| Title | Use and effects of chemical agents on Australian personnel in Vietnam - Royal Commission (Hon. Mr Justice P. Evatt) - Final report, dated 31 July 1985 - Report - Volume 6 - Mortality, class action VAA and section 47 |
| Source | Both Chambers |
| Date | 22-08-1985 |
| Parliament No. | 34 |
| Tabled in House of Reps | 22-08-1985 |
| Tabled in Senate | 22-08-1985 |
| Parliamentary Paper Year | 1985 |
| Parliamentary Paper No. | 293 |
| System Id | publications/tabledpapers/HPP032016003938 |
The Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia
ROYAL COM M ISSION ON THE USE A N D EFFECTS OF CHEMICAL AGENTS ON
A U STR A LIA N PERSONNEL IN VIETNAM
Commissioner: The Hon. Mr Justice P. Evatt, D SC , LLB
Final ReportâJuly 1985
Volume 6: Mortality, Class Action VVAA and Section 47
Presented 22 August 1985 Ordered to be printed 19 September 1985
Parliamentary Paper No. 293/1985
H's1 â * * & » !
*
ROYAL COMMISSION ON THE USE AND EFFECTS OF CHEMICAL AGENTS ON AUSTRALIAN PERSONNEL IN VIETNAM
Commissioner: The Hon. Mr Justice Phillip Evatt DSC, LLB.
A Judge of the Federal Court of Australia
FINAL REPORT
July 1985
VOLUME 6
Australian Government Publishing Service Canberra 1985
© Commonwealth of Australia 1985
ISBN 0 644 04339 3 Set of Volumes ISBN 0 644 04345 8 Report Volume Six
Printed by Canberra Publishing and Printing Co., Fyshwick, A.C.T.
ROYAL COMMISSION ON THE USE AND EFFECTS OF CH EM ICA L A G EN TS ON AUSTRALIAN PERSONNFI IN VIETNAM -H, AUSTRALIA ,/t-
Commissioner: The Hon. Mr Justice Phillip Evatt DSC
G.P O. Box 4842 Sydney, N.S.W. 2001 Telephone: (02) 23V 6222
Your Excellency,
Secretary: Mr B.D. Meade
31 July 1985
In accordance with Letters Patent issued to me on 13 May 1983, 27 June 1984, 3 August 1984 and 23 April 1985, I have the honour to present to you the Final Report of my inquiry.
I believe that the Report complies with those Letters Patent and that my task is therefore completed.
Yours sincerely
JUSTICE PHILLIP EVATT Royal Commissioner
His Excellency the Right Honourable Sir Ninian Stephen, A.K., G.C.M.G., G.C.V.O., K.B.E. Governor-General and Commander-in-chief Government House
CANBERRA A.C.T. 2600
TABLE OF CONTENTS
VOLUME 6
CHAPTER X
MORTALITY
1. INTRODUCTION 1
2. ALLEGATIONS 1
3. W A A MORTALITY RECORDS 8
4. DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS' AFFAIRS RECORDS 18
5. ANALYSIS OF MORTALITY RECORDS 26
6. AVHS MORTALITY REPORT 34
7. OTHER MORTALITY STUDIES 72
7.1 Studies of Exposed Workers 73
Hogstedt and Westerlund 73
Axelson and Sundell 76
Riihimaki and Hernberg 79
Zack and Suskind 81
Theiss et al 82
Ott et al 84
Cook et al 86
Jirasek et al 87
Summary 88
7.2 Australian Regional Studies 91
MacLennan et al 91
McCabe et al 92
Victorian Agricultural Workers 94 7.3 U.S. Vietnam Veteran Mortality 95
Lawrence et al 95
Ranch Hand Mortality Study 97
Kogan et al 100
8. HEALTHY-WORKER EFFECT 101
9. STUDIES OF MORTALITY IN VETERANS OF OTHER WARS 104 10. INTERPRETATION OF NEGATIVE RESULTS 111
11. INFERENCE OF CAUSATION 115
12. CONCLUSIONS 117
ENDNOTES 123
APPENDIX I 127
V
CHAPTER XI
CLASS ACTION
I. INTRODUCTION 1
2 . EARLY CONCERNS 3
3. PRE-TRIAL HISTORY 4
4. PLAINTIFFS' ALLEGATIONS 13
5. DEFENDANTS' ANSWERS 18
6. ISSUES FOR TRIAL 19
7. PROBLEMS OF PROOF 21
8. THE CASE AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT 33
9. SETTLEMENT 36
10. FAIRNESS HEARINGS 39
II. DISTRIBUTION PLANS 46
12. ORDER AND JUDGMENT ON DISTRIBUTION 54
ENDNOTES 62
Vi
CHAPTER XII
STATUS OF W A A AND RELEVANT MATTERS
1. STATUS OF W A A 1
2. W A A 1 s SUBMISSIONS 18
3. THE ROLE OF JOHN EVANS 21
4. DISSENSIONS AMONG VIETNAM VETERANS 30
4.1 Re Relations Between RSL and W A A 31
4.2 Re Internal Dissension 40
4.3 Re Epidemiological Studies September 1981 57
5. CONCLUSION 65
ENDNOTES 67
CHAPTER XIII
INTERIM REPORT AND S.47
vii
TABLE OF CONTENTS - REPORT
VOLUME 1 - INTRODUCTION and EXPOSURE
I II III IV
Prologue
Introduction Standard of Proof Ascertainment of Claims Exposure
VOLUME 2 - TOXICOLOGY and GENERAL HEALTH
V VI
Toxicology and Safe Doses Health Effects General
VOLUME 3 - BIRTH ANOMALIES
VII Health Effects, Reproductive Outcomes and Birth Anomalies
VOLUME 4 - CANCER
VI 11 Health Effects. Cancer
VOLUME 5 - MENTAL WELL-BEING
IX Health Effects. Mental
VOLUME 6 - MORTALITY CLASS ACTION W A A and SECTION 47
X Mortality XI Class Action XII XIII
Status of W A A Interim Report and S .47
VOLUME 7 - BENEFITS and TREATMENT
XIV Benefits and Treatment
VOLUME 8 - CONCLUSIONS. RECOMMENDATIONS and EPILOGUE
XV Conclusions and Recommendations Epilogue
VOLUME 9 - EXHIBIT LISTS AND BIBLIOGRAPHY
viii
CHAPTER X
MORTALITY
"Every violation of truth is not only a sort of suicide in the liar. but is a stab at the health of human society."
Emerson "Prudence"
Essays: First Series (1841)
H CN m
CHAPTER X
MORTALITY
5 . 6 .
7 .
INTRODUCTION ALLEGATIONS W A A MORTALITY RECORDS DEPARTMENT OF VETERANSâ AFFAIRS RECORDS
ANALYSIS OF MORTALITY RECORDS AVHS MORTALITY REPORT OTHER MORTALITY STUDIES 7.1 Studies of Exposed Workers
Hogstedt and Westerlund Axelson and Sundell Riihimaki and Hernberg Zack and Suskind
Theiss et al Ott et al
Cook et al Jirasek et al Summary
7.2 Australian Regional Studies MacLennan et al McCabe et al Victorian Agricultural Workers 7.3 U.S. Vietnam Veteran Mortality
Lawrence et al Ranch Hand Mortality Study Kogan et al
8. HEALTHY-WORKER EFFECT 9. STUDIES OF MORTALITY IN VETERANS OF OTHER WARS 10. INTERPRETATION OF NEGATIVE RESULTS 11. INFERENCE OF CAUSATION
12. CONCLUSIONS ENDNOTES APPENDIX I
1 1 8
18 26 34 72 73 73 76
79 81 82 84
86 87 88 91
9 1 92 94 95
95 97 100 101 104 111 115 117 123 127
CHAPTER X
MORTALITY
1. INTRODUCTION
Throughout the Mortality hearings, every effort was made
not to refer to a deceased veteran by name out of respect
for privacy of the relatives of such serviceman and a
desire to avoid causing any further distress to those
relatives. For similar reasons, in this chapter of the
Report, reference to individual servicemen has been kept
to a minimum. Where reference has been necessary, the
case number which is a number assigned by DVA to deceased
servicemen has been used. A list by case number was
exhibited.1
2. ALLEGATIONS
Suggestions that Vietnam veterans have been and are
experiencing excessive rates of mortality have been
widespread since 1980. In particular, suicide and cancer
have been the subject of many claims. The Commission
examined these allegations in the course of its
X-l
investigations and formal hearings on this topic were held
in the week commencing 26 November 1984.
Specific submissions on the topic of mortality were not
reguired of the parties, viz Monsanto Australia Ltd. and
the Vietnam Veterans' Association of Australia (WAA),
prior to these hearings. Both parties were given the
opportunity to suggest or call witnesses on this topic;
neither sought to do so. However, page 62 of a
2
submission lodged on behalf of W A A in November 1983
dealt with the topic of mortality as follows:
The WAA's submission is that
(a) substantially more than the statistical expectation of deaths have occurred in Vietnam veterans group; (b) Of these deaths the suicide rate is very
much higher than the expectation in the population at large or in any comparable group. The suicide rate is linked to the psychological and brain damage effects of the chemicals. (c) Cancers are unduly prevalent in the causes
of death, in particular rare forms of cancer are manifest. (d) Death from heart attacks are also prevalent in a group which was in excellent health at
the t ime of going to Vietnam.
A number of quotations and press clippings, which did not
purport to be exhaustive, were tendered by Counsel
Assisting 3 They serve as typical illustrations of the
X-2
nature and extent of the concern that has been expressed
to have existed in this area. Quoting only relevant
portions:
[W]ord of mouth tells us that suicide rate is incredibly high - Dux and Young's "Agent Orange - The Bitter Harvest", Sydney, Hodder and
Stoughton, 1980 at p 146 guoting Holt McMinn of the WAA.
The suicide rate among Vietnam veterans is
disproportionately high... - Ballarat News (Vic.) 14.5.80.
The president of the NSW Vietnam Veterans' Action Association, Phil Thompson, says there is a high rate of divorce, suicide, alcohol abuse, violence and depression among veterans. - Sunday Telegraph
(NSW) 24.8.80.
... and thus then the tide of the increasing
suicide rate - letter from John Riters of MacLeod seeking money to help Vietnam veterans - The Age (Vic) 2.1.81.
They (Vietnam veterans) also alleged a high suicide rate. An estimated 470 Australians are alleged to have committed suicide since returning from Vietnam - Daily Telegraph (NSW) 5.1.81.
They (Vietnam veterans) also allege a high
suicide rate, and ex-serviceman suggested that as many as 470 Australians had killed themselves since returning from Vietnam - The Australian 5.1.81.
Four hundred and seventy Australian Vietnam war veterans have committed suicide since discharge - statistically more than 100 times the national suicide rate.
The figure - leaked to the Truth this week from a government department - has been confirmed by a veterans' aid group.
X-3
The Australian Vietnam Veterans' Action
Association claimed the suicides were caused by contact with Agent Orange herbicide in Vietnam.
Details of the 470 suicides were leaked this week as Federal Veterans' Affairs minister Senator Anthony Messner, announced new plans to help Australia's 45,000 Vietnam veterans.
Truth put the figure of 470 deaths to Holt
McMinn, national president of the WAA.
He said 'I would certainly regard that as a
feasible figure. It ties in with my information, although I have never been able to get official confirmation.
The figure could actually be higher. There is no doubt that there are many other veterans on the brink of suicide, so it's going to increase. 1 - Melbourne Truth (Vic) 17.1.81.
Mr Lonnie said it had been established that more than 470 Australian Vietnam veterans had
committed suicide since their return from
service. - Daily News (WA) 19.1.81.
The Vietnam Veterans' Association, a national body, claims Vietnam Diggers are suiciding at an alarming rate. It claims that more than 1 per cent of the 41,000 who went to Vietnam have done away with themselves since coming home. - The Advertiser (SA) 31.1.81.
Our article on the late Mr Rex Voltz (The
Australian 5/2) repeats the unsubstantiated claim that 470 Vietnam veterans have committed suicide since discharge. This figure does not tally with records held by the Department of Veterans' Affairs.
Our records could not be comprehensive without a study of all 45,000 veterans, but they give a clear indication that the figure of 470 is
exaggerated. It certainly did not come from any official source. - The Australian 11.2.81.
A Melbourne newspaper recently quoted a public service source as saying more than 470 veterans were known to have committed suicide in the last
X-4
ten years.... Merv Chambers, spokesman for WA
Veterans' Association, says he knows of at least 10 of the group's 300 members who have committed suicide.
That would be many times greater than normal', says Mr Chambers. 1 Do you know ten guys who1 ve tr ied to commit suicide?' - Sunday Independent (WA) 29.3.81.
More Vietnam veterans have committed suicide in the 10 years since the war ended than were killed in action, according to Federal Government statistics.
Statistics from a Department of Veterans' Affairs internal document revealed at the end of June 470 veterans throughout Australia committed suicide compared with the 424 killed in action. - West Australian (WA) 5.8.81.
A Melbourne doctor warned yesterday that summer weather would trigger more suicides by Vietnam war veterans.
Dr Malcolm Barr said diggers exposed to
defoliants during the war suffered severe
symptoms of depression which worsened in hot weather... - Melbourne Sun (Vic) 7.11.81.
Summer could trigger more suicides by Vietnam war veterans, a Melbourne doctor has warned... -
Sunday Telegraph (NSW) 8.11.81.
A notice to members requesting details of Vietnam veterans who have committed suicide in order that the W A A "can maintain an accurate register - "Debrief" (Journal of WAA) Dec 81/Jan 82 Issue.
At least six Vietnam veterans have committed suicide in the past four months - a rate more
than 180 times higher than the national
average... - The Australian 19.4.82.
'We know at least 40 veterans have died of rare cancers or suicided in the past seven months - and that figure is just scratching the surface,' Mr Thompson said. - Border Morning Mail 8.9.82.
X-5
Almost 20 per cent of deaths among Australia's Vietnam war veterans could be attributed to suicide, according to a report to be released next week.
The report also states that 28 per cent of the estimated 600 deaths among Vietnam ex-servicemen were a result of cancer.
Ten Vietnam veterans have committed suicide in the past year... - Daily Sun (Qld) 11.9.82.
The red ink entries in Bob Hannah's register of dead Vietnam veterans leap out at you like
spatters of blood. 'Suicide', they say. And occasionally, 'Murdered'.
On almost every page, among the conventional blue ink entries of cancer, leukemia and heart
attacks, there is at least one in red. Sometimes there are two or three, on one page there are
four.
Bob Hannah, the Queensland Welfare Officer for the Vietnam Veterans' Association, began the register only two months ago.
Already it suggests that more veterans have died since the Vietnam conflict ended than the 473 killed there but as yet no-one knows just how many. Welfare organisations have not bothered to compile follow-up statistics.
Bob and other Association workers have had to go to cemeteries and find the names and serial numbers of dead veterans and then carry out their own investigations to find out what happened to them.
'No-one else wants to know,' he said. ' The
Government, the RSL, the medical people, welfare workers, no-one is interested' - Brisbane Courier Mail (Qld) 16.9.82.
A Vietnam war veteran has compiled a register which indicates more Australian veterans have died since the war than the 473 killed in the war itself. - The Daily News (WA) 20.9.82.
X-6
The Federal Government has been asked to
investigate the cause of 17 suicides by Vietnam veterans in the past 12 months.
The Vietnam Veterans1 Association said yesterday it had recorded 17 suicides of Vietnam veterans but believed the total figure was more likely to be double this.. .
The National President of the Association. Mr Phil Thompson, said there was an urgent need for the Government to initiate medical research to find out the cause of the suicides.
Mr Thompson said the Association had been advised by the Department of Veterans' Affairs that the number of suicides expected for a group in the community of the size and age of Vietnam veterans
in the past 12 months was about 10. - The Age
(Vic) 6.1.83.
Articles in similar terms to the last article guoted above
also appeared in the Canberra Times and the Australian on
6 January 1983.
The Secretary of DVA, Mr Volker. wrote to the National
President of WAA, Mr Phill Thompson, on 16 August 1982.
It is apparent from the contents of that letter that the
Department was concerned that it could not reconcile
WAA's statements with information held by the
Department. The letter was accompanied by a number of
tables which purported to show the number of deaths from
suicide and cancer (malignant neoplasms) which could be
expected on the basis of data held by the Australian
Bureau of Statistics in respect of Australian males. It
X-7
is obvious that the claims being made in the press
exceeded those expected numbers as well as being greater
than the numbers known to DVA.
Mr Thompson replied to this letter on 30 August 1982. In
his letter, Mr Thompson queried the applicability of
population statistics to the Australian Vietnam Force due
to the selection processes which resulted in only healthy
servicemen going to Vietnam. Mr Thompson's letter also
criticised certain statistical studies and proposed a 4
meeting to discuss a number of matters.
3 . W A A MORTALITY RECORDS
In view of the fact that allegations were being made by
officers of W A A and in an effort to achieve some
reconciliation between W A A 1s records and those of DVA,
the Commission sought and obtained WAA's list or register 5
of deceased Vietnam veterans. The list was
hand-written and not well organised. There was also a lack of detail: some veterans were described only by
service number (e.g. "42511"), others by surname (eg.
"Smith") and many by nicknames (eg. "Shorty" "Dusty"). In
some instances, as will presently appear, veterans whose
names were included on WAA's mortality register were
X- 8
still alive I The Commission produced an alphabetical
list6 from the list supplied by WAA,
Newspaper articles, such as those referred to above,
disclosed the existence of registers maintained by members
of WAA. In each case efforts were made to obtain those
registers. In the case of the register kept by Bob
Hannah, which was the subject of several graphic
references in the Brisbane Courier Mail on 16 September
1982, Counsel Assisting spoke with Mr Hannah who indicated
that the list was compiled whilst he was President of the
Queensland Vietnam Veterans' Association, that this list
had been surrendered to his successor and he presumed that
it had been taken into account by the national body in
placing material before the Royal Commission.
Accordingly, although a summons was prepared, it was not
served nor was any further action taken.
Similarly, a register in respect of the mortality
experience of members of the Victorian Vietnam Veterans'
Association was said to have been compiled by Adrian
Bishop. When contacted by the Commission, Mr Bishop
indicated that that list had been supplied to Phi11
Thompson, National President of WAA. Mr Bishop also
presumed that his list had been taken into account in the
submission made by WAA.
X-9
Having obtained all the available details from VVAA. a 7
copy of the list prepared by the Commission was
forwarded to DVA in order that further identification
might be made, dates and causes of death obtained and to
enable the information to be analysed. This list
contained 865 entries: that number also represented the
number of entries contained in the material supplied to
the Commission by W A A . 8
DVA undertook not to make any use of the information
supplied other than to make an analysis and comparison of
the particulars therein with records held by DVA and the
Department of Defence.
Evidence of the results of the analysis was given by Robyn
King, Principal Research Officer in the Special Projects
Branch in DVA. Her evidence was given in a written
9
statement supplemented by oral evidence.
Ms King indicated the nature and extent of the work which
had been undertaken by DVA in respect of the list provided
to it by the Commission.10 The list was transcribed
onto a personal computer file to enable classification and
sorting of the information.
X-10
Attempts were made to match the details with the Nominal
Roll of Vietnam service provided by the Department of
Defence. Wherever a matching was possible, a
cross-reference to DVA1s client data base was made. The
details provided were analysed into nine separate
categories and a document listing members in each category
was provided to the Commission, becoming Exhibit 1751.
Category 1, which spannned pages 1-16 inclusive of Exhibit
1751 contained an alphabetical list compiled from the list
provided to DVA by the Commission. Accordingly, that
category disclosed 865 records.
Category 2, page 17 of Exhibit 1751, contained 32
instances where the details supplied (originally from
W A A ) were able to be matched with records on DVA1 s
computer file and for whom there was no notification of
death. The headings on this list were:
Match Status - shown as "ALIVE" in each case;
Service Number, Surname and Given Name as supplied originally by the WAA;
Service Number, Surname and Given Name as supplied by the Department;
X-ll
File Number - being the Departmental file number with the first initial indicating State. (e.g. N = New South Wales);
Pension Status - from the Departmental records. showing type and level of pension.
Of these 32, the majority (21) were currently receiving
pensions. Of the 32. 24 appeared on the November 1984
Electoral Roll _ Ms King also gave evidence that, of the
remaining 8, she was sure that at least one was alive: she
had spoken to him on the telephone on the previous Friday.
Before drawing any conclusions on this aspect the
Commission wrote to Counsel for W A A on 12 November 1984
(two full weeks prior to the commencement of the Mortality
hearings) seeking clarification. To date, no reply has
been forthcoming reflecting either a lack of organisation
or courtesy, or both.
The Commission is satisfied that 25 of the 32 so listed
were in fact alive at that time and for the purpose of
analysis it is proposed to assume, in the absence of any
indication to the contrary, that all 32 are alive.
Category 3, pages 18-23 of Exhibit 1751, contains 317
cases where a matching by both service number and surname
had been achieved. This enabled the date of death, cause
X-12
of death and whether the deceased was a National
Serviceman or not to be extracted from DVA1s records. The
headings of this list were:
Match Status - described as "COMPLETE";
Service Number. Surname and Given Names as supplied originally from WAA;
Date of Death;
The Edition or Revision Number of the International Classification of Diseases used to obtain the cause of death code;
The Cause of Death Code by reference to the
International Classification of Diseases;
Whether the Deceased had been a National Serviceman (Y=Yes; N=No);
Remarks - the words "ON SERVICE, VIETNAM" indicate that the death occurred during service in Vietnam.
Category 4. pages 24-26 of Exhibit 1751, revealed 144
instances where only some matching has been possible. In
some instances either service number or surname was
matched. The remaining entries represent a situation
where some minor discrepancy existed between the
information derived form the W A A and the Department's
records. The Match Status is described in the list as
"PARTIAL" and the remaining details contained in the list
are service number, surname and given name (from WAA);
the same details from the Department's records; date of
death; cause of death information; National Service
X - 13
indicator and remarks, all of which have been previously
defined or described.
Category 5, pages 27 and 28 of Exhibit 1751, disclosed 97
entries which, although not matching with DVA1s records,
were matched with the Nominal Roll provided by the
Department of Defence. This category would obviously
include servicemen who had not made any claim with DVA for
treatment or a pension. The list of entries showed the
Match Status; service number. surname and given names both
from WAA-supplied information and the Department's
records; date of death; cause of death information and
National Service indicator.
Category 6, pages 29-30 of Exhibit 1751, indicates
veterans whose names appear on the Nominal Roll as having
served in Vietnam, but who are not known to have made any
claim against DVA and about whom the Department had no
information concerning their vital status (ie. whether
they are dead or alive).
In order to correctly classify these servicemen more
information, such as date of death and cause of death, was
required. Mr Mclnnes QC, Senior Counsel for WAA,
indicated during the hearings that further efforts in this
X - 14
regard would be made.1' 1 ' However, no reply has been
forthcoming to date. The listing of these entries
describes the Match Status as "W R D B " . an abbreviation of
Vietnam Veterans' Registration Data Base (i.e. the Nominal
Roll), and provides service number. surname and given
names: firstly as obtained from WAA; secondly as obtained
from the Department of Defence.
Category 7, pages 31-33 of Exhibit 1751 contained a total
of 136 entries reflecting veterans for whom there was no
record of service in Vietnam on the Nominal Roll. Checking
fourteen such entries (i.e. 10 per cent of the total
number of 136), randomly chosen, with the Central Army
Records Office (CARO) revealed that, according to CARO,
all 14 had served in the Army but not in Vietnam. This
category of 136 entries was subdivided into three groups:
(a) 51 who were known to DVA;
(b) 12 for whom there were several possible matches with
DVA1s clients (i.e. veterans, wives or dependents who
claim with DVA); and
(c) 73 for whom there was no match possible with DVA1 s
records.
X-15
One possible explanation for the entries within this
category of 136 would be servicemen, whose names were
included on W A A 1s list, but who did not in fact serve in
Vietnam. Another possible explanation is that a
serviceman might be incorrectly omitted from the Nominal
Roll.
Match Status was shown as "NIL" and details provided on
this list were service number, surname and given names (as
supplied from W A A and from DVA1s records); file number;
date of death (if available) and service areas (eg. 'WW2',
1 Malaya 1, 1 Korea 1, 'Borneo').
Category 8, pages 34 and 35 of Exhibit 1751, listed 49
occasions where the information, originally provided by
WAA, did not enable a unique match to be found ie. there
was a multiple occurrence on the Nominal Roll of the name
information provided by WAA. Examples of this include
common surnames (eg. 'Smith') and surnames together with
nicknames (eg. 'Swampy','Buzz','Dustyâ and 'Dadda').
Consequently no matching with records of the DVA was
possible. The listing of this category indicated the
Match Status as "MULTIPLE" and the only other information
provided was the surname and given names as supplied
originally by WAA.
X-16
Category 9 included 19 records each representing a
duplication of information supplied by WAA. The listing
for this group described the Match Status as "DUPLICATE"
and provided the service number, surname and given name as
originally supplied by WAA. As indicated earlier, a
letter was forwarded to Counsel for W A A seeking
confirmation that the entries were in fact duplicates but,
to date, no reply has been received.
The following table represents a summary of the various
categories dealt with above:
TABLE 1
12
Description Category
(A) Believed Deceased Department of Veterans' Affairs Complete Match 3
. Partial Match 4
No of
Cases
317 144
Department of Defence Records Nominal Roll Match 5 97
558
(B) More Information Required Vital Status Unknown 6 71
Multiple Matching Possible 8 49
120
(C) Believed Capable of Exclusion Believed to be Alive 2
Believed not to be veterans of Vietnam Conflict 7
Duplication of Information 9
32
136 19 187 865
X-17
Thus, on the basis of information provided by WAA. and in
the absence of further information, it is assumed that the
number of Vietnam veterans shown on the list provided by
W A A who are in fact deceased is between 558 and 678 (i.e.
865-187 or 558+120).
4. DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS' AFFAIRS RECORDS
Records of DVA1s clients are managed by Branch offices in
the State of residence. In New South Wales. Victoria and
Queensland, since about 1968, the major features have been
recorded on a computer file, commonly known as the Client
Data Base.
The only readily accessible body of records in 1981 which
would assist in identification of individual veterans was
this Data Base. Three initial criteria were applied: (i)
service periods between 1962 and 1972; (ii) file number in
the "SS" series which relates to the Repatriation (Special
Overseas Service) Act 1962 under which the eligibility of
benefits in respect of Vietnam service is conferred; and
(iii) a determination in respect of disability or death
under the provisions of the Repatriation Act 1920 as
applied by the Repatriation (Special Overseas Service) Act
1962 .
X - 18
Statistics available to DVA suggested that. of the
population of veterans meeting these criteria,
approximately 95 per cent would have served in Vietnam.
This population of servicemen was then searched for any
indication of death in respect of those who did in fact
serve in Vietnam.
The following details were recorded manually on a card for
each such deceased Vietnam veteran:
Name Address Departmental File Number Service Number
Periods of Vietnam Service Unit and Arm of Service Date of Birth
Date of Death Cause of Death State of Usual Residence State in Which Death Occurred
DVA sought to ascertain the exact cause. mode and
circumstance of death for each such Vietnam veteran by
access to State Registrar-Generals' certificates of death
and, where death occurred from external causes (such as
motor vehicle accidents and suicide), transcripts of
proceedings of Coronial Inquiries were obtained. Formal
Inquiries are not conducted in all cases of death by
external cause and in such instances DVA sought access to
X - 19
reports of police investigation. In many cases, reports
of post-mortem examinations were obtained and hospital and
clinical notes sought in order to ascertain the full
details surrounding death.
In 1983 , a personal computer was obtained and the
information held on the card system was transcribed in
order to enable greater efficiency of analysis.
The co-operation of the Australian Bureau of Statistics
(ABS). which is responsible for the coding of causes of
death of the Australian population, was sought. The ABS
agreed to provide coding of the cause of death for each of
those veterans in accordance with its usual procedure
relating to the International Classification of Diseases
Manual published by the World Health Organisation.
The ABS coded the cause of death on the basis of the death
certificate and, when necessary, supporting data such as
the transcript of a Coronial Inquiry. By following this
procedure the coding of the cause of death of the clients
of DVA has been carried out on the same basis as that of
the general community. This was done so that any trends
indicated by veterans' causes of death might be examined
and compared with the incidence in the Australian
population or a section thereof.
X-20
It is important to realise that this is an on-going
process: the coding of information is being progressively
completed as the documentation upon which it is based
becomes available. As at November 1984 there were in the
vicinity of 125 cases for which the coding had not been
completed. These cases are included on the various lists
produced by DVA with the Cause of Death column left
blank.13
In South Australia, Western Australia and Tasmania
computerisation of the major features of the clients'
files was introduced in 1982 and, until 1984. no
retrospective data collection was undertaken. Hence the
data available in respect of clients of DVA residing in
those States is limited in some respects.
Primarily as a result of a recommendation of the Senate
Standing Committee on Science and the Environment
contained in the Report of its Inquiry on Pesticides and 14
the Health of Australian Vietnam Veterans, DVA
undertook a major expansion of its client data base,
particularly in the less populated States, in 1984. This
recommendation was to the effect that DVA should improve
its capacity to investigate specific groups of clients in
addition to catering for normal administrative
requirements.
X-21
A large identification and data collection project was
commenced in April 1984 whereby those Vietnam veterans who
had at any time sought benefits or assistance from DVA
were identified and certain data collected. This project
concentrated on recording onto the client data base in all
States the features outlined earlier in respect of Vietnam
veterans of the larger States.
The collection of service information and disabilities
related and not related to service was -completed by
October 1984. In respect of deaths the process is
continuing although at the time of the Mortality hearings
(November 1984), there was very little information
outstanding from other States, i.e. South Australia,
Western Australia and Tasmania.
The Department of Defence made available the Nominal Roll
of Vietnam service in order to assist in the process of
identifying which clients of DVA were Vietnam veterans. A
procedure was undertaken matching all veterans on the
Nominal Roll by service number, surname. given names or
initials and date of birth to all records on the client
data base except those of 1914-18 veterans. Through a
series of computer and manual searches DVA1s population of
Vietnam veteran clients were identified and, where those
X-22
client data base records were incomplete, data collection
was undertaken.
This project enabled the identification of deceased
veterans not previously recorded and documentation as
outlined above was sought in respect of their deaths.
These records have been added to both the manual card
system and the personal computer file.
As at 20 November 1984, 834 veterans were recorded on the
personal computer file as having died since returning to
Australia from South Vietnam. Each such case has been
sequentially numbered and termed "Case No." It serves to
permit identification other than by name. The numbers
were assigned as DVA became aware of the death and do not
purport to be in any particular order.
Two listings from this personal computer file were 15
produced and tendered: an alphabetical listing and a
Case Number listing.16 Each list has similar layouts
and reveal the following information:
* CASE NO. - an internal working number entered onto the personal computer file.
* FILE NUMBER - Department file number for clients - first character indicates state. ( 1C 1 prefix denotes Central Office in Canberra). *
* SURNAME.
X-23
GIVEN NAME.
* INTL - Initial of second and subsequent given names.
* DOB - Date of birth.
* DOD - Date of death.
* I CD REV - Edition or Revision number of International Classification of Diseases.
* ICD CODE - Cause of death by reference to
International Classification of Diseases.
* s e r v i c e NUMBER - Defence Force Regimental number of veteran during service in Vietnam.
* ARM - Force of which veteran was a member during
service in Vietnam.
* NS - National Serviceman - indicated by Y (yes) or N (no).
* RC - Veteran on list given to DVA by the Royal
Commission - indicated by Y or N.
At this stage, an indication as to the extent to which it
is possible to cross-reference details between the list
provided by the Commission to DVA and the personal
computer file print-out provided by DVA is given. The
Department's file was matched with the lists supplied by
W A A to establish the number of deceased veterans known to
each organisation.
WAA's list, as has already been indicated, incorporated a
total of 865 records of whom 558 were confirmed to be
deceased by reference to either DVA or Department of
Defence records; 307 W A A records could not be verified.
X-24
Of DVA1s mortality information which disclosed 834
post-Vietnam deaths, 461 veterans were also known to
WAA. Therefore, 373 deceased veterans known to DVA were
not matched with the list supplied by WAA.
For each of the 834 post-Vietnam deaths, a separate file
has been established and maintained. These files, which
are held in Canberra contain all documentation upon which
the classification and coding was based, occupy a total of
some 14 filing cabinets. Ms King brought with her to
Sydney a sample of these files: all case files of deceased
Vietnam veterans known to the Department whose surnames
commenced with the letter A, B, or C.
One such file was randomly selected: it proved to be Case
Number 619. The file contained an authorised copy of the
death certificate, a notification from Central Army
Records Office in Melbourne, an Advice of Death from a
Repatriation Beneficiary Form, copies of police
photographs and drawings, a copy of a report of the NSW
Police Force regarding the death and various associated
depositions. A photocopy of each document contained in
this file became Exhibit 1747. It was marked
âConfidential" with access limited to Counsel since
details of police investigations were contained in the
X-25
file and for the reasons outlined in the opening paragraph
of this Chapter.
Obviously the contents of the files differed accordingly
to the circumstances attending the death.
This record keeping is an on-going process within DVA.
The Commission was impressed with the thoroughness of the
work, its presentation and the way in which it lends
itself to further analysis. Through Ms King, DVA offered
to conduct such analyses as the parties may require.
The next section deals with analyses which were presented
by Ms King either as a result of analyses already
conducted by DVA or in response to requests from Counsel
Assisting.
5 - ANALYSIS OF MORTALITY RECORDS
A document headed "Vietnam Veteran Deaths Known to the
Department of Veterans' Affairs" was tendered through Ms
King.17 it provides examples of how the Department's
mortality records on the personal computer file permit
analysis, as the following tables reveal. (The
information provided was based on the file as at 22
November 1984 ) .
X-26
As has been previously indicated, the data is not complete
for all deaths known to DVA. Hence, some information is
unavailable for the purposes of certain tables with the
consequence that the totals for all tables will not always
agree.
Another limitation is that DVA is not notified of all
deaths occurring amongst Vietnam veterans. Notification
may be the result of:
Claim by dependants that the veteran's death was due
to a service-related cause;
Claim for funeral benefits;
Notification to terminate pension payments or other
benefits; or
Notification to DVA as an interested party or out of
courtesy.
Obviously, DVA is interested to know of any deaths
occurring amongst Vietnam veterans in order that its
records might approach the ideal situation where details
of all deaths occurring amongst Vietnam veterans are known.
