ALBONICO, Mr Lindsay Robert, Project Director, John Holland Pty Ltd

BROOKS, Mr Andrew John, Health, Safety, Environment and Quality Manager, John Holland Pty Ltd

[13:27]

ACTING CHAIR: Welcome. Do you have any drama having your faces splashed all across the ABC statewide today?

Mr Albonico : No, we do not.

Mr Brooks : No.

ACTING CHAIR: None at all? That is fantastic. Thanks for appearing before the committee today. Mr Brooks has been in the room for a while, so he has heard the evidence. I invite you to make an opening statement, if you want to, before we fire off a few questions to you.

Mr Albonico : Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today. Perth Children's Hospital replaces the 100-year-old Princess Margaret Hospital for Children as Western Australia's only dedicated paediatric hospital. John Holland was appointed managing contractor by the WA government in 2011. The hospital is state of the art and it will be a world-class paediatric facility. The extensive use of facade panels is a distinctive design feature of Perth Children's Hospital. John Holland contracted Aurecon Australia to develop the facade performance specifications, which incorporated the atrium unitised roof panels, with the project architects. Aurecon worked with John Holland's building surveyor to ensure the brief complied with the National Construction Code. An international scan of facade manufacturers identified 12 potential suppliers, of which four were invited to tender in 2012. John Holland awarded the facade contract to Yuanda Australia, as a recognised global facade supplier, in December 2012. The contract was awarded with the knowledge the panels would be manufactured in China, by Yuanda China, using components sourced from various suppliers. It was a contract requirement for these panels to be free of asbestos-containing materials.

The atrium roof panel design and composition was approved by representatives from John Holland and Aurecon, as design verifier, and to a point where the client—in this case, the state—had no further comment. This process involved reviewing internal material samples, including a fibre cement sheet provided by Yuanda, which was accompanied by a test report that identified the product as autoclaved cellulose fibre cement flat sheet, non-asbestos. This report was conducted by the National Quality Supervision and Inspection Centre for Building Materials and Decoration Materials, which is a department of the Shanghai Institute of Quality Inspection and Technical Research, a non-profit scientific Chinese government research laboratory.

Between January 2013 and April 2014, a mix of representatives from John Holland, Aurecon, the client and the client's technical advisers made six visits to the Yuanda China factory to view and assess the panel production and the quality management processes. Between May 2014 and January 2015, 34 partial-vision panels and 155 non-vision panels were installed on the atrium roof. In June 2016 a need to increase the capacity of the hospital's ventilation system was identified. On 11 July 2016 work commenced on fitting an additional exhaust fan system, where workers made six penetrations in three atrium roof panels. Workers became suspicious of a piece of dislodged fibre cement sheet and dust released as a result of that cutting.

On 12 July 2016, workers alerted John Holland managers of their concerns and advised that they had retained a sample of the sheeting. The timing of this discovery at PCH coincided with media reports about asbestos in gaskets supplied by Yuanda at 1 William Street in Brisbane. In response, John Holland staff checked the original test results that cleared the panels for use. In addition, John Holland managers decided to test a piece of fibre cement sheet for asbestos using a NATA accredited laboratory. By late afternoon, this test confirmed the presence of chrysotile, white asbestos—

Senator XENOPHON: What day was that?

Mr Albonico : On or around 12 July.

Senator XENOPHON: So it was on the same day?

Mr Albonico : Yes, on the same day that we reacted to the media report about 1 William Street—so 12 July. By late afternoon, this test confirmed the presence of chrysotile, white asbestos, and at 8 pm the site was cleared of all workers. The confirmation of the presence of asbestos triggered an immediate and thorough response by John Holland that involved extensive dust and air quality testing—388 separate tests by multiple NATA accredited laboratories; more than 20 briefings, attended by 550 workers; other support to workers, including offers of baseline health checks, access to an occupational GP, tool cleaning and/or replacement, and vehicle tests.

In the immediate days and weeks following the discovery of asbestos, various regulators visited PCH to assess control measures and plans to remediate these panels. These agencies included Comcare, WorkSafe, Border Force and the WA Building Commission. On Friday, 15 July, the WA Building Commissioner announced an audit of the Perth Children's Hospital. From mid-July to September 2016, the Building Commission made several site visits and examined documents, including contract documents which were commercial-in-confidence, specifications, certificates, inspection reports, product test results, laboratory test results, building surveyor and fire engineer reports, subcontractor sample submission records and shipping schedules. The findings of the Building Commission, released in September 2016, confirmed John Holland had appropriately managed its response to the discovery of asbestos and assessed John Holland's procurement processes as comprehensive and consistent with industry practice. Yuanda's manufacturing process was identified as allowing non-specified and non-conforming products to enter the supply chain. At the end of July, clearance certificates declared the contamination area safe for occupation.

John Holland investigated a number of options to remediate the atrium roof panels before selecting a top down, in situ approach as the safest option. This remediation process, which was proven in a trial conducted on 12 August 2016, involved deconstructing each panel by removing the outer aluminium skin, insulation and asbestos-containing fibrous cement sheets; cleaning each shell and rebuilding them with new materials; and each cleared shell and new fibre cement sheet was tested and certified as asbestos free before the new materials were installed. Stringent safety measures applied throughout the remediation process. Remediation work started in early September 2016 and was completed on 9 November 2016. Of the 189 atrium roof panels replaced, 132 were found to contain white asbestos. John Holland activated an emergency management response team that initially met daily to manage the event and enforce measures to protect the health and safety of all project related personnel.

John Holland initiated two formal investigations following the discovery of asbestos, including an exposure event investigation that considered the business's immediate response. As an outcome of that investigation, a new work procedure was introduced on 19 July that requires pre-approval for any work that involves the penetration of materials irrespective of the risk assessment carried out under the procedure. An NCR investigation report that reviewed procurement practices related to non-conforming products. This review found Yuanda's quality-management system to have had significant weaknesses in its procurement, receding and production processes that resulted in the non-conforming product being delivered to PCH.

