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Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security—Report for 2013-14


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Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security Annu Al RepoRt 2013-2014

ANNUAL REPORT

2013-2014

LOCATION 1 National Circuit BARTON ACT 2600

WRITTEN INQUIRIES Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security 1 National Circuit BARTON ACT 2600

PARLIAMENTARY AND MEDIA LIAISON Neville Bryan Phone: (02) 6271 5692 Fax: (02) 6271 5696

GENERAL INQUIRIES Phone: (02) 6271 5692 Fax: (02) 6271 5696

NON-ENGLISH SPEAKERS If you speak a language other than English and need help please call the Translating and Interpreting Service on 131 450 and ask for the Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security on (02) 6271 5692. This is a free service.

INTERNET Homepage: www.igis.gov.au

Annual report: www.igis.gov.au/annual_report/index.cfm

ISSN: 1030-4657

© Commonwealth of Australia 2014

All material presented in this publication is provided under a Creative Commons Attribution 3.0 Australia licence. For the avoidance of doubt, this means this licence only applies to material as set out in this document. The details of the relevant licence conditions are available on the Creative Commons website www.creativecommons.org.

Design and typesetting by Spectrum Graphics [sg.com.au]

Printed by New Millennium Print

Correspondence ref: 2014/887 F ile ref: 2014/15

The Hon Tony Abbott MP Prime Minister Parliament House CANBERRA ACT 2600

Dear Prime Minister

I am pleased to present my annual report for the period 1 July 2013-30 June 2014.

This report has been prepared in accordance with section 35 of the Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security Act 1986 and reflects the Requirements for annual reports - for departments, executive agencies and FMA Act bodies, as approved by the Joint Committee of Public Accounts and Audit, and updated in May 2014.

Each of the agencies within my jurisdiction has confirmed that those components of the report which relate to them will not prejudice security, the defence of Australia, Australia’s relations with other countries, law enforcement operations or the privacy of individuals. The report is therefore suitable to be laid before each House of Parliament.

The report includes my office’s audited financial statements as required by section 57 of the Financial Management and Accountability Act 1997.

As required by the Commonwealth Fraud Control Guidelines, I certify that my office has undertaken a fraud risk assessment and has a fraud control plan, both of which are reviewed periodically. I further certify that appropriate fraud prevention, detection, investigation and reporting procedures are in place, which comply with the guidelines applying in 2013-14, and that the office has responded to the mandatory Australian Institute of Criminology annual survey of fraud control data.

Yours sincerely

Vivienne Thom Inspector-General

30 September 2014

1 National Circuit BARTON ACT 2600 P hone (02) 6271 5692 Fax (02) 6271 5696

E-mail info@igis.gov.au

www.igis.gov.au

ii Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security Annual Report 2013-14

CONTENTS

Letter of transmittal i

Glossary iv

Part One: Overview 1

The role of the Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security 1

The intelligence agencies 2

Inspector-General’s review 3

Part Two: Performance 6

Outcomes and programs 6

Agency engagement 7

Inquiries 7

Complaints and contacts 11

IGIS role in Freedom of Infor mation and Archives matters 14

Numbers and trends 15

Timeliness 16

iii Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security Annual Report 2013-14

Effecting change in agencies 17

Inspections 18

Summary of IGIS financial per formance and resources for outcomes 31

Part Three: Management and accountability 33

Corporate governance 33

Management of human resources 35

Part Four: Financial statements 39

Part Five: Annexures 76

Annex 1: Summary of inquir ies and complaints 77

Annex 2: Salary ranges f or APS employees in OIGIS in 2013-14 78

Annex 3: Agenc y resource statements 79

Annex 4: Requir ements for annual reports 81

Index 86

iv Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security Annual Report 2013-14

GLOSSARY

AAT Administrative Appeals Tribunal

AFP Australian Federal Police

AHRC Australian Human Rights Commission

AML/CTF Act Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorism Financing Act 2006

APS Australian Public Service

ASIO Australian Security Intelligence Organisation

ASIO Act Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Act 1979

ASIS Australian Secret Intelligence Service

AUSTRAC Australian Transaction Reports and Analysis Centre

DIAC Department of Immigration and Citizenship

DIBP Department of Immigration and Border Protection

DIGO Defence Imagery and Geospatial Organisation

DIO Defence Intelligence Organisation

DSD Defence Signals Directorate

FOI freedom of information

FOI Act Freedom of Information Act 1982

IGIS Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security

IGIS Act Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security Act 1986

IMA irregular maritime arrival

Immigration Department of Immigration and Citizenship (before 18 September 2013) Department of Immigration and Border Protection (from 18 September 2013)

ISA Intelligence Services Act 2001

MOU memorandum of understanding

OIGIS Office of the Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security

ONA Office of National Assessments

ONA Act Office of National Assessments Act 1977

PGPA Public Governance, Performance and Accountability Act 2013

PID Act Public Interest Disclosure Act 2013

SES Senior Executive Service

TIA Act Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act 1979

WHS Act Work Health and Safety Act 2011

1 Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security Annual Report 2013-14

PART ONE: OVERVIEW The role of the Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security The Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security (IGIS) is an independent statutory office established by the Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security Act 1986 (IGIS Act) which commenced on 1 February 1987. Dr Vivienne Thom was appointed as Inspector-General for a term of five years from 19 July 2010.

The Office of the IGIS (OIGIS) is situated within the Prime Minister’s portfolio. As an independent statutory office holder, the IGIS is not subject to general direction from the Prime Minister, or other ministers, on how responsibilities under the IGIS Act should be carried out.

The role of the IGIS is set out in the IGIS Act and is, broadly, to assist ministers in overseeing and reviewing the legality and propriety of Australian intelligence agencies’ activities, to assist ministers in ensuring that these activities are consistent with human rights, and to assist the Government in assuring the Parliament and the public that intelligence and security matters relating to Commonwealth agencies are open to scrutiny.

Regular inspections of the intelligence agencies are designed to identify issues, including with agencies’ governance and control frameworks, before there is a requirement for major remedial action.

IGIS’s inspection role is complemented by an inquiry function. In undertaking inquiries the IGIS has strong investigative powers, akin to those of a royal commission, including the power to compel persons to answer questions and produce documents, to take sworn evidence, and to enter agency premises.

The IGIS can investigate complaints, including complaints by members of the public or staff of an intelligence agency, about an action taken by an intelligence agency.

The IGIS also has a role under the Archives Act 1983 and the Freedom of Information Act 1982 (FOI Act) to provide expert evidence to the Administrative Appeals Tribunal and the Information Commissioner in relation to national security, defence, international relations and confidential foreign government communications exemptions.

The role and functions of the IGIS are an important part of the overall accountability framework applied to the intelligence agencies. The focus of the IGIS on intelligence agencies’ operational activities complements Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security and Australian National Audit Office oversight of other aspects of governance in those agencies.

PART ONE / OVERVIEW

2 Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security Annual Report 2013-14

PART ONE / OVERVIEW

The intelligence agencies

Australian Security Intelligence Organisation (ASIO)

ASIO’s main role is to gather information and produce intelligence that will enable it to warn the government about activities that might endanger Australia’s national security.

The organisation’s functions are set out in the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Act 1979 (ASIO Act). ASIO is also subject to guidelines issued by the Attorney-General under the ASIO Act.

Security is defined in the ASIO Act as the protection of the Commonwealth and the States and Territories and the people in them from:

u espionage

u sabotage

u politically motivated violence

u the promotion of communal violence

u attacks on Australia’s defence system

u acts of foreign interference

and fulfilling Australia’s responsibilities to any foreign country in relation to any of these matters.

Security under the ASIO Act also encompasses the protection of Australia’s territorial and border integrity from serious threats.

ASIO collects information using a variety of intelligence methods including the use of human sources, special powers authorised by warrant, authorised liaison relationships, and published sources.

The Attorney-General is responsible for ASIO.

Australian Secret Intelligence Service (ASIS)

ASIS’s primary function is to obtain and communicate intelligence not readily available by other means, about the capabilities, intentions and activities of individuals or organisations outside Australia. Further functions set out in the Intelligence Services Act 2001 (ISA) include communicating secret intelligence in accordance with government requirements, conducting counter-intelligence

activities and liaising with foreign intelligence or security services.

ASIS’s collection of relevant foreign intelligence generally relies on human sources. This intelligence information is transformed into intelligence reports and related products which are made available to key policy makers and select government agencies with a clear and established need to know.

Under the ISA, ASIS’s activities are regulated by a series of ministerial directions, ministerial authorisations and privacy rules.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs is responsible for ASIS.

Office of National Assessments (ONA)

ONA is established by the Office of National Assessments Act 1977 (ONA Act) and provides ‘all source’ assessments on international political, strategic and economic developments to the Prime Minister and the Government. ONA uses information collected by other intelligence and government agencies, diplomatic reporting and open sources, including the media, to support its analysis.

Under its Act, ONA is responsible for coordinating and reviewing Australia’s foreign intelligence activities and issues of common interest in Australia’s foreign intelligence community, and the adequacy of resourcing provided to Australia’s foreign intelligence effort.

The Prime Minister is responsible for ONA.

Defence intelligence agencies

Three of the six intelligence agencies are within the Department of Defence (Defence): the Defence Intelligence Organisation (DIO), the Defence Imagery and Geospatial Organisation (DIGO), also known as the Australian Geospatial-Intelligence Organisation, and the Defence Signals Directorate (DSD), also known as the Australian Signals Directorate.1 These three agencies sit within the

1 T he 2013 Defence White Paper announced changes to the names of the Defence Signals Directorate and the Defence Imagery Geospatial Organisation to the Australian Signals Directorate and Australian Geospatial-Intelligence Organisation respectively. Legislation to give effect to these changes was introduced shortly after the reporting period.

3 Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security Annual Report 2013-14

PART ONE / OVERVIEW Intelligence and Security Group in Defence. The functions of DSD and DIGO are set out in the ISA and their activities are regulated by a series of ministerial directions, ministerial authorisations and privacy rules.