X-27
TABLE 2
Deaths Classified by Year of Death
Year of No. of
Death Deaths
1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984
TOTAL
3
13 7
21 26 38 37 44 49 58 53 57 55 54 69 64 69 78
36 (part year)
831
TABLE 3
Deaths Classified by Cause of Death
Cause No. of
Deaths
Neoplasm 197
Circulatory diseases 214
Motor vehicle accidents 118
Other accidents 51
Suicides 106
Other external causes 19
Other causes 70
TOTAL 775
X-28
TABLE 4
Deaths Classified by Age at Death
Age Group No. of Deaths
20 - 24 76
25 - 29 129
30 - 34 142
35 - 39 130
40 - 44 73
45 - 49 88
50 - 54 100
55 + 87
TOTAL 825
TABLE 5
Deaths Classified by Cause of and Age at Death
Age Neoplasms Circulatory External Other Total
Group Diseases Causes Causes
20 - 24 10 3 46 2 61
25 - 29 27 14 80 3 124
30 - 34 29 22 75 12 138
35 - 39 25 29 56 11 121
40 - 44 15 25 20 12 72
45 - 59 23 37 12 14 86
50 - 54 37 45 4 9 95
55 + 31 39 1 7 78
TOTAL 197 214 294 70 775
X-29
TABLE 6
Deaths from External Causes Classified by Cause of and Age at Death
Age Group
Mo tor Vehicle Accidents
Other Accidents Suicide Other External
Causes
Tota 1
20 - 24 31 6 6 3 46
25 - 29 30 18 29 3 80
30 - 34 25 14 29 7 75
35 - 39 21 9 23 3 56
40 - 44 7 3 9 1 20
45 - 4 9 3 1 6 2 12
50 - 54 1 0 3 0 4
55 + 0 0 1 0 1
TOTAL 118 51 106 19 294
The proportion of Vietnam veteran deaths notified to the
Department has not been the same for each year . Some
factors which affect the extent of this proportion are:
Whether the veteran has dependants.
The cause of death since death from accidents could be
expected to be less frequently the subject of a claim
than death from diseases which might be thought to be
service related. Similarly, owing to the provision of
free treatment for cancer, the coverage of death
occurring due to cancer should be greater.
X- 30
The age at death. The proportion may be expected to
increase over time as more veterans become known to
DVA, more veterans marry and have dependants and since
the pattern of causes of death alters with age: motor
vehicle accidents and other external causes being
predominant at young ages whilst circulatory diseases
and other diseases become more common with increasing
age.
In view of the concern which has been expressed as to the
incidence of a particular type of cancer termed lymphoma
(a growth or tumour arising in the lymph glands or
lymphatic vessels) information was extracted from the
personal computer files. The resulting . â 18 print-out
revealed, for the 1.5 Vietnam veterans whose cause of death
was classifiable as. lymphoma, the following details in
addition to that provided in the alphabetic or case number
listings:19
"Clm-"Dec" - Decision: 1 = successful: 2 = unsuccessful: 8 = not yet determined.
"Lvl" - Level of decision: 1 = Repatriation Board: 2 = Repatriation Commission: 3 = Repatriation Review Tribunal:
8 = not yet recorded.
X- 31
State of Usual Residence State:
State in which death occurred:
Date of commencement and date of completion of each veteran's tour(s) of duty to Vietnam.
The names of two deceased servicemen were added to the
print-out bringing the total number to 17. The list may
not be complete since DVA, at the time Ms King gave her
evidence (November 1984), was engaged in coding all
disabilities recorded for Vietnam veterans and, in respect
of at least two States. that coding had not been
2 0 21
completed. By letter dated 20 February 1985 DVA
indicated that no additional instances of lymphoma had
come to the attention of the Department.
Subsequently DVA was requested by the Commission to supply
in respect of each of the 17 veterans, name. date of
diagnosis, details of the units with which they served
whilst in Vietnam and DVA files in respect of each veteran.
Additionally,
data base (as
all Vietnam 22
lymphomas.
the rate of
broader list
a print-out was obtained from DVA1s client
opposed to the personal computer file) of
veterans known to DVA to have contracted
This list, directed towards the issue of
incidence or occurrence of lymphomas, is a
than the print-out of the personal computer
X-32
file which only dealt with the instances of mortality
amongst those who have contracted lymphomas since
returning from Vietnam service.
DVA client data base print-out of lymphomas contains 64
entries disclosing 43 veterans, the reasons for the
duplication being that some veterans had determinations
for both disability claim and treatment under Reg. 66A.
This list contained the I CD code, the Client Data Base
File Number, the surname and initials and a description of
the disability from which he was suffering.
A further example of the use of DVA1s mortality records
was the list obtained in respect of deaths categorised as
2 3
suicides which contained details of 108 cases
classified as suicide and included five instances where
the Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) had classified
the cause of death as "injury undetermined whether
accidently or purposely inflicted". The list reflected
the information held by DVA as at 11 February 1985. The
numbers for each month of the year were as follows:
X-3 3
TABLE 7
SUICIDES BY MONTH OF YEAR
January February March April May
June July August September October November December
14 8 7
12 6 8
13 8 8
10 4
10
TOTAL 108
6. AVHS MORTALITY REPORT
In 1980, the Commonwealth Institute of Health was
commissioned to conduct a series of scientific studies
into the health of Vietnam veterans and their families. A
special, independent unit known as the Australian
Veterans' Herbicide Studies was set up within the
Institute to conduct the investigations. At the time the
unit was created there was substantial public concern as
to the effects of herbicides on health and this was
reflected in the original title of the unit. Subseguently
the scope of the investigation was broadened to examine
all aspects of Vietnam service and the title was
accordingly changed to the Australian Veterans' Health
X-34
Studies (AVHS). This unit was originally intended to
conduct three studies: a Birth Defects study, a Mortality
2 4
study, and a Morbidity (ie. sickness) study. The
results of the Birth Defects study are reported
25
elsewhere in this Report as is the failure of the
Government to approve the proposed Morbidity study.26
The Mortality Report, comprising three volumes, was
27
tendered in the course of the Mortality hearings. The
study was a retrospective cohort study of mortality
amongst former National Servicemen. Planning for the
study began in July 1981 when a protocol was prepared. A
Scientific Advisory Committee (SAC) had been established
by the then Minister for Veterans' Affairs to advise on
the scientific merit of the studies. On 17 June 1982 the
SAC endorsed the protocol. Following the conduct of the
study the SAC reviewed the proposed report and gave its
final endorsement at a meeting on 16 August 1984. From an
abundance of caution the Commission summonsed all drafts
and correspondence relating to the final, published
version of the report.
Michael Fett, the Principal Investigator throughout the 28
study gave explanatory evidence on 26 November 1984.
Dr Fett obtained the degress of Bachelor of Medicine,
X-3 5
Bachelor of Surgery and Bachelor of Medical Science, all
with First Class Honours, from Monash University in 1978.
He then spent some eighteen months in residency at the
Alfred Hospital and Prince Henry Hospital in Victoria
after which he studied for and obtained a Masters Degree
in Public Health at Harvard University. His evidence was
illustrated with material which was displayed on an 2 9 overhead projector and copies thereof exhibited.
The aim of the Mortality study was to compare the death
rates of Vietnam veterans with a comparable group of
non-veterans for all causes of death combined, cancer
(including soft tissue sarcoma and lymphoma) and external
causes (including suicide and motor vehicle accidents).
The study was confined to National Servicemen. Regular
Servicemen were not studied (unless. of course, they had
previously been National Servicemen). There were a number
of reasons for this. In order to minimise the risk of
bias it was important to ensure that the group with which
Vietnam veterans are compared was as similar as possible
at the time the veteran left for Vietnam. Furthermore,
National Servicemen were selected randomly and, subject to
a consideration of those who deferred service or obtained
exemption form service, this group was more representative
X- 3 6
of the general population than members of the regular
army. Also, in the process of selection of soldiers for
service in Vietnam, while the same standards applied to
National Servicemen and regulars, it appears that a higher
proportion of regular servicemen were precluded from
serving in Vietnam due to health problems.
Subjects for the study were all National Servicemen who
could have been veterans of the Vietnam conflict. This
criterion required enlistment between 1 June 1965 and 28
February 1971. The other important selection criterion
was that National Servicemen had to have served in the
army for at least 90 days and later in the analysis this
initial criterion was increased to 12 months. The 90 day
criterion was adopted because it became apparent following
discussions with the Army that the first 3 months of
service acted as a screen additional to the enlistment
medical examinations. i.e. people who had enlisted but
were subsequently found not to be suitable tended to be
discharged in the first three months of their service.
The twelve month period was later adopted as a replacement
criterion since there were approximately 1200 National
Servicemen who served for less than 12 months but within
that group only 4 Vietnam veterans served for less than 12
months. Hence it was considered that those who served for
X-37
less Chan 12 months would not be typical of National
Servicemen who could have become veterans.
Deaths which occurred in the course of combat in Vietnam
and those which occurred during National Service in
Australia were excluded from consideration: combat deaths
would make comparison difficult as such deaths were not a
possibility for those who did not serve in Vietnam; deaths
which occurred in Australia during National Service were
excluded for similar reasons, i.e. such deaths could be
due to factors to which veterans serving in Vietnam were
not exposed.
Having identified the subjects within the study, strenuous
efforts were made to determine the vital status of each
subject as at 1 January 1982 (i.e. whether the subject was
alive or deceased at that date). For the purposes of
finding out who was alive and who was dead those actually
performing the investigatory work did not need to know
whether the subject was a veteran of the Vietnam conflict
or not. The study was designed to ensure that as far as
possible those collecting the data did not know whether
the persons subject of their enquiries did serve in
Vietnam. This was done to reduce the chance of any bias.
X- 3 8
There were 46.166 study subjects: 19,209 veterans of
Vietnam conflict and 26,957 non-veterans. The identities
of subjects and the data relating to army service were
obtained from the Department of Defence. This included
age and calendar year of enlistment, civil education,
army corps, and, for veterans, dates of Vietnam service.
A number of sources were used to determine who was alive
and who was deceased as at 1 January 1982. First, army
records were searched to assertain those currently serving
in the army on that date. Then the electoral registers
were searched: first the July 1982 register and secondly
that for July 1981. If a study subject matched with a
record on the Electoral Register they were considered to
be alive prior to the compilation of that register as
discussions with the Australian Electoral Office indicated
that the record of deceased persons were removed from the
register within six months. This aspect was tested by
searching the register for the names of some test
subjects, known to be deceased. None of those subjects
appeared on the electoral roll which gave confidence that
it was a good indication of vital status. Other data
sources were all Australian death registers, the death
register maintained by the Army, drivers licence registers
in all States and Territories, Department of Immigration
X- 3 9
and Ethnic Affairs records of the names and dates on which
people arrive and leave Australia and police, corrective
services, welfare and credit records.
The records of DVA were used to provide information on
deceased subjects (i.e. people that the investigators knew
to be dead) but these records were not used to determine
vital status since they have a gross over-representation
of Vietnam veterans relative to non-veterans in all data
bases and it would have biased the ascertainment of
veterans' and non-veterans' vital status.
The data sources used to ascertain the cause of death
included the death certificate or an extract from the
death register, hospital records, Coroners' records, and
doctors' records as well as histopathology slides, (i.e.
tissue slides used to assist in the identification of
diseases).
Causes of death were coded by the Australian Bureau of
Statistics (ABS) according to the classifications
contained in the International Classification of Diseases,
8th revision. This revision was used by the ABS between
1968 and 1978 which covered about two thirds of the
follow-up period and thus made comparisons with the
X-40
general population feasible. These causes were confirmed
by a panel of specialist physicians and, for cancer
deaths, by pathological examination of tissue slides.
Mortality among subjects was examined in relation to
variables relating to pre-enlistment characteristics,
enlistment characteristics, discharge characteristics and.
for veterans, Vietnam service characteristics. For these
comparisons, analysis was confined to 19,205 veteran and
25,677 non-veteran former National Servicemen who had more
than 12 months of army service. In the period from the
end of National Service engagement to 1 January 1982 there
were 260 deaths among veterans and 263 deaths among
non-veterans.
As at 1 January 1982 the investigations had revealed 94.4
per cent of the veterans to be alive. 1.4 per cent
deceased and the vital status of 4.3 per cent was
unknown. The correspondLng figures for non-veterans were
94.4 per cent , 1.0 per cent and 4.6 per cent, . If the
mortality rate revealed amongst those for whom vital
status was known is reflected amongst the percentage for
whom vital status was unknown, then only 1.4 per cent of
the 4.3 per cent of veterans whose vital status was
unknown may be expected to, in fact be deceased.
X-41
This amounts to a mere 0.06 per cent or about 1 in 1,650.
The corresponding calculation for non-veterans gives a
similar figure. The high quality of the data was
confirmed by a concurrent search of registers using the
records of men with independently determined vital
status. This indicated that over 95 per cent of the
subject deaths were identified and that it was unlikely
that living subjects were incorrectly identified as
deceased.
These recovery rates make this an excellent
epidemiological study.
The mortality or death rate is calculated as the number of
deaths in the population of a particular group thereof
divided by the total number of subjects in that group and
the period of observation. For example, the death rate
for veterans, as revealed by the study, was 11.6 deaths
per 10,000 person-years and 8.9 deaths per 10,000
person-years for non-veterans. It may be, and in the case
of the present study it was, that the period of
observation differs between subjects. In those
circumstances the calculation is a little more complicated
but the principle remains the same.
X-42
By dividing the death rate for one group by the death rate
of another group. the relative mortality rate is
obtained. To continue the example, the relative mortality
rate (veterans cf. non-veterans) is equal to the death
rate of veterans divided by the death rate of non-veterans
or 11.6 divide 8.9 which equals 1.29, i.e. the death rate
of veterans is 29 per cent greater than that of
non-veterans.
Two kinds of comparison were involved: comparison between
veterans and non-veterans (as revealed in the previous
paragraph) and the comparison of veterans' mortality with
that of Australian males.
This latter comparison is achieved by dividing the actual
number of deaths observed by the number of deaths which
would be expected if veterans have the same death rate as
Australian males of their own age.
As mortality varies with a number of factors such as age,
it is useful to subdivide the data by age and calculate
age-specific death rates. Other subdivisions, resulting
in cause-specific rates and rates for various Army Corps,
can be calculated from the data. Having made such
X-43
calculations and compared veterans to non-veterans or
veterans to the Australian male population then recognised
statistical tests may be applied to determine whether any
resulting difference is statistically significant. This
gives an indication of the likelihood that the result is
due to chance. If a statistically significant result is
obtained then further analysis may enable influencing
factors to be identified. Such analysis may permit
inferences or conclusions to be drawn with greater or
lesser degree of confidence.
Dr Fett gave some examples of how the AVHS Mortality
Report could be analysed and the nature of the conclusions
which might be drawn on the basis of the information
revealed by the study. A fuller treatment appears in Part 30
I of the AVHS Mortality Report.
Part II of that Report examines the relationship between a
number of variables influencing mortality in Vietnam
service for all dead study subjects, deaths occurring
during army service and a 4 per cent random sample of
mortality study subjects not known to be dead. The
investigation in Part II was conducted in order to
identify potential confounding variables for which data on
only a subset of subjects could be obtained. (Confounding
X-44
variables. as the name suggests, are factors which
confound or confuse results such thatâ if their effect mayÂ
be eliminated, a clearer analysis of the data is possible.)
Part III of the Mortality Report reports an investigation
of a variety of different aspects of Vietnam service.
Aspects studied in relation to mortality among Vietnam
veterans included the risk of sustaining a battle injury
and the type and geographic location of service in Vietnam.
Amongst Vietnam veterans there were 260 deaths observed
from all causes. If Vietnam veterans were experiencing
mortality at the same rate as Australian males of the same
age then the expected number of deaths would be 311.8.
Hence the ratio of observed to expected deaths for
veterans compared with the Australian male population is
0.83. Similarly, deaths amongst non-veterans amount to
263, whilst the expected number is 407.3 giving a ratio of
31
0.6. Hence the mortality of Vietnam veterans was 17
per cent less than that of the Australian male population
but was 29 per cent higher than the mortality of
non-veterans. Both these figures are statistically
significant at the 5 per cent level, i.e. if there were in
fact no difference in mortality then a result of this
nature would occur by reason of chance less than five
times in 100.
X-4 5
Presenting these figures in tabular form and subdividing
into age groups reveals that the mortality of both
veterans and non-veterans was below that of the Australian
male population in each age group. For non-veterans, the
deficit was fairly constant but for Vietnam veterans the
deficit increased with increasing age. This trend is
reflected in the decline in the relative mortality rates
from 1.44 to 0.81 and suggests that the excess mortality
among veterans was greatest in the youngest age group
(i.e. soonest after Vietnam service) and then gradually
diminished.
X-4 6
TABLE 8
Subdivision by Age Group
Age Group
20-24 25-29 30-34 35-39 TOTAL
Veterans Obs 65 111 75 9 260
Exp 66.95 128.0 103.2 13.66 311.8
Ratio 0.97 0.87 0.73 0.66 0.83
Non-veterans
Obs 58 106 83 16 263
Exp 85.84 170.4 131.3 19.73 407.3
Ratio 0.68 0.62 0.63 0.81 0.65
Ratio:
Veterans to 1.44 1.39 1.15 0.81 1.29
Non-veterans
obs = observed
exp = experienced
ratio = obs/exp
X-47
Line 3 in the above table indicates the results of a
comparison between veterans and the Australian male
population whilst line 7 indicates the results of
comparisons between veterans and non-veterans.
Analysing the data by cause and presenting the results in
tabular form (extracted from Table 4.1 page 56 Part I of
the Mortality Report):
X-48
TABLE 9
Subdivision by Cause of Death
Cause of Veterans Death ________
obs. exp . ratio
(1) (2) (3) (4=2/3)
Cancer 31 32 .9 0.9
Circulatory 23 27. 8 0.8
Diseases
Digestive 7 7 .6 0.9
Diseases
External 192 207 0.9
Causes
All Causes 260 312 0.8
Non- veterans Veterans cf Non-veterans
obs. exp. ratio
(5) (6) (7=5/6) (8 =4/7)
41 43.0 1.0 1.0
16 36.4 0.4 1.9*
0 9.96 0 _ *
198 270 0.7 1.3*
263 407 0.6 1.3*
* = Statistically significant at the 5% level.
It will be readily observed that, for the categories
itemised above, there is no class of deaths in which the
observed number was greater than the expected number. In
fact, for some classes, the number of deaths was much less
than expected. Caution should be exercised when looking
for patterns of mortality in sub-groups where the number
of deaths is small because in such situations, small
X-49
differences in numbers (which are most likely due to
chance) produce much larger changes in relative mortality
rates. Table 9 reflects the same overall trends as Table
8, namely that the mortality of Vietnam veterans is
greater than that of non-veterans but that the mortality
of both is less than that of the Australian male
population.
Cancer is self-explanatory; circulatory diseases includes
heart disease, high blood pressure and stroke as well as a
number of other such causes. The seven deaths observed
amongst Vietnam veterans from diseases of the digestive
system were comprised of four instances of cirrhosis of
the liver, two cases of pancreatitis and one death was
from a bowel obstruction. The category termed External
Causes, which comprised about 3/4 of the deaths observed,
includes motor vehicle accidents, other accidents, suicide
and self-inflicted injuries.
The most likely explanation of these trends is that due to
the screening process, (i.e. the selection of men for
National Service and in the rejection of unfit men during
the first three months) the army was left with a very
healthy group of young men who additionally had
behavioural patterns which made them less likely to die
than their peers.
X-50
Within the individual classes there is nothing to suggest
that there is any difference in the death rate from
cancer. However for circulatory diseases, digestive
diseases and external causes there was a statistically
significant excess among veterans relative to non-veterans.
Turning to particular causes of death which have been the
subject of allegations and associated concern, namely
soft-tissue sarcoma, non-Hodgkins lymphoma, Hodgkin's
disease, suicide and motor vehicle accidents. Table 10
shows the observed and expected figures for veterans and
non-veterans and the relative mortality rates.
TABLE 10
Cause of Death Veteran Non-veteran Ratio veteran
obs exp obs exp to non-vet«
Soft-tissue Sarcoma 2 0.64 0 0.84 -
Non-Hodgkin's Lymphoma 3 2.04 4 2.67 1.0
Hodgkin's disease 0 2.15 3 2.81 0
Suicide 40 42.4 36 55.5 1.5
Motor vehicle 102 106 115 138 1.2
accidents
X-51
The above Table is extracted from Table 4.3 at page 62 and
Table 4.6 at pages 62 and 66 Part I of the Mortality
Report. None of these results are statistically
significant at the 5 per cent level, i.e. there is nothing
revealed by these figures or the AVHS Mortality Study
generally which would displace a no-effect hypothesis.
Accordingly this study does not support the claims which
have been made in respect of cancer and suicide.
An analysis in respect of the digestive diseases was also
presented by Dr Fett. There were seven deaths observed
amongst veterans and none observed among non-veterans. Of
the seven among veterans, four were due to cirrhosis of
the liver, two veterans died of pancreatitis and one of a
bowel obstruction. In all six of the cases involving
cirrhosis or pancreatitis the subject was either drunk on
his terminal admission to hospital or had a known history
of chronic alcoholism. Furthermore, in the four instances
of cirrhosis of the liver there was nothing to indicate
that these cases were other than alcohol-associated.
Accordingly, Dr Fett concluded, on clinical grounds,
having regard to the hospital records which were assessed,
that these six deaths were directly attributable to
excessive alcohol intake. As with cigarettes, the lack of
available data on alcohol consumption precludes further
analysis.
X-52
In respect of motor vehicle accidents the AVHS Study
suggests that Vietnam veterans are more likely to have
motor vehicle accidents than servicemen of comparable age
who are not veterans of Vietnam. However, the result (a
relative risk ratio of 1.2) is not statistically
significant. Furthermore, a comparison between Vietnam
veterans and the general population of the same age
reveals no material difference.
National Servicemen were allocated to corps before it was
known whether they would serve in Vietnam. Army sources
indicated that corps may be grouped into five categories
according to the level of stress and danger to which men
in the corps would have been exposed in Vietnam. Corps
groupings were as follows. in order of decreasing stress
and danger: (1) Infantry, (2) Engineers, (3) Armour and
Artillery, (4) Corps with minor field presence (signals.
medical, electrical mechanical engineers), (5) Non-Field
corps (including such groups as catering and dental). It
will be apparent from Table 11 that National Servicemen
were more likely to serve in Vietnam if they were in
Infantry, Engineers or Armour and Artillery than in the
other corps. Also, among non-veterans, death rates
differed significantly between corps groupings with
Infantry, and Armour and Artillery having the higher death
X-53
rates than the remainder. This indicated that corps was a
potentially confounding variable. This aspect is dealt
with subsequently.
X-54
TABLE 11
(Extracted from Table 3.10, page 34, Pt 1 of the Mortality-Report) .
Subdivision by Army Corps
Corps % of Study Death Rate (per 10,000 Ratio:
Grouping Subjects
who were veterans
person years)
Veterans
Veterans to Non-Veterans
Non veterans
Infantry 61 12.5 13.0 0.96
Engineers (RAE) 52 14.1 5.7 2.48*
Armour and Artillery
48 11.7 11.1 1.06
Minor Field Presence
28 8 .6 5.6 1.52
Non-field Corps 27 9.0 9.0 1.01
TOTAL 43 11.6 8.9 1.29*
* = Statistically significant at the 5% level.
Leaving aside, for the moment, the Engineers category it
is apparent that the Infantry and Armour and Artillery
categories have a comparatively high proportion being sent
to Vietnam and comparatively high death rates among the
X-55
veterans, namely 12.5 and 11.7 deaths per 10,000
person-years respectively. In contrast to this in the
Minor Field presence and Non-Field corps groups there are
low proportions going to Vietnam and low death rates
amongst the non-veterans, i.e. 5.6 and 9.0 respectively.
This suggests that part of the relative mortality rate of
veterans compared with non-veterans could be due to death
rates being related to corps rather than to Vietnam
service. The results suggest that at least part of the
excess mortality being observed in veterans relative to
non-veterans could be due to variation in death rates due
to another factor, namely corps grouping, and that corps
grouping is in itself related to service in Vietnam, i.e.
the results suggest that corps is a confounding variable.
Turning to the Engineers one finds that the high relative
mortality rate of 2.5 is as much due to a comparatively
low death rate among non-veterans as it is to a high death
rate among veterans.
Education, Corps grouping and age at enlistment were
identified as potentially confounding variables. However
these variables may interact so that although they
confound individually, they may not be confounding after
taking into account the effects of the other variables.
X-56
Table 12 which is extracted from Table 3.11 on page 36 of
Part I of the Mortality Report shows estimated relative
mortality rates for veterans and non-veterans after
adjusting for different combinations of these variables.
TABLE 12
Variables Used for Relative Mortality
Ad justment Rate
None 1.29
1. Age group only 1.29
Corps only 1.16
Education only 1.27
Age at Enlistment 1.26
2. Age group and corps 1.17
Age group and education 1.27
Age group and age at enlistment 1.26
3. Age group, corps and education 1.16
Age group, corps and age at enlistment 1.15 Age group. education and age 1.25
at enlistment.
Corps, education and age at enlistment 1.15
4. Age group, education, corps and age 1.15 at enlistment.
It is apparent from the above Table that the presence of
corps grouping results in a substantial alteration in
relative mortality rate but that the other three factors
leave the relative mortality rate almost unaffected. This
indicates that there is substantial confounding by corps
grouping, but that other variables examined were not found
to be confounding. It is also worth noting that the
X-57
mortality of Vietnam veterans was not statistically
significantly higher than the mortality of non-veterans
after adjusting for the confounding effects of Army corps
grouping (paragraph 2. page viii. Part I), i.e. if the
confounding variable of corps grouping is removed then the
results could be due to chance.
Dr Fett put forward a number of possible explanations for
the result which had occurred in respect of the Engineers
corps grouping. First, he said the results could be due
to pure chance. Secondly, he postulated:
It could be due to the fact that men, when they walk into the recruitment depot, have a
particular risk of dying over the next 15 years and those with higher risk, for some reason or another, tended to be more likely to end up
serving in the Infantry, Engineers, Armour and Artillery than in the other corps.32
His third explanation, which to him did not seem to have a
great deal of plausibility, was that there might be an
effect of army service in Australia on death rates. Dr
Fett agreed with Counsel Assisting that a very attractive
interpretation of the data was that there may be more
risk-taking individuals amongst those who actually get
into the corps that go to Vietnam.33
X-58
In an effort to discover whether the relative mortality-rate for the various corps groupings differed between the
States of enlistment. Dr Fett prepared a series of tables
which subdivided the data so as to permit such
34
analysis. By way of example. the relative mortality
rates for Engineers were 9.30 (Qld. ); 1.06 (NSW); 2.62
(Vic.) and 1.37 (WA). No figure could be calculated for
either South Australia or the Northern Territory since
there were no deaths amongst non-veteran Engineers in
those categories. Similarly, Tasmanian and Papuan
Engineers had no deaths in either veterans or
non-veterans. Of these f igures the only statistically
significant result is that of Queensland.
Homogeneity testing involves the conduct of recognised
statistical tests in order to determine whether the
results from a number of groups differ to a statistically
significant extent. When such tests were conducted in
respect of the abovementioned relative mortality rates it
was found that, whilst the rates differed considerably
from State to State. they were not different to a
statistically significant extent.
Further tests for homogeneity (i.e. similarity) of death
rates revealed that death rates did not vary in a
X-59
statistically significant way between the various States
of enlistment in the case of non-veteran Infantry members,
veteran Engineers or non-veterans Engineers.
Dr Michael Adena was a statistician with AVHS during the
conduct of the Mortality Study. He graduated from the
University of Melbourne in 1974 with First Class Honours
in Mathematical Statistics and subsequently obtained a PhD
from the Australian National University - a full
curriculum vitae including details of membership of
professional societies and his publications was
exhibited.35
in order to understand Dr Adena1s evidence it is necessary
to become familiar with the issue to which his evidence
was addressed and certain statistical terms. As has been
already indicated, the result of the AVHS Mortality Study
in respect of Engineers was statistically significant and
the Commission's enquiries accordingly involved an
investigation of possible explanations for this result.
The analysis of Dr Fett, referred to above, involved
subdivision of the Engineers' category into the component
figures for the various States of enlistment. Dr Adena' s
evidence however subdivided the Engineers' category into
four groups entitled "none", "low", "medium", and "high"
X-60
reflecting the direct battle casualty index as measured by
AVHS in the course of the Mortality Study in order to give
some idea of the level of involvement in the hostilities
of the Vietnam conflict.
Using the figures for Engineers (RAE) contained in Table
3.19 on page 46 of Part 1 of the Report, Dr Adena
explained the analysis. The table he used was as
, Î , 36
follows:
TABLE 13
DR ADENA'S EVIDENCE
None Low Medium High Total
Observed Deaths IS 25 5 0 45
Person-years 16,888 12,051 2,974 11 31.924
Expected Deaths 2 3.81 16.99 4.19 . 02 45
If the mortality rate was the same for each group then the
expected number of deaths in each group would be the
overall rate (calculated as 45 divided by 31,924 or
0.00014096) multiplied by the number of person-years in
X- 61
each group. The results of such calculations are
presented on the third line of the above table. They
involve the underlying hypothesis that the death rate does
not vary between the groups.
Deviance is a statistical terra denoting a measure of the
extent of discrepancy between observed and expected data.
If a measure of deviance is statistically significant then
it is considered that the hypothesis should be rejected as
not being commonly obtainable by the operation of chance
factors alone. If the death rate did not vary between the
groups then the deviance would be zero. Calculating the
deviance from the above table yields 7.23. The deviance
difference is thus 7.23 - 0 or 7.23.
The degrees of freedom are the number of comparisons which
can be made in respect of a number of observations. In
order to fully understand this definition, one would need
to deal with rather advanced questions of algebra.
Reduced to its simplest form, the number of degrees of
freedom is mathematically equal to the number of
observations or groups minus one, i.e. 4 - 1 = 3 in the
present illustration.
X-62
The appropriate statistical distribution used to test
hypotheses about deviance is the Chi-square distribution
and using standard statistical tables for such a
distribution with three degrees of freedom reveals that
obtained deviance difference (i.e. 7.23) has a probability
of 0.07 or 7 per cent which is not statistically
significant at the five per cent level.
Accordingly the initial hypothesis that the death rate
does not differ between the groups is not rejected on
statistical grounds.
As to the possible effect of calendar year and duration of
Vietnam service Dr Fett indicated that the study of
overall death rates and death rates amongst veterans in
each corps grouping were not found to vary significantly
with calendar year of Vietnam service or duration of
service. This suggests that death rates do not vary
significantly according to when a veteran served in
Vietnam or for how long he remained there. The fact that
death rates do not so vary provides some support for the
proposition that mortality is not affected by exposure to
herbicides. This arises since if chemical agents such as
herbicides did affect mortality then higher mortality
cates amongst those who served in Vietnam for longer
X- 6 3
periods would be expected. Similarly, if mortality
subsequent to service was specifically related to combat
or herbicide exposure then it should have been more
evident In eras when combat was more intense or herbicide
exposure greater.
Drs Armstrong, Mathews and Fett each gave evidence as to
possible explanations of the results obtained by the AVHS
Mortality Study.
Since 1979 , Dr Armstrong has been the Director of the
National Health and Medical Research Council Unit in â
Epidemiology and Preventive Medicine within the University
of Western Australia. He graduated in medicine from that
University in 1969 and then trained as a specialist in
internal medicine at the Royal Perth Hospital, becoming a
Member of the Royal Australian College of Physicians in
1972. He became a Fellow of the College in 1975. He
trained in epidemiology between 1972 and 1975 and obtained
a Doctorate in that discipline in 1975. Subsequently he
was Senior Lecturer in Medicine at the University of
Western Australia, thereafter Director of Health, Research
and Planning in the Department of Health, Western
Australia which position he held until 1979.
X-64
Dr Armstrong, at page 31 of his written statement.
summarised the results of the Study as follows:
37
(i) A small excess mortality in national
servicemen who served in Vietnam compared with those who did not, from causes other than those directly related to combat;
(ii) This excess was concentrated in three categories of cause of death - circulatory (cardiovascular) diseases, digestive system diseases and external causes;
(iii) Mortality in veterans did not vary
significantly by length or era of service in Vietnam.
He advanced four possible explanations for the overall
results: chance, bias, confounding, and a causal effect of
Vietnam service.
After adjusting for the effect of corps grouping the
excess mortality, whilst still present (16 per cent), was
not statistically significant and accordingly the
possibility of the result being due to chance cannot be
eliminated. The statistical probability that the results
of the AVHS Mortality Study were due to chance factors is
3 in 1,000 if no allowance is made for corps grouping but
1 in 10 if such allowance is made.
Since selection for service in Vietnam was not a random
event, there was a possibility of bias influencing any
comparison between Vietnam veterans and non-veterans.
X-65
Although corps grouping was found to be a confounding
variable, other confounding factors may remain as yet
unidentified. The selection process for Vietnam may have
resulted in veterans who went to Vietnam differing from
those who did not in respect of lifestyle factors which
are related to health. Alternatively, the experiences of
those who did serve in Vietnam may have produced lifestyle
changes which influenced mortality following service. The
pattern of excess mortality is consistent with the effects
of tobacco, alcohol and other lifestyle factors.
A causal effect of Vietnam service to increase mortality
from particular causes remains possible although the lack
of effect of duration and era of service weigh against
this explanation. In the absence of a detailed analysis
of exposure, a conclusion as to whether herbicides might
be a cause is difficult. However, the pattern of excess
mortality is not such as to suggest chemical agents as a
cause. For example. mortality from cancer was not higher
in veterans when compared with non-veterans.
Dr Armstrong was asked to indicate which of these four
explanations he regarded as most likely. He expressed a
preference for confounding38 ie. that the process of
X-66
selection which led to servicemen going to Vietnam was
associated with behavioural characteristics which put that
person at a higher risk of subsequent mortality and/or an
effect of Vietnam experiences on lifestyle resulting in an
increase mortality following service. Factors such as
attitude to risk taking, personality type, alcohol and
tobacco consumption were given by Dr Armstrong as examples
of behavioural patterns which might give rise to such a
change in mortality rates which he believed to be real,
although small, after allowing for the influence of corps
grouping.
In respect of the increased mortality from circulatory
disorders. Dr Armstrong agreed with Mr O'Keefe, Counsel
for Monsanto, that cigarette smoking and alcohol can have 39
an adverse effect. on the circulatory system.
40 .
Similarly, he agreed that alcohol consumption was the
best explanation of the increased incidence of digestive
disorders as revealed by both the US Ranch Hand Mortality
41
Study and the Australian Study. Behavioural aspects,
such as attitudes to risk, would only be a potential
explanation in respect of deaths from external causes.
Professor John Mathews also gave evidence during the
Mortality hearings: aspects included in his evidence were
X- 67
an explanation of the healthy-worker effect, a
consideration of the results of the AVHS Mortality Study
and evidence regarding studies of other war veterans'
mortality.
He believed that the result of the Australian Study
disclosed a real excess of mortality which was not due to
chance alone. Leaving aside the possible operation of
chance, Professor Mathews advanced four possible reasons
for the results obtained in the study.
First, that the characteristics of National Servicemen
being sent to Vietnam might differ from those not sent to
Vietnam in ways which might subsequently affect their
mortality. Secondly. that because of their Vietnam
experience, soldiers might change their behaviour in
relation to drinking, smoking or other lifestyle factors
in such a way that their subsequent mortality might be
altered. The third possibility advanced by Professor
Mathews was that combat stress or some other stress in the
Vietnam war might have a delayed effect on mortality. The
final possibility was that exposure to chemical agents
might have an effect on subsequent mortality.