This incident should never have occurred, yet it did. As a result of the PCH incident and subsequent reviews, John Holland has implemented a number of changes and processes to strengthen its quality-management system and processes, including but not limited to updating standard contract templates to include a requirement that all materials must be certified as asbestos-free. Specifically, this requires testing to be in accordance with AS4964 2004 method for the qualitative assessment of asbestos in bulk samples. In this instance of international procurement, overseas laboratories must be recognised as being equivalent to a NADA accredited laboratory.

An asbestos-awareness presentation is being created to increase awareness related to identifying, managing and handling asbestos in workplaces and issues associated with importing high-risk materials from overseas suppliers and manufacturers. John Holland established a quality reference group of senior personnel from across the business that meets quarterly to review events such as the PCH asbestos event, consider the need for changes in business processes as an outcome of an event and raise awareness of quality management.

In closing, I would like to thank the committee for the opportunity to present an overview of the circumstances surrounding the discovery of white asbestos at PCH. John Holland looks forward to participating with the industry and other stakeholders to address the importation of non-conforming building products into Australia.

Senator XENOPHON: Chair, can we get a copy of that opening statement? That will be quite helpful.

ACTING CHAIR: Yes. If you could table that opening statement, that would be appreciated.

I want you to walk me through a couple things that are not clear in my mind. We heard earlier on from a number of witnesses. You see in front of you who they are, and I am sure you have been told. When did John Holland first hear of the possible presence of asbestos in the Perth children's hospital? I am really asking for specific timing because a few things are not lining up in my head with your opening statement and what we have heard earlier. Can you walk me through that?

Mr Albonico : We can. I just might need to defer to our investigation report if you are looking for a very specific—

ACTING CHAIR: Do not worry; Mr Brooks has been sitting there diligently doing his homework as the other witnesses have been there, so he cannot bulldust me. I know he would not even try.

While Mr Brooks is looking: things do not line up. We are going to get to the bottom of that. It is bad enough the Chinese or Yuanda have lied through their eyeteeth—have they lied through their eyeteeth or have they just slipped up at the last minute? What do you reckon there?

Mr Albonico : I do not want to comment about them lying, but simply there has been a process that has broken down.

ACTING CHAIR: You have had paperwork that said specifically there is no asbestos and we promise, cross our heart, hope to die, we're good, honourable citizens and so on. It is pretty simple. Is that a nod in the affirmative? Are you agreeing with me? They put you in a really difficult position.

Mr Albonico : I would agree they have put us in a very difficult position.

ACTING CHAIR: I would like to think that no-one in Australia is going to touch them again, because they cannot be trusted.

Mr Albonico : Certainly, if you wonder whether they were to be considered by us or somebody else in terms of procuring facade or building products, because they produce other products for markets around the world, as a result from John Holland's perspective, we would be approaching that with a lot more caution.

ACTING CHAIR: I bet. Thank you. How did you go there, Mr Brooke? Do you have a timetable for me?

Mr Brooks : Yes. Mr Albonico became aware at two o'clock.

ACTING CHAIR: Let's get this right. It was at 2 pm on 12 July.

Mr Brooks : Yes. At that point, that was from the construction director, so there was some discussion of whether people may or may not have a sample. We explored that and asked the supervisor of that work group. From that point it started to escalate. It got to a point with the media article when Lindsay became aware of it at two o'clock. Further discussion was asked, and then at four o'clock.

ACTING CHAIR: Hang on. First off: thank you. Who first informed whoever it is at John Holland that, you know what, we could have a problem here with asbestos?

Mr Brooks : The first one was the construction director.

ACTING CHAIR: And who is the construction director? Is that one of your employees?

Mr Brooks : Yes.

ACTING CHAIR: At two o'clock.

Mr Brooks : Yes.

ACTING CHAIR: What happened then?

Mr Brooks : At that point it coincided with the article on Queensland coming out, so there was a discussion held with the team to go, 'Let's go have another look at products that we've had brought in from Yuanda—specifically, the board.' From that point we went back to the design manager, Aurecon. Aurecon said, 'No, we've got the certificate to say it's nonasbestos.' At four o'clock there was a decision made, for, I suppose, our peace of mind to voluntarily go and get a test taken.

Senator XENOPHON: I am trying to understand the time line. Mr Albonico, the issue became apparent when there had to be some additional mechanical exhaust system work done in the north atrium roof, correct?

Mr Albonico : That decision had already been taken. Those works were being carried out, which is how we became aware.

Senator XENOPHON: Right. Is it because of roof panel dust, a roof panel fell down or something? What is your understanding of what actually triggered the concern of the workers on the site? Was it on 12 July, or did something happen a few days earlier?

Mr Albonico : For your benefit as well, if it is of any interest to the committee: we have a document here that is a chronology by date and by time on that day. If we are talking about some specific event, this may be helpful. It is many pages, but it talks about the date and the hour of the day and runs a chronology all the way through this process.

Senator XENOPHON: But do you know when the workers on the site became suspicious of the substance?

Mr Brooks : The workers on the site became suspicious?

Mr Brooks : The workers of that particular group did on the 11th. However, they only discussed it amongst themselves. They did not communicate to their direct supervisor that they were concerned about it.

Senator XENOPHON: Why did they become concerned? Where they doing some drilling? Did something fall down?

Mr Albonico : Essentially, imagine standing below the roof. What it looks like looking up is simply a plain galvanised iron sheet, so that is what they are looking at. They had the design drawing about what type of penetrations and where those penetrations needed to be in those panels, and they normally start with drilling a set-out hole. That is physically drilling it. Once they identify that, they mark out, because some of these penetrations were either square or rectangular. So they would set out the templates and then they would nibble that PGI sheet out. It was during that process of drilling and cutting. Nothing fell down. There was no safety event around this other than that, when they drilled through the PGI sheet, these compressed fibre boards sit behind the plain galvanised sheet. They cannot see it, so they drill into it. There is dust being produced, and they nibble out a square for bigger penetration. Then they attempt to break out the compressed fibre board that is sitting behind the PGI sheet.

