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Select Committee on the Exposure Draft of the Marriage Amendment (Same-Sex Marriage) Bill
Marriage Amendment (Same-Sex Marriage) Bill

HARVEY, Ms Tamsyn, Acting First Assistant Secretary, Civil Justice Policy and Programmes Division, Attorney-General's Department

SWINBOURNE, Ms Emma, Director, Human Rights Unit, Civil Law Unit, Attorney-General's Department

WALTER, Mr Andrew, Assistant Secretary, Civil Law Unit, Attorney-General's Department

WILLIAMS, Ms Kimberley, Principal Legal Officer, Marriage Law and Celebrant Section, Attorney-General's Department


CHAIR: Welcome. I remind officials that the Senate has resolved that an officer of a department of the Commonwealth or state or territory shall not be asked to give opinions on matters of policy and shall be given reasonable opportunity to refer questions asked of the officer to superior officers or to a minister. The resolution prohibits only questions asking for opinion on matters of policy and does not preclude questions asking for explanations of policies or factual questions about when and how policies were adopted.

Thank you for appearing before the committee today. I invite you to make a brief opening statement should you wish to do so.

Ms Harvey : No, thank you; we are happy just to take questions.

CHAIR: I am not sure how much you have been following the evidence over the last few days but I assume you have read many of the submissions that have been made to the committee. One of the things we are interested to explore is the interplay between federal statutes—whether that be the Marriage Act or the SDA—and state based law. When it comes to the protections of individuals or, indeed, officials of a denomination, what we have seen is that within Australia, where there has been action taken, generally, it has been through a state based legislation, regardless of what has happened federally, and there have been some calls for us to look at a broad no-detriment provision.

I am wondering, from the A-G's Department perspective, if governments of either persuasion were inclined to go down that path, to try and have a positive protection as opposed to an exemption based system, how could that be implemented?

Mr Walter : I will make an opening comment for a bit of clarification about what you are seeking advice about. As has already been mentioned this morning, the interplay between Commonwealth and state laws in the human rights area can be quite complex and it depends on the area we are talking about. In terms of marriage, the Commonwealth has clear constitutional power. But, at the same time, there is a little bit of added complexity in that many state officials exercise functions on behalf of the Commonwealth in the space of marriage, as well. So, how any proposal would work, we would have to think through both the constitutional as well as the other principles that would apply in the particular context. Could I just ask some clarification in terms of a positive protection—a bit more precision about what you had in mind in that regard.

CHAIR: It is more what the—

Mr Walter : What the proposal has been saying—

CHAIR: A number of people have talked about the fact that if the right to the freedom of religion and belief, albeit some manifestation subject to appropriate limitation where necessary—they are concerned that it is being portrayed at the moment on the basis of exemptions as opposed to putting a difference view on it: 'This is a right, and the state must identify areas where you cannot exercise that right'—as opposed to the other way around. I am just wondering: given the interplay between federal and state law, if the Commonwealth decided that on the basis of our international covenants we needed to pass such a law—and, I guess, a precedent might be Toonen, where the Commonwealth overrode the Tasmanian law in terms of the legality of homosexual relationships—how would the Commonwealth interact with the states if we were to take that approach of saying, 'This is going to be a positive protection as opposed to an exemptions-based protection.'

Mr Walter : I presume from that we are talking more broadly than just in relation to marriage.

CHAIR: We are because, clearly, they intersect—in that if the whole purpose of this committee is to look at religious freedoms if there were a change to the Marriage Act then what we have seen is where people's religious freedoms have been impinged it is generally under not the Marriage Act but anti-discrimination law, often based at state level.

Mr Walter : Sure. In the event that the government was minded to consider that issue further, we would want to, obviously, think through very carefully as to exactly what we are talking about here. Are we talking about an extension of existing anti-discrimination laws? Are we talking about something else which allows you to positively manifest your religion? We have already heard the description a couple times that laws could be a sword or a shield. Exactly what would that look like? We would want to clearly understand more: what is the mischief we are trying to address? What specific problems are we trying to address. The next challenge for us then would be to find, if we are doing this on a stand-alone Commonwealth basis, what head of power we would have under the Constitution to enact such laws and whether that would allow us only to enact a law relating to the Commonwealth, or whether we are looking at trying to legislate for the entire of the country—so it overrides state and territory laws. That could get a little bit tricky. If we were trying to rely on the external affairs power, for example, then we would have to think very carefully about on what basis our international obligations would support that kind of legislation. So we go through that kind of exercise. I think it would be a very complex and difficult process.

