with more fully in
section 3.1. hereafter). Craig's estimates were based
solely on procurement records whereas the National Academy of Sciences (NAS) estimates and those of Westing were
based on both procurement records and estimates: the
differences between these last two estimates arise from differing assumptions as to the amount of herbicide
d . h f . .
5
spraye 1n t e course o a m1ss1on.
Why were Herbicides Used?
A number of features of the Vietnam conflict led to the
use of herbicides: the terrain in Vietnam and the usage of
that jungle terrain by the enemy forces in the course of
their guerilla tactics involving hit and run coupled with concealment; concealment which took the form of concealed
roads, pathways and encampments which were invisible from
the air and even from the ground at close quarters and the
use of locally grown food as part of the war effort.
In deciding to use herbicides in the course of the Vietnam
conflict, the military authorities had two principal
objectives in mind: defoliation (both for offensive and
IV-7
defensive purposes) and crop destruction. The former
ob jec t.i ve was defined as "the use of herbicides to cause
t rees and plants to lose their leaves in order to improve
observation";
t o plants to
the latter as "the application of herbicides 6
destroy their food value". The former
included defoliation around the precincts of allied
mili t ary sites and supply routes as well as suspected
enemy locations. However, the objectives have little, if
any, bearing upon the issues with which the Commission is
required to deal.
The differing objectives and the varying types of
v e getation within the region were significant factors
affecting the usage patterns of these herbicides. Agents Orange, Orange I I, Purple, Pink and Green (notably those
herbic i des containing 2,4,5-T) were effective on a wide
variety of woody and broadleaf species of vegetation .
However, grasses, bamboos and the like were less affected.
Pine trees were particularly susceptible to Agent White
which, being water soluble, was often used where spray
drift was to be kept to · a minimum such as near rubber
plantations. On the other hand, White was not favoured
for use on crops owing to the persistence of picloram in
soils. Agent Blue was the primary choice for crop
destruct i on missions, whether they were cereal or grain
7
crops.
IV- 8
As in the case of the quantities used, estimates of the
number: of a·cr:es treated with herbicides in South Vietnam
dur:ing the period fr:om January 1962 to Febr:uar:y 1971
var:y. Table 3, taken fr:om page 1 - 12 of Exhibit 906.
discloses thr:ee such estimates which make no allowance for: multiple coverage of any ar:ea .
Table 4 gives an indication of the number: of acr:es within
the thr:ee major: vegetational categories treated with
herbicides between 1962 and 1971 in South Vietnam. The
figures, derived fr:om Exhibit 906, page 1 - 13, r:epr:esent
about 90% of all ar:eas treated with either: single or:
multiple coverage.
TABLE 3
Year: I r:ish et al NAS Repor:t Westing
1962 5 681 NAa 5 724
1963 24 947 NA 24 920
1964 93 842 NA 93 869
1965 221 559 75 50lb 221 552
1966 842 764 608 106 845 263
1967 1 707 758 1 570 114 1 707 784
1968 l. 330 836 l 365 479 l 696 337
1969 NA l 519 606
1970 NA 294 925 252 989
1971 NA l 259 3 346
a NA = data not available
b data for: per:iod August to December:
IV-9
Category of vegetation
Inland forest Mangrove forest Cultivated crops
Total
TABLE 4
NAS Report
2 670 000
318 000 260 000
3 248 000
Westing
2 879 000
746 000 595 000
4 220 000
Certain governmental policies applied to the usage of
herbicides to accomplish these objectives in South Vietnam.
US policy directives existed in early days but the first
available directive and the earliest held on Australian
files is dated 22nd November 1967. These directives were revised from time to time.
ThA Army Report, 'Report on the Use of Herbicides,
Insecticides and Other Chemicals by the Australian Army in
South Vietnam', is in three volumes and was tabled in
Parliament by the then Minister for Defence in December,
1982. It was prepared by a team of Army officers under
the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Malcolm Peele It was
compiled from original documents.
Those assisting the Commission spent many man- hours
spot-checking the Report against the source documents.
Those representing the VVAJo. availed themselves of a
similar opportunity. The Commission is satisfied that it is an accurate and carefully compiled document.
IV-10
This Report which became Exhibit 892 contains a useful and
accurate summary of the US policy at pp 3-6 and 3-7 as
follows:
(a) Defoliation and
were ostensibly operation. crop destruction programs a Government of Vietnam
(b) The Military Assistance Service Fund (MASF) program suppl led the Government of Vietnam with the chemicals normally used for
herbicide operations.
(c) US personnel were involved in assisting the
Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces during
herbicide operations.
(d) Military Assistance Command Vietnam (MACV) exercised command supervision,
co-ordination, liaison and control of all US Armed Forces in support of defoliation and
chemical crop destruction.
(e) Crop destruction required approval from the Commanding Officer, US Military Assistance Command Vietnam (COMUSMACV) and the US
Ambassador to Vietnam.
(f) Concurrence from the Province Senior Adviser was required for herbicide operations.
(g) All Free World Military Assistance Forces
[FWMAF] were required to comply with
Military Assistance Command Directive 525-1 dated 22 November 1967 [i.e. to abide with
this policy] when requesting herbicide
operations.
The US was the primary supplier of herbicides; it provided
the personnel and the means to execute the operations.
Furthermore, US personnel occupied the key positions in
controlling joint herbicide operations. However. the
IV-11
policy was at pains to ensure that all levels of the US
and FWMAF command st .ructure gained the concurrence of the
Vietnamese authorities for herbicide operations.
A US investigation into herbicide operations was conducted
in 1968. The Report on the Herbicide Policy Review,
Am e r lean Embassy, Saigon, 28 August 1968 resu1 ted in a
complete revise/reprint of MACV Directive 525 - 1. The new
directive was dated 12 August 1969. Significantly, it
indicated:
Policy. Special care will be taken in planning
and executing operations to prevent herbicide
damage to rubber trees. A no-spray zone of two
kilometres for helicopters and five kilometres for fixed - wing delivery will be maintained around active rubber plantations . B
E:xhibit 892, pp 3--9 to 3 -- ll details the changes of policy
l eading to the cessat i on of herbicide operations.
S ubo rdinate commanders were advised to cease using Agent
Or ange forthwith by COMUSMACV on 17 April 1970. Continued
us e of Agents White and Blue was permit ted. Three months
la t er on 17 July the directive was further amended by
cancelling all fixed - wing aerial defoliation missions.
The next significant alteration of US policy was on 31
January 1971 when I I Field Force Vietnam advised
subordinate formations of the revised herbicide policy as
follows:
IV-12
l.
A.
Policy for the conduct
operations by all US forces
in the above references
indicated below:
of herbicide
in MR3 conveyed is modified as
All crop destruction operations will
terminated immediately.
be
B. Use of herbicides will be restricted to
remote, unpopulated areas or around fice
(sic) bases and US installations The
stresses and risks involved in herbicide
application are to be no greater than those
sustained by the US population and the US
environment in normal peacetime activities.
c. Effective immediately, all
will be made by either
ground-based spray.
US operations helicopter or
D. Orange continues to be suspended from use.
However, white and blue may be used provided they are carefully controlled, employed with discrimination and in with the
policies which govern the use of herbicides in the US set forth by the US Department of
Agriculture (USDA).
E. USDA Registration Numbered 6308-20 for
Phytar 560 or blue cautions: Do not
contaminate water used for domestic
consumption, or by animals, wildlife and
aquatic life, or for irrigation purposes.
Do not graze treated areas to livestock.
Keep children and pets off treated areas
until after rain or sprinkling following
treatment. Do not track from treated to
untreated areas.
F. USDA Registration Number 434-306 for Tordon 101 pgblhite (sic) cautions: Do not
contaminate water. To avoid injury to crops or other desirable plants, do not trat (sic)
or allow spray drift to fall onto inner
banks or bottom of irrigation ditches. Do
not store near food, feedstuff, fertilizer. seeds, insecticides, fungicides or other
pesticides. To avoid injury to desirable
plants, containers and sprayers used for
IV-13
Tordon 101 should not be reused to contain
or apply other materials.
G. All stocks of herbicide will be carefully
controlled to prevent unauthorized use and to avoid injury to crops or other desirable
plants.9
In June 1971 II Field Force Vietnam directed that chemical
c r o p destruction operations would be phased out.
In the same month COMUSMACV ordered that:
All herbicide operations by US forces, using US
assets , or involving US support were suspended
for an indefinite period effective 1 May 71.
Pending receipt of further instruction no, repeat no, herbicide operations are authorized. The
term herbicide encompasses herbicides BLUE,
WHITE, ORANGE . and similar chemical formulations known by a variety of Trade names (e.g. Phytar
560, Tordon 40, Tordon 101, Dalapon, Kenapon,
Hyvar, Telvar, Monuron, Tandex, Urox, Karmex, MG 30.)
All stocks of herbicides in hand in US units will
be consolidated and stored at division, separate brigade or equivalent level, strict
accountability will be intained, no issue of
herbicides will be made until further notice.10
Despi t e the order of 17 July 1970, the last fixed - wing
mission actually occurred on 7 January 1971. The last
helicopter mission under US control was on 31 October
1971. 11
IV-14
As the previous consideration of US policy indicates, the
herbicide operations were conducted with the approva 1 of
the government of South Vietnam. Indeed, the Herbicide
Project Processing Channels suggest that the spray
missions approval process, be they fixed--wing, helicopter
or ground spray operations involved the approval of
officers of the South Vietnamese Army.
The instructions issued by the Australian Army and the
extent to which such instructions were obeyed is dealt
with later, in section 6 of this Chapter. Insofar as
involvement in the US/South Vietnamese herbicide program
was concerned, Australia came within the policy directives
referred to above and accordingly any Australian request for aerial spraying were processed in the same manner.
The 'colour-coded' herbicides were obtained by the US
Government from eleven different manufacturers. Seven
such manufacturers subsequently became defendants in a
United States class action. Issues relating to this class
action are dealt with in Chapter XI of this Report. Two of
those issues bear on the topic of exposure, namely the
level of contamination with TCDD and the rates of
application of these by the Defendants
herbicides.
that the US
IV-15
There were
Government
suggestions
(i.e. the
military) dispersed such chemical agents at a level
greater than the stated 3 (US) gallons per acre.
Th e rna jor i ty of these herbicides were dispersed by
fi xed - wing. Hercules C- 123 aircraft under the Operation Ran c h Hand program. These planes were originally fitted
with an MC-1 spray configuration and disseminated a spray
of l-1.5 gallons of herbicide per acre. Later, the system
wa s modified to permit spraying of 3 (US) gallons per acre
in a single pass. This spray system was capable of
depositing three gallons per acre on swaths 240 feet wide
when spraying at an air speed of 130 knots at an altitude
of 150 feet. 12
In 1966 a new defoliant dispenser system, the A/A 45 Y- 1
replaced all older systems. This system permitted spraying
at the rate of 240 (US) gallons per minute and at an air
speed of 130 knots from 150 feet altitude produced a swath
of 260 .±. 20 feet wide with a mean deposit of 3 (US)
gallons per acre. Spraying time was approximately 3.5 - 4
minutes and this dispensed 950 gallons of chemical on a
spray line about 8. 7 statute miles (14 km) in length. In
order to achieve predictable deposits. it was recommended
that the missions be conducted under inversion to neutral
temperature situations and in calm wind conditions. The
IV-16
aircraft required a crew of pilot, co-pilot and flight
engineer. the flight engineer doubling as a console or
spray sys tern operator. Observers frequently accompanied . h b. . . . 13 a1r crews on er 1c1de m1Ss1ons.
Standard operating procedures have been summarised by
Young et al in Exhibit 906 as follows:
1. Each of the 11 different companies that
manufactured military herbicides packed them in new ICC 17C 55 - gal [US] 18 gauge steel
drums for shipment to Southeast Asia. Until 1967. lined drums were used only for
shipment of Blue. However, because of the
results of compatibility tests, lined drums were also used to ship White beginning in
1967.
2. Each herbicide drum was marked with a
three- inch color - coded band around the
center to identify the specific military
herbicide. This marking was initially a
12- inch band. but was changed to a 3--inch
band in March 1966 .
3 . Shipping time from the arrival of the
herbicide at a US port until it arrived in
South Vietnam varied from 47 to 52 days.
4. About 10 out of every 10,000 drums shipped
were received in a damaged or defective
state. This represented a damage rate of
0.1 percent. About 50 percent of these
damaged drums leaked as a result of
punctures or split seams. These were caused by improper loading and defective drums.
Forklifts operated by stevedores also caused punctures. Redrumming was accomplished at the ports.
5. About 65 percent of the herbicide was
shipped to the 20th Ordinance Storage Depot, Saigon. and 35 percent was shipped to the
IV-17
Sllth Ordinance Storage Depot, Da Nang.
Under the normal hand ling procedures. drums were unloaded at Da Nang and Saigon from the
cargo vessel directly into semi-trailers and were placed in an upright position. The
trailers were driven to the various units of the 12th Air Commando Squadron (primarily at the bases of Da Nang, Phu Cat, or: Bien Hoa)
for disposition.
6. Normally the contents of the drums were
transferred into blocked F-6 trailer tanks through a suction tube without removing the full drums from the semi-trailers. Each F-6 trailer held 4,298 gal or about 78 drums of
herbicide. If blocked F-6 trailer tanks
could not accommodate the total inventory. the drums were stacked in pyramidal style
until needed. 7. The transfer of the herbicides from the
steel drums to storage tanks or
aircraft tanks required some precautionary measures. Personnel charged with the
supervisory responsibilities of handling the herbicides were indoctrinated in appropriate safety precautions including the use of
gloves and face shields as needed.
Personnel handling the chemicals were
encouraged to "take norma 1 sanitary
precautions and to maintain personal
cleanliness and to avoid skin and eye
contact with the mateiral. Contaminated
clothing were to be washed before re-use.
Spillage on the skin or in the eyes was to
be rinsed copiously with clear water.
8. When the herbicide was pumped from the drums
into the F-6 trailers about 0. 5 to l. 5 gal
remained in the drum. Hence the drum was
placed on a drain rack and the "drippings"
were collected from many drums in a pan- type receptacle and used for spraying base
perimeter areas.
9. Empty drums were given to the military
forces (Vietnam, US and Free World Military Assistance Forces) for use as barriers in
defensive positions. The drums were filled with sand or concrete and used in the
IV-18
of in foundations
for runways and barbed wire perimeters.
10. areas contaminated by spillage of
the herbicides flushed with diesel fuel
with diversion of the drainage into
settling basins or pits for incorporation
into the soil.
11. The F - 6 trailers were tied to plumbing and
pumps so that the herbicide could be
delivered to the aircraft without moving the trailers. 12. As previously noted, Orange was insoluble in
water. while Blue and White were not . When
Orange was mixed with either Blue or White.
a gummy substance formed. The F-6 trailers
were therefore color-coded to correspond to the drum color - codes and used exclusively
for the to which the code applied.
13. The aircraft spray tanks , positioned in the
centre of the airplane, and the spray system
was purged before the type of herbicide
carried was changed. Particular attention had to be given to sequences involving Blue
and White. A mixture of these two
resulted in the formation of a
precipitate consisting of the sodium salt of 2,4-D.
14. Most of the personnel involved in the actual
handling of the herbicide drums were
Vietnamese. However, a USAF flight mechan i c or crew chief was responsible for ensuring
that the aircraft was properly loaded and
the spray system functional. A flight
mechanic was a l so the console operator for
the spray unit. The pi lot and co-pi lot were
officers while the flight mechanics and crew chiefs were usually enlisted personnel.
15. For record keeping purposes a herbicide
"mission" consisted of several if
only one aircraft was used the operation was a sortie. All missions [with the
same target area) a project.
IV- 19
16. Aircraft takeoffo were normally before
sunrise. From a tactical point of view, the
arrival of the aircraft at the target area
just prior to sunrise permitted the aircraft to approach the target from the direction of the rising sun. This afforded some degree
of protection from enemy ground fire. From
the standpoint of herbicidal action,
application by aerial spray was most
effective if accomplished prior to 0800
hours while inversion conditions existed. in the absence of precipitation, and while the wind was calm or not exceeding a velocity of
8 knots. This insured the proper settling
of the spray on the target area.
17. Within the aircraft, it was not uncommon to
have herbicide leakage from around the
numerous hose connections joining the spray tank and pumps with the wing and aft spray
booms. In hot weather, the odor of
herbicide within the aircraft was decidedly noticeable. Periodically, the spray tank
with console was removed (especially with
the portable A/A 45Y-l system) and the
interior flushed with surfacant or with soap and water. Because of the corrosive nature
of some herbicides, it was necessary for the
aircraft to also be repainted periodically . 18. In the 1966 through 1968 period, more than
one sortie per day was often common. For
example, during the first six months of
1968, the 24 C-123 aircraft assigned to
RANCH HAND averaged approximately 39 sorties per day. 14
Following the decision to suspend herbicide operations the
qu e stion of disposal arose. This is dealt with more fully
in section 7 of this chapter. 15
In considering the issue of exposure it is important to
consider not just the quantities of these herbicides which
were dispersed during the course of the Vietnam conflict
IV- 20
but also to link such quantities to time, locations and
the proximity of Australian troops.
Year No. of
Personnel a
1962 50
1963 87
1964 178
1965 1 875
1966 5 115
1967 8 152
1968 8 580
1969 8 162
1970 6 921
1971 5 120
1972 137
1973 .0
1
3
2
3
:_I.'ABLE 5
Agent Orangeb
353 350
520 890 105 569
168 377
190 950 547 578
1
2
Agent White
514 375
319 335
075 998
997 888
208 173
12 175
a source = Table 1, page 10, Exibit 1448
b all figures in US gallons:
Agent Blue
15 800
355 225
271 015
227 793
134 803
2 330
1 US gallon = 0.83 imperial gallons = 3.785 litres
Table 5 subdivides the usage of herbicides Orange, White
and Blue (as contained ] n Table III B-2 on p III-17 of
Exhibit 903) by calendar year and also indicates the total
number of Australian Army and Air Force personnel who
commenced their first tour of service in Vietnam in that
year, as contained in Exhibit 1886. The resulting
comparison is thus indicative rather than definitive.
IV-21
However, these figures do not make any allowance for the
l ocation of the herbicide dispersal. The breakdown of the
number of fixed - wing aircraft missions by province within
South Vietnam is shown in Table 6.
TABLE 6
Ye ar Binh 'I'uy Long Khanh Bien Hoa Phuoc Tuy
1965 0 0 2 10
1966 19 15 16 28
1967 42 8 34 71
1968 6 34 42 54
a
1969 0 1 38 0
1970 0 0 8 0
Total 67 58 140 163
a No Ranch Hand missions recorded after 30 June 1968.
S ource : Table 9, page 40, Exhibit 1448
Gia Dinh
0
30
104
94
21
0
249
Co mbining the personnel figures with the missions in Phuoc
Tuy prov i nce and the amount of herbicide dispersed by
f ixed - wing aircraft missions in that province by year,
gives t he results shown in Table 7.
IV-22
Year
1962 1963 1964 1965
1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971
1972 1973
a
b
TABLE 7
No. of
Personnel a
50 87 178
1 875
5 115
8 152
8 580
8 162
6 921
5 120
137 0
No. of
Missions
10 28 71 54
from Table 5 herein in '000 gallons (US)
Agent Orangeb
24 54 141 64
Agent Whiteb
38 151
Agent Blueb
15
Source: Table 9, page 40 and Table 10, page 41, Exhibit
1448
Further analysis of the records of Australian personnel
serving in Vietnam reveals the following potential for
exposure from fixed-wing aircraft flying herbicide
missions:
IV-23
TABLE 8
Battalion Deployment Total days of Spraying
Agent Agent Agent
Orange White Blue
SR AR 1. 4.66 - 5. 7.67 36 3 4
6R AR 1. 4 . 66 - 5. 7.67 36 3 4
2 RAR 2. 3.67 - 18. 6 . 68 38 30 4
7R AR 2. 3.67 -- 24. 4.68 34 21 0
3R AR 12.12.67 - 5.12.68 13 28 0
lRAR 19. 1. 68 - 28. 2.69 13 25 0
4RAH 29. 1. 68 - 30. 5.69 12 24 0
9RAR 5.11.68 - 5.12.69 0 0 0
5R AR 28.11.69 -- 5. 3.70 0 0 0
6RAR 7. 5.69 - 28. 5.70 0 0 0
8R AR 18.11.69 - 12. 11.70 0 0 0
7R AR lO. 2.70 - 10. 3.71 0 0 0
2R AR 28. 4.70 - 4. 6.71 0 0 0
3R AR 12. 2.71 - 19.10.71 0 0 0
4RAR 1. 5.71 - 12. 5. 72 0 0 0
Source: Table 11. page 42, Exhibit 1448.
The details shown in Table 8 do not consider the proximity
of Australian personnel to these herbicide flight
missions. Table 9 represents a collection of occasions
when Australian personneL whilst in Phuoc Tuy province,
were within 4km of a mission, obtained from Table 12, page
43, Exhibit 1448.
IV-24
Date
26 . 1.67
31.10.67 13. 4.68
30. 4.68
20. 6.68
25. 6.68
26. 6.69a 22. 8.69a
TABLE 9
Agent
Orange White White* White* White
Orange White Orange*
Proximity
(in km)
1-4 1-4
within 1 within 1 1-4 1-4
1 - 4
direct exposure
a Although the flights concerned are shown as being
within Bien Hoa province, as Australian troops were
operating close to the border of Phuoc Tuy and Bien
Hoa provinces. they are included.
Table 10 discloses the corresponding details in respect of
Hoa province, obtained from Table 13, page 44,
Exhibit 1248.
IV-25
TABLE 10
Da t e Agent Proximity
(in km)
18. 6.68 Blue 1 - 4
4. 7.68 Orange 1-4
7. 7 . 68 White 1-4
20 . 5 . 69 Orange 1-4
30. 8.69 Orange 1-4
31. 8 . 69 Orange 1-4
l. 9.69 Orange
20. 9.69 Orange 1-4
Clearly, if the criterion was altered to include
prox i mities greater than 4 kilometres then the number of
instances would be greater. On t he other hand, if the
c riterion of 'within l kilometre' is adopted, then only
t hree incidents (marked '*' in Table 9) would arise: two
i nvolving Agent White and one Agent Orange.
Allied with the concept of proximity is the question of
dose, i.e. it is necessary to consider not only "how
close" but also "how much". For example, a member of the
Australian forces might be in close proximity to a
fixed - wing herbicide fl i ght mission yet, because of his
duties at that particular time on that particular day, be
unlike l y to receive any significant "dose".
IV-26
It is most important to also consider what amounts to a
significant dose, i.e a dose which might give rise to
resulting health affects. This question is considered
later in this chapter in section 2 - Exposure Models.
Concern as to the use of these herbicides has been
directed not only to the 2,4-D and 2,4,5-T ingredients but also to the contaminants of manufacture. TCDD, to give it
the shortest possible description, has been the subject of
a great number of allegations. The extent to which
Australian personnel were exposed to TCDD in Vietnam
involves considerations similar to those mentioned above
in respect of the herbicides in general. An additional
factor is the extent to which TCDD was present in the
herbicides. Other sections in this Report deal with the
question of the extenL to which TCDD is toxic (i.e.
poisonous). A proper understanding requires at least a
brief consideration of what TCDD is and the level of its
presence in the chemical agents used in the course of the
Vietnam conflict.
Chloro-dibenzo-para- dioxin molecules consist of two
benzene rings linked by two adjacent oxygen atoms and have
from one to eight chlorine atoms attached. Thus, in
theory. 75 different kinds are possible. To date. only
IV-27
about · 10 such compounds have been synthesised and only a
s mall number have been found to exist naturally. The most
common variant is para-
Q.ioxin: the prefix tetra indicating the presence of four
chlor i ne atoms and the numbers denoting their location in
t he molecule. This name is understandably abbreviated to
TCDD or. given that this is the most commonly discussed
variant. dioxin. TCDD arises during the chemical process,
known as hydrolysis. which produces 2. 4. 5-trichlorophenol
from tetrachlorobenzene, as shown diagrammatically in
F'igure 1 .
FIGURE 1
2,4-
PHENOL DICHLORO-PHENOL
2,4- D
2,4 - D BUTYL
ESTER
AC ETIC MONO- SODIUM AGENT
AC I D CHLORO- MONO - ORANGE
ACETIC CHLORO ACID ACETATE
2,4,5 - T
2,4,5 - T BUTYL
ESTER
TETRA - 2,4,5-
BEN ZEN E CHLORO- TRICHLORO - 'I'CDD
BENZENE PHENOL
IV-28
This chemical reaction is carried out under alkaline
conditions, at high temperatures and under high pressure. Such conditions, favourable to the formation of TCDD. need
to be carefully controlled in order to minimise the level
of TCDD in 2. 4. 5 - T. The production of 2. 4-dichlorophenol
in the course of producing 2,4-D does not involve such
conditions, neither does the production of picloram or
cacodylic acid. Accordingly. TCDD levels are only
relevant to a consideration of Agents Orange (and Orange I I). Pu.rple. Pink and Green but not to Agents White and
Blue.
IV-29
Source of
Sample
Johnston Island inventory. 1972
Johnston Island inventory, 1974
Gulfport inventory, 1972
Gulfport inventory, 1975
Eglin AFB Archived Sample
Eglin AFB inventory, 1972
a: in parts
b: 4 of the
Source: Table 6,
TABLE 11
Number of SamQles TCDD Concentration
Orange Purple Rangea Mean a
200 (4)b 0.05-47.0 l. 91
10 0.07-5.3 l. 68
42 0.05-13.3 l. 77
238 0.02-15.0 2.11
l 45.00
2 0.04
per mi 11 ion {ppm) 200 samples may have been Agent Purple page I-23, Exhibit 906.
Table 11 sets out the available data on the concentration
of TCDD in samples of Agent Orange and Agent Purple. The
overall average of these samples (i.e. the weighted mean
concentration) is 1.98 parts per million {ppm).
Tlle herbicide sampled at Johnston Island was procured no
earlier than February, 1964 whereas that at Gulfport was probably procured in 1968 or 1969. 16 This is consistent
with the suggestion that TCDD concentration levels were
more closely monitored later in the period of supply.
IV-30
However. a closer examination of the results reveals that
only 4 of the 200 samples from Johnston Island exceeded
that of the
samples were
noted that
Gulfport inventory: the
16
17, 22, 23 and 47 ppm .
results of those
It should also be
the average concentrations do not differ
markedly between Johnston Island stocks and those held at
Gulfport although the maximum levels of TCDD do: 47 and 15
respectively.
If the four drums indicated in Table 11 above, (see
footnote b thereto) were in fact Agent Orange then the
average or mean concentration of TCDD in Agent Purple
would have been 32 . 8 ppm. This mean value may not
represent the actual concentration of TCDD in the Agent
Purple used in South Vietnam between 1962 and 1964; rather
it represents the best estimate which is possible from the available data. On the assumption that this concentration was likewise reflected in Agents Pink and. Green then the
mean concentration of TCDD in those herbicides would have
been 65.6 ppm since they contain twice the amount of
2,4,5-T.
It is important to note that usage of Agents Purple, Pink
17
and Green was confined to less that 90.000 acres from
IV-31
1962 to 1964, 18 i.e. at a time before any substantial
number of Australian personnel were serving in South
Vietnam (as the first column of Table 5 above indicates).
Furthermore, these three herbicides contained
approximately 40% of the estimated TCDD dispersed in South
Vietnam.
As Tables 9 and 10 indicate, the potential for exposure of
Australian personnel to TCDD from fixed-wing aircraft
carrying out herbicide missions is limited to one occasion
if a criterion of within one kilometre is adopted.
About 86% of all herbicide operations appear to have been 0
d b f" d . 0 f 19 c arr1e out y 1xe -w1ng a1rcra t.
The active ingredients of these 1 colour-coded 1 herbicides
are as follows:
* 2,4-D (Agents Orange, White, Pink, Purple and
Green)
* 2,4,5 - T (Agents Orange, Pink, Purple and Green)
* Picloram (Agent White)
* Cacodylic acid (Agent Blue).
IV-32
These four chemicals, together with the 2,4,5 - T
contaminant; TCDD, have thus been the focus of the
Commission's investigations in respect of the
'colour-coded' herbicides.
1.2 Other Herbicides
Dinoxil. Trinoxil. Monuron, Diuron, Dalapon and Tandex
(trade names) were also used in Vietnam. However. these
were used by US forces: there was no Australian use of
these chemicals. Furthermore, only small quantities of
these chemicals were in Vietnam between 1962 and 1964
f
. 20
or test1ng purposes.
Additionally, the Holt/Lugg test program (further
considered in section 4.4 of this chapter) involved the
use of chemicals with the following trade names (common
names): Weedazole (Amitrole), Primatol A (Atrazine),
Chlorflurazole S (Chlorflurazole), Le-pon (Dalapon). and
Afalon (Linuron).
Other herbicides which were used by Australian personnel
were:
IV-33
Trade Name
Tordon SO-D
Polybor chlorate Creosote HYVAR GRAMOXONE REG LONE DMSO DEL 21
Tor don
Active Ingredient(s)
Picloram (200 grams/litre or 80%) 2,4 - D (50 grams/litre or 20%)
Borate and chlorate
Bromacil Paraquat Diquat
Paraquat, diquat and DMSO
Department of Defence records disclose that 360 gallons
(1637 litres) of Tordon SO-D were despatched from
Australia to Vietnam in the period November- December,
1968. 21 The Army Report (Exhibit 892) endeavoured to
trace the procurement process through the various stages.
Results of this investigation of records held in respect
of Tordon SO-D are set out in Table 12.
IV-34
Records of -Forecast usage Procurement requests Procurement
Despatch
TABLE 12
Gallons (Imp)
352 315 675 (315 in Nov '67;
360 in Nov '68)
360 (in Nov ' 68)
Source: Annexures I to N to Book III, Chapter 1, Exhibit 892
The Pesticides Report suggests that there was a purchase
of '13 x 45 gallon drums of picloram/2,4-D from Dow
Chemicals, 22 Sydney'. The Commission notes that if this
figure were 15 drums then the gallonage involved would be 675. Holdings of Tordon 50-D (in Australia) were given as
360 gallons (360 = 8 x 45) in March, 1972. 23
There are no records indicating quantities issued and
consumed in Vietnam. However. it was decided to return
surplus stocks to Australia 24 and, since no Tordon 50-D
was so returned, it would appear that a maximum of 360
gallons was used in Vietnam between December, 1968 and
January. 1971. The fact that 1 ATF requested 360 gallons
of Tordon 50-D in December. 197023 suggests that the
Tordon 50-D issued two years earlier had been
substantially, if not fully, consumed.
IV-35
G A Lugg's report (Exhibit 1061) contains a table of the
chemicals used in Operation ORION, the latter of the
Holt/Lugg trials. which commenced in December. 1967.
(considered more fully in section 4.4 of this chapter).
This table, reproduced as Table 2 on page 13 of the Senate
Report (Exhibit 1448) does not include Tordon 50 - D.
However. the May 1968 report of Major E S Holt (Exhibit
99) discloses that 1 gallon of Tordon 50-D was added to
300 gallons of water. together with four other chemicals.
in order to test a knockdown spray mixture. Table 'A' of
his report suggested that such a mixture was applicable to
'Dense shrubs and grasses to 6ft high' with a suggested
time of application as 'Pre or post wet'. Significantly,
the remarks column of that Table suggests 'Delete TORDON
in vicinity of rubber trees'.
The tenor of Major Holt's report suggests Tordon usage for
control of vegetation around base camp perimeters. The
Commission is satisfied that the best conclusion available
to it is that a limited quantity of Tordon SO-D was used
in the Holt/Lugg trials and that a maximum of 360 gallons
was used for vegetation control around Australian bases
between December 1968 and January 1971. Such a conclusion
as to the purpose of usage is supported by the Pesticides
Report (Exhibit 1288):
IV-36
The vegetation control program around Australian base areas and other defended locations was
repeated on a seasonal basis between April and
November to cope with vegetation growth following the monsoon season each year until 1971. The
annual usage for this program was in the order
of: ... 350 gallons of
The quant ity shipped to Vietnam would appear to have been
sufficient for but one year's spraying program . However, if usage of Tordon 50- D commenced following the Holt/Lugg trials, then only two spray seasons (namely April to
November 1969 and 1970) would be involved. There do not
appear to be any record s suggesting usage of a greater
quantity than that suggested by Department of Defence
records.
The toxicity of Tordon 50- D and its active ingredients,
picloram and 2,4-D are considered elsewhere in this
Report. It is sufficient for present purposes to indicate
the quantity, location and purpose of usage in order to
enable some assessment of likely exposure.
It is worth noting that stocks of Tordon 50- D were
. . . . 26 f .
suppl1ed 1n br1ght yellow conta1ners as some con us1on
with Agent Orange containers might reasonably be expected.
IV-37
Borate Chlorate
Borate Chlorate was the trade name for a mixture of the
borate and chlorate salts of alkaline metals. It
c omprised. as the name suggests, borate (sodium borate)
a nd chlorate (sodium chlorate). At the time of
procurement, from OSTA Chemicals in Sydney, it was the
standard Army weedki ller. Records held by the Department o f Defence in respect of Borate Chlorate are summarised in
Table 13.
Records of -Forecast usage Procurement requests Procurement
Despatch
TABLE 13
Lbs
7 056
16 744 (3360 in Oct '66;
4480 in Mar '67;
8904 in Jul '67)
6 85o+ (?qty in Sep-Dec '66)
4350 in Apr '67;
2500 in Sep '67)
Source: 892. Annexures I to N to Book I I I. Chapter 1. Exhibit
Records of holdings are as follows: in Vietnam. 4. 000 lbs
as at August, 1967 but none by January. 1971 and in
Australia, 9,000 lbs as at August, 1967 and 8,904 lbs as
at March 1972. 27 Combining this information with Table
13 suggests that:
IV-38
(i) all of the initial. unquantified shipment plus a
further 350 lbs had been consumed in Vietnam by
January, 1971; and
Cii) the 8,904 lbs procured in July 1967 was not
forwarded as 8,904 lbs remained in Australia as
at March 1972. Further. that 96 lbs were either
forwarded to Vietnam between August 1967 and
March 1972 or removed from stores for use in
Australia.
Prior to April 1967 borate chlorate had been used around
the base area at Nui Dat to control vegetation which might
have provided cover to the enemy. By this time trials
were being conducted in order to determine which
defoliant(s) should be used for perimeter vegetation
28
control. As Lugg's report indicates, Polybor Chlorate
proved to be either too selective in its action or
required a rate of more than 50 kg/hectare (44 lbs/acre)
. d f . 29 1n or er to be e fect1ve. Furthermore, as the request
for pumps (indicated below) demonstrates, the equipment
initially used proved unsuitable for spraying large
30 areas.
IV-39
The authors of the Army Report (Exhibit 892) described the
Polybor Chlorate program as follows:
62. A weed control team was established in the 1 ATF
area to carry out defoliation using Polybor Chlorate. Typical composition of the weed control team was:
1 x Junior NCO (CPL or LCPL)
1 x Driver
4 x Privates
(All men were drawn from local units.)
1 x 1/4 ton vehicle
3 x knapsack sprays Gloves and goggles
Team members were to report to
ATF Regimental Aid Post each
period at 0800 hours.
the Hygiene Section l day for the rostered
63. With the onset of the wet season in May 1967
there was an increase in the number of units
requesting the assistance of the weed control team .
64. As well as perimeter defences at Nui Dat, an area
of 4 - 5 million square metres, 1 ATF also maintained a
base at the HORSESHOE feature [so named because of the horseshoe shape of the contours on a map of the
feature] immediately north of Dat Do. The perimeter
of this base (0. 35 million square metres) also
required defoliation from time to time ....
66. The use of Polybor Chlorate as a defoliant
resulted in high workload for defoliation teams. 32
lbs of Polybor Chlorate in solution covered only 400
square feet in the desired rate of application. To
cope with the work involved l ATF sought the use of
pumps. On 13 June 1967 1 ATF requested the supply of
two such pumps and on 17 June 1967 HQ AFV requested a
third . These were to be employed as follows:
a . one for 1 ATF,
b. one for the HORESHOE feature. and
IV-40
c. one for the repair and maintenance pool [this was
an equipment reserved held to replace items which broke down] .
These items were to be supplied from US Army sources
but it is not known whether delivery was effected or
not.