Senator XENOPHON: From what you now know, they got suspicious on the 11th.

Mr Albonico : Yes, but they did not alert their immediate supervisor. They spoke amongst themselves. They are not John Holland employees; they are employees of a subcontractor. Nonetheless, the workforce that was actually doing the work, which is documented in here, discussed that event amongst themselves.

Senator XENOPHON: But the CFMEU actually got it tested before you got your sample tested. Is that right?

Mr Albonico : I am not aware of that. I have heard that said today.

ACTING CHAIR: Let's clear that up. The CFMEU said that on the Hansard today very clearly. This is where your story differs from what we have heard today.

Mr Albonico : Yes.

ACTING CHAIR: The Brisbane fiasco came out on the 11th. Workers on the site through social media or whatever picked that up, rang the CFMEU and said, 'We believe we have a problem'. The sample was taken and sent to Coffey on 12 July. Coffey, who told us very clearly what they do and how they did it, came straight back within a matter of hours to say, 'Yes, this is asbestos.' Then the CFMEU—I am going to wait for a nod from the back of the room if I have this wrong—contacted Holland on the 12th.

Mr Albonico : The CFMEU never contacted John Holland.

Mr Brooks : That is incorrect.

ACTING CHAIR: They contacted Comcare?

Mr Albonico : You would have to ask them.

ACTING CHAIR: I will follow that up. But what we have heard from Comcare earlier today is that you guys had your own asbestos people—whatever you call them—on the site and engaged and you took your own study or sent off your own sample, which you have confirmed today. What we are trying to establish is: did you react because there was notification that Coffey had found this, and you did not believe it and wanted to do your own?

Mr Albonico : No.

ACTING CHAIR: Or were you just fantastically on the ball? You have to understand how I operate, Mr Albonico, because we are from the same country. Straight in your face, we will get it out and then we will be friends forever after. Make no mistake.

Mr Albonico : I feel like we are friends already!

ACTING CHAIR: Now you have me worried!

Senator XENOPHON: Can Hansard note that Mr Albonico said that with a complete steadfastness.

ACTING CHAIR: I am not convinced. My problem here is that it has been raised that there was asbestos and I have not seen anything in front of me yet—though there were some fights going on about right of entry—where there is a reaction of: 'Oh my god, there is asbestos on the site; something as serious as this. For god's sake get everyone out of the area and let's do whatever we have to do.' The picture that is being painted in my head so far was: 'Hang on, we're not quite sure. We'll do our own tests and meanwhile workers will still go about their chores.' What do you say to that?

Mr Albonico : What I can say to that is that we were not alerted by the CFMEU or anyone else about—

ACTING CHAIR: I will follow that up.

Mr Albonico : That is the first thing. The actual event that took place was that we had received an alert via ABC online—it was a Google alert which I have that came up on my screen as asbestos. It came up because I had alerts for different people that we use. Yuanda came up and this issue on 1 William Street in Brisbane came up. That was on 11 July—

Mr Brooks : On the 12th.

Mr Albonico : On 12 July?

Mr Brooks : Yes.

Mr Albonico : That was brought to my attention. I called across a site project manager and simply said—I can say this, Senator, because it was me that actually had this conversation; I am not recollecting something that was told to me. They came across to my office and I said simply: 'There's this news alert. We obviously are using Yuanda. Let's have a look at this issue.' Then it was raised with me that we were making penetrations in some panels. I said: 'Look, we've got all the test certificates for a range of different tests that we were required to produce for the facade. Let's get a sample of that and get that into the laboratory. Let's be ahead of the curve before it is announced tomorrow that there is a suspicious substance. Let's get it into a laboratory overnight so that when they return a negative or a non-positive in the morning I can be ahead of that and speak to the workforce and speak to any union concerns or client concerns and simply say, "This is the test certificate and this is the sample we had tested." So when the certificate comes back from the NATA lab we'll be able to say we had done all of that.' That is, totally not expecting the fact that a positive result came in.

ACTING CHAIR: Mr Albonico, this is where I have concerns. If there is a possibility that there is asbestos, I ask: why didn't John Holland say, 'Get the hell out of there, everyone'? Open the floodgates or doors to anyone and say: 'Let's work together because we are a responsible employer. We've not broken the code or the laws because of these deviants.' You wonder why they are undermining everything else going on in Australian jobs. Why didn't that happen? Your biggest fear has to be how many people were exposed or potentially exposed to the fibres in the 12 or 16 hours before, from when it was first raised with you until they found it actually was asbestos.

Mr Albonico : That is a very reasonable question. Simply put, looking backwards at the event, perhaps there may have been a decision that should have been taken.

ACTING CHAIR: Mr Albonico, I am sorry. I do not see a 'maybe'. You will not win me over with 'maybe'.

Mr Albonico : That is fine; I will not use the word 'maybe'. We had no reason to suspect that that unitised roof panel contained anything like asbestos. We had no expectation.

ACTING CHAIR: I understand, but we are all experts after the event. The sad part is, from where I am sitting here at the front, that John Holland, for whatever reason, did not go, 'We have to take this seriously and evacuate, get people out, call the experts in and do whatever we do.' It is like saying, 'Only one more beer and then I'll drive home'—it is no good whingeing after the coppers pull you up. But this is more serious than that. I am seeing a dereliction of duty from John Holland to sit back and let those workers, with what we know now, still be exposed to asbestos. I cannot see any good in this.

Mr Albonico : I cannot agree with anything you have just said.

ACTING CHAIR: You cannot agree with me?

Mr Albonico : No, I cannot.

ACTING CHAIR: Do you think I am wrong?

Mr Albonico : I think the event was handled appropriately. Have there been lessons learnt around the management of that? Yes.

ACTING CHAIR: How can you seriously look me in the eye and say that it was handled appropriately?

