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Australian Nuclear Science and Technology Organisation Act - Nuclear Safety Bureau - Report - 1993-94


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S A F E T Y

Annual Report

1993 -1994

S A F E T Y A <5

Annual Report

1993 -1994

© Commonwealth of Australia 1994

ISSN 1321-2435

This work is copyright. Apart from any use as permitted under the Copyright Act 1968, no part may be reproduced by any process without prior written permission from the Australian Government Publishing Service. Requests and inquiries concerning reproduction rights should be directed to the Manager, Commonwealth Information Services, Australian Government Publishing Service, GPO Box 84, Canberra ACT 2601.

Produced by the Australian Government Publishing Service

jkM-P, N uclear Safety Bureau

« 5^

Level 3, 14-16 Central Road, Miranda, NSW

P.O. Box 653 Miranda, NSW 2228 Australia

29 September 1994

The Hon Carmen Lawrence, MP Minister for Human Services and Health Parliament House CANBERRA ACT 2600

Dear Minister

In accordance with Section 63M of the Audit Act 1901,1 present the Annual Report of the Nuclear Safety Bureau for the period 1 July 1993 to 30 June 1994.

Financial accounts for the year ending 30 June 1994, together with a report by the Auditor-General as required by legislation , are included in the Annual Report

Yours sincerely

M R Allen, Director

Copied to Senator the Hon Peter Cook Minister for Industry, Science and Technology

Tplt^nhnnf1· /02Λ S74 1164

Facsimile: (02) 540 ISOS

CONTENTS

CONTENTS

DIRECTOR'S STATEMENT...................................................................................... I

CORPORATE OVERVIEW.......................................................................................... 3

PROGRAM REPORTING............................................................................... 6

FUNCTIONS OF TEE NSB UNDER SECTION 37A (l)(a)........ 6

FUNCTIONS OF THE NSB UNDER SECTION 3 7A (1 )(b) I

FUNCTIONS OF THE NSB UNDER SECTION 37A (l)(c) 23

REPORTS OF THE NSB .....................................................................

INTERNATIONAL NUCLEAR REGULATORY ENVIRONMENT

HUMAN RESOURCES............................................................................................... u

FINANCIAL RESOURCES......................................................................................... 35

FINANCIAL STATEMENTS........................................................................ 36

OTHER RESOURCES................................................................................................. 47

EXTERNAL SCRUTINY.............................................................................................. 49

IMPACT MONITORING..........................................................................

Glossary and Acronyms................................................................................

Index............................................................................................................................

DIRECTOR S STATEMENT

DIRECTOR'S STATEMENT

The Nuclear Safety Bureau (NSB) was established as a statutory body in 1992, by an amendment to the Australian Nuclear Science and Technology Act 1987, and this report covers the second year o f its operation.

A Research Reactor Review was established in 1992 by the Minister for Science and Technology to investigate the issues associated with the possible replacement of the HIFAR research reactor The Review investigated the regulatory arrangements for the operations of the Australian Nuclear Science and Technology Organisation (ANSTO) and the NSB recommended, in a submission to the Review, that a national regulatory body be established for nuclear plant The Review published its report in August 1993 and concluded that the

regulatory machinery, even considering the small nuclear industry in Australia, is unduly fragmented and unclear, and the scope of the responsibility for the current regulatory body, the NSB, is too limited. It also concluded that a regulatory body should be accountable to a different Minister to that which the operating organisation is accountable

Subsequently, the Government announced in November 1993 that a new body would be formed, by the amalgamation of the NSB and the Australian Radiation Laboratory (ARE), with regulatory and licensing powers for the nuclear and radiation activities of the Commonwealth This body, to be known as the Australian Institute for Radiation Protection

(AIRP), will report to the Minister for Human Services and Health Following the announcement, drafting instructions for the new legislation were discussed by ARL and the NSB with relevant Government Departments and Agencies and in consultation with Australian States and Territories. The establishment· of AIRP will largely complete the

evolutionary process for nuclear regulation in Australia and arrangements will be consistent with those for most other countries. And importantly, as participation by the States and Territories in AIRP is envisaged, consistency o f Commonwealth and States legislation will be encouraged

The NSB had informed ANSTO that NSB agreement to continued operation of HIFAR after April 1995 was dependent on the completion of a documentation upgrading program The program addresses all aspects of HIFAR's operations and a demanding set of outcomes was defined in order to ensure that methods, analysis and procedures are upgraded, consistent with

the reactor having a significant remaining lifetime. Tangible progress was achieved by ANSTO during the year and the NSB was satisfied that adequate resources had been allocated

The NSB reviews all aspects of the operation of ANSTO's research reactors relevant to sate operation and allocates similar resources to those used by regulators in comparable countries The results of the reviews are published in quarterly reports to the Minister The reviews showed that significant progress was made by ANSTO on improvements to safety-related

plant and accreditation of operating staff

ANSTO complied with a number of NSB requirements during the year and no restrictions

DIRECTOR'S STATEMENT

were imposed by the NSB on the operation of ANSTO's nuclear plant.

The NSB concluded that, following a review of the issues reported and, as a result of its audits, reviews and inspections, the safety of operation of ANSTO's nuclear plant was satisfactory for the reporting period

Following the submissions to the Research Reactor Review, it was apparent that some organisations did not perceive the NSB as totally separate from ANSTO As one o f a number of corporate objectives, the NSB has endeavoured to further demonstrate that it is independent of ANSTO. Consequently, in January 1994, the NSB relocated from the Lucas Heights Research Laboratories to Miranda in the Sutherland Shire of Sydney. The NSB also met with representatives of local government in order to describe its working methods and discuss their concerns on safety issues

The NSB was aware of public concerns regarding the emergency arrangements for HIFAR and, accordingly, the NSB organised a major exercise at HIFAR in December 1993. A severe, but highly unlikely, accident was used as a basis for the exercise, in order to evaluate the effectiveness of both ANSTO and NSW State emergency arrangements. The NSB published a report of its assessment and concluded that, although there are improvements that should be made, the arrangements were satisfactory.

There is a considerable amount of nuclear regulatory guidance, provided by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and the regulatory criteria of countries with large nuclear programs However, it is essential that Australia has its own regulatory criteria to address the national situation including consideration of public expectations. During the year the NSB produced a revised Safety Assessment Policy document for Nuclear Facilities that was issued initially to ANSTO and ARL for comment

The NSB contributes to the safety programs for visits by Nuclear Powered Warships (NPWs) to Australia In consultation with Commonwealth Agencies, States and Territories, the arrangements for emergency planning were continually reviewed During the year the NSB gave priority to the evaluation of new computer codes and the publication of its safety assessments for ports visited by NPWs.

The NSB concluded that the safety assessment methods and procedures are appropriate for the purpose of ensuring adequate safety standards for visits by NPWs

2

CORPORATE OVERVIEW

CORPORATE OVERVIEW

The new NSB offices located at Miranda in the Sutherland Shire.

LEGISLATION

The NSB was established by Part VIIA - Nuclear Safety Bureau, Australian Nuclear Science and Technology Organisation Amendment Act 1992, legislation which amended the Australian Nuclear Science and Technology Organisation Act 1987. For the period of this report, Part VIIA of the Act was administered by the Minister for Industry, Technology and

Regional Development, but from 1 July 1994, the administration was transferred to the Minister for Human Services and Health

CORPORATE OBJECTIVES

• Protect individuals, society and the environment by regularly and systematically monitoring and reviewing the safety of nuclear plant operated by ANSTO

• Provide technical advice to the Commonwealth on the safety of nuclear plant, and in relation to safety assessments of visits to Australia by nuclear powered warships, based on international best practice.

• Ensure consistency between Australian nuclear safety policies and practices, and the programs and publications of international nuclear safety organisations •

• Maintain adequate Australian regulations for the safe transport of radioactive substances

3

CORPORATE OVERVIEW

SOCIAL JUSTICE OVERVIEW

The NSB is required by its functions to assess the safety of nuclear activities; and some of these activities create apprehension in members of the public. The NSB recognises a responsibility to invite public comment on its safety assessment policy and safety assessments, and to take into account the views of the public.

PUBLIC INFORMATION

The NSB, in addition to its monitoring and review function, is developing methods for informing the public in the event of nuclear incidents and accidents, including information on the risk involved and the appropriate emergency measures Such initiatives are encouraged by the OECD Nuclear Energy Agency (NEA) in order to reinforce the perception among the public and plant operators of nuclear regulators, as competent and independent authorities Against this background the NSB presented a paper on its information policies at a seminar held at the OECD Headquarters in Paris, on 6-8 December 1993

EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY IN APPOINTMENTS

Number of positions filled as at 30 June 1994 10

Consisting of: *

Women 2

People of non-English-speaking background -

Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islanders -

People with disabilities -

4

CORPORATE OVERVIEW

ORGANISATION OF THE NUCLEAR SAFETY BUREAU AS AT 30 JUNE 1994

Director

Administration Manager Records Administrator Administrative Assistant

Technical A ssessm ent Leader, Safety Specialist Engineer/Physicist Health Physicist

Leader, Safety Engineer Engineer Technical Officer

Plant A ssessm ent

5

FUNCTIONS OF THE NSB UNDER SECTION 37A.(l)(a)

PROGRAM REPORTING FUNCTIONS OF THE NSB UNDER SECTION 37A.(l)(a)

Monitor and review the safety of any nuclear plant1 owned or operated by ANSTO.

Key Tasks Maintain comprehensive and current assessment criteria for nuclear plant.

Ensure that safety assessment criteria take into account operational experience in Australia and overseas, and evolving nuclear safety standards

Conduct regular and systematic reviews and audits to assess the safety of operation of ANSTO's nuclear plant and to identify operational deficiencies.

Require corrective action by ANSTO of deficiencies to ensure safe operation of nuclear plant

Conduct regular and systematic reviews and audits to assess the safety management of ANSTO's nuclear plant and to identify management deficiencies

Require corrective action by ANSTO of deficiencies to ensure adequate management of safety of nuclear plant

Outcomes

SAFETY PHILOSOPHY

The nuclear plant operated by ANSTO comprises two research reactors, HIFAR and Moata and associated plant For the purpose of monitoring and reviewing the safe operation of these reactors, the NSB has drawn on guidance intended for application to nuclear power reactors The NSB believes that, in nuclear safety issues, a wide distinction should not be made

between research and power reactors

This approach ensures that the results of safety research programs are reviewed for applicability to Australian nuclear plant. The NSB allocates a high priority to the maintenance of current awareness of the results of safety programs, in particular resulting from the work of

the IAEA and the NEA, as well as work reported by regulatory bodies in other countries. However, the safety guidelines provided by organisations such as the IAEA must be applied in the context of the expectations of workers, the general public and Australian safety standards

.Although the NSB is not a licensing authority, it has significant powers to place restrictions and conditions on the operation of ANSTO’s nuclear plant. The NSB applies these powers in a manner comparable to the way in which authorities of other nations regulate nuclear industries

Nuclear plant in this context effectively refers to research reactors.