CHAIR: This is my last question before I go to Senator Pratt. We have had a number of witnesses make comments about civil celebrants or religious ministers, and some have, by what they have written, indicated that they do not actually understand how many religious bodies and churches work. We have had witnesses just before you put their hand up and say, 'We're not religious; we don't understand.' I note with interest that the new Prime Minister of the UK has appointed a specific adviser on faith issues, so that her and her government when they make laws actually have greater insight into what faith communities believe, how they work, what the impact might be of laws. Does the Attorney-General's Department have a nominated person, panel or group who provide to the government that very specific informed insight into faith communities?

Mr Walter : No, I do not think it would be correct to say that we have that kind of arrangement where there is some kind of standing panel or a group of people that we would commonly go to in a formalised way. However, areas of the department do have regular contacts with certain religious groups and talk to them about specific issues. So we tend to have contacts in certain religious groups that we would make contact with if we were thinking about a particular issue and we needed insight into that issue. I think I would be right in saying it is not as formal as that. The only exception I might make to that—I would have to take it on notice—is that our countering violent extremism area has particular contacts with a few religious groups, so they might have a bit more of a standing arrangement; I would have to check on that. But I cannot think of any other example where we have that kind of standing arrangement.

CHAIR: Thank you.

Senator PRATT: Are Commonwealth registered marriage celebrants who are ministers of religion from unrecognised denominations covered by section 47 of the act, or will they be covered by the new section 47 exemption for ministers of religion?

Ms Harvey : Under the existing act the structure is that ministers of religion is defined in section 5, and they can be either ministers who are part of a recognised denomination, and there is a process for that to occur, or a person who is a celebrant under the celebrant scheme but who is, also for want of a better term, recognised by their religion to carry out marriages. Under the act at the moment it differentiates between ministers of religion, so it includes both of those. Section 47 at the moment talks about ministers of religion. It encapsulates both those ministers who are from recognised denominations and those who are civil celebrants.

Senator PRATT: So both sets of celebrants have no obligation to solemnise a marriage?

Ms Harvey : Those who are Commonwealth registered celebrants who are also ministers of religion are captured by that, as well as those who are appointed because they are part of a recognised denomination. So they are not Commonwealth registered marriage celebrants. It is a complicated scheme. We have different—

Senator PRATT: Are there still churches relying on the civil part of civil celebrants to enable them to conduct marriages?

Ms Harvey : There are a small number—I think we had a look at the numbers this morning—of the broader cohort of celebrants who are registered under the Commonwealth act who are then also ministers of religion.

Senator PRATT: So they are essentially occupying both. Are there religiously practising civil celebrants who are not registered within the religious parts of the act?

Ms Harvey : Sorry, I might not have been very clear. One part of the act allows for recognised denominations, and they can then nominate who can perform marriages, and that falls outside of the celebrant scheme, if you like. Then, within that scheme, there are people who can be also nominated as ministers of religion by their own religion, but those religions are not recognised denominations. Then there are the remainder—

Senator PRATT: So someone can be registered in both?

Ms Harvey : No.

Senator PRATT: I am just trying to think my way through the extent of conscientious belief in terms of wanting to object to someone's marriage. For example, say you are doing an interfaith marriage—so you are not just doing it within the denomination of your religion but you are one or other religion. I am thinking of the example of a friend of mine who had a Buddhist marriage celebrant but it was done in a Catholic Church. The ceremony did not fit with the tenets of either faith, but in that sense it was still appropriate that it was not a civil celebrant that was conducting the ceremony. There is no preclusion on ministers who are officiating to conduct the rites of any particular faith when they do so, is there?

Ms Williams : When we recognise a denomination they are required to provide us with one or more examples of the service that they are going to provide and we authorise that denomination, and under the Marriage Act they are required to follow the religious ceremony that they have put forward to us. So, if you are a minister of religion under a recognised denomination then there is a particular format that you are to follow.

Senator PRATT: Yes. And I think in this instance that is why the Catholic priest at this particular wedding did not officiate and, rather, it was the other celebrant who did. Okay.