Mr Albonico : Do not just take my word that it was handled appropriately—

ACTING CHAIR: How can you dare look at me—do I have my head on back to front?

Mr Albonico : No, I am looking straight at you.

ACTING CHAIR: Workers were exposed and, for whatever reason, John Holland did not go, 'We have to take this seriously.' I am not talking about a loose nut or a spanner that is not working; I cannot believe that you would think that I am that dull and that dumb that you could run that argument.

Mr Albonico : I am not making any allegations against you, Senator Sterle—at all. You have asked me a question around the process—

ACTING CHAIR: You should replay what you are saying.

Mr Albonico : or the events around that. The moment we became aware that we had a test result that was positive, we immediately took steps.

ACTING CHAIR: How many hours later? 15, 16? How many hours from two o'clock on 12 July, when it was raised with you, until you evacuated the site?

Mr Albonico : I think it was 6 pm.

Mr Brooks : It was two hours.

ACTING CHAIR: Two hours?

Mr Brooks : Yes.

ACTING CHAIR: So by four o'clock you had found out—it does not matter if it was one hour or two hours. Okay, it was two hours, but workers were still exposed, because for some reason you did not believe that it could be or you did not believe the source it came from. Who told you that there was asbestos at two o'clock?

Mr Albonico : I think I know where the gap is in the conversation. We had not had any result to say that it was asbestos.

ACTING CHAIR: What happened at two o'clock?

Mr Albonico : We determined that there was asbestos.

Senator XENOPHON: Chair, though you—

ACTING CHAIR: Help me out.

Senator XENOPHON: on the same train of questioning: it appears that workers on the site suspected that this material contained asbestos on 11 July 2016. Correct?

Mr Brooks : Correct.

Senator XENOPHON: You did not have knowledge of that. You first became aware that there was a concern about it containing asbestos on 16 July?

Mr Albonico : No, 12 July.

Senator XENOPHON: Sorry, I got my dates wrong—12 July. Was that after workers had told you about it?

Mr Albonico : No-one had told us at that point either.

Senator XENOPHON: What made you want to check it?

ACTING CHAIR: So it was the construction director?

Mr Albonico : No.

Senator XENOPHON: What led to you getting it tested? Surely you had a complaint?

Mr Albonico : No. It was a Google Alert.

Mr Brooks : It was also from—

Senator XENOPHON: A Google Alert about Yuanda products? That is what the trigger was?

Mr Albonico : Yes.

Senator XENOPHON: When was that Google Alert out?

Mr Brooks : At two o'clock.

ACTING CHAIR: On the 12th.

Senator XENOPHON: So it was a Google Alert that triggered your testing, and you got a sample and got it tested when?

Mr Albonico : We went and bagged a sample.

Mr Brooks : At four o'clock. That was sent off to the test house.

Senator XENOPHON: So the Google Alert came out at two, somebody saw it within an hour or so—

Mr Albonico : Me.

Senator XENOPHON: You saw it at two?

Mr Albonico : Yes.

Senator XENOPHON: You read your Google alerts; you are very good—I do not. You then got it checked out and you got the test done that day?

Mr Albonico : Yes.

Senator XENOPHON: And you got the test done to day, 'Nothing to worry about,' so you could assure the workforce.

Mr Albonico : Correct.

Senator XENOPHON: But you did not get that result, obviously.

Mr Albonico : No.

Senator XENOPHON: Chair, can I just go back one step on this? There is something that troubles me. If I may—I do not want to interrupt your line of questioning.

ACTING CHAIR: Yes.

Senator XENOPHON: You relied on a certificate from the National Quality Supervision and Inspection Center for Building Materials and Decoration Materials, a department of the Shanghai Institute of Quality Inspection and Technical Research. Correct?

Mr Albonico : Yes.

Senator XENOPHON: Which said it was asbestos-free?

Mr Albonico : It says it is non-asbestos.

Senator XENOPHON: Okay. Are you aware that the rules for the definition of non-asbestos in China are completely different from what it means in the ordinary meaning of the word?

In China—I do not have it specifically in front of me—I understand it actually goes by weight. There is a percentage.

I put this to you: it is on the record that in China the standard for 'non-asbestos' does not mean that at all; it means a percentage by weight. If you are importing railcars, for instance, the steel is included in the weight, but it could be laced with asbestos. It could be covered in asbestos, but because it is so heavy because of the other components—similarly, with these panels—it is about the percentage. Sorry I do not have it in front of me. Some people have suggested it is 10 per cent of the weight. But it is not a standard. It is a fiction that says that something can be classified as non-asbestos. Did anybody bother to check what the Chinese standard, or lack thereof, was, which could show that a certification from China of 'non-asbestos' does not mean that at all?

Mr Brooks : We also during the period—

Senator XENOPHON: Yes or no? Were you aware of that?

Mr Albonico : I am not aware. I am aware that that is recorded in a Hansard thatI read prior to coming today; you have used the same example in that.

Senator XENOPHON: Yes.

Mr Albonico : But that is the first time I have ever heard that or read that.

Senator XENOPHON: Mr Brooks, have you been able to verify what the standard in China is based on?

Mr Brooks : No, I have not.

Senator XENOPHON: Wouldn't you want to check if they are talking about a different standard, because some other countries do. Even the US, I think, have a different standard. I will have to check that; I do not want to get a tweet from Donald Trump saying I am wrong!

Mr Brooks : Yes. Also, during the period of four o'clock to six o'clock on that day, we went back to our facade leader, or our facade specialist, who was involved in the package right through, just to verify again the technical specs and that it did not contain asbestos. He came back and said, 'No, the product is fine.' We were relying on, I suppose, technical specialists to give us some information as well.

Senator XENOPHON: But since this whole thing has blown open—and it has not been good for the reputation of John Holland, for Yuanda, in particular, or for the state government, and of course the primary concern is the health of the workers or others exposed to it—have you looked into the standard, because the metric used to measure something as being non-asbestos in China and other countries is quite different from what we understand it to be, which is zero?