6

FUNCTIONS OF THE NSB UNDER SECTION 37A.(l)(a)

The NSB requires that operating procedures and plant are continually upgraded, consistent with international standards, and meet the 'as low as reasonably practicable’ (ALARP) safety criterion HIFAR operates within a comprehensive safety framework, known as an Authorisation, which is effectively a licence to operate a reactor.

Safety culture is a concept, originally directed to nuclear power plants, that was formalised by the IAEA as a method of determining the attributes necessary for the establishment of satisfactory safety regimes During the year, the NSB continued to promote the use of this concept for its own organisation and working policies and, also, for the operation of

ANSTO's nuclear plants

SAFETY ASSESSMENT POLICY

The NSB and its predecessors have published safety assessment criteria for reactors in Australia Currently the criteria are included in the Authorisation - HIFAR Operation The criteria are amended from time to time in order to include the results of safety research and to

be consistent with national and international nuclear safety standards

Nuclear safety criteria address the issues of siting, design, construction, commissioning, operation and decommissioning. Operating organisations are required to prepare formal submissions, for approval by nuclear regulators, in order to demonstrate that safety issues have been adequately addressed.

Notwithstanding the detailed nature of safety analyses and operating procedures, the nuclear industry acknowledged that, in order to achieve higher safety standards, it is necessary to relate the more fundamental principles such as safety culture and defence-in-depth to the more tangible principles such as design and operation. The NSB published a draft Safety Assessment Policy based on current safety objectives and principles for nuclear facilities

The foundation document for the NSB's Safety Assessment Policy for Nuclear Facilities is the International Atomic Energy Agency publication Basic Safety Principles for Nuclear Power Plants, Safety Series No. 75-INSAG-3, 1988. Although INSAG-3 is intended for use with nuclear power plants, the methods used provide a sound basis for the safety of other nuclear facilities having hazards with potential off-site consequences. In particular, a strategy is

developed which relates the safety objectives to plant operation through a consideration of the issues of human factors, defence-in-depth, safety culture and formal quality assurance programs

7

FUNCTIONS OF THE NSB UNDER SECTION 37A.(l)(a)

Although research reactors have a smaller inventory of radioactive material, and operate under less demanding operating conditions than nuclear power reactors, the utilisation of research reactors is more varied and less predictable Thus, in general, the INSAG-3 methods need to be applied to research reactors as comprehensively as they are to power reactors.

The NSB's Safety Assessment Policy is intended to replace other NSB safety criteria previously developed by ANSTO and the NSB The NSB Safety Assessment Policy is applicable to pre-existing nuclear facilities, and proposals to modify existing facilities, as well as new facilities. Pre-existing facilities may have been designed to different safety standards, and judgements may be necessary in applying the Safety Assessment Policy to continued operation Such judgements would be based on detailed analyses of the significance of non­ compliance of existing plant with the Safety Assessment Policy, and the application of the 'as

low as reasonably practicable' (ALARP) and 'as low as reasonably achievable' (ALARA) approaches to safety issues.

The safety analyses in the nuclear industry are in general based on so called deterministic methods whereby the effects of particular plant failures are studied and safety systems are provided to prevent or to mitigate the effects of potential accidents. However, increasing use is being made of probabilistic methods whereby the likelihood of accidents is studied in order to calculate potential risks Most nuclear regulatory organisations agree that the two methods are complementary. Relationships between the two methods and numerical safety criteria, such as accidental radiation exposures to the workers and public, are developed in the Safety Assessment Policy.

HIFAR

AUTHORISATION - HIFAR OPERATION

The NSB uses the Authorisation - HIFAR Operation as a basis for monitoring the management of safety at HIFAR The separation of the NSB from ANSTO in 1992, by amendment of the ANSTO Act, changed the formal basis for the NSB's advisory role to the ANSTO Board In order to reflect this changed relationship, modification of the approval procedures for the Authorisation is required ANSTO agreed that the anomaly of the Authorisation with regard to current legislation should be addressed, and amendments were drafted These amendments could allow the Authorisation to act as a quasi-licence and they would be consistent with the proposed regulatory arrangements for ANSTO

As reported previously, ANSTO had provided an overall schedule and plan of work, with a completion date of April 1995, to address deficiencies in the Authorisation and associated documentation Subsequently, the NSB issued a requirement for ANSTO to complete the work by this date. During the year ANSTO completed upgrading work on documentation for the following items of the Authorisation: Security, Health and Safety Procedures, Radiation

Protection, Accreditation of Other Personnel, and Arrangements for Carrying Out Modifications

8

FUNCTIONS OF THE NSB UNDER SECTION 37A.(1 )(a)

INTERNATIONAL NUCLEAR EVENT SCALE

In 1992 the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), in conjunction with the Nuclear Energy Agency o f the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), invited nuclear and non-nuclear countries alike to formally adopt the International Nuclear Event Scale (INES), developed in 1990 for nuclear power reactors. The primary purpose of the INES is to facilitate communication between the nuclear community, the media and the

public, in relation to events at nuclear installations The Scale has a range from Level 0, for events of no safety significance, to Level 7 for major accidents such as occurred in 1986 at the Chernobyl Unit 4 reactor. Level 1 to Level 3 events are termed "incidents" while those events

at Level 4 and above are termed "accidents” From the beginning of 1991, the NSB has been assigning levels on the INES on a trial basis to events at ANSTO's reactors For purposes of reporting on unusual operating events at ANSTO's reactors, the NSB refers to events at INES Level 2 and above as having "adverse safety implications". In 1992 the IAEA invited trial use o f the INES at other types o f nuclear installations such as research reactors

Adoption of the International Nuclear Event Scale by Australia

At a meeting in October 1993 of the operators of "DIDO-type" research reactors (i.e. of the same type as HIFAR) in Australia and overseas, the NSB presented a paper on the experience with the trial use of the INES for rating events at HIFAR. Subsequently, the NSB issued a report which concluded that it is useful to apply the INES to unusual events and occurrences at research reactors, that sufficient experience has been gained in the use of the INES for

rating events at nuclear installations in Australia, and that it is desirable to continue to do so on a formal basis. The report recommended that discussions be initiated between the relevant Government Departments and Agencies (which include ANSTO and the NSB), and the States as appropriate, to consider the adoption by Australia o f the INES for use at Australian nuclear installations, and participation by Australia in the INES Information Service

UNUSUAL OPERATING EVENTS AT HIFAR

Unusual operating events, classified by HIFAR management as abnormal occurrences, are required to be reported to the NSB These, and other unusual operating events, are reviewed by the NSB The NSB continued to assign levels on the International Nuclear Event Scale (INES) to abnormal occurrences at HIFAR During 1993/94 there were forty-six abnormal

occurrences at HIFAR compared to forty-four during the previous year The number of events assigned each INES level are shown in Table 1.

9

FUNCTIONS OF THE NSB UNDER SECTION 37A.(l)(a)

Table 1: INES Levels Assigned to HIFAR Abnormal Occurrences

INES Level 1993/94 1992Z932

1 12 9

0 34 34

Out of Scale3 0 1

Total 46 44

As shown in Table 2, the largest category of abnormal occurrences was equipment fault, some of which were assigned Level 1 on the INES, ie an anomaly beyond the authorised operating regime, but most were Level 0, ie of no safety significance. The number of human-factors- related abnormal occurrences, of which about half were Level 1, was essentially unchanged from 1992/93 However, the number of unscheduled automatic reactor shutdowns reported as abnormal occurrences increased These occurrences are assigned Level 0, and result from the appropriate response of the reactor shutdown system to disturbances such as electrical power surges4

Table 2: HIFAR Abnormal Occurrences - Breakdown by Type

Occurrence Type 1993/94 1992/93

Equipment Fault 23 28

Human Factors Related 8 6

Unscheduled Automatic Shutdowns 14 9

Miscellaneous 1 1

Total 46 44

In the 1992/93 Annual Report of the NSB, the number of INES Level 1 events was given as 8 (p.9). However, one abnormal occurrence from the 1992/93 reporting period was reclassified by the NSB from Level 0 to Level 1 during 1993/94. The number of Level 0 events for 1992/93 was correspondingly decreased from 35 to 34.

An "Out-of-Scale" event is one of no relevance to nuclear safety.

Spurious actuations of the reactor shutdown system, such as may be due to electrical power surges originating in the off-site supply, are fewer in number than the routine monthly actuations required for mandatory function testing.

10

EXTENDED SHUTDOWNS

Extended shutdowns of HIFAR are scheduled every four to five years to permit maintenance, inspections and modifications that are not possible during the monthly refuelling shutdowns of four days duration.

The last extended shutdown of HIFAR was in 1991 and the NSB reviewed the ANSTO report on the activities completed and the results of the inspections These indicated that the reactor piping was in a satisfactory state, and that the condition of the reactor tank, which had been considered a potential life-limiting factor, was good

The NSB informed ANSTO of its concerns on a number of matters raised in the extended shutdown report. Discussions are continuing between the NSB and ANSTO on these matters, and their implications for future extended shutdowns. Requirements were placed by the NSB

on ANSTO for future extended shutdowns covering the frequency of such shutdowns, the schedule for completion o f the shutdown reports, NSB agreement for the work program, and start-up after shutdown. In order to provide additional data for the HIFAR safety assessments, recommendations were made to ANSTO on items to be addressed in the 1995 extended shutdown including various inspections and tests

HIFAR FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS

The NSB emphasised the importance of the need for additional work on fire hazard at HIFAR CSIRO performed a fire hazard analysis of HIFAR for ANSTO and a copy of the report was provided to the NSB A program of work, for the next two years, was proposed by ANSTO which is being reviewed by the NSB

TRAINING AND ACCREDITATION OF HIFAR OPERATING STAFF

Appropriate training (and retraining) of reactor operations and maintenance personnel is essential for the safe operation of nuclear plant and it is a necessary feature of stall accreditation. The updating of HIFAR training documentation continued, and was monitored by the NSB, as part of ANSTO's program to upgrade the Authorisation - HIFAR Operation and associated documentation Training and retraining proposals were submitted to the NSB for review, but additional documentation remains to be completed An abnormal occurrence

in 1992, which was assigned INES Level 2 by the NSB, highlighted the need for retraining ot the HIFAR Active Handling crew members and this was completed during the year

Before being authorised to perform their duties, professional reactor operations staff undergo a formal accreditation, and periodic re-accreditation is required. During the year revisions were made to documentation covering accreditation and re-accreditation of certain sub­ professional operations staff, which included re-accreditation requirements for Reactor Shill

Superintendents (RSS). The NSB monitored the accreditation and re-accreditation of these staff An observer was provided by the NSB for the re-accreditation interviews of the full RSS complement. The NSB also provided an observer for accreditation and re-accreditation interviews of some Active Handling Supervisors and Active Handling crew members

______ _______FUNCTIONS OF THE NSB UNDER SECTION 37A.(l)(a)_____________

11

FUNCTIONS OF THE NSB UNDER SECTION 37A.(l)(a)

Photo: Courtesy of ANSTO

Cross-bracing installed on a building adjacent to HIFAR as part of the seismic strengthening program.