Ms Williams : In terms of the religious celebrants who are authorised under category C of the Marriage Act, which is the Commonwealth registered celebrants, there are approximately 538, I believe, who are registered as religious celebrants. When they go through the application process for authorisation they are required to provide as part of that a letter from the head of their organisation endorsing that person to provide those services as part of their religious organisation. Again, they would be expected to follow the format of that religious organisation in solemnising that marriage.

Senator PRATT: So, the Buddhist who did this particular ceremony—because it had some Catholic elements, be they probably not official—would have been doing it strictly as a civil celebrant?

Ms Williams : I cannot speak to that particular example.

Senator PRATT: I guess I am just trying to unpick the extent to which we can put our celebrants in separate buckets without inconveniencing the marrying public in relation to the kinds of ceremonies they want to have. Do you have a view about that in relation to the operation of the act currently?

Ms Harvey : The act at the moment is really quite clear about those who are ministers of religion and who are recognised by their denomination and then those who are registered celebrants under our act. There is also then another category of officials at a state and territory level who can also perform marriages, can solemnise marriages, as well.

Senator PRATT: I still need a little bit of clarification about where religious celebrants who are not part of a religious denomination fit. Do they fit solely within the civil category or within the religious category, or are they registered under both?

Ms Harvey : It is a little bit complicated because of the way the act is set up, but they are registered civil celebrants, so they go through the application process and the ongoing professional development and all of those types of things. Then they are also, in the act, ministers of religion, as long as they meet the requirements—

Senator PRATT: So, that means that they do not have an obligation under the Sex Discrimination Act, for example, to uphold anti-discrimination law on the basis of their religious tenets in the same way that a civil celebrant would have an obligation to do?

Ms Harvey : They are currently captured under section 47 of the existing act, and then as that relates through to the Sex Discrimination Act.

Senator PRATT: Sorry; who are you referring to when I say 'they'—the religious—

Ms Harvey : Ministers of religion.

Senator PRATT: With respect to anti-discrimination law as a whole, can I ask about the ramifications for the way our anti-discrimination law operates in this country to, as the bill is currently expressed, have a carve out for the purpose of a marriage ceremony as it relates to goods and services, when in essence the refusal to grant a good or service is very similar to protections that are provided? For example, someone refuses to provide flowers or a hire care for a commitment ceremony versus an actual wedding, once same-sex marriage is legal.

Mr Walter : Sorry; I am not sure I entirely understand what you are getting at, but perhaps I will give a little bit of background. Obviously, at the moment, we have exemptions in the Sex Discrimination Act. Section 37 is the relevant provision for religious bodies—

Senator PRATT: That is right.

Mr Walter : against the non-discrimination principles provided that they are acting in accordance with their tenets, beliefs et cetera. That only applies to the religious body, and so for your hire car company—

Senator PRATT: Okay, so you could consistently implement that for the purposes of the current Marriage Act, but what the bill before us does is have a carve-out just for marriages in relation to the delivery of goods and services.

Mr Walter : Yes. The government's decision in relation to this bill was that it wanted to make it clear on the face of the Marriage Act what exemptions applied or did not apply. It could potentially have done that through the Sex Discrimination Act, but the government made the decision it wanted to make it very clear on the face of the Marriage Act that those exemptions were in place. In terms of the goods and services exemption, the Sex Discrimination Act would probably already apply. The easiest circumstances to think of are churches and church halls. If a gay couple came along for any purpose and said, 'We want to use this church hall,' if the religious body reached the conclusion that that would be in contravention of their tenets and beliefs then currently 37 might apply. What the bill essentially does is reproduce that provision but then confines it just in relation to the solemnisation and anything incidental to the solemnisation: the actual wedding ceremony and anything incidental to the wedding ceremony. The intention there is to again say that, if a same-sex couple have come along and say, 'We want to use the church grounds for having our wedding ceremony,' the church can say, 'Well, hang on; our tenets and beliefs are that marriage is between a man and a woman, so we will not agree to that,' and that would not be discrimination for these purposes.

Senator PRATT: So that right of refusal does not apply to the driver of a vehicle on the way to the church ceremony?

Mr Walter : We are talking about an ordinary commercial service provider?

Senator PRATT: Yes.

Mr Walter : No, that would not apply. The ordinary commercial provider could not say, 'No, I do not believe that two men should get married. It is confined—

Senator PRATT: I have a technical question to take on notice. Can you tell me why you needed to confine it if it is the same as 37?