Mr Brooks : Absolutely.

Senator XENOPHON: You have looked into it?

Mr Brooks : Yes. As the broader John Holland group we are going down the line—as Lindsay touched on before—of not relying on overseas certification anymore.

Senator XENOPHON: No, no. Sorry, I have not expressed this well. I think, Acting Chair, you know what I am getting at. If in China or in any other country you can certify something as being non-asbestos by virtue of a different standard—one per cent, two per cent, five per cent by weight of the product, or whatever other metric they use—do you know what the standards are behind their certificates? It is a question of forged certificates, fraudulent certificates or certificates that are, on the face of it, complying with the law of that country but would not comply with the law of our country.

Mr Brooks : I understand the question. I was framing it in the way that we are not going to the point where we understand what their limits are, because our limits are zero, and we will only rely on certification from a NATA-approved body or one that is mutually recognised.

Mr Albonico : Can I help answer the question?

Mr Brooks : Yes.

Mr Albonico : Certainly, as a result of this, we now understand in some way, anecdotally as well, that 'non-asbestos' actually does not mean 'zero asbestos'.

Senator XENOPHON: Hang on. How big is John Holland?

Mr Albonico : Big.

Senator XENOPHON: Big? Globally, how big is it?

Mr Albonico : It is not a global company. It is in Australia, New Zealand and Singapore.

Senator XENOPHON: You are in three countries. You are a multinational—and I do not say that in a pejorative sense. What is your market cap? What is your turnover each year; can you tell us?

Mr Albonico : Three and a half billion dollars.

Senator XENOPHON: You are a $3½ billion turnover company. How many employees do you have?

Mr Albonico : A little over 2,000, I think.

Senator XENOPHON: Can one of those 2,000 employees go on Google, make some calls and do some research to find out what a certificate from China means when it says it is non-asbestos? Has anyone done that?

Mr Brooks : Yes, they have.

Senator XENOPHON: So, what is the answer?

Mr Brooks : Border control has a list of high-risk countries, where they still allow—

Senator XENOPHON: That is not my question, sorry. I know this is—

Mr Brooks : And I—

Senator XENOPHON: Do you understand—

Mr Brooks : Yes, I understand—

Senator XENOPHON: Have you looked behind what the standard in China actually means?

Mr Brooks : I will have to take that on notice, because I certainly have not done that myself.

Senator XENOPHON: Okay, because the assertion is that in some countries—and I do not just want to pick on one country—when they say, 'This is non-asbestos,' sometimes that can mean that it is the white asbestos, that it is in a different category to blue asbestos and the like.

Mr Brooks : Yes.

Senator XENOPHON: Whereas, in fact, we know that any level of exposure to any form of asbestos can be life threatening or, indeed fatal. Can you take that on notice?

Mr Brooks : Yes, sure.

Senator XENOPHON: But I am surprised you would not know that by now.

Mr Brooks : I think we have, but we have taken a different view of how we approach that.

Senator XENOPHON: Okay, so that means you get it tested independently now?

Mr Brooks : Yes.

Senator XENOPHON: Under what standards? Under Australian standards?

Mr Brooks : Under Australian standards, yes.

Senator XENOPHON: But if it is understood that you are a company with $3½ billion in turnover and with 2,000 employees, did anybody do a risk assessment on how the standard on a certificate from a particular country saying that it is 'non-asbestos' is very different from what we understand it to be? Was that risk assessment undertaken prior to this event?

Mr Albonico : No.

Senator XENOPHON: Okay. I do have some other questions, but I am just trying to figure that out.

ACTING CHAIR: Okay. We are not in a rush; we are going to do this properly. Mr Brooks, can you table your chronological running sheet there for us, please? I have missed so much there—there are big gaps. We can go through it with you.

Mr Brooks : Yes.

ACTING CHAIR: Just to see why you were doing it—do you have a spare copy?

Mr Brooks : No, I do not. I just have this single—

ACTING CHAIR: You work on that, but we will table it when you are finished.

Mr Brooks : How far back would you like to go?

ACTING CHAIR: Let's just clear this up. The event in Brisbane was reported by the ABC on 11 July—am I correct?

Mr Brooks : Yes.

ACTING CHAIR: It was.

Mr Brooks : Yes. Do you want me to start on 11 July and just work through?

ACTING CHAIR: No, that is fine. That is when it was first reported. When was your Google alert, Mr Albonico? Was that—

Mr Albonico : It came up on the 12th.

ACTING CHAIR: The 12th, okay. But I thought you said that at 2 pm—and I have written it here—you were notified by a construction director. That is what I am sure you said to me, Mr Brooks.

Mr Brooks : No, I was incorrect on that detail.

ACTING CHAIR: Okay, so it was not a construction director. When I asked John Holland the question it was something along the lines of, 'When were you first notified that there was asbestos at the Perth Children's Hospital?'

Mr Brooks : First notified?

Mr Albonico : That was when we received the positive test results.

Mr Brooks : Yes, so—

ACTING CHAIR: Hang on, okay—sorry—so why did you go off and get a test?

Mr Albonico : Because of commonality of supplier.

ACTING CHAIR: So the first time was when you got the test back?

Mr Albonico : Correct.

ACTING CHAIR: And when was that?

Mr Brooks : At 6:10 on 12th.

ACTING CHAIR: At 6:10? Okay. So it was not two o'clock. And that came from your laboratory, did it?

Mr Brooks : Correct.

ACTING CHAIR: And you asked for that test to be taken at what time?

Mr Brooks : At four o'clock.

ACTING CHAIR: So 4 pm was the first you raised it?

Mr Brooks : Yes.

ACTING CHAIR: And is that laboratory next door, or on site or close by? Tell me how that worked?

Mr Brooks : The chain of custody for us was that we took a piece, took it to the laboratory and said, 'Please test this.' So there was not the pure chain of custody, but it was to get a result.