Defence Intelligence Organisation (DIO)

DIO is Defence’s strategic-level, all-source intelligence assessment agency. Its role is to provide independent intelligence assessment, advice and services in support of: the planning and conduct of ADF operations; Defence strategic policy and wider government planning and decision making on defence and national security issues; and the development and sustainment of Defence capability.

Defence Imagery and Geospatial Organisation (DIGO)

DIGO is Australia’s national geospatial intelligence agency. DIGO’s geospatial intelligence, derived from the fusion of analysis of imagery and geospatial data, informs Australian Government and Defence Force decision making. DIGO directly assists Commonwealth and state bodies responding to security threats and natural disasters.

Defence Signals Directorate (DSD)

DSD is Australia’s national authority on signals intelligence and information security. DSD collects foreign signals intelligence, and its reports on this intelligence are provided to key policy makers and select government agencies with a clear and established need to know the information.

The Minister for Defence is responsible for these Defence agencies.

Inspector-General’s Review

The year in review

Highlights

The ongoing challenge for the office is to adapt to changes in the operations and powers of the intelligence agencies while maintaining effectiveness, credibility and transparency in our oversight role.

We have had to be flexible and innovative; we have

u taken a risk-based approach to prioritising our

work. This necessitated greater engagement with agencies to understand their compliance risks and anticipate future areas of risk. Using this approach we have maintained inspections of ASIO, ASIS and DSD but fewer resources have been allocated to DIGO, DIO and the ONA

u continued to publicly report findings

and recommendations of inquiries to the maximum extent consistent with the protection of national security

u commented on the development of policy

and legislation, where appropriate, to ensure that any new agency powers have provision for appropriate oversight

u adapted to systems developments in agencies,

altering our programs to take advantage of these developments and encouraging agencies to build compliance into new business processes.

Dr Vivienne Thom, Inspector-General

4 Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security Annual Report 2013-14

PART ONE / OVERVIEW

During the year the office had a significant inquiry workload. Completed inquiries examined:

u the attendance of legal representatives at

ASIO interviews

u the actions of ASIO, the Australian Federal

Police (AFP) and the then Department of Immigration and Citizenship (DIAC) in respect of an Egyptian irregular maritime arrival who was placed in immigration detention and was the subject of an Interpol red notice

u the use of weapons and self-defence

techniques in ASIS staff.

A major project for the office was the successful implementation of the Australian Government’s Public Interest Disclosure scheme which began in January 2014.

Legislative changes

Public Interest Disclosure Act 2013

The Public Interest Disclosure Act 2013 (PID Act) commenced on 15 January 2014. The PID scheme is intended to promote integrity and accountability in the Commonwealth public sector by establishing a framework to facilitate reporting of suspected wrongdoing and ensure timely and effective investigation of these disclosures. Public officials who make disclosures under the scheme are protected from adverse consequences.

Key IGIS responsibilities include:

u receiving and, where appropriate, investigating

disclosures about suspected wrongdoing within the intelligence agencies

u assisting current or former public officials

employed, or previously employed, by intelligence agencies, in relation to the operation of the PID Act

u assisting the intelligence agencies in meeting

their responsibilities under the PID Act, including through education and awareness activities

u overseeing the operation of the PID scheme in

the intelligence agencies.

During the second half of 2013, my staff worked closely with the Commonwealth Ombudsman in developing cross-government guidance to assist the operation of the new scheme, particularly the ‘Agency Guide to the Public Interest Disclosure Act 2013’ published by the Ombudsman, which includes specific advice concerning the intelligence community. I also liaised closely with the intelligence agencies to ensure the PID scheme was implemented fully on 15 January 2014. All intelligence agencies as well as OIGIS had all necessary appointments and administrative arrangements in place to receive and handle disclosures —this was a higher level of compliance at commencement than for the rest of the Commonwealth Government sector. The intelligence agencies have also undertaken a range of awareness-raising and training activities concerning the operation of the scheme, some involving assistance from OIGIS staff.

Parliamentary oversight

I appeared before the Senate Standing Committee on Finance and Public Administration on 18 November 2013 during the 2013-14 Supplementary Budget Estimates hearings, on 24 February 2014 during the 2013-14 Additional Budget Estimates hearings, and on 26 May 2014 during the 2014-15 Budget Estimates hearings.

Decisions by the judiciary, tribunals or the Information Commissioner

No judicial decisions or decisions of administrative tribunals or of the Information Commissioner made in 2013-14 had, or may have, a significant impact on the operations of the office.

5 Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security Annual Report 2013-14

PART ONE / OVERVIEW Submissions to inquiries and reviews

On 13 February 2014, I gave an introductory briefing to the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security. On 20 February 2014, I made a submission to the Committee for the Review of Administration and Expenditure No. 12 (2012-13) Australian Intelligence Agencies and appeared before this Committee at a private hearing on 15 May 2014.

On 26 February 2014, I made a submission to the Senate Legal and Constitutional Affairs References Committee for its Inquiry into comprehensive revision of the Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act 1979 and on 23 April 2014 appeared before the Committee for this Inquiry.

Looking ahead

Shortly after the end of the reporting period the Government introduced the National Security Legislation Amendment Bill (No. 1) 2014 into Parliament. The Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security is examining whether the Bill appropriately implements recommendations agreed by the Committee in 2013 and is assessing the balance of national security and safeguards proposed in the Bill. The Bill proposes new powers for ASIO and ASIS and other significant changes that would increase the scope and complexity of oversight arrangements and the workload of the OIGIS.

On 5 August 2014, the Prime Minister issued a media release about new counter-terrorism measures and noted:

These powers will be balanced with proper oversight to protect the individual rights of Australians, including their right to privacy. To ensure this the Government will increase the resources of the independent Office of the Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security.

The principal challenge in 2014-15 will thus be to ensure the office develops and maintains the technical capability to continue providing effective assurance about the legality and propriety of intelligence agencies’ extended activities, while maintaining the capacity to respond to ministerial requests, initiate inquiries, and handle complaints as necessary.

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PART T WO / PERFORMANCE

PART TWO: PERFORMANCE Outcomes and programs The 2013-14 Portfolio Budget Statements provided a strategic direction statement with one planned outcome for the Office of the Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security. That outcome was:

Independent assurance for the Prime Minister, senior ministers and Parliament as to whether Australia’s intelligence and security agencies act legally and with propriety by inspecting, inquiring into and reporting on their activities.

The key strategies employed to achieve this outcome were:

u to continue the agency’s inspection activities,

which involve proactively monitoring and reviewing the activities of the intelligence agencies

u where appropriate, to initiate ‘own motion’

inquiries and investigate complaints or referrals about the activities of the intelligence agencies

u at the request of the Prime Minister, to inquire

into an intelligence and security matter of a non-intelligence agency.

The single program reflects the small size of the agency and the relatively narrow focus of its activities.

Program deliverables

The program deliverables include:

u conducting own motion inquiries as

appropriate

u undertaking a comprehensive inspection and

visits program to monitor and review casework

u providing effective and timely responses to

complaints or referrals received from members of the public, ministers or Members of Parliament

u undertaking presentations to new and existing

members of the intelligence agencies to ensure an awareness and understanding of their responsibilities and accountability

u liaising with other accountability or integrity

agencies in Australia and overseas.

Performance indicators

The effectiveness of the office is assessed against four key performance indicators. These measures take into account the unique role and functions of the office as a specialised review body:

u the breadth and depth of inspection work

undertaken

7 Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security Annual Report 2013-14

PART T WO / PERFORMANCE u the timeliness of completion of inquiries or complaint resolution

u the level of acceptance by agencies,

complainants and ministers of findings and recommendations of inquiries conducted

u the extent to which there has been change

within the agencies as a result of the activities of the office.

Agency engagement I meet regularly with intelligence agency heads and their senior staff to discuss current issues or concerns, and to highlight issues arising from our inspection and inquiry activities. Agencies typically also use these discussions to brief me on emerging risks or potential concerns and how they plan to respond to these challenges.

These discussions enhance my awareness of each intelligence agency’s operational environment and also provide a forum to resolve issues informally without the need for extended or time consuming correspondence where appropriate.

Each agency has also established regular points of contact to facilitate our visits and to coordinate our various requirements, while within the OIGIS, designated officers lead interactions with each intelligence agency. The designation of these coordination points does not limit my capacity to speak with anyone else in the organisation when required, and indeed goes a long way to ensuring that our requirements are met in a full and prompt manner. I would like to express my appreciation to our regular points of contact within each agency for assisting the work of my office during the 2013-14 reporting period.

Outreach

Presentations provide an opportunity to explain to staff in the intelligence agencies the role and functions of the office and to discuss matters relating to compliance, professionalism, accountability and ethical conduct. In the reporting period, we delivered a total of 22 presentations. Of these, 13 were to staff in the intelligence agencies, including in regional offices and other sites outside of Canberra, and nine were to external groups.

We maintained our focus on agency leaders, regional operational staff, and officers newly appointed to roles with higher compliance risk. In response to feedback, we increased our discussion of issues identified in recent inquiries and remained open to leading presentations addressing particular issues as necessary. Interaction with staff during these presentations remains strong.

I continued the practice of meeting with ASIS heads of station and ASIO officers before they are posted. This allows me to remind them of the OIGIS’s functions and explore specific potential challenges raised by conditions at their post.

In the reporting period I was invited to address several leadership groups outside the intelligence agencies, including the Senior Executive Development Program of the Australian National University’s National Security College, the Attorney-General’s Department ‘Talking Heads’ Seminar, and the Australian Cyber Security Centre leadership group. In April 2014, I was part of a panel at the Law Society of NSW discussing Privacy in a Digital Age.

The Assistant Inspector-General, Jake Blight, presented once again to the Department of Defence Senior Intelligence Managers’ Course, and, in August 2013, to the Australian Research Council’s Centre of Excellence in Policing and Security.

Similar presentations are planned for the coming year.