CHAIR: Could you take that on notice please? We are running out of time and we need to go to Senator Paterson.

Senator PATERSON: Thank you. I just have one—hopefully quick—line of questioning. One of the surprising or unanticipated areas of agreement between witnesses that are both in favour of and against same-sex marriage has been about 47(3)(a). I stress we have not asked every witness about this issue, but witnesses who are both in favour of and against same-sex marriage have agreed that 43(3)(a) could be removed and that would still deliver the protection for religious ministers that churches are seeking and at the same time would make same-sex people feel like they are not being singled out for special or different treatment. So a minister of religion should be able to refuse to officiate any wedding that was against their religious beliefs, not just limited to same-sex couples. Did the department consider not having that part of the act in there, and is that part of the act necessary to achieve its objectives?

Mr Walter : Thank you for the question. The purpose of paragraph (a) in that instance is actually to confine what would otherwise be a broader exemption than currently exists in antidiscrimination law. At the moment, the situation is that there are religious exemptions in two of the antidiscrimination acts. There is also one, I think, in the Fair Work Act. So there is one in the Age Discrimination Act. There is one in the Sex Discrimination Act. However, you will not find religious exemptions in the Disability Discrimination Act. You will not find one in the Racial Discrimination Act. So you will not find religious exemptions in there.

If we remove paragraph (a) the effect of that, we think, would be to create a very broad religious exemption which would apply across the board, including in relation to those other acts. You might, for example, find yourself in a situation where a religious body holds a belief that marriage is only for the purposes of procreation. In that case, where a person has a disability that means they are unable to procreate, the religious body could say it is not going to solemnise their marriage because it believes marriage is for the purposes of procreation. What would happen in that instance is that you are expanding out to a broader religious exemption than currently exists in discrimination law. Some of the people who have given evidence would agree with doing that and some would disagree.

In terms of the general principle of not singling out people on the basis that it is a same-sex marriage, there might be other ways we could go about drafting the provision to, for example, refer to discrimination on the grounds set out in part II of the Sex Discrimination Act, which does not use the same language; we might be able to find other ways of drafting it to deal with the issue of singling people out.

Senator PATERSON: Although, to put it crudely, that would be a more polite way of doing it, the intent would still be the same: you are only exempt if it is a same-sex wedding and not any other type of wedding.

Mr Walter : The government obviously made a decision when it drafted this bill that that was the only ground on which it was going to provide that exemption. We have two different groups. Some would like that to more or less stay the same, or be narrowed, and others would like that to be broadened. That would obviously be a decision for government as to which way they would go on that.

Senator PATERSON: Am I correct in assuming that, even if we took out 3(a), it would still require that it be consistent with their religious beliefs? It could not be for any other reason.

Mr Walter : I think that is right.    But it would be a mistake to think that it does not have consequences; it does. And we would need to—

Senator PATERSON: Of course. I am just trying to understand exactly what those consequences would be. If you had a minister of religion who held personal views about race and did not want to intermarry people of different races, would removing 3(a) grant that minister protection or not?

Mr Walter : If that belief is part of the tenets of their religion then, yes, potentially that is one of the consequences.

Senator PATERSON: Correct me if I am wrong. I am not aware of any religions in Australia that have those views—

Mr Walter : Exactly. But it could potentially open that up, yes.

Senator KITCHING: Following on from Senator Pratt's question in relation to the confining of discrimination in the exposure draft, do you think section 37 of the SDA needs to be replicated in the Marriage Act?

Mr Walter : I guess the exposure draft bill does two things. The first thing is that it substantially replicates what is in section 37. Again, because of the significance of this as a piece of social change legislation, the government took the view that it should be very clear on the face of the legislation what exemptions applied so that everyone would know what we were talking about. The second thing is that it extends beyond section 37 because it introduces the concept of a conscientious belief. That is a departure from the current provision in the Sex Discrimination Act; it replicates it and extends it.

Senator KITCHING: We have had some evidence around grandfathering—I am not sure about the written submissions but it was certainly in some of the oral evidence. For example, if the law was to change, would existing civil celebrants be able to continue as they are and be able to refuse as they can?

Any new civil celebrants would have to comply with the law as it was at the time of becoming a celebrant or being registered as a celebrant. Is that possible within the various legislation around celebrants and how do you see that working?