67. On 24 August 1967 P'ORS prepared
perimeter wire defoliation problem. significant because it describes
defoliant agents used to that time.3l
In respect of Polybor Chlorate it stated:
a review of the
This review is
the chemical
18 lb/44 gal, 1 gal/ sq yd, rain washes it away; no
longer used.32
The report concluded that this defoliation effort resulted
in four members committed, virtually full-time, from May
to November each year for the defoliation at over 13 km of
perimeter wire at Nui Dat alone. 33 It is significant to
note that Polybor Chlorate was not one of the herbicides
included in the Holt/Lugg December, 1967/January, 1968 34 test program.
Hence the usage pattern of this chemical suggests a
relatively high exposure for applicators (few in number) with a much lower exposure to be expected for personnel
stationed at the base and negligible exposure likely in
respect of personnel on patrol.
IV-41
The toxicity of borate-chlorate is further considered
later in this Report.
Distillate - Creosote
It appears that, prior to 24 August, 1967 a mixture of
creosote with distillate (i.e. diesoline) was used for
base perimeter defoliation. The review of such operations
on that date by FORS (Field Operational Research Section)
stated, inter alia:
Chemicals tried ...
b . Distillate + 5\ creosote worked well,
except that tar precipitated from creosote, clogging nozzles. No longer used. c. Distillate+ 2\ creosote presently used,
works extremely well with minimum clogging of nozzles. Doesn't wash away even if rain
falls immediately after application. Fairly safe to use, as slight irritation of skin or
throat shows [operator] when to stop.
Coverage of [44 gallons is approximately] 50 yards of fence ... 41
This review concluded that the short-term solution was to
use distillate + 2\ creosote with existing equipment.
Similar problems to those experienced in respect of
borate-chlorate appear to have led to the abandonment of
creosote for base perimeter defoliation, i.e. either too
selective in its operation or requiring too high an
application rate and, as the FORS review indicated. not
IV-42
suited to the equipment being 42 used. It would thus
appear: that. although the quantities used cannot be
determined, the usage of creosote was confined to 1966 and 1967.
Hyvar X (Bromaci1)
Department of Defence records suggest that a total of
16,500 lbs (7,500 kg) of the soil sterilant HYVAR X- WS was
sent to Vietnam, as Table 14 indicates.
Records of -Forecast usage Procurement requests Procurement Despatch
TABLE 14
25 000
14 520
23 500
16 500 ( 500 lbs in Jul '68
7000 in Nov- Dec '67;
and 9000 in May '69)
a 2.2 lbs = 1 kg or 1 lb = 0.455 kgs
Source: Annexur:es I to N to Book I I I, Chapter 1, Exhibit
892.
As 2,800 lbs (1273 kg) were returned from Vietnam to
Australia in January. 197135 it would appear that usage
of HYVAR in Vietnam between July. 1968 and January, 1971
was not more than 13,700 lbs {6,227 kg). The Pesticides
Report suggests that 114 x 50 1b drums of bromacil were
IV-43
o bta i ned from SHELL chemicals, Sydney and 220 x 50 lb
drums from Amalgamated Chemicals, Bankstown. 36
It i s clear that HYVAR was included in the December
1967/January 1968 Holt/Lugg spray trials. The report of
Ma j or Holt dated May 1968 (Exhibit 99) indicates that:
[It was] calculated by Mr Lugg that 15 lb of the
soil sterilant Hyvar - X- WS would be needed per 300 gal of water in a sterilisation spraying
operation for a sterilant effect lasting one
year. As a safety factor the quantity was
increased to 20 lbs . J7
Ta ble A of that report suggests that vegetation should be
m i.n i mal and the suggested time of application as pre-wet
38
seas on. Appendix 1 to Annexure A of
i ndicated both the results and recommendations:
APPLICATION OF STERILANT
the report
1. Although about 5 acres had been treated with
HYVAR-X - WS the major task of sterilization remains. As no rain fell during the period
Dec 67-Jan 68 the applied sterilant remained on the surface of the ground and had no
apparent effect on regrowth. Aerial
spraying calibration trials indicated that a satisfactory spread of HYVAR could be
achieved using the spray equipment developed by No. 9 Sqn RAAF.
2. Most of 1 ATF perimeter wire can be aerially
sprayed with HYVAR in mid-Apr i 1. prior to
the wet season, at a rate of 1 lb . HYVAR per
gallon of water. This should be premixed in
the spray truck tank and pumped from the
truck tank into the helicopter tank .
Priority refilling of the t ruck tank must be
IV-44
established at the water point to ensure
that the helicopter hours are not wasted.
3. Standard operating procedures have been
developed by No. 9 Sqn RAAF for spraying
sterilant on open, unmined, areas. 4. In areas where air spraying is inpractical
(sic). either due to the canopy of trees or
inaccessibility to the area, the sterilant
will have to be hand sprayed. This
operation will be time consuming, especially where the complexity of the wire further
hinders accessibility. The mixture to be
applied is 20 lb HYVAR per 300 gallons of
water ....
8. Depending on t he effectiveness of the
sterilant application it may be possible to control wet season regrowth with a further
application of sterilant in Oct 68. Some
areas may be missed in the initial sterilant
spraying in Apr 68 and may require the full
treatment of knockdown and sterilant
spraying in Oct 68.39
An annua 1 usage of 9, 000 lbs of bromaci 1 is suggested in
the Pesticides Report as being part of the vegetation
control program around the Australian base areas
undertaken annually between April and November until
1971. 40 The pattern of the despatches, as shown in
Table 14, do not disclose a sufficient quantity to enable
such a program to be carried out.
However, apart from usage in the Holt/Lugg trials. it
would appear that usage of HYVAR X-WS was confined to the
period from April to November in 1968, 1969, 1970 and 1971
and that it was used to sterilise soil around the
IV-45
Australian bases. It would also appear to have been
applied both by hand spraying and by
available figures suggest usage of not
lbs during this period.
helicopter. The more than 16, 500
Insofar as the exposure of Australian personnel is
concerned it would appear that the position is similar to
that in respect of Polybar Chlorate except that allowance
should be made for the inclusion of applicators involved
in helicopter spraying.
As bromaci l is water soluble and also a
compound which can lead into ground water it
that some bromacil entered the wells used
persistent is possible as a water
supply by lATF. Exposure via water is considered later in
section 5.3 of this Chapter.
Paraquat (Gramoxone)
Gramoxone, having as its active ingredient paraquat (40%),
was used in Vietnam although it would appear that only a
small quantity was involved. Department of Defence
records reveal that 45 (Imperial) gallons were procured
and despatched to Vietnam in December 1967, 36 gallons
were returned (see Section 7.2).
IV-46
Diguat (Reqlone)
The records in respect of Reglone, the active ingredient
of which was diquat (40\). are not as clear. Contract
acceptance and purchase orders from the Department of
Supply suggests a total purchase of 6,345 gallons as
follows:
Location
Melbourne
Sydney
Sydney
Sydney
TABLE 15
Date Order No
6 Dec 1967 Cl05833
1 Oct 1968 Nl44272
4 Nov 1968 Nl44374
12 May 1969 Nl45151
TOTAL
Source: Appendix 1. p 22, Exhibit 969
IV-47
Quantity (Imp Galls)
13 X 45
24 X 45
16 X 45
67 X 45
141 X 45
1 530
1 080
720
3 015
6 345
TABLE 16
Records of Imp Galls
Forecast usage 2 640
Procurement requests 1 530
P rocurement 6 345
Despatch 4 365 (1 350 in Nov- Dec ' 68
and 3 015 in Feb '70)
So urce: Annexures I to N to Book III, Chapter 1. Exhibit 892.
De p a r t ment of Defence records in respect of Reglone are
eat out in Table 16.
As
42
t h e Army Report notes, 2,655 gallons of unspecified
c hemicals were despatched to South Vietnam in November
19 67 for Operation ORION . These chemicals almost
ce r t ainly included Reglone. There was a request from
V i e tnam in November. 1967 for 1 530
41
gallons and
planned quantities for purchase for the Holt/Lugg trials
i ncluded 1.530 gallons being 7 x 45 gallon containers for
immediate despatch and 27 containers for later
IV-48
43
despatch. Clearly. the total amount of Reglone could
not exceed 2,655 gallons. It is unlikely that it exceeded
l. 980 gallons (calculated as the difference between the
purchases of 6, 345 gallons and the documented despatches
of 4.365 gallons).
Having regard to the 2,115 gallons returned from South
Vietnam by sea in February 1972. 44 the total amount of
used in South Vietnam would appear to be somewhere
between 2,250 gallons (i.e. 4,365 gallons from specific
despatch records less 2,115 gallons returned) and 4,230
gallons (6,345 gallons purchased less 2,115 gallons
returned). The Commission is satisfied that the best
available conclusion is that 1,530 gallons of Reglone was included in the November 1967 despatch and. accordingly.
the total quantity qf Reglone consumed in South Vietnam
was 3,780 gallons subject only to the small quantity
contained in the DEL 21 mixture dealt with later in this
section .
In February 1970 HQ lATF advised HQ ATF that it held 1,144
gallons of Reglone. sufficient for 60 spraying days, and
forecast a requirement up to August 1970 of a further
45 2. 000 gallons . In the absence of knowledge as to the
frequency of spraying days that aspect does not add much
IV- 49
although this
requirement for
communication does suggest an annual
1970 of at least 2,000 gallons. However.
the fact that stocks in February 1970 were 1,144 gallons
enables further analysis. Obviously, the stocks of 1.144
gallons pre-dated the arrival of the 3.015 gallons known
to have been despatched in February 1970 from Australia.
These two amounts total 4.159 gallons and deducting the
quantity remaining in February 1972 (i.e. 2.115 gallons)
suggests usage of 2.144 gallons of Reglone after February
1970.
Furthermore. assuming tha L the unspecified shipment late
in 1967 included 1.530 gallons of Reglone. and given that
there was a shipment of 1. 350 gallons late in 1968. then
the total quantity available for use prior to February
1970 would have been 2.880 gallons. Deducting the stock
remaining at that date (1,144 gallons) suggests usage
prior to February 1970 of 1.736 gallons. Combining the
pre - February 1970 and post-February. 1970 figures suggests
total usage of 1.736 + 2.044 3.780 gallons. Clearly.
this second analysis proceeds on the same assumptions and
accordingly the same result may be expected to arise. The
significance of this second analysis lies in the fact that
knowledge of the February 1970 level of stocks is
consistent with and in no way detracts from the previous
analysis.
IV-50
In all the circumstances the Commission is satisfied that
the total usage of Reglone was of the order of 3,780
gallons.
A herbicide known as DEL Defoliant 21 (also termed
DEL 21 was used on 12th April 1967
46
in a limited trial
over some 3,000 square feet (280 sq m) at Nui Dat. 46
DEL2l was a mixture of paraquat and diquat together with
DMSO. It would appear that the quantity used was small
enough to have been supplied from Australian Science
r b . 47 ,a oratortes in bottles and, being pre-mixed, only
required dilution prior to use in Vietnam.
Diquat (i.e. Reglone) was used in December 1967 - January
1968 in the first part of the Holt/Lugg trials, code named
Operation ORION, which involved testing a number of
chemicals, each applied to a 7 square metre plot with a
strength of 20 ml herbicide diluted with water to give a
volume of l litre. (The ten products so tested are
outlined in section 4.4 of this Chapter.) By monitoring
the effects on vegetation over the ensuing five weeks,
Lugg concluded that diquat was the most rapid-acting
. . 47
herb 1c :1de. The effect of diquat was summarised in
48
Table 2 of his report as follows:
IV- 51
l day
4 days
2 weeks
5 wee ks
TABLE 17
partial browning and withering
continued browning; 70\ plot death
continued browning; desiccation with 90\
plot death. Evidence of translocation
continued plot death; almost complete;
minor growth of grasses
Di qua t and paraquat were also used in the second part of
the Holt/Lugg trials. Army records suggest that
Gra moxone, Reglone and Tordon 50 - D were mixed with 88
ga llons (400 litres) of DMSO for Operation ORION in
December, 1967 49 and despatched t o Vietnam by air in
Jan ua r y. 1968. 50 The mixture. termed a 'knockdown
mi x t ure ' . was of the following proportions:
IV- 52
TABLE 18
Chemical Mixture No 1 Mixture No 2
Reglone 3.75 3
Gramoxone 1.25 1
Tordon 50-D 1 1
Agral 0.5 0.5
DMSO 2.5 Nil
Source: Exhibit 99, p13
The application of this mixture 'commenced on Sunday 3
December 1967 and continued until Friday 8 December
1967â¢. 51 Three modes of application were tested: spray
guns operated from the back of a truck; a spray boom also
located on the back of a truck (each using a 300 gallon
tank) and a similar spray boom attached to a No 9 Squadron
RAAF Iriquois helicopter (using a 100 gallon
52
tank) .
The fact that application by helicopter was available and
had been tested suggests the possibility of use of
helicopters for defoliation of inaccessible areas of the Nui Dat perimeter.
IV-53
It is clear that 9 Squadron RAAF was involved in the
Holt/Lugg 0 52 tr1als . Furthermore. it appears that the
RAAF carried out three sorties on 1 November. 1967 as part
o f Operation SANTA although the chemical used is not
53
known . The RAAF aerially sprayed Reglone in July 1968
53
as the Army Report notes:
In July, 1968, HQ 1 ATF requested the approval of
the Province Chief Phuoc Tuy to destroy crops in
a Viet Cong controlled area. The request advised that 1 ATF had the aircraft and spraying
for the task. 9 Sqn RAAF requested
particular information from 1 ATF and advised on the aircraft and methods to be used for the
task. On the same day. 1 ATF advised 9 Sqn RAAF
that clearance for the mission had been obtained and that the chemical to be used was REGLONE!.
Further, 1 ATF requested that:
'our chemical adviser accompany spray ac
[aircraft] to observe and advise' Confirmation that spraying actually took place is contained in a 1 ATF signal which states that
' DURING JUL 68 EN [enemy] GARDENS WERE
SPRAYED FROM A RAAr' RW [rotary wing] AC
[aircraft]. THRIVING CROPS OF GREEN CORN WERE KILLED WITHIN 24 HOURS'. Further confirmation is provided in HQ 1 ATF Intelligence Summaries for
the period which state in part '1 ATF with RAAF
assistance have carried out aerial spraying of
certain gardens. This will continue where it is
considered feasible. necessary and effective. '
Following Operation ORION a program was recommended for
e a c h wet season involving the use of Reglone (i.e. Diquat)
and Tordon 50-D (i.e. picloram and 2.4-D) being applied to
desiccate the vegetation which was then burnt off.
IV-54
Subsequently Hyvar - XS (i.e. bromacil) was to be used as a
soil . . 54 ster1lant. It has
requirement of diquat was
been suggested that the annual 55 2,000 gallons. It is clear
that the records of quantities despatched do not indicate
a sufficient quantity to enable such a program to be
carried out. Accordingly, either the program so described was not carried out or additionaL unrecorded quantities
of Reglone were forwarded to South Vietnam. The former is
more likely to be the case.
Major Holt's recommendations insofar as they involved
56
Reglone or Gramoxone were as follows:
IV-55
Spray t ype Vegetation
knockdown dense shrubs
and grasses
to 6ft high
g r as s spray grasses and
TABLE 19
Suggested
Time of
Application
pre or post
wet
pre or post
o r 'follow- small shrubs wet
up s pray
ce r eal spray
to 2 ft
early growing
stage
Reglone Gramoxone
(gallons) (gallons)
3
1 1
1 1
The absence of any indicat i on that further quantities of
Gra mox one were involved suggests that the knockdown
mi x t ure was adopted. On ' the other hand, the
r eco mm e ndations summarised in Table 19 may explain the
seemingly deficient supply of Reglone: if the 'follow- up'
mix t ur e was used from 1969 onwards then the annual
requiremen t for Reglone would reduce by two - thirds after
IV- 56
1968. The fact that the first specified despatch of
Reg lone to South Vietnam was in November-December 1968
(Table 16) suggests that the amount used in 1968 was less
than 2. 000 gallons. Given that 2,115 gallons of Reglone
remained in Vietnam as F b 44 . . at e ruary 1972, 1t 1s
unlikely that there was a shortage of Reglone. Hence the
available information is most consistent with a usage of the 1 follow-up 1 mixture during 1969, 1970 and 1971. This
usage would appear to require an annual supply of amount
667 gallons per annum and. assuming that the initial,
unspecified shipment was 1,530 gallons. gives a total
usage of Reg lone of about 3,530 which is broadly
consistent with the amount of 3,780 gallons mentioned
above.
55 EWPS reported to HQ AFV in September. 1971 that usage
of Reglone since December 1968 had been 95 gallons per
56 month . If this amount were used each month then the
amount so used would have been 3,135 gallons. However,
the effect of Major
program confined to
Holt's recommendations the period from April to
is a spray
57
November
and applying the monthly rate to these months only would
roughly halve this amount. In any event, the amount used
in the Holt/Lugg trials and the 1968 program would need to
be considered in addition. Hence, it is difficult to make
IV-57
any reliable inference from this piece of information as
to the total quantity of Reglone used in South Vietnam.
Evidence at Formal Hearings
Having examined the various reports and documents relating
to the use of Reg lone, Gramoxone, Tordon and Hyvar, it
remains to consider how that information compares with the
evi dence of veterans which the Commission received during
i ts Exposure Hearings. The witnesses to be considered are
Messrs Nunn, Erbs and Rhodes. The following consideration
does not purport to be a comprehensive consideration of
all such evidence: much of the evidence of veterans is
more appropriately dealt with in later sections of this
Chapter.
Leslie Robert Nunn was attached to 1 Field Hygiene Company
during his second
January, 1970 to
tour of duty in Vietnam which was from
58
January 1971. He acknowledged that
Tordon was used to kill vines and trees; that Reglone was
used to achieve a quick effect as a knockdown defoliant
and that Hyva r . 59 A h was used as a ground ster11ant s sue
h i s experience reveals a consistency with Major Holt's
recommendations and thereby suggests that they were
substantially if not fully adopted.
IV- 58
John Ceci 1 Rhodes was the Task Force Hygiene Officer at
Nui Dat from April 1968 to April 1969. 60 He recalled
having used Tor don, Hyvar, and Reg lone in South
V . 61
tetnam . Mr Rhodes initially suggested that Gramoxone
61
was used but later conceded that he did not use
⢠t 62 1 ⢠He indicated that, upon his arrival, he became
aware that '[i]n December 1967 and January 1968 a spraying
program has been done by an operations research group' and
that he 'had a couple of spots which had not been
defoliated at that stage ... They were at the end of
Luscombe Field'. 61 He further indicated that he had
spraying responsibilities at the village of Dat Do and at
the American advisers compound within the South Vietnamese
Army Training Centre at Baria.
61
Mr Rhodes indicated
that one area near Luscombe Field, which contained an
extensive amount of wire for the protection of aircraft
from enemy fire. was defoliated successfully by an RAAF
Iriquois helicopter applying Reglone and later Hyvar
pellets in about May 1968. 63 He also recalled the use
of helicopters to defoliate a series of food-growing
gardens in the Thua Tich area in about August 1968 and
claimed that the chemical sprayed was a mixture of Agents
Orange and Purple because he 'had no other herbicides
whatever left in the Task Force area'. 64 He identified
the purpose of this mission as crop destruction, the crops
IV-59
. d '11 65 be1ng corn an m1 . et. It is clear that this witness
was referring to the operations described in the Army
66
Report as being conducted in the vicinity of Thua Tich
on 28 July, 1968 to which reference has already been
67
made. The fact that clearance was granted and
approval to return fire for fire, 68 an aspect confirmed
d
. d 69 by Mr Rho es' ev1. ence ⢠suggests an absence of allied
troops within the vicinity of the area to be sprayed. It
should be noted that the chemical proposed was Reglone and
Mr Rhodes' claim that he used a combination of Agents
Orange and Purple as other herbicides were not available
confirms the earlier conclusion that there existed a
shortage of Reglone during 1968 rather than additional.
unrecorded shipments to South Vietnam.
Hence Mr Rhodes' evidence also confirms the view that
helicopters were used to defoliate inaccessible areas of
the base perimeter at Nui Dat. Insofar as his evidence
suggests a usage of Agents Orange and Purple rather than
Reglone for the defoliation of corn and millet crops on 28
July, 1968 as part of Operation SANTA FE, exposure to this
mixture would appear to be confined to those involved in
this particular mission.
IV- 60
Paul Erbs gave evidence before the Commission on Friday 10
February 1984. He served as a hygiene company corporal in
the latter part of his Vietnam service which was from
November 1969 to September 1970. 70 He gave evidence of
backpack spraying using diquat and replenishing supplies
from the back of 71 a Landrover and that he used Reglone
and Hyvar as perimeter defoliants, Reglone being the main 72 one. Mr Erbs also gave evidence of some involvement
in Operation MASSEY HARRIS which is well documented in the 73 Army Report. Mr Erbs described his occupation at the
time he gave evidence as a d . 74 me 1c. He subsequently
conceded in cross-examination that he spent only about 1t
of his time on first aid duties and the remainder as an
assistant 75 cook. This was but one instance which
demonstrated that his evidence had t o be treated with
caution and, to the extent that there were discrepancies
between his evidence and the account contained in the Army
Report as to Operation MASSEY HARRIS, the latter is to be
preferred and thus it is not necessary to deal in any
detail with his version of his involvement.
These witnesses provided substantial support for the
account contained in the various documents which have
become exhibits before the Commission.
IV-61
Clearly exposure to Reglone would have been greatest for
t hos e involved in handling the chemicals: loading. mixing,
carrying, spraying or cleaning implements. Section 6 of
t his Chapter deals with the instructions given by way of
safe t y precautions and the extent to which such
precautions were observed.
It should be noted that Counsel for WAA indicated on 15
February 1984 76 that they would not 'contend that
Vi etnam veterans suffered any long te r m detrimental effect
by reason of exposure to Gramoxone or Reglone used as a
herbicide in Vietnam'. Obviously, this did not finalise
the task of the Commission to inquire into such
chemicals . However. it did reflect a concurrence as to
t he lack of evidence to support any allegations that these
two particular chemicals were causing or contributing to
adverse health effects being experienced by Vietnam
ve t erans. This concession enabled Mr McPhee QC, senior
counsel for ICI to forego further attendance at formal
hearings of the Commission. This concession bears on the
issues of Exposure and Toxicology since an adverse health
effect requires not just exposure but also a level of
exposure which is likely to produce an adverse health
effect. The latter i ssue is a question relating to the
t oxicology of the chemical in question.
IV- 62
The effect of the addition of DMSO can be gauged from
Table 3 of G A Lugg's report (Exhibit 1061), dealing with
the comparative results of adding 20ml of DMSO to a 1
litre water- diquat mixture containing 20ml diquat; 77
TABLE 20
Spray 1 day 2 days 4 days
Diquat Partial browning Overall browning 70\ plot death
Diquat Overall Complete browning More than 90\
& DMSO browning and of plot plot death
withering
(N.B. N.N dimethylformamide was also used with diquat to produce a similar effect to DMSO)
The addition of DMSO was successful in speeding up the
intake of the chemicals into the vegetation and the
chemical process within the plant system. However. in
like manner, it accelerated the intake of the chemicals by the operators whenever they became exposed. The health
problems experienced in this regard are dealt with more
fully in section 4. 4. of this chapter. It is sufficient
IV-63
for present purposes to indicate that, because of these
health effects. the usage of DMSO was suspended and Major
Holt's report recommended that it should not be used
. . ⢠. 78
turthar lll oparatlOOS.
1.3 Insecticides
Insecticides were used in Vietnam to control diseases
carried by mosquitoes such as malaria, dengue fever,
filariasis and Japanese encephalitis which might affect the health of allied forces. It is clear that malaria was
the principal cause for concern: the incidence of malaria
in October, 1968 among Australian troops has been reported
as being the equivalent of an annual rate of 384 cases per
1,000 79 troops. The NAS 80 Report discloses the irony
that one of the ecological consequences of Operation RANCH
HAND was the creation of additional mosquito breeding
81 grounds. A reluctance on the part of troops, when in
combat areas, to use spray or rub-on personal protection
insectides is understandable due to the smell usually
associated with such products. Outside the base areas it
would obviously be difficult to conduct more conventional
ground - based methods due to either the nature of the
terrain or the presence of hostilities.
IV-64
Insecticide operations were carried out by both United
States and Australian personnel. us insecticide
operations. insofar as they may have led to the exposure
of Australian servicemen, were conducted by aircraft. The
motivation was similar:
By 1967, the total number of confirmed malaria
cases among American troops exceeded 10,000. In addition, viral encephalitis and
meningoencephalitis had become a serious problem and dengue fever was also commonly diagnosed.79
Spraying of the Nui Dat base with insecticide commenced in
1966 with the use of helicopters containing 200 gallon
tanks and capable of spraying 1.5 gallons/acre when flown
into the wind at 55 knots at an altitude of 100 feet. 82
Due to their greater capacity, fixed wing C-123 aircraft
soon replaced the helicopters. These operations involved
malathion and DDT. 83 However. policy directives dated 5
April 1967 and 10 May 1971 restricted operations to
1
. 84
rna at1non . The former directive suggests the approved
rate of application as half a pound per acre (i.e. 560
grams per hectare). C
. 2
ra1g has also suggested that the
Helicopter Insecticide Dispersal Apparatus Liquid (HIDAL)
spray system dispersed 560 grams per hectare. Buckingham
et al suggest that the application rate for insecticide
85
by C-123 aircraft was half a pound per acre.
IV-65
Herbicides were dispersed in large droplet size in an
effort to reduce spray drift. the target being
ground-based vegetation. However, the insecticide
comprised minute droplets which took the appearance of a
white fog that settled slowly on the jungle canopy86
The differences in particle size are dealt with in the
following table.
TABLE 21
Term Particle diameter
in microns ( 1. ooo microns
Fog - dry aerosols
- aerosols
Mists Sprays - fine
- coarse
Dusts - fine
- medium - coarse
0.1 10 50 100 400
45 45 175
Source: Defence Medical Services Committee, Pesticides Sub-Committee Report, 1972
to 10
to 50
to 100
to 400
or more or less
to 175
to 400
=
A number of aspects of the US insecticide operations are
well summarised at pages 3-139 and 1-140 of the Army
Report (Exhibit 892) as follows:
IV-66
1 mm
Aerial spraying of Nui Dat 19. United States Air Force. Aerial spraying of
1 ATF · was carried out be the United States Air
Force using Cl23 aircraft from the 7th Air Force
(7AF). On 26 July 1971 a Cl23 aircraft advised
that his call sign was 15, his base was Phan Rang
and he was under MACV and 7AF orders to spray Nui
Dat.
20. No Warning Prior to Spraying. On 2 August
1967 1 ATF was sprayed, and the same day lATF
advised HQ AFV that on the last three occasions
when spraying had occurred HQ 1 ATF was not
warned.
21. Regues ts for Weekly Spraying. 1 ATF made a
request to HQ AFV on 25 July 1968 that the aerial
dispersal of insecticides carried out at
infrequent intervals over Nul Dat be carried out weekly.
22. Proposed Aerial Insecticide Flights.
References have been found to a number of
proposed insecticide spraying flights to be flown over Nui Dat. However, it has not been
ascertained if these flights were flown. It is
believed that aircraft would take off on
scheduled dates, but that after they were
airborne, a decision may have been made to
complete runs in scheduled areas, change to
another area, or cancel .
23 . Proposed Flight Dates. The following
proposed insecticide flight dates scheduled for Nui Dat were located: a. 1 July 1967,
b. 2 October 1967,
c. 19 October 1967,
d . 2 9 May 19 7 1.
e. 1 July 1971,
f. 9 July 1971,
g. 17 July 1971,
h. 24 July 1981.
24. Aerial Spraying Luscombe Field - Nui Dat.
oc 161 ( Indep) Reece Fl t wrote to HQ 1 ATF on 24
May 1971 noting that 1 ATF had forecast an
increase in aerial spraying i n the 1 ATF area
during the coming wet season. He said that the
IV-67
solution used in the spraying reacted with the
perspex of Sioux bubbles and porter windscreens and caused that material to become pitted. In
turn this would affect the pilot's vision and
therefore the safety of the aircraft. At
Luscombe Field. the problem had been overcome by washing the aircraft immediately after the
spraying had been completed. A minimum of one
h our's notice of intended spraying was needed as 100 gallons of water had to be positioned so
washing could commence immediately after the
spraying had been completed.
Exh i bit 1065, a copy of a memorandum addressed to the
Aus t ralian Force Surgeon in Vietnam from USMACV in
a bout mid June, 1967 dealt with the aerial dispersal
of insecticides in the following terms:
1. Reference the attached inquiry (R515 - 1-1) on
insecticide equipment. 2. US force in Vietnam are using rotary and
fixed-wing aircraft for the aerial dispersal of insecticides. The following information on dispersal equipment is provided.
a. Rota.ry wing US forces in RVN are
currently utilising 6 prototype models of
the modified AGAVENCO spray system . This
equipment is designed for attachment to and use with the UH-1B/D model helicopter and
has the capability of dispersing low-volume, high concentrate insecticides. Fully loaded the rig weighs 2000 pounds, which is the
maximum load for the helicopter. Duration
of the spray operation varies with the
necessary flight pattern and the length of
pass, but usually take from 1. 5 to 2 hours.
During application, the aircraft flies at 80 knots and 75 feet altitude, producing a
spray swath width of 200 feet. Output is
adjusted to produce 0.5 pounds malathion per acre. Rig is attached to the aircraft by
IV-68
utilising standard aircraft lugs. Mounting holes align with the standardised pattern of tie-down mounts within the aircraft. The
spray boom extends 32 feet from tip to tip
and has provision for 50 nozzles. Usually
20 to 40 nozzles of the 4664 AL Diaphragm
Tee-Jet construction are utilized for the
57% malathion currently being dispersed. Additional information may be obtained from:
US Army Medical Equipment Research and Development Laboratory Flushing, New York
b. Fixed- Wing - the UC-123 aircraft, used
in the dispersal of herbicides and
defoliants is equipped with a permanently
installed spray system which can be modified for low-volume. high concentrate dispersal of insecticides. This has been done in RVN
and results have been quite good. Tank
capacity on this aircraft is 1000 gallons,
swath width is 250 feet, air speed 150 MPH,
at an elevation of 50 to 100 feet.
Additional information on this system is
also available at the research and
development laboratory cited above.
The Australian operations included both aerial and
ground-based spraying as a letter of 25 July, 1968
from the Commander of 1 ATF to HQ AFV reveals:
In addition to the ground control measures
carried out by 1 ATF, Nui Dat area receives an
aerial dispersal of insecticides at infrequent intervals. A decrease in the mosquito population is evident for some five to seven days after each
treatment.87
Insecticides were obtained both from United States and
Australian sources. Although no records of exact
quantities procured from us sources appear to be available
IV- 69
t here is an almost complete record of receipts and issues
of insecticides by RAASC Supply Platoon at Nui Dat. 88
Records disclose monthly figures which are also summarised
in the Army Report for the following periods:
(a) 25 December 1967 to 24 December 1968;
(b) 25 December 1968 to 24 December 1969;
(c) 25 December 1969 to 24 December 1970; and 89
(d) 25 December 1970 to 24 September 1971.
A summary of the total receipts and issues is contained in
Table 22: it should be noted that receipts prior to 25
December 1967 are not recorded with the consequence that
figures for receipts and issues will not necessarily
balance. It would appear that Lindane and Diazinon were
also ava i lable through US sources. 88
Similar data in respect of Vung Tau is not available. The
Senate Committee received a letter from the Department of
Defence dated 21 October 1982 which addressed this issue
i n the folowing terms:
Although the details contained in the table
relate only to Nui Dat and not to the whole of
the Australian Force in Vietnam, advice from Army Office is that they are indicative of the total
position and represent the greater part of the
insecticide receipts and issues in Vietnam .
IV-70
Records of receipts and issues at other RAASC
units have not been found.89 TABLE 22
Commodity Unit of Total Total
Measure Receipts Issues
Aerosol Insecticide - large dispenser 12 oz 142 542 133 557
- small dispenser 6 oz 12 639 20 793
Lindane - tin 2 oz 36 816 36 132
- liquid gall (Imp) 526 380
- powder pounds 1 117 1 092
Chlordanea gall (US) l 045 2 940
Malathiona gall (US) 2 958 2 792
DDT - powder a pound 4 595 3 945
- liquid gall {Imp) 2 265 2 975
Diazinon - liquid gall (Imp) 2 672 2 571
- powder pound 2 850 2 832
Dieldrinb 475 430
Insecticide spray KDc gall (Imp) 1 320 1 415
Mite/tick repellentb 87 143 80 622
Creosoteb 3 056 3 209
Insect Repellentb - larger bottle 3 oz 131 506 123 502
- smaller bottlea 2 oz 35 079 44 776
Dapsone packets 150 tabs 2 470 300 2 360 350
Paludrine packets 1400 tabs 8 607 500 7 117 000
a specifically identified as being from US stocks b quantity not specified
c Q.own' sprays. all of which were pyrethrin based
Source: Annexure B to Chapter 2. Exhibit 892
Two Australian insecticide repellents (one for personal
application; the other for clothing) replaced .a
dual-purpose US product in November 1968. 88 Surplus
IV-71
stocks of insecticides appear to have been disposed of by
either returning stocks obtained from us sources,
inclusion in the Gift Stores program or using the
c hemicals to disinfect items of stores and equipment prior
to their return to Australia: no records were found in the
compilation of the Army Report to suggest destruction or
dumping of insecticides in
90
instructions relating thereto . â¢
South Vietnam or any
Aus t ralian insecticide operations are usefully summarised
by base location in Book III. Chapter 2, Part 3 of the
Army Report (Exhibit 892) as follows:
Action at Bien Hoa
The first instructions for the prevention of
malaria were issued by 1 RAR at Bien Hoa in
1965. This covered the use of paludrine, nets.
protective clothing, repellent and other
measures. 1 RAR directed that sub- units were to
maintain a hygiene squad for this purpose and
advised on the use of residual and knock- down
insecticides.
In addition to anti-malarial precautions,
instructions on anti - mite precautions were issued to prevent scrub typhus. This concerned the
smearing of clothing by hand with
Dibutylphthalate. The instruction advised that this chemical was 'harmless to skin and clothes'. Action at Nui Dat
The first Malarial Control and Hygiene Squad was formed by 1 ATF under the Hygiene Officer in
IV-72
1966. Its functions included supplementation of measures carried out by units.
In July 1967, the Hygiene Officer 1 ATF advised
that a firm program of malaria control had been
established at l ATF. This included aerial
spraying of the Hoa Long/Nui Dat area with
Malathion every three weeks (40 oz per acre) and
systematic fogging of the 1 ATF area with 5%
Malathion in distillate in a seven day cycle.
The report also advises that there was little
mosquito breeding in Nui Dat, but that extensive breeding still occurred in Hoa Long village
nearby.
There were problems in insect control as reported by the l ATF Hygiene Officer in his next report.
The fogging equipments held by 1 ATF units were
inadequate and insufficiently robust. The supply from Australia of various insecticides was poor, there was difficulty in obtaining Diazinon,
Lindane and Chlordane from the American supply organisation, and the readily available Malathion was not considered appropriate for use in the Nui Dat area.
Despite these difficulties in 1967 the October to December 1968 report indicated that unit areas in Nui Dat could be sprayed twice weekly, and Fire
Support Bases twice daily during operations.
As a result of the unsatisfactory nature of the
issue and general use of insecticides, HQ 1 ATF
issued instructions on their application and use in December 1970. In particular, the instruction warned of the toxicity of all the residual
insecticides and limited their use to trained
RAAMC health personnel.
A further instruction was issued by HQ 1 ATF in
May 1971. This apparently concerned a new
spraying program. The same methods as used
previously were to apply. In addition there was
a possibility that aerial spraying by helicopter was to be used. That aerial spraying of the 1
ATF base had been an ongoing occurrence is
evidenced by the SMO 1 ATF in May 1971. He also
notes that the RAAF 'have sprayed 1 ALSG for
about 2 years' using equipment of their own
design. As a result of his discussions with the
IV-73
20th Preventative Medicine Unit (US), the SMO
concluded that helicopter spraying of
insecticides in the 1 ATF area would be
advantageous. The required technique was the
high concentration/low volume technique, not high volume/low concentration technique which had been used by the RAAF at 1 ALSG. A frequency of
spraying of once each two weeks was recommended.