X-68
On the issue of the relationship between exposure to
chemicals in Vietnam and subsequent mortality. Professor
Mathews addressed this issue in two ways. First, by
extrapolation from data obtained in respect of experiments
with animals. This involved estimating the maximum
credible physical effects of exposure to the maximum
credible doses of chemicals in Vietnam. Professor Mathews
suggested that when this is done the calculations suggest
that the physical effects on mortality, if any. would be
so small as to be undetectable in the AVHS Mortality
Study. Further, that the expected number of deaths
attributable to chemical exposure would be so small as to
be negligible compared to the effects related to alcohol
use and behavioural disturbances. The second approach
suggested by Professor Mathews was to look at whether
mortality in the post-Vietnam period of those who served
in Vietnam is plausibly related to the pattern of chemical
usage in Vietnam. He concluded that in the absence of an
increase in mortality relating to duration of Vietnam
service or to peak usage of chemicals in Vietnam that
there is nothing to suggest any untoward effects of
chemical usage on mortality in the post-Vietnam period.
There is no doubt that pre-existing characteristics can
affect subsequent health and mortality. For example.
X-69
better educated people and those of a higher
socio-economic class have lower mortality rates, whilst
alcohol and tobacco consumption are generally accepted as
leading to higher mortality rates. Professor Mathews 42 acknowledged this and gave evidence that such aspects
4 3
were indicated in the results of the study.
If pre-existing characteristics, such as initiative.
personality and the like also affected the likelihood of
serving in Vietnam then a higher level of mortality would
be revealed by a study although it could be due to those
characteristics rather than service in Vietnam per se. It
is this trend which Professor Mathews believed to be
evident in the findings of the AVHS study. He found
confirmation for this in the fact that a higher mortality
rate was revealed by the study in respect of those
soldiers who were discharged early from the Army as
unsuitable. Further support for this effect was obtained 44
from studies such as that of Kadushin et a 1 which
showed that pre-existing psychiatric disturbances were
predictive of subsequent increases in mortality rates.
This was described as the effects of the selection process
and it is important to note that such selection may be the
product of self-selection or selection by the Army
X-70
(through recruitment, unit allocation and posting), or
both.
The data available from the AVHS study did not allow the
second suggestion, namely that there may have been
behavioural changes as a result of experiences in Vietnam
which affected subsequent mortality, to be tested
adequately. However, this hypothesis does have the
advantage that it is supported by the very nature of the
results: the incidence of deaths due to external causes
(motor vehicle and other accidents), the number of
alcohol-related deaths and the number of deaths which
might be related to tobacco consumption are all consistent
with this explanation. It was the consistency between the
observed results and that which would be expected if this
hypothesis is in fact correct which led Professor Mathews
to conclude that this explanation was a contributing
factor although he noted that it was not possible to
decide the extent to which these differences in areas such
as behavioural aspects and alcohol use were caused by
45
Vietnam service or pre-existing factors. Some support
also derives from studies of World War II veterans which
indicate that that conflict had an effect on soldiers'
likelihood of drinking and smoking.
X-71
In order to assess the likelihood of combat stress
influencing subsequent mortality Professor Mathews noted
that the study looked at this aspect and found no clear
and unambiguous relationship between the amount of combat
experience in Vietnam and mortality in the period since 4 6 Vietnam. Of course, some indirect relationship might
be present: if combat stress promoted or increased tobacco
and/or alcohol consumption then these lifestyle factors
may cause higher mortality levels following service in
Vietnam.
Professor Mathews argued that age, education and corps
grouping do not wholly account for the increased mortality 47 observed. He further agreed with Mr O'Keefe that the
selection process (be it self-selection or Army selection)
and the pre-existing characteristics of veterans were the
most satisfactory explanations, leaving aside the ⢠4 f t
operation of chance factors.
7. OTHER MORTALITY STUDIES
A number of epidemiological studies relating to the
mortality experience of people exposed to phenoxy acid
herbicides and/or dioxin have been conducted. They
include studies of workers who have been exposed in an
X-72
occupational environment either over a period of time or
at a time when an industrial accident occurred. In the
Mortality hearings of the Commission they were dealt with
in some detail by Dr Bruce Armstrong in his written
49
statement.
7.1 Studies of Exposed Workers
Hoqstedt and Westerlund
The first of the studies of mortality in workers exposed
occupationally to phenoxy acid herbicides and/or dioxin
with which Dr Armstrong dealt was a study of the mortality
of forestry workers in Sweden by Hogstedt and Westerlund,
written in Swedish, and published in Dakartidningen 1980; 50 77:1828-1831. The translation of the title is 1 Cohort
Studies of Cause of Death of Forest Workers With and
Without Exposure to Phenoxy Acid Preparations'. This
study encompassed men who worked for a Swedish timber
company between 1914 and 1967 which company began to use
phenoxy acid herbicides in 1954. The records which were
available permitted workers to be classified as exposed
(for more than five days), unexposed, and foremen (who
were believed to have been more heavily exposed than other
workers). The mortality experience of 142 exposed
X-7 3
workers, 244 unexposed workers and 16 foremen was followed
to 1978. The average duration of exposure to herbicides
among workers was 30 days and that of foremen 176 days.
The following table summarises the results of this study:
TABLE 14
Hoqstedt and Westerlund Study
Cause of Death All Deaths Deaths Not Less
Than 10 yrs Afte First Exposure
Obs Ratio* Obs Ratio*
Foremen
Cancer 3 3.00 2 2.86
All Causes 8 1.95 6 2.22
Exposed Workers
Cancer 2 0.37 1 0.28
All Causes 21 0.88 15 0.97
Unexposed Workers
Cancer 10 0.68 7 0.72
All Causes 47 0.73 38 0.91
* ratio of observed deaths to expected deaths.
X-74
The mortality of foremen was higher than that expected
from population rates whereas mortality rates in the
exposed and unexposed workers were similar and less than
that of the population as a whole. The mortality excess
in foremen was based on small numbers and was of the same
degree for all deaths as for deaths which occurred ten or
more years after the first exposure.
There was little evidence in exposed workers of any
increase in mortality with long duration of exposure to
herbicides and there were no deaths from lymphoma or soft
tissue sarcoma. A harmful effect of exposure to
herbicides is one possible explanation for the increased
mortality in foremen. There are no other aspects of the
results which support this possibility. Factors which
weigh against firm conclusions from this study include the
small numbers and the fact than many of those exposed to
herbicides had also been exposed to DDT.
The tumours are not clustered to any site and the cause of
death pattern agreed with national expected rates.
X-75
Axelson and Sundell
The mortality of Swedish railroad workers exposed to 51
herbicides was investigated by Axelson et a 1 in 1973.
52
An update of this study was printed in 1980.
The 1980 study describes the follow-up of 343 people
exposed to herbicides for more than 45 days between 1957
and 1972. A variety of herbicides were used during that
period including amitrole, 2,4-D and 2,4,5-T. These three
were the best documented and most heavily used. A total
of 5541 person-years of follow-up were accumulated to the
end of the follow-up in October 1978. For the purposes of
analysis, workers were classified as exposed to amitrole,
exposed to phenoxy acids (2,4-D and/or 2,4,5-T) or exposed
to both. Many would have been additionally exposed to
other herbicides, particularly monuron and diuron.
The following table summarises the results of the 1973
study and the subsequent updating thereof.
X-76
TABLE 15
Axe l s o n and Sundell Study
Cause of Death All Deaths
Exposed to Amitrole
Cancer
All Causes
Exposed to Phenoxv Acids
Obs
5
7
Ratio1
0.49
0.51
Cancer 6 1.07
All Causes 20 0.87
Exposed to Both
Amitrol and Phenoxv
Acids
Cancer 6 2.08
All Causes 18 1.47
All Exposures
Cancer 17 1.43
All Causes 45 0.92
Deaths Not Less
Than 10 yrs After
First Exposure
Obs Ratio*
3 1.54
4 0.89
6 1.91
17 1.36
6 3.37
15 2.07
15 2.18
36 1.30
X-77
In comparison with population mortality rates, workers
exposed to both amitrole and phenoxy acids showed an
increase in mortality from all causes of death and cancer
specifically. An excess of cancer deaths was evident in
those exposed to amitrole alone and to phenoxy acids
alone. Accordingly, it was not possible to distinguish
between the possible effect of the two exposures or of
other herbicides to which the workers were exposed. Two
deaths in amitrole-exposed workers were certified due to
lymphoma, none were certified due to soft-tissue sarcoma.
This study provides some evidence of increased mortality
from all causes and from cancer specifically in men
exposed to herbicides. It is not possible to implicate
phenoxy herbicides specifically. Another factor which
limits the extent to which causality can be inferred is
the lack of any analysis showing relative mortality by
degree of exposure to herbicide (e.g. by days worked with
herbicides). Professor Axelson conceded in evidence that
his conclusion was as close as one can get to a negative.
(See also Chapter VI, Health Effects and Chapter VIII,
Cancer) .
X-78
Riihimaki and Hernberq
The Commission obtained a copy of a 1982 report by
53
Ri ihimaki et al of the results of a follow- up of 1926
men employed in Finland for at least two weeks between
1955 and 1971 in the spraying of 2,4-D and/or 2.4.5-T to
control brushwood growth. The cohort was assembled in
1972 and at that time only one quarter of them had worked
for eight weeks or more in spraying these herbicides.
Some may have accumulated additional exposure
subsequently. A total of some 16694 person-years of
follow-up were accumulated in the nine years of
observation to the end of 1980.
The results of this study, which appear in the following
table, indicate that the number of deaths, both from all
causes and from cancer, were less than expected from
population rates. This is consistent with the operation
of the 'healthy worker' effect.
I
X-79
TABLE 16
Riihimaki et al Study
Cause of Death All Deaths Deaths Not Less
Yrs After First
Than 10
Exposure
obs . . ratio obs ratio
Cancer 26 0.71 20 0.82
All Causes 144 0.78 88 0.74
No individual site of cancer showed an appreciable excess
of observed deaths over that expected. There were no
deaths from lymphoma or soft-tissue sarcoma. This study
provides no evidence of an effect of herbicide spraying on
the mortality of Finnish workers. The strong 1 healthy
worker1 effect and the likelihood of quite low average
exposure operate to reduce the likelihood of a positive
result being obtained in the event that there is. in fact,
a harmful effect resulting from the use of herbicides.
This study revealed no significant cancer excess and
indeed mortality and morbidity from cancer were about 75%
of national levels.
X-80
Zack and Suskind
An analysis was conducted of the mortality experience of
workers exposed to dioxin in a trichlorophenol process
accident at the Monsanto Company plant in Nitro, West
54
Virginia. A report of the study was exhibited.
The population of this study was 121 males who developed
chloracne following an uncontrolled hydrolization of
1,2.4.5-tetrachlorobenzene to 2,4,5-trichlorophenol (i.e.
a process involving the decomposition of the former
chemical into the latter by the extraction of water). The
products of the reaction escaped into the atmosphere
through a relief valve on 8 March 1949. All subjects were
followed up until 31 December 1978.
The following table shows the results of this study for
which no analysis of mortality (with any particular
latency period) was given.
X-81
TABLE 17
Zack and Suskind Study
Cause of Death obs. exp. ratio
Cancer 9 9.04 1.00
All Causes 32 46.41 0.69
There were five lung cancers (2.85 expected), three
lymphatic and haematopoietic neoplasms (0.88 expected) and
one fibrous histiocytoma of the skin. The small size of
the cohort and strong 1 healthy worker1 effect make the
drawing of firm conclusions from this study difficult,
although it does not support any impact on mortality by
TCDD. There is no indication of any excess of death in
exposed employees.
Theiss et al
Twenty-seven years after an accident which occurred at the
BASF Ludwigshafen plant in 1953, a mortality study of
persons exposed to dioxin in that uncontrolled reaction
X-82
during a trichlorophenol process was undertaken. The
results were published in the American Journal of
Industrial Medicine (1982) Volume 3, pp 179-189 in a
report entitled "Mortality Study of Persons Exposed to
Dioxin in a Trichiorophenol-Process Accident Had Occurred
in the BASF AG on November 17. 1953".55
The study involved a follow-up of 70 persons exposed to
dioxin and other toxic products. A further four subjects,
involved in the clean up processes during the succeeding
two years, were included in the study. Of this total of
74 people, 66 had developed chloracne or "severe
dermatitis". The follow-up was complete to 1976.
Comparisons of mortality experience were made with matched
cohorts from the unexposed workers and the general
population. The results, summarised in Table 18 below,
indicate some increase both in respect of all causes of
death and death due to cancer.
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TABLE 18
Theiss et al. Study
obs . exp. ratio
Cancer 7 4.22 1.66
All Causes 21 18.5 1.14
Three of the cancer deaths were due to stomach cancer (the
expected number was 0.61 and the ratio 4.92). There were
no deaths from lymphoma or soft-tissue sarcoma. Similar
differences were observed when a comparison was made with
other cohorts and the introduction of a 10 or 20 year
latency period did not alter the mortality differences
greatly. Due to the comparatively small number of
subjects the small observed mortality excesses in persons
exposed to dioxin might reasonably be attributed to
chance. Observe also that no excess of stomach cancers
emerges in any of the other industrial exposure studies
nor in Ranch Hand I, Ranch Hand II nor the AVHS Study.
Ott et al
This study56 involved the identification of all men who
worked in a 2.4.5-T manufacturing area between January
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1951 and January 1971. A total of 204 men were found to
have worked there for at least one month and 201 thereof
were traced to 31 December 1976.
The results are shown in Table 19 below. The one observed
cancer was a respiratory cancer which occurred in a
cigarette smoker; the six deaths from external causes
comprised 4 accidents and 2 suicides.
TABLE 19
Ott et. . al. Study
Cause of Death obs . exp. ratio
Cancer 1 3.6 0.28
External Causes 6 3.7 1.62
All Causes 11 20.3 0.54
There was little evidence of any emerging excess of
deaths, either overall or from any specific cause. in
those exposed to the process for a long time or following
a long latent interval from the first exposure. The small
number of deaths and the strong 'healthy worker' effect
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operate against the likelihood of observing an excess of
mortality from less common causes. No adverse effect on
mortality has been observed to be associated with this
work environment.
Cook et al
Sixty-one men engaged during 1964 in a trichlorophenol
manufacturing area, among whom cases of chloracne had been
observed, were followed up to 31 December 1978.
Forty-nine of the men had "acne-like" lesions. The
results of this study by R . R . Cook, J . C. Townsend, M. G.
Ott and L.G. Silver stein are published in the Journal of
Occupational Medicine (1980) Volume 22 at pages 530-532
and titled "Mortality Experience of Employees Exposed to
2,3,7,8-Tetrachlorodibenzo-p-dioxin (TCDD)".57 The
following Table summarises the results:
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TABLE 20
Cause of Death
Cook et. al.
obs.
Study
exp. ratio
Cancer 3 1.6 1.88
Cardiovascular 1 3.8 0.26
Other - 2.4 -
All Causes 4 7.8 0.51
One of the cancer deaths was from fibro-sarcoma, a type of
soft tissue sarcoma. However, the small number of deaths
does not permit conclusions to be drawn from these data
alone.
The magnitude of the dose is also relevant.
Jirasek et al
The mortality of workers in a 2.4,5-T factory in
Czechoslovakia is referred to in a report of the US
National Institute of Environment Health
Sciences/International Agency for Research on Cancer
(NIEHS/I ARC) Working Group which met during January 1978
in Lyons, France to review the history of human exposure
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to these chemicalsâ to collate current information and to
plan and forecast needed new directions. The report,
entitled "Long-term Hazards of Polychlorinated
58
Dibenzodioxins and Polychlorinated Dibenzofurans"
describes the results of the follow-up of 55 workers from
a 2,4,5-T factory in Czechoslovakia who had developed
chloracne. Six deaths had been observed with two from
lung cancer whilst 0.12 deaths were expected on the basis
of population rates. The inadequacy of the reporting of
this study limits its usefulness.
Summary
Dr Armstrong summarised in Table 21 the results of the
abovementioned Studies and presented the results of adding
the respective numbers of observed and expected deaths
from the Studies (i.e. Table 21 is an aggregation of
Tables 14 to 20 inclusive).
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TABLE 21
Summary of Results
1.
2 .
3.
Tables All Deaths Deaths 10 or More
Included Years After First
Exposure
Obs . Ratio Obs. Ratio
Herbicide sprayers and forestry workers
External causes 14 + 15 44 1.38 22 1.32
Natural causes except cancer 14 + 15 98 0.71 64 0.70
Cancer 14-16 43 0.84 35 1.05
All causes except cancer 14-16 168 0.86 106 0 .86
All causes of death 14-16 211 0.85 141 0.90
Trichlorophenol and 2,4.5-T process workers.
External causes 17-19 1.40 3 1.76
Natural causes except cancer 17-19 34 0.58 4 0.42
Cancer 17-20 20 1.08 1 0.38
All causes except cancer 17-20 48 0.64 7 0.63
All causes of death 17-20 68 0.73 8 0.58
All exposed workers
External causes 57 1.39 25 1.36
Natural causes except cancer 132 0.67 68 0.68
Cancer 63 0.90 36 1.00
All causes except cancer 216 0.80 113 0.84
All causes of death 279 0.82 149 0.88
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Notes
(1) From Table 14, only foremen and exposed workers have
been included.
(2) From Table 15, those exposed to phenoxy acids and
both amitrole and phenoxy acids have been included.
(3) The data in Section 2 above for deaths ten or more
years after first exposure is obtained from Table 19
only.
(4) Section 3 has been obtained by adding the observed and
expected numbers from Sections 1 and 2 then
calculating the ratio thereof.
This summary indicates that overall the mortality was
substantially affected by the "healthy-worker" effect; a
small increase in cancer mortality with some suggestion
that it was greater after a ten year latent period, and a
significant excess in mortality from external causes.
Dr Armstrong offered four broad categories of explanation
for these findings:
(i) Chance - probably not tenable except for the small proportionate increase in cancer mortality.
(ii) Bias - the "healthy-worker" bias applies. Its operation has reduced the likelihood of observing other real positive associations between working with herbicides and
mortality - if they are there.
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(iii) Confounding - that is there are other
differences between workers exposed to herbicides and the general population which explain the results. For example a higher alcohol intake with the associated
behavioural problems might well explain the excess of deaths from external causes.
(iv) A causal effect of exposure to herbicides - neither established or refuted on the basis of these data. The evidence would be more powerful if a dose-response relationship
could be demonstrated in the data.
Generally, the guality of data on herbicide exposure was too low to permit examination of dose-effects. Important likely
confounding variables probably do exist in some of the data sets, e.g. lifestyle
variables such as diet, alcohol intake and tobacco smoking. They might well explain the weak positive association with cancer mortality as well as the association with
"violent" death.49
7.2 Australian Regional Studies
MacLennan et al
The second category of mortality studies with which Dr
Armstrong's statement dealt was that of the regional
mortality in Australia in relation to herbicide usage.
The first such study was titled "Cancer in the Blue
Mountains of New South Wales" by R. MacLennan, J . Ford and
M. Coates.59 It appeared in the Medical Journal of
Australia (1982) Volume 2, pages 319-323 and dealt with an
investigation of the incidence of cancer and mortality for
the years from 1974-78 in the Blue Mountains area of New
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South Wales where 2,4,5-T had been widely sprayed.
Existing data was used to obtain population data. The
incidence of cancer was obtained from the files of the New
South Wales Cancer Registry and supplemented with data
from an ad hoc survey of doctors practising within the
Blue Mountains area. This study thus involved a
consideration of routinely collected data which, when
analysed, showed slightly lower rates of cancer in the
Blue Mountains area than in New South Wales as a whole: 8
per cent less for incidence and 5 per cent less for
mortality. Some instances of an observed excess incidence
of mortality for particular sites of cancer were found but
these may easily have arisen by chance. A lack of data on
individual exposure and the likely non-comparability of
the Blue Mountains population with the population of New
South Wales in other ways relevant to cancer make this
study of little value as a negative result, i.e. that
herbicide spraying does not affect the incidence of cancer
and mortality therefrom.
McCabe et al
The Medical Journal of Australia, 29 September 1984 pages
412-414 contains details of a study reported under the
title "Cancer of Lymphatic Tissues in Cane Growing Areas
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of Queensland" by M. McCabe, M. Nowak, R. Hamilton and P .
Hartshorn.60 The motivation for the study arose from
the death from leukaemia of a cane farmer who had
experienced substantial exposure to agricultural
chemicals. It analyses statistics in the tropical, urban
district of Townsville and in cane growing areas of
Queensland and compares these results with figures for the
general population. No attempt was made to collect
Information on the extent of exposure, the study being
essentially descriptive ie. making use of existing data
sources.
Population data was obtained from the Australian Bureau of
Statistics Census and other publications. The number of
deaths and standardised mortality ratios were calculated
for leukaemias and lymphomas occurring amongst men and
women during the period 1960-81: first, for the period
1960-67 and second for the period for 1968-81. A
significant excess mortality from leukaemia was found in
men aged 60 years and over in the cane growing areas
whereas there were significantly fewer deaths from this
disease in women aged 60 years and over. Page 23 of Dr
Armstrong's written statement61 was a copy of an article
he wrote for the same issue of the Medical Journal of
Australia in which he noted that these results were
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consistent with the frequently reported observation that,
the mortality rate from leukaemia in the US is higher in
farmers than males in other occupations. It is notable
that the study did not indicate any elevation in respect
of lymphomas or soft-tissue sarcomas which have been the
subject of specific allegations by WAA.
As Dr Armstrong concluded on page 24 of his written
statement:
The two studies reviewed in this section provide no direct or persuasive link between herbicide use and mortality from cancer. Nor do they
establish or encourage belief in the lack of any such association. Apart, therefore. from the possibility that they may encourage further research, they are essentially non-contributory on this issue.
Victorian Agricultural Workers
The Commission also received evidence from Professor
Mathews regarding a study of the mortality experience
of 2,181 Victorian agricultural workers who had
sprayed 2,4-D and 2.4.5-T for a period of at least 12
months and up to 25 years. This study is considered
in detail in Section E.l of Chapter VIII,
Health Effects-Cancer. Suffice it to say that, on
any view, these men were heavily exposed. The study
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provides strong evidence that even heavy exposure to
phenoxy herbicides does not cause any increase in
deaths from cancer.
7.3 U.S. Vietnam Veteran Mortality
Lawrence et al
The third series of studies which Dr Armstrong considered
in his statement were those studies which dealt with the
mortality experience of Vietnam veterans. C. E. Lawrence,
A. A. Riley, P. Quickenton, P . Greenwald. W. F. Page and
A. J. Kuntz have submitted a paper entitled "Mortality
Patterns of Vietnam Era Veterans"62 to the American
Journal of Public Health. That paper deals with the
results of a study conducted in New York State. Two
comparisons are made. First, a comparison of the
proportionate distributions of cause of death in Vietnam
veterans which was done by examining 1496 deaths which
comprised BBS Vietnam veterans and 941 non-veterans of the
Vietnam era. The second was an analysis of the
proportionate distributions of cause of death in veterans
(not classified as to whether veterans of Vietnam or not)
and non-veterans in 22,494 deaths in New York State in the
period 196B to 1980 excluding 1968 and 1969.
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Combat-related deaths were excluded from consideration in
each comparison.
I n the first set Of data. the notable findings were
relative excesses of dea th in Vietnam veterans from
"non-motor vehicular injuries of transport" for which the
relative risk was 2.34, "other accidents and burns"
(relative risk = 1.44) and "liver disease including
cirrhosis" (relative risk = 2.20). These categories of
cause of death were not in excess in the second set of
data comparing veterans with non-veterans except for
"non-motor vehicular injuries of transport" for which the
relative risk was 1.70.
At least 19 of the 21 Vietnam veterans who died from
"liver disease including cirrhosis" were alcoholics.
There was no evidence of an increase in mortality from
soft-tissue sarcomas or lymphomas in Vietnam veterans. It
is of interest to note that all three categories of cause
of death highlighted as being in excess in Vietnam
veterans in this study fall within two of the three
categories highlighted as being in excess in Australian
veterans of the Vietnam conflict as revealed in the AVHS
Mortality study previously referred to. namely diseases of
the digestive system (which includes "liver disease
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including cirrhosis") and external causes (which includes
"non-motor vehicular injuries of transport" and "other
accidents and burns").
Ranch Hand Mortality Study
Operation Ranch Hand was the US Airforce (USAF) operation
in Vietnam which involved the spraying of phenoxy acid
herbicides from fixed-wing aircraft. The Ranch Hand
Mortality Report63 and the first update to that Report
64
dated 27 July 1984 concern the mortality of the group
of veterans undoubtedly the most heavily exposed to Agent
Orange. A total of 1256 Ranch Hand personnel were studied
and their mortality compared with that of 9982 matched
comparison subjects. The comparison subjects, matched by
age, job, category and race, had been members of USAF
units which flew cargo to and from Vietnam during the
period of Operation Ranch Hand but who were not exposed to
herbicides. The follow-up included all deaths known to
have occurred up to 31 December 1983.
The following table is obtained from Table 14 appearing on
page 12 of the update report of 27 July 1984 and indicates
death rates subdivided by job category and groupings for
year of birth. 1
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TABLE 22
Ranch Hand Mortality Study
Job Category Year of Birth Ranch Hand Death Rate Comparison Death Rate
Relative Risk
Officer before 1935 0.030 0.068 0.44
after 1935 0.035 0.020 1.75
Flying before 1935 0.041 0.077 0.53
after 1935 0.030 0.028 1.07
Enlisted before 1935 0.098 0.084 1.16
after 1935 0.030 0.026 1.15
Ground before 1935 0.112 0.073 1.53
after 1935 0.032 0.022 1.45
As there was a total of only 54 deaths in Ranch Hand
personnel, cause-specific analysis gave rise to problems
of small numbers. For all groups of Ranch Handers there
was an excess of mortality from homicide (relative risk
2.68) and diseases of the digestive system (relative risk
1.91). Neither was statistically significant. These
excesses were present in the ground staff with a small
excess, in deaths from circulatory diseases (relative risk
1.34), also not statistically significant. In fact, none
of the analyses contained in the report gave rise to a
result which was statistically significant. It is of
interest to note that this pattern of cause-specific
mortality excesses is similar to that observed in the AVHS
Mortality Study.
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There was no indication, however, based on the study's
measures of exposure to herbicides, that these mortality
differences bear any relationship to herbicide exposure.
The report provides no comparison between Ranch Handers
and the comparison group with respect to other variables
possibly relevant to mortality.
The Ranch Hand Morbidity report indicates that that study
had:
(i) not identified statistically significant
differences for illnesses commonly attributed
to dioxin exposure,65
(i 1) demonstrated that there was insufficient
evidence to support a cause and effect
relationship between herbicide exposure and
adverse health;66 and
(iii) provided reassuring results for Ranch Handers
and their families.67
The second update to the Ranch Hand Mortality Report,
dated 10 December 1984 (Exhibit 1986), contains nothing to
contradict such conclusions. It demonstrates that:
X- 9 9
... the Ranch Hand officers had a
nonstatistically significant though slightly lower death rate than their comparisons, Ranch Hand flyers had a nonstatistically significant though slightly lower death rate
than comparisons, and Ranch Hand ground personnel had a slightly higher but
nonstatistically significant death rate than the comparisons.68
Furthermore, that:
When compared to the 1978 U.S. white male population, the Ranch Hand officers,
comparison officers, and comparison enlisted are living significantly longer than
expected. Although Ranch Hand enlisted are also living longer, the difference is not significant.69
Kogan et al
A study of the mortality patterns of Vietnam veterans in
Massachusetts, USA by Kogan et al, which was completed in
January 1985, became Exhibit 1872. It is fully considered
in Section D.2.(e) of Chapter VIII: Health Effects -
Cancer. It is thus sufficient to here indicate that the
study does not have regard to exposure to Agent Orange or
other chemical agents and thus adds nothing to the issue
of whether an association between exposure to phenoxy
herbicides and soft-tissue sarcoma exists. The Commission
finds this study inconsistent with the other work and
therefore suspect. It cannot, however, be ignored.
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HEALTHY-WORKER" EFFECT 8 .
In a consideration of the various mortality studies,
reference has been made to a feature termed the
"healthy-worker" effect. This is a term used to denote
the favourable health and/or mortality experience of a
particular group of people when compared with that of the
general population. It may arise in a number of ways: the
mortality experience of life assurance policy holders may
be less than that of the population due to a practice of
requiring a medical examination prior to accepting risk;
or workers in a particular industry may be healthier due
to the very nature of the work, e.g. work which is
physically demanding such that those who are not fit are
unable to cope with the work requirements.
Army recruits undergo a medical examination at enlistment
and, during the initial training period, are screened for
suitability. Furthermore, a program designed to achieve
or improve the physical fitness of recruits forms part of
that initial training. Hence National Servicemen as a
group may be expected to be healthier than Australian
males of the same age who were either not selected for
National Service or who were selected but rejected on
health grounds. This particular example of the
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"healthy-worker" effect which might be more appropriately
termed the "healthy-soldier" effect suggest that National
Servicemen in the Army may be expected to have a better
life expectancy, i.e. a lower mortality rate, than men of
the same age In the general Australian population. The
results of the AVHS Mortality Study suggest that this
effect was in fact present amongst National Servicemen.
It is important that this "healthy-soldier" effect be
borne in mind when interpreting the results of any such
study. Another aspect which should be emphasised is that
the "healthy-soldier" effect will be most evident in the
early years after the initial selection of healthy people
to serve in the Army and that the magnitude of any
difference in mortality rates may be expected to decrease
with time since the recruitment examination and
selection. This proposition is derived from literature on
follow-up studies of employees and military personnel.
Professor Mathews has represented the "healthy-soldier"
effect diagramatically as appears in the following ⢠70
diagram which he drew in the witness box.
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v ^ovrKUwUj
S waits ;
% ^
X-103
STUDIES OF MORTALITY IN VETERANS OF OTHER WARS 9 .
Professor Mathews also gave evidence on the effect of war
service on subsequent mortality as revealed by studies
which dealt with veterans of previous wars and veterans
from other countriesâ notably the United States. Specific
reference to individual studies was not made and those
studies were not exhibited. However, copies of these
studies were made available to the Commission and to
Counsel: a list thereof forms Appendix 1 to this Chapter.
To the extent that Dr Mathew's written statement dealt
with the results shown by these studies he was not
challenged in cross-examination. That portion read as
follows:
What then can be said about the effect of war
service on subsequent mortality. There have been several reports of mortality in the post war period for large numbers of veterans of war
service, particularly US veterans of World War 11 - Veterans of the World War II era are much
more likely to be representative of the general population of the US than are soldiers serving in the peace time regular army. Thus although the studies of u s veterans after World War II show a healthy soldier effect, they are unlikely to be subject to the bias arising from atypical
personal characteristics or atypical smoking and drinking habits in the veteran population.
After returning from World War II, US veteran mortality was not increased overall relative to the general male mortality of the US; in fact it
X-104
was somewhat decreased, corresponding to a small healthy soldier effect.
Excess mortality in the six year period after World War II was marked only in the sub-group of US veterans who had been prisoners of war of the Japanese. In the six years after World War II,
repatriated prisoners of war from Japanese camps were more prone to death from accidental causes, from tuberculosis, and from cardiovascular disease. These differences would be attributed
by most commentators to the effects of
malnutrition, stress and infectious disease incurred while in the prisoner of war camp.
In contrast there was no excess mortality in prisoners-of-war from the European prison camps, even though there would also have been stress involved there.
Morbidity or ill health in World War II veterans from the US Army was increased in survivors from Japanese prisoner of war camps particularly in areas related to psycho-neurosis, infectious
disease and malnutrition. These morbidity conditions were more evident in the survivors of Japanese camps than those who had been in prison of war camps in Europe. Similar results have
been found with studies of (the) Australian veteran population after World War II.
Short term effects of stress have been documented as a result of imprisonment in Vietnamese or Cambodian concentration camps. Psychiatric and behavioural symptoms have been documented some years after the stress of imprisonment (sic) had
been finished. Similar symptoms of
post-traumatic stress disorder have been related to Vietnam war experience without imprisonment. It would be anticipated that the mortality in veterans suffering from such post-traumatic
stress disorder would be increased relative to other veterans. I do not know of any documentary evidence to prove this proposition.71-
In his oral evidence Professor Mathews supplemented his
written statement in the following terms:
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Now, the excess mortality that is seen in the US studies and also in some Australian data after World War II is consistent with what has been found in the Australian mortality study after Vietnam, namely, the early deaths related to
behavioural - possibly alcohol-related deaths, external causes. The one exception is that after World War II there were excess deaths related to infectious disease in those who had been in
prisoner of war camps and I understand the
Australian study, a small number of excess deaths from tuberculosis as well. To conclude, what has been found in the Australian mortality study in that respect is consistent with the small effects that may be related to war service and
particularly to the stress of prisoner of war situations that have been found in other
studies.72
Four different reasons were advanced by Professor Mathews
as explanations for any difference between the mortality
experience of Australian veterans of the Vietnam conflict
and that of those who did not serve in Vietnam:
(i) The characteristics of National Servicemen being
sent to Vietnam might differ from that of those
not sent to Vietnam in ways which might
subseguently affect their mortality;
(ii) That, because of their Vietnam experience,
soldiers might change their behaviour in relation
to drinking, smoking or other lifestyle factors
in such a way that their subseguent mortality
might be altered;
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(iii) A delayed effect on mortality resulting from
combat stress or some other stress arising from
the Vietnam environment; and
(iv) Exposures in Vietnam such as exposure to Agent
Orange or other chemicals might have an effect on
subsequent mortality.
The AVHS Mortality Report (Exhibit 1761) noted the results
of studies of other service groups at page 88 of Part I
and, as a result of the statistically significant result
in respect of circulatory diseases (as summarised
previously in Table 8), suggested possible explanations
for the obtained result:
Observations concerning circulatory diseases have been made in other service groups as well. In 1951, mortality from coronary heart disease among non-officer ranks of the British Army aged 25 to
34 years was 1.4 times that expected from British male death rates (Kilpatrick, 1963). Lynch and Oelman (1981) found that mortality from coronary heart disease among 20-39 year old male members
of the British Army (between 1973 and 1977) was 1.9 times that expected from the male population of the United Kingdom (0.3 for officers and 2.2 for soldiers). This has been attributed to
higher than United Kingdom average cigarette smoking among soldiers. British soldiers are known to smoke more than other British men of the same age, (Crowdy and Sowden, 1975). Seltzer and
Jablon (1977) found among United States WW II veterans that mortality from ischaemic heart
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disease and cerebrovascular disease among former privates was twice that among former officers, while Keehn (1974) found mortality from
cardiovascular disease among former privates was twice that among former sergeants. Similarly, males in the Australian Armed Forces between 1975 and 1977 had a death rate from ischaemic heart disease which was 1.93 times that expected, and
the death rate from cerebrovascular disease was 1.73 times that expected (Taylor et al., 1983).