Ms Harvey : We are conscious of seeing the recommendation or that suggestion about how that would work. If the government was of a mind to implement that policy, we would then have a look at how that what might work from an administrative perspective, given there are around 8½ thousand civil marriage celebrants and we have a register that they are maintained on and those kinds of things. That is certainly one of the things that we would have to look at then. I imagine there would also then be questions about the different regimes that would apply to the two and some things that we would need to think through there as well around exemptions open to one lot of celebrants but not available to another. I am aware from interaction with celebrants that they take very seriously the role that they perform. They take a great deal of pride in the amount of time they have been a celebrant, so they might feel differently about being on the grandfathered list rather than the other list. That might be something we need to consider and consult with them about.

Senator KITCHING: Yes, it may be an indicator they may not want.

Ms Harvey : It might be used to suggest this group of celebrants will refuse when indeed they might not.

Senator KITCHING: There are some definitions in the exposure draft, but I am interested in the definitions around religious organisations and religious bodies. There is wording from the Sex Discrimination Act around those phrases. This is obviously just an exposure draft. A piece of legislation might carry those definitions forward from the Sex Discrimination Act. How would you define them in the new legislation?

Ms Harvey : To go back to the Marriage Act as it exists at the moment, it already uses the expression 'religious organisation' and 'religious body'. They are not defined in the act, but they are already used in the act. That is for that purpose we referred to earlier around recognised denominations and determining who is in one. I am not sure if the term has been in the act since 1961, but certainly it has been there for a very long time. If government decided that it wanted to look at a definition of religious organisation or religious body then that is something we would clearly need to give a great deal of thought to and how would that work with other definitions that there might be as well.

Senator KITCHING: It would be akin to the UK Marriage (Same Sex Couples) Act 2013, where it does not necessarily define as extensively as their other pieces of legislation around marriage. I do not know whether you have looked at this. I am happy to give you my copy.

Ms Harvey : I am sure some of my team have picked through it, but I have not.

Mr Walter : The Sex Discrimination Act also does not define what is a religious body. What tends to happen in Commonwealth legislation is we try and rely on the ordinary meaning of that term and, of course, there is a High Court authority on the characteristics of religious organisations. The Scientology case in particular is significant in that regard.

Senator KITCHING: I looked at that. I also looked for their conscientious belief. I was interested in how it had developed and whether it was using the ordinary meaning of the word.

Mr Walter : Again, that is meant to be the ordinary meaning.

Senator SMITH: On notice, could you provide information to the committee on how many complaints have been made against celebrants over the last three years and, just broadly, the nature of those complaints, unless you know it off the top of your head?

Ms Williams : Yes.

Senator SMITH: Regarding celebrants who are part of a nonrecognised denomination, are they primarily there to conduct a civil function or are they conducting a religious function or can they conduct both?

Ms Williams : Where a minister of religion is appointed under the civil scheme, predominantly they can conduct, as part of their authorisation, the religious ceremony which is prescribed by the religious organisation. However, there are a couple of things in the act where we differentiate between those who are ministers of religions under the recognised denomination scheme and those who are ministers of religion under what we will call the civil celebrants scheme.

Senator SMITH: It is the latter that I am interested in.

Ms Williams : I am sure one of my colleagues will correct me if I misspeak. For the ceremony, a minister of religion is not required to use the form of words in the vows as prescribed by the legislation. However, under section 46, which is an expression of what the definition of marriage is, which authorised celebrants are required to give, it is only ministers of religion of a recognised denomination that do not have to give that. If you are a minister of religion under the 'other' category, then you are required to state what we colloquially call the monitum, which is the form of words that are set out in 46(1).

Senator SMITH: That is where we have a bit of a dilemma. Someone conducting the ceremony is a member of an independent—let's call it that; I think that is what you use on the website—

Ms Williams : Yes, it can be independent.

Senator SMITH: religious organisation. At the moment they use the prescribed words, which are 'man and woman', so they would not have an issue with that, I assume, but of course if the law changes then they would be required to use the legal words, which would be 'two persons', and that might give rise to an issue.