Procurement action was then set in train, one
document of this transaction referring to the
'machine in current use'. This suggests that a
US helicopter was being used in the interim.
La t er the 20 Preventative Medicine Company were not able to arrange an aircraft but hired or
loaned equipment was used on RAAF helicopters
during this period .
Action at Vung Tau
There is evidence on the files that insecticide
operations in Vung Tau closely paralleled those at Nui Dat. In addition to regular aerial
spraying by the RAAF suggested by the SMs 1 ATF.
a pest control team was formed in the 1 ALSG area
i n 1968. This team was responsible for fogging.
spraying and baiting operations under the control of the Staff Captain 'Q' HQ 1 ALSG. In addition
to this team, Pacific Architects and Engineers
were conducting regular spraying of the 1 ALSG
area under contract.91
Ho wever. it is also necessary to consider the Australian
insecticide operations according to the means of
d i spersal: aerial and ground-based spraying.
The research team which compiled the Army Report
discovered five confirmed insecticide spray flights by 9
Squadron RAAF of 1. ALSG at Vung Tau. These flights
involved 14/15 October 1970, 14/15 January 1971, 21/22
January 1971. 16/17 April 1971 and 23/24 April 1971 which
IV-74
suggest a three-monthly program involving a follow- up
flight one week after the first. Records were also
located which indicated that the RAAF sprayed 1 ALSG by
helicopter prior to May 1971 for about 2 years although
only the abovementioned dates could be confirmed. 92
The Senate Committee reported :
The earliest record of RAAF helicopter spraying is 4 September 1966, when an unidentified
anti-malarial spray was used on domestic
facilities in the Nui Dat area. It appears from
the records that similar flights continued during 1966- 67 and again from mid - 1970.93
Apart from possible exposure to insecticides whilst at
Australian bases, troops were potentially exposed to
insecticides during field operations. one recorded
incident involved C company of 5 RAR who reported on 22
March 1968 that they were i n the vicinity of a landed
helicopter that had been spraying insecticide although the report did not indicate whether that company claimed to
. . . 94
have been directly exposed to the 1nsect1c1de spray.
A consideration of official records in respect of ground
spraying of insecticides resulted in the following
inclusion in the Army Report:
IV- 75
Ground Spraying of 1 ALSG
Fogging Aparatus. A Todd Insecticide Fogging
Apparatus (TIFA) arrived at 1 ALSG about 19
December 1966 from Australia and a second TIFA
was expected to arrive during January 1967.
Spraying of 1 ALSG 18-19 June 1967. A fogging
program is recorded as having been conducted at 1 ALSG Vung Tau over the period 18-19 June 1967.
During that period, the hygiene team sprayed the
whole of 1 ALSG area with a residual insecticide
spray, in conjunction with all units using a
knockdown spray.
Formal Ground Spraying Program. On 12 July 1968 HG 1 ALSG instituted a formal ground spraying
program whereby the trailer-mounted fogging
machine would be driven through unit lines at
Vung Tau between 1800-2000 hours each Monday,
Wednesday and Friday.
Ground Spraying of 1 ATF
Responsibility. Ground fogging with a vehicle
mounted TIFA was the responsibility of Det 1 Fd
Hyg Coy, under control of the Hygiene Officer 1
ATF. Ground fogging and spraying of bunkers,
weapon pits and buildings within unit areas was a unit responsibility in those units with Hygiene personnel and appropriate equipment.
Formal Ground Spraying Program. The following
formal program was commenced in 1 ATF on 13 May
1971 and divided into the following sections.
a. Exterior Fogging. Exterior
ground fogging with residual with knockdown on request.
fogging was
each week and
b. Interior Spraying. Interior spraying
consisted of spraying of all bunkers, weapon pits and insides of buildings with residual each month.
c . Operational Spraying and Fogging.
Operational spraying and fogging was
spraying and fogging of Fire Support Bases
and Night Defence Positions.
IV-76
Informal Ground Spraying Program. No recorded evidence has been found prior to 13 May 1971 of a
formal ground insect eradication program at Nul Da t. However, it would appear that an insect
eradication program had been conducted based on the following known information:
a. Request for TIFA. In August 1967, HQ 1 ATF
requested that four TIFA be located in Phouc Tuy. The request implies they were in
possession of one TIFA.
b. Spraying and Fogging. Spraying and fogging
was conducted between 1630 hours and 2000
hours, commencing 30 July 1969, by a vehicle travelling on roads throughout Nui Dat. An
itinerary is not recorded, and therefore it
is not known if this was to be done daily,
weekly or monthly.
c. Supply of Residual Insecticides. On 30
September 1970 the Hygiene Officer 1 ATF
stated that the supply of residual
insecticides to Nui Dat was constant and
adequate. 95
One incident involving the use of aerosol insecticide led
to the hospitalisation of a soldier who had become
involved with a colleague in spraying each other with the
aerosol whilst within a tent on 11 April 1968.
Consequential orders were issued in an effort to prevent a 96 recu.r renee. Otherwise, there does not appear to be
any evidence of Australian troops being hospitalised
during the period 1965 to 1972 as a result of having been
exposed to either aerial or ground
. 97
spraying. The
absence of significant short-term effects has consequences
dealt with more fully in the Health Effects sections of
this Report.
IV-77
I t remains to consider the evidence of veterans in respect
o f insecticides. A large number of veterans indicated
their recollection of being in contact with insecticide e ithe r from flight missions or ground base sprayings.
Ma ny soldiers had difficulty recollecting the frequency of
s u c h operations at the base areas due to their involvement
i n field operations. Of those who were stationed at the
base s t he most common recollection as to frequency was
fo r t nightly. A number of veterans gave evidence at the
Expo s ure Hearings of the Commission. The most significant
e v i d e nce on this topic was that of Brigadier William Orril
Ro dgers (Transcript pages 260- 283 and 320- 434) who
a ppe a red to give evidence of his own experience and not on
behalf of the Army or the Department of Defence. His
sta t ement. which was written from memory with little
recourse to documents, became Exhibit 1062.
At the time he gave evidence (18 January 1984) Brigadier
Rodgers was the Director of Medical Services for the
Au stralian Army . He graduated in Medicine in 1958 in
Ade la i de and became a fellow of the Royal Australian
Co llege of Physicians. He holds a Diploma in Tropical
Me di ci ne and Health from London; he has also studied
Mi litary Psychiatry, Military Epidemiology, Military
P reventa t ive Medicine and Mili t ary Surgery all. again, in
IV-78
the United Kingdom. He was commissioned in January 1956 and has seen service as a Medical Officer both in
Australia and overseas in the United Kingdom, Germany,
Papua New Guinea. Malaysia. Thailand, Singapore and
Vietnam. He saw service in Malaya in 1961-63 and visited
Vietnam i.n January/February of 1963 as part of
reconaissance operation. He served in Vietnam during
1966-67 and 1969-70. He impressed the Commission both by
his qualifications and skill and by his demonstrable
integrity.
As to malaria. Brigadier Rodgers indicated:
[m]alaria [was] seasonal and epidemic. The peaks of high incidence occurred despite an antimalaria discipline of high order. Personal antimalaria discipline involves non-exposure of skin to
mosquito bites. use of insect repellents and the
taking of chemical prophylaxis ... [T]he malaria
rate dropped miraculously when Dapsone was added to the proguani 1 chemo-suppress i ve regime. The
incidence of malaria [in South Vietnam] was much higher in those troops who were in contact with
the reservoir population, i.e. the indigenes
and/or the enemy.
This is understandable when it is known that the
vector, the anopheline mosquito, has a finite
flight range. Without doubt malaria was the
greatest cause of morbidity in Vietnam from
B65 - 1969.
There were only two deaths from malaria [amongst] Australians and these occurred in 1965 in US Army hospitals. before 1 ATF was deployed to Phuoc Tuy
IV-79
province. My task in 1966 was to reduce the
mosquito population in Nui Dat as much as
possible. This was done by a concerted attack on
b o th larvae (residual spraying, aerial spraying, swamp draining etc) and adults (residual
s praying, knockdown spraying avoidance of
villages etc).98
Brigadier Rodgers dealt with chemicals used in Vietnam in
t he following terms:
Mite/Insect Repellents
3 6. te Repellent. Each soldier was issued with
a plastic container of the miticide Dimethyl
Phthalate (DMP). This chemical is applied by
hand into the cloth of the â¢jungle green' uniform
using a standard drill so that no area of the
un i form is overlooked. DMP remains in the
uniform for up to two washes, although it
progressively and quickly washes out in the
rain. DMP repels the Trombiculid mite, which is
t he vector of scrub typhus, before this arthropod has a chance to bite the skin. It is of
significance that in Vietnam very few cases of
scrub typhus "''ere seen and no soldier died of
this disease. I cannot explain the low incidence
o f the disease in comparison with my Malayan
experience. In World War II in the South West
Pacific area, scrub typhus was a major cause of
morbidity. In some outbreaks in this
pre- antibiotic era, the mortality rate was as
high as 80%. DMP has no side effects and I have
never seen an instance of sensitivity or
i diosyncrasy to this chemical.
37. Insect Repellent. Each soldier was issued
with a plastic container of Dibutyl Phthalate
(DBP) and was instructed to use this on his skin,
mosquito veil and hat and jungle greens. whenever mosquitoes were present, particularly at night, dusk and dawn. When sweating DBP must be
re - applied as often as every half hour. It
should be understood that although the soldier is
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ins true ted to wear his protective dress or use
his mosquito net during the 'mosquito biting
hours' this is not always possible as, for
instance, when in ambush position where all
senses are required. Furthermore individual
mosquito nets which fit the narrow inflatable
field mattress tend to become kicked loose very
easily and although piquets (sic) and sentries
are told to check these nets, this can be a
dangerous practice in an operational setting.
Insect repellent on the sk i n is therefore
essential and must have saved many cases of
arthropod borne illness (malaria, scrub typhus, dengue fever, encephalitis, chikungunya and
filariasis). The only disadvantage of DBP is
that it will render watch glasses opaque and will irritate eyes if applied directly to them. I
have never had a patient with sensitivity or
idiosyncrasy.
Insecticides 38. General. Insecticides were used extensively throughout the Australian Force in Vietnam. The insecticides used were not new or different from
those used in civilian communities all over
Australia. The methods of application were,
however. novel in that aerial dispersal from
aircraft and from various fog and mist generators were not common practice in Australia.
39. The area that needed insecticide most was the
1 ATF base camp in Nui Dat and, after the first
few months. the outlying camp at 'The
Horseshoe'. Because there were many breeding
areas be tween the village of Hoa Long and the
perimeter of 1 ATF this area and the village was
sprayed by fixed - wing aircraft. The total area
sprayed by the Cl23 aircraft was 31 square
kilometers (12 square miles).
40. Helicopter spray ope rat ions by US Army
helicopters/aircraft, and on one or two occasions by RAAF helicopter, were very effective, but time consuming and damaging to the aircraft .
41. All insecticide missions were recommended by me and authorised by the Commander 1 ATF. I
satisfied myself that where the US Army were
dispersing insecticide this was done by competent
IV- 81
practitioners. I accompanied several of the
flights. I ensured that the insecticide was
indeed reaching the intended target in the proper concentration by laying out plates.
I''urthermore. I had several biological indicators from which I gauged effectiveness. My advisors were very competent specialist preventive
medicine practitioners from the US Army 20
Preventive Medicine Unit. Before recommending aerial dispersal by either rotary or fixed-wing aircraft I investigated the effectiveness of the practice and discussed the matter with the
highest US Army medical authorities in RVN. I
was convinced that if we were to minimise the
diseases spread by arthropod vectors. then we had to spray by air. The twelve square miles and the
several inaccessible areas in Nui Dat dictated
this. 42. Aerial spraying was done in 1 ATF with
rna la thion acquired from US sources. Depending on the method of dispersal this was used in
different concentrations and with different
diluents/carr iers. Aerial spraying was directed mainly at the larvae mosquito but as it was
residual, it was [also) effective against the
common house fly, the adult mosquito, possibly
the scrub typhus mite and the destructive and
ubiquitous biting rubber ant. As a side effect
the population of frogs and snakes diminished.
Indeed, birds and small jungle fauna were rarely
seen. Malathion was also used for area fogging
and misting.
43. Other insecticides acquired from Australia were:
a. Pyrethr in which was used as an insect adult
knockdown â¢ainly dispersed by the fogging
and misting apparatus. Pyrethrin was also
issued to all soldiers in the form of
individual aerosol pressure packs.
b. DDT which was used as residual spray in
tents, buildings and areas accessible to
spraying personnel. Also used in powder
form against fleas in conjunction with rat
baiting programs. c.. Dieldrin used for specific purposes under
the auspices of the hygiene officer.
IV-82
44. Other insecticides acquired through the US
Army system were used, but only for specific
purposes, e.g. diazinon, lindane chlordane.
45 . I [was] aware [that] all of these
insecticides with the exception of Pyrethrins, may have serious and cumulative effects and this was taken into consideration. Spraying
operations were conducted only when needed, and not routinely.
46. Although insecticides were used extensively and were dispersed in many different ways, I
never saw anyone in RVN affected either acutely
or otherwise by insecticides. To my knowledge
there were no accidents involving the dangerous concentrated insecticides. Rules for personal protection when spraying insecticides were
promulgated and were taught to all specialist
hygiene personnel as part of their routine trade
training. It should be noted that because of the
heat in RVN and particularly in Nui Dat,
insecticide dispersal operators could not
function in protective dress for any length of
time, and there was a tendency for them to divest
of clothing when not under close supervision.
47. I am of the firm opinion that had
insecticides, particularly those dispersed by aircraft. not been available in the 1 ATF area,
then the incidence of arthropod borne disease
would have been much higher. I would have
expected substantially more malaria,
encephalitis, dengue, chikungunya and other
arbovirus, filariasis, possibly scrub typhus, and fly borne disease such as dysentery and
hepatitis. It is not possible for me to quantify
this, however, I am convinced that the extensive
use of insecticides saved many lives .....
Anti Malaria Drugs
51. Antimalaria drugs were used by every soldier in Vietnam. Nominal rolls were kept and soldiers were given tablets under supervision. Where this procedure was not possible, for instance in
remote operational situations or when on leave, soldiers were given a supply of tablets for self
medication.
IV- 83
52 . The antimalarial drugs varied at different
stages of the war and in different areas. The
following drugs were used:
a. Proguanil (paludrine) 2 tablets per day.
b . Dapsone (DDS) - after 1968
c. Chloroquine and Primaquine - all servicemen
took an eradication course of these drugs
prior to return to Australia.
Many antimalar ia tablets have acute side effects but these are usually quite mild and diminish
with time. However, many soldiers suffered
severe acute blood problems with the
primaquine/chloroquine course, in some cases
necessitating reduction of the dose of
c hloroquine or even cessation of treatment. I am not aware of any long term sequela in those who
s uffered side effects.
After introduction of Dapsone in 1968 eleven
soldiers suffered a most severe blood complaint -agranulocytosis. Fortunately, none of these
soldiers died . The illness was thought at the
t ime to be due to the drug Dapsone. It was
suggested that one shipment of Dapsone had been
delayed in the unrefrigerated hold of a ship in
Panama, and the drug had deteriorated to such an
e xtent that degradation products were the cause of the problem. Fresh supplies of Dapsone
i mported from Australia resulted in no further
c ases. However:, because of these problems with
Dapsone the drug was only used when the risk of
death from malaria exceeded the risk of death
from Dapsone . 99
Les l i e Robert Nunn' s evidence a l so touched on the use of
ins ec ticides with wh i ch he became familiar when he was
att a c hed to l Hygiene Company in Vietnam from January 1970 to J anuary 1971. Prior to this Royal Commission Mr Nunn
p r o v i ded a statutory declaration asserting the use of DDT,
IV-84
chlordane, dieldrin, diazinon, malathion and pyrethrins in
Vietnam during his tours of duty. 100 There is no reason
to doubt that claim. The 'Pesticides 101 Report'
suggests that the Department of Defence has not found any
records of insecticides other than rna la thion being
provided for use by Australian forces in . 102 V1etnam.
The absence of records proves little and is inconsistent
with a body of material suggesting such use.
In view of the conclusions reached on the topic of
exposure to insecticides, it is not necessary to further
deal with the evidence of Mr Nunn or other Vietnam
veterans who gave evidence on the topic of exposure to
insecticides in the course of the Exposure Hearings of the Commission. The fact that such evidence is not dealt with
in detail does not mean that it was not helpful or
reliable. Indeed, such evidence brought to light the more practical aspects of insecticide operations and, as such, made the official records 'come to life'.
In summary. it is not clear precisely what was sprayed,
where and when or to what extent. Any purported analysis
would be of spurious accbracy as to any quantitative
assessment of the exposure of any individual serviceman.
However, it i.s possible to assess 1 ik:ely exposure levels
IV-85
as high, medium or low (low including ' not at all').
Further. that appropriate categories of exposure to
refl e c t the differing experience of servicemen are
a ppli c ators. base personnel and other soldiers (on field
o pe ra ti ons at various times). Having regard to the data
a vai lable. as contained in Annexures A and B to Chapter 2
of the Army Report as to the dates of receipts and issues
(summa r is ed earlier in Table 22), The Commission assesses
the li kely exposures of Australian personnel as follows :
Insecticide
Diet hyl toluami de Dibu t yl phthalate Aeros o l cans Malathion Diazinon Lindaue Chlo rda n e Di e l drin DDT Pyrethr i ns
TABLE 23
Period of use
? - 1971
? - 1971
? - 1971
1 965 - 71
? - 1971
?,1969 -? - 1970
? - 1971
1965 - 71
? - 1971
71
Likely Leve l of Exposure Applicators Base Other
Personnel Soldiers
high high high
high high high
high high med i um
high h i gh medium
h igh medium low
high medium low
h i gh medium low
high medium low
high medium low
high medium low
It Ls i mpor t ant to realise that the use of the word 'high'
in t he above t able rela t es to the 1 ikel i hood of exposure
rat he r than to the level of exposure: for example, in
res pe ct of Malathion it is h i ghly l i kely that applicators
we r e e xposed. The level of exposure is governed by
IV-86
factors such as the duration and number of tours of duty
as well as the frequency of usage of a particular
chemical. Hence, it is to be expected that for
applicators and base personnel the norm would have been
exposure to Malathion approximately weekly for twelve
months (being the usual length of a tour of duty). The
significance of exposure levels is dealt with in the next
section of this chapter.
It is to be noted that in one tour (6RAR) almost 20% had
elevated titt:es fot: Japanese B encephalitis, yet only a
handful had suffered any illness. 103 This indicates
infection but a successful immune response preventing
onset of the disease. Such instances reveal the
effectiveness of the immunisation program. In like manner the low incidence malaria confirms the effectiveness of
the preventive program and thereby provide strong
confirmation of exposure to the chemicals which comprised
that program.
The success of the program which was concerned with the
health of Australian troops cannot be overlooked. Nor was it: Brigadier Rodgers was awarded the Order of the British Empire in 1967 for his services to Australian soldiers
serving in V . 104 1etnam. On the basis of his
statement. 105 his evidence given in the Exposure
IV-87
Hearings of the Commission and the assistance which he
rendered during the course of the Commission's visit to
Vietnam in March 1983 such recognition was well deserved.
2. EXPOSURE MODELS
As already indicated, exposure or proximity to chemical
a gents used in the course of the Vietnam conflict cannot
be considered 1n isolation: it is critical to consider
dose as we ll . It is only through a combined consideration
o f whether a person was exposed to a chemical agent and,
i. f exposed, the likely extent of such exposure that a
proper assessment can be made of the likelihood of health
effects arising.
In order to provide some guidance as to the extent of the
exposure required in order to result in health effects a
number of witnesses gave evidence of what may be termed
'exposure models'. These models provide a benchmark.
based upon certain stated assumptions, against which any
particular exposure(s) might be assessed.
Dr Donald Crosby
The statement of Donald Gibson Crosby became Exhibit
llll. Dr Crosby is a toxicologist who for more than 20
IV-88
years has been on the faculty of the Department of
Environmental Toxicology at the University of California.
He has also been involved in the California Agricultural
Experimental Station. His particular interest has been
the environmental degradation and fate of herbicides and
related chemicals.
He indicated that when Agent Orange is applied to foliage
in ester form by means of a droplet spray. the droplets
disappear within a few minutes. Like other organic
liquids, the droplets of the material spread so as to form
a film on the surface of the leaves which would appear
shiny. The material could wipe off on skin and clothing
if firm contact were made with it but would not fall off
the surface of the leaves.
Dr Crosby's estimate was that after 12 hours the film of
herbicide would not longer be visible and the sprayed
leaves would be indistinguishable from any other leaves.
He suggested that during that period (i.e. 12 hours) the
rna ter ial would have been largely absorbed into the leaf.
He indicated that it would probably be possible to rub a
little of the herbicide off the surface of the leaf by
firm contact with it but that only a small proportion of
the amount originally deposited at that stage could be
removed in that way.
IV-89
Dr Crosby suggested that after about six hours in full
sunlight it would not be possible to detect any TCDD in
t h e material on the leaves and it would not be possible
for anyone to transfer TCDD from the leaves to their skin
or clothing by brushing past the foliage after the
expiration of that period. He further indicated that
during that period. sufficient ultra violet light energy
would have been absorbed from the sunlight in the presence
of 2. 4-D and 2. 4. 5-T esters to cause the rapid breakdown
of the TCDD.
As to exposure via soil, Dr Crosby indicated that the
t i ghtness with which TCDD binds to soil is of considerable
i mportance in that this quality makes it very difficult
and unlikely for the TCDD to come off the soil onto the
skin or clothing of persons coming into contact with the
soil. Indeed, he indicated that it is very hard to remove
TCDD from soil for analytical purposes and he noted the
views of Poiger and Schlatter that it is unlikely that
appreciable TCDD in soil would be detached from soil and
enter the body of a human or animal, even if
He ind i cated that there is a theoretical possibility of
a ttachment of TCDD to the skin and leaves of fruit and
vegetables from herbicide spray drift but that any such
surface - adhering material would rapidly photo degrade.
IV-90
The no-effect (NOEL) level for a compound in a particular
species is that dose of the compound assessed by
toxicologists to produce no harmful or other effect in the species even if absorbed daily for the whole of the life
of the species.
Dr Crosby indicated that the FDA and EPA have concurred in
a NOEL of TCDD for humans of one nanogram per kilogram of
bodyweight per day which corresponds to about 80 nanograms
per day in an adult male. Dr Crosby believed that this
was a very conservative figure and that up to 10 nanograms
per kilogram per day would be safe. i.e. 800 nanograms per
day in an adult male .
If one were to eat fish contaminated to the extent found
in fish from the Saigon River by Baughman and Meselson,
then Dr Crosby's calculations suggested that it would be
necessary to eat about a kilogram a fish each day in order
that the one nanogram per kilogram (very) safe level of
i ngestion could be exceeded. Dr Crosby added that
biochemical degradation of TCDD has been demonstrated in
mammals and involves conversion. by metabolic
hydroxylation, to a much less toxic form.
In paragraph 14 of his statement, Dr Crosby indicated:
IV-91
Vaporisation of Agent Orange does not involve the volatilisation of the substance as a whole but of its individual constituents separately. For
e xample. 2, 4- D butyl ester volatises faster than the butyl ester of 2, 4, 5-T. For all practical
purposes, TCDD does not volatilise at all. Thus, while the process volatilisation of Agent
Orange would involve increase in the
concentration of TCDD in the not volatile
residue, it also follows that any inhaled vapour
would contain no TCDD. On the other hand, the
odou r would provide a strong signal of the
presence of the herbicide.
Dr Crosby concluded that the combined operation of the
absor ption of Agent Orange by foliage, volatilisation and
the c ontemporaneous process of photo degradation meant
tha t in dappled sunlight or, more specifically, assuming a
level of ultra violet light in the lower areas of the
fo r e s t at 20% of that contained in full sunlight, one
wo uld expect little to be left of any constituent of Agent
Orange on fol i age to be transmitted to skin or clothing of
persons brushing against that foliage three days after
s p r ay i ng had taken place.
Dr Hermann Poiger
He rmann Poiger, the senior scientist at the Institute of
To x icology, Federal Institute of Technology and University
of Zurich, Switzerland. has undertaken work on
pha rm acokinet ics and the metabolism of TCDD since 1978.
IV-92
Both on his own and with others he has undertaken research
in relation to TCDD. its metabolism, metabolites and its
toxic qualities. Some of his joint work has been with the
Director of the Institute, Dr Christian Schllater, as the
earlier reference of Dr Crosby indicates. Dr Poiger' s
statement became Exhibit 1210. In paragraph 8 of his
statement, Dr Poiger indicated a number of propositions
based upon his research:
( i) TCDD metabolises in a number of animals.
Whilst the metabolic rates differ according to species the fact that TCDD metabolises
in dogs, rats and hampsters indicates that
it is likely that it metabolises in humans
as well.
(ii) The differences in susceptibility to TCDD among different species can be explained, at least in part, by different rates in
metabolism and excretion.
(iii) The biotransformation of TCDD is a process of detoxification. The compounds which are formed by metabolism of TCDD in dogs are
phenolic derivatives and when injected into the most sensitive of species (i.e. the
male guinea pig), are at least 100 times
less toxic than TCDD itself. Tissue
storage of the TCDD metabolites is very
unlikely.
(iv) The excretion rate of TCDD varies according to species. When comparing the dog and the
rat in this regard it is probable that the
reason for the variation is that the dog
has higher levels of enzymes or that the
enzymes which it has act faster.
(v) TCDD uptake is highly dependent on its mode of application. The rate of absorption of
IV-93
TCDD and the amount absorbed varies
according to the mode of application or
ingestion and the medium with which the
TCDD is mixed for the purposes of
application or ingestion.
The rate of dermal absorption of TCDD is
approximately one-tenth of the rate of
absorption where TCDD is administered
orally.
Further, in para 10 Dr Poiger conceded that, as at the
t ime that he gave evidence, he had not carried out
e xperiments on humans in relation to:
(a) Human uptake of TCDD as a result of dermal
contact is likely to be less than if TCDD is
ingested orally;
(b) The rate of human dermal absorption is less
than that of the rats on which my
experiments were carried out, namely rats of a hairless variety. Their skins are thin
and not as resistant a medium to penetration by TCDD as the human skin. The permeability
of the human skin varies according to the
part of the body on which it occurs. but
those portions of the human skin which are
normally exposed to the elements, e.g.
hands, upper forearms etc., are less
permeable than other portions of the human
skin, e.g. on the genital organs, and are
much less absorbent than the skins of the
rats. Thus I would expect a human to absorb
less dermally per kilogram of body weight
than would a rat of
the test variety to which a corresponding
application of TCDD was made. (c) The fact that when TCDD is adsorbed on to
soil or carbonaceous material there is a
very substantial reduction in the
bioavailability of the absorbed TCDD is
significant in relation to TCDD which is
present in the general environment. In the
IV-94
general environment TCDD is adsorbed on to various materials such as soil and plant
sui: faces. Its presence on these materials
decreases the availability of TCDD both for dermal and intestinal absorption.
(d) If TCDD is ingested orally in conjunction
with fibrous material such as is present in
fruits and vegetables he would expect that
any TCDD present in the ingested substances would have a reduced bioavailability.
On the bas is of his research and the experiments which he
has conducted in relation to the effect of mixing TCDD
with soil (e.g. soil taken from the Seveso region of Italy
but free from TCDD contamination}, Dr Poiger suggested
that the longer the contact time of TCDD with soil the
less its bio-availability and that even where the period of contact was 10-15 hours a reduced bio-availability was
demonstrated. He indicated that experimental results had
shown that TCDD was substantially or almost totally
immobilised in the particles after contact of only eight
days.
It was Dr Poiger 's opinion that the longer the period of
contact between TCDD and soil the greater will be the
binding effect achieved between the soil and TCDD. Hence,
that there would be a further reduction in
bio-availability, especially in the case of dermal
application. Dr Poiger suggested that the more organic
IV-95
ma tter present in the soil the less bio-availability and
that t he presence of such organic matter in the soil would
a l so result in a higher bio-degradation of TCDD than would
be the case, for example. in sand.
An appendix to Dr Poiger's statement
106
dealt with
d irect spraying in open country and in jungle terrain.
These pages combine practical assumptions with
t ox icological information and, in view of their usefulness
a re set out in full:
DIRECT SPRAYING IN OPEN COUNTRY: ASSUMPTIONS
l. A soldier in an open field with no canopy
protection; 2. Agent Orange sprayed at the rate of 3
gallons per acre; 3 . A concentration of TCDD of 2 ppm in the
Agent Orange; 4. The dress of the soldier consists of battle
trousers. army boots. long sleeved shirt
(with sleeves down) and a soft rag hat but
with his hands. face. neck and the "V" of
his chest exposed (i.e. at most 5% of his
body exposed); 5. The permeabi 1 i ty of the exposed skin of the
soldier is the same as that of the hairless
rat in the experiments. (An assumption
which is extremely conservative since the
human skin has been shown experimentally to be much less permeable for most compounds
tested to date). 6. A worst case which equates the penetration
rate of human skin by the TCDD with that of
TCDD dissolved in methanol; 7. A body weight of the soldier of 70 kgs.
The average t hus giving
body area
an exposed is approximately 1. 5 m2. area for the soldier of
IV-96
not more than 750 cm2. The deposition rate of
TCDD would be 5.797 ug/m2 and if the 750 cm2
of exposed skin is assumed to consist of
horizontal surfaces on which deposition could
take place (as on the ground) a total amount of
0.435 ug of TCDD could be deposited. This amount is much more than is (really) likely since
treating the 750 cm2 of exposed skin as
horizontal surface is not justified.
On these assumptions the amount of TCDD which might then
be absorbed by the soldier 1 s body would be a maximum of
0 1305 1 86 /k f b d
. h 107
. ug or . ng g o o y we1g t. The amount
actually absorbed would be likely to be less.
A one-time administration of such an amount would not, in
D P
. . . . l . l . k 106 r o1ger 1 s op1n1on, pose a tox1co og1ca r1s . The
Commission agrees with and adopts Dr Poiger 1 S opinion.
A more likely set of assumptions (since defoliation in
open country could not be expected to be the norm) was put
to Dr Poiger as follows:
DIRECT SPRAYING IN JUNGLE: ASSUMPTIONS
1. A soldier in a triple canopy jungle;
2. Agent Orange sprayed at the rate of 3
gallons per acre: 3. A concentration of TCDD in the Agent Orange
of 2 ppm;
4. A spray penetration rate in the forest of
10%;
5. The whole of the amount of TCDD entering the
lowest compartment of the forest is
deposited on the ground, i.e. none is
IV-97
intercepted by and bound to the foliage in
such compartment: 6. No TCDD has been lost as a result of
photodecomposition or microbial degradation: 7. The spraying took place 8 days prior to the
presence of the soldier: 8. A body weight of the soldier of 70 kgs:
9. The dress of the soldier consists of battle
trousers. army boots, long sleeved shirt
(with sleeves down) and a soft rag hat but
with his hands. face, neck and the "V" of
his chest exposed: 10. The permeability of the soldier's skin is
the same as that of the skin of the hairless
rat: (an assumption which is extremely
conservative since human skin is very much less permeable than the skin of the hairless rat used in the experiments): 11. The soldier smears his face, neck and hands
with soil for camouflage purposes: 12 . The amount of soil in contact with the
soldier as a result of the smearing is 10
gms dry weight: (this is the figure which
was used by Kimbrough et al in the CDC study
(Exhibit 1364) which determined up to 1 ppb
as a safe level for TCDD):
13 . A depth of 2 ems from which the soil is
taken and a weight of soil of 1.5 gms/cm3:
14. The whole of the TCDD which falls on the
ground is in the top 2 ems of soil: (this is
a very conservative assumption. Up to 90\
would be more likely).l08
Th e amount of TCDD which would be ava i lable in the soil
2
woul d be 0. 58 ug/m . The weight of soi 1 to a depth of 2
em s will be 30 kg in 1 square metre giving a concentration
o f 0.0193 ug/kg, i.e. 0.0000193 ppm (19.3 ppt).
The 10 gms of soil applied to a soldier would contain
0.000193 ug. Making the above assumptions and on the
basis of Dr Poiger' s experiments the total amount which
IV-98
would be absorbed by the soldier would be 0.1% of the
amount of TCDD present in the soiL i.e. 0.000000193 ug,
which for the 70 kg man assumed results in 0.00000276
ng/kg of body weight. This is far below the presently
achievable limits of detection and was not, in Dr Poiger's . . f . l . l . . f. 109 op1n1on, o any tox1co og1ca s1gn1 1cance. Again,
the Commission accepts Dr Poiger's opinion and adopts it.
Dr Ian Munro
Ian Craig Munro, a Canadian toxicologist who gave evidence
to the Commission, was also asked to make a number of
assumptions and express his expert opinion on the basis of
those assumptions. Those assumptions, as set out in the
transcript at page 2373, were as follows:
l. A soldier in Vietnam;
2. Agent Orange sprayed at the rate of three
gallons per acre when aerially sprayed; 3. A mean concentration of TCDD of 2 ppm in
Agent Orange; 4. The dress of a soldier usually consisted of
battle trousers, army boots, a shirt with
sleeves rolled up and with his shirt undone
to the waist but wearing soft rag hat;
5. A body weight of the soldier of 70 kg;
6. Wet with spray twice in one year from aerial
spray;
7. In jungle within 20 km of a spray path but
not directly sprayed six times during that
year;
a. Walking through jungles recently sprayed
from time to time during the same year;
IV-99
9. Using a backpack sprayer to spray vegetation
for a week continuously during the day once
in that year but with access to washing
facilities and changes of clothes during
that week:
10. Sleeping on the ground between 100 and 150
times during missions in areas previously
sprayed, with varying recentness: 11 . Applying soil to exposed skin for camouflage
purposes:
12. Not washing self or clothes during missions
of up to six weeks:
13. Ea t ing fruit, vegetables and occasionally
fish or animals from areas sprayed or within 20 km of spraying from time to time:
14. Drinking water from areas previously sprayed or within 20 km of spraying: 15. Drinking water collected from jungle foliage previously sprayed with varying recentness.
Dr Munro was then asked whether he would expect long term
to x i cological effects of any sort from that level of
e xpo sure. He indica ted that he would not and when asked
why. he responded:
Well, I think I have to pre-empt any statement by
saying under the conditions you have outlined
wh i ch are rather extensive it is almost
impossible to estimate with any precision the
precise quantitative risk of exposure because you d i d not present any information with respect to
t he dosage that would be received. I think there
are certain features in relation to the exposure as you have outlined it that I can comment on,
that is, based at least upon my knowledge of the
an i mal toxicity studies. I would not expect long
term effects such as cancer from such exposure
because in animal studies it is fairly clear now
that long term high dose exposure, certainly to
near toxic doses of dioxin is required over a
very long period of time, essentially the
lifetime in order to produce toxic effects like
cancer and therefore I would conclude that
i ntermittent and low level exposure over a short
IV-100
period, let us say in the range of six months to
two years, I would not expect would induce any
measurable long term effects.llO
Dr Munro indicated that although he gave cancer as an
example, his opinion also covered neurotoxic and
behavioural effects as well as the range of other general
toxicological effects.
He was then asked:
If we add to those assumptions the assumption of daily exposures to malathion used for vector control, would that change your
answer?---Based on what we know about the
toxicology of these two substances,
particularly keeping in mind in so far as
one can, the relative degree of exposure I
would not expect that exposure to malathion used as- a vector control agent would
increase the risk from TCDD exposure.llO
Professor Bo Holmstedt
Bo Holmstedt is a Professor of Toxicology with the Swedish
Medical Research Council, Department of Toxicology,
Karolinska Institute in Stockholm. His statement became
Exhibit 1198. Dr Holmstedt dealt with the significance of chloracne as a sign of exposure in the following terms:
IV-101
Chloracne is a sign of exposure to a number of
chlorinated cyclic organic compounds, including TCDD. Heavy exposure to these compounds is
believed always to produce chloracne. Chloracne thus serves as a sensitive marker of such
exposure.
While the absence of chloracne does not
absolutely negate exposure to a dose of TCDD, its ab s ence usually indicates that there has been no
exposure to a toxic dose of the substance. I use
"toxic" as including both systemic and local
e ffects.