Inquiries Under the IGIS Act, the IGIS can conduct a formal inquiry into a matter based on a complaint, of the IGIS’s own motion, or in response to a ministerial request. The Act establishes certain immunities and protections and provides for the use of strong coercive powers in such inquiries. These include the power to compel the production of information and documents, to enter premises occupied or used by a Commonwealth agency, to issue notices to persons to attend before the IGIS to answer questions relevant to the matter under inquiry, and to administer an oath or affirmation when taking evidence.

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PART T WO / PERFORMANCE

When coercive powers are used, the IGIS Act provides protections to people who have given the OIGIS information. Those compelled to give information are protected from any penalty under Commonwealth or Territory law that would ordinarily arise from disclosing that information.

The responsible minister is advised when the IGIS begins an inquiry into a particular agency, and is also advised of any conclusions or recommendations arising from the inquiry. The IGIS also provides opportunities for ministers, agency heads and affected individuals to comment during the course of an inquiry.

During 2013-14 I completed three inquiries that were carried over from the previous reporting period. Details of these are set out below. A new inquiry was initiated following on from one of these inquiries and remained open at the end of the reporting period. I will report on my conclusions and recommendations from this inquiry in my annual report for 2014-15.

Inquiry into the attendance of legal representatives at ASIO interviews

The 2012-13 Annual Report noted the progress of an inquiry following a complaint alleging ASIO officers had made arbitrary decisions regarding the attendance of legal representatives at security assessment interviews. My preliminary inquiries identified some inconsistencies between ASIO records and those of the complainant, as well as potential communication issues between ASIO and Immigration.2 Consequently, I decided to initiate an inquiry into the specific complaint, and to matters relating to ASIO interviews more broadly.

In conducting the inquiry, I considered a range of ASIO policy documents and records, including records of interviews other than those in the original complaint, and interviewed a number of ASIO staff. I also obtained statements from

2 A dministrative Arrangement Orders dated 18 September 2013 transferred the relevant functions of the former Department of Immigration and Citizenship to the Department of Immigration and Border Protection. This report uses the shortened form ‘Immigration’ to refer to both the current and former Departments.

several legal representatives who had attended, or attempted to attend, ASIO interviews with their clients.

I found that ASIO’s internal guidance was both sound and appropriate, and does not preclude the attendance of legal representatives at ASIO interviews. However, ASIO has discretion not to interview a person in the presence of a particular lawyer if it believes the presence of the lawyer would be counterproductive to the conduct of the interview. As such, I concluded that the attendance of legal representatives should be considered on a case-by-case basis, with the default position to allow such attendance.

I found that the attitudes of individual officers, combined with the process established by ASIO and Immigration to arrange interviews, strongly discouraged the attendance of legal representatives. In addition, ASIO differentiated between legal representatives and migration agents, precluding migration agents from attending interviews altogether.

This inquiry led to a number of recommendations. Specifically, ASIO should:

u work with Immigration to ensure

arrangements for visa security assessment interviews facilitate the attendance of legal representatives

u improve training in, and staff awareness

of, internal policy relating to the potential presence of lawyers at visa security assessment interviews

u clarify the status of any third party wishing to

attend a visa security assessment interview to ascertain if they are the interviewee’s legal representative, and further consider affording migration agents the same status as lawyers, with their attendance being addressed on a case-by-case basis

u improve guidance to officers in relation to

undertakings of confidentiality.

ASIO agreed to these four recommendations.

I also noted in the report that, in my view, visa applicants should be clearly advised that interviews with ASIO are voluntary. A fifth

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PART T WO / PERFORMANCE

Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security Annual Report 2013-14

recommendation was made to adjust the current guidance for staff. This recommendation and some supporting text was afforded a national security classification by ASIO and cannot be publicly released. ASIO agreed, in part, to this recommendation.

The inquiry report is classified but a public abridged version is available on the IGIS website.3

At the end of the reporting period ASIO provided advice about the implementation of the recommendations:

u In March 2014, after consultation between

ASIO and Immigration, the advice provided by Immigration to visa security assessment interviewees was revised to state that the interviewee is entitled to bring a legal representative.

u ASIO has updated guidance to staff,

training and policies relating to visa security assessment interviews. In particular, shortly after the end of the reporting period ASIO finalised a policy on visa security assessment interviews. Training and guidance to staff now reflect the policy position that visa security assessment interviews should commence without efforts to discourage the attendance of a legal representative.

u ASIO’s new policy and training requires

interviewing officers to clarify the role of a third party seeking to attend a visa security assessment interview to ascertain whether they are the interviewee’s legal representative. The presence of migration agents at a visa security assessment interview is considered on a case-by-case basis.

u Revised guidance about confidentiality

undertakings addresses the concerns raised in the inquiry.

Inquiry into the management of the case of Mr E

Last year I commenced an inquiry at the then Prime Minister’s request into the way that the Australian Federal Police (AFP), Immigration

3 www.igis.gov.au

and ASIO handled the case of a particular Egyptian asylum seeker, ’Mr E’, who presented complex security issues and, more generally, the management by Australian government agencies of complex security cases.

The purpose of the inquiry was not to establish whether the identified individual posed a threat to security but rather to look at whether the relevant agencies had, and followed, appropriate procedures to identify, assess and manage any such threat.

I completed this inquiry and provided the report to the Prime Minister in January 2014. The inquiry report is classified but a public abridged version is available on the IGIS website.4

The inquiry found that, although ASIO held information that might have caused it not to clear the individual for community detention, ASIO’s security assessment processes at that time did not include consideration of that information. Different areas of ASIO dealt with the potential match to alerts connected to the Interpol red notice and the community detention checks, and the two areas did not communicate effectively with one another.

Immigration lacked awareness of the types of security checks ASIO conducted and it is not clear that relevant ministers received advice about the rigour of the checks. Within ASIO, guidance provided to staff was inadequate. Operational staff misunderstood the intentions of ASIO’s senior executive and the process of checks conducted differed from that approved by the ASIO executive.

The inquiry found that Immigration made decisions on detention arrangements without a full appreciation of all relevant information. The AFP gave advice to Immigration over a period of time but there was no formal framework for such advice. Information held by separate parts of Immigration was not shared or interpreted consistently. ASIO provided no information to help Immigration assess or manage any detention risks.

The inquiry also found deficiencies in recordkeeping, particularly in Immigration. Key procedures and arrangements between

4 www.igis.gov.au

10 Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security Annual Report 2013-14

PART T WO / PERFORMANCE

Immigration and ASIO were not well documented. The report made a number of recommendations, primarily to Immigration. In summary these were:

u Immigration and ASIO should continue

to build on recent improvements in implementing a coordinated approach to resolving potential matches to national security alerts and document agreed procedures.

u Immigration should develop procedures to

ensure that the AFP is promptly notified of alerts for Interpol red notices. Immigration should continue to explore the feasibility of an automated system with the AFP.

u Immigration should access all relevant

information in assessing the identity of an individual in cases that may involve national security issues and formalise arrangements to obtain identity resolution advice from the AFP.

u Immigration should review its procedures

for conducting risk assessments in cases involving national security to ensure that those undertaking the assessment have access to relevant information and expertise, including from ASIO and the AFP.

u Immigration should ensure proper records are

retained of a decision to place a person in a particular form of immigration detention on the basis of security concerns.

u Immigration and ASIO should ensure that,

in the small number of cases where there are potentially national security issues, all relevant information is taken into account by Immigration when making immigration detention management decisions.

Significant changes were initiated in ASIO and Immigration prior to this case becoming a matter of public discussion. By the time this inquiry was finished, ASIO and Immigration had introduced considerably more robust security checking processes prior to community detention or the issue of bridging visas, and ASIO had published guidance for staff on how to do the checks and escalate and resolve concerns. Immigration had established a team to identify and oversight national security and serious criminality cases.

At the end of the reporting period the agencies advised me of their progress on implementing the inquiry recommendations.

Immigration advised that coordination and collaboration between the Department, ASIO and the AFP had improved significantly. I was provided with details of actions taken and a copy of the Persons of interest placement operational procedures document, which guides staff regarding the placement of detainees who are of interest to law enforcement, intelligence and/or other agencies for criminal or national security matters. This document was developed in response to the inquiry recommendations.

ASIO notes that it continues to advise Immigration on significant emerging threat issues through providing adverse security assessments and discussing impending assessments where this would assist Immigration’s decision making on detention issues. Where ASIO holds information potentially relevant to Immigration’s consideration of a person’s overall visa suitability, a qualified visa security assessment may be issued. I was provided with a procedural document relating to security assessments for IMAs for whom Immigration is considering the grant or re-grant of a bridging visa, or for those being placed in community detention. This will provide formal guidance for officers in both agencies for handling referrals which potentially match national security alerts.

The AFP advised that similar subsequent cases have seen the agency implement measures addressing the inquiry’s recommendations, including case management meetings to facilitate complete assessment and sharing of all available information among stakeholder agencies.

Overall, all three agencies have made sound progress to strengthen communication and information-sharing between the agencies. Internal policies and procedures have been developed and documented to address the deficiencies highlighted in the inquiry report.

Inquiries into the use of weapons and self-defence techniques in ASIS

In April 2013, I commenced an inquiry into the use of weapons and self-defence techniques in

11 Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security Annual Report 2013-14

PART T WO / PERFORMANCE ASIS. The inquiry was finalised in November 2013. The inquiry report is classified but an unclassified executive summary is available on the IGIS website.5

The inquiry noted that overall ASIS had managed the training in and use of weapons and self-defence techniques well. Two breaches of the ISA occurred between 2004 and mid-2013, both involving the discharge of a firearm without appropriate prior approval. However, both incidents occurred within controlled weapons training environments and were not indicative of systemic issues. (I note elsewhere in this report that in the 2013-14 reporting period there were three further, similar breaches of the ISA relating to the unauthorised use of a firearm.)

Two main concerns were identified by the 2013 inquiry. The first was in relation to delays in providing oleoresin capsicum spray and batons to some overseas Stations after this had been approved by the Minister on the basis that the weapons were necessary for the safety of staff. The inquiry found the delays were due primarily to the lack of central governance of weapons policy and procedures in ASIS.