SEISMIC SAFETY ASSESSMENT OF HIFAR

The NSB completed a review of an ANSTO report "The Assessment of Seismic Risk from HIFAR" and areas for further work, or need for clarification of previous work, were identified These included: further advice on the structural model and assumptions used, the preparation of a "best estimate" deterministic seismic analysis, and the confirmation of the use of nationally accepted seismic data for seismic hazard assessments at Lucas Heights

ANSTO reported the completion of the original seismic strengthening program of buildings adjacent to HIFAR (see photo above) The program was expanded to include the assessment of the anchorage capacity of plant items not in the original program and this work is scheduled for completion by the end of 1994

SITE EMERGENCY EXERCISE

A major exercise was conducted to test and evaluate the ANSTO Emergency Arrangements. The exercise was designed, observed and evaluated by the NSB, assisted by specialists from the Sutherland Shire Council and Commonwealth Government Agencies. The NSB based the exercise on a very unlikely severe accident in order to call for a significant on-site and off-site response from ANSTO personnel and NSW State Combat Agencies.

12

FUNCTIONS OF THE NSB UNDER SECTION 37A.(l)(a)

DEFENCE-IN-DEPTH

HIFAR has multiple systems designed to prevent damage to the fuel and, in the event that damage should occur, safety systems are provided to minimise the possibility of a release of radioactive material to the environment. As an additional layer in this defence-in-depth

approach to safety, emergency arrangements have been developed to provide for the radiological protection of site personnel and the public, if radioactive material is accidentally released from the reactor. As far as practicable, these arrangements are independent of the reactor design, construction and operation. They are extendible to severe accidents, beyond

the design bases of the reactor safety systems, even though such accidents are considered to be extremely unlikely.________________________________________________________ ____

Resources allocated by ANSTO and the NSW agencies were adequate and there was good cooperation by all organisations It was concluded that the arrangements are satisfactory for dealing with emergencies having on-site and off-site effects resulting from severe accidents at F1IFAR Nevertheless, the NSB believes that the arrangements can and should be improved,

as part on an ongoing commitment to safety upgrading, and its recommendations are set out in a report on the exercise The ANSTO Board generally accepted the NSB recommendations and the NSB requested a program of work for its agreement

Photo: C ourtesy of ANSTO

HIFAR Emergency Control Room for use under accident conditions.

13

FUNCTIONS OF THE NSB UNDER SECTION 37A.(l)(a)

OPERATIONAL LIMITS AND CONDITIONS

Operational Limits and Conditions (OL&C) establish the process parameters and plant and personnel requirements for the safe operation of nuclear plant NSB agreement is required before changes can be made to the parameters. During the year, the NSB reviewed and agreed to changes ensuring the availability of adequate Engineered Safety Provisions during periodic cleaning of the secondary coolant circuit while the reactor is shutdown.

The NSB has received for review a draft OL&C document which has been completely revised to reflect international best practice for OL&C, in accordance with recent recommendations of the IAEA for research reactors.

SECURITY

ANSTO is upgrading the Lucas Fleights Research Laboratories site physical protection systems to the current standard of the IAEA. Site construction work for the security fencing around the HIFAR area, and the associated surveillance systems and control centre, were

completed The work was inspected and accepted by the Australian Safeguards Office, the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation and the NSB, and the security systems were made operational. Procedures for the operation of protection systems around HIFAR also

received NSB agreement following a review to ensure that security changes did not reduce safety. Arrangements, for the emergency evacuation of the area enclosed within the fence around HIFAR, were successfully exercised. Further upgrading was in progress and, on completion of the work, the emergency arrangements will be further exercised.

RADL4TION PROTECTION AT HIFAR

A Dose Reduction Working Party (DRWP) at HIFAR met regularly to review staff radiation doses resulting from operational activities, and to review the design, project schedule, training and other relevant radiation safety aspects of new projects. The NSB monitors the activities of the DRWP An ANSTO analysis of collective radiation doses to HIFAR staff showed reductions of generally between 20% and 30% for various occupational groups, compared to collective doses in the previous year

DIDO OPERATORS’ MEETING

HIFAR is one of six "DIDO-class" reactors, all of which began construction between 1953 and 1957. Three are still in service, these are HIFAR, DR3 at Riso in Denmark, and FRJ-2 at Julich in Germany The three British reactors DIDO, PLUTO and the DMTR have been taken out of service Biennial meetings are held for the operators of these reactors and the most recent was held in Australia in October 1993. The conference covered operational,

maintenance, experimental and plant refurbishing activities at these reactors ANSTO reported on the 1991 extended shutdown of HIFAR and in particular on the remaining life investigations of the HIFAR reactor tank NSB staff contributed papers on accident consequence analysis and the trial use of the IAEA's International Nuclear Event Scale (INES) in Australia.

14

FUNCTIONS OF THE NSB UNDER SECTION 37A.(l)(a)

LAND USE RESTRICTIONS

As described in the report for the period 1992-93, the NSB undertook, in 1990, to place in one document the technical arguments and review the assessments against current criteria The completion of an up-to-date seismic analysis was considered to be an important part of the review

During the year the NSB reviewed and accepted an ANSTO submission on an assessment of seismic risk from HIFAR, subject to additional validation of the seismological bases and the structural analysis used for the assessment ANSTO provided a program of work for the

validation with a completion date of December 1994.

ANSTO and the NSB also agreed a program to prepare a summary report on land use issues, based on current safety assessments, in advance of completion of the above validation work

MOATA

AUTHORISATION - MOATA OPERATION

The finalisation of an Operating Authorisation for Moata was given a lower priority than completion of the Authorisation - HIFAR Operation, due to Moata's low operating power (100 kW compared to HIFAR's 10 MW) and much lower safety significance During the year ANSTO submitted revised key documentation, referenced in the draft Moata Authorisation, which the NSB reviewed The NSB notified ANSTO it would recommend that the draft

Authorisation be approved by the Chairman, ANSTO, subject to certain conditions An updated draft Authorisation document was subsequently received by the NSB for review

UNUSUAL OPERATING EVENTS AT MOATA

One abnormal occurrence was reported to the NSB during the year This was related to a spurious automatic shutdown at low power due to an equipment fault during a reactor startup The NSB continued to assign levels on the INES to abnormal occurrences at Moata, and assigned Level 0 to the occurrence. This may be compared to the previous year in which there were three INES Level 1 occurrences

15

FUNCTIONS OF THE NSB UNDER SECTION 37A.(l)(a)

OTHER ISSUES

IRRADIATED FUEL STORAGE AND CRITICALITY CERTIFICATES

The role of the NSB to monitor and review the safety of nuclear plant operated by ANSTO is mainly in the context of the HIFAR and Moata reactors. However, the NSB initiated a review of ANSTO Criticality Certificates which cover operations involving fissile materials at various other locations at the Lucas Heights Research Laboratories.

One of the outcomes of this review was a series of recommendations relating to the information on ANSTO Criticality Certificates, and these recommendations have been implemented by ANSTO. The review concluded that the strict physical and procedural conditions required on some Criticality Certificates indicated that criticality may be possible under certain circumstances at some locations and, therefore, these areas could be regarded as nuclear plant and subject to NSB review.

RADIOACTIVE DISCHARGES TO THE ENVIRONMENT

The NSW Environment Protection Authority (EPA) advised ANSTO that radioactive gaseous discharges from the Lucas Heights Research Laboratories are no longer authorised by the Radiological Advisory Council as the "Airborne Discharge Authorisation", provided by that body, no longer has effect Also, an independent analytical service for monitoring liquid and gaseous radioactive discharges is no longer to be provided by the EPA

The NSB viewed the lapsing of the Discharge Authorisation as most significant, as some discharges are from the reactor plant. The NSB expressed the opinion that ANSTO should be concerned, for reasons of safe operation and public expectations, to establish additional alternative agreements ANSTO gave a firm commitment to continue controlling its emissions in accordance with the Authorisation until such time as AIRP regulatory arrangements are in place Discussions involving ANSTO, the NSB and the Director, Australian Radiation Laboratory, were held to establish these additional alternative arrangements in the period before AIRP is established

RESTRICTIONS AND CONDITIONS ON OPERATION OF NUCLEAR PLANT

Under Section 37C of the amended Act, the NSB can impose restrictions or conditions on the operation of ANSTO's nuclear plant The NSB uses the term "restrictions" to mean a requirement to shutdown or delay startup of a reactor. The terms "conditions" and "requirements" are used to apply all other types of intervention by the NSB. In assessing the safety of nuclear plant, the NSB gives due consideration to the requirements of the relevant reactor Operating Authorisations, and to current and evolving international standards of nuclear safety. During the reporting period no restrictions were placed on HIFAR and no restrictions, requirements or conditions were placed on Moata. However, the NSB placed the following requirements or conditions on the operation of HIFAR.

16

HIFAR Operations

Requirements placed on ANSTO during the year covered various operational issues including prompt reporting to the NSB of certain types of abnormal occurrences, rescinding of changed responsibilities for some operations staff, rectification of a defect in the Emergency Core­ Cooling System, revision of the radioactive gaseous release authorisation for normal operation, and Electrical Power Supply System operating procedures

HIFAR Inspections and Maintenance

Requirements were placed on ANSTO which addressed various issues relating to future- extended shutdowns for reactor plant inspection and maintenance, including scheduling. NSB agreement before restart after the shutdown, and the completion of reports of extended shutdown activities.

HIFAR Modifications

Requirements were placed on ANSTO concerning modifications and procedures for modifications. These included: procedures for the expansion of irradiated fuel storage racks, application of seismic design criteria to a reactor safety system, establishment of a safety category system for all plant modifications, proposed modifications to safety-related plant to

be provided to the NSB on a quarterly basis, and an amended design review system for safety- related modifications to be put in place

Other Than HIFAR and Moata

In areas other than HIFAR and Moata, the NSB required ANSTO to review and update procedures and documentation in relation to work areas where Criticality Certificates have been issued by ANSTO to cover fissile material, and also to provide copies of safety submissions, operating procedures, and radiation protections details for two radioactive waste

processing projects

______________FUNCTIONS OF THE NSB UNDER SECTION 37A.(l)(a)_____________

CONCLUSIONS

The NSB noted improved safety outcomes from management initiatives, as evidenced by reduced worker radiation doses and the commitment of increased resources to safety at HIFAR

Abnormal occurrences, significant to safety, are a measure of the compliance of the operation of a nuclear installation with a range of safety related items such as operating limits and demands on safety systems The number of abnormal occurrences at HIFAR remained essentially the same as for the previous year when the significant reduction was reported

However, the similar number of human-factors-related abnormal occurrences at HIFAR indicates that, for reactor operations, a further reduction should be sought to demonstrate continuing improvement of safety culture

17

FUNCTIONS OF THE NSB UNDER SECTION 37A.(l)(a)

The number and severity of abnormal occurrences at Moata is considerably reduced compared to the previous year which, in the view o f the NSB, was due in part to the reduced utilisation of the reactor

In assessing the safety of nuclear plant, the NSB gives due consideration to current and evolving international standards of nuclear safety The NSB concluded that the safe operation of HIFAR and Moata continued during the year, and, consequently, the risk to on-site personnel and the public was maintained at an acceptably low level.