Whara there has been exposure to TCDD and
chloracne has resulted, it is the only clinical
sign wh i ch persists for a long period. It may
persist for the course of the exposed person's
life . In a large group exposed to mixtures containing
TCDD. the absence of chloracne: C a) makes it improbable that there was exposure
to a toxic dose;
(b) renders it unlikely that systemic disorders will result.lll
As indicated earlier. Lo 50 is a term used in toxicology
to d e note a dose which proves to be a lethal gose in 50\
o f a population to each member of which that dose is
ad mi ni s tered. Dr Holmstedt indicated that 2. 4. 5-T has an
LD50 when administered orally to rats of about 300
mi l i grams per kilogram of body weight and that the
co rrespond i ng figure for 2,4-D is 375 miligrams per
k i logram body weight. 112
I n c onsidering the symptoms of exposure to malathion, Dr
Ho lmstedt assessed those symptoms as symptoms one would
IV-102
get from an acute dose of this compound. He described the
amount of malathion which one would need to ingest to get
symptoms of the sort described as "grand doses" 113 and
indicated that it would not be likely to achieve such
grand doses by the wetting of skin.
When asked whether it would be likely that symptoms of
malathion exposure would develop years after exposure by
spraying in the absence of acute effect, Dr Holmstedt
replied:
I worked with this compound in malaria
eradication in Africa. Before that we had
exposure of volunteers and I supervised the spray teams and I supervised the population and I
measured the cholonesterase in the blood of these people and we could not find any substantial
decrease in the enzyme activity of those people
that were sprayed with malathion.ll3
Dr Holmstedt indicated that no adverse health consequences
through the use of malathion were observed throughout that
African program in the late 1960s early 1970s. 114 Dr
Holmstedt was asked to assume spraying of malathion by
aircraft twice a week and internally to huts once a week
over a period of one year. He replied that: "Without
knowing
f
II 115
sa e .
the local conditions,
IV-103
I would consider it
Dr Frank M. Dost
Dr Frank M. Dost is an Extension Specialist in Toxicology
and Environmental Chemistry and Professor of Agricultural
Chemistry at Oregon State University. Dr Dost was asked
to make the following assumptions:
1. A soldier in an open field with no canopy
protection; 2. Agent Orange sprayed at the rate of 3
gallons per acre; 3. The concentration of TCDD of 2 parts per
million in the Agent Orange; 4. The dress of the soldier consisting of
battle trousers. army boots, long sleeved
shirt with the sleeves down and a soft rag
hat but with his hands, face, neck and the
"V" of his chest exposed; 5. That the permeability of the exposed skin of
the soldier is the same as that of the
hairless rat in the Poiger experiments; 6. That the penetration rate of human skin by
TCDD is to be equated with that of TCDD
dissolved in the carrier methanol; 7. A body weight of the soldier of 70 kgs .116
In relation to assumption number 4 Dr Dost estimated the
area of the exposed portion of the soldier in such
circumstances as one tenth of a square metre, i.e. 1000
square centimetres. He also indicated that he would
regard assumption number 5 as conservative in that he
assessed that the ability of human skin to absorb the
material was probably less than that of the hairless rat
in the Poiger experiments. Dr Dost' s calculations gave
IV-104
the result of a contact of . 58 micrograms. And, assuming
an absorption rate of 10% he calculated that the
individual would absorb about .058 micrograms. On the
assumption of 70 kilograms body weight he obtained a dose
level of .3083 micrograms per kilogram, i.e. a little less
than .001 micrograms per kilogram. This measurement was
far less than the no effect level derived in the
experiments of Koc iba et a 1. 117 Furthermore, the dose
administered in the Kociba experiments was daily virtually
for the life of the rats. Dr Dost indicated that he would
not expect any toxic effects from a dose received in
accordance with the given assumptions.
Dr Dost was given a second set of assumptions:
1. A soldier in triple canopy jungle;
2. Agent Orange sprayed at the rate of 3
gallons per acre; 3. The concentration of TCDD in the Agent
Orange of 2 parts per million; 4. A penetration rate of the spray in the
jungle of 10% to the last compartment. i.e.
the compartment from the ground to six feet
above the ground; 5. That the whole of the amount of TCDD
entering that lowest compartment is in fact deposited on the ground, meaning that none
is intercepted by and bound to the foliage
in that compartment; 6. That no TCDD has been lost as a result of
photo decomposition or microbial degradation; 7 . That the spraying took place eight days
prior to the presence of the soldier;
IV-105
a. That the soldier had a body weight of 70
kilograms;
9. That the soldier was dressed in battle
trousers. army boots, long sleeved shirt
with the sleeves down and the soft rag hat,
but with his hands. face, neck and the "V"
of his chest exposed; 10. That the permeability of the soldier's skin
is the same as that of the skin of a
hairless rat; 11. That the soldier smears his face, hands and
neck with the soil for camouflage purposes; 12. That the amount of soil in contact with the
soldier as a result of the smearing is 10
grams dry weight; 13 . That the whole of the TCDD which falls upon
the ground is in the top 2 centimetres of
that soil; 14. That the soil which is used in assumption 11
for camouflage purposes is taken wholly from that top two centimetres of soil and has a
weight of 1.5 grams per cubic centimetre; 15. That the deposition rate is the same as in
the previous assumptions, i.e. 5.8
micrograms per square metre but reduced to
0. 58 micrograms per square metre because of the 10\ penetration rate.118
Dr Dos t was then asked whether he would expect any toxic
e ffects on the soldier. He indicated that he thought not
and went on, "I would be very. very confident that there
would be no effect. There is an incredible dilution
here." 119 (emphasis added).
In re-examination by Counsel Assisting, Dr Dost dealt with
t he relationship between short term and long term effects
as follows:
You were asked some questions by my learned friend Mr Mcinnes about weight loss, about
IV-106
anorexia, about liver damage, about thymus injury, about kidney damage, matters of that order in relation to TCDD?- ---Yes.
Are those effects effects that you would expect acutely soon after application - within six weeks of application or years
later?----Those kinds of effects, the loss
of appetite and so forth would probably
occur if exposure was large enough; it would
probably occur within perhaps several days.
In the absence of the occurrence of any of those
signs or symptoms within a few days or
weeks, would you axpect long term
consequences?- - --Not normally. I think that
if the dose is of just the right order that
-· as you know, the lethal effect of TCDD is
long delayed. It takes sometimes weeks
before a lethal dose will cause death.
Presumably there are going to be lesions
that develop late in that time course, so it
would really depend on the dose.
Are we talking about weeks and months or are we talking about years?--- -We talking about
at most a few weeks, very few weeks.120
(emphasis added)
2,4-D and 2,4,5-T
The rates of aerial application of herbicide in Vietnam
were of the order of 15 kilograms per hectare of 2,4-D and
2,4,5-T. 121 However, in Phuoc Tuy Province 90\ of Ranch
Hand herbicide was applied for defoliation purposes with
only about 6 % reaching the ground through multi-canopy
forest . 122 vegetat1on Even assuming that 40% reached
ground level the intensity of the spray would be six
kilograms per hectare of 2,4-D and a like amount of
IV- 107
2 . 4. 5 - T. These amounts are the equivalent of 600
mil ligrams per square metre. If a soldier were lying
na ked o n the ground he would present an area of about 1
sq u a r e metre of skin to the falling droplets and
a cco rd i ngly, may be exposed to 600 milligrams of 2,4-D and
2 .4.5 - T. Assuming a body weight of 70 kilograms gives a
dose of about 8 . 5 milligrams per kilogram body weight.
Ho we ver. the degree of absorption by the skin must also be
co nsidered. Assuming the upper limit of skin absorption
of 6\ then the absorbed dose would be 0.5 miligrams per
kilo grams body weight . This is only about 1\ of the
estimated minimum dose required to produce toxicity.
Dosa ge due to contact with sprayed plants may be expected
to be less than via direct exposure due to the uptake of
2 .4.5- T into plants and its degradation on the forest
flo or.
Bearing in mind the composition and application rate for
Agent White, quantities to which a soldier lying naked on
t he ground would have been exposed are 300 milligrams of
2.4 - D and 75 milligrams of picloram. Assuming a 70
k ilogram body weight these figures convert to 4 milligrams
pe r kilogram body weight in the case of 2.4-D and 1
mil ligram per kilogram body weight in respect of
IV- 108
picloram. Assuming an absorption factor of 6% these
figures convert to 0.25 milligrams per kilogram in respect of the 2,4 - D in Agent White and 0.6 milligrams per
k.i logram in respect of the pic lor am in that herbicide.
The latter figure must be compared with the LD 50 value
for acute toxicity in mammals of between 2000 and 3750
. 11. , . 1 . h . l 123 m1 1grams per ogram 1n t e case of p1c oram.
124
Ramsey J C et a l . examined the rate of absorption of
2.4.5-T (l kilogram per litre) in a group of 21 forestry
workers engaged in spraying herbicide from helicopters.
back packs and tractors. The workers took. no special
precautions to minimise exposure to themselves. The
estimated dose from a full day's work ranged up to 0.063
milligrams per kilogram for back pack sprayers and 0. 07 3
miligrams per k i logram for herbicide mixers. Tractor
drivers absorbed 0.04 mi ligrams per kilogram and
supervisors 0.011 miligrams per kilogram. The primary
route of absorption was through unprotected skin. About
2% of the dose was absorbed via the respiratory airway.
Lavy e t a 1 125 measured 2. 4, 5-T absorption in back pack
sprayer and, following a three hour spraying period
observed inhalation of 0.1 mi ligrams and skin contact of
82.6 miligrams for a 65 kg man. The calculated skin
IV-109
absorption factor (i.e. the proportion of 2,4,5 - T on
e xposed skin which is absorbed) was 3-6\, giving an
absorbed dose of 0.077 miligrams per kilogram.
Experiments in human volunteers have demonstrated that
almost all of oral doses of 5 miligrams of 2,4,5-T are
absorbed into the body126 and that 2,4,5-T is rapidly
excreted, unchanged, by the kidneys with the half - life of
clearance from plasma and appearance in urine of about 20
hours. 127
The likely maximum ground level application rate of TCDD
following aerial spraying of Agent Orange may
calculated by using the following estimates:
Maximum Agent Orange application rate = 40 kg/ha. Proportion of Agent Orange reaching ground level = 30\.
Maximum likely TCDD concentration = 5 ppm. Maximum TCDD application rate at ground level
following TRAIL DUST mission = application rate x proportion reaching ground level x TCDD
concentration (40 kg/104 m2) X 0.3 X (5 X 10-6)
6 ug/m2 or
6 millionths of a gram/square metre or 6 x lo-10 grams/square centimetre
be
This agrees very closely with the estimate of 8. 8 ug of
TCDD per square metre made by Reggiani in 1980
128 . Six
2
ug/m is 6 orders of magnitude less than the TCDD
IV-110
concentration in the Missouri horse arena (which was 4. 5
grams and is l/40th of the TCDD
concentration in Seveso Zone A. It is similar to the
mean TCDD concentration in Seveso Zone B. the zone from
which no people were evacuated, and in which the chloracne
incidents was similar to the even less contaminated Zone
R. To date, no long term health effects have been
detected in the inhabitants of Zone B. 130
Since soldiers would probably have had very much less
exposure to sprayed soil than inhabitants of the
contaminated Zone B. it is difficult to see how long term
health effects could be observed in troops as a result of
TCDD exposure from soil.
Direct spraying with Agent Orange would yield a maximum
cutaneous dose of 6 ug of TCDD which is 1/3 of a
cutaneously applied dose (16 ug) which has been shown to
d . ff 131 pro uce no tox1c e ects.
TCDD is insoluble in water and is rapidly photodegradated
on the surface of plants, so intake through drinking water
or passing through defoliated areas after several days had
elapsed would be negligible. Further, walking through
vegetation in which some appreciable amount of skin or
IV-111
clo t hing contact with vegetation occurred would imply a
j ung l e of such density that a great deal less than 30% of
t he sprayed herbicide would reach ground level and hence
be available for human contact even immediately after
spraying.
Wit h a maximum concentration of coastal fish of 979 parts
per trillion (ppt) of TCDD and an estimated minimum toxic
do s e of 7 ug for a 70 kg man, one would have to eat about
100 kgs of the most heavily contaminated fish in the space
o f 2 - 4 weeks in order to approach the minimum toxic dose
of TCDD. As fish i s estimated to have comprised about 1%
of t he diet of Australian troops ingestion of toxic
c oncen t rations of TCDD through food appears extremely
unlikely.
I nhalation
The fact that the diameters of the sprayed droplets of
herbi c ide were very much larger than the diameters needed
f o r lung deposition to occur, coupled with the low
volatility of TCDD, means that respiratory exposure to
TCDD would have been negligible.
IV-112
Sprayers
Australian personnel possibly sprayed 1240 litres of Agent Orange in 1966. If one assumes that the skin absorption
factor for TCDD is the same for 2,4,5 - T, and that the TCDD
concentration in Agent Orange is 5 parts per million then
the most heavily exposed applicators possibly absorbed
36.5 x 10- 6 ug per kg body weight per day. This is
l/2800th of the estimated minimum toxic dose of TCDD which
indicates that it is very unlikely that any Australian
received toxic doses of TCDD as a result of perimeter
spraying with Agent Orange in 1966.
Evidence of John Bamford
Comparative evidence of exposure is also obtainable from
the evidence of John· William Bamford. a land management
officer employed by the Victorian Department of
Conservation of Forests and Lands. Mr Bamford commenced
his employment with that Department in August 1970 and,
when he first joined the Department, was employed as a
spray hand and in that capacity used hand - held wands
attached by hoses to a pressure tank. mounted on wheels and
pulled behind a land rover. He initially used an 80%
solution of the ester form of 2. 4. 5-T and later a 40%
IV-113
s olut i on. In the course of his duties he sprayed
somewhere between 800,000 and 1,000,000 litres.
Mr Bamford's statement became Exhibit 1126. Paragraph
t hree of that statement indicated that he did not wear
g l oves. hat or other protective clothing: merely long
trousers and a long sleeved shirt in the cooler weather
and long trousers with a short sleeved shirt in warm
weather.
Paragraph 5 of this statement indicated a particular
i ns tance where he entered the 180 gallon capacity spray
t a n k for the purpose of making repairs. He was inside the
t ank for some five minutes and was naked at the time. The
ta n k at that stage contained roughly 150 gallons and the
level of herbicide was some 18 inches below the top of the
t a n k which was about 4 - 4 1/2 feet in diameter and
c y li ndrical in shape. In respect of the instance when he
was locked in the tank, an occasion when he was
e ndeavouring to fix the agitator , he did not wash or
s hower for about 4 or 5 hours after the incident.
Mr Bamford also used knapsacks for about 4 - 6 weeks every
12 months, ma i nly in inaccessible areas where the trailer
IV- 114
could not be pulled behind the land rover. Additionally.
he used a knapsack mister for about 1 day in 16 .
Mr Bamford's involvement in herbicide spraying spans a
longer period than that of spray applicators in Vietnam.
Not only is the period of his involvement longer than the
normal tour of duty (l year) but his involvement was much
more constant. Furthermore, he has given evidence to the
Commission of an incident which resulted in substantial
direct exposure to virtually the whole of his body. And
paragraph 5 of his statement indicates that such an
incident was by no means an isolated one.
Paragraph ll of his statement was not admitted during the
exposure hearings as evidence of health effects was not
being taken at that time. However. it was subsequently
admitted and it discloses "I have no health problems and
none of my children has any health problems or other
disabilities". Mr Bamford has three children born in
1966, 1973 and 1980.
Whilst Mr Bamford's experience alone is not definitive on
the issue of exposure to 2,4-D or 2,4,5-T. it does provide
some evidence and, as such, weighs against short term or
long term effects as a result of limited exposure to such
herbicides.
IV- 115
The e xposure models dealt with in this section are of two
Lypes : either a consideration of conditions in Vietnam to
esti ma te the dosage level based upon certain assumptions or . on t he other hand. the dose required in order to
p r odu c e adverse health effects (short term or long term).
The r e are two consequences of this consideration of
e xp osure models. The first
cons ideration of all the aspects
sp ray drift) of exposure of
he rbicides in Vietnam is not
is that a detailed
(e.g. wind direction and
Australian servicemen to
warranted: attempts at
prec ision are unnecessary and, in any, event , of spurious
accuracy.
The s ec ond consequence is that the available toxicological
i nformation (cf Chapter V) establishes that a dosage level
necessary to produce adverse health effects would not have
bee n reached in service in Vietnam. This conclusion sits
c om fo rtably with other conclusions in this Report.
3. DIRECT AERIAL EXPOSURE
The greater proportion of herbicide usage in South Vietnam
was by aerial application: either by fixed-wing aircraft
IV-116
or helicopters. Apart from the location of the flight
path the question of the extent of the spray drift and
volatilisation must be considered. In order to assess the extent of any direct exposure to such aerial dispersal of
herbicides, there are essentially two methods of
approach. The first involves a consideration of the
official records of flight paths and troop movements; the second involves a consideration of the evidence of
individual veterans. There is no doubt that members of C
Company of 5 RAR were proximate to a fixed - wing herbicide
flight mission of 22 August 1969. Accordingly, a
consideration of that occasion is included in this section.
3.1 Herbs Tapes Analysis
Bruce Manning of the Department of Veterans' Affairs
produced five volumes which became Exhibits 1067, 1068,
1069, 1075 and 1076. These volumes were the result of his
extensive work in checking and correlating evidence as to
the location and particulars of Ranch Hand herbicide
missions with all the available material as to the
location of Australian troops in order to determine the
distance between such missions and Australian personnel
or, as Mr Manning referred to it, the "proximity" of
troops to such missions.
IV- 117
The sources and manner of preparation of the HERBS tapes
3
ar e discussed in the NAS Report at Page III-31 et seq.
Another convenient discussion is to be found in the AVHS
Report on November 1981 at page 48 et seq. The NAS Report
concluded that:
Despite its various shortcomings, and although the immediate source of information the log
book - was not intended for the purposes to (sic)
which the information was used by the Committee, the HERBS tape is the best, and in fact, the only
c omprehensive compilation of the major part of
the herbicide operations conducted in the Vietnam War . 132
It is to be noted that the same view was adopted in the
133 Senate Report .
Th e HERBS tapes have been criticised on various grounds
fo r inaccuracy and incompleteness. These critic isms are
c onveniently discussed on pages 31-39 of Section I I I of
the NAS Report and that discussion and related aspects of
t he question are further discussed by Mr Manning in his
Basic I 134 Volume at page 27 et seq. Mr Manning notes
that a random sample of more than 200 original missions
reports checked against the HERBS tapes showed that the
HERBS tapes correctly recorded the relevant
. f . 135
1n omat1on.
IV-ll8
A high degree of correlation between continuing visual
evidence of herbicide missions records in Landsat
photographs and flight paths as recorded on the HERBS
tapes, was demonstrated in an excellent piece of
scientific work by Dr R . h d 136 1c ar s. This work
concentrated on the Rung Sat region as that was an area
which was heavily sprayed. There is no reason to believe
that a similar analysis of any other area would yield a
different result. Dr Richards' report is Appendix 1 to
this chapter.
Messrs Dudenhoeffer and Hubbs, who were directly involved
in the Ranch Hand program, gave evidence before the
Commission at its exposure hearings. Mr Dudenhoeffer
explained the accuracy of navigation achieved by Ranch
Hand navigators usipg radio cross-fixes on the Tacan
navigation system with which the Ranch Hand's aircraft
were . d137 equ1ppe
available from and the
altimeters which were
the
radio 138
used.
accurate height readings
pulse operated absolute
Mr. Dudenhoeffer made it
clear that the mission reports on which the HERBS tapes
were ultimately based included details of the exact
co-ordinates between which the spray was actually deposted . . 139
as recorded after the miss1on by the lead nav1gator.
IV-119
Wi nd speed and direction, he explained, were able to be
a ccu r ately determined by reference to smoke from rockets
de liberately placed for that purpose or otherwise
a va i lablP. in the area and that missions did not proceed
whe r e the wind was above the permitted maximum
140 speed . The accuracy of the maps used was determined
by survey flights conducted before defoliation
. . 141
m1ss 1ons .
Mr Dud e nhoeffer also testified that spraying was not
carried out later than 11 am or when the temperature
e xceeded 85° fahrenheit 142 or when weather conditions
might operate to cause the spray to extend beyond the
desi red swath .
Th e Comm i ssion found Messrs Hubbs and Dudenhoeffer to be
co nv i ncing and reliable witnesses.
One of t he criticisms levelled against the HERBS tapes is
that it fails t o take into account dumping, that is to
say . t he use by Ranch Hand crews of a valve which enabled
the m, in an emergency, t o jettison the entire contents of
the aircraft's herbicide tank within 30 seconds . Dumping
was put i nto its perspective both by Mr Dudenhoeffer and
Mr Hubbs. The former flew some 160
. . 143
mlSSlOnS the
IV-120
latter 400 . . 144 mlSSlOnS Yet their personal involvement included ·only one instance of dumping each145 .
Moreover. any instance of dumping was in fact the subject
of a detailed report which had to be prepared by the lead
. t h. b 144 nav1ga or upon 1s return to ase.
In addition, despite the generalised allegations made as
to the unreliability of the HERBS tapes (for example, the
initial submission lodged by WAA. Exhibit 1040. at pages 26-27 and pages 33-34) no material has been put before the
Commission to establish any specific instance of herbicide
being sprayed from Ranch Hand aircraft otherwise than in
accordance with the material recorded on the HERBS tapes.
This proposition does not overlook the evidence of Messrs
Daniels and Freeman which is considered later in this
chapter. On the contrary, the detailed analysis which
emerged from the examination and cross-examination of Mr
Ducker demonstrates quite convincingly the high degree ·of
accuracy of both the HERBS tapes records and the material
related to troop location.
Some doubt as to the accuracy of the troop location data
was expressed by Mr Walker. the first witness to give
evidence before the Commission. He said that he "would
never have been surprised after a days march for a unit to
IV-121
be anything up to 1000 [metres] out, depending of the
nature of the 146 country". However, he conceded that
such an error had occurred only once in his
0 147
exper1ence.
This i s to be contrasted with the evidence of Mr Walker ' s
ba t talion commander, Brigadier Kahn. He described the
navi gation training of the Australian officers as being
s econd to none and said that, while he would not be
surprised at some units being up to 500 yards out of their
position at times, error as lar:ge as
he would be immensely worried by an
148 1000 yards. He also explained the
checks that were available to prevent such an event
occurring149 including battalion supervision (which, in
the case of his battalion. included supervision from the
command helicopter). artillery fire, smoke and helicopter
contact.
S i mi larly, Mr Ducker was able to express a high degree of
confidence in the positions in which he had fixed his
t r oops on 22 August 1969 150 despite the 1 imi ted
vis i bility that was available in the area through which he 0 151
was mov1ng.
IV-122
3.2 Spray Drift and Volatilisation
In compiling his proximity analysis, Mr Manning adopted a
5 km criteron. He described this as "necessarily an
arbitrary figure" 152 apparently in order to accommodate any distribution of herbicide as a consequence of drift
and volatilisation outside the primary spray swath. He
referred to advice from "US authorities", based on test
studies at Eglin Air Force Base in Florida suggesting that
under operational conditions in South-East Asia, 75% of
the herbicide inluding drift and volatile moities would
have fallen within the spray swath and the remaining 25%
within 1 km.
1 153 . Young et a g1ve the parameters in relation to Ranch
Hand spray missions as:
mean deposit rate - 3 gallons per acre
swath - 260 feet + or - 20 feet
spray line - 8.7 statute miles (14 kms)
quantity dispense - 950 gallons
If the mean swath width of 260 feet is adopted the above
figures are internally inconsistent as the following
calculation reveals:
IV-123
The
was
area of spray rectangle 260 feet x 8.7 statute miles
x 5280 feet per statute mile
11,943,360 square feet
274 acres
thus, the deposit rate per acre 950/274
3.46 gallons per acre
(not three gallons per acre as specified).
evidence
in fact
of Mr Dudenhoeffer was 154
16 kms in length
that the spray line
i.e. 10 miles. The
following calculation, made on the basis of a 10 mile
spray path, indicates the correctness of Mr Dudenhoeffer's
figure:
area of spray rectangle 260 X 10 X 5280
13,728,000 square feet
315 acres
deposit rate 950/315
3.01 gallons per acre
If only 75\ of the herbicide actually fell within the
spray swath then the acutal deposit rate would be in the
region of 2.25 gallons per acre.
If in fact 25\ of the herbicide drifted in one direction
only (i.e. down wind) for 1 km, then adopting the maximum
IV-124
figure suggested by the Eglin Air Force Base tests and
assuming an equal distribution of the drifting herbicide
over that area a concentration of herbicide in that area
may be calculated as follows:
area of drift 0.625 miles (1 km) x 10 miles
6.25 square miles
4,000 acres
amount of herbicide deposited on drift rectangle
25\ x 950 gallons
237.5 gallons
deposit rate per acre 237.5/4,000
0.059 gallons per acre
ie, concentration less than 1/50th of a concentration of 3 gallons per acre and about 1/40th of the concentration
which would be experienced if 75% of the herbicide fell
within the spray swath.
If it were to be assumed that drift occurred to the extent
of 5 kms then.
deposited spray
concentration of
assuming the
so drifts
herbicide
same proportion of
(i.e. 25\). the
distributed over
the
mean
the
theoretical drift rectangle would be 0. 0118 gallons per
acre or less than 1/250th of the theoretical concentration
IV-125
of 3 gallons per acre or about l/200th of the acutal
concentration per acre assuming a deposit rate within the
spray swath of 75\.
Furthermore, any drift may be expected to consist of
droplets at the smaller end of the droplet sizes and,
since there is an increasingly small percentage of
droplets at each stage of droplet size as the end of that
spectrum is approached, there would not be an even
distribution of drifting particles throughout the drift rectangle. Accordingly. the concentration at the extreme end of the drift area (whether a 1 k:m or 5 k:ms criterion
is adopted) would be substantially less than the mean
figures calculated above.
In the light of available knowledge as to the probable
extent of spray drift, in particular the indication of a
very limited amount of spray drift from the Landsat
material, and for the reasons indicated above, it is
unrealistic to adopt 5 k:ms as a criterion for "proximity".
Even if one kilometre was adopted as the distance over
which drift might occur, the concentration of herbicide in
the drift rectangle would be so insignificant that no
practical purpe>se is served in extending the width of the primary spray swath on account of the possibility of
IV-126
drift. The only justification for extending the width of the swath for the purpose of considering proximity is one
based upon the possibility that the available information
in relation to troop location and the co-ordinates for
spray paths given in the HERBS tapes may be subject to
some minor inaccuracies.
As to the margin for error in troop location a reasonable
figure would appear to be 500 metres either side of the
spray path. As to the location of the flight path of the
Ranch Hand aircraft there does not appear to be any cogent
evidence to suggest the adoption of any margin and,
accordingly, a margin of 500 metres either side of the
spray flight path would appear adequate to allow for
errors both in troop location and aircraft flight path.
Another criterion or parameter adopted by Mr Manning in
preparing his proximity tables was what he termed the
one-day time criterion. This involved considering the
location of a body of troops not only on the day of the
spray mission but also on the day before. A unit was
included in his proximity tables if it was found to be
within 5 kms of a spray path either on the day of the
spray mission or on the day before.
IV-127
Mr Manning ex t racted. inter alia, a list of those
instances where the location of troops on the day of a
mis s ion was withi n 0.5 kms and, for more abundant caution,
between .5 kms and 1 km from a spray path, when the
her bicide delivered on a mission was Agent Orange . The
155
r e sul ts in respect of the distance 0 - 0. 5 kms are set
out in Table 24; the resu lts in respect of the d i stance
0 . 5- lkm are set out in Table 25.
TABLE 24
DATE UNIT NO . OF DISTANCE
SERVICEMEN (KM)
21.08. 69 5 RAR Bn HQ 37 0 . 5
5 RAR Spt Coy 173 0.5
22.08. 69 5 RAR C Coy 123 0.1
l Arm Regt
B Sqn 2 Troop 17 0.5
27.08 . 69 5 RAR Bn HQ 37 0.2
5 RAR Spt Coy 173 0. 2
l Fld Regt lOS Bn 117 0 . 4
31.08 . 69 l Arm Regt
B Sqn 2 Troop 17 0.5
3 Cav B Sqn
2 Troop 25 0.5
3 Cav B Sqn
3 Troop 25 0.2
IV- 128
TABLE 25
DATE UNIT NO. OF DISTANCE
SERVICEMEN (KM)
25 . 06.68 1 Arm Regt
C Sqn 2 Troop 17 0.8
21.08.69 5 RAR B Coy 123 0.7
1 Arm Regt B Sqn
1 Troop 17 0.7
3 Cav Regt
B Sqn 2 Troop 25 0.7
31.08.69 6 RAR Bn HQ 37 0.7
1 Fld Regt 101 Bn 117 1.0
As Exhibit 1102 demonstrates, if the "day before"
positions are included, the only additions to Table 24
which is based upon the 0-0.5 km criterion, are:
(i) 3 CAV 1 B 1 Sqn 2 Troop who were within 0.4 km the
day before (21 August 1969),
(ii) 1 ARM Regt 1 B 1 Sqn 2 Troop who were within 0.5 km
the day before (26 August 1969)
(iii) 5 RAR 1 A 1 Coy who were within 0. 5 km the day
before (30 August 1969).
In respect of (.ii) above, their distance from the spray
path on the day of spraying was 6 kms and in respect of
(iii) above their distance was 22 kms.
IV-129
There are no additions to Table 25 i.e. adopting the
criterion 0.5 to 1.0 km if the day before positions are
considered.
If the criterion was "within 5 kms". Mr Manning at page 8
of Attachment E of his Basic 2 Volume (which became
Exhibit 1068) indicated that the number of Australian
personnel who would have been exposed to
Agent Orange spray mission would be 4129.
t hat all personnel in the respective Units
f ield on the day in question.
a fixed-wing
This assumes
were in the
For the reasons indicated above it is really only material
t o consider those units which come within 0.5 kms from an
Agent Orange spray path. Such instances occurred on only
four days in the whole period of seven years and only 10
units were involved. Of these. only five were less than
0. 5 kms from a spray path. Eliminating duplications from
Table 24. the total number of servicemen involved would
appear to be not more than 517.
In determining the number of troops who had a potential
for exposure by being within 0.5 kms of a spray path. the
following further circumstances need to be considered:
IV-130
(i) 5 RAR battalion headquarters and 5 RAR support
company figure twice in the Table, i.e. on 21
August 1969 and on 27 August 1969. In
determining the number of troops who may possibly
have been directly exposed, those units should be
counted once only, i.e. there should be no double
counting;
(ii) The strength of 5 RAR C Company is shown in
Exhibit 1101 as having been 123, based upon the
unit strength tables produced by Mr Manning.
However, the evidence of Mr Ducker made it
abundantly clear that the possibility of direct
exposure existed for only a limited number of
those troops namely those members of 8th Platoon
who had been sent forward at the time of their
mission in order to fill their water bottles at
the stream which lay to the north of the main
body of 8 platoon and company headquarters.
There were about 30 men in 8th platoon on the day
. . 156
1n quest1on Even if it be assumed that as
many as half of that number were forward in order
to fill their water bottles, the potential for
direct exposure was in fact confined to some 15
men.
IV-131
(iii) One of the units within 0.5 kms on 27 August 1969
was one field regiment, 105 battery an
artillery unit. The spray mission took place
between 0955 and 1030 hours. 157 Mr Nunn gave
the following evidence about the day-time habits
of artillery in a fire support base:
And when they were not operating, when there was no cannonade proceeding, what do bombardiers and gunners do? Do they stay in their
quarters. do they drill. do they clean their
guns or do they do a combination of all
those things?---Well. Sir, the nights are
made up of pickets and ---
I am concerned about the daylight only.---This is relevant Sir. The fact is at night time you
are working on pickets around the defensive perimeter, you also have your weapon to keep clean, and you are on stand-by but in day
time you try to get some sleep.
And get into your dugout or hole or whatever name you apply to it?---That is right Sir.l58
The number of Australian troops exposed and the extent of
their exposure would thus appear to be very low.
3.3 C Company 5 RAR- 22nd August, 1969
As Table 24 indicates, 22nd August 1969 represents the
occasion when Australian servicemen were closest to a
fixed-wing aerial herbicide mission, based on the
IV-132
information contained in the HERBS tapes and troop
location This involved c Company of 5 RAR.
In respect of this incident, the following
transmissions were recorded:
1125H F/5 dust msn. area I
Action.
RAR Ref. earlier discussion re trail
that we denied clearance on, A/C now in
require an immediate aborting of msn.
Action: II FFV FSCE & G 3 Air contacted. A/C have
no clearance for msn at this time we are
investigating. To 5 RAR - we appear to have clearance from you
to time 0950 - 1030 - msn. is being aborted.
From 5 RAR: C Company have been sprayed - request assurance spray is harmless.
Answer: Have been assured on many occasions from II FFV that spray is completely harmless to
animal life.159
radio
This occasion was considered during the Exposure Hearings
of the Commission. In particular, Claude Henry Ducker.
the commander of that company in South Vietnam between
April and December 1969 gave evidence on 6th and 7th
February 1984160 . He also lodged a written submission
with the Commission. 161
Mr Ducker's evidence does not provide clear guidance as to
this incident. The Commission acknowledges the
IV-133
difficulties of recalling details of a particular incident some 15 years later. Further difficulties arise from Mr
Ducker's demeanour as a witness: he was not content to
give his recollections; he appeared to be seeking to
advocate a particular cause. The result was that he came
to regard a number of questions as offensive to him.
c Company comprised Headquarters (HQ) and 7,8 and 9
Platoons . HQ, including the Company Commander, were
moving with 8 Platoon on 22nd August. 8 Platoon itself
numbered around 30 men and HQ together with some attached
artillery personnel numbered about 15 - making a probable total of about 45 men moving as the combined HQ and 8
162 Platoon group.
Mr Ducker fixed the probable time of the spray mission in
. 163
quest1on as between 0950 and 1030 hours.
HQ and 8 Platoon had stopped to make a locstat (a location
statement by radio to HQ 1 ATF) prior to the aircraft
appearing. According to Mr Ducker's recollection they had
moved about 300 yards from their overnight position at
t hat time. At the relevant time. Mr Ducker recalled, 7
Platoon was operating about 700 yards to the south-west of
8 Platoon and HQ whilst 9 Platoon was operating about 500
IV-134
yards to the north-west. 164 The locations and movements
of the thtee groups, plotted in accordance with the
locstats, noted on the relevant log sheets and
commander's . 165 d1ary reflected fairly closely the
various relative positions as recalled by Mr Ducker. 166
From these records and Mr Ducker's evidence it is clear
that 7 Platoon was well removed from the relevant spray
flight path.
Mr Ducker accepted that the position of HQ and 8 Platoon
(apart from some forward troops of 8 Platoon) at the time
of the spray mission was that position recorded for 8
Platoon and HQ at 1140 hours and 1210 hours that day,
namely reference 273773. i.e. some 480 yards south of the
nearest point on the relevant spray flight path as
recorded on the HERBS 166 tapes. At that time 9 Platoon
appears to have been moving from its 1020 hours position
to the position which it reported at 1140. Accepting the
estimate by Mr Ducker that 9 Platoon was about 500 yards
to the north-west of HQ at the time of the spray mission
and selecting a point along the course travelled by 9
Platoon which is about 500 yards to the north-west of the
HQ position. 9 Platoon would have been roughly 280 yards
south of the spray flight path when the mission took place.
IV-135
Although there was ample opportunity it was never stated
by Mr Ducker that any members of 9 Platoon complained of
being sprayed. He told the Commission t.hat some men in
the group with which he was travelling were forward of the
main body of that group for the purpose of filling their
167 water bottles.
It appears to the Commission that only a small proportion
of the men present on this occasion were directly
underneath the spray path. Adopting. as it does, the
criterion of being within 500 metres either side of the
spray path as constituting direct exposure, the Commission
concludes that members of C Company 5 RAR on that day were
directly exposed.
However. as indicated earlier in Exposure Models (section
2) a single such instance would not represent any health
risk to those involved on the basis of the known
toxicology of these chemicals.