The second concern related to the consumption of alcohol. ASIS policy at the time required that a person with a blood alcohol content above zero must not be issued with or have carriage of a weapon. The inquiry found some staff misunderstanding in relation to this requirement and that ASIS did not have adequate controls in place to provide assurance that there was compliance with this requirement.

Six recommendations were made as a result of the inquiry, most relating to the governance of weapons policy and procedures in ASIS. ASIS accepted all the recommendations and by the end of the reporting period most had been implemented. A number of the recommendations were waiting on the release of revised ASIS Guidelines for the use of weapons and self-defence techniques to be fully implemented. The most significant of these guidelines are in relation to the consumption of alcohol and controls to

5 www.igis.gov.au

ensure compliance. Shortly after the end of the reporting period revised Guidelines covering these issues were implemented.

In December 2013 a further more serious incident occurred overseas involving an allegedly inappropriate action by an officer of another Australian government agency towards an ASIS officer. A review of the incident confirmed that ASIS did not yet have adequate controls in place to provide assurance that a person with a blood alcohol content above zero would not be issued with or have carriage of a weapon. While no physical injury resulted, the incident had the potential to cause serious injury. ASIS’s investigation of the incident highlighted systemic issues. I was advised by the Director-General of ASIS that the investigation also revealed that there were inaccuracies in the information provided to me during the course of my 2013 inquiry. My review of the ASIS investigation report and interviews indicated other substantial discrepancies.

In June 2014, I initiated a further inquiry into the management of weapons by ASIS in that particular location to examine these issues and related matters and to review the findings of my 2013 inquiry report. Further details of the inquiry will be included in my 2014-15 annual report.

Complaints and contacts Complaints can be made orally or in writing on matters that relate to the legality and propriety of actions of an intelligence agency.

Each contact made to my office is assessed to determine whether it falls within the functions of my office and what is the most appropriate course of action. Where it is assessed that a complaint justifies further action, it will be handled administratively in the first instance. Since the introduction of the PID scheme, contacts are also assessed to determine whether they should be handled under that scheme.

In most cases complaints and other matters can be resolved quite quickly and efficiently by IGIS staff speaking to the relevant agency or looking at their records. This approach can resolve whether a particular matter is within jurisdiction and reduces

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the procedural burden of an inquiry when a simple discussion with an agency or a check of records can resolve the matter. Administrative resolution can allow for a timely response to be provided to the complainant. Information provided by agencies in this way can help decide whether to pursue an inquiry for more serious or complex matters.

Notwithstanding how a matter is handled, all persons contacting my office are advised of the actions of my office, and the outcomes, to the extent possible.

Complaints about security assessments for visa applicants

ASIO provides Commonwealth agencies with security assessments relevant to their functions and responsibilities. A visa application to travel to, or remain in, Australia may be referred to ASIO with a request to provide a security assessment. My office does not assess the merits of any particular security assessment, nor do we request a change in the priority of processing of cases, or request that any particular case be expedited. However, where visa applicants have reasonable concerns that an error may have occurred, we examine ASIO’s processes.

During 2013-14 we increased our focus on ASIO’s handling of visa security assessments because of the significant impact this can have on individuals. This increased focus was achieved through obtaining

direct access to ASIO’s systems as well as increased liaison with other government stakeholders including Immigration and the Commonwealth Ombudsman.

In cases where the visa application was lodged more than 12 months previously, we examined ASIO’s systems to determine whether or not the applicant had been referred to ASIO for a security assessment and, if so, reviewed ASIO’s handling of the matter. In each case, we looked at whether ASIO had acted unreasonably or had made a processing error.

My office does not ordinarily advise complainants that they have or have not been the subject of a security assessment by ASIO, unless this has already been confirmed to them by Immigration, or where we have found a significant issue of concern involving ASIO which would justify this office doing so. Where I am satisfied that there is no evidence of error by ASIO, my staff will advise complainants of that. While we identify few errors, where we do find ASIO has made an error, we request that the organisation rectify the matter. Where we find that no referral has been made, or that one has been made and finalised, my staff advise the complainant that there is currently no referral with ASIO. We are unable to provide complainants with specific information but indicate three possible explanations: there has been no referral, there has been a referral and it was not required, or there has been a referral and it has been finalised.

ASIO visa security assessment processes

During the reporting period we initiated a new process for investigating visa security assessment complaints. IGIS staff now interrogate ASIO’s systems directly for information relating to particular visa security assessments. This process has proven to be an effective way of integrating our complaint and inspection activities. As a result of this new process we identified progress had stalled for up to six months in a small number of visa assessments because they had not been reassigned following the departure of staff from the visa security assessments team. We raised this issue with ASIO, which subsequently reviewed and formalised procedures relating to the allocation of cases in accordance with priorities set by Immigration, and national security considerations.

During the reporting period we have noted improvements in systems, processes and recordkeeping within ASIO. For example, case officers are recording more detailed case notes and reasons for changes in priority and case assignment. My staff can also request information from Immigration, which has proven useful in verifying claims.

Despite the issues we identified, overall I am satisfied that ASIO visa security assessment processes have been appropriate.

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PART T WO / PERFORMANCE Commonwealth Ombudsman

The work of this office complements the work of the Commonwealth Ombudsman who has jurisdiction to investigate matters relating to Immigration. During the reporting period my staff increased engagement with their counterparts in the office of the Commonwealth Ombudsman. This engagement led to discussions of future collaboration and improvements in the flow of information between the two offices. We also refreshed our memorandum of understanding (MOU) with the Commonwealth Ombudsman and revised our online complaints form to allow complainants to consent to the direct transfer of complaints where appropriate.

Referrals from the Australian Human Rights Commission

The Australian Human Rights Commission is required to refer to the IGIS human rights and discrimination matters relating to an act or practice of intelligence and security agencies. In this reporting period the AHRC referred one case concerning ASIO delay in processing security assessments for immigration purposes. Our investigation revealed the individual concerned had not been referred to ASIO for a security assessment.

Other complaints (non visa-related)

The OIGIS registers as a complaint any approach from a member of the public that involves a credible allegation about illegality or impropriety in relation to an action by an intelligence agency. That is, there is a reasonable basis for the person believing that an intelligence agency or one of its employees has done something wrong.

I received seventeen non visa-related complaints in the reporting period. Thirteen complaints were about ASIO, while two related to ASIS and two to DSD. All seventeen complaints were resolved administratively.

Employment-related matters

The IGIS Act (ss. 8(5) and 8(7)) limits the capacity of the IGIS to investigate what might be regarded as individual employment-related grievances within the six intelligence agencies - essentially those relating to promotion, transfer or reduction, termination, discipline, remuneration or other terms and conditions of service.

When a complaint to the office relates to this type of grievance, our usual practice is to refer the matter, at least in the first instance, back to the agency concerned to be addressed through its internal grievance mechanisms or through procedures for reporting alleged breaches of the relevant Code of Conduct (where this is applicable).

The Code of Conduct provisions under the Public Service Act 1999 apply to employees of DIGO, DIO, DSD and ONA, while similar arrangements are separately established by determinations made under the ASIO Act and the ISA for employees of ASIO and ASIS respectively.

Seven of the seventeen non visa-related complaints (41%) were from current or former employees or agents of intelligence agencies — five were ASIO employees and two worked for ASIS. Complaint issues included the impending loss of a security clearance and consequent loss of employment, workplace culture, and failure to meet contractual obligations. In each case, we examined agency records and met with key personnel.

Investigations into payment of entitlements by ASIS

Two complaints about ASIS were from individuals whose arrangements with ASIS had been terminated. In both cases the individuals believed they had suffered detriment caused by ASIS, including financial detriment because entitlements had not been paid. After reviewing ASIS’s records — some stretching over many years — I was satisfied there was no evidence ASIS had not fulfilled its obligations and that the matters did not warrant further inquiry. These cases demonstrate the value of detailed and accurate records in resolving such claims.

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Six of the seventeen complaints received were about the conduct of an intelligence agency that was affecting the complainants’ employment in sensitive roles outside the intelligence agencies.

Four of these concerned ASIO delay in finalising security assessments for Aviation Security Identification Cards (ASIC) or Maritime Security Identification Cards (MSIC). These cards are issued by the Department of Infrastructure to identify persons who have met the minimum security requirements to work unescorted or unmonitored in a maritime or aviation security zone. A background check is undertaken by AusCheck, a unit of the Attorney-General’s Department, and includes checks by ASIO.

The four complaints received about such delays represent a very small fraction (0.002%) of ASIO’s annual workload of ASIC and MSIC security assessments, and I am generally satisfied with ASIO’s processing arrangements.

I have undertaken to continue to monitor the progress of complex MSIC and ASIC cases.

Other contacts with the office

We were also contacted by over 200 individuals who were seeking advice or expressing concern about matters affecting them that were assessed to be outside the jurisdiction of my office, or as lacking credibility.

In response, we provided written or verbal advice about the jurisdiction of the office and alternative avenues to pursue, including other complaint-handling bodies, the police and the National Security Hotline. In cases where there had been previous contact with my office about matters that had already been assessed, we took no further action.

Statistics on inquiries and complaint matters raised with my office can be found at Annex 1.

Public Interest Disclosure scheme

As mentioned earlier, the PID Act commenced on 15 January 2014. OIGIS has received a number of enquiries concerning the PID scheme, but by 30 June 2014 had received only one disclosure directly that fell within the scheme’s parameters.

This disclosure was made in April 2014 by a former intelligence agency employee who raised concerns about an officer in another Australian government agency. In this case, the OIGIS referred the matter to the agency in question for investigation.

OIGIS has been formally advised that six PID cases have been raised and allocated across the six intelligence agencies. Investigations were completed in four of these before the end of the reporting year 2013-14. Cases have mostly involved a range of personnel management matters. One case involved administrative deficiencies in the procurement of external services, and the agency concerned has advised that investigation of this disclosure identified useful refinements to administrative processes.