18

FUNCTIONS OF THE NSB UNDER SECTION 37A (l)(b)

FUNCTIONS OF THE NSB UNDER SECTION37 A.(l)(b)

Provide technical advice to the Commonwealth on the safety of nuclear plant and related matters.

Key Tasks

Provide advice on the safe operation of existing or proposed nuclear plant used for power generation, propulsion, and research and related matters

Ensure that the safety assessment criteria applied to visits to Australia by nuclear-powered vessels takes into account current radiation and nuclear safety standards

Ensure that international best practice is used for the safety assessments of visits to Australia by nuclear-powered warships.

Outcomes

LEGISLATIVE ARRANGEMENTS FOR NUCLEAR REGULATION

The issue of the most appropriate legislative arrangements for independent review of nuclear reactors was discussed in the previous Annual Report of the NSB The current legislation effectively restricts the functions of the NSB to a monitor-and-review role for research reactors and associated plant, and it does not permit oversight of operations such as waste management or radioisotope processing.

The Research Reactor Review received submissions from the NSB and other organisations on this issue and, in their report published in August 1993, presented several conclusions relevant to nuclear regulation The principal conclusions of the Review were that the regulatory arrangements in Australia are unduly fragmented, there is scope for rationalisation of the

separate safety and safeguards regimes in relation to ANSTO, and, a regulatory body should have unambiguous and effective sanctions.

Subsequently the Government announced that the NSB is to be amalgamated with the Australian Radiation Laboratory to form a new Australian Institute for Radiation Protection (AIRP). The new body, which will report to the Minister for Human Services and Health, will have regulatory and licensing powers for the nuclear and radiation activities of the

Commonwealth.

These developments are in accord with the recommendations that the NSB has made for further changes to the regulatory arrangements and will, when in place, ensure greater consistency with international standards for the regulation of the Commonwealth's nuclear activities

19

FUNCTIONS OF THE NSB UNDER SECTION 37A.(l)(b)

In addition, the proposal for AIRP will provide an important opportunity for the development of improved co-ordination between the States, Territories, and the Commonwealth, on issues of common interest such as radiation protection standards and radioactive discharges to the environment

PROPOSAL FOR THE INCORPORATION OF ANSTO INTO CSIRO

The NSB provided a submission to the Interdepartmental Committee concerned with the proposal to incorporate ANSTO into CSIRO The purpose o f the submission was to advise the committee of the NSB requirements for the management of the safety of nuclear plant, current arrangements at ANSTO that met those requirements, and the possible impact of the proposed incorporation on the ability of the operator to continue to meet the requirements.

The NSB identified the resources necessary to fulfil the fundamental responsibilities for safety in terms of the management structure, required skills, on-going commitment to nuclear safety research, and maintenance of access to international operating experience and agencies The NSB recommended that: the management of safety of operation should be considered to be a very important aspect, the relative contribution to safe operation by existing parts of ANSTO

should be identified, and any program for incorporation should ensure that the speed of transition does not reduce safety.

Subsequently the Government announced measures to improve the links between ANSTO and CSIRO and, whilst incorporation was found to be compatible with the Government's science policy objectives, a non-legislative route would be taken to achieve the science policy objectives

THE RESEARCH REACTOR REVIEW

In the previous annual report the NSB reported on its submissions to the Research Reactor Review As well as making recommendations on changes to regulatory legislation, the NSB addressed the remaining life of HIFAR Continued operation of HIFAR was supported by the NSB taking into account the current safety upgrading program. In the view of the NSB, continued operation of HIFAR beyond about ten years would be dependent upon a major upgrade, and assessment by the NSB as for a new reactor. In arriving at the latter view the NSB took into account the current plant status, effect of future safety developments and the age of the reactor ten years hence

In its report published in August 1993, the Review noted that the remaining life of HIFAR is not likely to be less than a decade and recommended that operation should continue. It also recommended that a Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) should be carried out to assess HIFAR's remaining life and refurbishment possibilities.

Subsequently, ANSTO requested the NSB to specify its requirements for a PRA and the request was being considered in the context of NSB requirements for the HIFAR safety case for both current operation and remaining life.

20

FUNCTIONS OF THE NSB UNDER SECTION 37A ( 1 )(b)

ACCIDENT CONSEQUENCE ANALYSIS COMPUTER CODES

The prediction of the consequences of an accidental release of radioactive material to the environment is a complex problem governed by meteorological dispersion and dosimetric processes. Nevertheless, the growth of the nuclear industry and concern over the possible consequences of nuclear accidents have led to extensive research on this problem. Over the

years, numerous atmospheric dispersion and radiation dose computer models have been developed, and, with the increasing capability and availability of computers, these are being more widely used.

In 1993, two internationally-accepted accident consequence analysis computer codes, PCCOSYMA and UMPIRE, for use on a PC, were purchased by the NSB to improve Australia's nuclear accident assessment capabilities. Both codes utilise a Gaussian atmospheric transport model to predict the magnitude and extent of radiological consequences of a radioactive release. However, the two codes have different applications

PCCOSYMA was produced by the Commission of the European Communities and is designed for use in emergency planning and probabilistic risk analysis. It is a sophisticated code able to model, on a deterministic or probabilistic basis, individual and collective organ radiation doses, risks and health effects, as well as the required extent of

countermeasures and their effects on reducing consequences.

The UMPIRE code was produced by AEA Technology in the UK as a real-time emergency tool for decision-makers in the event of a nuclear accident. The code is simpler than PCCOSYMA and includes features such as the ability to plot radiation dose contours on a map, and the ability to accept field radiation measurements to refine dose predictions I he

above codes, particularly UMPIRE, have been thoroughly investigated and tested by the NSB throughout 1993/94, and have proved to be useful and powerful tools for emergency planning and response applications.

The NSB believes that the use of a real-time accident-consequence-analysis code in a radiological emergency offers advantages for ANSTO's emergency arrangements and. in its report on the emergency exercise held at ANSTO in December 1993, recommended that a real-time consequence code be incorporated into ANSTO's emergency arrangements

Presentations on the UMPIRE code were made to the Visiting Ships Panel (Nuclear). VSP(N) which is responsible for developing emergency arrangements for visits to Australia by Nuclear Powered Warships (NPWs). Subsequently, the VSP(N) agreed to make UMPIRE available as part of the emergency response plans for visits by NPWs

21

FUNCTIONS OF THE NSB UNDER SECTION 37A(l)(b)

NSB INVOLVEMENT IN VISITS BY NUCLEAR POWERED WARSHIPS TO AUSTRALIA

With the separation of the NSB from ANSTO in 1992, the membership of the Visiting Ships Panel (Nuclear), VSP(N), was changed to include both NSB and ANSTO representation The responsibilities of the NSB concerning visits to Australia by nuclear powered or armed warships are specified by Defence Operations Manual (OPSMAN 1). These include the provision of technical advice on all aspects of nuclear reactor safety; nuclear reactor accident modelling and radiation monitoring proposals, and assessment against radiological criteria of the suitability of specific ports for visits by NPWs

The NSB continued with its program for the review of safety assessments of Australian ports visited by NPWs Changes in radiological criteria, port-specific population details and meteorological data are included in the revised assessments Reports for the visit of a NIMITZ-Class aircraft carrier to Hobart, and smaller NPWs to Darwin, have been issued An

NSB report was also issued on the effects of revised National Health and Medical Research Council (NHMRC) intervention levels on port safety assessments. Although the revised NHMRC intervention levels do not alter the current assessments, they provide amended guidance on sheltering, evacuation and stable iodine administration

Emergency exercises associated with NPW visits were conducted by Western Australian Authorities and observed by NSB Staff as part of a VSP(N) working group The exercise demonstrated that the arrangements were satisfactoiy and detailed comments were provided to the Western Australian authorities.

Photo: Courtesy of the "Tasmania Photo Services", Tasmanian Government.

The nuclear-powered NIMITZ-Class aircraft carrier "USS Carl Vinson" at anchorage in the Derwent River, Hobart, July 1994.

22

FUNCTIONS OF THE NSB UNDER SECTION 37A (l)(c)

FUNCTIONS OF THE NSB UNDER SECTION37A.(l)(c)

Such other functions as the Minister has determined in writing:

Contribute to technical work associated with the Environment Protection (Nuclear Codes) Act 1978; and

Participate in activities of the IAEA and the NEA relevant to the other functions of the NSB.

Key Tasks

Ensure, with regard to nuclear regulatory issues, that the Regulations of the Code of Practice for the Safe Transport of Radioactive Materials provide a safe system of transport for Australia.

Ensure, to the greatest extent practicable, consistency between Australian policies and practices, and the programs and publications of the IAEA and the NEA, with regard to nuclear safety regulatory issues.

Outcomes

ACTIVITIES OF THE IAEA AND NEA

The NSB ensures, to the greatest extent practicable, that the safety and regulatory programs of the OECD Nuclear Energy Agency (NEA), and the IAEA, are consistent with Australian policies and practices, and to ensure that NSB policies are consistent with those of the international nuclear community. The annual meetings of the NEA standing committees are the principal events for the year to which working parties and task groups report

COMMITTEE ON RADIATION PROTECTION AND PUBLIC HEALTH

The NSB provided the Australian delegate to the annual meeting in 1994 of the Committee on Radiation Protection and Public Health (CRPPH) which addressed notably future directions of the Committee and revision of its mandate, radiation protection towards the turn of the

century, and the final draft o f the Basic Safety Standards for protection against ionising radiation and the safety of radiation sources. This standard is in the process of being submitted for adoption by the governing bodies of the six sponsoring organisations the Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations, the IAEA, the International Labour Organisation, the Pan-American Health Organisation, the World Health Organisation, and the OECD-NEA

23

FUNCTIONS OF THE NSB UNDER SECTION 37A.(l)(c)

ATTENDANCE AT THE MEETINGS OF THE OECD'S NUCLEAR SAFETY COMMITTEES

The NSB provided the Australian delegate to the annual meetings in 1993 of the Committee on Nuclear Regulatory Activities (CNRA) and the Committee on the Safety of Nuclear Installations (CSNI). A number of matters of interest to Australia were discussed including:

• the strengthening of Eastern European nuclear regulatory activities;

• the methods to determine that an operating nuclear power plant remains safe when judged by current safety standards;

• regulatory requirements for advanced power reactors; and

• the Three Mile Island reactor pressure vessel investigation project and the margins to vessel failure during the accident.

At the meetings, Australia reported on the outcome of the Research Reactor Review and the proposed formation of the Australian Institute for Radiation Protection, which is to have nuclear licensing and regulatory powers.

INTERNATIONAL THIRD PARTY NUCLEAR LIABILITY CONVENTIONS

Although the high safety standards of the nuclear industry mean that the risk of an accident is very low, the possible magnitude of damage from a nuclear accident, and the possibility of transboundary consequences, has necessitated the development of international third party liability regimes The regimes aim to provide adequate protection to the public from possible damage and to ensure that the growth of the nuclear industry is not hindered by an intolerable burden of liability

At present the Paris Convention (and supplementary Brussels Convention) and Vienna Conventions are in place. However, countries with significant nuclear industries such as the United States, Canada, Japan and the countries of the former USSR are not parties to either Convention Also, the definition of damage under such Conventions, for persons, property and the environment, is not precisely defined and is an additional issue.