It is significant to note that no member of C Company 5
RAR was called as a witness at the Health Effects hearings
of the Commission. If the health effects alleged to arise
from minimal exposures do, in fact, arise then this group,
representing the best instance of direct aerial exposure.
IV-136
would be expected to be amongst those suffering adverse
health consequences. The failure of WAA to call any
member of this group is telling.
3.4 Participation in Helicopter Spraying
Four witnesses allege participation as crew members of
helicopters which allegedly sprayed herbicide: Messrs
McMahon, Cotter. Haxell and Rhodes.
John Farguhar McMahon
Mr McMahon gave evidence of having flown in 4 helicopter
sorties in the northern part of the Australian tactical
area of responsibility (TAOR) using herbicides loaded at
Da Nang on 15 September 1967. He had no recollection that
he was personally wet with the spray during those
missions, and he did not identify the herbicide
used. 168 It would seem that the missions to which he
testified were those described in the Air Force
during Operation
170 Report, Ainslie
as
for
169
in the Army Report and
having been carried out
the purpose of crop
destruction, which destruction was to have been carried out on "14 or 16 Sep. if possible" in the Slope 30 area.
The herbicide used was not identified.
IV-137
Clive Francis Cotter
Mr Cotter gave evidence that between April 1967 and April
1 968. he was a Senior Engineering Officer stationed at
Vung Tau with 9th Squadron RAAF and that during that
peri od he was given instructions to construct a spraying
rig t o be fitted to a UH - IB helicopter for the purpose of
. . 171 H . d h . defo l 1at1on. . e satd that he constructe sue a r1g
and t oo)(. part in the testing of it over the sea using.
i ni tially, a combination of water and shark repellent and
l at e r "a chemical which was supplied to me from some
ou t s i de
172
source". He was very vague as to the
identity of that chemical. He said "There were some
drums. from memory. and in discussions with some of my
squadron personnel some two or three years ago, it was
brought to mind that they were in grey drums with some
coloured band on them. 172 He could not recall the
colour of the coloured band. He thought that he "probably
t ⢠II h ' fl ' 1 h' 173 go 1t on 1s y1ng c ot tng.
been tested. he had nothing further
After the rig had
to do with it. 172
He d i d not take part himself in loading the chemical into
t he tank in the helicopter and it is not clear who
did. 174 His personal recollection of the grey drums was
faint in the extreme and appears to have derived
substantially from discussions at recent reunions:
IV-138
Up till that time you had no recollection of
that?----I had no real consideration of it.
1 believe I had a recollection but it did
not concern me.
Who jogged your memory about these grey drums? - ---Several people discussing it at
reunions.174
It is to be noted that the drums as described were grey in
colour rather than either black or dark olive green. It
may be that they were drums of the same kind as the grey
ones (with a white band) which
tendered through the witness Mr
appear
E b
175
r s.
in photographs
Whatever the
drums shown in those slides contained, there is nothing to
suggest that they were drums of Agent Orange.
It cannot be concluded from the evidence of Mr Cotter that
the chemical which he used to test his spray equipment was
Agent Orange.
John Cecil Rhodes
Mr Rhodes was Task Force Hygiene Officer: in Vietnam from
April 1968 to Apr:il 1969 . A small par:t of his duties
comprised supervision of the spraying of the perimeter:
ar:eas at Nui Dat. 176 He had no recollection of the use
at any time of any of the "Agent" chemicals for that
177 purpose. Indeed the witness said:
IV-139
... Under no circumstances would I allow anything
other than chemicals which were supplied from
Australia to be used in the Nui Dat area ... 178
Ho we ver. he gave evidence that at the time of his arrival
1n Nui Dat he saw between 12 and 20 drums, dark olive
green in colour each with a coloured band around the
centre 179 the bands being coloured purple and orange,
whi t e. He said that around about August 1968, he
participated as a Supervisor in a helicopter spray mission
o ver a Viet Cong garden complex in the Thua Tich area. The
herbicide used was a 50/50 mixture of Agent Orange and
Agen t Purple mixed with water because he "had no other
herbicides whatever in the Task Force 180 area". The
purpose of the mission was crop destruction, the crops
b . 181 d . ll 182 e1ng corn an m1 et.
The total quantity of Agent Orange used was between 60 and 183 80 gallons. Two sorties were flown during which Mr
Rhodes lay on the floor looking out the door of the
helicopter, giving instructions to the pilot,
communicating with him through the headphones and
microphone which he 184 wore. There were two gunners in
the a ircraft in addition to the pilot and Mr Rhodes. He
claimed that a considerable amount of spray came back into the heli c opter and "we were quite we were not wet
IV-140
through, but we were wet". He modified that proposition
slightly by subsequently saying in respect of the gunners that "their clothing was damp as well" . 185 Apart from
the microphone and earphones and his usua 1 uniform, Mr
Rhodes was wearing a "bone dome" (helmet) and a flak
jacket. The gunners also wore helmets and gloves as well.
The missions described by the witness appear to be the
same missions described in the Army Report at page 3-49
para. 46. The target areas as described in the Army
Report were in the vicinity of Thua Tich, spraying was
conducted on 28 July, 1969 and the results reported were
that "thriving crops of green corn were killed within 24
hours" by herbicide spraying from RAAF rotary winged
186 aircraft. It is noted in the Army Report that
clearance for this exercise was granted by HQ 1ATF for the
spraying aircraft to return fire for fire. a strong
indication that friendly ground forces were not in the
area. The absence of Australian personnel in the area is
confirmed by the evi dence of Mr Rhodes. It is also to be
noted from paragraph 46 at p 3 - 50 of the Army Report that
the proposal was that the selected target areas were to be
sprayed with Reglone; it may be that the failure to carry
through that proposal is simply explained by his statement
referred to above that stocks of Reglone were unavailable.
IV-141
I t is clear that to the extent that the incident described
by Mr Rhodes reveals exposure of Australian personnel to
Agent Orange, the exposure was very limited. The only
persons potentially exposed were. on the evidence. Mr
Rhodes and the gunners in the spraying helicopter and
perhaps also any personnel involved in the mixing and
l oading of the herbicide. As to the latter. there is no
187
e vidence as to the extent of their exposure.
As to Mr Rhodes and the two gunners. it is clear that they
we r e substantially protected from any chemicals which may
ha v e entered t he aircraft by the clothing that was worn
whic h included helmets for all of them. earphones.
mic r o phone and flak jacket for Mr Rhodes. and gloves for
t he gunners. in addition to their ordinary uniforms.
Mi chael John Haxell
Mr Haxell served in the RAAF as a helicopter pilot with
No. 9 Squadron Vung Tau between November 1966 and November
1 967. In a statement tendered to the
. . 188
Comm1ss1on he
said that he had participated as a helicopter pilot
(p i loting an aircraft equipped with a spray system) in the
s praying of both insecticides and herbicides in Phuoc Tuy
Province. He also said that during spraying operations
t hose i nside the helicopter (comprising pilot. co-pilot.
IV-142
two crew members and occasionally a representative of the
Army) had some spray settle on them and that while
spraying herbicides the occupants would have a thick
greasy film all over them "which seemed to be the chemical . d . h d. . 189 m1xe Wlt 1esel1ne". He also said that chemicals were loaded from 44 gallon drums and that he remembered
some of the drums having faded coloured bands around them
and had "a vague recollection of faded orange colours " and
"possibly other 189 colours". However, he later conceded that he did not associate these drums with either his crop destruction or other missions. Indeed he finally said
that he had seen the drums to which he had referred in his
statement on one occasion only and then only on the back
190
of a truck.
Tn his oral evidence he indicated that there was only one
helicopter in the squadron which was fitted with the spray . 191 d equ1pment an in cross- examination said that the only crop destruction or crop denial mission that he recalled
flying in South Vietnam was one which had as its target a
small rice growing area in the north- east of the
province. It was about 20 minutes transit time at 90-100
knots from Nui Dat. 192 The only defoliation missions
which he could recall flying were around the perimeter
areas of Nui Dat and the Horseshoe
location. 193
IV- 143
one in each
The re is no proper basis for concluding that Mr Haxell' s
e v i d ence establishes any exposure of Australian troops to
Ag e n t Orange. While he suggested that he saw drums with
f aded Orange bands on the back of a truck at Nui Dat, he
e xpressly dissociated those drums from any of the
he rbicide missions which he flew.
Gi v e n the dose required to produce health effects (as
ind i cated in section 2 Exposure Models), the limited
numb er of occasions and the extent of exposure on such
occ a s ions, the Commission is satisfied that any exposures
arising from such incidents do not carry any associated
like lihood of resulting health effects.
3 . 5 Evidence of Veterans
Vi et nam veterans contributed evidence to the Commission in
th r ee ways: by giving evidence at formal hearings such as
t h e Exposure hearings; by attending Informal Sessions held
throughout Australia and by making written submissions .
Ev i dence given at Formal Sessions has been fully
considered and referred to where apparopriate, in the
rel evant sections of this Report.
IV-144
Material gained from Informal Sessions has also been
used. In some instances such contributions have resulted
in follow- up work by the Commission; in other cases
particular avenues for investigation have been indicated. This material has also provided useful information which
has been included in a summary of the responses in this
Report. see Chapter VI. Of course, all material received
at Informal Sessions provided important background
information which enabled the Commission to become aware
of the views and experiences of many Vietnam veterans.
Many written submissons were also received and
considered. Neither the quality of such submissions nor
their usefulness should be under - estimated. An excellent example of
of Terry
surpassed
t ypesetter
the usefulness of written submissions was that 194 Gygar whose standard of typescript was
only by a ·qua 1 i ty of handwriting of which any
would be proud. The Commission found Mr
Gygar' s submissions, especially those on ground
navigation, accuracy of maps, difficulties in low level
air navigation and aspects of Ranch Hand operations well reasoned and most informative.
IV-145
4 . NUI OAT INCIDENTS
In the course of the Commission's inquiries on the issue
of Exposure a number of instances relating to alleged
events at the Nui Oat base arose. These included leaves
f alling from the rubber trees; alleged contamination of
t he water supply and the nature and extent of ground
s praying of the camp and base perimeters. Finally, the
Hol t/Lugg trials. the purpose of which was to develop safe
procedures for perimiter spraying, are considered.
4.1 Rubber trees
Thr e e witnesses at
Harris and Freeman, the Exposure hearings, Messrs Daniels, alleged that they were subjected to
aerial spraying at Nui Dat with an unidentified
herbicide. Their evidence is to be compared with that of
Brigadier Rodgers on a similar topic.
It seems reasonably clear that in or about September 1966
a substantial area of rubber plantation within the Task
Force Base at Nui Oat was defoliated, i.e. the trees lost
t he i r leaves. The thick canopy of the rubber trees had
bee n of considerable value to the troops based in the
area because of the protection which it afforded from the
tropical sun.
IV--146
Acccordingly, the loss of leaves was a matter of some
great moment to those who were affected. But evi dence
given about this incident is conflicting as to the cause
of the loss of the leaves.
William Orril Rodgers
Brigadier Rodgers, at pages 365 366 of the Transcript,
described an incident:
it was said that one of my officers, my
hygiene officer had defoliated the rubber trees. He was the officer who was in charge of the
spraying program around the perimeter. It was
found that the rubber trees were dropping more
leaves than they normally did. , .[T]he sun was
shining through and the Commander was getting
very angry because it was hot without the shade
protection. It was suggested that the hygiene
officer had left some herbicide in the tank which was used for the herbiciding as well as the
insecticiding, and had sprayed these.
Brigadier Rodgers said that when he put this allegation to
the Hygiene Officer:
He denied it, that he had done it at all. I asked
him specifically - and part of the deal of having
my equipment to do the herbiciding was that they
wash it out several times, in fact three times,
befo.re they put insecticide in it . I put it to
him that he did not do this. He insisted that he
did. It was never resolved.l95
IV- 147
Having agreed that it would be usual for the insecticide
t o reach the foliage of the rubber trees, Brigadier
Rodgers went on to say that:
As a result of that- I did not know but it was
s aid - we always used an oil base, petroleum base
a s the carrier and we changed from diesel . . . . It
was a diluent and we changed from either diesel
to kero or kero to diesel because it was
suggested by someone that the spraying of the
diesel would have made the leaves drop - just the
diesel itself without any herbicide in it.l96
It should be noted that a similar view was expressed by Dr
Cr o sby:
In the United States, diesel oil is a very common
weed killer. In fact, in California it is called
weed oil and it is one of the most commonly
used,most prevalent herbicides to be used in the State of California.l97
At page 417 of the Transcript, Brigadier Rodgers fixed the
ti me for the occurrence of the event described above as
"i n the early dry of 1966, so in about December 1966".
Raymond Arthur Daniel
Mr Daniel was a member of the Regular Army who served in
Vietnam from May 1966 to May 1967. He produced a number
of photographs and slides which were said to have been
ta ken at the Australian Task Force Base at Nui Dat, on the
IV-148
north east perimeter. in "July/August, August to
September, mid-August" 1966. 198 The slides and
photographs became Exhibit 1127. He firstly claimed that the slides and photographs related to an incident in
August 1966 when a camouflaged aircraft flew over the Nui
Dat Base several times, spraying. A plane appeared in
some of the slides and photographs, and it was a Cl23. Mr
Daniel said of the leaves in the area where the aircraft
sprayed:
They died slowly over a period of 4 - 6 weeks.l99
The thrust of this portion of his evidence was that
several of the slides and photographs which depicted the
spraying aircraft also showed lush foliage, and other
photographs and slides which he initially claimed were
taken 4-6 weeks later allegedly showed foliage which had
died as a consequence of the spraying.
He said in cross- examination that he took many photographs
while he was in Vietnam. and that when he had finished a
roll of film he would send it to his wife in Australia who
had it developed for him and then sent it back to him. He
agreed that there was no reason why he would keep exposed
film in Vietnam for months on end, and that it was
. . . . . 200
undesirable to keep ftlm 1n hot and humtd cond1t1ons .
IV-149
The fact was that the so-called "before" slides, i.e. Nos.
1 . 2, 3 and 6 bore processing dates which indicated that
t hey had been developed in May 1967 whereas the so-called
"after" slides, i.e. Nos. 4, 5, 7, 9, 10, 11. 12, 13 and
1 6 -2 2 each bore dates indicating that they had been
deve loped either: in March or April 1967. He was
cr o s s - examined about this circumstance at p. 1072 of the
Tr anscr: ipt but could offer: no real explanation and at p.
1073 t hereof he conceded that he had taken the "second
l ot " of slides at a time when the dry season had already
commenced. He did not dispute that during the dry season
g r as s in his area of Nui Dat dried off very
. . . 201 . .
s 1gn1 f 1cant ly but that some of the low vegetat1on 1n
the a rea, such as was shown in slide No. 7 tended to
remain 202 green. He conceded that it was possible that
slide No. 6 (which he had . d . b d203 prev1ously escr1 e as
ha v i ng been taken in August 1966 and showed the road as
wet (allegedly from the aircraft's spray) may have been
take n dur i ng the wet of Apri 1 or even early May
19 6 7. 201
He did not dispute that slide No. 8
(o r i ginally put forward as having been taken ·at the time
of sp r aying) had in fact been taken after slide No. 9
(or: ig ina lly put forward as having been taken 4-6 weeks
l a t er than No. He said that he did not
nec e s sarily agree with the proposition, but did not
IV-150
dispute it, and then went on to say it was possible . At
p. 1126 he agreed that the banana foliage as shown on
slide No. 12 (originally put forward as having been taken
4-6 weeks after the spraying) was in no essential way
different from that shown in slide No.1 (originally put forward as showing the condition of the foliage before the
spraying). At page 1130 it was put to him that slide No.
4 (originally put forward as having been taken 4-6 weeks
after spraying) was in fact a photograph taken during the dry season . He agreed that was poss i bly the case: he
would not argue with the proposition but he would not
necessarily agree wi th it either. At p. 1130 he conceded
that it was a possibility that slide No . 3 (origi nally put
forward as having been taken during the spraying in August
1966) had in fact been taken
developed in May 1967. He
in April or May 1967 and
205 also stated that the
incident which he had photographed was the only occasion
he could recall on wh i ch an aircraft sprayed in close
proximity to him.
The Commission finds that none of the slides produced by
Mr Daniel show anything that could be described as the
result of defol i at i on . Some of the photographs simply
s how the grass in Mr Daniel's area having browned off
during the dry season whilst banana trees depict the
IV-151
normal dying off of old leaves and their replacement by
new growth.
Having regard to the dates which appear on some of the
slides , the different rolls of film from which they
clear ly came, the absence of any satisfactory explanation of the apparent inconsistency between those dates and Mr
Daniel 's evidence-in-chief as to the dates upon which the
slicles were taken. the Commission cannot accept his
e v idence that the "before" group of slides preceded the
"after" group or that the spray event occurred in August
19 66 .
It is clear that no inference can be drawn from his
evidenc e that Agent Orange was sprayed over Nui Oat in
August 1966.
Ronald Bruce Harris
Mr Harri s served in Vietnam from June 1966 to May 1967 in
the RAAF as an LAC, Telecommunications Operator on the
comm unications system by which aircraft movements through
the Nui Dat area were controlled. The operations room was
at HQ l A'l'F about 400 metres into the rubber planation
west of Kangaroo helipad. 206 He initially placed the
events which he described as being in August or September
IV-152
1966, but said that as a result of recent conversations
with a former Air Force Officer, he thought the correct
date was early October 1966. 207 At that time, he says
he saw an Iroquois helicopter "spraying up and down over
the Task Force Area at a low level above the trees". 208
The spray fell on him, his recollection being that it was
h
. 209
somew at greasy or sllmy. The area which he said the
helicopter sprayed was "the whole of the area being used
by HQ. and the 103 Signals area. There were some
engineers there". 209 The vegetation throughout the area
was rubber trees. His evidence included the following
question and answer:
Did you see the whole flight of the helicopter, or did you only see it for part of the
time?----! saw part of it, a flash.209
He said that the spray was colourless as compared with the
insecticide sprayed by fogging machines. namely. a misty white cloud. 209 He claimed that the spraying operation
went on for "at least one day. possibly up to three
days". A few days after the spraying "the leaves on most
of the trees began browning and about a week later were
falling off in very. very large quantities." Whilst some
trees only thinned out slightly. others lost almost all
their leaves. There were some areas in which there was a
210
straight line of naked trees.
IV-153
He said that he was not aware of any other aircraft
s praying at Nui Dat during the period from June 1966 to
May 1967. 211
Af t er the event he was present in the Operations Centre
when a discussion took place between Air Force and Army
personnel. Whilst he could not recall the identity of the
persons present, he said "they would range from Flying
Off i cer, Flight Lieutenant, Squadron Leader up to Group
Captain". 210 For the Army, there were Captains and
Majors 212 present. There was an hour-long discussion
dur i ng which the Army officers accused the RAAF of
blunder i ng, and thereby poisoning the rubber trees.
However the RAAF officers maintained that they carried out
h
. . . 211
t e 1 nstruct1ons g1ven to them by Army personnel.
S i gnificantly, Mr Harris also recollected that insecticide
fogging was carried out regularly over three days of every
k . h" . 211 Sl"d wee us1ng ve 1cle mounted equ1pment. 1 es
p roduced by Mr Harris were tendered as Exhibit 1130.
These show thinning of and loss of foliage from the rubber
trees .
Under cross - examination he said that the particular
hel i copter was mostly obscured by the canopy of leaves,
h . . 213 even w en 1t was dlrectly overhead.
IV-154
Stanford Radley Freeman
Mr Freeman served in Vietnam from May 1966 to April 1967
as a signalman attached to 103 Signal Squadron. He gave
yet another account of the causative events which preceded leaves falling off the rubber trees in the area of Nui Dat
occupied by 103 Signals Squadron.
Mr Freeman placed the events which he described in his
evidence as having occurred in September, 1966. 214 He
did so by reference to a letter dated 28 September, 1966
written by him to his fiancee describing the incident.
This letter was produced by him and tendered as Exhibit
1133. He gave evidence that on the day in question the
area around 103 Signals Squadron was sprayed with a
"clammy" spl"ay which "seemed to get into your nostrils and
h
. 214
everyt 1ng. He said that the spray came from
aircraft which in an earlier written statement he had
identified as "Dakotas". However, in his
evidence-in-chief he said he was not sure what they were
but . . . . ft 214 knew they were some k1.nd of f 1.xed- w1ng a1rcra .
He said that the smell of the spray was there fo.r;
days. 215 He produced a series of slides and photographs
(Exhibits 1131. 1132 and 1134) showing the rubber
plantation before the incident in question with full
foliage. and afterwards, showing loss of leaves.
IV- 155
He stated that the area of the rubber plantation occupied
by 103 Signals. Task Force HQ and an American group which
was also in the same area, measured about 300 metres by
600
216
metres. The area of the rubber trees which lost
t heir leaves measured approximately 200 metres by 400
metres. within the larger 217 area. He saw fogging
machines being used regularly all over the base including
h i s area.
218
He said that he was unable to identify the
aircraft that flew over otherwise than as a fixed-wing
aircraft which he did not actually see. He only heard it,
but, by its noise, knew it was a fixed-wing aircraft
rather than a helicopter. He only heard one aircraft noise at the time when this incident 219 occurred. He agreed
t hat he heard a plane approach above the canopy of rubber
trees, go near to him and fly away into the distance, that
he was not able to see the aircraft or any spray coming
out of it. 220 He said that the leaves began falling off
the trees within a week of his observing the plane going
overhead and that within a couple of weeks nearly all the
t . th t h d 1 . l 221 rees 1n a area a the1r eaves.
The witness was then permitted to give hearsay evidence of
ce rtain matters he was told of by a Captain Spencer after
the aircraft had gone over.
Spencer told him "the bastards
IV-156
He alleged that Captain
have defoliated II 222
us .
He said that Captain Spencer told him that "they had sent
the wrong craft over the wrong area", that he had told
them to go away. that the message was relayed to "them"
and they "took off". He was standing in the
communications tent about 10 yards from the radio room
when Captain Spencer told him this .
223
Although the
witness sought to convey the impression that there was a
"panic on" in the operations room when he arrived, he
agreed that in fact he saw nothing and heard nothing
before he had -his conversation with Captain 224 Spencer.
He said that later he sent out a message to Canberra via
Hawaii in relation to the . . 225 :1nc1dent that the message
t . . f c b
226 d was sen 1n response to any enqu1ry rom an erra an
was sent about 2 days after the incident. 227
The evidence of Brigadier Rodgers, and the photographic
evidence of Harris and Freeman make it clear that some of
the rubber trees at Nui Dat lost their leaves at some time
during the second half of 1966 . That circumstance was an
occasion of some discomfort to the troops who were
deprived of their shade and it no doubt became a matter of
some notoriety. It is not surprising in those
circumstances that rumours and fanciful explanat i ons as to
the cause of the incident should be generated around the
Base and it is not surprising that people who were at the
IV-157
Base at the relevant time might now have mistaken views as
to a causal relationship between an event which did in
fact take place (the defoliation of the rubber trees) and
what they have come to believe over the years to be the
t hen factual cause of that defoliation. A further
illustration of "myth development" on this topic is Mr
N ' d 229 unn's ev1 ence that he was told (some four years
later) of the defoliation of rubber trees at Nui Dat
t hrough mistaken spraying of herbicide to kill spiders.
Obv i ously, the differing versions as to how the
defol i ation occurred cannot be correct. The Commission is
of t he view th'.it the more likely explanation is that put
forward by Brigadier Rodgers. He was personally involved
i n t he relevant events at the time whereas the other three
were. at best, bystanders.
Further evidence on the topic of this defoliation derives
from the evidence of Wee-Lek Chew, a consultant botanist
of some 24 years' experience and research, virtually all
of which related to the South-East Asian region. Dr Chew
i ndicated that rubber trees of the variety in question
would suffer patchy defoliation in the dry
230
season.
He also agreed that a heavy spray of dieseline would be
requ i red to defoliate such trees although he noted that a
IV-158
lighter concentration over a longer period may have the
same
. 231
effect. Dr Chew also reviewed all the slides
tendered or marked for identification on this issue,
including those referred to above.
The competing explanations would appear to be an
application of herbicides or a continued application of
insecticide mixed with dieseline. The Commission is of
the view that the latter explanation is more likely.
However. even if the incident did. in fact. involve the
application of herbicide the Commission is satisfied that the extent of the exposure would not be such as would give
rise to adverse health effects consequent upon any such
exposure.
4.2 Dam/water supply
Mr Erbs gave evidence of a practice alleged to involve the
washing of a Landrover used for carrying herbicides and
insecticides in a dam at Nui Dat which he claimed "was the
water supply that supplied our "t" 232 un1 . He made it
clear that he believed that the water supply was for
drinking purposes. When asked who made the decision to
give this vehicle 'a swim'. he said
233 that he was
"just carrying out instructions that were passed down".
IV- 159
He was prepared to and did name the person who he
s uggested gave the instructions. but the misleading nature
of h i s allegation was revealed by the following question
and answer:
You mean - did he actually say 'put the truck in
the lagoon' or did he say to wash it down?
You see the difference?----Yes. I do. He
would say, 'Get the vehicle clean' 233
He said that although commonsense told him not to put weed
k i ller in water that he was going to drink, he did not
have any thoughts whatsoever about the alleged practice of
washing the truck in the dam. 234
He also said that he took about 2.000 photographs while he
wa s . s h v· 235 1n out 1etnam and. although he agreed that the
truck being washed in the dam would have made a most
unusual-looking photograph, he never took such a
photograph. He explained that circumstance by saying that
"you never take your camera along with you on spraying
0 0 236
mlSSlOns". However, he was obliged to concede that
slide number 6 produced by him as part of what became
Exhibit 1162 showed Vietnamese mixing insecticides in the
f 0 0 0 0 h d 236
course o a spray1ng mission on whlch he a gone.
IV-160
As indicated earlier (section 1. 2 of this Chapter) the
Commission had cause to regard the evidence of Mr Erbs
with some caution. Mr Erbs' suggestion is contrary to all . . 237
Army lnstructtons and, if true, would not only be
unauthorised but also likely to result in disciplinary
measures, if discovered. Some water sources served
purposes such as nurturing the rubber trees referred to
earlier and providing a means of attracting mosquitoes
away from the base camp area. Clearly, precautions in
respect of drinking and washing water would be higher lest
enemy forces might contaminate such supplies.
In all the circumstances the Commission is not satisfied
that Mr Erbs' suggestion as to the washing of a vehicle or
vehicles in water subsequently used for drinking purposes
is established: his suggestion is rejected.
4.3 Perimeter Spraying
This topic has already been dealt with in some detail when
considering the identity and amounts of chemicals used in
Vietnam (section 1). In the course of the Exposure
hearings, in the written submissions lodged and in the
information provided at Informal Sessions, allegations
were made that Agent orange was used in and around the Nui
Dat base.
IV-161
Wi th the exception of certain evidence given by Mr Erbs
(reference to some aspects of which have already been
made) and to the use of a small quantity of 2,4-D and
2,4,5 - T in the Holt/Lugg trials conducted in December
1967. there is no evidence of the use of Agent Orange or
ot its constituents in ground (as opposed to aerial)
spraying by or in proximity to Australian troops in South
Vi etnam.
I t i s true that the Army Report records an approval given
by HQ 3 Corps for the provision of six barrels of Agent
Orange for defoliaition of the perimeter of Nui Oat, to be
d iluted in the ratio one part herbicide to two parts
di esel fuel and to be applied by ten hand sprayers under
t h e supervision of a US chemical
. 238
off1cer. There is,
however, no evidence that this proposal was ever
i mp l emented and its i mplementation seems inconsistent with
the evidence of Brigadier Rodgers, the Senior Medical
Of fi c er in South Vietnam at the time. He stated that no
Agent Orange was sprayed at Nui Oat or Vung Tau and that
h e never saw at any of the Australian bases 55 gallon
d rums with an orange- coloured band, either full or
e mpty . 239
IV- 162
The Commission accepts this evidence. It might also be
expected, if that proposal had been implemented, it would
have been the subject of some consideration or comment by
Major Holt or Mr George Lugg in connection with the
herbicide trials which they carried out between December
1967 and January 1968. However, there was no such comment
in the reports made by them, 240 and no Agent Orange was
used by them in their trials.
The evidence of John Cecil Rhodes, ATF Hygiene Officer at
Nui Dat from April 1968 to April 1969, has already been
considered (section 1.2). It appears from his evidence
that his experience of Agent Orange is confined to that
which was used for a helicopter mission at Thua Tich in
241 August 1968.
Leslie Robert Nunn, who was responsible for the dispersal of pesticides in the Task Force Area and in Phuoc Tuy
Province during his second tour of duty from January 1970
to January 1971, stated that the only herbicides which
were then available were Tordon (used for vines and
trees), Reglune (a knock- down herbicide for immediate
. ) 242
effect) and Hyvar X (a ground ster1lant .
Evidence on this topic was also given by Paul Erbs. As
has been already indicated, the Commission has grave
IV- 163
doubts as to his credibility and treats his evidence on
this topic accordingly.
4.4 Holt/Luqg Trials
The Holt/Lugg trials have been considered earlier (section
1. 2) in the context of considering what chemicals were
u s ed by Australians in the Vietnam conflict. Hence, this
section concentrates on the precautionary aspects of these
t rials .
Following a request for assistance from 1 ATF in October
1967 Mr G. A. Lugg, Defence Standards Laboratories,
Department of Supply, and Major E. S. Holt, Scientific
Advi sers Office, Department of Defence, were sent to
Vietnam with equipment and herbicides to conduct
experiments using different combinations and strengths of
chemicals on the local vegetation. They were also to
establish handling and spraying techniques and to train spraying teams from 1 ATF.
The tests were conducted during the dry season in December
1967 January 1968. Nine herbicides were sprayed on
t ypical undergrowth to assess their short-term effects on
i nd i genous plants. These were compared with the effects
IV-164
obtained with diquat alone and in separate admixture with
dimethylsulphoxide, and another carrier
N, N1 dimethylformamide.
The results of the tests were subsequently written up and
published by Mr Lugg. 243 The herbicides used in Test
One in the Test Program ME. which appear at Table 1 of
that report, are set out below:
IV- 165
Common Name
2 .4 - D
2,4 , 5 - T
Am i t r ole
At razine
Cacodylic Acid
Chlorflurazcle
Da l apon
Di camba
Di. quat
Li nuron
Trade Name (Supplier)
Estone 80 (ICIANZ)
Buxtone 80
Weedazole (Geigy)
Primatol A
Phytar 560
TABLE 26
Chemical Name and Composition
30\ ethyl ester of 2,4-D
80\ butyl ester of 2,4,5-T
25\ 3-amino, 1,2,4-triazole
80\ 2-chloro-r-ethylamino 6-isopropyl-/amino-1:3:5-trazine 30\ sodium salt of dimethylarsenic/acid
Chlorflurazole S. 20\ sodium salt of 4,5-dichloro-2-trifluoro-methyl benzimidazole
Le-Pon 85\ sodium salt of
2,3-dichloropropionic acid
Banex 20\ dimethylamine salt o f
2-methoxy 3-6-dichlorobenzoic acid
Reglone 40\ 9:10 dihydro-8A, lOA
diazonium phenathrene dibromide monohydrate
Afalon 50\ N(3 , 4 dichlorophenyl) - NÂ
methoxy- N methylurea
Maj o r Holt himself compiled a comprehensive report of the
244 Test Program in May 1968 and this report was tabled
in t he House of Representatives on 27 March 1980. 245
IV-166
The experiments conducted at the 1 ATF area Nui Dat were
to techniques for dealing with the acute
problem of dense vegetation in the wire and mine fields at
1 ATF. A total of approximately 100 acres were sprayed
with a knockdown or quick-acting herbicide mixture during
the developmental and instructional periods. Five acres
were sprayed with a sterilant, or growth retardant
chemical, and aerial spraying techniques were developed .
The program was modified when it was decided by the
Commander 1. ATF that · unit teams from 2 RAR and 3 RAR
Defence Employment Platoons were to be trained in the
techniques and procedures of herbicide spraying while
operating in their own unit areas.
This was
original medically
felt necessary after it was found that the
spraying team from the Hygiene Squad had been
affected by the chemicals and more strict
procedures and precautions were enforced. The Hygiene
Squad Team were barred from further spraying operations on
medical advice from the Senior Medical Officer l ATF until
the medical problems were overcome. At the conclusion of
the training of the unit teams the equipment and chemicals
were handed over to 1 ATF and "Instructions for Spraying
Herbicides",
prepared.
being annexure C to Exhibit 1105, were
IV- 167
The report's recommendations in respect of equipment were
as follows:
No defects were observed in the spraying operations, but nature of the chemicals
recommendations are made:
the equipment during due to the corrosive used the following
a. At the end of a spraying session the tank
should be filled with clean water and the
pump and spraying equipment be operated to
clear chemicals from the pump and spray
lines.
b . The vehicle driver is made responsible for
rna intenance of pump and engine and is to
keep all exposed unprotected steel work
lightly smeared with oil to prevent
corrosion.
c . The vehicle is to be washed with detergent
and fresh water using the pumping equipment and spray-guns at reduced pressure
{approximately 150 psi) every 2 to 4 days,
depending on the amount of chemicals
contaminating the vehicle.246
Maj o r Holt also recommended that in any future project of
th i s nature some operators should be trained, the
e quipment tested, and the calibration carried out in
A t 1 . . d f . 24 7 us ra 1a pr1or to eparture or V1etnam.
As to operational timings, Major Holt cited several facts
which emerged from the time of day of operations:
IV-168
(a) Spraying could not commence in the morning
un!:il the normal clearing patrols had
checked the perimeter. This meant that 0700 hrs was about as early as spraying
operations could begin outside the
perimeter. Similarly. operations had to be completed by 1830 hrs at night.
(b) In December 67 and January 68 the weather
was hot, and no rain fell. A summary of the
weather is attached as Appendix 3 to Annex
A. This meant that knockdown spray applied
after about 0930-1000 hrs was wasted as it
evaporated from the foliage very quickly,
and did not thoroughly kill the vegetation. The leaves and grass browned but
considerable sap remained in the plant,
hindering burning off. Additionally strong sunlight caused one of the chemicals
Reg lone. to break down. and so spraying had
to be completed before about 0930 hrs on a
clear day. (c) If the weather was overcast the humidity
increased. the clouds protected the spray
from the sun. and spraying could continue
for as long as the spraying team and driver
remained in a fit state to work. However
high relative humidity and high temperature are not compatible with full face
respirlltors, rubber gloves. and cover- up
clothing. Consequently operator fatigue was most noticeable by mid-afternoon on an
overcast day.
(d) Generally the operators started work at
0700-0730 hrs and ended the morning spraying by 1000 hrs. After a half hour break, the
chemicals for the afternoon and next
morning's spraying were measured, mixed, and poured into labelled jerricans . Afternoon spraying normally recommenced at 1500- 1530 hrs and ended at 1700-1730 hrs. Cleaning
respirators. gloves and equipment, and
washing and showering after spraying
occupied from 30- 45 minutes. Consequently almost one and a half hours a day were
required for after spraying maintenance and personal hygiene.248
IV- 169
The summary of weather referred to in paragraph (b)
reveals the average maximum temperature for December 1967
a s 89 degrees F and the minimum temperature at 71 degrees
F. wi th relative humidity 71 per cent. For January 1968
t he average maximum temperature was 85 . 5 degrees F,
mi n i mum 68.5 degrees F and the relative humidity 68 per
c ent. 249
The reference to "opera tor fatigue" refer red to in
paragraph (c) parallels a similar reference made in the
statement of Brig . Gen. W. 0. 250 Rodgers where he
recalled noticing "the spray teams were quite distressed
f rom the heat" . This aspect is further considered in
s ection 6 of this Chapter.
Plastic measuring buckets originally used proved
u n s atisfactory for the reason that the chemicals softened
the plastic and the wire handles worked loose . Major Holt
c i t ed one instance of an operator who lifted a bucket by
the handle which broke free allowing 2 gallons of chemical
c oncentrate to "saturate his
. 251
clothlng". The liquid
c hem i cals were supplied in forty-five gallon drums which
were rolled onto a raised platform for decanting via the
pla s tic measuring buckets into jerricans .