IGIS role in Freedom of Information and Archives matters The Freedom of Information Act 1982 (FOI Act) sets out various exemptions to the requirement for government agencies to provide documents. One of the exemptions applies to documents affecting national security, defence or international relations. Before deciding that a document is not exempt under this provision the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT) and the Information Commissioner are required to seek evidence from the IGIS. There are equivalent provisions in the Archives Act 1983 for the AAT.

In this reporting period I was called on twice by the Information Commissioner to give evidence in FOI matters. In one case I decided that the matter fell outside of my area of expertise and, on that basis, I declined to give evidence. In the other case I provided evidence on one aspect of the claim being made by the Commonwealth.

I was notified by the AAT of two new Archives cases where I may be required to give evidence. One case was carried over from the previous reporting period. In each of these three cases I undertook the lengthy process of examining documents and preparing evidence. In two of the cases I was ultimately not required to give evidence. In the other case, Fernandes and National Archives of Australia [2014] AATA 180

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PART T WO / PERFORMANCE (2 April 2014), I gave evidence about a number of documents. The Tribunal decided that two parts of one contested document could be released; that decision has been appealed to the Federal Court.

The number of cases referred to me by the Information Commissioner and the AAT is similar to the previous reporting period; however, the size and complexity of the AAT cases meant that more office resources were devoted to the preparation of evidence in 2013-14.

Numbers and trends

Inquiries

During the reporting period, three inquiries that had been carried over were concluded and one inquiry was initiated. This compares to five inquiries initiated in 2012-13.6

Complaints

As noted above, we consider a matter to be a ‘complaint’ if it concerns a credible allegation about illegality or impropriety in relation to an action of an intelligence agency.

With approaches to the office about non visa-related matters, a straightforward judgement is normally sufficient to determine whether or not the issues raised reach the threshold to be considered as a complaint.

For approaches about visa-related security assessments, we also consider the length of time ASIO has had to respond to a request for a security assessment before determining whether the matter should be treated as a complaint or a contact. Specifically, we consider whether the visa application was submitted more than twelve months earlier or, where an individual has previously approached the office, whether six months have passed since previous inquiries were made. Approaches about visa-related security

6 T he IGIS 2012-13 Annual Report counted complaints resolved through making inquiries of an agency head but without the use of any formal powers as a ‘preliminary inquiry’. This is a potentially misleading use of the word ‘inquiry’ — which in the IGIS Act is reserved for Division 3 inquiries. These complaints are now included in statistics as complaints handled administratively.

assessments that do not meet these criteria are described as ‘contacts’ (see below).

In 2013-14, IGIS received a total of 504 complaints, of which 487 were about visa-related security assessments and 17 were non visa-related (see also Annex 1 Table1.2).

In 2012-13, IGIS received a total of 375 complaints, of which 361 were about visa-related security assessments and 14 concerned non visa-related matters.

In 2011-12 we received a total of 439 complaints comprising 430 complaints about visa-related security assessments, and 9 non visa-related matters that were treated as complaints.

Complaints about security assessments for visa applicants

The 487 visa security assessment related complaints received in 2013-14 came from a wide variety of individuals. The following table shows a breakdown of visa complaints actioned by my office, by visa type.

2013-14 Complaints by visa type

Visa type Number Percentage

Study 1 0.2

Refugee & humanitarian

12 2.5

IMA 46 9.5

Family 101 20.8

Skilled, business and work 327 67.0

The largest number of complaints came from individuals seeking skilled business and work visas, or family reunion visas. Complaints from irregular maritime arrivals (IMAs) comprised 9.5 per cent of complaints actioned by my office.

Visa-related security assessment complaints have consistently represented 96-98 per cent of all complaints made to IGIS since 2011-12.

The number of complaints about visa-related security assessments has varied but the sample size is small and the number of complaints can depend on unpredictable external factors. If a few

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migration agents decide to refer all of their clients to our office this will cause a surge in the number of recorded complaints. And changes in the intake of irregular arrivals in one year may affect the number of complaints to our office 12 months later.

No readily discernible factors drove the increased number of visa-related security assessment complaints to my office in 2013-14 compared to the previous reporting period, and I do not regard the year-on-year increase as being statistically relevant or a cause for undue concern.

Although the majority of complaints to our office concern visa-related security assessments, we spend more time per complaint processing non visa-related complaints. This is because visa-related security assessments are predominantly focused on issues of timeliness, while other complaints to our office can and do cover the full range of agency activities which may require more extensive investigation.

Despite this, during the 2013-14 reporting period my office made a number of refinements to our inspection activities in regards to visa security assessment complaints, with a view to improving our understanding of the visa application process at both Immigration and ASIO and focusing on areas of potential concern based on any trends which emerge from our complaints-handling function.

Other complaints (non visa-related)

I received 17 non visa-related complaints in the reporting period. This is comparable to the 14 complaints received in 2012-13. Thirteen complaints in this reporting period were about ASIO, while two related to ASIS and two to DSD. All 17 complaints were resolved administratively.

Contacts

In addition to dealing with complaints, we also respond to people who raise issues we regard as ‘contacts’ rather than complaints.

These contacts are approaches made to the IGIS which fall outside of the jurisdiction of the office, fall outside of the timelines described above for visa-related security assessments, or do not raise serious and credible concerns about

the intelligence agencies. Contacts are handled administratively rather than by means of inquiry or investigation.

Although we maintain a record of all persons who contact our office, figures for the number of contacts we receive are inexact as not all contacts by all persons are recorded due to the administrative burden involved in doing so (for example, some individuals send repeated emails or faxes, or make repeated phone calls to the office).

We received contacts from approximately 200 individuals during the reporting period, all of which we responded to administratively. This is similar to the number of individuals who contacted our office in the previous two reporting periods. No obvious trends are discernible from this data other than that a number of individuals continue to seek reassurance that they are not being targeted by the intelligence community.

Public interest disclosures

As noted above, one PID disclosure was directly received and handled in the reporting period. Six PID complaints were notified to the office as having been received by the intelligence agencies.

Timeliness Three inquiries were completed during the year. The complexity of the subject matter and the individual circumstances of each inquiry were factors affecting timeliness. The duration of these inquiries ranged from 228 days for an inquiry into ASIS’s use of weapons, to 280 days for an inquiry into the actions and interactions of three Commonwealth agencies in the management of an irregular maritime arrival case (see Annex 1 Table 1.1).

The IGIS Act has prescriptive and comprehensive procedural fairness requirements allowing individuals, agency heads and ministers the opportunity to comment on or discuss a report’s findings before the report is finalised. This can add some months to an inquiry. For example, the inquiry into the management of the case of the Egyptian IMA involving ASIO, the AFP and Immigration commenced in June 2013, initial documents were obtained in July, interviews

17 Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security Annual Report 2013-14

PART T WO / PERFORMANCE were largely conducted in August, the report was largely drafted in September and preliminary views provided to agency heads in early October. Following consideration of further submissions and additional documents that were provided, the proposed report was provided to ministers at the end of November inviting them to meet to discuss the report. Following these meetings the final report was provided to the Prime Minister at the end of January.

Complaints of all types were assessed promptly and initial responses were made within two weeks of receipt in all cases, with the average time taken to acknowledge a complaint being two days. Of complaints about visa security assessments that were handled administratively, 88.5 per cent were completed within two weeks of the complaint being received, with the average time taken

being nine days. For other complaints, 35 per cent were completed within two weeks of the complaint being received, with the average time taken being 55 days. These variations in timeliness reflect differences in the nature of the complaint, with common themes arising in many complaints about visa security assessments compared to the diversity of complex issues that can arise in other complaints.

Effecting change in agencies Where an inquiry makes recommendations, we ask agencies to indicate whether they accept these recommendations. Where appropriate, we also follow up at the end of the reporting period the progress of outstanding recommendations, including those from previous years. I am pleased with the agencies’ high level of acceptance

Implementation of recommendations — Analytic independence inquiry of 2012-13

In 2012-13, I conducted an inquiry into the analytic independence of the assessment activities of ASIO, DIO and ONA. While there was no evidence of inappropriate pressure being placed on any of the agencies, the inquiry recommended a number of improvements to policies, procedures and training in ASIO and DIO so that those agencies could consistently demonstrate their assessments are free from interference or bias.

That inquiry recommended DIO and ASIO implement policies to improve the consistency of referencing and recordkeeping in regard to analytical product. The review also identified that ASIO and DIO did not conduct formal reviews of key judgments to see whether there were any lessons that could be learnt from previous analytic work and did not have written policies relating to the management of dissent.

In early 2014, I conducted a review of DIO’s implementation of the inquiry’s recommendations. This review found that DIO has implemented new policies regarding referencing and recordkeeping. My staff inspected a large sample of DIO’s analytic product issued in 2013-14 and found substantial improvements in the use and quality of references. This review also found improvements in the consistency of recordkeeping in product development.

DIO is developing a new intelligence production IT system. Technical problems with the new system have required DIO to delay its introduction until later in 2014. We have looked at the initial functionality of this system and agree with DIO that it is likely to make a sound contribution to further improving DIO’s referencing and recordkeeping.

This review also found DIO had implemented new policies regarding key judgment reviews and dissent management. OIGIS staff attended a key judgments review session and found the process productive and robust. DIO had not experienced a major case of dissent under the new dissent management policy, but this review found the policy was likely to be effective.

In mid-2014, I initiated a similar review of ASIO’s implementation of the 2012 inquiry’s recommendations. This review is expected to be completed by late 2014.

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and implementation of my recommendations. The actions taken by the agencies in respect of inquiries completed in the reporting period are described further in the section on inquiries commencing on page 7.

Our inspection and complaint activities also provide opportunities for the office to effect change in the intelligence agencies. Any issues that we identify through inspections and complaints are raised with the agency concerned and, as a result, we have seen a number of changes in agency processes. Some of these changes are described in our highlight stories and elsewhere in this report.

Inspections

Overview of inspection activities

The office regularly examines selected agency records to ensure that the activities of the intelligence agencies comply with the relevant legislative and policy frameworks and to identify issues before there is a need for major remedial action.