Under the sponsorship of the IAEA, the Vienna Convention is currently being reviewed with the objective of addressing these issues as well as providing more realistic financial resources for nuclear indemnity for major reactor accidents. A new system of supplementary funding, based on funds provided by the nuclear industry, is under consideration and the NSB contributed to the Australian review of proposals

24

FUNCTIONS OF THE NSB UNDER SECTION 37A ( 1 )(c)

SAFE TRANSPORT OF RADIOACTIVE SUBSTANCES

At the end of 1992, following a determination by the Minister, the NSB commenced participation in the activities of the IAEA relevant to the Australian Transport Code and provided the Australian delegate to the tenth meeting, in 1994, of the Standing Advisory Group on the Safe Transport of Radioactive Materials (SAGSTRAM)

A revised edition of the IAEA Transport Regulations is scheduled for publication in 1996 During the year the NSB participated in revision of the regulations to reflect updated radiation safety standards, and in issues relevant to radioactive material found in Australian mineral sands. The NSB also initiated participation by Australia in an IAEA international data base

for approved transport packages.

Photo: Courtesy of ANSTO

Transport package for irradiated HIFAR fuel elements

25

FUNCTIONS OF THE NSB UNDER SECTION 37A.(l)(c)

During the year the International Maritime Organisation (IMO) adopted a code for the transport of irradiated nuclear fuel, plutonium and high-level radioactive wastes on board ships, based on the work of a joint working group drawn from the IAEA, IMO and the United Nations Environment Program Together with other Government agencies, the NSB participated in the Australian review of the work of the group.

NUCLEAR SAFETY CONVENTION

Under the auspices of the IAEA, a Nuclear Safety Convention was agreed on 17 June 1994, and will be open for signature by member countries from 20 September 1994. The Convention, which is for land-based civil nuclear power plants, places obligations on countries who become signatories The obligations include requirements for regulatory organisations as well as a comprehensive framework of topics important to safe operation. Under the convention the safety of existing reactors must be reviewed and where necessary all reasonably practicable improvements must be made as a matter of urgency. If upgrading cannot be achieved, plans should be implemented to shut-down a reactor as soon as practically possible However, the social, environmental and economic impact may be taken into account in the timing of a shut-down. Although Australia does not have civil nuclear power plants within its jurisdiction, Australian officials played an active role in the negotiation of the Convention and the NSB contributed advice on nuclear safety matters.

26

REPORTS OF THE NSB

REPORTS OF THE NSB

• The NSB must submit an annual report under Section 63M of the Audit Act [37R.].

• The NSB must submit reports to the Minister relating to the performance of the functions of the NSB as the NSB considers appropriate. [37U.(1)].

• The NSB must provide a quarterly report to the Minister [37U.(2)].

Key Tasks

Satisfy requirements under the Audit Act in a timely and efficient manner

Provide clear and unequivocal reports on the results of the monitoring and reviewing of ANSTO's nuclear plant.

Report on significant developments with regard to nuclear plant safety issues in the nuclear industry

Make recommendations to the Minister regarding changes to legislation relevant to the functions of the NSB

Outcomes

AUDIT ACT

The annual report of the NSB for 1992-1993 was submitted to the Minister under Section 63M of the Audit Act 1901

ANSTO ACT 1987

Reports relating to the performance of the NSB were submitted to the Minister each quarter under section 37U.(2) and these were tabled in both Houses of Parliament

27

REPORTS OF THE NSB

NSB REPORTS

The following technical reports were published during the year:

NUCLEAR SAFETY BUREAU REPORTS

Report Title

7/1993 IAEA Pre-Osart Mission to Guangdong Nuclear Power Station, China, May-June 1993, Observer's Report

8/1993 Safety of Operation of ANSTO's Nuclear Plant for the Period 1 April - 30 June 1993

9/1993 Overseas Visit Report, CRPPH, Thailand, Malaysia and Indonesia

11/1993 Safety of Operation of ANSTO's Nuclear Plant for the Period 1 July - 30 September 1993

1/1994 Safety of Operation of ANSTO's Nuclear Plant for the Period 1 October -31 December 1993

2/1994 Ansto Emergency Exercise "BOFFEX", Notes for Observers, Umpires and Participants

3/1994 Report on ANSTO Emergency Exercise "BOFFEX"

4/1994 Radiological Assessment of a Darwin Anchorage and Berths for Visits by Nuclear Powered Warships

5/1994 Safety of Operation of ANSTO's Nuclear Plant for the Period 1 January - 31 March 1994

6/1994 Application of the International Nuclear Event Scale to Nuclear Plant in Australia

MINISTERIAL DETERMINATIONS AND DIRECTIONS

There were no ministerial determinations or directions during the year

Author

T Mountford- Smith

D J Westall

D I Macnab

D I Macnab & A J Frikken

T Mountford- Smith

28

INTERNATIONAL NUCLEAR REGULATORY ENVIRONMENT

INTERNATIONAL NUCLEAR REGULATORY ENVIRONMENT

INTERNATIONAL SAFETY PROGRAMS

International collaboration through the IAEA and the OECD Nuclear Energy Agency (NEA) and also by direct country-to-country agreements are important aspects of nuclear safety research. The work o f the OECD Nuclear Energy Agency is complementary to that of the IAEA but, whereas the IAEA comprises members with programs at various stages of

development, the NEA is characterised by countries with advanced nuclear programs at a similar stage of development. As a result some safety issues, particularly those specific to reactors designed and operated by member countries, can be addressed more expeditiously by the NEA by means of joint theoretical and experimental research The results of the work of the NEA are made available to the international community and to the IAEA

In general, most nuclear regulatory authorities have similar responsibilities for the monitoring and approval of nuclear power plant. Currently, for nuclear power plants, the interest of nuclear regulatory authorities is focused particularly on: plant ageing effects, human factors, computer-based control for safety systems, evaluation of the implications of operational

experience, computer codes for thermal-hydraulic analyses, probabilistic safety assessment, severe accidents, and advanced reactor systems.

The nuclear power reactor accidents at Three Mile Island, in 1979, and Chernobyl, in 1986 were major set backs to the nuclear power industry, although the consequences of the two accidents were very different. The nuclear industry has responded in several general ways Safety targets have been reviewed in order to reduce the likelihood of reactor core damage by

improved design. The influence of human factors has been increasingly analysed and factored into safety criteria There has been increased recognition that even for very low probability accidents the plant should be equipped with engineered features and operating procedures in order to mitigate the consequences of accidents, more severe than those with which the

multiple safety systems are designed to cope Finally, several new reactor designs, known as advanced reactors, have been proposed, and some are planned for construction These designs are claimed to offer higher levels of safety by reducing the likelihood of core damage, and by the use of less complex safety systems

During the year, active programs on all o f the above issues were in progress, although some concerns were reported by the NEA that funding levels for national safety research programs have been reduced in recent years.

29

INTERNATIONAL NUCLEAR REGULATORY ENVIRONMENT

CONTACTS WITH NUCLEAR REGULATORS IN THE ASIAN REGION

The NSB has a policy of initiating negotiations and planning joint programs of work with regulatory bodies in South East Asia. An NSB officer visited the Atomic Energy Control Board (AECB) in Indonesia for discussions on the regulation of research reactor activities

Information was exchanged and the AECB described how they regulate all radiation sources and nuclear installations

An NSB officer also visited the Republic of Korea for discussions with the Ministry of Science and Technology (MOST) and the Korean Institute for Nuclear Safety (KINS). Korea's comprehensive nuclear power program has resulted in wide ranging regulatory experience and significant nuclear safety research programs. This year the Republic of Korea

was accepted as a member of two OECD Committees, namely, the Committee for Nuclear Regulatory Activities (CNRA) and the Committee for the Safety of Nuclear Installations (CSNI) Topics for possible formal agreements between Australian and Korean nuclear regulators were discussed with MOST.

OVERSEAS VISITS BY NUCLEAR SAFETY BUREAU STAFF 1993-1994

Mr Daniel Westall attended as Australia's delegate, the 51st meeting of the OECD Committee on Radiation Protection & Public Health (CRPPH) in Paris, 7-8 September 1993. In Thailand, Mr Westall visited the Director and staff of the Nudear Regulatory Centre, Office of Atomic Energy for Peace In Malaysia he met the Director-General, Atomic Energy Licensing Board, Ministry of Science, Technology and Environment, and discussed arrangements for visits to Australian ports by Nuclear Powered Warships. Mr Westall also visited the Indonesian Atomic Energy Control Board From January 1994, Mr Westall was seconded to the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission (US NRC) for a period of six months

When in Europe, Mr Vincent Diamond met with officers of the UK Nuclear Installations Inspectorate at its London office. In Paris Mr Diamond attended, as Australia's delegate, the OECD Committee for Nuclear Regulatory Activities meeting, 29-30 November 1993, the OECD Committee on the Safety of Nuclear Installations, 1-2 December 1993, and the international seminar on Information Policies of Nuclear Regulatory Organisations, organised by the OECD/NEA, 6-8 December 1993 As part of the visit Mr Diamond visited the Atomic Energy Control Board (AECB), Indonesia and met with senior staff which included Head, .AECB, Head, Reactor Nuclear Materials Division and Head, Radiation Safety Inspection Division Whilst in Indonesia he visited the Multipurpose Reactor Centre, BATAN, Serpong.

Together with the Counsellor (Science) Australian Embassy Seoul, he visited the Korean Atomic Energy Research Institute (KAERI) and met with senior staff, and also held discussions with the Ministry of Science and Technology.

Mr Michael Allen, attended as the Australian delegate, the tenth meeting of the IAEA's Standing Advisory Group on the Safe Transport of Radioactive Material (SAGSTRAM) in Vienna, April 1994.

30

INTERNATIONAL NUCLEAR REGULATORY ENVIRONMENT

BRIEF OVERVIEW OF INTERNATIONAL NUCLEAR REGULATION

lhe IAEA has published several Safety Standards for nuclear regulation which reflect arrangements uf the nudcar industry in many of its member countries. In order to protect the public and the environment from undue radiation hazard, and workers in the industry, these arrangements offer a statutory basis for an independent nuclear regulatory body which addresses the siting, design, construction, commissioning, operation, modification and decommissioning of nuclear installations. This statutory basis ensures adequate financial indemnity for third parties in the event of a nuclear accident. The IAEA recommends that regulatory bodies promote, establish or adopt safety principles and associated criteria covering all phases of activities in lhe nuclear industry, and that they licence the operation of nuclear installations and key operating personnel.

Nuclear Regulation in the United Kingdom

The legislation in the UK for health and safety in the workplace includes that governing regulation of nuclear installations. Nuclear Installations Regulations specify prescribed installations which include: power reactors, research reactors, isotopic enrichment plants, fuel fabrication facilities, nuclear fuel reprocessing

facilities, radioisotope extraction facilities, and nuclear waste storage. The Health and Safety Executive (HSF.) is the competent authority for regulating nuclear safety in accordance with the legislation and grants licences to operators of nuclear installations. A Nuclear Installations Inspectorate (NIL), under the USE. ensures that all statutory requirements regarding safety of workers and the public, in relation to nuclear

installations, are strictly adhered to. In the UK an approach is adopted which requires licensees "to make and implement adequate arrangements" for areas of safety concern. The Nil has the powers to order the shutdown of a facility or revocation of a licence, and may potsue breaches of the legislation in civil courts.