IV- 170
These were metal five gallon jerricans, and the pouring
process required the attention of two operators , one to
hold the jerrican and filling funnel steady and the other
to pour the chemicals into the funnel. Parallax error
through the eye-pieces of the respirator occasionally
caused minor distance misjudgment during the trials as
when pouring or turning off a tap. Major Holt, however
states that the operators soon learned to bend the head
forward and look directly through the eye-pieces of the
respirator when judging the distance to an ob j ect below
th 252 em.
Spraying with a mixture of Reglone, Gramoxone, Tordon,
Agral. and DMSO commenced on Sunday 3 December 1967 and
continued up till Friday 8 December 1967 without any toxic
effects being noticed. Major Holt in his report states
that the operators were asked if they had experienced nose bleeds or sore throats but on each occasion they had
replied that they were quite fit . 253 On 8 December 1967
the operators reported to the RAP exhibiting symptoms of
breakdown mucous membrane, nose bleeds, ulceration of
. . . . . 253
llpS, and COn]UnCtlVltlS.
Of the three officers who had been actively engaged in
mixing and spraying the chemicals none showed any of the
IV- 171
me d i cal effects described . As at least one of the
of f i cer s had been exposed to the chemicals as much as any
of the operators it was deduced that personal hygiene and
at tention to safety precautions were the points which
needed attention. 1t was discovered that at least one of
the operators and one of the drivers had spilled chemical
co ncent rates on themselves but had made little or no
ff . 1 254 a ttempt to wash o the chem1ca .
Originally the operators had worn nose and mouth
res p i rators. plastic eye shields and rubber gloves but
whe n no adverse medical effects had been noticed after
three days spraying the operators were permitted to remove
the eye shields which were difficult to keep in place then
to remove the nose and mouth respirators which were very
hot to wear and soon filled with sweat. Finally the
r ubbe r gloves were discarded except when mixing the
c he mi cals .
More stringent precautions were introduced which included
full- face respirators, rubber gloves and cover-up clothing wh en mi x i ng and spraying. Emphasis was placed on personal
hygiene, careful washi ng of equipment, and clean
cloth i ng . The safety precautions were per haps
overst ressed but i t was then felt that, whereas new
IV- 172
operators naturally acquired skill in using the equipment
the precautions could not be learnt on the job and had to
be taught before spraying operations and enforced most
strictly during operations to ensure that they would not be forgotten.
DMSO was used as an accelerating agent in the spraying
operations at 1 ATF to speed up the intake of the
chemicals into the vegetation and progress of the
chemicals within the plant system. As such it was most
successful during the trials but it also accelerated the
intake of the herbicide chemicals i nto the operators
wherever an accidental spill occurred. For this reason
the use of DMSO was discontinued and it was then
recommended by Major Holt tha t it should not be used in
herbicide work. 254
The two particularly significant recommendations made by
Major Holt in his report were:
(a) In any future operation of this type,
operators must be trained, the equipment and chemicals tested, calibration completed, and the techniques of the operation must be
established in Australia prior to going to
Vietnam.
(e) Stringent safety precautions should be
applied for the handling and spraying of
chemicals. These should be based on
consultation with medical experts and the
manufacturer. 255
IV- 173
Major Holt prepared "Instructions for Spraying Herbicides"
for use by l ATF. 256 It comprises three parts: Part
One deals with the pump and equipment, Part Two with the
properties and quant i ties of chemicals, and Part Three
wi t h spraying procedure. Section 4 of Appendix I to Part
One deals with operating instructions and, in respect of
protective equipment, requires:
6. Full face respirators and rubber gloves must
be worn by all team members, including
drivers, when spraying with spray guns is in progress . Norma 1 "Greens" are sui table as
protective clothing provided trousers were t ucked into boots and sleeves rolled down.
The cartridges in the respirators were to be
changed after 8 hours spraying, clean
uniforms worn each day, and the respirators and gloves must be washed and cleaned after
completion of spraying.'
7. Rubber gloves and respirators were also to
be worn by those actively engaged in mixing
the chemicals and pouring mixtures into the spray tank. Care must be taken that the
chemicals are not splashed or spilled on
personnel, clothing, or equipment.
8. The chemicals are water soluble and
immediate washing with plenty of water is
essent i al to remove the chemical from
clothing, skin or equipment.257
Append i x II to Part One describes the ancillary equipment
used for spraying herbicides. These include items such as
s pray gun, boom spray , fibreglass - l i ned chemical tank
holding 300 gallons, high pressure hoses, full face
IV- 174
respirc1tors, Ansell rubber gloves. buckets and metal
jerricans.
on the topic of cleaning these items Major
recommended:
All the items can be cleaned by washing and
rinsing in clean water. The tank and spraying
lines and guns can be cleaned by first draining
the tank of chemicals through the suction hose,
filling the tank with water, and operating the
pump and spraying equipment.258
Holt
The only item needing maintenance on the tank was the
filter, and gloves were to be worn when the filter was
removed for cleaning with water and a stiff brush. High
pressure hoses were to be cleaned weekly. Respirators
were to be washed after each sprayi ng session and wiped
internally with methyl ethyl or butyl alcohol for personal hygiene. Fi 1 ters were to be replaced after eight hours
spraying. Gloves were to be washed on the hand, removed,
rinsed in clean water. and hung up to dry after each
spraying session.
Part Two of the Instructions259 detailed the properties and quanti ties of chemicals required for various sprays.
In describing Reglone (d i quat) paragraph 5 to Appendix I
required gloves and respirators to be used when mixing and
IV- 175
i mmediate washing of skin splashed with the solution. The
us e of a protective cream such as barrier cream before
s praying was also recommended. The same precautions were
pres c ribed also in the use of Gramoxone (paraquat). No
s u c h i ns t ructions were given in respect of Tordon 50-D.
Full safety precautions, however, including the wearing of
r es p i rators and gloves, were prescribed for the mixing of
Hyvar (containing 50 per cent Bromacil) and when applying
tha t mixture by spray guns .
Herb Lc i des were not to be stored in the same building with
insec t i cides. Chemicals and chemical containers were to
b e k e p t in a separate building used exclusively for this
p u rpose, and the building required to be dry and well
v e n ti lated. Empty containers and any unused chemicals
we r e to be returned to the storage area at the end of each
d ay . Burning and dumping of empty containers were
p erm i tted under certain conditions, including the chopping
of h o les in the containers, avoiding as disposal areas
la n d which might later be returned to crop and utilizing
lev el ground so that any residue would be absorbed by the
s oi l and therefore less l ikely to be carried away in water
r u n o f f. Any chemical remaining in a container was to be
drained in t o a pit dug in sandy soil and isolated from
wat e r sources. In the event that burning or dumping were
IV-176
not possible empty containers were to be carefully rinsed
with water and detergent. and allowed to remain in the
container for 15 minutes with intermittent agitation. The
rinse solution was to be poured into a pit dug in sandy
soil. The container was to be re-rinsed and again the
rinse poured into the pit. The container was to be
inverted and let to drain for 15 minutes. Finally the
d b 1 1
. 260
rum was to e comp ete y flushed Wlth clean water.
The officer commanding (OC) the team plus one member of
the team were required for mixing the chemicals. Full
face respirators and gloves were to be worn. The OC Team
was to supervise the drawing of the quantities of the
chemicals and supervise and assist in pouring the
chemicals into two jerricans. At the water point the oc
Team and one member of the team were required for pouring
the chemical into the spray tank and filling the tank with
the required amount of water. Full face respirators and
gloves were to be worn . The instruction warned that care
must be taken that the correct pair of jerricans was used
when filling the tank, that spilling and splashing be
avoided, and that the tank was to be filled with water
only to within three inches of the collar of the access
hole. Only those actually required for spraying were to
remain on the spray vehicle. Respirators and gloves were
IV-177
to be worn by all team members on the vehicle, including
the driver. when chemicals were being added to the tank
and when the spray guns were used. Sleeves were to be
rolled down and long trousers worn. Any spillage of
chemicals could be washed off the tank or the jerrican at
the water point provided common sense was used and the
chemicc1ls not transferred on to other personnel or
0 261
equipment.
The oc Team was to ensure that team members were wearing
respirators and gloves whilst spraying. Many other
instructions were given as to aspects such as speed and as direction of spray and wind
require elaboration here.
262
factors. They do not
In respect of procedures to the following after spraying,
t he main instruction of interest was that contained in
paragraph 2(e) namely "Gloves may be removed at oc Team's
discretion " . 263
It is quite obvious. from a consideration of the
instruct i ons, that they were based upon a real
apprec i ation of the potentially harmful nature of the
che micals comprising the spray mixture. The emphasis
t hroughout is on safety precautions being properly
IV-178
observed, the active participation of the oc Team and the wearing at all relevant times of respirators, long
clothing. and gloves. Indeed paragraph 2 (e) of Part 3.
Section 4. clearly instructs that gloves should be worn
until the absolute cessation of all spraying activities.
As the chemicals used in the Holt/Lugg trials and those
recommended for use following those trials have already
been considered in some detail as to aspects such as
quantities. dates and locations. further consideration is not warranted; especially having regard to the evidence in
respect of exposure models (as to which see section 2).
Evidence was received by the Commission in respect of the
Hol t/Lugg trials from Vietnam veterans. The most cogent
evidence in this was that of Robert Clifford Gibson
who was involved in those trials . In his statement he
recounted his experiences as follows:
I was serving in Vietnam between November. 1967 and November, 1968 as a Defence Platoon
Rifleman. During that time I was involved with
George Lugg ⢠s first exper imenta 1 spraying. This lasted for a period of three or four days.
During this break there were three of us in the
back of a truck which was completely rigged up
with hoses at the back. We would stand on the
back of the truck and direct the spray into the
vines. This spraying was conducted during the
dry season in early December 1967.
IV- 179
On t he first day of spraying we wore masks,
goggl e s and gloves, however we found these
grossly uncomfortable. After the first day we
too k o ff the masks after talking to one of the
NCO's there. While we were spraying our clothes
we re soaked in the chemicals and we would breath
in chemicals after we had taken off the masks
be c ause it couldn't be avoided.264
A pho tograph of Mr Gibson wearing a face mask became
Exhi b it 1060. The caption on the reverse side suggested
tha t i t was taken in or about December 1967. His evidence
was generally consistent with the reports of these
0 265
tr 1a ls. Allowances of course need to be made for the
fac t t hat he was endeavouring to recall events some 16
yea rs after they occurred.
Mr Gibson c l aimed to have experienced some short - term
hea l t h effects as a result of his brief involvement in
this spray program. The Commission is satisfied that this was the case: it is consistent with the contemporaneous
repo r t, drafted by Major Holt at 1200 hours on 9 December
1967 . which indicated that medical symptoms suffered by
me mbe r s of the spraying team were due to insufficient use
of protec tive clothing and equipment and poor hygiene
d
0 0 0 266
1sc1pllne .
The br i ef period of Mr Gibson's involvement in the spray
prog r a m weighs most heavily against his experiencing
IV- 180
long-term health effect due to this exposure. Even if
this were not so, it would be difficult to reach a
positive conclusion in that regard due to the existence of alternative possible causes and incidents giving rise to at least si.milar symptoms which incidents pre-dated his service in Vietnam.
It is clear that the Holt/Lugg trials represent an
instance where there is some certainty as to the duration
of exposure, the manner of exposure and the identity of
the chemicals involved . These trials confirm that
exposure levels were highest for applicators and
the demonstrate an endeavour to take advantage of
experience which the trials provided in order that an
effective herbicide program, with due regard to the health of Australian personnel, might be put into effect.
5. INDIRECT EXPOSURE
A common feature t hroughout the life of the Commission was
for veterans who could neither recall nor establish that
to allege that they must have they were directly exposed been indirectly exposed.
ways: transit through
Allegations were put in four
areas which had been previously
exposure through consumption of sprayed with herbicide;
IV-181
local food (notably seafood); exposure via drinking water
and exposure to soil.
The lay evidence received by the Commission, notably that
c alled by VVAA, failed to adequately consider two vital
a spe cts: the environmental fate of the herbicide spray
and the concept of dose level.
It remained for Counsel for Monsanto to call Dr Donald
Gi bson Crosby on the former issue; the latter has already
been considered in Section 2 - Exposure models.
Dr Crosby,
Un i versity
Professor of Environmental Toxicology
of California at Davis, has had over
at the
thirty
y ears' experience in organic chemistry with particular
ref erence to pesticides. His
o u t 1n Exh i bit 1106, appear
7 40 - 745.
eminent qualifications, set
in the Transcript at pages
The evidence of Dr Crosby , which is
Commission, may be conveniently reduced
propositions:
accepted by
to a number
the
of
(i) Within a rna t ter of seconds, or at most a few
minutes, of Agent Orange being sprayed on to
IV-182
foliage. a spreading of the esters on the leaves
to form a shiny film on the surface of the
leaves occurs. During this short early stage a
transfer of the components of the herbicide may b b h . . h . 267 occur y rus tng aga1nst t e foltage.
{ii) Each constituent of the total herbicide (2,4-D
Cii i)
ester. 2,4,5-T ester and TCDD) will thereafter react in the environment independently, having d t 1 . t 's . 2 6 8 regar o own properttes.
Immediately upon contact with foliage, each of
the three constituents begins to dissolve in the
cuticle (the waxy, fat-rich surface of the leaf) and to penetrate the leaf structure.
Penetration·by 2,4- D is the fastest of the three
followed by 2. 4. 5-T and then TCDD. The process
of penetration of the cuticle by formation of a
solution in the wax is complete within "a matter 268
of a few minutes to several hours".
(iv) Within two hours after spraying. the components
of Agent Orange are in solution in the waxy
surface layer of the leaf "and at that point
they are no longer available to be rubbed off.
IV- 183
( V )
It would be no easier to rub that wax off than
it would be to rub the wax off an untreated
1eaf". 269
Thereafter, the two phenoxy herbicides penetrate
the leaf structure, while the TCDD remains in
the cuticle. Short of removal by scratching
(and subject to photodegradation) the TCDD will
remain dissolved in the fatty cuticle of the
leaf. 269
( v i) After a period of hours the appearance of a leaf
( v ii)
s prayed with Agent orange is indistinguishable
269 from that of an unsprayed leaf.
TCDD, in the medium of the lipid-rich leaf
cuticle and the esters of 2,4 - D and 2 , 4,5-T on
the leaf, photodegrades in sunlight . The bonds
between the carbon and the chlorine in the TCDD
molecule are progressively broken and chlorine
is relaced by hydrogen from the organic solution
around it. A similar process occurs in the case
of 2,4 - D and the 2,4,5 - T. 270 The rate of
photodegradation of the 'I'CDD is unchanged,
whatever the concentration of the TCDD in the
Agent Orange may be. 271
IV-184
(viii)
(ix)
(X)
The successive intermediate products of
photodegradation are transient, and its end
products have virtually a nil toxicity. 272
After six hours in full sunlight TCDD cannot be
detected on or in the leaf, at levels of
d . f b 273 etect1on o l pp .
The operative factor in the process of
pho todegrada t ion is ultraviolet light energy in
sunlight. The existence of a cloud cover makes
l . l d. . . 273 1tt e 1fference 1n th1s regard.
(xi) About 10-20% of the ultraviolet light to which
(xii)
( xii i)
the top canopy of a three canopy forest is
exposed will reach the forest floor. About 40%
will reach the forest floor in a two canopy
forest. 274
There is a direct relationship between the rate
of photodegradation of TCDD and the quantity of
available ultraviolet light energy.
Any TCDD on foliage at the forest floor of a
three canopy forest should decompose within 30
IV- 185
(x i v)
(XV)
(xvi)
hours (of exposure to ultraviolet energy).
Experiments in forest roughly comparable to a
Vietnam jungle demonstrate the disappearance of
TCDD after two days. 275
TCDD has an extremely low vapour pressure or
volatility. Any odour detectable in a recently
sprayed forest would be from something other
than TCDD. 276 Thus even a person who smelt a
chemical odour in a recently sprayed area would 277
not be inhaling TCDD vapour.
For all practical purposes, any TCDD which gets . t . l . h d . . 276 1n o sot rema1ns t ere esptte ratn. The
esters of 2, 4-D and 2, 4, 5-T reaching soil would
be hydrolysed into the corresponding acids, and
whilst in that form they will move more readily
in surface water, but they are unlikely to
278
penetrate to ground water.
If Agent Orange is sprayed on to the surface of
a body of water, the herbicide components
shortly hydrolyse into the corresponding acids which thereafter dissolve in the water. Any
TCDD, being insoluble, and being heavier than
IV-186
(xvii)
(xviii)
water, would eventually sink to the 278 bottom. However initially, Agent Orange would remain as
a film on the surface for several hours in still
water but would break up more readily if the
surface were not still. During this period,
photodegradation of all components would occur
and if the film remained sufficiently long, the
break down to a TCDD component might 279
considerable degree. Some photodegradation
of TCDD within the water would thereafter
continue below the surface. 280 80% of
ultraviolet light reaching the surface of the
water penetrates to a depth of five feet in
clear water,
feet. 281
and 10% penetrates to twenty
TCDD would ultimately bind to any organic
. f h t 282 mater1al at the bottom o t e wa er.
The rate of photodegradation of TCDD in the
water would, in the absence of a hydrogen donor,
be decreased and would cease in relation to TCDD
under the surface of soil or sediment, which
. bl 282 would then be photochemlcally sta e.
IV- 187
(x i x) In the presence of turbidity, TCDD would be
absorbed on to the surfaces of any suspended
organic particles with which it made contact.
In conditions of turbidity, little
photodegr:adation would occur below the surface 279 of the water.
( xx) 2,4-D, 2,4,5 - T and TCDD break down slowly under
(xx i )
microbial action in the soil: the half - life of
2.4 - D in those circumstances is a matter of days
or several weeks; that of 2,4,5-T is distinctly
longer: being measured in weeks or months, wh i lst
the rate of microbial degradation of TCDD is
very slow and
283
demonstrated .
has only recently been
TCDD binds quite tightly to soil particles by an
electrostatic process, and so bound , its
availability to be absorbed on human contact
with the soil is severely . 284 restr1cted.
Animal tests show that orally ingested soil
contaminated with TCDD does not release the TCDD
withi n the digestive system of the animaL but
that the TCDD is excreted with the soi1. 285
IV-188
(xxii)
(xxiv)
By an electr:ostatic process, free TCDD ingested
by a fish is attracted to basic protein and
consequently tends to concentrate in the
l
. 286
1ver. Where the TCDD has been so
ingested, that part retained tends to be found
as to 10\ in the muscle of the fish and as to
90\ in the viscera, primarily the liver. 287
Accepting the levels of TCDD found by Baughman
and Meselson in homogenised fish from rivers in
South Vietnam (8 to 810 parts per trillion), and
a conservative human no-effect level of 1 ng.
per kg. of body weight for TCDD. it would be
necessary to eat 1-2 kg of the edible parts of
the fish daily (throughout a whole lifetime) to
288
exceed the no-effect level.
These propositions relate to 2,4-D. 2,4,5-T and TCDD since
they. were the dominant subject of allegations. The
authors of these allegations often refused to acknowledge
fundamental propositions, such as the fact that airborne
droplets of TCDD released in an aerial spray and exposed
to sunlight during their fall. would be the subject of
photodegradation.
IV-189
5.1 Transit through defoliated areas
This avenue of potential for indirect exposure requires a
consideration of the amount of herbicide which may be
expected to reach the ground or ground foliage as well as
factors which would serve to diminish that herbicide
c ontent.
As to the former. the Commission notes the unlikelihood of
t roops in open areas being exposed owing to the purposes
of t he spray missions and a consideration of the spray
f light paths together with troop location data.
Interception by the vegetation canopy is thus a factor
wh i ch would serve to diminish exposure levels.
Other factors which would operate to diminish the level of
any exposure include the tendency of droplets to form
fi lm. volatilisation, absorption by foliage,
photodegradation and removal by rain.
Herbicide spray would, soon after settling on foliage,
form droplets . Such droplets may be dislodged from
fo l iage with relative ease. within about ten
mi nutes after they had been deposited the droplets form a
fi lm over the waxy surface of the foliage. Once this film
IV-190
has formed it cannot be dislodged or removed from the
foliage other than by direct abrasive contact. This
follows from the first of the propositions derived from
the evidence of Dr Crosby, as indicated above.
Colour-coded herbicides principally contained the n-butyl
esters of 2,4-D and 2,4,5-T both of which are
1 . 1 289 vo at1 e. There are no known data on the rate of
volatilisation when in the form of droplets or film on
foliage. However, Grover et a 1 290 found that 25\ to 30%
of the emulsion of the butyl ester of 2,4-D volatilised in
the course of spraying. Some continuing volatilisation of
the 2,4-D and 2,4,5-T could be expected from the surface
of the foliage. 291
However, TCDD is of 1 '1' 291 low vo at1 1 ty and, accordingly,
any vapours resulting from volatilisation may rightly be
regarded as unlikely to contain any, or any reasonable
quantity, of TCDD. This conclusion is strongly supported by the results of air sampling at Johnston Island during
. . 292
the course of the d1sposal operat1ons.
As to absorption by foliage, the propositions derived from
Dr Crosby's evidence and numbered (iii) to (vi) inclusive
suggest that after a matter of hours only a small
IV-191
pr o portion of the initial deposit would remain. That
s ma l l proportion would be expected to require abrasive
actio n for removal · and, even so. the amount of any such
e xposure is unlikely to be anything but minimal.
Both 2,4-D and 2,4,5-T decompose as a result of exposure
to the ultra-violet radiation present in sunlight: Dr
Cros by ; proposition (vii) above. Furthermore, after 6
hour s of full sunlight , TCDD cannot be detected above a
lev el of one part per billion (1 part in 1,000 million):Dr
Cros by ; proposit i on (ix). Of course, as anyone who has
eve r become sunburnt on a cloudy day will verify, the
c r i t i cal factor is not direct sunlight but rather the
ult ra - v i olet energy · contained in sunl i ght. Even a !lowing for a tr i ple canopy forest. such cover would only extend
t he period of photodegradation to 30 hours: experiments on
si milar vegetation suggest not more than two days : Dr
Cr o s by; proposition (xiii).
Although both Agent
insoluble in water,
Orange and
commonsense
TCDD are virtually
dictates that some
dro p l e t s of the herbicide would be washed from the surface
of t he foliage if rain fell whilst the herbicides remained
1n droplet form on the foliage, i.e. within about ten
mi nu t es of the spray settling. Given the conditions under
IV-192
which the spraying was carried out and the shortness of
the droplet 1 ife this aspect is unlikely to be of any
significance in a consideration of exposure levels.
A consideration of these factors leads the Commission to
conclude that any indirect exposure resulting from transit
through defoliated areas was significantly less than any
instance of direct exposure. Having regard to the
exposure levels which may be expected to result from
direct exposure (as to which see section 2 Exposure
Models) the Commission finds that no adverse health
effects may be considered to be the product of such
indirect exposure: i.e . physical contact via foliage. As to this conclusion the Commission entertains no doubt.
Mr Walker gave evidence that troops on operations would
get through the foliage "by cutting and by breaking the
foliage. The forward people would have one hand with
secateurs and cut off pieces of {oliage and pull them away
with their hand". 293 Soldiers would clear a place for
themselves to sleep by pulling vegetation or cutting it
and that in high grass areas progress would be made by
soldiers throwing themselves onto the grass to make a
th 293 pa . Even this sort of contact would not result in
a transfer of any TCDD to a soldier, having regard to the
IV-193
evidence of Dr Crosby, unless it followed virtually
immediately upon the application of herbicide. Such
instances, as a consideration of the HERBS tapes and troop
l ocation data demonstrates, are virtually non- existent .
Even if there were such an instance then, as a
consideration of the various exposure models clearly
i ndicates, no resulting adverse health effects are at all
likely.
5.2 Exposure via food
At pages 422 and 423 of the Transcript, Brigadier Rodgers
c onfirmed as accurate the evidence given by him before the
Senate Committee as to the sources of food made available
t o Australian troops in South Vietnam. The Commission
does not propose to detail such evidence in this Report.
It seems clear to the Commission that the majority of
Australian troops spent more than two - thirds of their
t welve month tour of duty on operations in the field. For
e xample, an analysis of the summary of operations of 8 RAR
which appears on page 20 of 'The Grey Eighth in
Vi etnam⢠294 in relation to Mr Walker's company. A
Company, reveals that in its twelve month tour of duty it
s pent 235 days in the field not including any periods
s pent by individual platoons on TAOR patrols.
IV-194
Food sources on operations were primarily the Australian
issue and American issue ration packs. These rations came from sealed containers of food and were clearly not the
subject of any contamination by herbicides. 295
Opportunities for the eating of local food were confi'ned
to the 1 imi ted periods when the troops were at Nui Dat,
during the even more limited periods when they were on
rest and recreation leave at Vung Tau and elsewhere and on the occasions when hot-box meals were taken out by
helicopter during operations. Brigadier Kahn said that,
as Battalion Commander of 5 RAR, he arranged such meals
f 1 f
. bl 296 or mora e purposes as o ten as poss1 e.
In relation to locally grown food, fruit and vegetables
presented no significant risk of contamination by Agent
Orange or like chemicals. Any broad leafed vegetables
sprayed with such chemicals would be destroyed by them.
The process of photodegrada tion would operate to reduce
the amount of TCDD deposited on the surface of fruit to
negligible . 297 proport1ons and other factors, such as
those dealt with in section 5.1 above, must also be
considered. In any
primarily originated
event. fresh fruit and
from within the United
vegetables 298
States.
It would appear that only bananas and lettuce were sourced
IV-195
f rom wi t·hin the local
298 economy. Bananas, would
necessarily be peeled before being eaten. Meat and eggs
came from the United States.
299
Milk was reconstituted
and the water content was
300
local. Bread was also
made at a local bakery at Vung Tau, but little of it was
eaten:
There was a lot of bread thrown out, an enormous
quantity thrown out. In fact it's true to say
that many units did not want to pick it up. they
had plenty of bread.30l
Br i gadier Rodgers said that he had never heard of
soldiers buying and eating local 302 corn and no
e v i dence was received to the contrary. He said that
" purchase of fish was an occasional thing, maybe
e very two months or so" and that prawns were eaten
"up to once a month, that was the greatest frequency
I have heard".
prawns and
303
uncommon.
He said that they were salt water
that salt water crabs were not
He also mentioned the "Dalat salad".
a meal of Australian type salad vegetables which
would be purchased in places such as Saigon and the
vegetables for which, he understood, came from Dalat
i n the central highlands of Vietnam. 304
Mi lk involves local water in the reconstitution
process; exposure via water is considered in the next
IV-196
section. Otherwise; the only food source warranting consideration in the context of the possible exposuie of Austral ian troops is seafood. Eaten on an
occasional basis and, even assuming the levels of
TCDD contamination as reported by Baughman and
Meselson305 in homogenised fish, it is out of the
question that Australian troops could have eaten any
amount approaching even a conservative no - effect
level of TCDD, let alone a toxic dose. Dr Crosby
. . 306 . .
1nd1cated the doubts wh1ch must be enterta1ned
as to the accuracy of the figures reported by
305 Baughman and Meselson. but he expressed the view that, even accepting those figures, a person would
have to eat between one and two kilograms of fish
day each day of their life in order to approach what
he regarded as a conservative no-effect level (NOEL)
of 1 nanogram per kilogram of . h 307 body we1g t. It
is obvious that, even assuming one fish meal per
month, no Australian troops could have remotely
approached such a level.
It would seem that prawns may be in a slightly
different category. Having regard to the fact that
eating prawns in the usual Australian fashion
involves eating the hepatopancreas together with some
IV-197
. 308 d . .
of the prawn's v1scera an even 1f 1 t be assumed
that prawns contained 10 times the proportion of TCDD
contained in the edible portions of fish (an
assumption not supported by the measurements of
305
Baughman and Meselson), prawns consumed at the
rate of one meal per month would not present a
prospect of consumption of TCDD at levels approaching
the 1 nanogram per kilogram of body weight per day
NOEL . In any event, it is to be stressed that this
NOEL figure is one established on the basis of daily
consumption for life.
In light of the foregoing, imported foods. bread and
local fruits can be excluded as likely sources of
TCDD. Further, a serviceman would have had to have
eaten an extraordinary and unrealistically large
quantity of contaminated fish (more than 1, 000 grams
per day) in order to reach the NOEL indicated above.
The possibility of this occurring is quite
inconsistent with the evidence given before the
Senate Committee as to the low proportion of locally 309
sourced food consumed by Australian troops.
'IV-198
5.3 Exposure via Water
Having considered the possibility of the exposure of
Australian troops to herbicides generally and TCDD in
particular as a consequence of drinking water which may have been contaminated with such chemicals, the
Senate Report concluded:
While the Committee acknowledges that drinking water supplied to Australian troops was not
monitored for TCDD contamination, it appears
unlikely that any large scale contamination of this water by TCDD took place. There will. of
course, always be the possibility that some
Australian troops may have been exposed to small amounts of TCDD through drinking water while in Vietnam.310
A consideration of the sources of drinking water, the
remoteness of those sources from herbicide spray locations
and the environmental fate of such chemicals relative
(both in respect of possible entry into water and
behaviour when in water) negates any possibility of other
than minute exposure from such a source of Australian
troops whilst in South Vietnam.
Brigadier Rodgers confirmed the accuracy of the evidence
which he had given before the Senate Committee in relation
to the water supply for Australian troops in
IV-199
. 311
Vt et nam. His submission to the Senate Committee was
f ormally tendered before the Commission as Exhibit 1066.
Br i efly. the Brigadier's evidence before the Senate and
be f o re the Commission was that water supplies at Nui Dat
c ame from a series of wells each of which was within the
c amp perimeter. It was suggested to him that there were
a lso sources outside the camp perimeter but he denied
t h . 312
lS. The water was taken to water points in tanker
t rucks used exclusively for that
313
purpose. At Vung
Tau, water was tapped by wells sunk into what Brigadier
Ro dgers described as a lens of fresh water overlying the
s alt.314
Th e re was no evidence from which it could be inferred that
ei ther of these water sources could have been contami nated
by Agent Orange from aerial or from ground spraying.
It seems reasonably clear that whilst on operations troops u s ed local streams for the purpose of refilling water
bottles when they were available and water was needed .
(S ee, for example. the evidence of Mr Ducker at p 1262 of
t he Transcript and the evidence of Mr Walker at p 102.)
I n some operational areas. water supplies were short.
Wh e re this was the case, water supplies were carried or
IV-200
fresh supplies were brought out from the base. (See, for
example, the evidence of Mr Freeman at p 1185, and of
Brigadier Kahn at p 221.) Sometimes water bottles were
refilled on operations by collecting rain water in a
"hoochie". 315 The troops were provided with chlorine
water steri l isation tablets and also detasting
316 tablets . The tablets were not always used 316 and
in any event they were not relevan t to a consideration of
possible exposure to Agent Orange through ingestion of
contaminated water: there is no suggestion that they were
effective otherwise than for destroying bacteria . It
appears that aluminium sulphate or alum was used to
flocculate sediment out of 317 water and in addition the
Millbank F i lter was available to the troops in the field.
This was described as follows by Brigadier Rodgers:
[It] is like a canvas bag with the right size
mesh. so he then hangs it up it has got a
little hook on one side - and pours water in it,
it has got a bevelled bottom thus so the water
comes out from a point, it oozes out like a water
bag and then goes into the water bottle , so that
is the filtration. He does not use alum in the
field, he filters to get the stones sticks and
mud out of it and the cysts of amoebic dysentery
which is what he does it for.318
He also said:
It has got a definite sized pore in the canvas .
That pore is about 8 microns. the size of an
amoebic cyst from the amoebic dysentery germ -
the smallest size is 8 microns.319
IV-201
Dr Crosby explained the significance of a capacity to
f ilter out objects greater than 8 microns in size:
What is 8
millimetre? millimetre, millimetre .
microns in terms of part of a
A micron is 1/lOOOth of a
so we are dealing with 8/lOOOths of a
If you had a speck of dirt which was 8 microns in
size, you would not see it with the naked eye?
You would not be able to see a single
particle. If you had a cloud of particles of 8
microns you probably would be able to see that
the water was not perfectly clear. . . . It would
be like a dilute milk, for example.320
He went on to explain that commonly airborne dust lay
within the particle size of 10- 100 microns.
Mr Freeman claimed that he had never heard of or been
issued with a Millbank Filter 321 and Mr Ducker said that
it was an impracticable device for use by infantry
soldiers in the circumstances in which they were operating i n Vietnam. 322
It seems clear enough that from time to time Australian
troops on operations may have filled their water bottles
from streams over or near which Agent Orange flights had
taken place at some time previously.
IV-202
The Commission is satisfied that, even in the absence of
the use of the Mi llbank Filter device, no rea 1 risk was
associated with their drinking that
to the propositions of Dr Crosby
water, having regard
and the evidence of
Exposure models collected in section 2.
In short, where Agent Orange settled on water, both
herbicides and any TCDD component would be subject to
photodegradation during the time the material remained as
a film on the surface. It would be likely to remain on
the surface for some hours in still water. Ultimately,
any remaining TCDD would sink. It is insoluble and would
not form a solution in the water. Any dust or other
organic particles in suspension in the water would attract
molecules of TCDD which would bind firmly to those
particles. These would be progressively diluted by the
matter of the stream.
Photodegradation would continue to occur as the TCDD moved
through clear water up to a depth of 20 feet. Upon
finally reaching the bottom. the TCDD would bind tightly to silt and other organic material at the bottom. It is
highly unlikely that water collected by soldiers would
contain the bottom sediment although this could be
possible in the case of a very shallow stream. However,
IV-203
the shallower the stream. the greater the
photodegradation.
Any TCDD ingested with water. while bound to organic
s ediment, would probably remain bound to the sediment and
be excreted from the body with it.
I t i s extremely unlikely that any TCDD would enter streams
ot herwise than by the spray settling directly on the
s treams. The fact that the TCDD is insoluble. and that it
binds tightly to soil prevents the compound from leaching
t hrough the soi 1. These are consequences of the chemical
proper ties of these chemicals and the behaviour and
e nvironmental fate of them. as dealt with in the evidence
of Dr Crosby.
5.4. Exposure via Soil
I t seems clear enough that Australian troops regularly
came in contact with the ground in the course of
operations and on TAOR patrols. According to Mr Walker,
They were covered in mud. covered in dirt.
certainly after several weeks of operation I
think involuntarily and also voluntarily because the soldiers used mud. for instance. for
camouflage both of their faces and their
clothing. particularly any new clothing that was brought in. and the new supply was usually
IV-204
smeared with mud immediately. cleared places to sleep each
soldiers slept on ground sheets, the ground.323
They certainly night. usually but sometimes on
He referred also to troops lying on the ground all night
in ambush positions and moving during a contact with the
enemy. by means of a "leopard crawl". 323 It seems
reasonably obvious that most of the matters to which Mr
Walker referred in this regard would have occurred not in
areas exposed to the sk:y and to the surveillance of the
enemy, but .in areas where a protection of overhead forest
canopy existed. In any such areas over which Agent Orange
had been sprayed, the quantity reaching the soil would
have been substantially reduced by the factors already
discussed in this chapter. in particular those dealt with
in section 5.1 dealing with foliage.
Although there appear to be no experimental data available
the quantity of the various components of Agent
Orange might be apportioned between the low growing
foliage on the one hand and the soil or forest floor on
the other, it is clear that the major proportion of any
herbicide penetrating through the upper canopies to the
lower levels would be intercepted by that low growing
foliage before it reached the soil. It follows from the
evidence of Dr Crosby that any herbicide so intercepted by
IV-205
foli age would not subsequently reach the ground unless it were washed off the foliage by heavy rain or very strong
wind occurring within a matter of minutes of the spray
sett ling on the foliage. Both of these events are
u nl i kely because of the weather criteria applied to the
co nduct of spray missions.
What about the mateiial itself, without any contact by a person or some abrasive agent,
falling off the leaf?----Not much likelihood
at all of it simply falling off although
there is a possibility it could be washed
off by heavy rain in the first several
minutes after it was applied.
I see. That is by the physical action of the
raindrop?--- -The physical action.
But not by being dissolved? - ---That is correct .
What about breeze or wind?----! think it would be
practical to say that there would be no
removal by wind. The material is not in the
presence of droplets that would be able to
move through and rather at this point it is
a thin film that is quite tightly attached
actually to the surface fatty layer.324
Furt her, as Dr Crosby pointed out, TCDD binds tightly to
soil particles by electrostatic process and once so bound to t he soil its availability to be absorbed by any human
. h h . . . d" 325 co n t act Wlt t e so1l 1s "severely restr1cte .