Excesses of death from circulatory diseases in such context have also been attributed to
essential hypertension secondary to alcohol consumption (Mathews, 1979). In this context, it is noteworthy that in Vietnam, but not in
Australia, alcohol and cigarettes were heavily subsidised. Further, commentators in the Army have claimed that acute respiratory disease was common among soldiers in Vietnam, as was
drunkenness among men not on duty. These aspects of Vietnam service are described more fully in Appendix IX. In view of these claims and the
very limited avenues in Vietnam for the release of tension for soldiers, it is likely that
alcohol and tobacco consumption could have been higher amongst servicemen in Vietnam than it might have been had they served in Australia. Such patterns of consumption may have persisted
into post-service life. Alternatively, or in combination, men with greater pre-service alcohol and tobacco consumption may have been more likely to be posted to Vietnam.
Sections IX.7.5 and IX.7.6 on pages 210 and 211 of Part I
of the Australian Mortality Study deal with alcohol and
tobacco respectively as follows:
IX.7.5 Alcohol
Alcohol was heavily consumed by Australian troops in Vietnam. Servicemen were not permitted to drink while in the field, and this regulation was
X - 108
observed to a large extent. This meant that each serviceman's ration of [2] cans of beer per day accumulated, allowing binges of very heavy alcohol consumption to occur when servicemen returned to base from operations. However, it appears that this restriction of [2] cans per day
could be circumvented since among those
servicemen who did not go on operations
overnight, some were observed to be intoxicated on most evenings. Apparently beer formed the currency for an informal market in various
commodities. Alcohol consumption was encouraged by the heavily subsidized price structure, the social organisation and the lack of alternative recreational outlets. Beer was 15 cents a can
and a bottle of spirits cost $A1. Further, each Infantry company (of about 120 servicemen) had its own canteen, which was a primary site for sale and consumption of alcohol and for
socializing.
These data suggest that two extreme patterns of alcohol consumption may have occurred.
Servicemen in Infantry and as attached to
Infantry units, which went on patrols in the field, may have tended to consume alcohol in binges after returning from patrols. Servicemen who tended to remain in base areas and not go
into the field, for example, those in non-field corps, may have tended to consume alcohol
regularly. Armour. Artillery and corps with minor field presence had patterns of service in the field which were intermediate between
Infantry and non-field corps. By contrast, the functions of Engineers were varied. Servicemen in construction and workshop and park squadron tended to be in base at night, while those in
field squadrons may have been attached to
Infantry or Armour, and would have followed the pattern of their unit of attachment.
Alcohol was subsidized in army camps and
establishments in Australia, although the level of subsidy was much less than in Vietnam. With the social dislocation of service in Australia, and limited recreational outlets during the
evenings, it is possible that service in
Australia may also have been associated with an increase in alcohol consumption.
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IX.7.6 Tobacco.
In Vietnam packets of cigarettes were one-fifth their price in Australia. Further. cigarettes were available free from the ration packs
servicemen used while in the field, and every few days, boxes of refreshments that included free cigarettes were delivered to servicemen in the field.
While on operationsâ servicemen were only
permitted to smoke during rest breaks. Also, they were not supposed to smoke at night or while lying in ambush, due to the risk of detection by the enemy. No restrictions on smoking in base areas have been noted, apart from obvious safety precautions.
Medical officers have reported that all canteens were full of tobacco smoke during the hours they were open, and that acute respiratory ailments were frequent among servicemen, with a
considerable number of servicemen developing bronchopneumonia. One medical officer reported that on several occasions, soldiers commented to him that they were smoking five times the number of cigarettes they used to consume in Australia, since the subsidy meant that the total cost was the same. This officer was of the opinion that many servicemen started smoking in Vietnam.
Dr Fett acknowledged that there was a relationship between
circulatory disorders and the consumption of
cigarettes. Unfortunately, no data on cigarette
consumption was available to those responsible for the
conduct of the AVHS Mortality Study and further scientific
analysis is not possible.
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10. INTERPRETATION OF NEGATIVE RESULTS
Many of the studies referred to earlier in this Chapter
disclosed results which suggested that exposure to
chemical agents had not caused and was not causing
increased rates of mortality amongst studied populations.
Dr Armstrong's evidence included a consideration of this
issue. A paper entitled "Interpretation of Negative
Results in Epidemiological Studies" by Dr Armstrong was
74
exhibited together with a paper by Sir Richard
75
Doll, Emeritus Professor of Epidemiology and, until
recently. Master of Green College at Oxford University.
Dr Armstrong indicated that, before reaching a negative
conclusion, a number of considerations apply:
(i) Bias. It may be that a "no-effect" result has
occurred due to the presence of some aspect of study
design or the group studied which operated to
promote such a result. One such common bias is the
"healthy-worker" effect dealt with previously.
(ii) Consistency. Obviously, a negative conclusion will
be more persuasive if several studies of different
X-lll
populations conducted by various investigators
suggest such a conclusion. Of course, if the data
from which a result has been derived is unique, then
the issue may never be resolved with any scientific
certainty.
(iii) Biological Plausibility. A negative conclusion will
be more readily reached if a positive result is
biologically implausible on the basis of current
knowledge.
(iv) Confounding. The possibility of negative
confounding (i.e. a truly causal effect masked by a
positive correlation with exposure to some
protective agent or a negative correlation with some
other truly causal agent) should be considered and
be capable of exclusion.
(v) Statistical Precision. The mathematical probability
of correctly rejecting a no-effect hypothesis is
known as the power of a study. Clearly, confidence
in a no-effect or negative conclusion increases with
the power of the study which suggest that
conclusion. Recognised statistical methods may be
used to determine an interval within which the true
X - 112
result is thought to be with a certain degree of
confidence. This is termed the confidence interval
and the endpoints of this interval, the confidence
limits. If the confidence interval were small or if
the confidence limits are close to the no-effect
result, then a negative result will be more
persuasive. Such statistical techniques may be used
to support or detract from a negative conclusion.
(vi) Size. Clearly the number of subjects studied
affects the level of confidence in the results
obtained.
As Dr Armstrong noted in his written statement on this
topic:
It is important to recognise that a negative result, no matter how well supported. is
necessarily relevant only to exposures and times elapsed since exposure which are within the range of the observations made. Exposure, in this sense, means not only dose, but also route of administration and the presence or absence of possible modifying factors.76
The views of Peto and Doll are summarised as follows:
Unless epidemiologists have studied reasonably large, well-defined groups of people who have been heavily exposed to a particular substance for two or three decades without apparent effect, they can offer no guarantee that continued
X-113
exposure to moderate levels will, in the long run, be without material risk. For this reason prudent restrictions on occupational or public exposure to various substances often have to be based on indirect inference from laboratory studies of the agent being examined, without any direct evidence concerning its actual effect on humans. That is not to say that human evidence can ever be dispensed with. It is always
relevant, but the weight that can be given to it varies greatly with the duration and intensity of the exposure experienced.... Negative human
evidence may mean very little, unless it relates to prolonged and heavy exposure. If, however, it does and is consistent in a variety of studies (correlation studies over time, cohort studies of exposed individuals and case-control studies of
affected patients). whereas the laboratory evidence is limited in scope to, for instance, a particular type of tumour in a few species,
negative human evidence may justify the
conclusion that for practical purposes the agent need not be treated as a human carcinogen. In practice it is, of course, not usual for such perfect negative evidence to be available, but even less conclusive negative human evidence may help determine priorities between different lines of action.77
In a situation where a negative result is suggested, the
risk of drawing an incorrect conclusion may be important.
This risk involves a value judgment rather than scientific
assessment. The level of risk which might be considered
as negligible or "socially acceptable" is highly
subjective.
On the topic of negligible risk figures of 0.001 per cent
(ie. l in 100,000 or 10-5) or less have been suggested,
sir Richard Doll,78 quoted the report of a Royal Society
(1983) study group:
X-114
There may be a wide spread of individuals'
views.... and decisions are likely to leave some people feeling they are exposed to risks calling for further control. There is a widely held
view, 'though perhaps better described as speculation', that few people would commit their own resources to reduce an annual risk of death that was already as low as 10~5 and that even
fewer would take action at an annual level of 10~6 .... while the manufacture of a product
might for the sake of his good name seek to keep the numbers of possible deaths very low, not all the inhabitants of the country will buy his
product, and so ... the figure of 10~6 is
probably still appropriate. except perhaps if clear causal links are established in the risks from certain consumer products. In such
circumstances we would consider 10-7 to be an annual level below which further control was certainly not justified, but even then the
further problem of the very salient situation .... may well remain.79
Where human health and safety is involved, it may be that
precautionary steps or corrective action is taken even
though the available scientific studies suggest a negative
conclusion. Such measures reflect caution due to the
chance of being wrong, not a positive conclusion. For
example, protective measures may be recommended for the
use or application of a chemical even though the available
studies suggest that it is safe.
11. INFERENCE OF CAUSATION
Causation is not proved by the mere existence of a
statistical association: alternative explanations need to
X-115
be considered. Epidemiology does not purport to provide
complete proof of causation - it cannot absolutely
establish that a particular exposure causes a certain
health effect although it can provide substantial evidence
for such a proposition, thereby suggesting preventive
measures.
Apart from the factors considered in the previous section,
the following aspects would normally be required before a
causal relationship may be inferred:
(i) A high relative risk;
(ii) Specific results i.e. strong association between
exposure and outcome;
(iii) Dose-response relationship i.e. increasing exposure
associated with an increasing incidence of the
health effect;
(iv) Natural experiment i.e. if changes in the level of
risk factors produce an altered level of incidence
of the health effect.
It is clear from even these four considerations that
accurate records of exposure are most desirable, notably
X-116
in the area of dosage levels. In the absence of such
detailed records it becomes more difficult to reach a
positive conclusion.
12. CONCLUSIONS
The material produced by W A A demonstrates that the
allegations made by its journal and submissions could not
be substantiated by the material held. W A A was prepared
to disclose the existence of various registers to the
media; the descriptions which appeared in a number of
newspapers were most graphic. Such registers were never
produced to the Commission. W A A asserted that all the
information contained in the registers was included on the
lists provided to the Commission.
Furthermore, Counsel for W A A led no evidence at the
Mortality Hearings of the Commission. Given the content
of the initial submission made, the Commission views with
concern the absence of evidence adduced to support the
claims which were advanced.
The closing submissions received from Counsel for W A A
were scant on the topic of Mortality, being confined to a
single submission directed to the AVHS Mortality Study.
X-117
That submission reflected a lack of understanding of such
studies in general and that one in particular.
A proper consideration of the AVHS Mortality Study
establishes the following propositions:
(i) Vietnam veterans are experiencing lower rates of
mortality than other Australian males of the
same age (83% of a level which would be expected
if the mortality rates were the same);
(ii) They are probably experiencing slightly higher
rates of mortality when compared to National
Servicemen who did not serve in Vietnam;
(iii) This excess, if it in fact exists (i.e. if the
result is not due to other factors such as
chance), is not caused by chemical agents;
(iv) Such an excess may best be attributed to an
increase in risk-taking behaviour, in smoking
and drinking connected with Vietnam service;
(v) There is no statistically significant increase
in death from suicide or cancer although a small
X-118
increase in suicide rates by comparison with
non-veteran National Servicemen cannot be
excluded:
(vi) Suicide rates amongst Vietnam veterans are no
higher than for Australian males of the same age;
(vii) Cancer rates amongst Vietnam veterans are no
higher than for Australian males of the same age.
This study was recent, it was a study of Australian
servicemen and it was a study of significant size,
involving as it did all National Servicemen (subject to
certain limited criteria). The Commission accepts the
results of this study and congratulates those responsible
for its conduct and their associated report.
The Commission has considered other mortality studies:
those relating to exposed workers, the Australian regional
studies and the studies of the mortality experience of
Vietnam veterans in the United States. Such studies do not
cause the Commission to alter any of the above findings.
In fact, the evidence to support WAA's allegations is so
scant it is a wonder that it ever gained public credence.
X-119
Throughout the life of the Commission the DVA showed a
keen interest in ascertaining all available information in
respect of deceased veterans to enable further analysis.
As well. DVA sought to investigate the claims of W A A when
they were being aired in the popular press. The
Commission, in the course of its mortality investigations,
became well aware of the nature and extent of the records
of DVA in this area, some of which derive from the
conclusions and recommendations of the Senate Committee
Report.
There was not the slightest indication that the DVA had
misused the material which it had received. Indeed, a
separate computer file was maintained in order to honour
the undertaking that DVA would not 1 educate' themselves
from the material provided by W A A without their express
approval.
Unfortunately, the same cannot be said of WAA. Mr
Thompson. National President of W A A telephoned Counsel
Assisting late in April 1985 claiming that he had
information to suggest that DVA had understated the number
of Vietnam veteran deaths of which it was aware at the
Commission's Mortality hearings. Mr Thompson was informed
that the matter would be investigated upon his production
X-120
of material to support his claim and an appointment was
fixed for his attendance together with Mr Terry Loftus,
also of WAA, on 13 May 1985. He initially indicated that
a large number of veterans were involved. However, when
he attended the Commission on 3 May (in respect of an
unrelated matter), he produced a list containing but 18
names. As to these names, the Commission immediately set
inquiries in train.
The 13 May appointment was cancelled by Mr Thompson only a
few days before the appearance of the issue of the
National Times bearing the date 17 - 23 May 1985. In an
article, appearing under the name of a Mr Frank Walker,
headed 'Vietnam veteran deaths understated at Royal
Commission1 an allegation identical in form to that raised
by Mr Thompson was detailed. It was accompanied by the
suggestion that the Commission was not willing to
investigate the matter, which claim was supported by
extracts from a letter forwarded to W A A on an unrelated
topic, namely the form and content of a proposed closing
address by Mr Thompson.
The clear implication of the article was that the
Commission was shutting its doors to important material
and thereby assisting some cover-up by DVA. Ironically,
X-121
the reality was that the Commission was at that time
keeping its doors open for the reception of a birth
defects study conducted by and/or on behalf of WAA.
The Commission wrote a letter in reply to the article to
the Editor of the National Times who chose not to publish
it. He wrote to the Commission denying any intention to
make the implication.
Full and complete explanations were received from the DVA:
for example, one of the alleged 18 had already been
disclosed to the Commission and 5 did not even serve in .
Vietnam! "Cut-off dates" were also relevant.
The allegations which have worried Vietnam veterans and
concerned a great many Australians are unfounded.
This Commission does not find anything untoward in the
mortality rates being experienced by Vietnam veterans in
Australia. Nor does the Commission find any evidence to
support the allegations in respect of suicide or cancer.
X-122
ENDNOTES
1. Exhibit 1750.
2. Exhibit 1040.
3. Exhibit 1744.
4. Both the letter from DVA and the reply on behalf
of the Vietnam Veterans' Association of Australia became Exhibit 1771. There does not appear to have been any further resolution of this matter.
5. Exhibit 1745.
6. Exhibit 1746.
7. Exhibit 1746.
8. Exhibit 1745.
9. Exhibit 1748.
10. Exhibit 1748.
11. Transcript p 5928.
12. Exhibit 1751 p 36.
13. Exhibit 1751.
14. Exhibit 1448.
15. Exhibit 1749.
16. Exhibit 1750.
17. Exhibit 1752.
18. Exhibit 1753.
19. Exhibits 1749 and 1750.
20. Transcript p 5951.
21. Exhibit 1876.
22. Exhibit 1754.
X-123
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41 .
42 .
43 .
44 .
45 .
46 .
47 .
This information became part of Exhibit 1876.
Exhibits 1248. 1761. see Chapter VI.
Ch VII.
See Ch V I .
Exhibit 1761.
Transcript pp 5962-5994.
Exhibit 1762.
Exhibit 1761.
See Table 3.1, p 24, Part I, Exhibit 1761.
Transcript p 5978.
Transcript p 5979.
Exhibit 1767.
Exhibit 1768.
Exhibit 1770.
Exhibit 1766.
Transcript p 6018.
Transcript p 6030.
Transcript p 6032.
Exhibit 1755.
Transcript p 6075.
Transcript p 6076 referring to Table 3.7 in Part 1 of Exhibit 1761.
Exhibit Nos 1499 & 1504V.
Exhibit 1773 p 7 .
Exhibit 1773 p 7 .
Transcript p 6 1 1 2 .
X-124
48. Transcript pp 6114-5.
49. Exhibit 1766.
50. Exhibit 1764.
51. Exhibit 763 .
52. Exhibit 11.
53 . Exhibit 852 .
54. Exhibit 250.
55. Exhibit 1765 .
56 . Exhibit 147 .
57. Exhibit 673 .
58 . Exhibit 1757.
59 . Exhibit 1760.
60. Exhibit 1758 .
61. Exhibit 1766 .
62. Exhibit 1759 .
63 . Exhibit 1755.
64 . Exhibit 1756
65. Exhibit 1394 p XIX 98.
66 . Exhibit 1394 p iii.
67. Exhibit 1394 p 3.
68. Exhibit 1986. p ii.
69. Ibid.
70. Exhibit 1774.
71. Exhibit 1773 at pp 4 a
72. Transcript p 6079.
X-125
73 .
74 .
75 .
76 .
77 .
78 .
79 .
Transcript p 5987-8.
Exhibit 1766.
Exhibit 1772.
Exhibit 1766 p 3.
Exhibit 1959 at p 1219, quoted at p 7 of Exhibit 1772.
Exhibit 1772 at p 10.
Ibid p 10.
X-126
APPENDIX I
Archibald H . C. and Tuddenham R . D. , "Peristent Stress Reaction After Combat". Arch Gen Psychiat, 12:475-481 ( 1965) .
Archibald H. C . , Long M. C. and Tuddenham R. D. , "Gross Stress Reaction In Combat - a 15 Year Follow-up", Am. J . Pschiat.(1962): 119: 317-322 .
Beebe G. W. and Simon A. H. , "Ascertainment of Mortality In the U.S. Veteran Population", Amer J Epid, 89:636-643, 1969 .
Beebe G. W. , "Follow-up Studies of World War II and Korean War Prisoners". Amer J Epid. 101:400-422. 1975.
Beebe G. W . . "Lung Cancer In World War I Veterans:
Possible Relation to Mustard-Gas Injury and 1918 Influenza Epidemic", J Nat Cancer Inst. 25:1231-1252, 1960.
Cohen B. M. and Cooper Î. Z .. "A Follow-up Study of World War II Prisoners of War", VA Medical Monograph, 1954.
Gill G ., "Study of Mortality and Autopsy Findings Amongst Former Prisoners of the Japanese", J R Army Med corps, 129:11-13, 1983.
Kalinowsky L. B . , "Problems of War Neuroses in the Light of Experiences in Other Countries", Am. J . Psychiat. (1950): 107: 340-346.
Keehn R. J . , Goldberg I. D. and Beebe G. W. . "Twenty-four Year Mortality Follow-up of Army Veterans with Disability Separations for Psychoneurosis in 1944", Psychosomatic Medicine, 36(1): 27-46 . 1974.
Klnzie J . D. . Fredrickson R. H. , Ben R. , Fleck J . , and Karls W.,"Posttraumatic Stress Disorder Among Survivors of Cambodian Concentration Camps", Am J Psychiatry, 141:645-650, 1984.
Menninger W. C ., "Psychiatric Experience in the War, 1941-1946", Am. J. Psychiat. (1947): 104: 577-586.
Moritz A. R. and Zamcheck N ., "Sudden and Unexpected Deaths of Young Soldiers", Arch Path, 42:459-494, 1946.
Ragsdale B . D.. âGunshot Wounds: A Historical
Perspective", Military Med, 149:301-315, 1984.
X - 127
Robinettee C. D. and Fraumeni J . F . , "Asthma and
Subsequent Mortality In world War II Veterans", J Chron Dis, 31:619-624. 1978.
Robinettee C. D., Hrubec Z. and Fraumeni J. F., "Chronic Alcoholism and Subsequent Mortality in World War II Veterans". Amer J Epid, 109:687-700, 1979.
Rogot E. and Murray J. L., "Smoking and Causes of Death Among U.S. Veterans: 16 Years of Observation". Pub Health Rep, 95: 213-222, 1980.
Rogot E. and Murray J., "Cancer Mortality Among Nonsmokers in an Insured Group of U.S. Veterans", J Nat Cancer Inst, 65: 1163-1168. 1980.
X - 128
CHAPTER XI
CLASS ACTION
Full little knowest thou, that hast not tried, What hell it is in suing long to bide: To loose good days, that might be better spent To waste long nights in pensive discontent;
To speed to day, to be put back to morrow; To feed on hope, to pine with fear and sorrow.
Edmund Spencer Mother Hubbard's Tale
CHAPTER XI
CLASS ACTION
1. INTRODUCTION 1
2. EARLY CONCERNS 3
3. PRE-TRIAL HISTORY 4
4. PLAINTIFFS' ALLEGATIONS 13
5. DEFENDANTS' ANSWERS 18
6. ISSUES FOR TRIAL 19
7. PROBLEMS OF PROOF 21
8. THE CASE AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT 33
9. SETTLEMENT 36
10. FAIRNESS HEARINGS 39
11. DISTRIBUTION PLANS 46
12. ORDER AND JUDGMENT ON DISTRIBUTION 53
ENDNOTES 61
CHAPTER XI
CLASS ACTION
1. INTRODUCTION
Many Australian veterans of the Vietnam conflict took an
interest in the conduct of the class action in the United
States. Indeed. a substantial number of Australian
veterans were members of the class who were the Plaintiffs
in that action. The progress of the class action was one
of the common topics which veterans attending the
Commission's program of informal sessions wanted to
discuss. Also, the Royal Commission received many
telephone calls from people who wanted information
relating to the class action.
It has become apparent to the Commission that there is a
need for information on this topic. In particular, many
veterans who criticise the settlement are obviously not
aware of the issues involved and the considerations which
led to it.
XI-1
Accordingly, it has been decided that a summary of the
class action including its history and the issues involved
should be included in the Report. As far as possible, the
use of technical, legal language has been avoided. It is
hoped that it will prove informative to Australian
veterans and their families, especially those who chose to
become involved in the Class Action.
It will be apparent from that which follows that the trial
judge, (Judge Weinstein, Chief Judge of the Eastern
District of New York), by virtue of his involvement in the
case, has expressed certain views on the strength and
weaknesses of various aspects of the plaintiffs' case.
Having made certain findings after a lengthy and thorough
investigation of the issues raised by the Terms of
Reference, some of which were common to the issues in the
class action, the Commission obtains reassurance from the
fact that Chief Judge Weinstein has expressed views
similar to those of the Commission, especially on the
issue of causation. Given that the concept of judicial
independence has been an important underlying factor in
both efforts, it is the Commission's sincere hope that
Australian veterans will derive some measure of comfort
from the fact that two legal processes have resulted in
similar conclusions.
XI-2
2. EARLY CONCERNS
Concern in the United States of America over Vietnam
veterans' health effects and their possible connection
with the usage of chemical agents in the Vietnam conflict
originated in Chicago in June of 1977 when Maude De
Victorâ a veterans' administration officer, received a
telephone call from an understandably upset women whose
husband was dying of cancer.
Charles Owen, who had served with the US Airforce for
about 24 years prior to 1973, had spoken to his wife about
a chemical which had been used in Vietnam. Following his
death and consequent upon the initial refusal of a pension
by the U.S. Veterans' Administration, it became Ms De
Victor's task to represent the widow at the hearing of the
appeal from that decision.
Investigations made by Ms De Victor in an effort to
establish that the veterans death was service-related, her
subsequent observations and documentation of cases aroused
public concern. This concern was fuelled by reports which
XI-3
appeared nationally in the United States following the
screening in Chicago on 23 March 1978 of a program
entitled "Agent Orange: the Deadly Fog" on WBBM-TV, a
television station affiliated with the CBS network. The
hour-long program contained suggestions that Vietnam
veterans and their children were experiencing a variety of
health complaints which might be associated with exposure
to herbicides.
3 . PRE-TRIAL HISTORY
In the (American) spring of 1978, 28 year-old Paul
Reutershan, who had served as a helicopter crew chief in
Vietnam, heard of Ms De Victor's involvement and, being
convinced that his cancer was linked to the spray through
which he had flown in Vietnam, he retained Edward Gorman
of O'Hagan, Reilly & Gorman who filed a claim for damages
of $US10m. in a New York State Court which named three
chemical companies as Defendants.
The field of civil litigation against manufacturers and
distributors of chemical substances suspected to be toxic.
XI-4
commonly referred to as " toxic torts", was not one in
which Gorman was experienced. In August 1978 he rang
Victor Yannacone. well known for the role he had played in
1966 in an action which led to Suffolk County's banning of
the pesticide DDT, which was later banned nationally in
the United States. Reutershan died four months later, on
14 December 1978, without ever having met Yannacone. Soon
after the funeral, his friend and fellow Vietnam veteran,
Frank McCarthy. contacted Yannacone and urged him to
pursue the case on behalf of all Vietnam veterans.
McCarthy, who had been involved in the formation of a
self-help group called "Agent Orange Victims
International" (also called "Vietnam Veterans Agent Orange
Victims Inc"), told Yannacone of the many calls he was
receiving each day from Vietnam veterans who were
concerned about their own legal rights following
Reutershan1s death.
By early 1979 Yannacone had rewritten the pleadings in
Reutershan's case as a class action complaint which named
five chemical companies as Defendants. Although initially
filed in the Federal Court in Manhattan it was
subsequentially transferred to Uniondale on Long Island.
Telephone calls soon began to flood Yannacone1s office in
Patchogue, New York and the number of Plaintiffs in the
XI-5
action increased. The number of actions increased as well
when McCarthy and Yannacone conducted a tour of many parts
of the United States.
In April 1979 the Multi-District Litigation Panel. sitting
in St Louisâ Missouri, made an order consolidating all the
actions and appointed Judge Pratt in Uniondale, New York
State to oversee the pre-trial procedural steps, such as
the discovery of documents, which would otherwise be
repeated in every case filed.
Meanwhile. the time and cost of getting what was now
officially termed "Agent Orange Product Liability
Litigation (MDL No. 381)" ready for trial had forced
Yannacone to seek the aid of other Long Island law firms
and by September 1979 eleven such firms had agreed to
operate as Yannacone & Associates.
As in all multi-district litigation cases, upon completion
of the task of discovery each case would have to be
remitted back for trial in the jurisdiction in which the
action was originally filed. The advantages of having the
common issues tried but once were compelling and in
November 1979 Judge Pratt conditionally certified the
litigation as a "class action". (Chief Judge Weinstein
finally certified the "class" on 19 December 1983.)
XI-6
As the name implies, a class action involves one trial
which will determine issues affecting a group or class of
people all of whom have a common interest in the
litigation by reason of similar if not identical questions
of fact or law. A class action involves more than just
permitting a group of people to join together in one
action as co-plaintiffs: it involves one action
determining the rights of every member of that class.
Class actions are not permitted as such in most Australian
States although the Australian Law Reform Commission has
been considering a reference in this area for some six
years. Areas such as health effects alleged to be
industrially related, product liability and environmental
cases are commonly suggested as being appropriate for
class actions.
The decision of the English Court of Appeal in Markt & Co
Ltd v. Knight Steamship Co Ltd [1910] 2 KB 1021. which is
authority for the propositions that a group cannot bring
an action where a dispute arose from individual agreements
as opposed to a collective agreement and that a group
could not sue for damages (even if all the members
sustained the same kind of loss due to the same event),
correctly states the present situation in most States of
Australia. A similar effect to class actions is not
XI-7
u n c o m m o n l y achieved both in Australia and the United
Kingdom either by agreement between the parties or by the
consolidation of a number of actions at least in respect
of common issues such as liability. Two more recent
English decisions not only illustrate this but also
suggest a relaxation of the propositions stated above: in
Prudential Assurance Co Ltd v Newman Industries Ltd (No 1)
[ 1980] 2 WLR 339 the Plaintiff was permitted to sue on
behalf of a group with a view to establishing liability
and in EMI Records Ltd v Riley [1981] 1 WLR 923 where the
Court permitted an inquiry into the damages sustained by
each class member although it should be noted that both
the Plaintiff and the Defendant agreed to that course of
action.
In the U.S. Agent Orange class action, with so many
plaintiffs from many States, each with its own laws having
at least potential application. the complexities were
daunting. Perhaps the best example of such complexities
is that which arose from legislation which limits the time
within which an action must be commenced. In some US
States legal proceedings must be commenced within two
years of the occurrence of injury; other States require
commencement within two years of discovery of the injury,
some provide that the period commences from finding the
XI-8
actual cause of the injury and the time period involved is
not uniform. Yannacone and his associates attempted to
overcome such complexities by applying to have the case
heard under federal common law.
If successful, this would result in one law being applied
to all members of the class with the consequence that some
equally unhealthy veterans would not be denied their
prospects of recovery by a law governing procedural
aspects. If not. Vietnam veterans in as many as 20 states
of America might be deprived of any possible remedy. Late
in 1980 the second circuit of the Court of Appeals in New
York ruled that the case could not be tried under federal
law.
The partnership recruited Aaron Twerski, a Hofstra Law
School Professor whose specialties lay in the fields of
torts and products liability. Twerski advocated that the
case should be conducted as a series of trials of the
fundamental issues common to all class members. One such
issue was the Government Contract defence adopted by the
chemical companies who were the Defendants in the class
actions. The basis of this defence was that the normal
principles of legal liability which apply to manufacturers
who sell consumer goods in the market place should not
XI-9
apply to manufacturers who produce weapons for military
use in time of war in compliance with design
specifications provided by the purchasing Government.
Otherwise, efforts to protect national security might be
jeopardised. This defence, colloquially termed the
Nuremberg defence, ("I was just following orders"), is not
without precedent.
If the Defendants were to succeed in this defence they had
to establish that they delivered to the Government the
very product which it sought and that the Government was
in possession of all relevant information as to the
dangers and risks involved in using the herbicides.
Accordingly, what was in issue, was the quality of the
product provided by each Defendant and whether it complied
with the Government's specification of its requirements,
the knowledge of the Defendants as to the toxicity of
their product and the extent to which they passed on this
information to the Government.
There are a number of reasons why a duty to warn the
Government is imposed on suppliers: public policy requires
a supplier should not avoid liability for damage that
would not have arisen if the Government had known the
risks associated with the use of that product.
XI-10
Furthermore, a Government armed with such knowledge is
able to properly assess the risks and benefits of using
that product as a weapon and, if it be utilised, take
steps to avoid or minimise such risks.
The Defendants argued that if anyone is liable for the
damage allegedly caused by these herbicides it is the
Government of the United States. The significance of this
defence for the Plaintiffs was that, owing to a previous
ruling of Judge Pratt, the Plaintiffs could not sue the US
Government directly. Thus the Defendants would either
prevent the plaintiffs from retaining any financial
recovery or, in the event of the Plaintiffs recovering,
the chemical companies would obtain reimbursement or
indemnity from the US Government. Judge Pratt scheduled
this issue for determination commencing on 27 June 1983.
In April 1983, in the midst of all the preparatory work on
pre-trial procedures including discovery, depositions,
interrogatories and motions, the Defendant companies
submitted a motion for summary judgment. Judge Pratt
ruled against this motion on 12 May 1983 saying that he
had seen enough evidence to indicate that some of the
chemical companies may have withheld vital information
from the Government therefore making it impossible for the
XI-11
Government to draw up safety specifications for using
Agent Orange. Accordingly he ruled that the trial should
proceed against five defendants, (Dow Chemical Company,
Monsanto Company, Diamond Shamrock Chemicals Company, T.H.
Agriculture & Nutrition Company and Uniroyal Inc.), and
dismissed the claims against four others. His Honour also
cancelled the trial date and decided that all issues of
liability and general causation would be tried together
with the Government Contract defence. The breadth of
matters and the amount of detail involved as a result of
this decision were beyond the resources of the Plaintiff's
lawyers and in September 1983 they sought and were granted
leave to withdraw from the case.
Furthermore, later that month. Judge Pratt asked the
Multi-District Litigation Judicial Panel to relieve him of
his duties as he no longer believed it would be feasible
for him to both oversee the pre-trial activities in the
case and fulfil his duties on the bench of the Second
Circuit Court of Appeals to which he had been appointed in
1982. His replacement was Judge Weinstein, Chief Judge of
the Eastern District of New York and the litigation
transferred to the Federal Court in Brooklyn, New York.
XI-12
A revised group of lawyers termed "the Agent Orange
Plaintiffs' Management Committee" took control of the
enormous task of preparing for the trial which, on 21
October 1983, had been set down to commence on 7 May
1984. Chief Judge Weinstein's approach involved trying in
toto the cases of a small number of representative
Plaintiffs with the broader issues such as liability and
causation being covered along the way. He also reinstated
two chemical companies (Hercules Inc., and Thompson
Chemical Corporation) bringing the number of Defendants to
seven. The Defendants made persistent unsuccessful
applications for a postponed commencement of the trial
which was estimated to take at least six months and as
long as two years.
4. PLAINTIFFS' ALLEGATIONS
Unlike this Commission, which was required to consider all
chemical agents used in the Vietnam conflict, the only
chemicals in issue in the class action were those which
contained dioxin, ie. Agents Orange, Orange II. Purple,
Pink and Green.
XI-13
The Plaintiffs put their claim on a number of bases:
(i) negligence;
(ii) strict product liability and breach of an implied
warranty;
(iii) breach of contract, breach of an express warranty
and misrepresentation;
(iv) intentional tort; and
(v) nuisance.
In order to establish that the Defendants were negligent
the Plaintiffs needed to show that the Defendants owed
them a duty of care, that such a duty was breached, that
the Plaintiffs suffered injury and that the injury was
caused by the breach of the duty of care. It was alleged
that the duty of care arose in one or more of the
following ways.
First, that the Defendants had a duty to warn that the
contaminant dioxin supplied to the Government was
dangerous to human health. In support of this claim the
Plaintiffs asserted that the defendant chemical companies
knew or ought to have known the prospects of injury from
scientific information in their possession including
results of tests conducted with animals and studies of
XI-14
human exposure to the chemicals either as a result of an
industrial accident or employment in the manufacturing
process. Secondly, that each of the Defendants has a duty
to warn of the other Defendants' product which was being
simultaneously manufactured and supplied to the Government
for use in Vietnam. Finally, the Plaintiffs claimed that
the defendants were negligent in their design, manufacture
and quality control methods by not avoiding, minimizing or
eliminating the presence of the contaminant dioxin in the
herbicide.
In respect of the claim founded upon strict product
liability and breach of an implied warranty the Plaintiffs
claimed that the Defendants were liable to them because
the herbicides were supplied in a defective condition (ie.
contaminated with dioxin) and accordingly that they were
unreasonably dangerous to the Plaintiffs. Furthermore,
that each Defendant had impliedly warranted the herbicide
supplied to the Government to be reasonably fit for the
ordinary purposes for which they were to be used in
Vietnam. If the herbicides were unreasonably dangerous
then, it was claimed, they were not reasonably fit for
military use in Vietnam.