These inspections largely focus on the activities of ASIO, ASIS, DIGO and DSD given each of these agencies has access to intrusive powers and investigative techniques.

During 2013-14, inspection teams responsible for oversighting ASIO, ASIS, DIGO and DSD continued to coordinate closely to identify areas of high compliance risk. Inspection activities focused on the management of joint ministerial authorisations made under the ISA, special powers warrants issued to ASIO, information sharing between agencies, systems for communicating information requests between agencies, and recordkeeping.

Inspection activities relating to DIO and ONA are generally limited to ensuring that their assessments comply with administrative privacy guidelines (which have a similar effect to the privacy rules applying to ASIS, DSD and DIGO).

Inspection activities consider whether or not each agency is acting in accordance with its statutory functions, any guidance provided by

the responsible minister, and its own internal policies and procedures.

In the reporting period the relatively high inquiry workload resulted in prioritisation of inspections work based on a risk management approach. The oversight of ASIO, ASIS and DSD was maintained but fewer resources were allocated to DIGO, DIO and ONA.

Inspection of ASIO activities

The ASIO Act empowers ASIO to obtain, correlate and evaluate intelligence information relevant to security. ASIO’s activities are governed by the ASIO Act as well as the Attorney-General’s Guidelines and internal policies and procedures. The Attorney-General’s Guidelines require that any means used by ASIO to obtain information must be proportionate to the gravity of the threat and the probability of its occurrence, and inquiries and investigations into individuals or groups should be undertaken using as little intrusion into individual privacy as is possible consistent with the performance of ASIO’s functions. Where such intrusions are unavoidable, the distribution of any information obtained should be limited to persons or agencies with a demonstrable ‘need to know’.

Human source management

This inspection activity focuses on ensuring the management of ASIO human source operations is both legal and proper. While the details of these inspections are sensitive and cannot be disclosed in a public report, we noted that there was considerable improvement in both recordkeeping and compliance with internal ASIO guidelines during 2013-14 in relation to the management of human sources.

Review of submissions to the Attorney-General

Each quarter my office reviews a range of submissions made by ASIO to the Attorney-General on operational matters. In addition to the other ASIO inspection activities, these reviews are proving useful in obtaining an overview of legality and propriety issues relevant to high risk activities.

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PART T WO / PERFORMANCE Regular inspection of investigative cases

Each month my staff review a sample of ASIO investigative cases to examine:

u the justification and objectives provided for

the investigation

u whether the investigative activities that were

undertaken or proposed were appropriate

u whether investigations were subject to formal

approval and periodic review

u the application of the principle of

proportionality (using less intrusive methods where possible and only progressing to more intrusive methods as required)

u compliance with internal policies and

procedures.

Our sample selection is oriented to those cases utilising more intrusive investigative methods — for example, cases with warrants approved by the Attorney-General, access to sensitive financial information or prospective data authorisations.

During the reporting period my office sought advice from ASIO on the adequacy of their internal approval procedures for accessing sensitive information from government and non-government agencies. ASIO has advised this issue will be considered in a comprehensive review of their policies and procedures which has recently commenced, and I will be monitoring its progress in this regard.

In one case it was noted that ASIO had provided assistance to a law enforcement agency in response to a request, although that request had not been made by the head of that agency as required under section 19A(2) of the ASIO Act.

Another ongoing focus of my inspections has been to ensure a high standard of recordkeeping and decision making is maintained, particularly that appropriate guidance is provided by authorising officers to more junior staff.

My staff continue to work with ASIO to ensure that the inspection process can provide direct and meaningful feedback to ASIO investigative staff in a timely manner.

ASIO warrants

ASIO can intercept telecommunications and use other intrusive powers following the issue of warrants by the Attorney-General. The authority for telecommunications intercepts is provided by the Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act 1979 (TIA Act). The ASIO Act authorises other powers including the use of listening devices, searches and computer access.

In 2013-14 we reviewed approximately half of the warrants obtained by ASIO. These inspections occur after the Attorney-General has authorised the warrant and usually after ASIO has completed the operation and reported back to the Attorney-General.

During 2013-14 our inspection program identified four errors in ASIO’s execution of warrant powers, each of which constituted a breach of either the ASIO Act or the TIA Act. I also identified a very small number of minor administrative errors, including typographical errors. In all these cases I was satisfied that these administrative errors did not impact on the legality or propriety of the warrant, and that appropriate remedial actions were taken.

u My office identified one breach under the

ASIO Act relating to delay by ASIO in revoking a warrant. The ASIO Act requires ASIO to inform the minister ‘forthwith’ once the grounds on which the warrant was issued cease to exist. For the warrant in question there was a considerable delay in providing the relevant notification to the Attorney-General. ASIO consulted us about an appropriate timeframe for notifying the Attorney-General, and a new policy was developed to ensure ASIO meets its legislative obligation.

u Three breaches under the TIA Act were

identified by my office across the reporting period. Two of these incidents were not within ASIO’s control but were the result of information from a carrier which later proved to be incorrect. The third incident involved ASIO’s failure to comply with section 17 of the TIA Act to address the usefulness of warrant activity in a formal report to the Attorney-General.

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ASIO continued to self-report proactively during the reporting period. In addition to the breaches identified by my office, ASIO reported three breaches of the TIA Act, and two breaches of the ASIO Act.

u In the first breach of the TIA Act, ASIO

intercepted, without warrant, calls made from one of its own regional offices due to a technical error. The data was deleted and processes put in place to ensure it does not happen again.

u The second breach of the TIA Act occurred

when a notice to cease collection sent to a telecommunications provider was mis-recorded by the provider and was subsequently renewed. ASIO identified the error within 24 hours and quarantined and deleted the data before it could be accessed by staff.

u The third breach of the TIA Act reported by

ASIO dates back to the previous reporting period, and involved the malfunctioning of a telecommunications provider’s equipment which resulted in non-warranted data being forwarded to ASIO systems. Once the error was identified, ASIO removed all non-warranted data from its systems.

u In the first breach of the ASIO Act, ASIO

reported that an incorrectly configured device collected data that was not covered by a warrant over a period of several months. All non-warranted data was deleted.

u The second breach of the ASIO Act occurred

due to an internal administrative error when collection of a listening device continued for seven days after the warrant was revoked by the Attorney-General. None of the non-warranted data was accessed by ASIO staff, and the data was subsequently removed from ASIO’s systems.

While I am generally satisfied by the overall manner in which warrants are processed I did identify some additional issues which merit comment.

As noted in previous annual reports, I have a particular interest in ASIO’s use of B-Party warrants

because of the potential for intrusive collection of material that is not relevant to security. In 2013-14 there was a modest increase in the use of such warrants following a decrease the previous year. This increase was due to a growth in the number of Australians involved in foreign conflicts. Most of these warrants are reviewed by my office. I am currently consulting with the Attorney-General’s Department about ASIO’s interpretation of the provisions in the TIA that restrict the availability of B-party warrants.

During the reporting period my staff were briefed on ASIO’s management of the process of providing a formal report to the Attorney-General on warrants, a requirement under both the ASIO Act and the TIA Act. The reporting regime is generally quite robust, with a number of internal and external oversight mechanisms operating to ensure ASIO complies with its legislative requirements. One area identified for additional focus is the consistency and accuracy of reporting over long-running warrants that are periodically renewed. It is my intention to conduct a ‘whole of life’ review of a number of long-running and complex warrants and I expect to be able to report on this activity in the next reporting period.

Questioning and detention warrants

No questioning, or questioning and detention warrants were sought by, or issued to, ASIO during the reporting period.

ASIO access to telecommunications locational information or subscriber data

The TIA Act provides the legal authority for a nominated group of ASIO senior managers to authorise collection of prospective and historical telecommunications data from telecommunications carriers or carriage service providers. Prospective data authorisations provide near real-time location and other subscriber information for the period that an authorisation is in force. The threshold that ASIO is required to meet is that access to the data is in connection with the performance by ASIO of its functions. In addition, the Attorney-General’s Guidelines state that investigative activities should use as little intrusion into

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PART T WO / PERFORMANCE personal privacy as is possible, consistent with the performance of ASIO’s functions. A request for access to telecommunications data should only be submitted once less intrusive methods have been attempted, or considered and found to be insufficient. Similarly, the Attorney-General’s Guidelines state that authorisation levels for activities should be higher for more intrusive investigative techniques.

ASIO’s access to prospective telecommunications data is reviewed as part of our regular inspection program. Due to their intrusive nature, access to prospective and historical telecommunications data are reviewed in a similar manner to telecommunications warrants.

I did not identify any concerns with ASIO’s access to prospective and historic telecommunications data. My office’s oversight of this particular investigative technique decreased during this reporting period due primarily to changes in our inspection program and the high rate of compliance in this area.

I am satisfied that prospective data authorisations reviewed were endorsed by an appropriate senior officer, and that ASIO has regard to the Attorney-General’s Guidelines and is meeting the legislative requirement to only make requests for data in connection with the performance of its functions.

Preservation requests

The Cybercrime Legislation Amendment Act 2012 came into effect in late 2012. This Act amended the TIA Act to provide a new power for ASIO and law enforcement agencies to give notice to telecommunications carriers to require them to retain certain stored communications for up to 90 days while ASIO seeks an appropriate warrant to access those communications. These notices are called Preservation Notices.

While the new legislation refers to both domestic and foreign preservation notices, only domestic notices are relevant to ASIO. These notices can only be used where they ‘might assist the Organisation in carrying out its functions of obtaining intelligence relating to security’.

Section 158A of the TIA Act specifically provides that the IGIS has functions in relation to providing

assurance of compliance by ASIO in respect of preservation notices.

Throughout the reporting period there was a very small number of such notices raised by ASIO. These activities were reviewed as part of our ongoing inspection program and there were no issues of concern identified in relation to those reviewed.

Access to taxation information

The Taxation Administration Act 1953 (s.355-70; Schedule 1) provides for a taxation officer authorised by the Commissioner of Taxation or delegate to disclose protected information to an authorised ASIO officer if the information is relevant to the performance of ASIO’s functions.