Nuclear Regulation in Canada

The Canadian Atomic Energy Control Board (AECB) is established under legislation to licence and regulate the following: power reactors; research reactors; heavy water plants; uranium mines, mills, refineries and conversion plants; fuel fabrication facilities; radioactive waste management facilities, sub-atomic particle accelerators; use of radioisotopes; and transport packaging of radioactive materials. Licensing uf reactor

operators is also the responsibility of the AFCB. An approach is adopted, similar to the UK, with plant operators responsible tor achieving set safety standards. 'lhe AECB has the powers to order the shutdown of a facility or revocation of a licence, and may pursue breaches of the legislation in civil courts.

Nuclear Regulation in the United States

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) administers legislation concerning nuclear installatious in the l S and licenses: power reactors, test and research reactors, uranium mills and chemical conversion plants, fuel fabrication facilities, fuel reprocessing plants, isotopic enrichment plants, irradiated fuel storage facilities, and high and low-level radioactive waste repositories. The scope of licence proceeding covers radiation safety, environmental protection and antitrust considerations. Although the NRC licenses the possession and

use of radioactive materials, such as radiation sources, many States license these by agreement with the NRC Government-owned and -operated reactors are not licensed by the NRC. Nuclear regulation in the I S is covered by legislation which provides several levels of appeal against decisions made by regulatory stall and which embodies a judicial structure within the nuclear legislation. Public bearings, for the issue of

construction permits for nuclear installations, are required by legislation, and may be held in nth<.r circumstances. In contrast to the UK and Canada, the US NRC promulgates detailed rules for design, construction, operation and decommissioning of nuclear installations. Nevertheless, the NRC maintains that the responsibility for safe operation rests with the operator. Enforcement powers include ordering the

shutdown of installations or the cessation of construction, and the NRC also has the power to impose monetary fines.

31

INTERNATIONAL NUCLEAR REGULATORY ENVIRONMENT

Mr Donald Macnab was overseas from 20 June to 1 July 1994 and met with officers at the National Radiological Protection Board (NRPB) Didcot, UK to discuss the use of UMPIRE and other PC computer codes for UMPIRE, written by AEA Technology Mr Macnab visited AEA Technology UK to discuss the possibility of modifications to the code to improve its real-time application for emergency situations. Mr Macnab also visited the UK Nuclear

Installations Inspectorate to discuss the assessment and licensing of sites and facilities in the UK, which produce radioisotopes, and also the authorisation of routine discharges of radioactive material. Mr Macnab attended the annual OECD/NEA Committee on Radiation Protection and Public Health (CRPPH) in Paris, the principal event of the CRPPH to which working parties and task groups report. Mr Macnab also attended a Technical Committee meeting which examined the impact of the 1990 Recommendations of the International Commission on Radiological Protection and the revised Basic Safety Standards on the IAEA

Regulations for the Safe Transport of Radioactive Material, Vienna.

PAPERS PRESENTED BY NUCLEAR SAFETY BUREAU STAFF AT CONFERENCES AND MEETINGS

PAPER AUTHOR CQNFERENCE/MEETING

Information Policies of Australia's T V Diamond OECD/NEA International Seminar Nuclear Safety Bureau on Information Policies of Nuclear

Regulatory Organisations, Paris, December 1993

Towards a National Regulatory Authority M R Allen & 18th Annual Meeting Of Australian D J Westall Radiation Protection Society,

Sydney, October 1993

Experience with the Trial Use of the T Mountford- DIDO Operators' Meeting, Lucas International Nuclear Event Scale for Smith Heights, October 1993 Rating Abnormal Occurrences at HIFAR

Accident Consequence Analysis using A J Frikken DIDO Operators' Meeting, Lucas UMPIRE 88i : HIFAR - a Case Heights, October 1993

Study

Challenges for Nuclear Regulators M R Allen 9th Pacific Basin Nuclear Conference, Sydney, May 1994

32

HUMAN RESOURCES

HUMAN RESOURCES

STAFFING OVERVIEW

Mr M R Allen was appointed Director by the Minister on 18 November 1993

As at 30 June 1994, the Bureau consisted o f an approved staffing level of 10 full time equivalent staff, as follows:

Director

Total 1

Male 1 Female 0

Professional Staff 5 5 0

Technical Staff 1 1 0

Administrative Staff 3 1 2

Total 10 8 2

Administrative 30% Executive 10%

Technical 10%

Professional 50%

All employees were located at Miranda , in the Sutherland Shire, NSW All employees were full time employees. No staff were directly employed under the Public Service Act 1922. No temporary staff were employed as at 30 June 1994.

The Director is a full time holder of a Public Office, whose salary and allowances are determined by the Remuneration Tribunal. No employees received Performance Pay during the year

Staff Of The NSB

At the end of the reporting period the staff complement was ten, which is the Approved Staffing Level (ASL) This structure includes the Director, six professional officers (engineers and scientists), one technical officer and three administrative staff and was the same arrangement that existed at 30 June 1993 During the year the administration manager resigned, and a replacement officer was recruited

33

HUMAN RESOURCES

Training

The Bureau is strongly committed to long term development and ongoing training o f all staff members The pursuit of excellence and compliance with international best practice requires attendance at international symposiums and conferences to learn of the latest developments in nuclear safety and regulatory matters.

Less Subsidies -

Amount of Training Guarantee (Administration) Act 1990 shortfall -

Bureau staff also participated as lecturers in various courses hosted by ANSTO at the Lucas Heights Research Laboratories.

The program for staff development addresses the requirement of technical, professional and administrative staff.

All Bureau staff participated in training courses during the year The training courses included advanced communication, computer applications, reliability engineering, performance measuring for Workplace Bargaining, industrial democracy, internal quality systems, technology management, human resources management and executive management.

Equal Employment Opportunity

The NSB has yet to finalise a formal Equal Employment Opportunity (EEO) policy. However, EEO principles are incorporated into the activities of the NSB in several areas including procurement, recruitment and advancement.

Industrial Democracy

Workplace reform was addressed for technical and administrative functions and, as a small unit, generally all staff participated The reform formed the basis of a revised Enterprise Agreement that was being negotiated.

Occupational Health and Safety

A Workplace Safety Committee was established and initiated action with the building owners aimed at reducing occupational risks and hazards and other initiatives included first aid training and input for the purchase of ergonomic workstations.

Total Annual Payroll Minimum Training Requirement Actual Training Expense

$474,050 $7,111 $14,867

34

FINANCIAL RESOURCES

FINANCIAL RESOURCES

The Bureau's financial statements for the year ended 30th June were audited by the Australian National Audit Office during September 1994. An audit certificate was issued by the Australian National Audit Office on 19 September 1994 As shown in the following chart, the

NSB's main expenditure is on salaries, superannuation and employee benefits The salary- related expense accounted for 69% of the total Bureau expenditure for the year ended 30 June 1994

NSB EXPENDITURE PROFILE

Employee Benefits 9%

Postage and Telecommunications 2%

Travel Expenses 6%

Superannuation 8%

Rental and Property- Outgoings 11%

Other Expenses 13%

Salaries and Related Expenses 51%

35

FINANCIAL RESOURCES

FINANCIAL STATEMENTS

DIRECTOR’S STATEMENT

In my opinion the financial statements, including the notes thereto, have been properly drawn up so as to show fairly:

(a) the operating result of the Bureau for the year ended 30 June 1994;

(b) the financial position of the Bureau for that date; and

(c) the Bureau's cash flows during the year ended on that date.

These statements have been made out in accordance with the applicable accounting concepts and standards, and with the guidelines for Financial Statements of Public Authorities and Commercial Activities issued by the Minister for Finance.

M R Allen Director 16th September 1994

36

FINANCIAL STATEMENTS

NUCLEAR SAFETY BUREAU

Operating Statement 1994 1993

for the year ended 30 June 1994 Note $ $

COST OF SERVICES

Operating expenses Salaries and Related Expenses 448435 447349

Employee Benefits 80798 87924

Rental and property outgoings 7 95578 80012

Superannuation - Employer's Contribution 6 72496 77389

Travel Expenses 52356 49147

Depreciation 20771 10196

Stores and Material Purchases 7622 3390

Postage and Telecommunications 13082 2675

Other Expenses 2 86839 46507

Total operating expenses 877977 804589

Operating Revenues from independent sources

Miscellaneous Revenue 3 6902 1323

Total Operating revenues from independent sources 6902 1323

Net cost of Services 871075 803266

REVENUE FROM GOVERNMENT Parliamentary appropriations received 4 830000 802000

Resources received free of charge 5 35000 88213

Total revenue from government 865000 890213

Operating Result (6075) 86947

Accumulated operating results at beginning

of financial year 86947

Accumulated operating results at end of financial year 80872 86947

The accompanying notes form an integral part of this statement.

FINANCIAL STATEMENTS

NUCLEAR SAFETY BUREAU

Statement of Financial Position as at 30 June 1994

Note

1994

$

1993

$

CURRENT ASSETS Cash Other

141112 6330

159521 4851

Total current assets 147442 164372

NON CURRENT ASSETS Property, plant and equipment 9 43473 35935

Total non current assets TOTAL ASSETS

43473 190915

35935 200307

CURRENT LIABILITIES Others Provisions 10

12469 65472

54065 50830

Total current liabilities 77941 104895

NON-CURRENT LIABILITIES Provisions 10 32102 8465

Total non-current liabilities TOTAL LIABILITIES

32102 110043

8465

113360

NET ASSETS 80872 86947

EQUITY Accumulated operating results TOTAL EQUITY

80872 80872

86947 86947

The accompanying notes form an integral part of this statement.

38

FINANCIAL STATEMENTS

NUCLEAR SAFETY BUREAU

Statement of Cash Flows for the year ended 30 June 1994 1994

$

1993 $

CASH FLOWS FROM OPERATING ACTIVITIES Inflows:

Parliamentary Appropriation 830000 802000

Bank Interest 5630 -

Miscellaneous Revenue 1272 -

836902 802000

Outflows:

Payments to suppliers and employees 1821659) 1624561)

Net Cash provided by operating activities 15243 177439

CASH FLOWS FROM INVESTING ACTIVITIES Outflows:

Term Deposit (103268)

Payments for Property, Plant and Equipment 1 33652) 117918)

Cash used in investing activities (136920) (17918)

Net (decrease)/increase in cash held (121677) 159521

Cash at beginning of reporting period Cash at end of reporting period

159521 -

37844 159521

Reconciliation of Operating result with cash flows from operations:

Operating Result: (deficit)Zprofit (6075) 86947

increase in Employee entitlements 38279 59295

decreaseZ(increase) in prepayments 726 (3528)

decreaseZ(increase) in accrued income 1323 (1323)

increase in resources free of charge (6787) (28213)

(decrease)Zincrease in creditors (41650) 54065

depreciation 20771

10196

increase in loss of sale of assets 5128

increase in recoverable expenditure Net increase provided by operating activities

3528 15243 177439

The accompanying notes form an integral part of the statement.