XI-15
Next, the Plaintiffs charged that there had been a breach
of contract, breach of warranty and misrepresentation by
the Defendant. The foundation for the breach of contract
claim was that the contracts between the Government and
each Defendant imposed specifications which did not
include dioxin. The breach of an express warranty was
said to arise from a provision in the contracts which
provided that the herbicides would not be "defective in
material or workmanship, or otherwise not in conformity
with the requirements of the contract". The
misrepresentations were said to arise because the
Defendants, knowing of the health hazards and the presence
of dioxin, either made affirmative statements
misrepresenting material facts or wilfully failed to
disclose such material facts. The latter was claimed to
have occurred when the presence of dioxin was not
disclosed in registration statements. petitions for
residue tolerances and other documents required under the
Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act and
failure to place warning labels upon the herbicide
containers.
The intentional tort claim involved a repetition of
allegations already outlined coupled with the claim that
these actions were deliberate, calculated and in complete
XI -16
disregard of the consequences. Likewise the nuisance
claim was an additional legal remedy which the Plaintiffs
claimed was justified by their allegations.
According to the P l a i n t i f f s t h e veterans' exposure to
dioxin-contaminated herbicides in the course of their
service in Vietnam resulted in injuries such as chloracne.
various systemic diseases including soft-tissue sarcomas
and porphyria cutanea tarda as well as miscarriages to
veterans' wives and birth anomalies in their children.
They itemised more than 100 health effects to be
attributable to the use of herbicides and claimed damages
under a number of headings: wives sought to recover in
their own right for miscarriages; damages claims of family
members included pecuniary loss for wrongful death and
loss of society, services and support and children claimed
compensation for birth anomalies. Punitive damages were
also claimed for alleged misconduct in furnishing
herbicides to the US Government. The Plaintiffs also
sought from the Court a declaration that their injuries
were service-related so as to entitle them to treatment
and payments from the Veterans' Administration.
XI-17
5 . DEFENDANTS' ANSWERS
The defendant chemical companies denied each of the
Plaintiffs' claims and raised a number of defences :
contributory negligence, assumption of risk, misuse, lack
of privity, mitigation, proportionate liability. Statutes
of Limitations, the Defense Production Act and the
Government Contract defence.
They claimed that the Plaintiffs' case in negligence
should not be allowed due to the conduct of both the
Plaintiffs and the Government which was suggested to
amount to contributory negligence and the voluntary
assumption of risk. Further, that any damage suffered by
the Plaintiffs was due to factors other than the
Defendants' conduct such as the Government's misuse of the
herbicide. As the contracts for the supply of the
herbicides were between the Defendants and the Government,
the chemical companies claimed that the Plaintiffs were
prevented from any recovery based on the contract since
they were not a party to such contracts, ie. a lack of
privity between the Plaintiffs and the Defendants.
In the event of the Plaintiffs becoming entitled to an
award of damages the Defendants claimed that such damages
should be reduced by the amount of any benefits which the
XI -18
Plaintiffs had received or were entitled to receive from
any State or Federal government department or agency. The
Defendants claimed that any award of damages should be
further reduced to take into consideration the extent to
which the Plaintiffs' conduct and the Government's conduct
were responsible for any damage.
The Defendant chemical companies also claimed two types of
statutory defences: first, that the Plaintiffs' claims
were barred by the Defense Production Act which, according
to the Defendants. compelled them to produce and sell the
herbicides to the Government for use in Vietnam; secondly,
that the claims were barred by the various limitation
statutes which require legal actions to be commenced
within a specific period.
Another claim which the defendants made was that they were
protected by reason of the Government Contract defence
which has been previously dealt with.
6. ISSUES FOR TRIAL
The Plaintiffs' legal advisers had been directed by Chief
Judge Weinstein in October 1983 to choose ten Plaintiffs.
(veterans, wives and children) who had what they
XI-19
considered to be typical injuries in order that their
claims might be presented to the jury as characteristic of
those of the class. It was proposed to deal with issues
such as liability and causation in the course of the
trial. Hence the factual issues for trial involve both
general and individual issues although the individual
issues were to be of a representative nature.
The individual factual issues included exposure to
herbicides and the health effects of each witness. The
exposure issue involved a consideration of the location of
veterans whilst in Vietnam together with an analysis of
the location of herbicide flight missions and the type of
herbicide used on those missions. In the health effects
area it would have been necessary to identify the health
problems experienced by each witness and investigate
possible causes unrelated to herbicides.
General factual issues involved such areas as liability
and causation. Liability involved the need for evidence
as to the dioxin content in the herbicides, the knowledge
of both the seven chemical companies and the US Government
and the extent to which the chemical companies passed on
their knowledge to the Government. In order to prove
causation the parties to the litigation would have found
XI-20
it necessary to call a variety of specialist experts on
the issue of whether the health effects were caused by
exposure to herbicides.
Even from this brief analysis of the issues involved, it
is obvious that any trial of the class action would have
been both lengthy and complex.
7. PROBLEMS OF PROOF
By virtue of the American pre-trial procedures it is
possible to know what the nature of the evidence in a case
will be before the trial actually commences. This is
designed to streamline the conduct of the case and promote
a well-informed assessment of the strengths and weaknesses
of each party's case. The plaintiffs' legal advisers
faced a number of problems in proving their case.
Primarily, these were factual problems and the most
significant one was that posed by the causation issue.
To prove that veterans' exposure in Vietnam to relatively
small quantities of dioxin caused their health effects
would ideally require the evidence of scientists who would
explain to the Court how this was possible. indeed
probable, if a favourable verdict was to be obtained.
XI-21
Knowledge of the mechanism(s) by which dioxin acts is
required in order to establish such a ' cause and effect
relationship1. Any such explanation would ideally
establish a causal relationship between exposure and
particular diseases or health effects. In the absence of a
credible and rational explanation it would be necessary to
resort to what might be termed as statistical approach.
Reduced to its simplest terms, this involves a comparative
study of the rates of occurrence of health effects in two
groups, one exposed and the other not exposed. and the
application of recognised statistical tests to determine
the likelihood that there is in fact a difference between
the groups. If such a difference is apparent and if
alternative explanations of that difference may be
eliminated then some evidence is provided that health is
affected by exposure. This science is known as
epidemiology.
Clearly, there are number of factors which would affect
the weight of such evidence. These include the experience
of those responsible for the study, the design of the
study and the way in which it was conducted: all of which
reflect the possibility of errors or biases influencing
the outcome. The outcome of any such study will clearly
XI-22
be more persuasive if more numbers are involved as the
likelihood of chance variations influencing the outcome
decreases.
For example, if a coin is tossed twice and the result is
two heads then one is more likely to suspect that such a
result is due to chance. However, if the result of 100
tosses is heads on 100 occasions then one is far more
likely to suspect that the coin is double headed
However, if the result was 75 heads out of 100 tosses
then one could rule out the possibility of a double headed
coin but before blaming the person tossing the coin one
would need to consider other factors which might be
influencing the results. including pure chance.
Furthermore, the probative value of a study is influenced
by whether its results are repeated by other similar
studies. To continue the example, if another person
tossing the same coin resulted in say, 77 heads out of 100
(or if the same person tossing a different coin achieved
50 heads out of 100 throws) then one would suspect the
coin not to be fair. On the other hand, if another person
tossing the same coin resulted in 25 out of 100 throws
then concern about the coin would probably diminish.
XI-23
In so far as attributing health effects to herbicide
exposure is concerned, if the health effect is one which
occurs very rarely in the general population then one
would be more easily persuaded than if the health effect
was a common one or had a variety of possible causes, or
both. Yet changes in the incidence of health effects which
occur very rarely in the population can be very difficult
to detect unless the number of subjects under
consideration is large.
There are a number of reasons why it is difficult to
obtain useful evidence on the effects of the herbicides on
servicemen: when inducted they were a healthier group than
the general population because of the medical test
conducted that ensured that they were fit for service;
there are many potential alternative factors which may be
operating; some of the health effects may take a long time
to become apparent; and there is an understandable human
tendency for a study subject to believe he was exposed if
he is now sick or believe that he was not exposed if he is
not now sick. The technical terms for these factors are
the healthy worker effect, confounding variables, long
latency period and recall bias respectively. Examples of
possible confounding variables arising from Vietnam
experience are anti-malarial drugs, drinking, smoking and
the special stresses which prevailed in that conflict.
XI-24
It is important to remember the distinction between the
regulatory process, which has as its aim the avoidance of
risk, and the compensation process which usually require a
probability higher than 50 per cent to be established
since the law does not require any defendant to pay for a
plaintiff's injury, loss or damage unless it is shown that
it is more likely than not that the defendant's conduct
was the cause. Hence. for example, a study which resulted
in certain action being taken because of, say, a 10 per
cent greater risk shown by the study would not, of itself,
be sufficient proof. Or, if a regulatory agency set a
tolerance level of one part per million for a particular
chemical because there is chance of some human health
effect occurring above that level of concentration, then
that does not prove that such a chemical is to blame
whenever it occurs at a greater concentration. Neither
does it prove that a person suffering from the health
effect is suffering because of that chemical.
Appropriate studies, the outcome of which might support
the Plaintiffs' case, were in progress but would not be
completed in time for consideration of their results in
the class action. The Court could not, of course, wait
indefinitely whilst all such studies were completed: a
decision had to be reached on the information then
available.
XI-25
However. it was very doubtful that the completed
epidemiological studies overcame this aspect of the
Plaintiffs' case, mainly proof to the necessary legal
standard of a causal relationship between exposure to the
herbicides and the health effects which the veterans were
alleging. The lack of evidence to support the claim that
birth defects had occurred and would continue to occur as
a result of dioxin exposure of the father was such that
this claim rested on little more than a theoretical base.
Chief Judge Weinstein, at p 149 of his Preliminary
Memorandum1 which accompanied the order made on 25
September 1984 approving the settlement agreement subject
to hearings on attorneys' fees and a preliminary
consideration of plans for distribution, summarised these
problems on the causation issue:
In sum, then, the result of an enormous
scientific effort to be helpful on causation has, from the plaintiffs' point of view, left the case at best open. This is not sufficient to support a recovery in tort law even though it might
suffice to permit regulation of products that might contain dioxin or support a public policy decision to use public funds to compensate
exposed Vietnam veterans or their children with medical problems.
XI-26
The causation issue was a factual one, albeit complicated,
for the determination of the jury. Yet. even if the
plaintiffs persuaded the jury on this issue it may well
have been set aside. At pages 129 to 131 of the same
Memorandum Chief Judge Weinstein commented:
Based on the evidence so far provided, however, even if the case were permitted to go to a jury and even were there a verdict for the plaintiffs, it appears doubtful whether the verdict would have withstood a post-trial motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict in the trial and appellate courts. This legal evaluation shared
by almost all attorneys from both sides in the case provides a strong inducement for the
plaintiffs to settle.
Causation was not the only obstacle facing the
plaintiffs. On the issue of exposure the lack of detailed
records of US troop movements made it difficult to prove
the location of a serviceman within Vietnam at any time
and hence there were difficulties in establishing whether
a serviceman was located under or near the flight path of
a herbicide mission. There is no doubt that fixed-wing
aircraft were but one of the dispersal methods used.
However, in terms of the quantity of herbicides dispersed,
it was certainly the major method. Furthermore. the
Plaintiffs needed to establish that the exposure was to a
chemical which was one of those on which the claim was
based: the Plaintiffs only sued the Defendants in respect
XI-27
of the herbicides which contained dioxin, namely Agents
Orange. Orange II, Purple, Pink and Green. Agents Blue and
White and the insecticides used were not an issue. Even
if a Plaintiff could prove that he had been exposed the
absence of markings or labels on the drums of herbicides,
the inevitable mixing of herbicides from different
manufacturers, and the lack of records which would
overcome these problems meant that he was unable to
establish to which Defendant's or Defendants' herbicide he
had been exposed. Various legal theories were advanced in
an effort to overcome this problem.
As has been indicated earlier, the Government Contract
defence would succeed, and thus prevent the plaintiff's
claim, if the Defendants were able to show that the
Government knew as much as they (the defendants) knew or
should have known about the risks associated with use of
these herbicides. The extent of this knowledge became
apparent during the pre-trial procedures. In the course
of a pre-trial motion the Court, having considered the
evidence then available, concluded:
Even when all doubts are resolved in favour of the plaintiffs .... the record demonstrates that the Government and the military had a
considerable amount of knowledge about 2.4,5-T, about dioxin. and about the health hazards
associated with both.2
XI-28
Little if anything could be done to overcome this problem
which was obviously an important factor in settlement
consideration. The Plaintiffs' written submissions on the
issue of the fairness of the settlement dated 7 August
1984 and filed with the Court (titled "Plaintiffs Fairness
Brief") dealt with this issue at pp 52 to 80. At p 52 it
was described as "a primary obstacle to the plaintiffs
recovery in this case" and at p 80:
Plaintiffs face substantial problems of proof concerning the quantity and quality of Government knowledge accumulated by various individuals and/or agencies in the Government on Agent
Orange/2,4.5-T and/or dioxin. Plaintiffs submit that the level of knowledge of the Government was âlight years" removed from the overwhelming quality and quantity of the knowledge possessed by the defendants. However, the quality of that
knowledge was such that the jury might well have found the evidence sufficient to exculpate the defendants . . .
As well as the problems involved in the factual issues
there were a number of legal problems with the Plaintiffs'
claims. First, the certification of the litigation as a
class action did not overcome the problem that the
Plaintiffs resided in various States and, in some
instances, overseas. Hence different laws governed
different Plaintiffs both in respect of procedural and
substantive issues. Despite the obvious commonsense of
XI-29
some simplification of those problems no appellate court
had considered how these types of matters should be
resolved so as to render such litigation workable. Hence
the possibility of an appeal from whatever decision the
trial judge reached could not be ignored. Any such appeal
would obviously take time, might involve a reversal of the
decision of the trial Judge and could result in a further
trial of all or some of the issues.
Second, there was a diversity in the provisions of the
various limitation Statutes which imposed time limits
within which an action must be commenced. There were
differences as to when the time period commenced to run,
in what circumstances it temporarily ceased to run and as
to the length of the time period itself. In all,
something in excess of 100 categories were possible and it
was not unlikely that Plaintiffs falling within a number
of these categories would be unable to succeed because of
these Statutes. Obviously it would be difficult to
explain why some plaintiffs' claims would be allowed
whilst others were denied for reasons unassociated with
the merits of their particular cases. Although a number
of legal theories could enable this problem to be
overcome, each involved a new approach which carried with
it the possibility of an appeal.
XI-30
The previously mentioned factual problem of identifying to
which of the seven defendants' herbicides a Plaintiff was
exposed had legal consequences as well since, under the
normal principles of product liability law, the Plaintiff
bears the burden of identifying the manufacturer of the
product which allegedly injured him. In the absence of
such proof it is not uncommon for the US Court to dismiss
the plaintiff's claims. The Defendants claim that the
problem was the result of the Government's specification
and the Government claimed immunity from legal action
owing to the military context in which the problem arose.
Several legal theories were advanced in an effort to
overcome this problem.
Under the principle known as alternative liability, once
the Plaintiff establishes that he has been harmed by one
of the Defendants, the burden of proof is then cast upon
each such Defendant to prove that he or she has not caused
the harm. The Defendants contested the application of
this principle on the basis that many of the claimed
health effects could have resulted from any one or more of
a number of alternative, non-herbicidal factors.
Market share liability was another approach suggested.
Since the seven Defendants shared about 99 per cent of the
XI-31
herbicide market it was argued that each should be liable
to pay a proportion of any awarded damages which reflected
the market share of tha t defendant manufacturer. This
theory, however. has been rejected by a majority of
American courts.
The principle known as concert of action was also
proposed. It imposes joint and several liability where
the defendants have participated jointly or pursuant to a
common design to produce a plaintiff's injury. The
factual foundation for this claim was certain documents
arising from meetings arranged by Dow Chemical Company,
one of the Defendants, which documents dealt with the
problems associated with the use of 2,4,5-T. Although a
jury may well have found for the Plaintiffs on this basis,
it has not been widely adopted by US courts and it was
therefore questionable whether any jury finding could have
been sustained on appeal.
Enterprise liability includes the following elements:
insufficient industry-wide safety standards; inability to
identify the defendant; a genetically similar, defective
product; and evidence of the normal elements of negligence
(duty of care, breach of that duty. injury and
causation). When established it causes the burden of
XI-32
proof to shift to the defendant: a defendant can only
avoid liability by showing that its product could not have
caused the plaintiffâs injury. As with all of these
somewhat novel legal theories. a favourable jury verdict
might not have survived legal argument on appeal.
The plaintiffs' lawyers also claimed that the Defendants
were prevented or estopped from asserting that the
plaintiffs could not identify which Defendant was to blame
because it was their conduct which caused the Government
to treat the herbicides supplied as generic or uniform.
This argument presupposed a duty to inform the Government
about the contamination of their competitors' herbicides.
The Defendants denied the existence of any such duty.
8. THE CASE AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT
One of the Defendants' responses to the plaintiffs' legal
suit was to issue a third party complaint against the US
Government seeking indemnification or contribution for any
amount ordered to be paid by the Defendants in respect of
the Plaintiffsâ claims. The Government in turn
endeavoured to have these claims dismissed on the basis of
a doctrine known as the Feres-Stencel doctrine which
prevents servicemen from bringing law suits against the
XI-33
Government in respect of its conduct of wartime
operations. On 16 February 1984 this application was
successful in respect of the claims of Vietnam veterans
and the associated claims of their family members but not
in respect of the independent claims of the veterans'
wives and children. These continuing claims were not part
of the Class Action settlement.
A motion of the Plaintiffs to have these claims certified
as a Class Action was refused for a number of reasons, the
major one being the almost non-existent possibility of
recovery against the Government on the merits. This
aspect rendered the enormous cost of notifying potential
class members unjustified. With scientific studies in
this area continuing, the effect of granting class action
status as sought would have been to dismiss
once-and-for-al1 these claims due to the lack of currently
available evidence to support them.
On 8 February 1985 , the US Government moved to have these
claims dismissed: Chief Judge Weinstein granted that
application. The plaintiffs relied upon the Federal Tort
Claims Act which Act waives Governmental immunity from
such proceedings with certain exceptions. One such
XI-34
exception derives from the decision in Feres v United
States (1950) 340 US 135 and is based upon factors such as
the existence of a compensation scheme for members of the
Armed Forces and the adverse impact of military discipline
and effectiveness if service people were permitted to sue
their Government. In an effort to overcome this bar the
plaintiffs unsuccessfully alleged that the relevant
conduct of the Government occurred prior to enlistment or,
alternatively, following discharge in that there was a
failure to take precautions, warn, treat or compensate the
plaintiffs. The policy considerations which underly the
Feres-Stencel doctrine were also considered to be a
sufficient answer to the plaintiffs' claim based on
intentional tort.
Hence, summary judgment was granted against all claims of
the veterans, their wives and all of the childrenâs
derivative claims against the Government. The direct
claims by the children were dismissed without prejudice,
i.e. the dismissal does not operate to preclude such
claims being brought in the future should the evidence to
support the claim become available.
XI-35
SETTLEMENT 9 .
In the light of the problems and complexities associated
with this litigation it is not surprising that a
settlement or compromise was reached. Early in the
morning of the day on which the trial was scheduled to
commence an agreement was reached whereby the Defendants
undertook to pay to the class $US180m. in a manner
directed by the Court which involved interest accruing on
that amount from 7 May 1984, the date of the settlement.
Included in the terms of settlement was a provision to
indicate that the Defendants did not admit liability and
both parties reserved whatever rights and claims they have
against anyone not a party to the class action, most
notably the US Government. The contributions to that sum
by the various defendant chemical companies were not
disclosed nor was the basis upon which these contributions
were calculated. Jurisdiction over the settlement funds
until their final distribution was retained by the Court.
It was a term of the settlement that the agreement was
only to be effective if the Court expressly approved it as
a fair, reasonable and adequate settlement of the action.
There were a number of reasons why the settlement was
desirable from the Plaintiffs' viewpoint, the Defendants'
XI - 3 6
viewpoint and that of the public. In so far as the
Plaintiffs were concerned the available scientific data
made it unlikely that the causal relationship could be
proved to the necessary legal standard. As Chief Judge
Weinstein commented during the San Francisco Fairness
hearings:
This case in England, I believe. would have
resulted in a clear dismissal with substantial costs, and I suspect that the same would be true in Australia. based on the evidence I've seen . . . . If there is no causation, any figure above
zero would be excessive from the Defendants' point of view. That's the problem with this
case.3
Furthermore, a decision in favour of the Plaintiffs would
need the support of unique legal reasoning which would
almost certainly give rise to appeals with consequential
delays and considerable prospects of no ultimate financial
recovery. Thirdly. there were doubts as to the
plaintiffs' lawyers ability to finance the litigation
under the American system whereby fees and disbursements
are accumulated and then deducted from any verdict
obtained. But for the settlement the Plaintiffs would not
have had the benefit of any funds for a number of years.
An adverse result in the trial might have had detrimental
consequences for the claims of Vietnam veterans with the
Government and its departments, such as Veterans
XI-37
Administration, for medical treatment and other benefits.
The settlement also ended the uncertainty and the stresses
and strains associated with continuing the litigation.
Finally, it enabled energies and talents to be devoted
toward achieving some help for those veterans and their
families experiencing health problems.
From the Defendants' viewpoint the settlement avoided the
costs of defending the case, the possibility of an
ultimately adverse finding and a substantial financial
burden which could accompany such a possibility. Other
indirect consequences of continuing the litigation
included the adverse publicity and the possibility of a
greater cost of borrowing. This could have arisen in a
number of ways: if investors found such companies less
attractive then raising money by less costly means such as
share issues might become more difficult or lenders might
require a higher interest rate on company borrowings to
compensate for the litigation risks. There were also
benefits to the public. The trial and appeals would have
represented a drain on public funds through the usage of
the judicial system and its associated personnel and
facilities. Settlement of the action also alerted a large
section of the public to the needs of many Vietnam
veterans and their families.
XI - 3 8
10. FAIRNESS HEARINGS
Rule 23(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
provides that a class action may not settle without
approval of the Court and notice to members of the class.
Such a procedure ensures that class members have an
opportunity to be heard either in support or opposition of
the settlement and protects the interests of those whose
interests may not have been given due regard in the
negotiation process by preventing private arrangements or
"sweetheart deals" not in the best interests of the class.
Each party had been engaged in substantial preparation
prior to the settlement and was fully aware of the
strengths and weaknesses of their cases. A settlement
agreement which reflects a well informed decision by
experienced lawyers with competing interests is. of
itself, indicative of fairness. The Court's role is not.
however, merely to check on the lawyers. It serves to
guard the rights of absent or silent class members which
is an important role given in the impracticality of
consulting each member of the class and because the
settlement, if approved, finalises the litigation once and
for all thereby precluding further proceedings by class
members. Chief Judge Weinstein, in his Preliminary
XI-39
Memorandum. op.cit., pp 55-56 placed reliance on the
decision of the Second Circuit of the Court of Appeals in
City of Detroit v Grinnel Corp 495 F .2d 448 (2d Cir. 1974)
for factors which a trial Court should consider in
determining whether to approve a settlement. Those
factors (and the respective assessments of Chief Judge
Weinstein) were:
(i) The complexity, expense and likely duration of
the litigation (enormous complexity and expense,
litigation likely to extend over years);
(ii) The reaction of the class to the settlement (the
class was divided, a majority of the minority who
addressed the Court opposed the settlement);
(iii) The stage of the proceedings and the amount of
discovery completed (the case was about to be
tried so almost all discovery was completed).
(iv) The risks of establishing liability (liability
was almost impossible to establish).
(v) The risks of establishing damages (damages could
be easily shown).
XI-40
(vi) The risks of maintaining the class action through
the trial (this could be accomplished although
difficult in view of the great expense to the
plaintiffs' attorneys).
(vii) The ability of the Defendants to withstand a
greater judgment (the Defendants had great
resources).
(viii) The reasonableness of the settlement fund in the
light of the best possible recovery (maximum
recovery was great but no recovery was more
likely).
(ix) The range of reasonableness of the settlement to
a possible recovery in the light of the risks
attending the litigation (the settlement was well
within the range of reasonableness in view of all
the relevant factors).
It is important to realise that the money amount of the
settlement is not the only issue: such an amount should be
considered in the light not only of the best possible
recovery but also with regard for the strengths and
weaknesses of the plaintiffs' case. Furthermore, it
XI-41
should be remembered that negotiations and settlement
discussions were observed by Special Masters who were in
fact Officers of the Court accountable to the Court thus
ensuring that the settlement was neither a "sellout" nor
founded on improper motives.
Notice of the proposed settlement outlined the basic plan
for distribution of the fund as proposed by the
Plaintiffs' Management Committee (plaintiffs' lawyers)
rather than any final plans. Such notice was given by
mail to all members of the class action known to the
Committee. Another similar notice was widely publicised
in newspapers and magazines throughout the United States,
Australia and New Zealand. Hearings were held throughout
the United States in order to provide an opportunity for
class members and representatives of a variety of veteran
organisations to express their views of the settlement
orally. The schedule for these hearings, held in August
1984, was: New York (8th, 9th, 10th), Chicago (13th,
14th). Houston (16th, 17th), Atlanta (20th. 21st) and San
Francisco (23rd, 24th). A special three-hour session in
San Francisco from 8pm on the evening of 24 August was
held for Australian veterans and lawyers to make
contributions. Written submissions were also received and
in combination with the eleven days of hearings, more than
a thousand submissions were received.
XI-42
Before setting out some quotations from the submissions
received. Chief Judge Weinstein eloquently summarised what
he had heard, seen and read:
A few quotations from the hearings and other communications are set out in this section.
The quotations do not begin to reflect the
moving sights and sounds of the hearings - broken hearted young widows who have seen their
strapping young husbands die of cancer, wives who must live with husbands wracked with pain and in deep depression, mothers whose children suffer
from multiple birth defects and require almost saint-like daily care, the strong men who have tears welling up in their eyes as they tell of fear that their families will be left without support because of their imminent death, the man whose mind is so clouded that he must be prompted
by his wife standing by with his defective child in her arms to go on with his speech, the
veterans trying to control the rage which wells up within them, the crippled and diseased with running sores and green fungus growths, and the women who volunteered for field or Red Cross duty
and now feel themselves rejected and sick with what they believe are Agent Orange related
diseases.
Just a few years ago these veterans were healthy and handsome youths in their teens and early twenties who bravely went to war because their leaders asked them to. And it is clear from what
they said and did in Court that they are sincere when many of them say that they would volunteer their broken bodies and worn spirits once again if their country called. Some are understandably
bitter that their Government and its people have shunned them instead of embracing them as
heroes. Only the cold written transcript is permitted as a record of these remnants of the war pleading for justice for themselves and for their families. They remind us, as we enjoy the
fruits of our power and wealth, to remember those men and women who struggle each day with
disastrous medical problems they attribute to service in Vietnam.4
XI-43
Later his Honour itemised recurring concerns as:
(a) Need for medical help for veterans and financial
help for those too ill to work;
(b) Medical and financial aid for children born with
defects;
(c) Need for information on possible genetic damage
to veterans and their children;
(d) Dissatisfaction with the Veterans Administration
and the treatment received in its hospitals;
(e) Insufficiency of settlement amount to pay
adequate damages;
(f) Failure of chemical companies to admit fault;
(g) Failure of Government to admit fault, participate
in settlement and accept its responsibility for
caring for Vietnam veterans and their families;
(h) Possibility of a cover-up of information with
sealed files and return of documents to
Defendants;
XI-44
(i) Need for a full open trial to vindicate the
Plaintiffs and protect their rights to individual
justice;
(j) Inability to decide whether to accept settlement
without knowing how it would be distributed or
how much would be spent in attorneys' fees;
(k) Inadequate payment by defendants relative to
their resources;
(l) Inadequate time to file claims;
(m) Need to settle now to get on with life; and
(n) Need for further research and reassurance.
Only a small fraction (less than 1 per cent) of the class
members contributed to the Court either orally or in
writing as to the fairness of the settlement. Whatever
the reasons, the vast majority remained silent.
On 25th September 1984, the Court approved the settlement
subject to hearings on the issue of attorneys' fees and
preliminary plans for the distribution of the settlement
fund.
XI -4 5
11. DISTRIBUTION PLANS
The Notice which was forwarded to class members included a
brief outline of three of the proposals which the
Plaintiffsâ Management Committee expected to submit to the
Court for consideration. They were:
(i) Payment to those who presently suffer from
designated effects;
(ii) A reserve fund to provide for payment to class
members who experienced the onset of those
designated health effects in the future;
(iii) Payments to assist children of Vietnam veterans.
both those born before the settlement (who were
class members) and those born afterwards who
(although not class members) may be entitled to
assistance from the fund.
These proposals were suggested for but a portion of the
settlement fund and no amount was indicated.
In order to determine the potential claims as soon as
possible a claim form was enclosed. Submission of a claim
XI-46
form did not automatically entitle the author to receive
compensation. An assessment process involving medical and
other information in support of the claim was intended to
be an aspect of the final distribution plan. The closing
date for forwarding claim forms was initially 26 October
1984 but this was subsequently extended to 2 January 1985.
As a result of the Fairness Hearings a number of
suggestions from United States veterans and veterans'
organisations were placed before the Court for
consideration. These included:
(a) A national [centre] for Vietnam veterans' assistance,
proposed to provide veterans with a central source of
legal and political power. It was suggested that such
a [centre] could provide legal aid in claims against
the Veterans Administration, seek further legislation
to improve the plight of Vietnam veterans and the
provision of counselling or advisory services.
(b) Veterans benefits, to be provided through a simple
system with easy proof and low administration costs.
Care should be exercised to ensure that payment of any
such benefit does not reduce the level of any existing
benefits. .
XI-47
(c) Genetic and family counselling, designed to deal with
the child-bearing fears of parents where the husband
is a Vietnam veteran. Counselling and testing
services could be involved.
(d) Childrens' benefits, to be paid from a fund with a
term of at least 25 years and having the ability to
seek donations both from the community and the
Government.
A number of general principles are emerging as objectives
for the distribution process: minimising administrative
costs; avoiding complex fact-finding and the consequential
need for attorneys' and experts' fees and time-consuming
adjudications; appropriate legislative amendments wherever
necessary to ensure that benefits paid or services
rendered do not become taxable; that payments are not
merely used to reimburse other institutions and that the
income of and donations to such funds are not taxable.
The lengthy and detailed Report of the Special Master
Pertaining to the Disposition of the Settlement Fund5
was forwarded to Chief Judge Weinstein on 27 February,
1985. It proposed a plan with the following essential
features:
XI -48
(i) Three separate funds to assist class members:
(a) $US130m. to provide cash payments to
eligible veterans or families of
deceased veterans, this fund to have a
termination date of 31st December. 1994;
(b) $US30m. endowment fund to provide
services to aid both children suffering
from birth defects and their families.
with a termination date of 7th May,
2009;
(c) $US30m. Social Services endowment to
provide grants and other funding to
assist veterans who were class members
and their families, terminating on 31st
December, 1994.
(ii) In view of the Court's indication that no causal
relationship between Agent Orange exposure and
health effects had been established, eligibility
for inclusion in the distribution plan is
proposed as a non-traumatic death or long-term
total disability occurring prior to 31st
December. 1994.
XI-49
(iii)
(iv)
(v)
(vi)
(vii)
However. eligibility is also proposed to require
a finding that the subject veteran was among the
more heavily exposed of the otherwise eligible
claimants.
It is proposed that the compensation plan be
based on precise, objective criteria so as to
enable ready implementation by an insurance
company or other similar agency.
Details to be provided to all claimants as to the
eligibility requirements.
Some 7,000 long-term disability cases and 3,000
veteran deaths currently eligible at that time.
A non-profit foundation to be established to
administer two endowments totalling $US60m: the
foundation to authorise grants for specific
purposes to assist class members. The foundation
is proposed to have a Board of Directors
primarily composed of Vietnam veterans.
XI-50
(viii) Funds from these two endowments to be primarily
distributed to existing organisations and
facilities in order to reduce overhead and
administrative calls and to avoid duplication of
effort.
In a letter dated 11 September 1984 forwarded on behalf of
the Agent Orange Plaintiffs' Management Committee to the
Australian Government's Minister for Finance a public
charity was proposed as an alternative to potentially
small payments to individuals. It was suggested that such
a charity could:
1. Take over the present Vietnam veterans counselling
service;
2. Provide advocates for representation before the
Repatriation Commission thereby ensuring the maximum
services under the Repatriation Act being available to
the veterans;
3. Provide maintenance to the veterans in financial
difficulties on a short term basis;
XI-51
4. Provide financial assistance for incapacitated
children; ie. special education needs, wheel chairs,
etc. ;
5. Provide monies for research;
6. Look after the general needs of veterans and in so
doing motivate them back into society.
Submissions on the issue of the allocation and
distribution of the Australian veterans portion of the
Settlement Fund have been lodged with the Court by the
lawyers representing the Australian Plaintiffs.
Australian class members, their legal advisers and
veterans organisations were expected to develop their own
proposals for dealing with their allocation from the
settlement fund. At the San Francisco Fairness Hearings
Chief Judge Weinstein indicated why:
I don't want to get involved in deciding how that corpus is to be handled in Australia. I donât know enough about Australian veterans, the Australian law. I don't know enough about the
veterans' medical situation, I don't know enough about their social services situation in
Australia.
Therefore, I cannot make judgments that satisfy me (as being) based upon sound assessment.6
XI-52
As to the process of distribution, his Honour commented:
The task of organizing representatives of Vietnam war veterans into an effective group that can make decisions which the veterans will support and that can speak to the veterans with one voice
must be given priority. With such an effective organization the [US]$180.000.000 available from the settlement provides a powerful legal.
medical, political and social instrument. Without that co-operation the money may become a reason for divisiveness and disunity that may serve to weaken the just claims of the veterans
and their ability to vindicate their rights ....
Similarly, a proportionate share of the funds set aside for Australian and New Zealand members of the class should be controlled by veterans of those countries. The Court would prefer to have a single payment made to a person or body of each
of these two countries with further distribution being made by those on the scene.7
It is to be hoped that those responsible for handling the
Australian component of the settlement fund can avoid the
discord and divisiveness of which his Honour warns.
12. ORDER AND JUDGMENT ON DISTRIBUTION
At page 7 of his 174 page judgment on the distribution of
the settlement fund, dated 28 May 19858, Chief Judge
Weinstein noted that the definition of the class involved
two conditions: exposure to certain herbicides in Vietnam
and a claim of injury as a result of that exposure. The
decision as to how the settlement fund should be
XI-53
distributed was influenced by the fact that there was no
substantial scientific evidence to support a finding of
causal connection between exposure to herbicides and any
specific disease (except chloracne) and the problems of
proving any particular plaintiff's claim. Furthermore,
even if a simple test for ascertaining exposure and injury
could be devised, the amounts which would be available for
distribution to individuals would be too small to provide
any appreciable benefit.