ACTING CHAIR: Right. So you had it reported on 11 July by the ABC that Yuanda—it was one of your projects, Yuanda in Brisbane?

Mr Brooks : No.

ACTING CHAIR: Oh, it was someone else's. But you got a Google alert on the 12th?

Mr Brooks : Yes.

ACTING CHAIR: Right, okay. So there was no action taken on the 11th by John Holland? They did not think, 'Oh, we've got a drama here. We could have a drama because we are using the same supplier'?

Mr Brooks : No.

ACTING CHAIR: Right, and that was first at four o'clock?

Mr Brooks : Yes.

Mr Albonico : Senator, could you just say the question again?

ACTING CHAIR: When you first thought, 'Hang on, we're using Yuanda. If they've got asbestos there we'd better make sure we haven't got it in this product,'—it was four o'clock when you first thought of that?

Mr Albonico : Just so it is clear as well: as I understood the article, the ACM was in a gasket on the aluminium strip—

ACTING CHAIR: Tell me what an ACM is?

Mr Albonico : Just an asbestos-containing material. It was in a gasket, not the product that we are talking about at PCH. It was simply the Yuanda name that drew my attention. Part of my request to my team was, 'I'm fairly confident in my recollection of the detailed design drawings that we don't use those gaskets. However, it's Yuanda, so let's check.'

ACTING CHAIR: Okay, so we have established that within two hours and 10 minutes of your first concern—and you swear that no-one notified you from the CFMEU? No-one notified John Holland?

Mr Brooks : No, no-one.

ACTING CHAIR: I am sure I heard that, but it will be clarified if I am not right. So at 6:10 it came back as a positive test. Walk us through what you did then.

Mr Brooks : From eight o'clock—that period in between 6:10—

ACTING CHAIR: You are really starting to confuse me, Mr Brooks—

Mr Brooks : Yes, sorry—

ACTING CHAIR: You threw me off one at two o'clock. You can see why I am getting a little bit head-spinny here—

Mr Brooks : I am sorry. This is how our time line—

ACTING CHAIR: So be very clear, please, for the committee what happened when.

Mr Albonico : Sorry, Senator, can I just help?

ACTING CHAIR: Please do.

Mr Albonico : Just simply read the description with the event, date and time and then there will be no confusion.

Mr Brooks : ARL emailed—

ACTING CHAIR: ARL is the laboratory?

Mr Brooks : Correct, yes. They emailed the results to the JH project director and the JH construction manager at 6:10. Lindsay will have to help me with the period for the next one because the time line goes to eight o'clock. That is when the project director cleared the site of approximately 200 workers as a precautionary measure before further testing could be taken under custody.

Mr Albonico : From the senator's question, and without trying to repeat the question, I think—

ACTING CHAIR: Feel free to do whatever we need to do to clear this up!

Mr Albonico : I think you are asking about the gap between 6:10 and eight o'clock?

ACTING CHAIR: I am actually talking about the gap from four o'clock, but okay. That is where I am coming from, where there could be a suspicion. Because you do not take this lightly, Mr Albonico—we understand that.

Mr Albonico : Correct.

ACTING CHAIR: So I just want to know how long it was before someone actually did something. At the moment I am getting a four-hour gap with 200 workers.

Mr Albonico : No, it was not 200 workers.

ACTING CHAIR: See, Mr Brooks, you threw 200 at me. This is where you are confusing me.

Mr Brooks : That is the number I have been provided with, Senator.

Mr Albonico : Are we talking about workface or are we talking about who was on site?

ACTING CHAIR: Well, these workers have been on site all day for different shifts, I assume. Let's not fool ourselves into thinking about just who was there at eight o'clock.

Mr Albonico : No, I understand. I just want to be very clear in my understanding of your question.

ACTING CHAIR: Absolutely, and I want you to ask me these questions.

Mr Albonico : Yes.

ACTING CHAIR: I should be questioning you, not you me, but I am happy to answer your questions! Let us start from when those first—what did you call them? Incisions or insertions or whatever they started—

Mr Albonico : Penetrations.

ACTING CHAIR: Penetrations. Let's work out how many workers—employees of your subcontractors, your white collars and your bosses; every single person—who could potentially have been exposed to fibres floating around that site were there from the time of the drill? Over to you.

Mr Brooks : The asbestos register is probably a good way to explain this. We have ascertained that approximately 40 people were directly involved in the works in the area. There is a link bridge on levels 7 and 8, where you walk from one block to the other block. We had 80 people who traversed through that area during that period.

ACTING CHAIR: Okay, 80 on top of the 40?

Mr Brooks : Yes, that had not been in that area.

ACTING CHAIR: That traversed it. Okay.

Mr Brooks : And then we have another 240 on our register who said they were within the building during that time.

ACTING CHAIR: On top of the 40 and the 80?

Mr Brooks : Correct.

ACTING CHAIR: So possibly—and I am not trying to alarm anyone, but just so it is clear for me—40 and 80 and 120 plus 240 is 360. All right, keep going, please.

Mr Albonico : Over time.

ACTING CHAIR: I understand that—I absolutely understand that.

Mr Brooks : At eight o'clock the site was cleared. The area was restricted to authorised personnel, only via lifts and stairs. John Holland's HSE manager—so, the project manager—an industrial hygienist from Indoor Air Quality Solutions and a licensed asbestos removal specialist were contacted and asked to come to site at that time.

ACTING CHAIR: At eight o'clock. And what time did they get there?

Mr Brooks : At 9.30 the industrial hygienist and the asbestos removal specialist were mobilised to site. They undertook a visual assessment of the affected area and potential transit areas or pathways. Following the visual assessment by Focus Demolition, the PCH HSE manager undertook a hazard assessment to review that against the asbestos control plan, and there was also an assessment by Focus Demolition in terms of activating the project asbestos management plan. At that point, air sampling was taken by Lancall and surface tests were taken by the industrial hygienist. There were three fragments and four tape tests in the area. The contaminated area is physically isolated at that point; it is encapsulated by black plastic. We have people on the outside.