FINANCIAL STATEMENTS

NOTES TO AND FORMING PART OF THE FINANCIAL STATEMENTS

1 Summary of Significant Accounting Policies

(a) BASIS OF ACCOUNTING

• The Bureau was established on the 30 June 1992, and there were no transactions for the year ended 30 June 1992. Comparative figures are presented for the first time.

• The financial statements have been prepared in accordance with the: - going concern basis; - accrual accounting, - historical cost convention; - provisions of Part VIIA of the Australian Nuclear Science and Technology

Organisation Act 1987, - Guidelines for Financial Statements of Public Authorities and Commercial Activities issued by the Minister for Finance and with applicable accounting standards; and - statements of Accounting Concepts.

(b) CAPITALISATION POLICY

Asset items are classified as non-current assets when the cost of acquisition is in excess of $ 1, 000.

(c) INSURANCE

The Bureau has made a decision not to take out separate insurance cover at this time, as it considers that adequate cover currently exists in other areas This policy will be reviewed periodically

(d) PROPERTY, PLANT AND EQUIPMENT

• Cost and Valuation Property, Plant and Equipment are carried at cost.

• Depreciation Property, plant and equipment is depreciated over the estimated useful life of the asset using the straight line method

40

FINANCIAL STATEMENTS

(e) EMPLOYEE BENEFITS

The provision for long service leave has been determined on the basis of entitlements arising from the application of the Long Service Leave (Commonwealth Employees Act) 1976 and the appropriate salary rate.

A written agreement with the Australian Nuclear Science and Technology Organisation (ANSTO) exists to cover the technical liability for Long Service Leave for five staff that are on Leave Without Pay from ANSTO ANSTO have agreed to accept the Long Service Leave of those staff that has accrued up to 30 June 1992, a liability of $96,845 The Bureau has accepted the liability of staff from 1 July 1992 onwards

Recreation Leave entitlements have been provided fully by the Bureau

(f) CASH

For the purpose of the statement of cash flows, cash refers only to cash at bank

(g) INCOME TAX

The Bureau is not subject to Income Tax.

2. OTHER EXPENSES

Other expenses comprised the following:

1994 1993

$ $

Courses and Conferences Audit Fees Consultants Fees Corporate/Accounting Support

Computer Software Advertising Legal Services Relocation Expenses

Loss on Sale of Assets Library Acquisitions Printing Freight

Minor Assets Vehicle expenses Other expenses

18,878 13,867

5,000 6,500

9,250 5,590

8,764 10,649

12,617 4,577

1,784 2,943

3,553 702

7,886 542

5,128 "

485 320

2,689 305

434 169

5,590 -

987 68

3.794 275

$86,839 $46,507

41

FINANCIAL STATEMENTS

3 MISCELLANEOUS REVENUE

Bureau staff gave lectures on nuclear related subject matter during the year. The Revenue received from this activity was $1,082 (compared to $1,323 for the previous year). In addition, bank interest of $5,630 and miscellaneous revenue of $190 were earned during 1993/94.

4 PARLIAMENTARY APPROPRIATION

An appropriation of $830,000 was made by Parliament under Appropriation Act (No 1) 1993/94.

5. RESOURCES RECEIVED FREE OF CHARGE

Rental accommodation at Lucas Heights, valued at $35,000, was provided free of charge by ANSTO for the period 1/7/93 to 31/1/94 In respect of the previous year, ANSTO provided rental accommodation for twelve months, valued at $60,000, in addition to providing non­ current assets worth $28,213.

6 SUPERANNUATION

The Bureau contributes to the Commonwealth Superannuation Scheme and the Public Sector Superannuation Scheme in accordance with Section 159 of the Superannuation Act 1976 The Bureau meets its liability as costs accrue, on the basis of contribution rates set by the Australian Government actuary An amount of $72,496 was contributed during the year

ended 30 June 1994 (compared to $77,389 for the previous year). This represents a composite contribution rate of 17% of superannuable salaries which includes the 3% Superannuation Productivity Benefit entitlements. These schemes provide benefits in the form

of lump sum payments and pensions.

7 RENTAL OF LEASED PREMISES

On the 1 February 1994, the Bureau transferred its office from Lucas Heights to leased premises on Level 3, 14-16 Central Road Miranda, still within the Sutherland Shire. The original lease ($60,000 p a ) was taken out for an initial period of 12 months. The Bureau also incurred the additional cost of light and power, cleaning, security, hygiene services etc from February 1994

8 CORPORATE SUPPORT SERVICES

ANSTO continued to provide a number of services to the Bureau for a negotiated fee. These included Human Resources (Payroll and Superannuation Administration), Financial Management Information System, Supply, Library Service and Protective Services

ANSTO provided other services on a user pays basis. These included Medical Services, Security Vetting, Occupational Health and Safety, Training Courses and Industrial and Consultancy Services.

42

FINANCIAL STATEMENTS

9 PROPERTY, PLANT AND EQUIPMENT

1994 1993

Office Equipment (at cost) $70,476 $46,131

less Accumulated Depreciation ($27,003) C$10,196)

$43,473 $35,935

10 PROVISIONS

Current:

1994 1993

• Recreation Leave Balance 1 July $50,830 -

Provided by charge to expenses $44,609 $82,141

Cost charged against provision C$35,947) C$31,311)

Balance 30 June $59,492 $50,830

• Long Service Leave Balance 1 July - -

Provided by charge to expenses $5,979 -

Costs charged against provision .... -.... ....... -........

Balance 30 June $5,979 ....... ~........

Non-Current

• Long Service Leave Balance 1 July $8,465 -

Provided by charge to expenses $30,209 $8,465

Costs charged against provision C$6,572) .... -■ ■ ■ ■

Balance 30 June $32,102 $8,465

11 EXECUTIVE REMUNERATION

The aggregate amount of remuneration directly received by the Executive Officer for the year ended 30 June 1994 was $110,512. Amounts paid to an approved Superannuation Fund throughout the year on behalf of the Executive Officer was $13,238.

12 AUDIT FEES

The fee relating to the audit o f the Bureau's financial statements performed by the Australian National Audit Office for the year ended 30 June 1994 was $5,000 (compared to $6,500 or the previous year). No other services were provided

43

FINANCIAL STATEMENTS

13 EXPENDITURE COMMITMENTS

• CAPITAL 1994 1993

Capital expenditure contracted for as at 30 June 1994 but not provided for: - $16,577

• OPERATING

Operating expenditure contracted for as at 30 June 1994 but not provided for:

- Payable within 12 months

. NON-CANCELLABLE OPERATING LEASES

Non-cancellable operating leases contracted for as at 30 June 1994

$445 -

- Payable within 12 months $37,725 -

- Payable later than one year and not later than two years $5,167 -

14 ECONOMIC DEPENDENCY

The Bureau is economically dependent on Parliamentary appropriation to perform its functions

15. CONTINGENT LIABILITIES

The Bureau has no contingent liabilities.

16 SEGMENT REPORTING

The activities of the Bureau being confined to a single industry and undertaken predominantly in New South Wales make segment reporting unnecessary

44

INDEPENDENT AUDIT REPORT

AUSTRALIAN NATIONAL AUDIT OFFICE

Level 7

130 SlizaDeih Street

Sydney New South W ales 2CCC

cur ref:

IN D EPEN D EN T A U D IT R E PO R T

To the M inister for H um an Services and H ealth

Scope

I have audited the financial statem ents of the N uclear Safety Bureau for the year ended 30 June 1994. The statem ents comprise:

. O perating Statem ent

. Statem ent of Financial Position

. Statem ent of Cash Flows

. Statem ent by the D irector, and

. Notes to and forming part of the Financial Statements.

The D irector of the Bureau is responsible for the preparation and presentation of the financial statem ents and the information contained therein. I have conducted an independent audit of the financial statem ents in order to express an opinion on them to the M inister for H um an Services and H ealth.

The audit has been conducted in accordance with Australian National Audit Office Auditing Standards, which incorporate the Australian Auditing Standards, to provide reasonable assurance as to w hether the financial statem ents are free of material misstatement. Audit procedures included examination, on a test basis, of evidence

supporting the am ounts and other disclosures in the financial statem ents, and the evaluation of accounting policies and significant accounting estimates. These procedures have been undertaken to form an opinion whether, in all material

respects, the financial statem ents are presented fairly in accordance with Australian accounting concepts and standards and statutory requirem ents so as to present a view which is consistent with my understanding of the B ureau’s financial position, the results of its operations and its cash flows.

The audit opinion expressed in this report has been formed on the above basis.

PO Box A-156 Sydney South .New South W ales 2000 Telephone (02) 367 7100 Facsimile Ό2) 36- - ° -

45

INDEPENDENT AUDIT REPORT

Audit Opinion

In accordance with sub-section 37R(1) of the Australian Nuclear Science and Technology Organisation Act 1987, I now report that the statements are in agreement with the accounts and records of the Bureau, and in my opinion:

(i) the statements are based on proper accounts and records

(ii) the statements show fairly in accordance with Statements of Accounting Concepts and applicable Accounting Standards the financial transactions and cash flows for the year ended 30 June 1994 and the state of affairs of the Bureau as at that date

(iii) the receipt, expenditure and investment of moneys, and the acquisition and disposal of assets, by the Bureau during the year have been in accordance with Part VILA of the Australian Nuclear Science and Technology Organisation Act 1987, and

(iv) the statements are in accordance yith the Guidelines for Financial

Statements of Public Authorities and Commercial Activities.

David C McKean Executive Director

Sydney

19 September 1994

46

OTHER RESOURCES

OTHER RESOURCES

FRAUD CONTROL

The Bureau had no reported instances of fraud during the year, and therefore no cases have been referred to the Australian Federal Police, and no staff resources have been used in investigating fraud during the year. The arrangements for controls were reviewed by the Australian National Audit Office during their audit of the Bureau's accounts for the year ended

30 June 1994 Arrangements were made for a staff member to attend a fraud awareness and control course as a forerunner to establishing a fraud control plan for the Bureau

CLAIMS AND LOSSES

No claims or losses were made during the year. The Bureau's risk management measures included utilising the Australian Protective Services for site security during the year As a policy, all new staff attend an OH&S course Procedures have been put in place designed to minimise the risks associated with the NSB's capability to sue and be sued

INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY PURCHASING ARRANGEMENTS

The Government's purchasing policy guidelines have been adhered to for hardware, software and services purchased from the IT Industry

The Bureau initiated a feasibility study into establishing a local area network with the capability of external linkages to the Department of Human Services and Health, the Australian Radiation Laboratory, ANSTO and other related organisations.