The approved distribution plan substantially adopts the
recommendations of the Special Master, Kenneth Feinberg,
whose report became Exhibit 1892 before the Commission.
There are three aspects to the distribution process: an
insurance-type compensation scheme covering death and
long-term disability ($US150m.); a foundation run by
veterans ($US45m.) and an allocation of 2% of the
settlement fund ($US4m.) to Australasian veterans.
Arrangements will be made for the operation of these
aspects although the implementation necessarily awaits the
outcome of certain appeals, by which time the $US180m.
settlement figure may be expected to have swollen to
$US200m. as a result of the interest which has been
accruing since the settlement on 7 May 1984.
XI-54
A number of other proposals were rejected for a variety of
reasons. One proposal was that distribution be deferred
until the US Government accepted responsibility; others
involved further research, the provision of medical
treatment and health care services and higher compensation
for specific diseases. The reasons for rejecting these
alternatives included the comparative scarcity of the
resources, the immediate needs of the class members, lack
of benefit to class members, cost of implementation,
duplication of existing facilities and problems which
derive from the lack of causal information.
The insurance-type compensation scheme is proposed to
provide cash payments for death or long-term disability
with administration by private contractors in order to
minimise administration costs and overcome the problems
associated with the uneven workload involved in such a
scheme. The advantages of this proposal include the
payment of benefits to those suffering most. the absence
of a need for proof in respect of a claim and that the
scheme gives some account of the likelihood of association
between exposure and illness by compensating those
veterans suffering death or long-term disability.
XI-55
A simplified determination of the exposure issue is
contemplated: those handling the relevant chemicals will
be deemed to be exposed; otherwise a comparison is to be
made between the HERBS tapes records and the troop
location data. The similarity of these proposals, coming
as they do after the formulation of the Commission's
conclusions and recommendations, provide some confirmation
of the evidence received at the Exposure Hearings and the
Commission's assessment of all the evidence received on
that topic. The Class Action scheme benefits are to be
limited to the 50% most heavily exposed in order to
increase the available benefits.
Death benefits are payable as a single lump sum regardless
of what disease was the cause, unless predominantly caused
by trauma (whether self-inflicted or not). The exclusion,
which would operate in such instances as accidents,
homicides. suicides and war wounds, is designed to
eliminate claims which are obviously unrelated to exposure
to herbicides in Vietnam. The maximum amount of $US3,400
will be payable to survivors of veterans who died before 1
January 1985. Those who died after that date will receive
an amount based on the number of years remaining in the
program, scheduled to continue until 31 December 1994.
XI - 5 6
Long-term total disability is defined in the same manner
as the definition contained in the (US) Social Security
Act. This avoids the time and expense associated with
assessment. The maximum award for disability will be
$12,800 payable in instalments over a ten year period.
Awards will vary according to the age of the veteran and
the duration of disability: higher payments will be made
for longer disability periods and younger veterans.
Awards in respect of disability will cease if the
disability ceases, either through recovery or death. As
in the case of death benefits, the program will cease on 1
January 1995.
Provision is to be made for review of the operation of
this scheme: the Court is to receive reports and retains
final control of the scheme. Variation in the level of
benefits may occur if the claims experience so dictates.
Any excess remaining at the termination of the program is
to be used to provide further assistance to class members,
particularly children of Vietnam veterans with birth
defects. An advisory group of Vietnam veterans will be
consulted as to the planning and development of the
payment program and the need for legal assistance is to be
minimal.
XI-57
The second aspect of the distribution plan involves the
creation of a Class Assistance Foundation designed to fund
services which will benefit the entire class thereby
avoiding the payment of trivial amounts. Children with
birth defects born to class members are to be given
priority by this Foundation which is to be controlled by a
Board of Directors composed primarily of Vietnam
veterans. A number of possible avenues for distribution
were canvassed by His Honour: funding for birth defect and
reproductive problem programs, emergency funding for
medical services and reproductive and genetic
counselling. Other possibilities included funding of
class wide services such as advocacy assistance, "hot
line", referral and information services and public
education programs.
The third component of the distribution plan is the
allocation of $US4m to Australian and New Zealand
veterans. A different treatment was the result of
differences between the US and Australasian public health
and medical programs. The fundamental principle is that
the respective amounts, $US3.6m. for Australian veterans
and $US400,000 for New Zealand veterans, will be paid to a
charitable trust or like body involving the co-operation
of interest groups, class members and Government.
X I - 5 8
Insofar as the Australian allocation is concerned, the
formation of the Australian Vietnam War Veterans' Trust
Limited was proposed under the chairmanship of a former
New South Wales Supreme Court Judgeâ the Hon. C.L.D.
Meares QC . Representatives of the Vietnam Veterans'
Association of Australia, the Returned Services League,
the Australian Veterans' Defence Services Council and
Legacy would also serve on the Board of Directors. members
of which would receive no payment except in respect of
out-of-pocket expenses. The Commission again indicates
that it has grave doubts as to the legal status of the 9
Vietnam Veterans' Association of Australia.
Whether the local Trust should follow the US distribution
plan or recommend some other alternative (s) was not laid
down: Chief Judge .Weinstein has indicated that any
reasonable plan will be permitted.10
The Commission regards the proposed Trust as worthwhile
and would only recommend consideration of further
representation. either as consultants or additional
directors, from the Vietnam Veterans' Counselling Service
and professions such as accountancy, actuarial science,
law and medicine.
Xi-59
Thus the issues relating to the litigation, settlement and
distribution of the Class Action appear to be approaching
finality.
Unfortunately, the discord between various Australian
veteran organisations continues and the proposed Trust has
not commenced its activities. It is to be regretted that
the interests of Australian veterans in this regard are
presently impeded by the attitudes of those who purport to
serve them. The Commission can but hope that common sense
will ultimately prevail.
XI-60
ENDNOTES
1. Exhibit 1890
2. In Re "Agent Orange" Product Liability Litigation 565 F. Supp. 1263 at 1266 (E.D.N.Y. 1983)
3. Transcript of San Francisco Fairness Hearings, 24 August, 1984, pp 542 - 543
4. Preliminary Memorandum, op. cit. , pp 65 - 66
5. Exhibit 1892
6. Transcript of San Francisco Fairness Hearings, 24 August, 1984, p 519
7. Preliminary Memorandum, op. cit., pp 346 - 347
8. Exhibit 1963
9. See Ch XIV.
10. Exhibit 1963 p 147.
XI-61
CHAPTER XII
STATUS OF W A A AND RELEVANT MATTERS
1. STATUS OF W A A 1
2. W A A ' S SUBMISSIONS 18
3. THE ROLE OF JOHN EVANS 21
4. DISSENSIONS AMONG VIETNAM VETERANS 30
4.1 Re Relations Between RSL and W A A 31
4.2 Re Internal Dissension 40
4.3 Re Epidemiological Studies September 1981 56
5. CONCLUSION 65
ENDNOTES 67
CHAPTER XII
STATUS OF W A A AND RELEVANT MATTERS
1. STATUS OF W A A
It will be recalled that when the Commission first
formally met on 14 July 1983 Mr Mclnnes QC sought leave to
appear for the Vietnam Veterans Association of Australia
(WAA) which he claimed was "an "Australia-wide
organization of 9,000 members having a very real interest
in the matter before the Commission."1
From the outset, the Commission was aware that about
45,000 Australians had been in Vietnam during the relevant
period. VAAA purported to have no more than 9,000
members, some of whom were not veterans but members of the
families of veterans and other supporters.
The RSL, which had amongst its membership some 12,000
Vietnam veterans, had made a deliberate decision not to 2 seek leave to appear.
XII-1
The Commission has been constantly concerned for the great
body of Vietnam veterans who were not represented at the
formal hearings of the Commission.
In that context and in the light of views expressed not
only by many veterans in informal sessions but also by
veterans purporting to represent sub-groups of WAA,
doubts developed about the representative capacity of W A A
and particularly the legal entitlement of its de facto
leadership to "speak for" even its "members" let alone
other Vietnam veterans.
W A A has no corporate structure and no rules binding upon
individual members. The so-called 'National Body1 seems
to have come into existence by way of meetings of people
purporting to represent others, some of whom were members
of state associations and other smaller and even less
formal groups. It is not known under what rules such
representatives purported to represent members of such
bodies or groups.
As early as February 1984 the Commission expressed its
concern to Senior Counsel for W A A as to the legal status
of his client and suggested some regularising of the
"Association's" structure. Initially, this was done in
X11 - 2
private chambers. As a result of this discussion copies
of certain documents were handed over by Counsel for W A A
to the Commission.
After examination of these documents the Commission
requested Mr Mclnnes to ask W A A for any further documents
which it considered relevant to the problem.
As nothing further was heard after the lapse of a
reasonable period, a summons directed to the person
apparently giving instructions to Counsel was issued.
That summons formally sought the appearance of Phillip
Thompson but in reality sought the production of the
following documents:
1. The Constitution, By-Laws and Rules and other
documents dealing with the structure and
decision-making processes of the Vietnam Veterans
Association of Australia and/or the powers of the
Association's office-bearers.
2. Minutes of all meetings (whether ordinary or
extraordinary) of the National Congress, the National
Council, the National Executive or the Trustees or any
form of general meeting of the Vietnam Veterans
X I 1-3
Association of Australia since the formation of those
bodies or any of them.
3. Certificates of registration, applications for
registration and any documents lodged in respect of,
or subsequent to, registration of the Vietnam Veterans
Association of Australia.
4. All documents, including books of account. indicating
the membership or membership strength of the Vietnam
Veterans Association of Australia.
5. Originals and copies of all letters since 14 May 1983
passing between the Vietnam Veterans Association of
Australia and the Minister for Veterans' Affairs, and
between Mr Thompson and the Minister for Veterans'
Affairs bearing upon the work of the Commission, its
Terms of Reference and the proposed Australian
Veteran's Health Study known as the Morbidity Study.
On the return of that subpoena on 1 June 1984 Senior
Counsel Assisting said:
In about mid-March your Honour developed concerns about an apparent inconsistency of response between certain Vietnam veterans' associations within the States and also about the actual
X I 1-4
structure and decision-making processes of the body granted leave to appear. A subpoena was at that time issued and its contents discussed with Mr MeInnes.3
After discussion between Counsel for W A A and the
Commission in respect of the response to the subpoena the
transcript shows:
THE COMMISSIONER: Mr MeInnes, so that there might be no misunderstanding as to the purpose of certain paragraphs in the subpoena in view of the documents that were produced to me earlier
pursuant to a reguest in March this year, it is apparent to me that the position might be that the Vietnam Veterans' Association of Australia-- which purports to be an association of certain
people, as I understand it-- has no rules at all, even though there may be a constitution; (but the) legal position may have very serious
consequences. It may be that your right of
appearance on behalf of that association--- you see, it is a voluntary association, unregistered, without rules which raises doubts as to whether it can appear before this Commission or whether
it has any legal-- I do not want to use the word "entity" or something technical-- it is not a question of whether it has got any flesh and
blood running around some skeleton but rather whether the skeleton is even there.4
After a short exchange with Senior Counsel for W A A
wherein he indicated that he had not looked into the
problem the Commission expressed its concern: I
I suggest that you do because the ramifications of all that, are very, very serious. I am not
talking about this hearing in this room - I do not want to say any more than that but you can
probably imagine what I mean.5
X I 1-5
Subsequently on 4 June 1984 the Commission again indicated
6
its concern.
Thereafter certain other documents were produced to the
Commission informally by Mr Thompson.
Although there are included in such documents, documents
entitled "Draft Memorandum of Association" and "Articles
of Association" in respect of an association named "The
Vietnam Veterans Association of Australia", no national
body of that name has ever been incorporated or registered
under either Commonwealth or State legislation nor have
any rules, registered or otherwise, of any such national
body been produced to the Commission.
Provision is made under Commonwealth and various State
legislation for the incorporation of proprietary
companies, companies limited by guarantee and the
registration of voluntary associations. In addition,
certain States have legislation requiring registration of
associations wishing to canvass and receive charitable
donations.
But such legislation does not provide that incorporation
or registration of voluntary associations is compulsory.
X I 1-6
Voluntary associations may validly function within
Commonwealth territories or within State boundaries
without having to be incorporated or registered under
relevant legislation.
But a voluntary association, either incorporated or
unincorporated, requires rules under which it can validly
function; either because the Act of Parliament under which
it is incorporated or registered requires rules to be
filed with the appropriate authority, or. in the case of
an unregistered, unincorporated association, because the
body or 'association1 is but the creature of an agreement
between persons who form the membership of that body or
association.
Perhaps in an association consisting of a very small
number of members. such rules are merely the terms
verbally agreed upon by each and every member (together
with necessary implications arising from such terms) at
the time of the formation of the association. But when
the membership of an unregistered and unincorporated
voluntary association is some 9,000 persons, then it is
readily seen that to say that the terms of any agreement
claimed to have been made between each and every member
making up the 9,000 membership have not been reduced to
X I 1-7
writing, points up the difficulty in claiming that such a
voluntary association of 9,000 members without written
rules has been validly functioning within Australia for
some 4 years.
How are the office bearers of such an association
elected? For what period are they elected? What are the
powers and duties of such office bearers? How often do
they meet? What is the procedure for calling such
meetings? By what method and under what circumstances are
any suggested rules amended. What constitutes a quorum
for any particular body within the association? These are
but a few of the 1,001 questions that can be asked.
Answers to such questions, in a properly constituted
unincorporated voluntary association will, of course. be
found in its rules.
After it was clear that all available documents had been
produced by Mr Thompson or Mr Mclnnes. the Commission
again expressed concern to Mr Mclnnes in private
chambers. it went so far as to suggest incorporation,
perhaps as a company limited by guarantee, with the
formality of meetings and the ratification of actions
previously taken by the "National Office" of WAA. So far
as the Commission is aware, nothing further has happened
X I 1-8
to regularise the position as outlined to Senior Counsel
for WAA.
Counsel appearing for W A A informed the Commission in
private chambers in June 1984 that they were satisfied as
to their respective entitlements to appear for the
"Association". They stated they were instructed by the
"National Office". It was clear that they had the
confidence of the de facto leadership and of the few
veterans who were regular visitors at the Commission.
They had prepared themselves to present evidence, to
cross-examine and to make submissions.
At that time they pointed out that they both had been
present at a meeting of the so-called "National Congress"
of W A A held on 14 May 1983 at which the Minister for
Veterans' Affairs, Senator Gietzelt, announced the setting
up of this Commission by Letters Patent dated 13 May
1983. The Minister had also announced at that meeting
that the Government would assist in funding the appearance
of W A A before the Commission. Mr Mclnnes indicated that
certain resolutions had been adopted by that meeting
whereby both he and Mr Hill (instructed by Turner Freeman,
Solicitors) were named as Counsel who would represent W A A
before the Commission and that instructions were to be
XI1-9
given to the instructing Solicitors by the "National
Office".
On seeking information from Mr Mclnnes as to what the term
"national office" meant, the Commission was informed that
he believed that a further resolution had been later
adopted by the meeting wherein four particular persons
were nominated as a "National Office" for the purpose of
instructing his Solicitors.
Among the documents which had previously been handed to
the Commission by Mr Thompson or by Counsel representing
W A A were documents in relation to the 14-15 May 1983
meeting of a so-called "National Congress" of WAA.
Included was a six foolscap-page typed document headed
"Motions passed by the 4th National Congress of the
Vietnam Veterans' Association of Australia held at
Granville RSL Club, Memorial Drive, Granville, NSW,
Saturday 14 and Sunday 15 May 1983". Thereunder are
listed 23 motions each stated to be seconded by either
NSW, Victoria, Queensland, Adelaide, Tasmania, Western
Australia, Northern Territory, and to have been carried
unamimously. There are no minutes included in the bundle
of documents produced which make reference to these
motions. it is understood that this particular bundle was
XII-10
the totality of the papers in the possession of Mr
Thompson in respect of the so-called "National Congress"
meeting of 14-15 May 1983.
The documents do not disclose the persons entitled to be
and who were in fact present at that meeting nor what
office the so-called representatives from the various
States held. Nor is it known what powers they possessed
at relevant times or whether they were validly elected
delegates from affiliated groups. Indeedâ no rules from
any purported affiliated group (other than the West
Australian group) were lodged with the Commission and it
is not known whether such groups have the power to
nominate or elect representatives to any other body. The
Commission is aware that in Western Australia there has
been registered a voluntary association known as 1 Vietnam
Veterans Family Association of West Australia' .
Rule 27 of its registered rules provides: The President
and a nominated member from the Committee together with
Office Bearers holding the positions of President and
Senior Vice-President in other States in Vietnam Veterans
Associations shall be members of the National Executive
which will be known as the Vietnam Veterans Association of
Australia. So far as is known this or a similar rule does
XII-11
not appear in any of the rules of other associations or
groups in other States.
Included among the motions claimed to be passed at the
meeting of 14-15 May 1983 is the following:
Motion N.S.W. (John Haines) moved a motion
that this congress accept the Terms of Reference and Government appointment of the Q.C. and Junior Counsel and endorse the appointment of Adrian Mclnnes as Queens Counsel. Mr A. Hill as Junior Counsel and Turner Freeman to represent
the W A A case. (sic)
Seconded - Queensland
Carried unanimously
Motion N.S.W. (Don Wilson) moved a motion that the national office begin immediately to brief Counsel for the Royal
Commission and take what ever other steps it deems necessary in the
preparation of our case.
Seconded South Ustralia (sic)
Carried unanimously
Northern Territory requested biographical details of the Q.C. and Counsels. Phill Thompson advised we will write a profile on the persons that (sic) will represent us.
Seconded Queensland
Carried unamimously.
It is understood that the expression "Government
appointment of the Q.C. and Junior Counsel" referred to in
X I 1-12
the first motion above is a reference to Mr Coombs Q.C.
and Mr Max Kimber whose appointment as Counsel Assisting
had been announced by the Government at the time of the
announcement of the Commission.
Nowhere in the twenty-three motions stated to have been
adopted at that meeting does a motion appear as to the
composition of or the names of persons constituting the
"National Office" referred to in the second of the two
motions set out above. The Commission has never been told
nor does it know what is meant by the expression "the
National Office" nor who constitute that "office".
A perusal of the documents handed to the Commission either
by Mr Mclnnes or by Mr Thompson are documents identified
by yellow stick-on markers as "Minutes" of purported W A A
"National Congress" meetings held respectively in May
1981, May 1982, May 1983 and May 1984 together with an
agenda with documents attached for a so-called "Meeting of
Delegates from State Branches and Regional Groups of the
National Office of W A A 11-12 December 1982."
None of these documents include details of rules or
proposed rules of a national association adopted or
proposed to be adopted after confirmation by other
XI1-13
associations. Further, no rules of any State association
(other than those of an association registered in Western
Australia) have been produced to the Commission.
On 4 June 1984, despite the state of affairs briefly
described above, the Commission deemed it expedient in the
all the circumstances to allow Counsel for W A A to
continue to appear but with a "rider" of reservations 7
expressed to and accepted by Mr Mclnnes. Mr Thompson's
assertion in "Debrief" November-December 1984 that W A A
had been examined by the Commission on its bona fides to
represent veterans and been given a 1 clean bill of health1
was bizarre and a complete distortion of what in fact was
stated by the Commission on 4 June 1984. Nothing
happened, so far as the Commission is concerned, between 4
June 1984 and November/Dec ember 1984 that could have led
Mr Thompson to reach the conclusions expressed in that
issue of "Debrief".
By letter dated 12 June 1984 Mr Mclnnes wrote to Senior
Counsel Assisting as follows:
12 June 1984
John Coombs QC
Re W A A - Royal Commission
Following the meeting on 8 inst, minutes of the various State Branch inaugural meetings are being
X I 1-14
obtained - if they still exist.
I have now learned that my instructing solicitors were instructed some time ago to incorporate the Federal Body.
It was, however, considered desirable to await incorporation of all State branches to ensure that there are no gaps.
N.T. is now registered and Tasmania and
Queensland are awaiting certificates of
registration. As you are aware Victoria and South Australia are already registered.
That leaves N.S.W. outstanding and a request will be made for this to be expedited. The A.C.T. branch has been defunct for some years and
veterans have belonged to the N.S.W. branch. There is now a move to form a territory branch but registration cannot await this event.
In respect of the press release of the 7 June, Phill Thompson's remarks were based upon
newspaper reports and information passed on about matters raised in the Commission. You will
recall that he left for New Zealand before 1 June and returned only after the right of appearance was raised.
Regards.
The Commission thereafter caused searches of public
records in the various States and Territories to be made
in respect of the incorporation and/or registration of
various Vietnam veterans' associations.
In March 1985 the Commission was informed by Mr Mclnnes,
Mr Hill and Ms Ward that they would no longer be appearing
for W A A before the Commission.
X I 1-15
Thereafter on 18 April 1985 the Commission held a formal
hearing for the purpose of receiving statistical evidence
from Dr Adena concerning the incidence of certain deaths
of Vietnam veterans. On that day Mr Thompson attended and
requested leave to appear for W A A in order to
cross-examine Dr Adena. The Commission indicated that in
all the circumstances Mr Thompson might cross-examine Dr
Adena but pointed out to him that such leave was granted
in accordance with the riders and qualifications given by
the Commission to Mr Mclnnes on 4 June 1984.
It is trite law that an association of individuals has no
legal status to act for its membership at large. Nor can
its office-bearers validly represent the membership
without the agreement of the members. Such agreement is
usually to be found in express rules (or implications
properly drawn therefrom) which are binding on all members.
In the absence of any rules, the capacity of the de facto
leadership of this "association" to issue a receipt on its
behalf is doubtful and his or their power to make
decisions in any way binding upon or representative of the
association's claimed membership without evidence of an
agreement of all members validly granting such power is
non-existent.
X I 1-16
An unincoroprated association cannot be regarded as a
legal entity in the nature of a partnership, a company or
of any other variation of a legal person or entity.
The Commission repeats that a detailed examination of all
documents produced by W A A to the Commission and of the
relevant searches of Departmental records throughout
Australia has done nothing to allay the concern expressed
in June 1984. This concern does not seem to be shared by
those who represented W A A nor by those who have
authorised funds for its appearance before the Commission,
which funds have been stated to be in excess of $700,000.
Finally, on this subject matter, the Commission, in the
early days when it commenced receiving formal evidence,
was concerned that the views being put by W A A were not
always in accord with those of Vietnam veterans generally
or even those of some of the so-called branches of WAA.
Having had the advantage of speaking informally with
almost 2.000 Vietnam veterans throughout Australia. this
concern increased as W A A continued to put views to the
Commission not in accord with views that had been
expressed quite strongly to the Commission by veterans
personally. Further, concerns were felt from time to time
that allegations that had been made by veterans during
X I 1-17
informal meetings were not being presented or adequately-
presented to the Commission and, consequently, not being
adequately canvassed.
Nevertheless it should be widely known that the Commission
instructed Counsel Assisting it to ensure that no stone
was left unturned. The solicitors and staff of the
Commission were similarly instructed. The Commission
itself, in effect, acted for all veterans and their wives
and children in an earnest search for any possible
connection between chemical agents and adverse health
consequences. It searched also for such consequences and
their connection with Vietnam service.
2. WAA'S SUBMISSIONS
Throughout this Report reference has been made to the
various written submissions made on behalf of W A A
including its initial submission and its toxicology
submission.8 It is unnecessary at this stage to repeat
the Commission's views as to the standard of those two
submissions. At the time of their lodgment with the
Commission it was thought every possible latitude should
be afforded" to those representing WAA, it being hoped
that after all the evidence had been produced W A A through
X I 1-18
its legal representatives would thoroughly and precisely
deal with the issues which had been raised in the oral
evidence and the written material before the Commission.
After all the evidence had been collected in mid-December
1984 the Commission laid down a program for the filing of
final written submissions. Such program provided that
WAA's final submission was to be lodged by the end of
January 1985. It was hoped that this final submission
would repair the lack of particularity and clearly state
WAA's case and at the same time deal in a conventional
way with the evidence for and against on all issues.
However, on receipt of the final submission (Exhibit 1879)
the hopes of the Commission were dashed.
It abounds in generality and bald assertion and is short
on detail and logic. It makes no attempt to state or to
come to grips with the issues raised by the evidence and
fails even to mention. let alone confront. evidence
unfavourable to the veterans' general, if nebulous,
position.
The section on birth defects, for example, fails to deal
with the mechanistic problems. The evidentiary opinions
X I 1-19
of Dr Sune Larsson, Dr Dave Brusick and Dr Zena Stein are
not even mentioned. This is particularly significant in
light of what must be known to Counsel advising WAA,
namely, that Chief Judge Weinstein in the US class action
accepted the opinion of Dr Stein as the only analysis
acceptable as a matter of science and law.
The section on mortality, less than two pages long, makes
no attempt to deal with the primary thesis of all
witnesses called on this topic. namely. that increased
mortality might be expected amongst veteran national
servicemen but that such increase is not chemically caused.
To be blunt, had the WAA;s final submission been
profferred to a university supervisor by a student, it
probably would have been returned with a recommendation
that it be withdrawn rather than damage the reputation of
the submitter.
The effect of these shortcomings has been to throw an even
greater burden on the Commission to seek out what case
might have been made on behalf of veterans, represented
and unrepresented. This was done and done thoroughly.
The Commission takes no pleasure in making these
criticisms but its confidence in the Bar of New South
X I 1-20
Wales was shaken by the quality of this final submission.
That confidence fortunately has been restored by the
workmanlike and thoroughly professional assistance
received from Counsel Assisting and from Counsel for
Monsanto (Australia) Limited.
3. THE ROLE OF JOHN EVANS
From the earliest days of W A A and indeed from the time of
the first allegation by Bernard Szapiel that his ill
health was caused by Agent Orange the name John Evans is
prominent. He was present at almost all the early
meetings at which the association was mooted and its
objects and purposes were discussed.
There is no doubt that Evans was the driving force in the
propagation of the chemical/ill health theory in
Australia. Certainly, he converted Phillip Thompson who
in the early days regarded the Agent Orange story as (to 9
use his colourful phrase) "a wank". He was however a
force not only in "scientific" matters but also in
political and tactical matters from the very beginning.
As Phillip Thompson wrote "Without this man there would be
no Association, no .... counselling service, no ....
Senate Inquiry, no .... Royal Commission".10
X I 1-21
During the currency of the Commission Mr Evans "resigned"
as scientific adviser to WAA. There is little doubt.
that this step was taken so as to avoid giving further
evidence before this Commission.
He had given evidence during the hearing limited to
"Exposure" on 9 and 10 February 1984. He was then
subjected to cross-examination, which the Commission
limited to that subject matter.
John Evans had been the publicist for and largely the
author of the toxicological case believed in by and
presented to the Commission on behalf of WAA. A written
report1· 1 · of his general views was presented to the
Commission as part of W A A 1 s case in December 1983. At
that time toxicology hearings were foreshadowed. Evans1
evidence was to take a prominent place. An expansion of
his toxicological opinions was promised and re-promised by
Counsel for WAA.
When this expansion was not delivered to those Assisting,
the Commission put courteous pressure on those appearing
for W A A to produce the document. Pursuant to the
procedures laid down, as far as possible proofs were
delivered to the Commission and to all parties appearing
X I 1-22
in anticipation of the calling of witnesses so as to
permit proper preparation for cross-examination.
It ultimately became necessary for Counsel for W A A to be
publicly asked about the proof of Mr Evans1 evidence when
the toxicology hearings were drawing towards a close. On
26 June 1984, more than a week after the commencement of
the toxicology hearings the following exchange took place
as the official transcript at pp 3246-7 shows:
MR COOMBS: And, your Honour, we do not have an answer to the Evans question yet.
THE COMMISSIONER: (To Mr Mclnnes) I was asked to remind you about that.
MR McINNES: I am unable to assist, your Honour. We would not be relying on Mr Evans to
produce the document at this stage. I would say that I would not be seeking to call
him. I just do not have the document and I do not see one coming in the immediate
future and I would not be seeking to rely on it.
THE COMMISSIONER: Does he propose to produce a document?
MR McINNES: I think he does, your Honour. I think it is under way but if the matter
arose and became significant then I would have to take the matter up again in the
future, if and when that occurs.
MR COOMBS: Programming, as your Honour knows, is a very tight problem.
MR McINNES: I say that with the programming in mind, your Honour, because we know the
difficulty with the programming and if the report is not here at this time then it may be a penalty we will have to pay.
XI1-23
MR COOMBS: I think there is a bit more to it than that, your Honour. I think Mr Evans - if my learned friend did not propose to call him, I would call him anyway. He has put
too much into this debate to not face up ---THE COMMISSIONER: When you say call him - on this topic?
MR COOMBS: Yes, your Honour.
THE COMMISSIONER; Toxicology.
MR O'KEEFE: Your Honour, I specifically reserved a number of matters. Mr Evans has gone to the trouble of going on radio and television and absolutely slanging my client all over Australia, and I held back on those matters
on the last occasion and I regard my
cross-examination of him as incomplete. Whether he produces a document or not, I want him again, please, to cross-examine him at an appropriate time.
MR COOMBS: Your Honour, I would not have any inhibition about calling him blind - I do not mean that in the way it sounded, I am
sorry. I would be quite content to call him without a proof. So he should be told that and if necessary we will issue a subpoena.
Again, on 28 June 1984 the official transcript at pp
3446-8 reads:
THE COMMISSIONER: It has been suggested to me, Mr Mclnnes. when we were talking about Mr Evans' paper yesterday - or submission, document, whatever you want to call it - I
did not hear you say this but it was
suggested to me --- I have not got yesterday's transcript --- that you
indicated that if I were to put a time on it that you would not call him.
XI 1-24
MR McINNES: No. I did not say that. Well, I said that he had not got it in within the
time. I thought he would be here this
week. In those circumstances. I would not call him.
THE COMMISSIONER: What do you mean by that? Not call him at all on this aspect?
MR McINNES: Yes, your Honour. I understand that he is doing a paper. The difficulty is that I simply cannot say with any certainty when that paper will be ready. In those
circumstances, I thought that ---MR COOMBS: I certainly took my learned friend to be saying, your Honour, that his problem
was that he could not get a guarantee from Mr Evans. So he was not able to give us
one: it was not any problem with him.
THE COMMISSIONER: No. I am not being critical of you.
MR McINNES: No.
THE COMMISSIONER: I do not want it to be suggested that because it was not done this week that this Commission has blocked you calling Mr Evans to give evidence on this
aspect. Because Mr Evans will certainly be back in the witness box before this
Commission.
MR McINNES: When I get the paper ---THE COMMISSIONER: Even if it is only to conclude the cross-examination.
MR McINNES: Yes, your Honour. I think that I said when I got the paper if I thought it
was significant I would certainly pass it on to the Commission and if I thought it was significant then I would re-apply to call him on the paper.
THE COMMISSIONER: Yes.
MR McINNES: No, your Honour, I did not - I was saying that I cannot call him now....
X I 1-25
MR COOMBS: Timing is a problem. May I suggest that your Honour ask Mr Mclnnes to tell Mr Evans that paper or no he will be called
during the week commencing 20 August.
THE COMMISSIONER: Yes. very well, if you would
MR McINNES: Yes.
On 13 August 1984 at p 3647 the official transcript reads
MR O'KEEFE: Your Honour, before we commence the next witness - having regard to something that my learned friend - Mr Coombs, said late last week, namely, that Mr John Evans had been the subject of a summons to appear on Monday the 20th. I should indicate
formally that, having reviewed the
transcript of Mr Evans' evidence and his cross-examination, we would not wish to ask him any further questions unless he were forthcoming with some additonal evidence in chief by way of proof or otherwise.
THE COMMISSIONER: I have not looked at his transcript for some time, but was not his evidence restricted to the subject matter?
MR COOMBS: It was, your Honour, he gave evidence --- (on exposure only).
THE COMMISSIONER: He may be called on other matters, I do not know, Mr O'Keefe.
MR O'KEEFE: Quite, your Honour. All I am indicating is that, as far as we are
concerned, unless he were to give additional evidence in relation to 2,4-D. 2.4,5-T, TCDD, it would be hard to see that we would want to ask him anything. In fact, the
present decision would be not to ask him anything. Now, undoubtedly, there are other matters outside those three substances that he may wish to give evidence on or on which he may give evidence; but those would be outside the ambit of my brief and I just
X I 1-26
indicate that for the purpose of
programming, your Honour, and
decision-making in relation to his recall or not.
MR COOMBS: Your Honour, there are some other considerations which I would wish to discuss with your Honour privately; but it may be that those assisting would suggest that we
simply cancel his attendance.
MR O'KEEFE; That may assist on your times this week.
MR COOMBS; Yes.
THE COMMISSIONER: Those observations, I take it Mr Mclnnes, have been taken on board by you for whatever reasons you may want ---MR McINNES: Yes, your Honour, I do not propose
to call him again in relation to any matter, (emphasis added)
Senior Counsel Assisting was informed by Mr Mclnnes later
in August 1984 that he had been unable to get any further
document from Mr Evans and that Evans was no longer
scientific adviser to WAA. The Commission notes that Mr
Evans appeared on television and radio supporting the
chemical thesis on several occasions subsequent to the
announcement that he was not to be called by WAA. On
those occasions he was described as a chemical expert and
adviser to WAA. Nothwithstanding his widely publicised
opinions and what Counsel for Monsanto (Australia) Limited
called his "slanging" of chemical manufacturers, he has
lacked the courage to support his opinions before this
Commission, a forum sought by him. He had learnt on 9
X I 1-27
February 1984 when he gave evidence on the topic of
exposure that all opinions expressed by him would not
necessarily be simply accepted but would be subjected to
appropriately rigorous analysis.
It was easier simply to assist in the preparation of
W A A 1 s Toxicology submission (as the Commission suspects
he did) and steer clear of the witness box! ·
A brief examination of his background is helpful. Mr
Evans graduated in Science from the University of
Melbourne in 1963. He appears to have been accepted for a
Master of Science Preliminary Course with which he did not
persist.
Although he embarked upon research for a Doctorate in
Philosophy at the Monash University he never submitted a
thesis.
In 1968 he commenced work at the Division of Applied
Organic Chemistry of the Commonwealth Scientific and
Industrial Research Organization (CSIRO) at Fisherman's
Bend, Victoria. His work in that Organisation gave him no
special gualification as an expert in the herbicide field.
X I 1-28
He has never done any experimental work with any of the
chemicals about which he "spread the word" and gave
reports. Nor has he any qualifications in toxicology,
epidemiology, genetics or bio-statistics.
In the course of his work at the CSIRO he was injured as a
result of coming into contact with a laser beam which
rendered him blind in one eye.
At the time of giving evidence (in February 1984 ) he had
no fixed employment and described himself as a guest
lecturer at the University of Melbourne.
It transpired that this "guest lectureship" involved him
giving two hours of lectures per year in the School of
History and Philosophy of Science. He agreed that his
"expertise" in toxicology had been obtained from a reading
of literature on the topic.
It was put to him that he had read the literature and
picked out only those parts of it which were favourable to
the thesis which he wished to advance. In a series of
evasive answers commencing at. p 1588 of the official
transcript he resisted conceding this proposition. That
that is his method is inescapable from an examination of his written work.