ACTING CHAIR: Okay. I do not wish to cut you off, but fine. We know that at or around nine o'clock the procedures started: 'Let's get serious and let's get people out and do what we need to do.' What about clean-up events on that site prior to nine o'clock? We have heard the CFMEU, once again, say that they were told that workers on the site were cleaning up with broom or whatever, just with a Bunnings—someone is shaking their head in the background. Do you want to join the table, madam? You are welcome to come up. I am not having a crack at you, because I think you are integral to this. Are you sure? I am just seeing the head nodding. I am not having a crack; you can come and join if you want. All right. I want to get to the bottom of this. They have said that you could get these P1 masks, as I think they are called. How confident are John Holland in the clean-up process? Tell me what the clean-up procedures were on the site prior to someone saying, 'Actually, we've got a drama here,' from the time the cutting-in started to the time when it was discovered and someone said, 'Get the hell off the site.' How did they clean up?

Mr Brooks : There were some pieces of what they would have thought at that point was plasterboard. That would be cleaned up—and that would be correct—with broom and shovel, into a bin like a green SULO bin.

ACTING CHAIR: That is understandable. No-one knew at the time.

Mr Brooks : Yes.

ACTING CHAIR: What happened to the product that was cleaned up? Where did it end up?

Mr Brooks : It ended up in a skip bin down at the bottom of the basement, and from there it was taken to a waste facility.

ACTING CHAIR: Do the 320 employees that could be around the contaminated site or product include workers that could have been chucking stuff in that skip bin, emptying the skip bin or working around the skip bin?

Mr Brooks : Yes, they do.

ACTING CHAIR: And then where it has gone from there is probably to a tip, and we do not know.

Mr Brooks : Yes, it includes them as well.

ACTING CHAIR: Thank you very much. That is handy. I am going to flick across to Senator Xenophon because he has a plane to catch, and I want to give you every opportunity to ask your questions, because I live here.

Senator XENOPHON: Okay, I just want to ask a few questions about what occurred. According to the material that the Asbestos Safety and Eradication Agency have provided to the committee:

… China is still a major producer of asbestos. In addition to mining asbestos, China imports approximately 50% of the world's mined asbestos, and has no legislative prohibitions on manufacturing or exporting chrysotile asbestos.

In other words, it seems they have very different standards to the standards we have here in Australia. That might be why any certificate from that country at this stage is not reliable to use. What I am trying to establish is: was any risk management or risk assessment done of the veracity or the reliability of those certificates from China?

Mr Brooks : Not to my knowledge.

Senator XENOPHON: I just want to race through a few of the things that occurred. There is an allegation from the CFMEU. I invite you to look at the Hansard which hopefully will be out in a few days time and get back to us in the next fortnight. Two weeks should be enough time for you to see the Hansard and then respond to it. It might be in a draft form, but you can respond to it. The allegation is that people were told to sweep up the dust containing asbestos particles when asbestos was discovered. When you knew it was asbestos, what steps were taken to remove the dust on the site in the hot spot?

Mr Brooks : All removal of any asbestos dust that was in what we would call a contaminated area was conducted by a licensed asbestos removal—

Senator XENOPHON: This is very important. I am going to race through this. I need to know who that licensed person was—in other words, who the contract was with—and at what level and standard they do removal to. Presumably they would have had respirators on. Is that right?

Mr Brooks : Correct.

Senator XENOPHON: But there has been a very serious allegation from the union. They say that what actually occurred is that initially somebody was just sweeping the dust up. Could that have occurred before you were aware it was asbestos?

Mr Brooks : Yes, it could have happened before we knew it was an asbestos product.

Senator XENOPHON: But not afterwards?

Mr Brooks : But not afterwards.

Senator XENOPHON: So you are absolutely sure that at the time you knew it contained asbestos there was not somebody wearing a mask without a proper respirator cleaning it up? You are quite sure?

Mr Brooks : Absolutely sure.

Senator XENOPHON: You are absolutely sure of that. But I need to know when the proper contractors with the asbestos eradication gear were there. Can you establish whether there was an initial sweeping of the dust before you got the test results back? I will just frame this very carefully. Was there any sweeping of the dust after it was suspected it contained asbestos but before you got the test results back?

Mr Albonico : That is a question the senator has asked us to come back on.

Senator XENOPHON: That is a very important question. Do you understand the significance of that?

Mr Albonico : Do we have how to write this down or will we get some questions—

Senator XENOPHON: You will get the Hansard. From the moment you got the Google alert, which at least put in your mind the need to test it, was there any sweeping-up done of the site prior to the formal test results coming back? If there was, that would alarm me. The other allegation we have heard today is that one of the John Holland building site supervisors kept referring to 'poor old Colonel Kilgore' in Apocalypse Now and with a bit of bravado bit on the material and said, 'There's nothing to worry about.' Are you aware of that assertion?

Mr Albonico : No.

Senator XENOPHON: If that claim is true, would John Holland be talking to, disciplining, counselling and educating that particular supervisor?

Mr Albonico : For us, that is a hypothetical. We have no evidence of that. That is the first time I have heard someone say that. If—and it is a very big 'if'—that occurred, certainly there would be performance management required.

Senator XENOPHON: You will look at that?

Mr Albonico : I am aware the allegation has been made. It is the first time I have heard it.

Senator XENOPHON: The union has also made the assertion—and you will see this in the Hansard—that they had difficulty accessing the site. They say they had real difficulty in being able to access the site and that they had to go to court, whether it was for this episode or another, to access it for an imminent safety issue. I think you would agree that if there is concern about asbestos materials being on a site that would be an imminent danger to workers. You would rate that as a fairly important issue if there is asbestos on the site full stop and that is being disturbed in the form of dust.

Mr Albonico : There is not a connection between an imminent safety threat and what I understood happened on the day.

Mr Brooks : On the day, we had the area contained. People to work in that area were licensed and competent to do so, so no-one was at risk. We had testing—

ACTING CHAIR: No-one was at risk after you had done that.