This access to sensitive information is further governed by an MOU between the Commissioner of Taxation and the Director-General of Security, the Attorney-General’s Guidelines and ASIO’s internal guidelines and procedures, ensuring that a request for taxation information can only be made when less intrusive means have been exhausted and not yielded the required information.

ASIO rarely requests access to this type of information. My office reviews all of ASIO’s access to sensitive financial information, including:

u ASIO requests for information from the ATO

u spontaneous disseminations from the

ATO to ASIO

u disseminations of information from ASIO to

a law enforcement agency.

ASIO reported that no requests had been made to access ATO information in 2013-14.

Exchange of information with foreign liaisons

The ASIO Act provides the authority for ASIO to seek information from, and provide information to, authorities in other countries that is relevant to Australia’s security, or the security of the foreign country. ASIO may only cooperate with foreign authorities approved by the Attorney-General. In general, the types of foreign authorities approved by the Attorney-General perform broadly

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similar functions to ASIO, and include security and intelligence authorities, law enforcement, immigration and border control, and government coordination bodies.

ASIO has internal guidelines that govern the communication of information on Australians and foreign nationals to approved foreign authorities. These guidelines impose an internal framework for assessing and approving the passage of such information. ASIO’s internal requirements vary according to the country, based on factors such as ASIO’s previous experience dealing with their authorities and how the foreign authorities manage information received, including in relation to human rights issues.

During 2013-14, my office inspected a sample of authorisation documentation and correspondence for such exchanges, both through regular reviews

of ASIO investigative cases and through dedicated foreign liaison inspection activities.

My office identified one instance when ASIO communicated information on Australian persons to a non-approved foreign authority responsible for issuing passports for that country. The case raised complex legal issues and at the end of the reporting period I had not formed a final view on whether approval from the Attorney-General was strictly legally required; however, my view is that at least as a matter of propriety and compliance with the intention of the restrictions the matter should have gone to the Attorney-General.

Inspections by my office have also identified cases where ASIO could improve compliance with internal guidelines, particularly in relation to documenting human rights considerations. I continue to raise these matters with ASIO.

Access to ASIO’s information holdings by staff

Our inspection program includes the regular review of investigative authorities generated by ASIO for its own internal security purposes.

In one case I questioned whether the justification given for the internal security investigation was sufficient or reasonable, having regard to all of the circumstances. In particular I questioned whether it was appropriate for personal information about a member of the public to be passed to an ASIO officer who had expressed concerns that the individual might pose a risk to the officer’s own personal safety.

I was advised at the time that all ASIO staff members could access some ASIO holdings to perform checks on individuals, including neighbours and social contacts that might relate to personal security or safety. I expressed concern that ASIO did not have formal processes in place to ensure that personal information in ASIO’s holdings about a member of the public could not be released to a staff member or accessed directly by the staff member. In my view, this is out of step with community expectations in respect of privacy.

In response to the concerns I raised, in June 2014 ASIO implemented a new security policy for the use of information holdings within ASIO. The policy emphasises that information holdings within ASIO are only for official purposes and that ASIO staff are not to access ASIO information holdings to obtain information which may be relevant to their personal circumstances. Staff with security concerns should raise this with the relevant area within ASIO, which will conduct the necessary checks.

In my view this is a significant improvement in privacy protection that occurred as a result of concerns raised by this office. I will be monitoring the implementation of this new policy and have requested that ASIO provide details of any post-implementation audits.

23 Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security Annual Report 2013-14

PART T WO / PERFORMANCE Inspection of agencies subject to the Intelligence Services Act 2001

Limits on intelligence agencies’ functions

There was media interest in the reporting period about the extent to which the OIGIS could effectively assess whether intelligence agencies act within their functions or otherwise undertake what could generally be regarded as commercial espionage.

The functions of the ISA agencies are set out in sections 6, 6B and 7 of the ISA. For example, for ASIS the most relevant functions are to obtain in accordance with the Government’s requirements, intelligence about the capabilities, intentions of activities of people or organisations outside Australia; and to communicate in accordance with the Government’s requirements, such intelligence. The work of ASIS, DSD and DIGO is guided by the national intelligence priorities, which are reviewed and agreed by the National Security Committee of Cabinet each year.

The ISA also requires that ASIS, DSD and DIGO only perform their functions in the interests of Australia’s national security, Australia’s foreign relations or Australia’s national economic well-being and only to the extent that those matters are affected by the capabilities, intentions or activities of people or organisations outside Australia.

While I do not conduct particular inspections to determine whether agencies’ activities comply with the limits of their functions, we are always mindful of this fundamental question as the case study on page 25 demonstrates. In most cases it is clear how particular intelligence products relate to the national intelligence priorities.

Ministerial authorisations

Any activity to produce intelligence on an Australian person by Australia’s foreign intelligence collection agencies requires ministerial authorisation. Ministers may also direct that other activities require prior ministerial approval. In the case of Australian persons who are, or are likely to be, involved in activities that pose a

threat to security, the approval of the Attorney-General must also be obtained. In DIGO’s case, any intelligence collected over Australian territory requires authorisation by the head of the agency.

Privacy rules

Section 15 of the ISA provides that the ministers responsible for ASIS, DSD and DIGO must make written rules to regulate the communication and retention of intelligence information concerning Australian persons (privacy rules). The term ‘Australian person’ generally includes citizens, permanent residents and certain companies. These rules regulate the agencies’ communication of intelligence information concerning Australian persons to other Australian agencies and to foreign authorities, including to Australia’s closest intelligence partners. (Communication to foreign authorities is also subject to additional requirements.)

Privacy rules require that agencies may only retain or communicate information about an Australian person where it is necessary to do so for the proper performance of each agency’s legislatively mandated functions, or where the retention or communication is required under another Act.

If a breach of an agency’s privacy rules is identified, the agency in question must advise my office of the incident, and the measures taken by the agency to protect the privacy of the Australian person, or Australian persons more generally. Adherence to this reporting requirement provides me with sufficient information upon which to decide whether appropriate remedial action has been taken, or further investigation and reporting back to my office is required.

The presumption of nationality

The privacy rules require that ASIS, DSD and DIGO are to presume that a person located in Australia is an Australian person, and that a person who is located outside of Australia is not an Australian person unless there is evidence to the contrary.

An agency may later overturn an initial presumption of nationality, for example:

u New information or evidence may indicate

that a person overseas is an Australian person.

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If it was not reasonable for this information to have been known and considered at the time the initial assessment was made then the presumption of nationality could be overturned but there would have been no breach of the privacy rules.

u The agency may discover that it was already

in possession of evidence that indicated that a person was an Australian person that should have been considered in the initial assessment, or another Australian agency might have possessed that information. In this case the presumption of nationality would be overturned but, if intelligence information had already been communicated about the Australian person, there could have been a breach of the privacy rules.

If the agency made a reasonable assessment of the nationality status of that person, based on all information which was available at the time, there is no breach of the privacy rules but the case must still be reported to me.

Where a presumption of nationality is later found to be incorrect ASIS, DSD and DIGO must advise my office of this and the measures taken to protect the privacy of the Australian concerned.

Inspection of ASIS activities

Ministerial authorisations

There was a significant improvement in ASIS’s compliance with ministerial authorisation requirements during late 2013, compared to 2012-13 when a number of issues had been identified; however, a number of breaches of the ISA in relation to ministerial authorisations occurred in the first half of 2014.

In April 2014 ASIS advised my office of a breach where an ASIS officer collected information by searching the personal property of an Australian person without ministerial authorisation.

Section 10A of the ISA requires the Director-General of ASIS to report to the Minister for Foreign Affairs on the authorised activities within three months of the day on which the relevant

authorisation ceased to have effect. There were three breaches of section 10A of the ISA:

u an inspection by my office identified one

occasion where a report on an authorisation that had expired had been submitted outside the three month period

u ASIS advised my office of two occasions when

ASIS failed to submit a report within three months of the authorisations ceasing to have effect.

My staff also identified one occasion where ASIS failed to inform the minister when the grounds on which an authorisation was issued ceased to exist as required by s.10(2A) of the ISA.

Protecting the privacy of Australian persons

We meet with ASIS staff every two months to discuss compliance with privacy rules and undertake inspections of ASIS’s dissemination of information about Australian persons.

In 2013-14 ASIS reported eight occasions where the presumption of nationality was overturned; that is, information came to light that an individual was actually an Australian person and the privacy rules were applied retrospectively to reporting. On more than one of these occasions there was initial inconsistency between the views of ASIS and DSD on whether a person was an Australian person. I have advised all agencies that it is important that agencies take a consistent approach to the presumption of nationality, to avoid a situation where agencies draw separate conclusions as to the nationality of a particular individual. In seven of these cases the initial presumption of nationality had been reasonable and there was no breach of the privacy rules.

In one instance ASIS had been aware that the person was Australian but this had not been well documented or communicated. This was a breach of the privacy rules. It was subsequently found that there was also a breach of the requirement that ASIS only communicate intelligence in accordance with government requirements and the requirement for ministerial authorisation before taking action to produce intelligence on an Australian person. There is further information on this case below.

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ASIS reported two breaches because the privacy rules were not applied to reporting on a person known to be an Australian person. Inspections by my office identified an additional two breaches where the privacy rules had not been applied. ASIS subsequently amended all four reports and applied the privacy rules retrospectively.

Review of operational files

ASIS activities often involve the use of human sources and ASIS officers are deployed in many countries to support a wide range of activities including counter-terrorism, efforts against people smuggling and support to military operations. These activities are often high-risk and sensitive.

During the reporting period, we reviewed files relating to operational activities in a diverse range of countries where ASIS has a presence.

While the sensitive nature of ASIS’s operational activities means that I cannot specifically detail the nature and range of issues arising from these inspections in a public report, I can advise that these reviews are thorough and rigorous and something in which I take a keen personal interest. No significant issues were raised during the reporting period as a result of these inspections.