X I 1-29
Nor does he always quote and report accurately. The
consistent nature of the inaccuracies suggests bias rather
than appropriate objectivity. That he must be regarded as
one of those pseudo-scientists earlier referred to is a
sad fact. Sadder still is the heartache and anguish of
many fearful Vietnam veterans and their wives in this
country for which he must bear at least some
responsibility.
4. DISSENSIONS AMONG VIETNAM VETERANS
In Chapter I of this Report reference was made to the
early period of the formation of Vietnam veterans
associations throughout Australia and the mooted
suggestion that a national body be formed. Reference was
there made to the fact that in late 1980 dissension had
developed not only between associations of various Vietnam
veterans within Australia but between members within
particular associations. The suggested dissension was
stated to be in respect to three matters:
(i) The possible liaison and co-operation of a
proposed national body of Vietnam veterans with
the RSL;
X I 1-30
(ii) Dissension between Vietnam veteran groups in the
various States and Territories of Australia
regarding (inter alia) becoming parties to the
U.S. Class Action;
(iii) Whether further support should be given to the
epidemiological studies being carried out or to
be carried out by AVHS during 1981-1982.
In this regard the following documents are set out:
4 .1 Re Relations between RSL and W A A
(a) Report of March 1981 of Mr Holt McMinn. National President W A A on meeting with Sir William Keys QBE, MC. National President Returned Services League at the RSL National Headquarters on 25 and 26 February 1981.
Those attending the meeting were:
Returned Services League:
Sir William Keys QBE, MC - National President Mr John Button - National Solicitor to the RSL Mr Alf Clarke - RLS ACT Branch President Mr Peter Young - Assistant National Secretary
Vietnam Veterans Association of Australia
Mr Holt McMinn - National President Mr Frank Callaghan - National Repatriation Adviser Mr David Harris - State President Victorian Branch
1. Introduction
The following report concerns the meetings with Sir William Keys, National President ofthe RSL, which took place over 25/26 February 1981.
XII-31
The report lists items that were discussed that affect our Association and you will note in my conclusions that I have asked for a response on any aspect of this
report from you.
2. RSL Support for Vietnam Veterans claims before the DVA
I expressed concern to Sir William that whilst
instructions had been issued by the RSL National Executive that every assistance was to be given to Vietnam veterans in pursuing claims before the DVA, there still appeared to be some problems. Sir William
rang the Victorian State Secretary in my presence and asked what procedure was adopted when that Branch was approached by a Vietnam veteran.
The answer to that question is contained in a written report to Sir William by the Victorian State
Secretary. (Copy attached *). Sir William also undertook to establish what the NSW Branch of the RSL was doing to assist the Vietnam veterans in pursuing
claims and to fully explore this issue at the next National Executive meeting to be held 14/15 March 1981.
3 . Direct liaison RSL/WAA
We expressed concern that one cause of friction between our organizations was that the RSL had in the past made statements concerning all Vietnam veterans without consulting this Association.
I reminded Sir William that a request had been made by myself on 28 November 1980 for the RSL to establish a special sub-committee, including representation from our Association, to advise the RSL National Executive on matters that concerned Vietnam veterans. This proposal was put to the RSL National Executive meeting
in December 1980 but was refused. I
I again requested that this sub-committee be
established and Sir William responded by offering our Association participation on the RSL National Committee on Veterans' Affairs. Sir William suggested we put forward two members as our representatives on
the Committee. This Committee's role is to advise the National Executive of the RSL on all policy matters concerning the DVA.
XI1-32
This offer has been accepted. It is not what was
requested but it is a good beginning. I feel that Frank Callaghan, National Repatriation Advisor to our Association, should be one of those representatives.
The other representative can be appointed at our National Conference but I am willing to carry out these duties in the meantime. This RSL Committee meets every three months, but may be convened on a
more frequent basis if the need arises, and clearly in our case the need is there to influence RSL policy in a way that will assist our members and all
ex-servicemen generally.
4. RSL Executive Position
Mr Peter Young, a Vietnam veteran, has been appointed Assistant Secretary of the National RSL Executive, and is to become National Secretary in June, 1981. Both Sir William Keys and Peter Young expressed very
strongly that the next Assistant Secretary to be appointed would also be a Vietnam veteran.
5. RSL Financial Support
5.1. I brought to Sir William Keys' attention the issue of financial support generally, and the misconceptions that had arisen because of the RSL1 s position on financial support for any veteran involved in the US class action or
Australian litigation. It was pointed out that many veterans had read this to mean complete withdrawal of any financial support for any
Vietnam veteran or this Association. Sir William gave an assurance that this was not the case and the directive was aimed at restricting any legal costs involving veterans without the consent of
the National Executive. Sir William stated that he would make this quite clear to all State
Presidents at the forthcoming National Executive meeting, and further stated that there was no restriction on any State Branch or Sub-Branch supporting this Association in any way other than
that outlined above.
5.2. I raised the question of direct financial support to this Association and Sir William stated that he would examine the ways in which the RSL State Branches could assist us. Obviously this
question depends on the establishment and maintenance of good relations between our two organizations at both State and Federal level.
XI1-33
6. US Class Action
6.1 Mr John Button spoke on the US Class Action and advised:
6 .1 .1 .
6 .1 .2 .
6.1.3.
6.1.4.
6.1.5.
6 .1 .6 .
The US Court is to settle Notices to be
drawn to the attention of all people
comprising the various classes including those in Australia who are in the US Action. Any person who comes within a class must âopt out1 or he or she is automatically
involved in the class action. The form of Notices and the context and
method of distribution of the Notices is not yet known. Australian Plaintiffs (i.e. members of a Class) should, in Mr Button's view, expect
to pay costs of the Defendants in the event of the Plaintiff losing the case. That he had heard that in relation to the above action, a proposal had been made to subdivide Australia into three zones with W.T. McMillan Northern Zone; D. Teed
Southern Zone; and R. Lonnie Western Zone. controlling the Australian involvement in the US Class Action with W.T. McMillan
acting as Lead Counsel. He would follow up enquiries as to whether notices will be settled etc by the US Court. That W.T. McMillan had asked the Federal
Government to contact all veterans through these Notices. W.T. McMillan had made
approaches to the Queensland RSL and Service Clubs to bear the costs of issuing Notices in the event that the Government fails to agree to bear the cost.
7. Australian Matters
7.1. Mr F. Callaghan stated that it was immaterial what the Minister or the Secretary, or any body else for that matter, thought about the
connection between toxic chemicals and death or incapacity. This is a question that, under the Repatriation Act, can only be answered by the determining authorities. 7.2. Mr Callaghan raised the question of the proposed
High Court action to be initiated in Victoria. The RSL had, on taking legal advice, decided not to support this case and had insisted that the
XII-34
correct procedure is to seek remedy by appealing to the Repatriation Commission, and Sir William undertook to request that the Minister expedite appeal procedures that would allow, in lieu of our proposal, a rapid hearing of the case by the Repatriation Commission. Mr Callaghan wanted the
appeal to take no longer than four weeks,
including the appeal to the Repatriation Review Tribunal if that becomes necessary. 7.3. Mr Button reguested that copies of forty covering letters to Veterans concerning determinations
unfavourable to the claimant, and where reference was made to their case being reviewed after the Commonwealth Department of Health Epidemiological Study had delivered its finding, be supplied to
the League.
7.4. Mr Callaghan stated that the cases must proceed regardless of the C.I.H. study's findings and again made the point that the issue of
Prerogative Writs (Mandamus) to compel the Secretary to act according to the Repatriation Act had been suggested four months ago and had failed to attract the League's support. 7.5. Mr Button stated that the 82 page report that was
reported to be in the hands of the Department (reported in the Melbourne 'Age'), should be delivered by the Association to Repatriation Boards. Mr Callaghan replied to this by saying
that it was consistent with what was being done by drawing to the attention of the Boards, by way of claim formq. that this information was in the possession of . the Department, and that it was not
the responsibility of the individual claimant to have to submit evidence of this nature to a Board when the Department already had it.
8. Operation Simpson
8.1. This proposal for an independent Vietnam Veterans Counselling Service has been prepared by Mr Dirk Van Neuren, National Welfare Adviser, with the assistance of other professionals. It has been
prepared as an alternative to the Government's decision to establish such a service within the DVA. The reasons for our counter proposal are contained within the proposal paper. which will
be distributed to all State Branches as soon as possible.
XII- 35
8.2. The proposal paper less the supporting statement and budget was discussed with those present. Sir William indicated that he supported the proposal but. in discussing it with the Minister had
established that the independent management of the project by way of a Limited Liability Company was not acceptable to the Minister. 8.3. Many questions concerning the proposal were put by the RSL members and I feel that once they have read the paper on 1 Operation Simpson' fully then a better understanding of our proposals will be possible. It was apparent though that Sir William supported the proposal.
9. Conclusion
Submissions are now required from each State to be placed before the RSL National Committee on Veterans' Affairs. This will NOT be the only avenue we take to place our views before the Government and those organizations who may be able to assist our cause. Strong support has already been attracted from the Combined Ex-Servicemen' Associations Committee which has eleven ex-service organization member bodies. This Committee has been very active in investigating
the implications of our cause plus matters before the High Court may have on the Repatriation Act and are very concerned that an attempt may be made to change either the Act or the Regulations made under the Act
before the Senate majority passes from the hands of the Government in mid year. Please submit any matters you wish me to raise with the Government or the above committees, in writing, as soon as possible. I would be very pleased to receive comments on these
discussions with the RSL. These comments too should be in writing.
This report was circulated to all State and Territory Presidents on 17 March 1981.
(b) Letter dated 12 March 1981 to Sir William Keys QBE, MC, from Holt McMinn
You asked me recently if the W A A would be prepared to nominate two persons for appointment to the RSL National Committee on Veterans' Affairs.
The W A A is pleased to receive this offer and
willingly accepts it. The nominees are:
X I 1-36
Mr Frank Callaghan, the National Repatriation Advisor to the WAA; and
Mr Holt McMinn, the National President of the WAA.
Yours sincerely,
(c) Letter dated 12 March 1981 to Sir William Keys QBE, MC from Holt McMinn
The W A A is to hold a National Conference in Canberra on Saturday the 2nd and Sunday the 3rd of May 1981. The Presidents of all State and Territory Branches, or their nominated delegates, are to attend. The aim of
this conference is to formalize the organization and operations of the W A A as a national concern.
Three of the Branches do not have great financial resources at present and will find it difficult to fund the movement of their Presidents to Canberra. The Branches are those of West Australia, Tasmania and
the Northern Territory.
It is noted that Article 4(1) of the RSL Memorandum of Association states that the League should assist other bodies with like aims. As you are aware, the W A A is moving towards a close association with the RSL on the
problems of the veterans of the Vietnam conflict. It would be of tremendous assistance to the W A A if the RSL could see its way clear to give financial help with the fares of the three W A A Branch Presidents
concerned. Would you please consider asking the National Executive of the RSL if this could be done.
May I point out that the West Australian Branch of the W A A is a Sub Branch of the RSL and that the Tasmanian and Northern Territory Branches have close
affiliations with the RSL in their State and Territory.
Yours sincerely,
(d) Letter dated 1.2 March 1981 to Sir William Keys QBE, MC, from Holt McMinn
You are aware that the W A A grew up in a rather ad hoc manner and that the tremendous pressures on the various states' organizations during the past year have caused a number of problems.
XI I-37
With my move to Canberra and the appointment of Mr Peter Sadler as Acting National Secretary, the W A A is now in a position to organize itself as a properly constituted national body and to rationalize its aims and objectives. The RSL National Executive may be
interested in how we plan to go about doing this and what our overall plans for the future are.
A National conference has been convened for the 2nd and 3rd of May 1981. The stated aims of this
conference are:
a. To define and adopt national aims for the WAA. b. To adopt a constitution for use at the national level, and to form a model for State/Territory Branch constitutions.
c. To determine the duties of National Executive members. d. To determine financial support required at the national level and the provision of that finance. e. To adopt Standing Orders for the conduct of
National Executive and National Conference meetings. f. To elect National Executive office bearers.
The W A A 1 s relationships with the RSL have been the subject of much thought lately, and will, no doubt, be discussed further at the National Conference in May.
Because of the special problems of the Vietnam veteran, brought about by the peculiar circumstances of that conflict, we firmly believe that the W A A has
an important purpose to fulfil. However we are not blind to the necessity to seek advice and guidance from the RSL and to co-operate closely with the League in association with the RSL in resolving the problems
of our comrades from the Vietnam conflict.
It is, therefore, our intention to keep the RSL
National Executive informed of our plans and
activities for the future.
Members of the National Executive may not be aware of 'Operation Simpson1 , the draft proposal for the setting up of counselling facilities for Vietnam Veterans throughout the country. The submission has
been received most favourably by the Minister for Veterans Affairs, who has promised to give it close consideration.
Yours sincerely.
X I I - 38
(e) Letter to Sir Wil l i a m Keys QBE, MC, from Holt McMinn
Thank you for your letter of 16 March 1981. I was
naturally very disappointed that the RSL National Executive would not support the provision of financial assistance to fly three delegates to our National
Conference next May. However I can fully appreciate why this decision was taken: it is a matter of deep concern to me that our members continue to attack the
RSL and I have written to our Branch Presidents on this matter.
As I stated to you in my letter of 12 March 1981, we in Canberra see the need to work with the RSL, not against it, but unfortunately some of our members do not share this point of view. We hope to change this
in time and are actively working towards this end.
May I thank you for presenting the subject of
assistance and support to the W A A to your National Executive and for the assistance and guidance you have given me in recent weeks. Would you please pass on to the members of the RSL National Executive my
appreciation for the consideration they gave to our proposals. I sincerely hope that they will have cause to see us in a better light in the not too distant
future.
Yours sincerely,
(f) Copy of letter dated 20 March 1981 from Mr McMinn to all State/Territory Branch Presidents
I refer you to my letter of 9 March 1981 in which I
formally advised you that I was convening a National Conference of the W A A in Canberra on the 2nd and 3rd of May 1981. For administrative purposes the Acting National Secretary needs to know the names of
delegates to the Conference by the end of this month. Would you please forward names to the Acting National Secretary at the above address. I remind you that one delegate only is required from each State/Territory
Branch and that the delegate should be the Branch President, (though substitutes are acceptable if the President is unable to attend personally).
The RSL National Executive was approached earlier this month with a request for financial assistance to fly delegates from Perth, Darwin and Hobart to the
Conference. This request was refused for reasons that are given on page 1 of the attached letter to me from the National President of the RSL.
X I I -3 9
Steps have been taken in Canberra to improve our relationships with the RSL for it is recognized that the League has the potential for providing a great deal of assistance to the WAA. The present National President and the National Secretary-designate of the RSL especially are amenable to co-operating with and helping the WAA, but this goodwill will rapidly evaporate if attacks continue to be made on the League by members of the WAA. State/Territory Branch Presidents are urged to take note of this situation.
I do not wish to labour the point now for it is a
matter that we can discuss fully in May at the
National Conference.
The attached letter to me from Sir William Keys
contains other information of interest to you.
Yours sincerely
4.2 Re Internal Dissension
(a) Letter dated S March 1981 from Mr McMinn as National President to Mr P. Thompson. President. Vietnam Veterans Association of Australia (NSW Branch)
I refer to your recent correspondence concerning the position of National Secretary.
You will recall that at our Conference in Sydney in May last year it was agreed by those attending that:
a. The National Executive of this Association must, for obvious reasons, be located in Canberra,
b. That I should, as National President, reside in Canberra, and
c. That as soon as a suitable person in the ACT was found, who was willing to act as National
Secretary that Gary Adams would resign from that position. I
I now advise that Mr Peter Sadler is willing to. and has in fact assumed the position of Acting National Secretary of this Association as from 4th March 1981. Peter Sadler will continue to act in this capacity up
to the proposed National Conference to be held in the near future.
X I 1-40
Mr Peter Sadler Is a serving officer of the Australian Regular Army and brings with him a wealth of
administrative experience.
I express my sincere appreciation for the work put in by Gary Adams on behalf of the Association.
In due course the Acting National Secretary will contact you concerning the holding of the National Conference.
Yours sincerely
Copy of Mr McMinn 1 s letter of 5 March 1981 addressed to the Presidents of the Vietnam Veterans Association of Australia (Old Branch), Vietnam Veterans
Association of Australia (Vic . Branch), Vietnam Veterans Association of Australia (N.T. Branch), Vietnam Veterans Association of Australia, Madbury. S.A.. Vietnam Veterans Sub-Branch Returned Services
League. Armadale. W.A. , South East Asia Veterans Assoc . , Tasmania.
Those States that attended the National Conference in Sydney in May 1980 will recall the Agreement that;
a. The National Executive of this Association must, for obvious reasons, be located in Canberra,
b. That I should, as National President. reside in Canberra, and
c. That as soon as a suitable person in the
A.C.T. was found, who was willing to act as National Secretary, then Garry Adams would resign from that position.
Accordingly, I now advise you that owing to the resignation of Garry Adams from the position of National Secretary, I have appointed Mr Peter Sadler to the position which he shall occupy as
Acting National Secretary until the proposed National Conference is held in the near future.
Mr Peter Sadler is a serving officer of the
Australian Regular Army, and brings with him a wealth of administrative experience.
XII-41
In due course the Acting National Secretary will contact all states concerning the holding of the National Conference.
Yours sincerely,
A copy of the above letter was also sent to Mr John Evans,
Mr D. Van Neuren, c/- de Paul Medical Centre, Fitzroy,
Victoria, and Mr F.C. Callaghan of Cheltenham Victoria.
These three letters were dated 11 March 1981. Mr Evans,
of course, is the John Evans referred to earlier as being
the "Scientific Adviser to VVAA." Mr Frank Callaghan is
National Repatriation Adviser to Vietnam Veterans
Association of Australia. Mr Van Neuren was its National
Welfare Adviser.
(c) Letter from Mr McMinn dated 9 March 1981 to all
State/Territory Presidents of so-called Branches of W A A
1. The National Executive of the W A A is
convening a conference with State/Territory Presidents of the Association to be held in Canberra on Saturday 2nd and Sunday 3rd May
1981.
2. The conference is being convened primarily to formalize procedural and operational matters, therefore the aims of the
conference will be:
a . to define and adopt national aims for the WAA. b. to adopt an Interim Constitution for use at the National level, and to form
a model for State/Territory
associations' constitutions. c. to determine the duties of the members of the National Executive. d. To determine the financial support
required at the National level and the provision of that finance.
XI1-42
e . To adopt Standing Orders for the
conduct of National Executive and National Council meetings. f . To elect National Executive office bearers.
(For the purposes of this letter, the term 1 National Executive1 is defined as the President, Secretary. Treasurer and other National Officers of the WAA. 'National
Council1 is defined as the conference of the National Executive and State/Territory Presidents).
3. It is proposed that the conference should commence at 9 am on Saturday 2nd May and
conclude by 3pm on Sunday 3rd May. The
conference venue has yet to be determined. Accommodation in Canberra will be arranged for interstate visitors for the Friday and Saturday nights.
4. State/Territory representation to the conference is restricted to the President OR his nominated representative only. National level representation will probably only be
the President and Interim Secretary.
5. The agenda has yet to be formalized but its major items of business will be:
a. Elect members of the National Executive. b . Adopt aims of the WAA. c. Adopt Standing Orders.
d. Adopt an Interim Constitution for the WAA. e. Determine duties of the National
Executive members. f . Determine financial matters. g. Other business.
Meeting procedural matters have yet to be determined. They will be advised at a later date.
6. Any time remaining after the stated aims of the conference have been achieved will be used for general discussion of matters of
XI1-43
interest to delegates. However it should be noted that the conference is being convened specifically to resolve procedural matters as listed in paragraph 2.
7. An Interim National Secretary has been
appointed. He is Mr Peter Sadler, who lives in Canberra. Correspondence to the W A A should be sent to the Interim Secretary, WAA, PO Box 63, Hackett ACT 2602. Mr
Sadler's telephone numbers are 062-478458 (home) and 062-662073 (work).
8. The Interim Secretary will prepare draft aims, standing orders, duty statements and an interim constitution and hopes to be able to forward these to State/Territory
Presidents well before the National
Conference in May. It is requested that State/Territory Presidents staff these drafts within their associations and, where necessary, to regional associations within
their states, before the conference.
9. Details of administrative arrangements for the conference will be forwarded at a later date.
(d) Letter dared 17 March 1981 to all State/Territory Branch Presidents from Peter Sadler
The W A A National President, Mr Holt McMinn, met with the RSL National President, Sir William Keys, last month. Enclosed for your information is a copy of the written record of the meeting. The draft of this record was cleared with Sir William.
Arrangements for the National Conference of the W A A on the 2nd and 3rd of May are proceeding
well. The conference venue is to be the Woden Valley RSL Club. A buffet dinner for delegates is being organised at the club, commencing at 6.30 pm on Saturday 2nd May. The Minister for Veterans' Affairs, Senator Messner, the Shadow Minister, Senator Grimes, the National President
of the RSL and the Assistant Secretary of the RSL, Mr Peter Young have been invited to attend. This function will afford a unique opportunity for State/Territory Branch Presidents to meet
these people informally and you are asked not to make alternative social arrangements for that evening.
XII-44
Work on the preparation of the draft aims,
meeting procedures, duty statements and a
national constitution, (in the form of a
Memorandum and Articles of Association) is proceeding well. I hope to have these to you by the end of this month so that you have ample time to consider them within your branches before the National Conference.
Yours sincerely,
(e) Letter dated 27 March 1981 to all State/Territory Branch Presidents from Peter Sadler
Draft Aims and Memorandum of Association for the W A A
As you were made aware in letters from the
National President (9 March 81) and myself (17 March 81) I have been giving consideration to the National Aims and a Memorandum of Association (M of A) for the W A A to be considered (and possibly
ratified) at the National Conference in May.
The first stage of this exercise was devising the Aims, the first draft of these being:
"a. to monitor and where necessary co-ordinate the activities of the various states
branches of the WAA;
b. to represent their interests at the national level; and
c. to lobby, advise and co-operate with
government and non-government bodies, officials and organizations at the national level for the benefit of the association and its members."
I believe that the draft aims are
self-explanatory. They are designed to give a frame of reference to all W A A activities and the M of A has been drafted with these aims in mind.
Copies of the first draft of the M of A are
enclosed. It must be emphasised that this draft is almost wholly my own personal creation and is presented to you as a start point for
discussion. It attempts to fulfill what I
X I 1-45
understand and believe to be the requirements of the W A A at the National level. It and the
draft aims will be discussed at the National Conference, but I would appreciate any comments you might care to make in writing before then. These can be consolidated and possibly
alternative forms of contentious parts prepared before the Conference. In subsequent paragraphs I have prepared notes on the draft M of A to
speed your consideration of it.
It is envisaged that the proposed establishment of the W A A as a national organization with its headquarters in Canberra will require its
registration as a limited company in the ACT. The constitutions etc of a number of
organizations have been reviewed and it is
believed that the Memorandum of Association of the RSL provides the best model for the form of constitution that we require. It will, of course, require legal vetting and some amendments will probably have to be made after this is
done. Arrangements are being made to have the first draft of the M of A vetted by a solicitor in Canberra.
Page 1, Clause 4 . Some of these are formal
statements for legal purposes, while others expound on the Aims of the WAA.
Page 9, Article 4c, d and e . The organizational concept that I define here and elsewhere is of a National Congress which will set policy and determine overall activities for the year, a National Council to manage affairs during the
year and a National Executive (President, Secretary, Treasurer and Solicitor) to run the day to day affairs of the Association in Canberra.
Page li. Article 5. There are a number of
possibly very contentious suggestions here. I look forward to your comments.
Page 13. Article 6. Note that determination of membership (within the guidelines of Article 5) and the withdrawal of it, is seen as a State
Branch responsibility entirely.
Page 15, Articles 7 and 8. As for comments on
Article 5, above.
X I I - 4 6
Page 16. Article 10. Confirmation of correct State Branch titles are required. Note the
implied autonomy of State Branches in relation to Regional Branches within their states.
Page 22, Article 12. I've aimed at a simple. flexible but still formalised procedure for National Congress. This is reflected in the provisions for adjournmentâ proxy voting, voting
only on show of hands (no balloting), the
chairing of meetings and the admittance of
non-members of Congress to enjoin discussions there.
Page 25, Article 14. Note that there is no
provision for a Deputy National President. as it is believed that there is no need for one.
Page 26, Articles 15 and 16. The National
Council will probably become the real power of the Association, though it will still be
answerable to Congress. The comments made on Article 12 apply here also. Note especially Articles 16 e and 16 f (pages 28 and 29).
Page 30, Article 17. Note the various provisions that allow for a paid secretary (if one is needed in years to come) and for the President to
quickly replace a 1 lost1 Executive member.
Page 34, Article 22. I see no need for Trustees at present, but provisions for getting some later are included here.
Page 35, Article 23. By-Laws are not drafted yet. They will concern such matters as:
Membership application forms, subscriptions, powers of Branches, meeting procedure and nominations for President.
If possible, I will send drafts of ideas for other matters that need resolution at the
Conference, (e.g. By-Laws, financial arrangements and standing orders) to you before May.
Yours sincerely.
X I 1-47
(f) Letter from Acting National Secretary of WAA, Mr Peter Sadler dated 1 April 1981 addressed to National President W A A and all State/Territory Branch
Presidents
During the past month you have received a number of letters from me, some signed by Holt McMinn and others signed by me in the capacity of Acting National Secretary of the WAA. At present I'm
not sure what position I hold in the
organization, or if any one recognises that I hold one anyway. It might be opportune,
therefore, to write a personal letter to you all and state how I see my position.
In late February I was approached to be the
Interim or Acting National Secretary because the previous National Secretary, resident in Sydney, had resigned and there was a need to establish a national-level organization of the W A A in
Canberra. It was my understanding that I was acceptable in this role to the National President and the NSW and Victorian Branch Presidents and I gathered that the opinions of one or other of
these branch presidents are acceptable to the other State Branches. (Some of what I have said here may not be quite true, but that is what I
understood to be the case). I believed my
charter to be to get the W A A established as a
national organization in Canberra and that I would be required to organise a National
Conference.
Although I'm known personally to only two
addressees, the rest of you should by now have an idea of my administrative capabilities. If you have been suitably impressed, and are happy with the way the National Conference in May turns out, then I'm prepared to act as an elected National Secretary, but certain matters need to be made clear before that stage is reached.
It became clear to me fairly quickly that the W A A as a national organization is in a fair sort of mess - however effective the State Branches may be. There has obviously been a lot of
backstabbing, lack of cooperation and ill
feeling. I suspect that I have been misled about a number of aspects of the WAA's past
activities. I don't know all the background to
XI1-48
the whole business and quite frankly I'm not interested. What I am interested in is getting an efficient and effective National organization of the W A A operating in Canberra. This I
believe, is absolutely essential if the W A A is to achieve its full potential in serving our less fortunate comrades-in-arms.
You have all seen the results of my efforts so far and know of the arrangements I'm making for the National Conference. You may then imagine the shock I received in finding that the former National Secretary, who I had good reason to
believe had resigned, was calling a National Conference of the W A A without the knowledge and concurrence of the person I believed to be the National President, (whatever the 'legalities' of
that move may have been and however mistaken I may have been about the 'facts' of the
situation) . I can assure you, gentlemen, that that move however it came about, set the W A A
back to a marked degree in the eyes of those
members of the National Parliament with whom we have established working relationships and the RSL. We cannot afford to be a split organization and I'm not interested in serving a part of one.
Let me briefly discuss three matters that affect the National Conference next month.
Apparently it came out of the Sydney meeting that two representatives from each branch should attend the National Conference. In the W A A
letter of 9 March 1981 I suggested that only one delegate from each branch should attend, because of travel expenses. However the National
Conference might be seen as the 'form of National congress' described in the draft Articles of Association for the W A A (posted to you on 1st April 1981), Articles 11 and 12, so I'm prepared
to agree to having two delegates from each branch.
As I understand it, it was also suggested in
Sydney that all National executive positions be declared vacant on Friday 1st May 1981. This sounds like a good idea and I endorse it.
It was suggested last month that an independent, disinterested person should be invited to chair the National Conference. This is believed to be
XI1-49
a sensible approach and I will endeavour to find a suitable person willing to do the job.
There is no reason, despite all that has gone on in the past, why the National Conference in May should not go ahead and achieve its aims. I'm prepared to continue organizing it and do the hack preparatory work on the constitution, meeting procedures, etc. But. gentlemen, on my
terms. This is what I propose:
1. That the convening, organization and
preparation for the National Conference be left solely in my hands.
2. That the aims and agenda items as proposed in paragraphs 2.5. and 6 of the W A A letter of 9
March 1981 stand as the basis of the meeting's business.
3. That a disinterested person act as Chairman of all meetings of the National Conference, or at least until major items of business are resolved.
4. That two representatives from each
State/Territory Branch attend the National Conference and if only one attend that he or she have a proxy vote for the other.
5. That the conduct of the meeting, as far as is reasonable and applicable, be in accordance with Articles 11 and 12 of the draft Articles of
Association. and that meeting procedure be in accordance with draft procedures that I will prepare and send out later this month,
(notwithstanding that the meeting may alter the content of these drafts). (It is my intent to draft meeting procedures based, as far as is practicable, on the book "Handbook for Chairmen and Secretaries" Bentlv C.F.. Reed. 1970.)
Unless I receive written agreement to the general principles of these terms from the National President, the Presidents of the NSW and Victoria Branches and at least four of the remaining six State Branches. I will withdraw my services to
the W A A and dismantle the arrangements I have in hand for the National Conference on 2nd and 3rd May 1981. I request your replies by 17 April
1981, please.
Yours sincerely.
X I 1-50
(g) Letter dated 8 April 1981 to Mr A. Hill, Barrister, of New South Wales, from Peter Sadler
I believe that you indicated to Holt McMinn
recently that you would be prepared to chair the National Conference of the W A A in Canberra next month. We would be very pleased if you could do this because there will be a requirement for a
skilled, independent negotiator to handle the conference - for reasons that I know you are
familiar with.
You are, therefore, formally invited to attend the National Conference of the WAA, to be held at the Woden Valley RSL Club, Phillip, on
Saturday 2nd and Sunday 3rd May 1981, and act as Chairman of the meeting sessions. I would
appreciate an early indication of your
willingness to act in this capacity, please, so that I can make alternative arrangements if you cannot accept.
Enclosed for your information are copies of a number of letters and papers. The most important of these as far as the conduct of the conference is concerned are:
a. The first draft of the Aims and Memorandum of Association of the WAA. b . The first draft of the By-Laws and an
addendum to the Memorandum of Association of the WAA. c. The Agenda. d. My letter of 1st April 1981 to Branch
Presidents which. in part, sets out my
conditions for the running of the conference.
The other papers will help give you a feel for the way things are shaping up with the W A A at the National level.
Please call me if you need further information. My contact numbers are 062-478458 (home) and 062-662073 (work). I look forward to meeting you next month.
Yours sincerely.
X I 1-51
(h) Letter dated 8 April 1981 to Mr Frank Alcorta. Darwin NT from Peter Sadler
Thank you for your letter of 25 March 1981. I
haven't been with the W A A for very long and am not competent to comment on the legal and
scientific aspects of the Association's
activities. My primary job at present. (as my letter of 1st April 1981 to all Branch Presidents tried to explain). is to get the W A A organized and set up as a going concern at the national
level. The first stage of this exercise was to develop aims for the Association, the goals that we need before we can plan where exactly we are going.
Your suggestion that we ' are attempting to
broaden the terms of our charter to including symptoms and problems not directly attributable to chemical usage in Vietnam', is correct. I'm not sure what the original charter of the W A A was. (if it had one), but I believe that at the National level our charter should be to concern ourselves with problems of the Vietnam Veteran from whatever source, whether they be chemical sprays, the tropical climate, battle stress, social stress, or whatever. In fact, probably none of the potential causes of veterans'
problems should be considered in isolation.
I can understand your concern about diluting our effort, but this should not be a problem if we recognise the limits of our capabilities, determine our priorities and operate within those guidelines. Work in this direction is overdue. but we are now tackling it in Canberra.
There is no doubt within the W A A in Canberra
that we must remain an autonomous organization - let me reassure you of that. It is firmly
believed that we must co-operate with and seek the assistance of the RSL and other
organizations, but as an independent body
concerned solely with the problems of the Vietnam veteran.
Some of the matters you mentioned in your letter and to which I have alluded here, need to be
discussed at the National Conference next month. I sincerely hope that you and Alastair Henderson can make it to Canberra then, so that we can hear
X I 1-52
your points of view on them. Also, of course, we look forward very much to having a chance to meet you both.
Please don't hesitate to contact me on anything that concerns you about the W A A and its
operations at the national level.
Yours sincerely.
(i) Letter forwarded to Mr F. Alcorta, President, Vietnam Veterans Association of Australia. Northern Territory Branch by P.C. Thompson as National President W A A dated 12 April 1983
Thank you for your letter of 6 April 1983.
As you know our Association for several years now has had as its unambiguous goal the establishment of a Royal Commission into the effect on veterans of their exposure to toxic chemicals whilst in Vietnam. Successive National Congresses have
left no doubt that the National Office should pursue that goal boots and all.
The National Office in conjunction with your Branch and the Branches and Regional Groups of other States have done that. We have, as you know, spent many, many hours briefing the media,
until now we get good and sympathetic coverage. We have worked hard at lobbying politicians, so that both Labour and Democrat members of both houses carried our fight into the Parliament. We
have collected thousands of signatures on petitions which have been presented to
Parliament, displaying to its members the wider community support for us. Recently, we ran public meetings in marginal Federal electorates to show politicians that we can influence their futures. Most recently, we have conducted an
intensive publicity campaign, including a concert at the Sydney Town Hall in conjunction with the release of an Australian song about the Vietnam war.
During these campaigns the National Office has sought to keep all States informed of its
activities and to seek from them opinions and advice.
X I 1-53
This long and hard campaign has finally succeeded in achieving at least the first part of or goal; a government commitment to establish a Royal Commission. The second part to be achieved is a
terms of reference wide enough to cover our
concerns and flexible enough to allow the
Commissioner to pursue any direction of enquiry he accepts as relevant. There remains too. the appointment of a Royal Commissioner of high quality and undoubted integrity who we can trust
to pursue the truth with intelligence and
tenacity.
In our negotiations so far with the government, we have seen no reason to doubt its good-will and desire to approve wide ranging flexible terms of reference and to appoint an appropriate Royal Commissioner. Even if this good-will should evaporate behind the closed doors of cabinet. I feel that, as long as the Association remains united, the potential we have developed for effective political fighting would discourage the government from attempting to stage a whitewash.
Certainly, we have made our demands on these matters clear in the consultations we have had so far and certainly, the government is in no doubt that we would withhold agreement until we examine
its final announcement is made, we shall, as always, seek advice and opinion from all States.