In addition, troops on patrols were substantially
protected by their clothing. It was the practice for
IV-206
their sleeves to be buttoned down; they wore high boots
which formed a seal with their trousers and operated, in
effect, as built-in gaiters; they wore back packs and, in
open areas, they wore steel helmets and flak
. k 326 ]ac ets. on the other hand, according to Mr Walker,
in the tropical heat some troops unbuttoned the fronts of
their shirts. 323 This is understandable.
The Commission is satisfied that after the first few
minutes of any TCDD coming into contact with the lower
foliage and the soil there was, for all practical
purposes, no real possibility of the transfer of the
herbicide either from the soil or from foliage to the
troops. This was primarily due to the tight binding of
the herbicide to those two media.
A consideration of the troop location data and HERBS tapes
records and the evidence of Dr Crosby enabled the
Commission to conclude beyond reasonable doubt that it was
not possible for Australian personnel to ingest any
chemical agents via soil which were likely to cause
adverse health effects.
The lack of complaint from members of C Company 5 RAR on
22nd August 1969 does nothing to detract from this
conclusion.
IV-207
I n r espect of all allegations of indirect exposure it is
i mpo r t an t to bear in mind the way in which the chemical is
s u g g ested to have been absorbed: experiments establish
that . f or TCDD, the rate of dermal absorption (i.e.
t hro ugh t he skin) is but 10\ of the rate of oral
. 327
a b s orption (i.e. through the mouth).
6 . SAFETY PRECAUTIONS
Paragraphs (g) and (k) respectively of the Letters Patent
require the Commission to inquire into, inter alia, the
fol lowing matters:
( g) The extent to which adequate safety
precautions were taken and the extent to
which adequate action was taken when any
possible harmful effect of chemical agents became knvwn;
(k) Notwithstanding any limitations contained in paragraph (a), the nature and extent of the
safety precautions taken, during the
disposal at any time by or on behalf of
Australia of surplus chemical agents that
were in Vietnam during the period commencing on 31 July 1962 and ending at the expiration
of 11 January 1973.
Although the history of the Australian involvement in the
Viet nam conflict has been dealt with elsewhere, it is
per t inent to outline the features which are relevant for a
prope r understanding of thi s section of the Report.
IV- 208
Although the military presence of Australian personnel in
Vietnam as early as August 1962 with the
dispatch of
to Vietnam
members of the Australian Army Training Team
(AATTV), the first major deployment of
Australians commenced with the establishment of the First
Battalion. The Royal Australian Regiment, with appropriate support, in June 1965 at Bien Hoa Air Base, north of
Saigon. under the operational control of the US 173
Airborne Brigade (Separate) as its Third Battalion .
Its initial r-ole was to conduct operations in defence of
that base but by December: 1965 the role had been extended
to include operations in the whole of III Corps
conjunction with that Brigade. 1 RAR also
against National Liberation Front (NLF) For-ces
nadrby and long established base area "War ZoneD".
area in
operated
in the
In March 1966 the Australian Government announced an
increase in the Vietnam Force to 4. 500 which would. for
the first time, include National Servicemen. It was
decided to deploy the augmented Australian force into an
oper-ational area where the Army had more tactical
independence and would constitute a more distinctly
Australian "presence" in Vietnam.
IV-209
An Austral ian Army group led by the Chief of the General
Staff. Lt-Gen. Wilton, decided that Phuoc Tuy province
provided the most favourable location. The Australian
uni t s comprising two Infantry Battalions, with Artillery
and other support units, entered the province in May-June
1 966 and established a base in the centre of the province
at Nui Dat as the first Australian Task Force. 1 ATF
o perated under United States control and a third battalion
was added to it in late 1967.
One of the three battalions (8 RAR) was withdrawn at the
conclusion of its tour on 17 November 1970, leaving a two
battalion Task Force. On 30 March 1971 the new Prime
Mi nister Mr William McMahon (as he then was) announced a
f ur t her graduated withdrawal of one thousand men spread
over the three Services to be effective during the
fo llowing three months.
F inally, on 18 August 1971. the Prime Minister announced
t ha t the bulk of the Australian Forces would be withdrawn
by Christmas 1971 and the remainder, with the exception of
the AATTV. shortly thereafter. The Task Force withdrew
f rom Vietnam between October and early December 1971. the
last Battalion (4 RAR) departing on 8 December 1971. The
last of the logistics support element left Vietnam on 5
IV- 210
March 1972 and the remnants of the AATTV on 18 December
1972.
Three phases mark.ed the presence of Australian personnel
in Vietnam. with the notable exception of the outstanding
work. of the AATTV. Briefly, the phases were:
May 1966 - December 1967: most of the Operations were
conducted within Phuoc Tuy province by the 1 ATF. The
Task. Force fought a number of major engagements with
NLF/PAVN (Peoples' Army of Vietnam) Main Force Units
(including the "Battle of Long Tan" when an Australian
company fought an NLF Regiment near Nui Dat in August
1966) and also attempted to combat the NLF's political
structure through a series of "cordon and search"
operations in the villages.
=J-=a::.::n""'u=ca=r.._y_-=1c.:9c..:6=-:8=------=M.:.:a=-yL--=1"""9-=6-=-9 : the Te t Offen s i ve and its
aftermath in which operations outside Phuoc Tuy
province were frequently undertaken against NLF/PAVN
Main Force Units, with a corresponding diminution in
emphasis on Phuoc Tuy.
IV-211
6 . 1 Instructions
Th e re were in existence various (Australian) Army and Air
Fo r c e instructions/guidelines/operating procedures etc.
fo r t he use, handling, transport, storage, and disposal of
chemical agents which were effective prior to the
establishment of precautions were,
o v e ra l l standing
the l ATF in mid 1966 . Safety
then, in force albeit as part of the
orders appropriate to Australian
p e rsonnel wherever stationed.
On 18 March 1966 Brig. N. A. M. Nicholls, Australian Army
Re presentative, Office of the Military Attache, Australian
Embassy, Washington, forwarded to Army Headquarters in
Canberra a copy of the Draft Proposed Small Development
Re qu i rement for an Interim Defoliant System under the
Aust ralia, Britain, Canada, America (ABCA) Agreement.
Es sent i ally this referred to the Spray Tank Biological.
Ae roplane, 80 gallon, M44 and Defoliant. Appended as Item
1 0 of the submission of the Department of Defence (Exhibit
1151) were the specifications pertaining to this
d e velopment issued on 24 November 1965 by the Headquarters
o f the United States Army Material Command as AMCTC Item
4 0 5 5/1 - 66.
IV- 214
At page 6 of the Draft Proposal. at paragraph 2.c(3) (a)
dealing with the defoliant LNX, it is obvious from the
chemical description that what was being described was
Agent Orange. It was described as "non-toxic to man and
animals under normal use."
The paragraph continues:
The LDso for rats, oral dose is 666 milligrams
per kilogram of body weight for 2. 4. D and 300
milligrams per kilogram of body weight for
2,4,5,T. These materials have been in general
use throughout the U.S. for over 17 years.
General guidance relative to the hazards incident to handling and disseminating 2,4,D and 2,4,5,T is that these substances are considered non-toxic when used as a herbicide under handling
conditions of common agricultural practice by
unskilled personnel.
Various orders and instructions by the Army and RAAF
detail such safety precautions as:
(a) cleaning of equipment after use;
(b) forbidding smoking during handling and spraying;
(c) use of protective equipment, especially oil-resistant
gloves and aprons, goggles and masks (full face) for
spraying operations;
(d) washing and bathing on completion of spraying, or
immediately in the event of skin contamination;
IV-215
(e) action of contamination of utensils; and
(f) action in the event of illness or other medical
symptoms.
Mili t ary Board Instruction No.
f r o m Army Headquarters deals
12 issued on 1 January 1959
with "Safety Precautions
Spraying with Arsenical Weed Killers or Poison Sprays".
I t requires:
(a) protective clothing to be worn during spraying;
(b) weed killers not to be used from a knapsack spray;
(c) rubber gloves and a rubber or waterproof apron to
be worn when mixing the weed killer and spraying;
(d) immediate discontinuance of work and thorough
washing if the skin is splashed or otherwise
contaminated with weed killer or liquid spray;
(e) thorough washing of hands immediately afterwards
by those who have handled weed killer containers;
(f) thorough washing of hands and a minimum five
minute shower for those who have used the spray;
and
(g) thorough cleans i ng of
spraying weed killer.
IV-216
the sprays used for
The further: instruction was that this instruction was to
be "reproduced in Unit Routine Orders every six months".
MBI No. 9, issued on 1 January 1961. deals with safety
precautions for chemicals and insecticides. It replaced.
but substantially reproduced. MBI 117/1958. It made a
general observation:
Most chemicals used in pest control are poisonous in some degree to man. Poisoning may occur by
swallowing or inhaling these substances or in
some cases through contact with the skin".
It required:
(a) pest control materials to be kept in their
labelled containers;
(b) storage under lock and key;
(c) available only to persons trained in their use;
(d) stored apart from foodstuffs and food containers;
(e) products containing DDT. BHC (Benzene
Hexachloride) and Dieldrin not to be used near
food or utensils;
(f) contaminated food to be destroyed;
(g) contaminated utensils to be cleansed with steam
or boiling water;
IV-217
(h) a masK covering nose and mouth to be worn during
dry mixing;
(i) respirators, protective clothing and gloves to be worn during use;
(j) a shower of five minutes duration after use.
The Mi litary Board Instruction current at the commencement
o f Australian involvement in Vietnam and continuing for at
least four years thereafter are those contained in MBI
2 30 - l (1 September 1962) entitled "Safety Precaution:
Chemicals , Insecticides, Weed Killers and Poison Sprays".
Th i s document contained elaborate warnings and
i nstructions as to use. The Commission does not deem it
necessary to set it out in full. Suffice it to say that,
i f followed, they would maKe the use of the chemical
agents safe.
In February, 1967 HQ ATFV requested a defoliation
. d 329
herbic i de for use 1n an around base areas.
He r bic i de DSL defoliant 21 was supplied with instructions
t hat "for reasons of safety these instructions must be
strictly followed . The instructions were :
IV- 218
INSTRUCTIONS FOR USE
1. Shake the concentrate.
2. Add one pint of concentrate to a knapsack
sprayer and fill with water. 3. Shake the knapsack sprayer.
4. Spray foliage lightly. One knapsack spray
should cover an area of at least 200 square
feet.
PRECAUTIONS
1. Use gloves, mask and eye shield when
handling and mixing the solution. 2. Use mask and eye shield when spraying.
3. If any concentrate is spilled on the skin,
wash off immediately with water. 4. Bathe after spraying.
These instructions were sufficient when combined with the
Standing Orders.
A telex message from A.F.V. to the Department of the Army
Canberra on or about 31 October 1967 in discussing
herbicide requirements stated:
Herbicides should be non-toxic when ingested in moderate quantities
operators should not have to take
safety precautions when using the
(emphasis added).
inhaled or Spray elaborate herbicide.
There were three sets of instructions which applied to the
handling of chemicals in Vietnam during the Australian
presence there. They were paragraphs 939-946 in the
Manual of Army Safety (Provisional) 1967. the "Instruction
IV-219
for Spraying Herbicides, 1 ATF" issued as a result of the
Holt/Lugg trials, and the instructions entitled
"Instructions for Spraying Herbicide Hyvar X- WS" issued on 26 July 1969 for ALSG, Vung Tau.
These instructions, if followed, provided a safe and
adequate basis for usage.
Manual of Army Safety, 1970
This updated the earlier instructions and placed somewhat
more emphasis upon the dangers of the chemicals. This
t rend was also noticed in the document "General Nuclear
Biological Chemical . 330 h Instructions", paragrap 6 of
which refers specifically to side effects including
systemic poisoning from absorption, inhalation or
swallowing.
Current Instructions
The most recent instructions in respect of pesticides are
those contained in the Australian Joint Service
Publication, Pesticides Manual - JSP (AS) 705 issued for
use by the Australian Defence Force in August 1983 and
effective forthwith. It supersedes all other instructions.
IV-220
These instructions emphasise that "[t]here are no
absolutely safe insecticides; all are capable of causing damage to body functions if absorbed in sufficient
quantity".
The chapters that
protective signs and
treatment.
clothing, symptoms
There
follow deal with personal safety and
storage and disposal of pesticides,
of poisoning and definitive medical
is emphasis upon training and
supervision, careful adherence to personal precautions and
protective clothing.
These instructions, which
compounds. provide safe and
light of current knowledge.
Personnel Engaged in Spraying
are specific to particular
adequate protection in the
Approximately 100 Vietnamese operators were engaged in
full time wor::k at Vung Tau spraying the base at 1 ALSG
with insecticides. The base was cold fogged with a
misting device by the operators working for Pacific
Architects and Engineers, a corporation contracting to the
US Military.
IV-221
The role of No. 9 Helicopter Squadron in the spraying of
herbicides and insecticides has been referred to. Both at
Nui Dat and at 1 ALSG technical assistance and supervision
i n the spraying of herbicides was the responsibility of
t he Hygiene Officer 1 ATF and the Hygiene Inspector
respectively. Brig. General Rodgers in his 331 statement refers to the use of certain insecticides, for example
Di eldr i n, under the "auspices" of the Hygiene Officer
(page 15, paragraph 43 (c)) or to appropriate instruction
given to "specialist hygiene personnel as part of their
routine trade training" (page 16, paragraph 46) . At page
17 (paragraph 48) Brigadier Rodgers states:
The
So far as I am aware all the spraying operations
were done under the supervision of a trained NCO who was familiar with the methods of dilution,
dispersal and personal protection.
Royal Australian Engineers also were given
responsibilities in respect of herbicidal operations. As stated in a minute dated 1 October 1971 from the DMO & P
the i r responsibility in herbicidal operations closely
paralleled those which they had in mine warfare. They
were therefore considered to be responsible for (a) advice
to commanders, their staff and units on herbicidal
operations; (b) conduct of herbicidal tasks beyond the
capabil i ty of units; (c) advice to the RAAF on aerial
IV-222
deli very of herbicides; use of herbicides and
involved.
(d) training of personnel in the
equipment including safety aspects
That minute further went on to state the responsibility of
"units" as being in ... "(a) the use of herbicides on
domestic tasks within their capability .... ".
In March 1969 each Infantry Battalion of the Regiment was
instructed to "detach one soldier to HQ Coy l ATF" to
carry out a defoliation program of the perimeter wire,
ammunition dump surrounds, radio aerial complexes and any
other sites "which may present a fire hazard during the
following dry season". During the period of their
detachment the four soldiers provided were to be under the
direct control of l ATF Hygiene Officer. Because of the
toxicity of the chemicals used and the rigid safety
precautions to be observed the soldiers provided had to be
"intelligent types" and the personnel provided were to
remain unchanged
program but, if
changed more
332
months".
throughout the entire
this was not possible,
frequently than "once
IV-223
period of the
were not to be
every three
Tt is also notable that a request for units to be supplied
with Hyvar X-ws for herbicidal operations, with the units
responsible for spraying being under the technical
supervision and control of the Hygiene Inspector 1 ALSG
was refused. Any defoliation program had to include
control by the Headquarters 1 ALSG "using a properly
supervised, organised and equipped spraying team" (cited
i n Telex message from Headquarters AFV to One ALSG and a
332 copy 1 ATF- July 1969).
This instruction appears subsequently to have been
modified in that by order dated 17 September 1969
headquarters 1 ALSG devised a program for the clearing of
all foliage from the perimeter wire at ALSG by the use of
a defoliant spray.
Uni t s having a res pons ibi li ty for the maintenance of a
section of the perimeter wire were also to be responsible
for the clearance of that section of wire. The Hygiene
Inspector 1 ALSG was to provide respirators and rubber
gloves and to determine the quantity of Hyvar required .
6.2 Observance
Bo t h Mr Rhodes and Mr Nunn stated that the instructions as
to clothing were strictly enforced. Those who had
IV-224
attended the School of Army Health were conscious of the
potential health hazards and "rigidly enforced" the
protective clothing . 333 requ1rements. However, Mr Nunn also stated that the respirators and protective clothing were not used extensively. The reasons were varied.
Obviously the oppressive weather conditions must have been
a major factor.
In addition, his team were doing a large volume of work
with materials and "did not find it possible to use
protective clothing" as would be perhaps the case with a
small job. Clothing also varied with the nature of the
task being performed. For thermal fogging protective
clothing was not terribly important in that a pair of
shorts and a shirt and boots would suffice. For wet
spraying full jungle greens, full trousers. and long
sleeve shirt. were required.
However, Mr Nunn recalls that it was very difficult to
control, in the sense of enforce. those requirements. He
recalled one incident in 1970 where he had to charge a
corporal who refused to wear long clothing while wet
spraying. The attitude was that, notwithstanding their
training at the School of Army Health, one did not have to
worry about chemicals.
IV-225
During informal hearings throughout Australia the
Commission heard of a number of instances, anecdotally, of
a flouting of regulations as to protective clothing,
particularly in the use of respirators. goggles or masks, rubber gloves and long-sleeved shirts and trousers. It is
possible that those who were charged with the task of
handl i ng or spraying the chemical agents were heedless of
any toxic potential. It is also possible that the
application of the sprays, particularly by the use of back
packs, militated against the wearing of full jungle dress.
A further factor is that there were insufficient numbers
of trained personnel in the hygiene detachment.
Pe r sonnel from other units performed hygiene duties and
ins t ructions may not have been adequately promulgated or
enforced amongst these personnel.
As well. operational exigencies may have precluded strict
observance of safety standards. As has been indicated
earlier, the success of the prophylactic program and the
conspicuous lack of toxic reactions in Vietnam point to a
h i gh standard of military discipline in relation both to
performance of hygiene duties and adherence to adequate
safety standards.
IV-226
7. DISPOSAL OF SURPLUS CHEMICALS
7.1 Disposal of the 'colour coded' herbicides
As at September. 1971 there were 1. 37m gallons (US) of
Agent Orange in South Vietnam and o. 85 m gallons (US) at
the Naval Construction Battalion Center at Gulfport.
M . . . . 334
lSSlSSlppl. The former stocks were transported to
Johnston Island in the Pacific Ocean in April, 1972 for
storage. Several possible disposal techniques were
investigated and, following public hearings of the US
Environment Protection Agency (EPA). a permit was granted
on 7 April, 1977 to enable incineration at sea in a
designated location. west of Johnston Island. in the North
Pacific Ocean.
A total of three loadings of the vessel 'MIT Vulcanus'
were required: one from Gulfport and two from Johnston
Island. At both sites the herbicide was transferred from
the drums to the Vulcanus. The drums were rinsed with
diesel fuel (later added to the cargo of the Vulcanus) and
then crushed. A total of 15.480 drums of herbicide were
processed at Gulfport from 24 May to 10 June 1977. At
Johnston Island, between 27 July and 23 August 1977. a
total of 24,795 drums were emptied.
IV-227
7.2 Disposal of surplus Australian herbicides
The Australian authorities decided to return its stocks of
herbicide to Australia, 2,800 lbs of Hyvar and 2,115
gallons of Reglone were returned by sea in February, 1972.
According to the Army Report:
No evidence was found as to in-theatre disposal
of herbicides. Indeed the stock figures suggest
that some herbicide in Nui Dat was returned to
theatre stocks in Vung Tau. There is no record
of HQ l ATF or of units in HQ 1 ATF issuing
orders for the destruction or reporting the
destruction of herbicide in Nui Dat in 1971 or
1972.335
An Army minute dated 15 April 1972 on "Disposal of
Operational S k f b .. d 336 d h toe s o Her 1c1 es" propose t at there be transferred to the Engineers a quantity of Bromacil
(Hyvar). The remainder of the serviceable stocks were to
be sold through the Department of Supply and the
unserviceable stocks were to be disposed of by letting a
contract for their removal and destruction.
On 29 August 1972 a minute to the Engineers from the
Operations Colonel instructed them to arrange for the
retention of the following stocks of herbicides from
operational stocks: Diquat 54 gallons, Bromacil 9,900 lbs,
Paraquat 36 gallons, Picloram 18 gallons.
IV-228
These amounts represented an estimated 3 years stock at
the annual usage rates for commands. The remaining
holdings of these herbicides were disposed of through the
Department of Supply in accordance with normal procedures.
No stocks of paraquat are shown to exist as at that time.
The Commission concludes that unused stocks were returned
and disposed of by use or sale if se.i:vt·ceable and by
destruction if unserviceable.
7.3 Insecticides
Unused stocks of insecticides in Vietnam were disposed of
by:
(a) returning stocks of US origin to US Forces;
(c) gift to the Vietnamese as part of the Gift Stores
Program; or
(d) treatment of stores and equipment being returned
to Australia.
The Army Report indicates:
No recor-d
destroyed or was found
dumped in
of insecticides [South Vietnam).
IV-229
being nor of
The
any instructions pertaining to destruction or
dumping.337
Commission finds that the arrangements for the
d i sposal of herbicides and insecticides were appropriate.
7 . 4 Lack of VVAA Contribution
The VVAA had substantial input into the Terms of Reference
f o r this I nquiry. None of its three submissions touched
upon safety precautions, remedial action or disposal. The
l a c k of any such submission left the Commission 1 in the
dark 1 as to the reasons for the inclusions of paragraphs
( g) and (k) of the Terms of Reference. The only
inferences which may be drawn from this silence are either
that these topics were not seriously in contention or that no evidence was available to support submissions it might
have wished to make in these areas. In the circumstances
the Commission must conclude that the VVAA position is
that no harm came to veterans as a result of any
def i ciencies in safety precautions, remed i al action or
d i sposal methods.
Tropi cal use of insecticide was commonplace for the
Australian Army although herbicides were a comparative novelty. With the benefit of hindsight and awareness of
IV-230
the environmental/ecological debate of the 1970s and 1980s
it would be easy to criticise the Army for adopting or
imparting what might now be called by some inappropriate
acceptance of possible risks. The Commission makes no
such criticism and observes that the herbicides used were
in common use, not only in Australia but throughout the
world. The Holt/Lugg trials were an appropriate testing
procedure and the safety precautions adopted as a result
of them quite adequate.
Of necessity, the Army delegated much of the day-to-day
responsibility for the observance of safety regulations to non- commissioned officers and even to soldiers relatively
unskilled and untrained. Those who had attended the
School of Army Health were seized of the importance of the
use of protective clothing. It is understandable that the
oppressive weather conditions contributed to widespread
failure to observe Standing Orders, particularly in view of the lack of concern about these well-known and widely
used commercial products.
There is insufficient evidence to form any conclusions as
to the adequacy of instructions promulgated by. or
equipment used in, the RAAF.
IV-231
Regulations requiring "immediate" washing of hands or
other parts of the body on which chemicals had been
spilled, or for changes of clothing under operational
conditions in a theatre of conflict would most likely have
been unable to be obeyed but as most chemical used by
Australian personnel in Vietnam took place in the
comparative calm of Nui Dat and Vung Tau. the regulation
probably could have been enforced. 338 Report concludes:
But as the Senate
there is no doubt that comprehensive
instructions were issued on the precautions to be taken in relation to the use of pesticides. It
was clearly recognised by the Army that some risk was associated with the use of herbicides and
insecticides and precautions had to be taken.
However it is equally clear from the evidence
provided by VVAA that in practice, these
precautions were not always implemented. In
retrospect, this should not be considered unusual in a situation where the substances being sprayed were not regarded as harmful, the safety
equipment was hot and uncomfortable, the
personnel hygiene requirements could not always he adhered to, and the personnel involved were
not always properly trained ...
The Commission respectfully agrees.
IV-232
8. CONCLUSIONS
8.1 Insecticides
In respect of insecticides the Commission's findings as to
the likelihood of exposures of Australian personnel are
summarised in Table 23. reproduced below as Table 27 for
the sake of convenience.
As indicated earlier, in respect of insecticides, the
category 'low' is used to include not exposed: it should
not be assumed that. in categorising exposure as low, the
Commission is finding that there was exposure.
It must also be remembered that mere exposure is not
indicative of effects: the
the likelihood
question of
of resulting adverse health
dose and the available
toxicological information must also be considered.
IV-233
Insecticide
Diethyl toluamide Dibutyl phthalate Aerosol cans Malathion
Diazinon Lindane Chlordane Dieldrin DDT Pyrethrins
8 . 2 . Herbicides
Period of use
? - 1971
? - 1971
? - 1971
1965 - 71
? - 1971
?,1969 -? - 1970
? - 1971
1965 - 71
? - 1971
TABLE 27
Likelihood of Exposure Applicators Base Other
Personnel Soldiers
high high high
high high high
high high medium
high high medium
high medium low
71 high medium low
high medium low
high medium low
high medium low
high medium low
Table 28 sets out the likelihood of exposures of
Australian personnel to herbicides during relevant periods
of the service in Vietnam.
IV- 234
TABLE 28
Herbicide Period
of use
Likelihood of Exposure Applicators Base Other
Personnel Soldiers
2,4,5-T 1966-1977/8 low low low 2,4-D 1966-1971 low low low TCDD 1966-1971 low low low Pic lor am 1968-1971 low low low Diquat 1968-1971 high medium low Paraquat 1967-? low low low Bromacil 1968-1971 high medium low Borate Chlorate 1966-1967 high medium low Distillate/kerosene 1966-1971 high medium low Creosote 1966-1967 high medium low 8.3. Pesticides Generally The Senate Committee concluded in respect of the issue of exposure as follows: The Committee concludes that it is unlikely that the majority of Australian troops were directly or indirectly exposed to the herbicides used by U.S. forces. namely Agent Orange and other compounds containing the phenoxy herbicides 2,4-D and 2,4,5-T. The Committee believes, however, that direct exposure to insecticides (such as malathion) which were used to control malaria, was probable in the majority of cases. In addition, exposure to one or more anti-malarial drugs was routine. It is also accepted that all Vietnam veterans would have been exposed to harmful chemicals, including potentially mutagenic and carcinogenic chemicals, during that part of their lives spent outside Vietnam. The question which arises from all this is: what additional burden of exposure to potential mutagens and carcinogens is likely to have been associated with a typical period of IV-235
one year's service in Vietnam? This question
cannot be easily answered, except by stating that there would have been a finite additional burden of exposure which, when viewed in the context of
likely exposure patterns to potentially harmful chemicals of individuals prior to Vietnam
service, and also subsequent to that service, is
likely to be relatively small.339
The Commission respectfully agrees with such conclusions
generally and in particular that the "additional burden"
referred to "is likely to be relatively small.".
Further, the Commission finds that the exposure levels of
Australian servicemen in Vietnam generally were not
greater than that of their American counterparts, Ranch
Hand personnel especially excepted. There can be no doubt
that Ranch Hand personnel experienced the greatest level
of exposure amongst American servicemen in Vietnam. The
evidence of Messrs Hubbs and Dudenhoeffer provides but one
basis for this proposition. Further grounds for this
conclusion derive from all the relevant, credible and
available literature in respect of Operation Ranch Hand;
the slides, film and like visual material. not to mention
commonsense. A number of American studies have proceeded
on this assumption to study the health or well-being of
those directly involved in the Ranch Hand program.
The Commission i.s satisfied that those involved in the
Ranch Hand operations were the most exposed military group
IV-236
to have served in Vietnam. On the basis of all the
evidence before the Commission the conclusion that they
were at least one thousand (1.000) times more exposed is
inescapable.
On consideration of all the relevant evidence the
Commission is satisfied that, adopting the criterion of
being within
flight path, half a kilometre either side of a spray
the only Australian personnel who may be
presumed to be directly exposed are those servicemen who
were serving on the relevant dates in the units as
indicated in Table 24.
In respect of indirect exposure the Commission is
satisfied that, whilst the likelihood of some such
exposure may be high, a consideration of the likely dose
level reveals beyond any doubt that such exposure or
exposures may be safely ignored for the purpose of
considering whether resulting adverse health effects may
have arisen.
Even if there were instances of direct exposure not
adverted to above and even if there were repeated indirect
exposure incidents of the kind referred to in this chapter
then such instances would not be such as to alter any of
the Commission's conclusions.
IV-237
It is important to realise that these conclusions result, at least in part, from a consideration of the available
toxicological information which has been converted to a more readily understandable form by means of exposure
models. Later chapters in this Report deal with the
scientific evidence which bears on issues such as
toxicology and both the type of health effects which may
be associated with exposure to relevant chemical agents
and the likelihood of adverse health effects persisting
following such exposure.
9. RECOMMENDATIONS
In respect of the issues arising from the relevant safety
precautions and their observance the Commission makes the
following recommendations:
1. The overlap between Engineers Corps and the Hygiene
Coy as to ordering, acquisition, storage, handling,
mixing, dissemination and destruction of herbicides
and insecticides should cease. One corps should have
the total responsibility for these tasks and the
records thereof.
IV-238
2. Members of that corps should have thorough training in
the use . of chemical agents and. in particular. any
toxic risks thereof.
3. Each unit of that corps should be adequately manned to
ensure that all hygiene functions are performed by the
trained personnel.
4. A Manual of Instructions appropriate to the Australian
Defence Forces should be maintained in consultation
with all relevant authorities and experts. including
but not limited to Standards Laboratories. NH & MRC.
Federal and State Health Departments and chemical
manufacturers.
5. Proper inventory controls should be maintained.
IV-239
ENDNOTES
1. Young, A. L., 'The Toxicology, Environmental
Fate, and Human Risk of Herbicide Orange and its
Associated Dioxin', USAF Occupational and
Environmental Health Laboratory Technical Report, No TR-78-92, Brookes Air Force Base, October,
1978.
2. Craig, D.A.: "Use of Herbicides
Asia, Historical Report". San
Logistics Center, Directorate
Management, Kelly AFB, Texas 1975.
in Southeast Antonia Air
of Energy
3. Committee on the Effect of Herbicides in South
Vietnam, Part A. Summary and Conclusions.
National Academy of Science, Washington D.C.
1974. (Exhibit 903) Table III C-1.
4. Westing, A.H. Ecological consequences of the
second Indochina War. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (1976) Table 3.3.
5. Exhibit 906, p I-ll.
6. MACV Directive No. 525-l. 12 August, 1969 quoted
in Exhibit 903 at pp 11-6 and 7.
7. Exhibit 906, p 1-18 & 1-19.
8. MACV Directive No. 525-l. 12 August.
considered in Exhibit 89, pp 3-8 and 9.
1969
9. Exhibit 892, pp 3-9 and 10 quoting CG II FFV
Message AVFBC-FM 010411 of 3112152 January 1971 as contained in File: IATF 890/5/6(1).
10. Exhibit 892, pp 3- 10 and ll quoting COMUSMACV
Message 46/71 (J3) of 3007492 Jun 71 as contained on File: IATF 890/5/612).
11. Exhibit 903, p 11-3.
12. Exhibit 906, p I-14.
13. Ibid, p 1-15.
14. Ibid, pp 1-15-1-18.
15. See also, Exhibit 906, Ch II.
IV-240
16. Exhibit 906, p I - 21.
17 . Exhibit 906, p I-31.
18. Exhibit 894. p 1-2.
19 . Exhibit 903, p III-39.
20. Exhibit 894, p 1-2 .
21. Submission by Dow Chemical (Australia) Ltd,
Commission file SC83/177 folio 24.
22. Exhibit 1288, p 29.
23. Exhibit 894, p 3- 71.
24. Exhibit 894. p 3-70.
25. Exhibit 1288, p 28.
26. Exhibit 1288, p 27.
27. Exhibit 892, Annexure M to Ch l, p 3- 1 - M-1.
28 . Ibid, p 3 - 54.
29. Exhibit 8. p l.
30. Exhibit 1288, p 28.
31. Exhibit 892, pp 3-54 and 3 - 55.
32. Ibid, p 3-56.
33. Ibid, p 3-58.
34. Exhibit 1061, Table l.
35. Exhibit 892, p 3-70.
36. Exhibit 1288, p 29.
37 . Exhibit 1105, p 6 (Exhibit 99 is a copy of
Exhibit 1105).
38. Ibid, p 15.
39. Ibid, pp 21-22.
IV- 241
Exhibit 892, p 3-70.
Ibid, p 3-71.
Exhibit 892, pp 3-62 - 3-63.
Exhibit 1288, p 26.
Exhibit 1061.
Exhibit 1105. p 15.
Ibid, p 6.
Exhibit 892. p 3-60.
Exhibit 1105. p 14 & p 22.
Exhibit 1288, p 28.
Transcript p 673.
Transcript pp 683 - 685. Transcript p 1414.
Transcript p 1415 & p 1443.
Transcript p 1415.
Transcript pp 1419 - 1420.
Transcript p 1483.
IV-242
65. Transcript pp 1430 - 1432.
66. Exhibit 892.
67. Supra. p 56.
68. Exhibit 892. p 3- 50. para 47.
69. Transcript p 1487.
70. Transcript pp 1620 - 1621.
71. Transcript p 1638.
72. Transcript p 1633.
73. Exhibit 892.
74. Transcript p 1620.
75. Transcript p 1649.
76. Transcript pp 1672 - 1674.
77. Exhibit 1061. p 2.
78. Exhibit 1105. p 16.
79. Exhibit 1448. p 17.
80. Exhibit 903 ..
81. Ibid. p VII-2.
82. Exhibit 892. p 3-130.
83. Senate Standing Committee on Science and the
Environment Enquiry into Pesticides Hansard. p 16.
84. Exhibit 892. p 3-129.
85. Exhibit 895. p 124.
86. Exhibit 1448. p 24.
87. Exhibit 892. p 3-122.
88. Ibid. p 3-134.
IV-243
89. Exhibit 1448, p 20.
90. Ibid, Annexures A and B to Ch 2.
91. Ibid, pp 3-131 and 3-132.
92. Ibid p 3-139.
93. Exhibit 1448, p 18.
94. Ibid p 3-140.
95. Ibid pp 3-138 and 3-139.
96. Ibid p 3-136.
97. Ibid p 3-137.
98. Exhibit 1062 p 7.
99. Ibid pp 12-16 and 18-19.
100. House of Representatives 15 May 1980 Hansard p
2791.
101. Exhibit 1288.
102. Ibid p 30.
103. Exhibit 1062, p 8; Transcript p 329.
104. Transcript p 261.
105. Exhibit 1062.
106. Exhibit 1210.
107. Transcript p 2159.
108. Exhibit 1210, Appendix 2.
109. Transcript p 2160.
110. Transcript, p 2374.
111. Exhibit 1198, p 7.
112. Transcript, p 1982.
IV-244
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118. 119.
120.
121.
122. 123.
124.
Transcript, p 1993. Transcript, pp 1993 - 4.
Transcript, p 1995. Transcript, p 2747.
Exhibits 114. 115, 116 & 286.
Transcript, pp 2751 - 2.
Transcript, p 2752. Transcript, p 2786.
Exhibit 906, pp I - 18 (3 gallons/acre) & I - 31
(4.21 1bs/gallon for 2,4-D; 4.41 lbs/gallon for 2,4,5-T).
Exhibit 906, pp I-5 & I-14.
The Merck Index, lOth edn, p 1067, para 7280
Quantification of applicator exposure in the Field, Scientific Dispute
Conference on 2, 4, 5 - T, Washington DC, 1979.
of 2 , 4,5 - T
Resolution June 4-6,
125. Exposure measurements of applicators spraying
(2,4,5- trichlorophenoxy)acetic acid in the
forest, J. Agric. Food Chern. l980(a);28: 626 - 630. 126. Gehring, P. J. et al. The fate of
2,4,5-trichlorophenoxy- acetic acid
(2,4,5-T)following oral administration to man, Toxicol . Appl. Pharmacol., 1973:26:352- 361.
127. Kohli, J. D. et al, Absorption and excretion of
2, 4, 5-trichlorophenoxy acetic acid in man, Arch. Int Pharmacodyn 1974;210:250-255.
128. Acute human exposure to TCDD in Seveso, Italy, J.
Toxicol . Environ. Health, 1980(a);6: 27-43 .
129. Carter, C. D. et a l , Tetrachlorodibenzo- dioxin:
an accident poisoning episode in horse arenas,
Science 1975;1888:738 - 740.
IV- 245
130. Reggiani, G, Medical problems raised
contamination in Seveso, Italy, J.