Ms Williams : It may. They are required by law to state those words. There is no preclusion in the law to add to that. That is happening at present in terms of, I think, some members from the Coalition of Celebrant Associations, CoCA. They have been asked over the last few years to, when they state what we call the monitum, indicate that it is not the view of the marrying couple and that they support a broader definition of marriage. I do not think there would be anything in the Marriage Act that would preclude a religion from then also stating that, under the tenets and beliefs of their religion, their view of marriage is that it be between a man and a woman.

Senator SMITH: So there is a remedy to that. On the 538 persons, have we seen a dramatic increase in the last two to three years? In just driving around my own electorate in the state of Western Australia, I see a proliferation of what we will call independently based faith organisations. Some might have three or four congregations or they might have one; they tend to be large et cetera. What is the trend with regard to this particular category?

Ms Williams : I will have to take that on notice. I cannot answer that.

Senator SMITH: That is fine. Mr Walter, have you seen, have you read and have you absorbed the Human Rights Commission's submission?

Mr Walter : I will confess: I have not read it, but I am happy to—

Senator SMITH: It is probably worth doing. It would have been helpful in advance of this dialogue. It raises some serious issues around conscientious objections. I am keen to understand. Does the Attorney-General's Department have a similar view around the conscientious objections that are raised in the Human Rights Commission report or do you have an alternative view? If so, why is that?

Mr Walter : I think it better if I simply state the government took the view that the institution of marriage has both—for want of a better term—religious and cultural aspects to it. The government's view was that in drafting this legislation it wanted to strike a balance and protect both elements of that, and that somebody could make an objection to being required to solemnise a marriage where they felt the institution of marriage was, essentially, just between a man and a woman. That was the position the government, ultimately, decided to bring forward in this exposure draft. If you could give me a moment of indulgence—

Senator SMITH: Of course.

Mr Walter : this was an exposure draft piece of legislation. It was predicated on the idea that there would be a plebiscite. In the ordinary course of events we would have had submissions, not unlike the ones you have now. We would have considered them and gone back to government advising on what they had to say and the government would have informed its position, in relation to the legislation. This was the balance the government took at that time to deal with those issues.

Senator SMITH: That iterative process is something the Senate committee is now doing as a result of the motion. Are you going to be able to provide me with some information around this particular element of the Human Rights Commission, or are you saying that a policy decision was taken—

Mr Walter : Yes. There was a policy decision taken by the government that this is where it would draw the balance on that element. I will nonetheless have a look at the submission. If there is anything that is factually useful for the committee we will provide that.

Senator SMITH: It does provide a mediating mechanism. If you could provide some commentary around that, that would be—

Mr Walter : The only difficulty there would be that we would not be in a position to provide policy advice on that.

Senator SMITH: I understand.

CHAIR: Senator Pratt, you have two minutes to put some questions on notice.

Senator PRATT: I wanted to ask about the definition of religious organisations, particularly in relation to commercial services. I do not know if a company like Sanitarium were providing wedding catering, for example, what their obligation would be to provide a service or not, under this act, in your view, and how the limit is drawn around that. Is there a reason you have not used the Sex Discrimination Act only? Is it because you did not want to broaden the grounds, that you wanted to limit it to same-sex relationships?

Mr Walter : There were two aspects to that. One was that the government's view was it should be clear on the face of the Marriage Act. That was just a clarity issue.

Senator PRATT: How is it clear? Is it to uphold the doctrine or is it to uphold the definition of sex?

Mr Walter : Sorry, I am not entirely sure what you mean.

Senator PRATT: Some doctrines will see a transgender person—

CHAIR: Senator Pratt can you—

Senator PRATT: I want to place it on notice but they need to understand the question. For the purposes of defining who a man is and who a woman is, are you relying on births, deaths and marriages or are you relying on the doctrinal definition of who a man is and who a woman is? For example, marrying someone who has a transgender history may be viewed by the church as marrying a man and a man or a woman and a woman but, nevertheless, they would have the protection under this act not to be discriminated against on religious grounds.

Mr Walter : I think I understand the question now so we will take that on notice.

Senator PRATT: Please also clarify why you did not just adopt the wording from the Sex Discrimination Act.

Mr Walter : Certainly.

CHAIR: The committee will conclude its investigation. I thank the officials from the Attorney-General's Department for their submission and evidence today. You have been asked to provide some further information to the committee. Given the time frame we have for reporting, if you could do that within one week it would be much appreciated. I thank Broadcasting, Hansard and the committee.

Committee adjourned at 12:59