Given acceptable terms of reference and a
suitable Royal Commissioner, the National Office does not share your pessimism on the quality of evidence available to support our case. Whilst we have been campaigning for the Royal
Commission, we have also been watching the
continuing growth of the body of evidence in our favour. Some of it is evidence not previously presented. It is of course impossible to predict the outcome of any tribunal hearing, but we
believe and in support of our case, is worthy of forum of a Royal Commission. As you suspect
otherwise, I invite you to Sydney a couple of days before the National Congress (or sooner) so I can have you fully briefed on that situation.
As we are all aware, past governments have
continually resisted our demands to be fully
XI1-54
informed about our potential for exposure to toxic chemicals whilst we were fighting in Vietnam. Our best chance of finding out about that is through the enquiries of a satisfactorily-
constituted Royal Commission. We believe too. that the Department of Veterans' Affairs has so far played an adversary role in the chemically caused disabilities debateâ a role contrary to
its statutory obligation to give veteran
claimants the benefit of the doubt where
substantial conflicting evidence exists. It is important that we get our own Repatriation System, a system with vast resources and a two billion dollar yearly budget. to fulfill its obligation and work for us, rather than continue with its present improper behaviour. In short,
it is, we believe, of primary importance to force our own war disability compensation system to properly and fairly compensate us. A properly constituted Royal Commission, we believe, is the only tribunal capable of wrenching the truth from the jaws of this reluctant bureaucracy, exposing any negligence, or worse, of which it may be
guilty and forcing it to act fairly.
Because, then, the resolutions and debate at National Congresses have left us in no doubt of the Association's strong demand for a Royal Commission to thoroughly examine all aspects of
the issue, because we believe we have good
quality evidence to present to such an enquiry, and because an Australian Royal Commission is the only tribunal which could effectively uncover the truth on many of the matters about which we feel
strongly; the National Office has given and continues to give the establishment and operation of an acceptably constituted Royal Commission, unlimited priority.
We are, of course, also most concerned with the progress and outcome of the U.S. Class Action. Indeed, you may have a copy of a long letter we recently sent to the U.S. lawyer running the Class Action, in which we asked a long list of questions compiled from queries we have received
from members. When the reply to our letter is received, . both a copy of our letter and the reply to it, will be published in DEBRIEF to inform veterans and perhaps give more of them the confidence to join it.
X I 1-55
We are. like you, aware of all the injustices. brush-offs and insincere words meted out to Vietnam veterans in the last ten or so years and if there is any difference between us, it appears
to be in the relative importance we attach to the Royal Commission and the Class Action. Your letter suggests that your emphasis on the Class Action may spring from a feeling that the
composition and terms of reference of the Royal Commission may be unsatisfactory, and from doubt about the quality of the evidence to be presented on our behalf. However, present indications are that the government is sympathetic to our demands on the Royal Commission composition and terms of reference and. in any case, knows that we will simply not accept a potential whitewash. Also, we are confident, while not being able to
guarantee the outcome of this or any other
tribunal hearing, that the evidence which will be presented on our behalf will surprise many
observers by its high quality. I invite you again to briefings on this evidence.
Be assured that we are working with diligence, with careful thought and with trusted expert advice, to promote the interest of Vietnam
veterans in a Royal Commission in the best
possible way.
I hope you will not mind my having sent a copy of this letter to State Presidents.
Thank you again for your letter.
Kind regards.
Phill Thompson. National President
4â 3 Re Epidemiological Studies September 1981
(a) Letter forwarded by P.C. Thompson as National President W A A to all Members of Federal
Parliament dated 8 September 1981 I
I am writing to you on behalf of the Vietnam
Veterans' Association of Australia which
represents some 5,000 Australians who served this country in South Vietnam.
X I I -56
Regardless of the political party you belong to, your support is needed by these veterans and their families to force the Government to
implement an independent judicial inquiry into the use of herbicide sprays in Vietnam.
Australia's involvement in the Vietnam War is not the key issue here; the war is over and is
history but the problems facing the veteran and his family are not. It is quite apparent now
that the psychological and physical difficulties facing these young Australians are in fact
increasing beyond belief. I say young because the average age of the 15,000 national servicemen who served in the Vietnam war is 34 years. They should in fact be in the prime of life but they
are not.
The Government's current epidemiological study which is being conducted by the Commonwealth Institute of Health, is purely a cosmetic
exercise. The Scientific Advisor and former Principal Investigator to the study has been appointed to the Queensland Institute of Medical Research. It is unknown how many key personnel
of the study will follow in the next few months. Why have other professionals from this group been isolated, suppressed and sworn to secrecy about aspects of this study which have no grounds to be
classified as confidential?
This study will cost the taxpayer in excess of $20 million in the long term. In the years to
come, if and when it reaches completion, it will only prove that statistically, veterans who served in South Vietnam have a higher incidence of certain illnesses in themselves and in their offspring. The cause of these illnesses will not have been established and the problem will not have been solved. Therefore some positive action has to be taken right now to ease the minds of
those affected. This can only be achieved by an independent inquiry which can evaluate the medical and scientific research which is
available now.
If you are a member of the Government and you believe the Minister's view that there is no creditable evidence to support the claims of the
X I 1-57
Vietnam Veterans, there is no reason why you should not support a judicial inquiry into the matter. Such an inquiry would be far less costly and less time consuming than the present
epidemiological study.
I am appealing to you not only as a politician but also as a human being; to let your conscience be your guide when this matter is brought before you in either the Senate or the House of
Representatives, and to stand up and be counted in your support for any of the motions which call for a judicial inquiry, regardless of the
political party which puts them forward.
The Vietnam Veterans' Association already has the support of two Ministers and a number of
Government backbenchers in its call for the appointment of a judicial inquiry. In addition. 26 other ex-service organizations support this
move.
I appeal for your support and would welcome any comments you might care to make regarding the appointment of a judicial inquiry into the
effects of herbicides on the health of Vietnam Veterans and their families.
(b) Letter by Senator A.J. Messner, the then Minister for Veterans' Affairs. dated 18 September 1981 to all Members of Parliament
You will have received from Mr P.C. Thompson, the National President of the Vietnam Veterans Association of Australia, a letter dated 8
September 1981 seeking your support for a
judicial inquiry into the effects of herbicides on the health of Vietnam veterans and their
families. As Mr Thompson has written to all
Members and all Senators I have elected to do likewise.
For some eighteen months the Government has been responding to periodic calls for a judicial inquiry into this question. Beginning with that contained in the Statement in the House on 31 March 1980 by my predecessor, the Hon. A .E .
Adermann, M.P., the response has been that such an inquiry will not answer the questions which need to be answered.
X I 1-58
It is all very well to refer to information in certain scientific literature which suggests that certain chemicals used in Vietnam are inherently toxic to varying degrees. The proponents of the argument that there is a causal link between the chemicals used in Vietnam and a range of
disabilities among veterans have selectively referred to supportive literature but ignored a large body of literature which does not suit their argument. To refer to just one example, in 1977 the International Agency for Research on
Cancer (IARC), reviewed the scientific literature as part of its evaluation of the carcinogenic risk of certain chemicals to man. It was unable to evaluate the risk from 2.4.5-T. 2,4-D and dioxin (TCDD), essentially because adequate, epidemiological studies were not available.
I do not doubt that a judicial inquiry would
weigh impartially the evidence at hand. It is naive I suggest, to expect that it would come to a firm conclusion on a scientific issue in which the world's most reputable scientists say that
inadequate evidence is available. Such an
inquiry has no prospect of "easing the minds" of veterans as Mr Thompson suggests.
The fundamental questions are about Vietnam and not about industrial accidents or long-term exposure to chemicals in the manufacture
process. No one has suggested that the chemicals are not toxic; if you drink most of them in
sufficient concentration they will kill you. The same is true of most of the pesticides - and many other chemicals - used in homes throughout
Australia.
The real issue is to determine which veterans were exposed to potentially dangerous chemicals in Vietnam and whether or not the extent of
exposure was sufficient to have placed a veteran at risk. There are major differences in risk between drinking a chemical, working every day for years in a factory which makes the chemical,
and walking through an area which might have been chemically defoliated days or months before. I might add on this point that in the eighteen or so months that the issue has been debated in
Australia less than one fortieth of the veterans who served in Vietnam have come forward to claim for disabilities which they believe might be associated with possible exposure to chemicals in
Vietnam.
X I 1-59
The Government has been responsible and objective in its approach to this matter and in attempting to get the answers it has followed the advice of experts. The problem is that no scientific
evidence is available concerning service in Vietnam. Logic suggests that such evidence should be sought. It is worth noting that the very literature which a judicial inquiry would be
required to evaluate places a high evidentiary value on properly conducted epidemiological studies, and urges that specific new ones be conducted.
Those who urge abandonment of the scientific approach in favour of a judicial inquiry have not appreciated that such an inquiry would almost certainly be forced to the conclusion that
epidemiological evidence was needed.
There are a number of points in Mr Thompson's letter that I feel should not be allowed to pass without comment.
It is true that the Scientific Adviser to the study team in Sydney has been offered a new
position in Queensland. The post is a senior and challenging one, and is further evidence of the high repute in which the Commonwealth Institute of Health team is held. Movement of qualified people in the scientific community is a normal process. I am advised by the Institute that
arrangements are in hand for the changeover in personnel to proceed with the minimum of
disruption to current work. There will be an obvious need from time to time to replace those who exercise their right to move to other areas.
The letters suggests that the study group has been sworn to secrecy about aspects of the
study. In actual fact, the Institute has given progress reports to the W A A on several occasions.
As to information which might be made available to the group to help the study, veterans as
individuals or groups are free to offer the
investigation any material or advice they like. As to information to be made available from the group, reports are given from time to time in response to enquiries, and via statements and
news releases which I issue. You will recall
X I 1-60
that a progress report was tabled in both Houses a few days ago. However, apart from the
time-constraint difficulties in trying to keep up a continuous flow of information to outside enquirers, the Director of the Institute has
quite properly been concerned for the
preservation of the best possible conditions for the conduct of a scientifically valid
investigation. This objective will not be reached if facts or analyses are taken out of context. Scientific work of this nature should be judged on its merits when it has been taken to finality, and should not be required to be
released in an incomplete state for public debate.
Mr Thompson suggests that a judicial inquiry would be far less costly and time consuming than present studies. You will be aware that a pilot study is being conducted to test matters relating
to the format of a major survey. The results of the pilot study are not yet available. Until they are neither I, Mr Thompson nor anyone else is in a position to discuss likely duration or cost. I do not have to remind you that judicial
inquiries are not necessarily completed quickly. Indeed in my own area, the inquiry into the
Repatriation System some years ago took over four years to complete.
Mr Thompson says that the study will only prove that statistically veterans who served in South Vietnam have a higher incidence of certain
illnesses in themselvesa and in their offspring. I have been accused of having pre-judged the issue; apparently Mr Thompson has taken the view that pre-judgement is acceptable if you argue one particular side of the debate, but not the other.
The Government does not ignore the possibility that, in the event, the exposure data which can be obtained will be judged to be scientifically insufficient to allow valid conclusions on the effects of chemicals on Vietnam veterans. In that case, the valid comparison would be between
the health status of Vietnam veterans and that of veterans who did not serve in Vietnam. I do not see that this would be a failure in terms of the Government's obligations to veterans. If the
study showed that there were no appreciable health differences between the two groups, the
X I 1-61
chemical issue would lose its relevance and a lot of families could stop worrying. If, on the
other hand, there were appreciable differences, then that fact would have been established
scientifically. I agree it would not provide the specific cause of the health disabilities, but would be vital information in a number of
respects. It would provide a basis for further scientific investigation and it would be very important in the context of the Repatriation legislation which is concerned with the
compensation of service-related disabilities.
The Government has never sought to avoid its responsibilities in this area and it will not do so in the future. Its main concern has been to follow the very path that it has been accused of not following; to resolve the question as soon as possible. It has recognised from the outset that the anxiety, needlessly created by exaggerated claims, can be removed from veterans only if the final answer is as scientifically accurate as is humanly possible. In the circumstances, the
Government believes that there is no realistic or reasonable alternative to the scientific
resolution of what is essentially a scientific problem.
Yours sincerely,
(c) Press Release by Vietnam Veterans Association of Australia dated 25 October 1981
"Revelations in the 'National Times' today, that the Australian Veterans Herbicides Study is in deep trouble, are extremely serious.
It has been alleged to my Association that the Commonwealth Institute of Health (CIH) study is a complete shambles.
Not only has the Director resigned, along with two other senior scientists, but because CIH contracts are due for renewal in December, 1982, it is highly unlikely that any reputable
scientist will associate him or herself with an insecure position on a study of doubtful
scientific validity.
X I 1-62
My Association now calls for a public
investigation of why the CIH study has collapsed.
The Government and the Minister for Veterans Affairs have placed total reliance on this study as the only answer to our claims.
In the Senate, on 15 October 1981 Senator Messner said:
"In fact, the route the Government is
following, that is, a solid scientific inquiry, we believe will finally produce the goods in this matter."
His solid scientific inquiry is in tatters.
Although Vietnam veterans have co-operated with the study (as acknowledged by Prof. Davidson in his letter to me on 24 August 1981), we have
consistently maintained the need for an
independent judicial inquiry.
We were supported in this by the Senate on 15
October 1981.
The Government can no longer hide behind the epidemiological study and must now announce the terms of reference for the judicial inquiry as a matter of urgency.
Apparently the Government is considering four other options for the CIH to carry out.
All of these options will take further time, be very costly, will suffer from the lack of
scientific respectability of the CIH, and will not necessarily be conclusive in any way.
The Government has ignored our claims for well over two years.
Do we have to wait thirty years for justice, as the Second World War mustard gas guinea pigs have done?
Phil Thompson National President
X I I -63
Press Release dated 26 October 1981
Scientific Studies continue despite Staff Changes
Work on the Vietnam Veterans' studies being carried out by the Commonwealth Institute of Health would continue despite some staffing changes, the Ministers for Health and Veterans' Affairs said today.
They were commenting on media reports that the Director of the Institute at Sydney University, Professor Lindsay Davidson, and two other senior staff working on the studies were leaving.
"It is mischievous nonsense to suggest that because certain personnel are going the studies are falling apart" Mr MacKellar said.
Professor Davidson had decided to return to Scotland, largely for family reasons. while the two other scientists mentioned in press reports intended to be available part time for
consultation. "Arrangements are in hand for provision of additional staff," Mr MacKellar said.
Senator Messner noted that Mr Thompson of the Vietnam Veterans' Association had repeated yet again his call for a judicial inquiry. The
Government had already pointed out that such an inquiry would not provide a scientifically valid answer on possible effects of Vietnam service on veterans and their families.
Mr Thompson seemed to have been unaware, or to have chosen to ignore the fact, that the Senate had decided to conduct an inquiry into herbicides and their possible effects on Vietnam veterans.
In so far as a non-scientif ic body can assess this matter, the Senate Committee has extremely wide powers of investigation and should be
capable of doing so. "The government was still of the view that it should also seek to pursue the line of scientific investigation to the extent that this was possible," Senator Messner said.
X11 - 6 4
5. CONCLUSION
It will be seen that there are still grave doubts as to
the legal status of W A A and its capacity to "represent"
its so-called membership of 9,000 people. The Commission
decided in all the circumstances not to withdraw the leave
granted on 14 July 1983 to W A A to appear before it as it
was considered that to do so would only have led to cries
of "foul" by certain veterans!
The Commission reiterates it should be widely known that
the Commission instructed Counsel Assisting it to ensure
that no stone was left unturned. The solicitors and staff
of the Commission were similarly instructed. The
Commission itself, in effect, acted for all veterans and
their wives and children in an earnest search for any
possible connection between chemical agents and adverse
health consequences. It searched also for such
consequences and their connection with Vietnam service.
Any inadequacies in research, inquiry and presentation by
W A A 1 s legal representatives were thoroughly redressed by
the Commission's legal team.
Further, it is the fervent hope of this Commission that
the present discord between various Australian veteran
X I 1-65
organisations in regard to the settlement and distribution
of moneys following the U.S. Class Action, reference to
which is made in Chapter XI of this Report, will soon
abate so that Australian Vietnam veterans, their wives and
their children may obtain whatever benefits there may be
from that settlement at the earliest possible time.
X I 1-66
ENDNOTES
1. Transcript at p 8.
2. See Ch I.
3. Transcript at p 2095.
4. Transcript at p 2102.
5. Transcript at p 2103.
6. Transcript at p 2210.
7. Transcript at p 2210.
8. Exhibits 1040 and 1878.
9. Personal Communication from Phillip Thompson to Senior Counsel Assisting, March 1985.
10. VVAA National Journal "Debrief" February/March 1985, p 9.
11. Exhibit 1160.
X I 1-67
INTERIM REPORT ÎÎΡ S.47
"We then that are strong ought to
bear the infirmities of the weak"
Romans 15:1
CHAPTER XIII
INTERIM REPORT AND S.47
On 30 May 1985 this Commission delivered to the
Governor-General an Interim Report and Recommendations in
the following terms:
Pursuant to Letters Patent dated 13 May 1983, (as extended). I, Justice Phillip Evatt, Royal Commissioner. hereby recommend:
(1) That s.47 of the Repatriation Act 1920
remain unamended pending my final report and recommendations.
(2) That S.107VG of the Repatriation Act 1920 remain unamended pending my final report and recommendations.
DATED this 30 day of May 1985.
It will be recalled that the Letters Patent dated 13 May
1983 charged this Commission, in part, as follows:
And we require you to make such recommendations arising out of your inquiry as you think
appropriate, including recommendations regarding the legislative or administrative changes, if any, that are necessary or desirable.
Prior to Thursday 30 May 1985 the Commission had received
no submission that the relevant legislation ought to be
XIII-1
changed and it had formed a preliminary view that no
recommendation for change would emanate from this
Inquiry. This preliminary view was to some extent
reinforced by Repatriation Commission v O'Brien (1985) 59
ALJR 363.
The context of this Commission included not only the Toose
Report but also an elaborate consultative process leading
towards a total revision of the Repatriation legislation.
The process included The Report of the Advisory Committee
on Repatriation Legislation and some continuing
consultation with DVA clientele. Clearly this Commission
was not intended to duplicate that process which was
working steadily towards the production of the Veterans'
Entitlement Bill 1985, which was tabled on 31 May 1985, to
permit consideration of its provisions and comment
thereon, inter alia, by veteran organisations.
No draft of this Bill had been sighted by this Commission.
on 14 May 1985 the Treasurer announced, as part of a
mini-budget, amendments to s.47 and s .107VG of the
Repatriation Act 1920.
These proposed amendments as the explanatory notes clearly
displayed1" at pages 8 and 9, bore upon the onus of proof.
XII1-2
Section 47 immediately before amendment read:
47.(1) The Commission in hearing, considering, determining or deciding a claim or application -(a) is not bound by technicalities, legal forms or rules of evidence; and
(b) shall act according to substantial justice and the merits and all the circumstances of the case, and, without limiting the
generality of the foregoing, shall take into account any difficulties that, for any reason, lie in the way of ascertaining the existence of any fact, matter, cause or
circumstance, including any reason
attributable to -(i) the effects of the passage of time,
including the effect of the passage of time on the availability of witnesses; or
(ii) an absence of, or a deficiency in,
relevant official records, including an absence or deficiency resulting from the fact that an occurrence that
happened during the service of a member of the Forces was not reported to the appropriate authorities.
(2) The Commission shall grant a claim or
application unless it is satisfied. beyond reasonable doubt. that there are insufficient grounds for granting the claim or application, as the case may be. (emphasis added).
Sub-section 107VG (3) before amendment read:
(3) On the completion of its consideration of a review of a decision -(a) if the decision was a decision to refuse to grant a claim for a pension - the Board
shall set aside the decision unless it is satisfied, beyond reasonable doubt, that there were insufficient grounds for granting the claim or application; or
XI11-3
(b) in any other case - the Board shall set
aside the decision unless it is satisfied, beyond reasonable doubt, that the decision is the decision that the Board would have made if it had had the responsibility for
making the decision the subject of the
review.
The veteran community generally and W A A in particular,
were deeply concerned at the proposed amendments and urged
this Commission to hold a special sitting. The Commission
agreed and sat on Thursday, 30 May.
W A A appeared and leave was also granted to AVADSC, a peak
organisation of 15 other veteran associations. The RSL
and the Departments of Prime Minister and Cabinet.
Attorney-General's, Treasury. Special Minister of State,
Finance, and Veterans' Affairs were offered opportunity to
appear.
As a result of submissions made, the Commission prepared
urgently and delivered in Canberra,an Interim Report and
Recommendations on that very day.
On 31 May 1985. notwithstanding that Interim Report the
Parliament passed the Repatriation Amendment Act 1985.
which took effect on 6 June 1985.
By s.16 that statute amended s.47 of the Principal Act by
substituting the following section:
XI11-4
16. Section 47 of the Principal Act is amended by omitting sub-section (2) and substituting the following sub-sections:
(2) Where the Commission is considering and determining a claim for a pension with respect to the death or incapacity of a member of the
Forces, the Commission shall not grant the claim if it is reasonably satisfied -(a) that the investigation of the claim did not disclose material, and there is no other
material before the Commission, that raises a reasonable hypothesis that there exists a connection required by this Act to exist between the death or incapacity of the member and the member's war service; or
(b) that any such reasonable hypothesis raised by material before the Commission has been dispelled.
(3) Subject to sub-section (2) -(a) in respect of a claim for a pension
made under Section 24 -(i) by a member of the Forces whose
war service included qualifying war service; or
(ii) by a dependant of a deceased
member of the Forces who died
before 12 November 1958 and whose war service included qualifying war service,
the Commission shall grant the claim unless it is satisfied, beyond
reasonable doubt, that there are
insufficient grounds for granting the claim; and
(b) in respect of any other claim for a
pension - the Commission shall not grant the claim unless it is reasonably satisfied that there are sufficient grounds for granting the claim.
X I 1 1-5
(4) Subject to sub-sections (2) and (3), in determining, or making a decision in relation to, any matter under this Act or the regulations, including the assessment or re-assessment of the rate of a pension, the Commission shall decide the matter to its reasonable satisfaction.
(5) For the purposes of sub-section (3) -(a) the qualifying war service of a member of the Forces consists of the war
service (if any) of the member outside Australia; and
(b) a reference to the grant of a claim
shall be read as not including a
reference to the assessment of the rate at which pension is to be paid.
(emphasis added).
By s.32 it amended s .107VG(3) and added s .107VG(7) as
follows:
(3) On the completion of its consideration of a review of a decision -(a) if the decision is a decision to refuse to grant a claim for a pension, being a
claim to which paragraph 47(3)(a) applies - the Board shall set aside the decision unless it is satisfied, beyond
reasonable doubt, that there were insufficient grounds for granting the claim; or
(b) in any other case - the Board shall not set aside the decision unless it is reasonably satisfied that the decision is not the decision that the Board
would have made if it had had the
responsibility for making the decision the subject of the review; and
(7) Where the Board is reviewing a decision granting or refusing to grant a claim for a
pension with respect to the death or incapacity of a member of the Forces, or is considering and
X I 1 1 -6
determining the decision to be made by it in
substitution for a decision that it has set
aside, the Board shall not grant the claim if it is reasonably satisfied -(a) that the investigation of the claim did not disclose material, and there is no
other material before the Board, that raises a reasonably hypothesis that there exists a connection required by this Act to exist between the death or
incapacity of the member and the
member's war service; or
(b) that any such reasonably hypothesis raised by material before the Board has been dispelled, (emphasis added).
The Senate added a so-called "Sunset Clause" as follows
Cessation of Operation of Certain Provisions 72.(1) Section 16, sub-sections 17(2), 19(2), 21(2), 23(2) and 24(2), sections 25 and 32, Part IV, sub-sections 54(2) and 61(2) and sections 69. 70 and 71 shall cease to be in force at the
expiration of 6 months after the commencement of this Act.
(2) When provisions of this Act cease to be in force by virtue of sub-section (1). the relevant Acts shall have effect as if those Acts had not been amended by those
provisions.
(3) After the expiration of 6 months after the commencement of this Act. the relevant Acts apply, in accordance with sub-sections (1) and (2), to and in relation to -
(a) decisions of the Commission in respect of claims for pension where
consideration of the claims by the Commission commenced after the
expiration of that period;
(b) decisions of the Veterans' Review Board in respect of reviews of decisions of the Commission referred to in paragraph (a); and
XI11-7
(c) decisions of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal in respect of reviews of
decisions of the Commission referred to in paragraph (a) or reviews of
decisions of the Veterans' Review Board in substitution for decisions of the Commission so referred to.
(4) In this section, 'relevant Acts' means the Acts referred to in section 65.
It is appropriate to trace the history of repatriation
claim-making and onus and standards of proof relating
thereto.
Australians have long accepted the responsibility of
caring for service personnel and their dependants in
circumstances where death or incapacity may be related to
war service or to service in war-like operations.
Governments in Australia have met this responsibility by
passing and implementing legislation aimed at providing
suitable repatriation benefits.
The initial statute was the War Pensions Act of 1914 and
after it in 1917 the Australian Soldiers' Repatriation Act
was passed.
The 1920 Act implied a civil standard of proof and left at
least an administrative onus on the claimant. In 1929 the
"Little Digger", William Morris Hughes, reversed the onus
XI11-8
of proof at Tribunal level once a finding that a prima
facie case was made out and he also introduced the notion
that the benefit of any doubt should be given to a veteran
or other appellant.
These two notions were continued in amendments which were
passed in 1934.
Difficulties however continued because of the requirement
that the veteran establish a prima facie case. These
difficulties were to a substantial degree resolved by an
amendment passed in 1940. This amendment to the then
s.45W introduced an important new notion. It said.
(4) For the purposes of sub-section 2 of this section an appellant shall be deemed to have made out a prima facie case when he avers that the
incapacity or death of the member of the Forces resulted from an occurrence happening during the period he was a member of the Forces or from his employment in connection with naval or military preparations or operations or as directly
attributable to his employment as a member of the Forces, (emphasis added).
Further difficulties and perhaps even bureaucratic
obfuscation led to amendments being proposed in 1943. A
war was current and the Government of the day wished to
recruit young Australians to fight and die in that War.
X I 1 1-9
Clause 39B of the amending Bill became s.47 by the
operation of the schedule to the 1943 amending Act.
Without setting out the amendment in full, suffice it to
say that four important notions were contained in ss.47
and 48 as adopted in 1943. The four notions are:
. the benefit of any doubt on any matter required
to be proved was to be given to the claimant;
. the claimant need not furnish proof;
. all reasonable inferences were to be drawn in
favour of the claimant;
. medical practitioners were required to express
any doubts they might entertain concerning any
matter they were required to report on and to
indicate the nature and extent of such doubts.
The amendments had a rocky passage through the House of
Representatives and the Senate because the section did not
include the establishment of a prima facie case or a
shifting of the onus by reason of mere averment.
XIII-10
However, an examination of the Hansard of the second
reading debate establishes that it was the intention of
the Parliament to place the onus of proof on the
Commission; to give the benefit of all doubt, reasonable
or unreasonable, to the veteran and to require him merely
to aver a connection between his war service and his
disability.
The then Labor Minister for Repatriation, Mr Frost said
Amendments affecting this subject were made to the Act in 1934 and then again in 1940. These
amendments removed the onus from the appellant to make out a prima facie case in support of a
claim, and the appellant is now deemed to have made out a prima facie case when he avers that the incapacity or death resulted from war
service. In addition, section 39B (i.e. s.47) provides that the Commission shall, in the
determination of appeals, act according to substantial justice and to the merits of each case and give the appellant the benefit of the doubt. The government intends going further than
this in the present bill, as has already been referred to in this speech, (emphasis added).2
On 11 March 1943. during a continuance of the second
reading debate, Mr Francis, the member for Mcreton said:
Another point in debate was the onus of proof. Under the law as it previously stood the onus of proof rested upon the applicant, but now, in all applications for pensions, the onus rests on the
Repatriation Commission to prove that the disability is not due to war service. That was the recommendation of the Committee and I am pleased to say that the Government has accepted
it. (emphasis added).
XIII-11
MR HARRISON: But the onus of proof is still on the claimant.
MR FRANCIS: The claimant has only to aver that his incapacity is due to war service and the onus is on the Commission to prove otherwise.
MR SPENDER: I am afraid that that is not so.
MR FRANCIS: The government has accepted the recommendation of the committee in this respect and if the honourable member can show that the recommendation is not properly embodied in the bill, I shall be happy to co-operate with him in placing the matter beyond doubt.3
On 18 March 1943. Dr H.V. Evatt said:4
We are reinforcing the position by the provision, amended at the instance of the Right Honorable member for North Sydney, that in all cases the member shall be given the benefit of the doubt.
The 1943 statute intended to apply the reverse criminal
onus to claims at all levels as the Repatriation
Commission itself conceded.5
Section 47 continued to cause difficulties of
interpretation as Mr Justice Toose observed.®
As a result of his recommendation, s.47 was amended in
1977. His Honour's intention is clear. He said:
Conclusion I am of the view that proceedings for
determination are, and should be. administrative proceedings of an inquisitorial character in which there are no opposing parties. Section
XI11-12
47(2) of the Act should be amended so as to
delete the onus it places on a person or
authority contending.7
The 1977 amendment reads:
47(1) The Commission. a Board. an Appeal
Tribunal or an Assessment Appeal Tribunal. in hearing, considering, determining or deciding a claim, application or appeal -(a) is not bound by technicalities, legal forms
or rules of evidence; and
(b) shall act according to substantial justice and the merits and all the circumstances of the case, and, without limiting the
generality of the foregoing, shall take into account any difficulties that, for any reason, lie in the way of ascertaining the existence of any fact. matter. cause or
circumstance, including any reason
attributable to -(i) the effects of the passage of time,
including the effect of the passage of time on the availability of witnesses; or
(ii) an absence of, or a deficiency in,
relevant official records, including an absence or deficiency resulting from the fact that an occurrence that
happened during the service of a member of the Forces was not reported to the appropriate authorities.
(2) The Commission, Board, Appeal Tribunal or Assessment Appeal Tribunal shall grant the claim or application or allow the appeal, as the case may be, unless it is satisfied, beyond reasonable
doubt, that there are insufficient grounds for granting the claim or application or allowing the appeal, (emphasis added)
XI11-13
As a result of the Toose Report claims for pension were to
be in accordance with an approved form but the requirement
that a form be lodged was "not to be taken as imposing any
onus of proof on a claimant.®
It is clear that DVA and the Repatriation Commission
regarded these amendments as having "tightened up" the
basis for allowing claims. Over the next few years the
DVA and the Repatriation applied in effect a threshold
onus requiring a reasonable prima facie case to exist
before allowing a claim.
That this approach was wrong was finally established in
Repatriation Commission V Law (1981) 147 CLR 635 after
amendments to the section in 1979. In that case Aickin J.
at p.652 said:
The Commission also relied on the difference between the former s.47 and the present s.47 and 107 VH but the general nature of the 1979
amendments demonstrates that the intention of the Parliament was to expand, rather than to reduce, the extent to which pensions are payable under
the Act. In my opinion the present form of ss.47 and 107VH does not demonstrate an intention to make pensions harder to obtain or to deny
pensions in cases in which, under the repealed sections, there would have been an entitlement to a pension.
Accordingly the submission that S.107VH is not an "evidentiary provision" should be rejected. I am satisfied that the operation of that section does
X I 1 1-14
not involve a two-stage process and that it
requires that, in relation to any fact necessary to establish entitlement, the Review Tribunal must be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the fact does not or did not exist before it can
refuse an application or dismiss an appeal by a claimant. The reference in sub-s(2) to the
"completion of its consideration in a proceeding on a review" is to the entire process of
examinining the evidence and determining whether the Review Tribunal is satisfied beyond
reasonable doubt that each of the factual
requirements has not been established.
Sub-section (2) then directs the Review Tribunal as to what it must do in the light of its
determination, i.e. to set aside the decision if it is not so satisfied, and to uphold the
decision if it is so satisfied.
DVA and the Repatriation Commission continued to contend
for a threshold onus (inter alia) in cases where disease
of unknown aetiology was the basis for the claim.
Law's case produced an increase in the number of claims
and the Repatriation Commission sought further
clarification (or tightening) by the High Court through
Repatriation Commission V O'Brien (1985) 59 ALJR 363.
This decision has, in this Commission's respectful
opinion, been misunderstood. It surely does not require
the allowing of a claim when the basis for it is mere
speculation. Speculation cannot be a ground. let alone a
sufficient ground. (See Chapter II supra).
XI11-15
Nonetheless the Governmentâ without promised prior
consultation with veterans groups. proposed to amend the
crucial sections in indecent haste.
Brennan J. (at p.369 in O 1Brien's case) drew attention to
what he called the legislative legerdemain embodied in
s . 47(2). One speculates that the 1977 amendments attempt
to actually tighten up the claim process whilst appearing
to keep faith with veterans. and to comply with Mr Justice
Toose's recommendation. In the Commission's view, similar
sophistry is apparent in the May 1985 amendments.
The proposed May 1985 amendments were at least open to an
interpretation dramatically changing the basis for dealing
with claims.
It could well be argued that a two-stage process for
entitlement was introduced. At the threshold the
determining authority is required to be reasonably
satisfied that a reasonable hypothesis linking service
with incapacity exists whether the veteran served overseas
or not.
It is also required to be so satisfied that any such
reasonable hypothesis has not been dispelled.
X I 1 1-16
Before those amendments the determining authority was
obliged to grant a claim unless satisfied beyond
reasonable doubt that there were insufficient grounds for
granting it.
After amendment the determining authority was obliged NOT
to grant the claim unless reasonably satisfied that a
reasonable hypothesis existed and had not been dispelled.
This effected, in the Commission's view, a most
substantial change to rights enjoyed by Australian
veterans (including Vietnam veterans) for more than 50
years.
Solemn promises had been made to Australia's fighting men.
For a Government to make such a change as part of a
mini-budget and in haste and without consultation with
veteran groups. whilst this Commission was charged to
consider changes in the legislation demanded a response by
this Commission.
The cost of providing pensions and benefits and comparison
between repatriation spending and defence spending are
matters for the Government as the Commission acknowledged
at its hearing on 30 May 1985.
X I I 1-17
The Commission's concern was that all members of the
Government be aware of the impact and effect of the
proposed changes and it therefore sought delay (of a mere
six weeks) so that its views as set out in this Report
would be available to the Government and Parliament.
It is the Commission's view that Australia's veterans
ought to have re-enshrined in legislation the following
notions:
. the claimant need furnish no proofâ but merely
aver;
. the benefit of any reasonable doubt should go to
the claimant;
The Commission so recommends.
X I 1 1-18
ENDNOTES
1. Commonwealth Government Printer, Ref No 84/1637, Cat No 85 09155.
2. Hansard 17 February 1943. p 816.
3. Hansard 11 March 1943, p 1545.
4. Hansard 18 March 1943, p 2015.
5. Repatriation Commission Report 1943, p 4.
6. Toose Report, Vol I, pp 246-247.
7. Ibid p 249.
8. S.24AA of the Repatriation Act 1920
provisions are now in s .25 .
24372/85.
- Similar
XII1-19