Environ. Health, 1980(a);6: pp 27-43; Exhibit 1255.
by TCDD Toxicol. see also
131. Rowe, V. K .⢠Direct testimony before the US
Environmenta 1 Protect ion Agency, FIFRA Docket No 415, 13 November, 1980.
132. Exhibit 903, p II I-32.
133. Exhibit 1448, p 34.
134. Exhibit 1037, p 27 et seq.
135. Ibid, p 28.
136. Transcript, pp 1399 - 1412.
137. Transcript, p 893.
138. Transcript, p 896.
139. Transcript, p 919.
140. Transcript, p 920.
141. Transcript, p 911.
142. Transcript, p 926.
143. Exhibit 1121, para 3.
144. Transcript, p 991.
145. Transcript, pp 924 & 991.
146. Transcript, p 122.
147. Transcript, p 125.
148. Transcript, p 193.
149. Transcript, p 194.
150. Transcript, p 1258.
151. Transcript, p 1361.
152. Basic 2 Volume. Exhibit 1068, p 8 of Attachment E.
IV-246
153. Exhibit 906. p I-15.
154. Transcript. p 915.
155. Exhibit 1101.
156. Transcript. p 1243.
157. Transcript. p 1357.
158. Transcript. p 719.
159. Exhibit 1137. Log Sheets of G(Ops) - HQ 1 ATF
(MAIN). sheet 154. dated 22 August. 1969.
160. Transcript pp 1240 - 1398.
161. File SC84/286.
162. Transcript pp 1242 - 1243.
163. Transcript p 1357.
164. Transcript p 1243.
165. Exhibits 1137. 1139. 1140 and 1141.
166. Exhibit 1146A.
167. Transcript p 1249.
168. Transcript p 1214.
169. Exhibit 892. p 3-49.
170. Exhibit 897.
171. Transcript p 1227.
172. Transcript p 1228.
173. Transcript p 1229.
174. Transcript p 1234.
175. Exhibit 1162.
176. Transcript p 1415.
177. Transcript p 1418.
IV-247
178. Trancript p 1480.
179. Transcript p 1421.
180. Transcript p 1483.
181. Transcript p 1430.
182. Transcript p 1432.
183. Transcript pp 1421 - 1425.
184. Transcript p 1426.
185. Transcript p 1427.
186. Exhibit 892, p 3-50, para 47.
187. But see Exhibit 1158, p 30, fig 4 and Ch VI.
188. Exhibit 1153.
189. Transcript p 1496.
190. Transcript p 1510.
191. Transcript p 1501.
192. Transcript p 1506.
193. Transcript p 1509.
194. File SC84/628.
195. Transcript p 365-6.
196. Transcript p 367.
197. Transcript p 822.
198. Transcript p 1041.
199. Transcript p 1055.
200. Transcript p 1072.
201. Transcript pp 1121 - 1123.
202. Transcript p 1121.
IV-248
203. Transcript p 1045.
204. Trasncript pp 1046 & 1125.
205. Transcript p 1140.
206. Transcript p 1083.
207. Transcript p 1084.
208. Transcript p 1086.
209. Transcript p 1087.
210. Transcript p 1088.
211. Transcript p 1089.
212. Transcript p 1088a.
213. Transcript p 1113.
214. Transcript p 1155.
215. Transcript p 1157.
216. Transcript p 1177.
217. Transcript p 1179.
218. Transcript p 1180.
219. Transcript pp 1181 - 1182.
220. Transcript p 1182.
221. Transcript p 1183.
222. Transcript p 1203.
223. Transcript p 1206.
224. Transcript p 1208.
225. Transcript p 1210.
226 . Transcript p 1211.
227. Transcript p 1212.
IV-249
228.
229.
230.
231.
232.
233.
234.
235 .
236.
237.
238.
239. 240.
241.
242.
243.
Exhibit 892.
Transcript p 688.
Transcript p 3998. Transcript p 4018.
Transcript p 1627.
Transcript p 1629.
Transcript p 1639.
Transcript p 1668.
Transcript p 1652.
Exhibit 1151.
Exhibit 892, p 3-69.
Transcript pp 425 - 426.
Exhibits 8, 1061 & 1105.
Transcript p 1422.
Transcript pp 683 - 685.
Exhibit 1061, Technical Note 117 of the
Department of Supply, Austral ian Defence
Scientific Service, Defence Standards Laboratory, June 1968.
244. Exhibit 1105 (a copy of the same report became
Exhibit 99).
245. House of Representatives Hansard, p 1311.
246. Exhibit 1105, p 5, para 19.
247. Ibid, p 7, para 27.
246. Ibid, p 9, para 31.
249. Ibid, pp 26-27.
250. Exhibit 1062.
251. Exhibit 1105, p 11.
IV-250
252. Ibid. p 12.
253. Ibid. p 15.
254. Ibid. p 16.
255. Ibid p 17.
256. Ibid. Annexure c. pp 33-60.
257. Ibid. pp 34-35.
258. Ibid. p 47.
259. Ibid. pp 50-54.
260. Ibid. pp 55-56.
261. Ibid p 57.
262. Ibid. p 58-59.
263. Ibid. p 60.
264. Exhibit 1063.
265. Exhibits 8. 1061 and 1105.
266 . Exhibit 892. p 3-64.
267. Transcript pp 755-756.
268 . Transcript p 757.
269. Transcript p 758.
270. Transcript pp 767-769.
271. Transcript pp 770-773.
272. Transcript p 774.
273. Transcript p 776.
274. Transcript p 777.
275. Transcript pp 780-781.
IV-251
276. Transcript p 784.
277. Transcript p 816.
278. Transcript p 785.
279. Transcript p 789 .
280 . Transcript pp 785-786.
281. Transcript p 787.
282. Transcript p 788.
283. Transcript p 798.
284. Transcript pp 799-800.
285. Transcript p 801.
286. Transcript pp 806-807.
287 . Transcript p 808.
288. Transcript p 815 .
289. Exhibit 906, p I II - 2.
290. Grover, R. et al. 'Droplet and Vapour Driftfrom
Butyl Ester and Dimethylamine Salt of 2,4-D':
Weed Science, vol 20; issue 4, pp 320 - 324.
291. Crosby, D. c. & Wong, A. S. 'Environmental
Degradation of TCDD ' : Science 195 (4284) pp 1337 - 1338.
292. Exhibit 906, Chap 2, Tables 1-4, 6 & 7.
293. Transcript p 101.
294. Exhibit 1055.
295. Transcript pp 271 - 272; evidence of Brigadier
Rodgers.
296. Transcript p 219.
297. Transcript p 801; evidence of Dr Crosby.
298. Transcript p 438; evidence of Mr Manning.
IV-252
299. Transcript pp 438 - 440.
300. Transcript pp 439 - 400.
301. Transcript p 441.
302. Transcript p 426.
303 . Transcript p 427.
304. Transcript p 428.
305. Baughman, R.W. & Meselson, M.S. 'An analytical
method for detecting TCDD (dioxin): Levels of
TCDD samples from Vietnam' Environ. Health
Perspect., 1973;5: 27 - 35. 306. Transcript pp 813 - 814.
307. Transcript p 815.
308. Transcript p 820.
309. Exhibit 1448, p 64.
310 . Exhibit 1443, p 60.
311. Transcript p 422.
312. Transcript pp 369 370.
313. Transcript p 368.
314. Transcript pp 267 - 269.
315 . Transcript p 433.
316. Transcript p 103.
317. Transcript p 352 .
318. Transcript p 353.
319. Transcript p 414.
320. Transcript pp 792 - 793.
321. Transcript p 1173.
IV-253
322. Transcript p 1264.
323. Transcript p 100.
324. Transcript p 756.
325. Transcript pp 799 - 800.
326. Transcript pp 135 - 137.
327. Exhibit 1211.
328. Much of the foregoing is taken from Frank Frost
"Australia 1 s War in Vietnam 1962-1972" in Peter King (Ed.) Australia 1 s Vietnam: Australia in the Second Indo-China War George Allen & Unwin,
Sydney, 1983, at pp 65-66.
329. Exhibit 1151' Annexure A, Item 12.
330. HQ ATFV R883 - 1-5, dated October, 1970.
331. Exhibit 1062.
332. Exhibit 1151, Item 6' Annexure A.
333 . Evidence of L.R. Nunn at transcript p 699.
334 . Exhibit 906, p II-1.
335. Exhibit 892, Ch 1, Part 5' Section, para 24.
336. Exhibit 1151, Annexure A, Item 8.
337. Exhibit 892, p 3-135.
338. Exhibit 1448.
339. Ibid, p 202.
IV-254
CORRELATION OF HERBS TAPE FLIGHT LINE
DATA WITH LANDSAT SATELLITE IMAGERY OF
SOUTH VIETNAM
Report prepared for
VIETNAM VETERANS ROYAL COMMISSION
17 February, 1984
J.A. Richards 1 and S.J. Dovey 2
1. Centre for Remote Sensing, University of New South Wales, Kensington, NSW 2033
2. Australian Landsat Station, Department of Resources and Energy, Belconnen, ACT 2616
APPENDIX I TO CH IV
(See p IV-119)
CORRELATION OF HERBS TAPE FLIGHT LINE
DATA WITH LANDSAT SATELLITE IMAGERY OF
SOUTH VIETNAM
Report prepared for
VIETNAM VETERANS ROYAL COMMISSION
17 February, 1984
J.A. Richards 1 and S.J. Dovey 2
1. Centre for Remote Sensing, University of New South Wales, Kensington, NSW 2033
2. Australian Landsat Station, Department of Resources and Energy, Belconnen, ACT 2616
1.
1. PREAMBLE
The authors were requested by Mr J. Coombs, QC, to examine image data acquired by Landsat satellites over South Vietnam and then to comment on any apparent correlation of features in the data with information concerning the flight lines of defoliation missions recorded on the C312 HERBO magnetic
tape. This work commenced on January 24, 1984 although one author (S J. Dovey) spent time during the preceding one and one half weeks ordering images, on behalf of the Department of Veterans Affairs, from the EROS Data Center in South Dakota. That center is the US supplier of Landsat pro ducts.
The satellite data presented initially for interpretation consisted of standard false colour composite products of the region in South Vietnam identified by the World Reference System (WRS) for Landsats 1 to 3 as path 133, row 53. Imagery at a scale of 1:500,000 acquired on January 19, 1973 and June 30, 1973 were presented, along with a portion of the scene of June 30, 1973 enlarged to a scale of 1:100,000. These images cover
approximately the region to the west and south-west of the Rung Sat special zone, the Rung Sat zone itself and the region eastwards just beyond the Phuoc Tuy Province.
Definite statements could not be made about correlation between the flight line data and the satellite images at that stage, for two reasons. First, notwithstanding very direct association of intense flight line activity with lack or weakening of mangrove vegetation in the Rung Sat
spectral zone, no associations could be detected readily in the Phuoc Tuy Province; moreover regions to the west and southwest of Rung Sat had the same appearance as the Rung Sat special zone in the imagery in areas with no recorded flight lines. Secondly, the scales of the images, and maps and flight line data provided were different, making careful
comparison difficult.
The authors were therefore requested to determine the of any other suitable Landsat data, either in photographic format or as digital data on computer compatible magnetic tape, and then to use that data to search for likely correlations. The possibility of magnetic tape data was raised on the suggestion of the authors since that type can be
computer processed in many ways before being displayed on a colour monitor, sometimes making subtle features evident.
The body and appendices of this report list the full range of satellite, map and other relevant data gathered for the investigation. Methodologies adopted in interpreting the data are also described in detail as are the likely positional errors in each case.
2.
2. DATA AVAILABLE TO THE INVESTIGATION
2.1 MAPS
Three topographic map products were made available:
(i) 1:50,000 scale map sheets identified as 6329 I, 6329 IV, 6330 II, 6330 III, covering the Rung Sat special zone, and dated 1965 and 1967.
(ii) 1:250,000 scale map series 1501, Sheet NC48-7 Edition 3. (Joint Operations Graphic (Ground)), dated 1972.
(iii) 1:250,000 scale map mosaic supplied by Mr Bruce Manning of the Department of Veterans Affairs covering a rectangular region bounded by UTM eastings 670,000 E and 820,000 E and UTM northings 1300,000 N. and 1140,000 N, on the everest
spheroid of the UTM (Universal Transverse Mercator) map projection and grid reference system. Four fiducial points are marked on the . mosaic, corresponding to similar marks on the flight line overlays of section 2.2. This was the principal map product used in the investigation.
2.2 C312 HERBO TAPE FLIGHT LINE OVERLAYS
Mr Bruce Manning of the Department of Veteran Affairs also supplied clear plastic sheets on which flight line data for agent orange, white and blue defoliation missions had been plotted from data contained on the C312 HERBO tape. The various missions are represented by plastic strips of the appropriate colour laid onto the clear sheets between the mission stop and start co-ordinates recorded on the tape. This data is at a
scale of 1:250,000 and each sheet has four corner fiducial marks to allow the sheets to be laid over,and registered spatially to,the 1:250,000 scale map mosaic of section 2.l(iii), above.
The plastic strips denoting the missions are 2mm wide. At a scale of 1:250,000 this represents a swath of 500m on the ground. Noting that the spray swath of the aircraft used to fly the defoliation missions is said nominally to be BOrn, then the plastic strips correspond to an equivalent of six aircraft flying side-by-side. While it is known that some missions were flown in this manner, others involved fewer, or per haps only one, aircraft. Consequently the width covered by the flight
lines when related to maps or Landsat images should be regarded as wide in general.
Twenty one of the flight line clear plastic overlays were available. Details of these are given in Appendix A.
2.3 LANDSAT SATELLITE IMAGE PRODUCTS
II. range of black and white, and false colour Landsat photographic products at different scales and of different regions was obtained for the investigation by the Australian Landsat Station from the EROS Data Center, Sioux Falls, South Dakota, USA. Details of these are given in Appendix B. Two were used extensively. These are:
A. Landsat 1. Path 133, Row 52, May 25, 1973.
1:250,000 scale, band 5, black and white print. South western quarter of scene only. (This covers the region to the north east of Saigon).
B. Landsat 1. Path 133, Row 53. February 6, 1973.
1:250,000 scale, false colour composite print. North western quarter of scene only. (This covers the Rung Sat special zone and Phuoc Tuy Province).
3.
The Australian Landsat Station also obtained two images in computer compatible tape format from the Thailand Remote Sensing Centre. These were acquired by Landsat 4. Although they cover essentially the same regions as the photographic products, they are identified by a different World Reference System of orbits, owing to the lower altitude of this
satellite. They are identified as:
Tl. Landsat 4. Path 124, Row 53. April 7, 1983
T2. Landsat 4. Path 125, Row 53, June 1, 1983
Appendix C contains a complete list of photographic and tape products advised as being available from the EROS Data Center and the Thailand Remote Sensing Centre. Not all of these were chosen for the investigation; nevertheless some may prove of value if subsequent studies are warranted.
4.
3. METHODOLOGIES FOR FLIGHT LINE ASSOCIATIONS WITH IMAGE DATA, INCLUDING THEIR ASSOCIATED POSITIONAL ERRORS
Three procedures were used in attempting to correlate the C312 HERBO tape flight line data with features in Landsat image data:
3.1 VISUAL INTERPRETATION OF HAND REGISTERED MAP, IMAGE AND FLIGHT LINE DATA.
3.1.1 Methodology
Landsat images A and B in section 2.3 were registered visually with the 1:250,000 scale map mosaic of section 2.l(iii). Roads, tracks, railway lines, the coastline and rivers around the image peripheries were used as registration points. Although the rivers
could not be regarded as highly accurate for this purpose, owing to possible changes with time, there were no alternative features. Figure 1 shows the images so registered. The flight line overlays of section 2.2 were then placed both singly and in groups over the
image map combination, using the four corner fiducial marks on the maps and overlays as registration points. This allowed associations between flight lines and image features to be examined, as depicted in Figure 2.
A limitation with this method is that the images cannot be seen clearly through the several layers of plastic when many overlays are used.
3.1 . 2 Positional Errors
Possible relative errors in position between points on the flight line overlays and corresponding points on the images, and their probable magnitudes are:
Notes:
Error in forming map mosaic Error in placing flight line strips onto overlay material
Error in registering images to map (lmm) 2 Error in registering overlays to map (2mm) 3
Root mean square of all errors
125m
125m
250m
500m
586m
1. Advice from Department of Veteran Affairs indicates that this would be a maximum figure. 2. Measurements to specific features on the map and the images from a common datum support this as a maximum error resulting from both
positional and scale discrepancies. 3. When all f our fiducial points are used this is a typical maximum error. It is suspected that the discrepancy has arisen from stretches and/or shrinkages in the map and overlay materials since the time when the
points were first marked. For most of the work in this study only the bottom left and top right points were used as these were consistently accurate and certainly well within the figure in this table.
5.
LANDSAT IMAGE A 1:250,000 MAP MOSAIC
LANDSAT IMAGE B
Figure 1: Registration of Landsat images A and B of section 2.3 to the 1:250,000 scale map mosaic of section 2.1(iii)
6.
Figure 2: Illustration of a flight line overlay (Section 2.2) registered to the map and Landsat image combination of Figure 1. The specific overlay used here shows agents white and orange flight lines for February 1967.
7.
On the basis of these figures it is believed therefore that features on the flight line overlays and the images are not likely to have an error in relative position of more than 600m. This is
dominated by the last two sources of error listed, both of which can be regarded as absolute maxima. Should they have typical errors of about 125m then the average relative positional
error would be more like 200-300m. It is believed that this is a
reasonable working figure. Also it should be recalled that this corresponds to only one half of the width of a flight line on the
plastic overlays.
3. 2 ENTRY OF FLIGHT LINE DATA AND IMAGE FEATURES INTO IMAGE ANALYSIS COMPUTER.
3.2.1 Methodology
To obviate problems caused by accidentally moving the plastic overlays, particularly when used in groups, and to increase flexibility in exploring possible associations of flight line and image features, both the flight line data and specific features in
the Landsat images were entered into a Dipix Aries II image analysis system using a co-ordinate digitizing table. In this manner all flight lines of a given agent colour could be displayed as a separate group. Also, even with the complete set of flight lines displayed, problems encountered in the previous method, with not
being able to see through the plastic, were removed.
Flight lines displayed on the system colour monitor with this method represented an effective width of about 70m for the Rung Sat special zone, and about 90m for the Phuoc Tuy Province.
3.2.2 Positional Errors
In addition to the locational errors listed in section 3.1.2 the following sources and magnitudes are also incurred in this approach.
Error in registering map to digitizer table Error in registering image features to computer video memory Error in positioning digitizer cursor over
flight line end points
Root mean square error from all sources
50m
30m
125m
602m
Therefore features identified in the images and entered into the system for display on its colour monitor are not likely to be more than 600m in error with respect to the flight lines displayed on the system. Again the expected error is more likely to be around 300m, again a figure obtained by reducing the last two error magnitudes
in section 3.1.2 to 125m each.
3.3 ENTRY OF FLIGHT LINE DATA AND LANDSAT IMAGE INTO IMAGE ANALYSIS COMPUTER
3.3.1 Methodology
This approach is essentially the same as that of the previous section with the exception that features were not entered into the computer from the image photographs using the digitizing table. Instead, the complete image data for a region was entered from magnetic tape, thereby allowing flight line data to be compared directly with the image. Indeed, this is the computer analogue of the manual overlaying procedure of section 3.1; the advantages here however are that the plastic film medium of the overlays does not obscure the image, that each agent colour can be displayed
separately and that the image data can be computer processed in various ways prior to comparison with the flight line information.
8.
This technique requires the Landsat image data to be corrected for errors in geometry and registered to the UTM co-ordinate system of the map and flight line overlays. This was done with standard digital resampling techniques, using software available on the image analysis system. The geometrically correct images were created with a picture element (or pixel) size of lOOm x This is therefore the
smallest increment of data that can be displayed on the colour monitor. Consequently the flight line data, entered into the system and registered with these images for simultaneous display, will have effective widths of lOOm.
3.3.2 Positional Errors
The locational errors for this approach include those discussed in section 3.1.2 along with the further sources and magnitudes:
Error in registering map to digitizer table 50m
Error in geometrically correcting Landsat digital data to UTM co-ordinate system 200m Error in positioning digitizer cursor over flight line end points 125m
Root mean square error from all relevant sources 634m
It is expected therefore that flight line information displayed on the colour monitor of the image analysis system will be within 640m of the correct position relative to the Landsat image displayed. Again, the actual average relative positional error is possibly more
in the range of 300-400m.
4. OBSERVATIONS 9.
4.1 RUNG SAT ZONE
When the flight line overlays are placed over the 1:250,000 scale map/ i ma ge combination as described in section 3 . 1, a very clear correlation is seen between the orientations (bearings) of the flight lines and regions in the images in which the vegetation is either ve.ry sparse or perhaps even lacking altogether. The Rung Sat region is described as being p r edominantly mangrove in its vegetation community (National Academy of Sciences, 1974) with rice growing to the north and in isolated areas on
the western boundary. ' In standard Landsat multispectral scanner false colour composite images this would be expected to appear therefore as a bright red. Some scattered bright red regions are evident, but in the main there is a predominance of blue observable in the 1973 image products. This indicates either bare soil, or sparse or perhaps even unhealthy vegetation. These blue regions are elongate in some cases, parallel to
the flight line data.
It is difficult to associate particular blue elongated regions in the satellite image with specific flight lines. A careful inspection of the flight lines on all overlays (Appendix A) reveals perhaps only about 6 lines for which a direct association could be claimed with lack of vegetation on the image. What is very clear, however, apart from correlation of flight line bearings and vegetation-loss trends, is the strong association between the northern boundary of the complete group of flight lines (1965-1970) over the Rung . Sat special zone and a boundary in the image between apparently healthy vegetation to the north and vegetation to the south
that is stressed in some manner. Such a strong association is easy to observe since the flight lines are east-west in that region.
The eastern boundary of the group of flight lines in Rung Sat and the t r ansition from stressed (to the west) and healthy vegetation are also readily associated.
The wes tern boundary of the Rung Sat special zone is marked by the Saigon River, which is particularly wide. Nothing special can be said a bout correlation with flight line data and the border of vegetation str ess since this appears to occur largely at the river. There is no
r eason t o s uspect from the image data that significant spraying extended into or beyo nd the river.
Initally concern was expressed by the authors (see preamble) over the blue/white appearance in the Landsat imagery of the region on the western side of the Saigon River opposite Rung Sat, and the extension of t hat colouring several tens of kilometres to the south across the Mekong River delta . The topographic maps supplied however indicate that that reÂ
gion is used for rice growing and could, therefore, reasonably be expected to have a blue appearance in a fallow state. If it is assumed that the crops
are r a in watered in that region and do not depend significantly upon irri ga t ion from the river systems. The appearance of the area in a sequence of satellite images supports the interpretation given. For example, noting that t he wet season in South Vietnam commences in about June and lasts to Novem be r , it is consistent that in January satellite imagery , the region appears genera lly a s bright red (implying full growth before harvest); imagery in Fe brua r y shows a mixture of red and white, indicating harvest could be
underway : while imagery in June shows the region as substantially blue,
10.
implying that the crops are fully harvested with perhaps new crops sown but not emerged. Emergence would depend presumably upon incipient wet season rainfall. It would be of interest to check this interpretation by obtain ing crop calender information and reliable vegetation maps for the region.
Since flight line orientations and vegetation stress patterns could be associated, as could regional spraying boundaries as noted earlier, and since specific flight line associations could not be made in general terms, it was concluded that if the vegetation stress was caused by spraying missions, as seems highly likely, then the damage is probably the result of
several spatially coincidental or near coincidental missions. This comment can be made particularly for regions in the Rung Sat special zone in which large numbers of flight lines intersect at different angles. Those regions seem almost totally devoid of vegetation in the 1973 satellite imagery used.
By entering the flight line data into the image analysis computer as described in section 3.2, it is possible to reinforce these observations. The coastline and river system around and in the Rung Sat special zone were entered into the system by the authors from the Landsat image B in section
2.3, using the facilities of the digitizing table. In addition, several significant regions in Rung Sat that in 1973 seemed to correspond to healthy stands of mangroves (mangals) were entered. The flight line data was then superimposed over this image information and displayed on the system's colour monitor. To the extent that the maximum and expected locational error of
the flight lines in the computer with this method are 600m and 300m respectively, a very good correlation can be noted between residual healthy mangals and areas in which there are either no flight lines or only very few flight lines. Regions in which the flight line density is high, and particularly where flight lines intersect in large numbers show no residual mangals. These features can be seen in Figure 3.
Towards the end of the investigation the computer compatible magnetic tapes noted in section 2.3 became available. T 1 covers the region to the west of the Rung Sat special zone, almost from Saigon in the north, south wards about lOOkm. It does not include all of Rung Sat but its eastern
boundary encloses about two thirds of that zone. Consequently, it was not pursued further except to note that the apparent vegetation stress patterns seen in the 1973 photographic data are still observable. There is some evidence of vegetation recovery indicated by a general but low level reddening in the Rung Sat zone. Whether this is mangrove regeneration or
the growth of a different vegetation type could not be determined.
Tape T 2 has its western boundary well to the west of the Rung Sat zone and extends eastwards and northwards to cover beyond Phuoc Tuy Province. It was therefore used for the remainder of the study. A
major drawback with this image, however, is that it has mottled, yet heavy cloud cover over the Rung Sat zone and along the Phuoc Tuy coastline, as seen in Figures 4 and 6. Nevertheless it can be used for some general
observations.
(a)
11.
Figure 3: (a) Coastline and river system in the Rung Sat Special Zone (purple). The regions identified in white correspond to some apparently healthy stands of mangroves in the Zone, identified by photointerpreting the Landsat image B of section 2.3. The
fine dark lines through these regions should be ignored. (b) Complete set of agents orange, white and blue flight lines over the Rung Sat Special for the period August 1965 to
December 1970, shown in green.
12.
As noted in section 3.3 it was necessary to register the image to the UTM map of section 2.l(iii) in order to remove image geometry errors and to allow map and flight line features to be entered into the computer for superposition on the image.
For the Rung Sat zone the same general remarks, as earlier, with regard to 1973 imagery, can be made concerning the associations of flight line and vegetation stress patterns, although vegetation recovery and the presence of clouds made the correlations less definite. This is seen in Figure 5. Perhaps the most . significant observation is that the apparent mangrove damage has not recovered substantially some 14 to 19 years after
the defoliation missions.
Figure 4:
(a)
(a) The Rung Sat Special Zone in 1983 as obtained from Landsat tape T2 in Section 2.3, showing the presence of clouds. (b) The result of a cloud suppression procedure. It is important to note that the clouds are still present, but shown in a mid-grey tone. Also areas of healthy mangrove (and other ?j vegetation show as brighter tones. A cloud "removal" procedure was tried on the Rung Sat image segment. This consisted of computer synthesing a new black and white image that is
the ratio of the Landsat band 7 (infrared) and band 5 (visible red). This is known to render water black, clouds mid-grey and healthy vegetation white. This product is shown in Figure 4. Even though the clouds are
still present their new subdued tones do not detract visually from the vegetation features of interest.
Another image processing procedure known as principal components analysis was also tried as a cloud removal procedure. This worked, but offered no apparent advantages over the ratio technique of the previous paragraph and was not pursued further.
(a)
(b)
Figure 5: (a) Agents orange, white and blue flight lines shown in green. in relation to the Rung Sat Special Zone image obtained from tape T2 in Section 2.3. Here the image data has been contrast enhanced to make the resigual mangrove regions more apparent.
13.
(b) As for (a) but with the flight lines shown. in red,
in relation to the cloud suppressed image of Figure 4(b).
14.
4.2 PHUOC TUY PROVINCE
In all of the Landsat products available· it is not possible to detect any regions of vegetation stress in the Phuoc Tuy Province that could be associated definitely with the flight line information on the transparent overlays. It is presumed that this is because the forest vegetation
types in that region are thought to regenerate in a matter' of months following defoliation, (National Academy of Science, 1974). Given that the earliest imagery available was acquired some four years after the last sprayings of the region, this is not an unreasonable conclusion to draw. Added to this is the fact that the spraying density seems to have been light
by comparison to that in the Rung Sat special zone and in the region to the north east of Saigon, described below. In those cases it seems that stress of vegetation is related more to regions of multiple spraying, rather than to just sihgle applications.
Computer processing of the digital Landsat data also does not reveal any flight line/vegetation stress associations, although this is made difficult by the poor quality of the data, the cloud distribution and the seasonal differences in vegetation caused by the preceding dry season.
(Figure 6). It is unfortunate that digital data appears not to be avail able for the 1973 imagery; computer enhancement in that case could have been of value.
4.3 NORTH EAST OF SAIGON
In the region bounded by UTM co-ordinates 700,000 E, 725,000 E and 1220,000 N, 1270,000 N significant linear vegetation stress patterns of some form are evident on the 1:250,000 scale Landsat black and white imagery available. These show as lighter than the background tone in the visible red data (band 5) and darker than the background tone in infrared
data (band 7), and can be observed in both dates for which the data is available (see Appendix B). The following remarks are made, however, on the basis of the single product A referred to in section 2.3.
When the flight line overlays of section 2.2 are placed over the registered combination of image product A and the map mosaic of section 2.l(iii) there is a very clear association of the orientations (bearings) of the flight lines and the vegetation stress patterns. As with the Rung Sat special zone discussed earlier, it is not possible in general to associate particular flight paths with a particular line of vegetation
stress; however the boundaries of the stressed area and the boundaries of the general group of flight lines agree particularly well, with the exception of that to the north. The western edge of the flight line group is well correlated with the vegetation stress patterns; also the eastern edge of the stressed region corresponds to the eastern edge of the most
intensely sprayed region. Flight lines do exist further eastwards, however they are less dense and apart from one small area (see below) do not associate any flight lines. The southern edge of the sprayed region,
a few kilometres south of the Saigon river, is also reasonably well correlated with the southern boundary of the area of vegetation stress.
Vegetation stress patterns extend about 15km further north than the complete group of flight lines contained on the overlays provided. It is
15.
Figure 6: The Phuoc Tuy Province (green boundary) as seen in imagery obtained from Landsat tape T2 in Section 2 . 3.
16.
presumed that the corresponding flight line data for that area has not been entered onto clear plastic overlays, since the current set of plastic sheets do not extend fully over that northernmost portion.
A small region to the east, centred on 734,000 E, 1244,000N seems to show residual north-south trending vegetation stress. That region does correspond to north-south flight lines, but in no greater density than the surrounding countryside. However it was sprayed in an east-west fashion at an earlier time (December 1966) than when the complete region was sprayed north-south. It is concluded therefore that the earlier spraying weakened the vegetation sufficiently there to cause noticeable residual stress when oversprayed north-south.
Since the Phuoc Tuy Province did not display any definite residual effects of sprqying in the satellite image data available, owing presumably to the rapid recovery of the woodland in that region, an explanation is required concerning the effects visible in the area north-east of Saigon. The topographic maps available show the area as used for cropland. This is
consistant with the topographic texture observable in the winter infrared imagery available (February 6, 1973). The region sprayed is seen to be quite flat (and thus could be used for cropping, being in the proximity of the Saigon river) by comparison to the more hilly and mountainous terrain which develops slightly further to the north-east.
Figure 7 shows the intensity of flight line data in this region, in relation to the river and major road system. This can be compared with the satellite data to observe the associations discussed above.
REFERENCE: National Academy of Sciences 1974. The Effects of Herbicides in South Vietnam Part A. Summary and Conclusions. Washington D.C.
Figure 7: Flight lines for herbicide agents in the region north east of Saigon. The major river stream system is shown in white, roads and tracks in yellow and lime green and the various herbicide agents in the colours shown. The broken blue line to the north east shows the onset of mountainous terrain.
17.
18. APPENDIX A
CLEAR PLASTIC FLIGHT LINE OVERLAYS PRODUCED FROM THE C312 HERBO TAPE AT A SCALE OF 1:250,000
The overlays provided gave information on agents orange, blue and white missions during the periods indicated.
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10. 11.
12. 13.
14.
15.
16. 17.
18. 19. 20.
21.
August 1965
January 1966 July 1966 November 1966
December 1966
January 1967 February 1967 March 1967
April 1967 July 1967 September 1967
October 1967
November 1967 -January 1968 April 1968 July 1968
September 1968-November 1968 -January 1969 July 1969 January 1970
December 1965
June 1966 October 1966
June 1967 August 1967
December 1967
March 1968
June 1968
August 1968
October 1968
December 1968
June 1969 December 1969
December 1970
19.
APPENDIX B.
LANDSAT PHOTOGRAPHIC PRODUCTS AVAILABLE TO THE INVESTIGATION
PATH 133 ROW 52
February 6, 1973 1:250,000 !z; BP bands 5,7 (south west)
February 6, 1973 1:1,000,000 BP band 4
February 6, 1973 1:1,000,000 BT bands 4,5,7
May 25, 1973 1:250,000 !z; BP bands 5,7 (south west)
May 25, 1973 1:1,000,000 BP band 4
May 25, 1973 1:1,000,000 BT bands 4,5,7
PATH 133 ROW 53
January 19, 1973 1:500,000 CP
February 6, 1973 1:250,000 !z; CP (north west)
February 6, 1973 1:1,000,000 CT
June 30, 1973 1:500,000 CP
June 30, 1973 1:100,000 CP (Rung Sat, Phuoc Tuy)
PATH 134 ROW 53
January 2, 1973 1:250,000 !z; CP (north east)
January 2, 1973 1:1,000,000 CT
May 26, 1973 1:1,000,000 BP bands 4,5,7
May 26, 1973 1:1,000,000 BT bands 4,5,7
KEY: BP - black and white print
BT - black and white transparency
CP - colour print
CT - colour transparency
A preceding !z; indicates a quarter scene only.
20.
APPENDIX c (a)
LANDSAT PRODUCT AVAILABILITY FROM WHICH TAPES AND IMAGES WERE SELECTED
IMAGE PRODUCTS - FROM EROS DATA CENTER - SIOUX FALLS, SOUTH DAKOTA, USA
PATH 134 - ROW 53
DATE CLOUD COVER
October 22, 1972 50%
November 27, 1972 70%
December 15, 1972 20%
January 2, 1973 10%
January 20, 1973 30%
February 25, 1973 70%
March 15, 1973 30%
May 8, 1973 20%
May 26, 1973 20%
Au gust 6, 1973 80%
September 11, 1973 70%
September 29, 1973 90%
February 24, 1975 50%
March 14. 1975 80%
April 1, _ 1975 40%
November 21, 1975 50%
February 1, 1976 20%
APPENDIX c (b)
LANDSAT PRODUCT AVAILABILITY FROM WHICH TAPES AND IMAGES WERE SELECTED
IMAGE PRODUCTS - FROM EROS DATA CENTER- SIOUX FALLS, SOUTH DAKOTA, USA
PATH 133 ROWS AS INDICATED
DATE
September 15, 1972
October 3, 1972
November 8, 1972
November 26, 1972
December 14, 1972
January 1, 1973
January 19, 1973
February 6, 1973
February 24, 1973
March 14, 1973
May 25, 1973
June 30, 1973
September 10, 1973
September 28, 1973
October 16, 1973
February 23, 1975
March 13, 1975
August 22, 1975
September 27, 1975
December 8, 1975
January 13, 1976
January 31, 1976
CLOUD
ROW 52
70%
60%
80%
50%
10%
60%
10%
10%
60%
10%
20%
70%
80%
60%
30%
40%
70%
60%
20%
30%
20%
COVER
ROW 53
60%
50%
10%
10%
10%
10%
50%
50%
10%
20%
90%
60%
80%
50%
90%
80%
30%
20%
21.
APPENDIX C (c)
LANDSAT PRODUCT AVAILABILITY FROM WHICH TAPES AND IMAGES WERE SELECTED
TAPE PRODUCTS (None available for 1972-1974 period)
- FROM THAILAND REMOTE SENSING CENTRE
LANDSAT 3 DATA
PATH 133 - ROW 52
DATE
March 26,
April 8, March 21,
1983
1982
1982
PATH 133 - ROW 53
March 26, 1983
November 10, 1982
LANDSAT 4 DATA
PATH 124 - ROW 52
April 7, 1983
PATH 124 - ROW 53
April 7, 1983
PATH 125 - ROW 52
June 1, 1983
PATH 125 - ROW 53
June 1, 1983
(Late line start problem)
CLOUD COVER
10%
10%
10%
0%
10%
10%
20%
10%
10%
22.