Mr Brooks : Correct.

ACTING CHAIR: Not before.

Senator XENOPHON: I might put some questions on notice, because I am worried about time constraints, and it gives you a chance to look at the Hansard. Through you, Chair, the secretariat has advised that 31 March will be the date by which to respond, because I think it will take a few days. That should give you a solid week to look at this and respond to it.

Mr Albonico : That is fine.

Senator XENOPHON: Who is responsible for the cost of remediation of the asbestos at the Perth Children's Hospital—Yuanda or John Holland?

Mr Albonico : John Holland has borne the cost to date, but we have also—

Senator XENOPHON: Will you recover it from Yuanda?

Mr Albonico : We will be seeking to recover that from Yuanda.

Senator XENOPHON: Or from the testing company in China?

Mr Albonico : We are contractors with Yuanda Australia.

Senator XENOPHON: So it looks as though there is going to be a bit of a legal dispute happening, potentially.

Mr Albonico : The potential is there. Yuanda could simply pay the bill, and there would not be a legal dispute.

Senator XENOPHON: All right, and we hope that they do.

Mr Albonico : Yes.

Senator XENOPHON: Can you answer why it was not simply cheaper to get brand-new Aussie-made materials rather than having to open up those panels like sardine cans and then take them out and clean them and do all those things? Was it cheaper to do what you did rather than get new materials?

Mr Albonico : There were a number of things. One is that we needed to continue working in the project; (2), there is a detail in which the metal, the PGI boxes, stay in situ—we could maintain it being weatherproof and we could do it safely. We had to demonstrate this to a number of regulators. So the answer to your question is that the dollars are not the only driver in that decision.

Senator XENOPHON: But, in hindsight—which is a beautiful thing—it would have been cheaper and reputationally much better to just use Australian-made material that you know would not have had any asbestos products in it—in other words, locally made building products?

Mr Albonico : That is quite a large question.

Senator XENOPHON: Will you be changing your procurement policies after this event to look at Australian-made?

Mr Albonico : We already have, and certainly around—

Senator XENOPHON: As a result of this event?

Mr Albonico : Very much around this event around our attitude to international procurement and the processes that we would use if we were to procure from overseas.

Senator XENOPHON: And you are aware of the changes in the Commonwealth Procurement Rules from 1 March, are you not?

Mr Albonico : Not in detail, but I am aware that there are changes.

Senator XENOPHON: Yes, very significant changes. I invite you to look at them.

ACTING CHAIR: We have to wrap up, unfortunately, because our eastern states based crew have flights to catch. Mr Albonico and Mr Brooks, you can help me out here. When we took evidence from Comcare—and if it is not Comcare, I will stand corrected—they mentioned that a supervisor with John Holland looked at the tailings or whatever it was—and I have no name—and he is a qualified asbestos removalist, and he said there was not asbestos. Could you shine some light on that? That was from Comcare. Mr Brooks, could you shine some light on that for me, please.

Mr Brooks : Yes. It is a restricted licence, and I am aware of who the supervisor is. He viewed it. He did not think it was asbestos; however, he took some further inquiries and went back to the certificate and said, 'Are we okay here? I want to make sure.'

ACTING CHAIR: So he was just part of the conversation. You did not say, 'Okay, she'll be right—

Mr Brooks : No.

ACTING CHAIR: That is all right. They came across a bit differently.

Senator XENOPHON: Have you conducted an audit of all other products you have obtained from Yuanda on other building sites around the country?

Mr Brooks : Yes.

Senator XENOPHON: What has discovered, revealed?

Mr Brooks : No other asbestos has been found.

Senator XENOPHON: You have actually done intrusive testing?

Mr Albonico : Yuanda appointed an external consultant to go through a number of projects throughout Australia, including some that they performed for John Holland.

ACTING CHAIR: Mr Albonico, if the CFMEU—I raise them because it is there on the Hansard—came to you at one of your sites and said, 'We have asbestos here. We've had it independently tested,' would you do everything you could to open the gates and say, 'Let's work on this together,' or would you continue to hinder restriction to them on the site?

Mr Albonico : We would simply behave consistent with law and regulation.

ACTING CHAIR: That does not answer my question.

Mr Albonico : Well, it does—

ACTING CHAIR: I am used to this bulldust and waffle sort of stuff. I am a senator. I sit with that crap in Canberra all the time. Mr Albonico, if it was raised—

Senator XENOPHON: Chair—

ACTING CHAIR: No, don't! Don't come in my state and start that.

Senator XENOPHON: I am not—

ACTING CHAIR: I am raising with you, Mr Albonico, yes or no. This is not a monkey wrench that is not working or a pair of pliers where the handle, the grip, has slipped off it. I am talking about asbestos. I will ask you once again: if someone raised that with you, would you open the doors and say, 'Come in and let's work on this together; we want to prove that that's not the case,' rather than hinder them getting on the site? It is a simple question.

Mr Albonico : And, simply, it is not a yes or no question.

ACTING CHAIR: Okay. That is fine. Nothing changes. Thank you very much. I do not need to ask any more questions.

Senator XENOPHON: Chair, I was not having a go. I just was trying to—

ACTING CHAIR: There are people that want to catch flights. Do you want to ask another question, Senator Xenophon?

Senator XENOPHON: We will put some questions on notice to you very shortly, Mr Albonico. They will go into specific protocols, procedures and documentation in relation to this. I just put you on notice that you should get those in the next two or three days.

Mr Albonico : That is fine. We will answer those.

Senator XENOPHON: Thank you.

ACTING CHAIR: Mr Albonico and Mr Brooks, thank you for your time today. If we have questions, we know where to find you. I am so sorry we had to wrap up, but we are pushed for time for our Canberra based crew. I thank the secretariat, Hansard and broadcasting, as always. You do a magnificent job. To all our witnesses, thank you kindly. That concludes today's hearing.

Subc ommittee adjourned at 14:26