PAYMENT OF ACCOUNTS

The Bureau's payment policy complies with the Commonwealth standard terms of accounts payment During the year the following payments were processed: 1994 1993

Number of Accounts received during the year 204

Number of Accounts processed on or prior to the due date 192

Number of Accounts received but not processed for payment during the year5 12

53 50 3

5 These accounts were all received in June and processed in the 1994/95 financial year.

47

OTHER RESOURCES

CONSULTANCY SERVICES

The Bureau engaged the services of the following consultants during 1993/94:

• Mr G Thomas, Industrial and Services Manager, ANSTO - provision of industrial relations services relating to the NSB's Enterprise Bargaining Agreement, $3,000

• Dr R C Cairns, Turramurra, NSW - provision of an external review of Nuclear Safety Bureau siting and safety assessment principles, and $1,150

• B R Lawrence Consulting, Sylvania, NSW - provision of consultancy services for Safety Assessment Policy. $5,100

$9,250

PROPERTY USAGE

For the first seven months of the financial year, the Bureau was located in a building owned by ANSTO at the Lucas Heights Research Laboratories. As no rent was paid, a notional value of $60,000 per annum has been placed on the facility ($35,000 for the seven months).

Included in the payment to ANSTO for the provision of a range of Corporate Services for 1993/94 was an amount of $15,337 in respect of outgoings for the seven month period whilst at Lucas Heights

On 1 February 1994, the Bureau relocated to leased premises in Central Road, Miranda, within the Sutherland Shire of Sydney An initial twelve month lease of $60,000, with a renewable option for a further twelve months, was negotiated.

Rental (including outgoings) Square metres of office space Total occupants

Lucas Heights $50,337 243m2 10

Miranda $45,241 331m2 10

All facilities are classed as Office Space, there are no Special Purpose facilities.

48

EXTERNAL SCRUTINY

EXTERNAL SCRUTINY

REPORTS BY THE AUDITOR - GENERAL

No reports by the Auditor General relating specifically to the Bureau were tabled in Parliament during the year

FREEDOM OF INFORMATION

In compliance with Section 8 of the Freedom of Information Act 1982, the following information is the annual statement on consultative arrangements, categories of documents maintained and facilities and procedures for access to documents relating to the NSB Details

of the functions and decision making powers are contained in the Annual Report

Arrangements For External Participation

• Liaison Group

The Safety Review Committee (SRC) is concerned with the safety of nuclear plant As part of this function, the Bureau meets with the SRC to review these safety aspects of ANSTO's operations

• State Government Arrangements

As a member of the Visiting Ships Panel (Nuclear) the NSB, located in NSW, liaises with State Government departments responsible for safety, in conjunction with Nuclear Powered Warship visits to Australia

• Commonwealth Government Arrangements

The NSB liaises with other Commonwealth Government departments and agencies, principally on nuclear and associated issues related with the IAEA and OECD activities in connection with the NSB's functions under section 37A (l)(c) of the ANSTO Act, 1987.

Categories of Documents Held

Available on Request

Copies of the Bureau's quarterly reports and technical reports.

Documents Related To The Decision Making Process

Cabinet documents relating to matters in which the NSB has an interest, M inisterial correspondence, determinations and directions, memoranda and decisions, deeds, lega

49

EXTERNAL SCRUTINY

contracts and formal arrangements, minutes and submissions, and employment, delegations, security, finance, and accounting handbooks and manuals.

General Correspondence

Ministerial briefs, speeches, conference papers for national and international meetings, parliamentary questions and answers, cables, telexes and facsimiles, and general records files.

Technical Documents

Scientific and technical reports, computer disks and printouts, plant and equipment operating manuals, records of audits, inspections and reviews, maintenance, quality assurance and safety manuals, accounting records and photographs.

Health And Safety Related Documents

Staff medical records, accident reports and emergency response procedures.

Administration Documents

Personnel records including staff promotion files, organisation and establishment reports, compensation files, word processor disc systems for administrative instructions and information storage, staff lists and classifications, accounting records, pay-roll, flexitime and overtime records, contract documents, building plans, instructions, directives, orders, memoranda, bulletins, notices and information.

Enabling Legislation

The Australian Nuclear Science and Technology Amendment Act was given Royal Assent on 30 June 1992. The principal Act is known as the Australian Nuclear Science and Technology Organisation Act 1987. The Amendment Act established the functions of the Bureau.

Functions of the Bureau

"37A (1) The functions of the Bureau are:

(a) To monitor and review the safety of any nuclear plant owned or operated by the organisation; and

(b) to provide technical advice to the Commonwealth on the safety of nuclear plant and related matters; and

(c) such other functions as the Minister determines in writing.

(2) A determination under paragraph (l)(c) is a disallowable instrument for the purposes of section 46 A of the Acts Interpretation Act 1901

(3) The Bureau may perform its functions to the extent only that they are not in excess of the functions that may be conferred on it by virtue of the legislative powers of the parliament, and, in particular, may perform its functions;

50

EXTERNAL SCRUTINY

(a) in so far as it is appropriate for those functions to be performed by the Bureau on behalf of the Government of the Commonwealth as the national Government of Australia, and

(b) for purposes for which it is appropriate for the Parliament as the national Parliament of Australia to authorise the Bureau to perform functions, and

(c) by way of expenditure of money that its available for the purposes of the Bureau in accordance with an appropriation made by the Parliament, and

(d) for purposes related to external affairs; and

(e) for purposes in or in relation to a Territory

(4) In this section:

"nuclear plant" means a nuclear reactor or assembly of fissionable material in respect of which criticality is contemplated or possible:

"nuclear reactor" means a facility or device, including any plant associated with such a facility or device, in which a controlled nuclear chain reaction can be maintained without an additional source of neutrons

Powers of the Bureau

"37B The Bureau has power to do all things necessary or convenient to be done for or in connection with the performance of its functions."

Facilities for Access

Written requests for access to documents under FOI should be addressed initially to Mr M R Allen, Director, Nuclear Safety Bureau, P O Box 655, Miranda NSW 2228, Australia The Director has been appointed as an authorised officer under Section 23 of the FOI Act

CLIENT COMMENTS

The Bureau has an obligation to consider community service issues. In order to measure and record community comments, the Bureau monitors the media and receives requests direct from the public

51

IMPACT MONITORING

IMPACT MONITORING

Due to the co-location of ANSTO and NSB at the Lucas Heights Research Laboratories from 1 July 1993 to 31 January 1994, the NSB complied with the energy policies and monitoring measures put in place by ANSTO This co-locational strategy was aimed at achieving and improving energy efficiency in operations, particularly in response to buildings and plant and equipment

Following the re-location of its office to a modern building at Miranda, the Bureau has initiated its own energy policy and monitoring measures designed to achieve optimum energy consumption.

Purchases initiated by the NSB are evaluated to determine full life cost and energy ratings

52

GLOSSARY AND ACRONYMS

GLOSSARY AND ACRONYMS

AECB AJRP ALARA ALARP ANAO ANSTO

ARL ASL ASO Bureau CNRA CRPPH CSIRO CSNI DIDO DMTR

Atomic Energy Control Board o f Canada Australian Institute for Radiation Protection As Low As Reasonably Achievable As Low As Reasonably Practicable Australian National Audit Office Australian Nuclear Science and Technology Organisation Australian Radiation Laboratory Approved Staffing Level Australian Safeguards Office Nuclear Safety Bureau

Committee on Nuclear Regulatory Activities of the OECD Committee on Radiation Protection and Public Health of the NEA-OECD Commonwealth Scientific & Industrial Research Organisation Committee on Safety of Nuclear Installations of the OECD

1OMW "DIDO-class" reactor in UK, now closed down Dounreay Materials Test Reactor, 10 MW "DIDO-Class" reactor in UK. now closed down DR3 EEO FOI

BIHAR IAEA ICRP IMO

INES LHRL Moata NEA NHMRC Nil

NPW NSB NSW OECD

OH&S OL&C PLUTO PRA

RAT RDRWP RSS SAGSTRAM

10 MW "DIDO-Class" reactor at Rise, Denmark Equal Employment Opportunity Freedom of Information High Flux Australian Reactor, a 1 OMW "DIDO-Class" research reactor

International Atomic Energy Agency International Commission on Radiological Protection International Maritime Organisation International Nuclear Event Scale Lucas Heights Research Laboratories

A lOOkW "Argonaut-UTR" research reactor Nuclear Energy Agency National Health and Medical Research Council, Australia Nuclear Installations Inspectorate

Nuclear Powered Warship Nuclear Safety Bureau New South Wales Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development

Occupational Health and Safety Operational Limits and Conditions for reactor plant 25MW "DIDO-class" reactor in UK, now closed down Probabilistic Risk Assessment Reactor Aluminium Tank

Reactor Dose Reduction Working Party, HIFAR Reactor Shift Superintendent, HIFAR ,

Standing Advisory Group on the Safe Transport of Radioactive Material of the IAEA SRC SAP UNEP

Safety Review Committee Safety Assessment Policy United Nations Environment Programme

53

GLOSSARY AND ACRONYMS

US NRC UTR VSP(N)

United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission University Training Reactor Visiting Ships Panel (Nuclear)

54

INDEX

INDEX

Accident Consequences Analysis Computer Codes, 21 Activities of the IAEA and NEA, 23 Claims and Losses, 47 Client Comments, 51 Conclusions on Nuclear Plant Safety, 17 Consultancy Services, 48 Contacts with Nuclear Regulators in the Asian Region, 30

Corporate Objectives of the NSB, 3 Defence-in-Depth, 13 DIDO Operators' Meeting, 14 Director's Financial Statement, 36 EEO in Appointments, 4 Enabling Legislation, 50 Equal Employment Opportunity, 34 Extended Shutdowns of HIFAR, 11 Fire Hazard Analysis of HIFAR, 11 Fraud Control, 47 Freedom of Information, 49 Glossary and Acronyms, 53 HIFAR Authorisation, 8 Independent Audit Report, 45

Industrial Democracy, 34 INES, 9 Information Technology Purchasing Arrangements, 47 International Nuclear Regulation, 31

International Safety Programs, 29 International Third Party Nuclear Liability Conventions, 24 Irradiated Fuel Storage and Criticality Certificates, 16 Land Use Restrictions, 15 Legislative Arrangements for Nuclear Regulation, 19 Meetings of the OECD's Nuclear Safety Committee, 24

Moata Authorisation, 15 NSB Reports, 28 Nuclear Safety Convention, 26 Occupational Health and Safety, 34

Operational Limits and Conditions, 14 Overseas Visits, 30 Papers Presented by Nuclear Safety Bureau Staff, 32 Payment of Accounts, 47 Property Usage, 48

Proposal for the Incorporation of ANSTO into CSIRO, 20 Public Information, 4 Radiation Protection at HIFAR, 14 Radioactive Discharges to the Environment, 16

Reports by the Auditor - General, 49 Research Reactor Review, 20

55

INDEX

Restrictions and Conditions on Operation of Nuclear Plant, 16 Safe Transport of Radioactive Substances, 25 Safety Assessment Policy, 7 Safety Philosophy, 6 Security, 14 Seismic Safety Assessment ofHIFAR, 12 Site Emergency Exercise, 12 Social Justice, 4 Staff of the NSB, 33 Training and Accreditation ofHIFAR Operating Staff, 11 Unusual Operating Events at HIFAR, 9 Unusual Operating Events at MO AT A, 15 Visits by NPWs to Australia, 22

56

THE PARLIAMENT OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA

PARLIAMENTARY PAPER No. 331 of 1994 ORDERED TO BE PRINTED

ISSN 0727-418

Λ50678 Cat. No. 94 2742 2