CASE STUDY — a breach of the privacy rules and the ISA

In August 2013 ASIS advised me that a March 2013 report had failed to take account of the fact that the individual concerned was an Australian citizen (with dual nationality) and thus the communication breached the privacy rules. At the time, the notification was limited to advice about the communication of intelligence. There was no notification about the collection of intelligence.

When ASIS provided further information about the case in March 2014 I raised concerns as to whether:

u the collection and passage of information in relation to this individual had adhered to

the ISA’s ‘requirement that intelligence only be communicated in accordance with the Government’s requirements’ (s.6(1)(b))

u there had been unauthorised collection against the individual breaching the ISA’s

requirement that ASIS ‘obtain ministerial authorisation before undertaking any activity to produce intelligence on an Australian person’ (s.8) after ASIS first became aware of the individual’s dual nationality in July 2012.

ASIS investigated the case further. I received a copy of the final report from the Director-General in June 2014, which confirmed there had been a breach of both section 6(1)(b) and section 8 of the ISA, as well as a breach of the privacy rules. The Director-General directed that remedial action include:

u further checks to determine whether there had been any other breaches of section 6(1)(b)

u updated guidelines, training and advice to staff on the issue, including on the requirement

for ministerial authorisations for Australian persons

u a review of systems, processes and procedures relating to the application of privacy rules

u a code of conduct and other investigations as necessary to determine appropriate action in

relation to the individuals responsible for the breaches.

I will monitor the implementation of these actions.

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Authorisations relating to the use of weapons

Schedule 2 of the ISA requires the Director-General of ASIS to provide the IGIS with:

u copies of all approvals issued by the Minister

for Foreign Affairs in respect of the provision of weapons and the training in and use of weapons and self-defence techniques in ASIS

u a written report if a staff member or agent

of ASIS discharges a weapon other than in training.

This reporting requirement was met during 2013-14 and I am satisfied that the need for limited numbers of ASIS staff to have access to weapons for self-defence in order to perform their duties is genuine. I am also satisfied that appropriate controls are in place to limit the circumstances in which weapons may be used for self-defence.

An inspection of records relating to the provision by ASIS of training in the use of self-defence techniques and weapons was conducted in May 2014. It was apparent that governance and recordkeeping improvements implemented in the previous reporting period were proving effective.

The May 2014 inspection confirmed one breach of the ISA, where an ASIS officer who had not been approved for training in or the use of weapons discharged a firearm in a skills maintenance session in March 2014. This incident had already been brought to my attention by ASIS. ASIS reported a further two breaches of the ISA relating to the unapproved use of weapons by ASIS officers during the reporting period: one at a skills maintenance session in September 2013 and one at a firing range in December 2013.

Inspection of DSD activities

OIGIS staff members have access to and ongoing visibility of DSD’s activities. We undertake regular inspections on a range of DSD activities, with a particular focus on the privacy of Australians. More generally, staff may inspect any activity undertaken by DSD, with regard to legality

and propriety, and whether the activities are consistent with human rights. The legality of any DSD activity is assessed by reference to whether the purpose was consistent with a function of DSD, whether it was within the limits set out in the relevant legislation, and whether the activity had an appropriate level of approval.

DSD can only cooperate with an authority of another country to the extent authorised by the Minister for Defence. These authorising instruments are reviewed by my office.

Ministerial authorisations

During 2013-14, OIGIS staff continued to review all ministerial authorisations presented to the Minister for Defence. Overall, I observed a high level of compliance with authorisations and relevant directions issued to DSD by the minister.

Throughout 2013-14, I continued to monitor records of intelligence collection activities undertaken by DSD under ministerial authorisations. Following the implementation of a number of improved governance and administrative arrangements in DSD in mid-2013, I observed a significant improvement in the agency’s ability to self-identify and appropriately respond to compliance risks during the reporting period.

We also conducted a small number of non-routine spot checks and inspection projects to assess how DSD deals with targets where there is a higher than usual compliance risk. These inspections demonstrated a high level of understanding by DSD staff of legislative requirements and thresholds for undertaking activities under the ISA and the ASIO Act.

In August 2013, I completed a review of an incident which came to my attention in mid-2013, involving a breach of the ISA where intelligence targeting occurred for several days after DSD had determined the target to be an Australian person. While I found no evidence of intentional wrongdoing, my review highlighted a number of compliance concerns in relation to the event and DSD’s handling of the matter.

27 Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security Annual Report 2013-14

PART T WO / PERFORMANCE DSD subsequently initiated an investigation into the incident and identified a number of areas for improvement in its internal policy framework and procedures. DSD has kept my office informed of progress on the implementation of revised procedures, and I am satisfied that action taken in response to my original concerns is appropriate.

In January 2014, DSD separately provided to me their final report on a breach of the ISA which occurred during October 2013, where incomplete records had resulted in DSD conducting intelligence collection activity on a person known to be Australian.

During the reporting period I continued to inspect cancellations of ministerial authorisations and non-renewal reports to the Minister for Defence under sections 10 and 10A of the ISA. In September 2013, as part of our regular inspection of DSD activities, I asked DSD to confirm that intelligence collection against several subjects had ceased (as had been advised by DSD to the Minister for Defence). DSD advised that collection against one subject had continued for several months beyond the expiry of the ministerial authorisation, in breach of the requirements specified in the ISA.

This finding in September 2013 contributed to a decision by DSD to consider its quality assurance processes for managing specific types of ministerial authorisations. In late 2013, DSD initiated a thorough retrospective analysis of cancelled or expired ministerial authorisations. This review is discussed below under Legacy incidents: review of ministerial authorisation cancellations and non-renewals. Protecting the privacy of Australians

In accordance with their obligations, DSD continued to report to me cases where a presumption of nationality had later been found to be incorrect, and the measures taken to protect the privacy of the Australian person. I found the actions taken by DSD in response to incorrect presumptions of nationality occurring during the reporting period, including the timely

notification to other intelligence agencies, to be generally appropriate.

In two cases there were breaches of the privacy rules as the presumption of nationality was not applied reasonably by DSD. In both cases, intelligence collection activity occurred against Australian persons in circumstances where DSD already had information indicating that the individuals concerned were Australian persons, but in each case members of staff had failed to make appropriate inquiries of existing DSD records. In addition to these cases being breaches of the presumption rule in the privacy rules, the action taken to produce intelligence on an Australian person was inconsistent with the ministerial authorisation requirement in the ISA.

During 2013-14, I assessed two instances where DSD communicated information about an Australian person not in accordance with the privacy rules. Both incidents resulted from a failure to follow established compliance processes. I am satisfied the remedial action taken in both cases appropriately addressed the privacy of the Australian persons concerned.

The privacy rules and cooperation with signals intelligence partners

DSD works particularly closely with a small number of allied signals intelligence agencies. During the reporting period, DSD reported to me several instances where it had identified that one of these partner agencies had made an incorrect presumption of nationality, and had inadvertently communicated information on an Australian person. I was satisfied that DSD followed up with partner agencies concerning any required remedial action in a timely and appropriate manner.

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Compliance with the Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act 1979

DSD brought to my attention one case where a DSD officer who was assisting with the execution of a warrant had not been listed as an authorised person for the purpose of exercising the authority of a warrant in respect of a telecommunications service. DSD took remedial action immediately upon learning of the error. I am satisfied that DSD’s actions were appropriate and that this error was administrative in nature.

Legacy incidents: review of ministerial authorisation cancellations and non-renewals

DSD conducted a thorough retrospective analysis in late 2013 of cancelled or expired ministerial authorisations, and reported the outcome of this review to me in June 2014. This review reported on three previously identified compliance incidents, and identified a further three instances where intelligence targeting continued beyond the cancellation of the ministerial authorisation during 2011 and 2012.

In all instances, DSD found intelligence targeting continued for periods ranging from several weeks to more than a month beyond the date the ministerial authorisation was cancelled by the Minister for Defence (at DSD’s request). DSD assessed that each incident demonstrated a failure by DSD to follow established procedures for the management of cancellations. In June 2014 DSD advised the Minister for Defence about these breaches of the ministerial authorisation requirement under the ISA and the remedial actions which had been taken.

Legacy compliance incidents

Prompted in part by some of the compliance concerns raised by my office, DSD also initiated a full review of their unfinalised compliance reporting records, covering legacy compliance issues raised and addressed since 2011, but not reported to my office.

The findings from the legacy investigations were progressively reported to me in the second half of the 2013-14 reporting period.

Inspection project involving DSD

In January 2014, I initiated an inspection project into specific activities of DSD conducted in response to a high-priority collection effort directed by government. The project found a high level of compliance by DSD in relation to:

u obligations imposed by ministerial authorisations and ministerial directions issued

under the ISA

u intelligence reporting and dissemination

u coordination between DSD and other Australian intelligence agencies

u actions taken to protect the privacy of Australian persons.

In a small number of the cases investigated, DSD staff did not consistently follow established recordkeeping requirements. While there was no breach in these cases, I note that a number of compliance incidents involving breaches of the ISA over the previous year had also resulted from a failure to adhere to recordkeeping requirements, thereby constituting a significant compliance risk.

Consistent with routine inspections of DSD, and reviews conducted internally by DSD of compliance incidents, the project findings highlighted the importance of best practice corporate recordkeeping for ensuring high levels of compliance. At the end of the reporting period, DSD advised it was updating a number of compliance frameworks which will help increase staff understanding and minimise compliance risks in similar cases.

29 Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security Annual Report 2013-14

PART T WO / PERFORMANCE Three of the legacy incidents investigated by DSD involved collection against persons already known by DSD to be Australian persons, breaching the requirements of the ISA. These incidents, which occurred between 2010 and 2012, all resulted from a failure by DSD to follow good recordkeeping practices.

While none of these incidents involved any intentional wrongdoing, these incidents were nonetheless of a serious nature.

DSD also reported to me a breach of the ISA which had occurred during 2011 where, due to human error, intelligence targeting against three Australian persons had occurred for less than one day without a ministerial authorisation. As the error was reported by the responsible analyst to DSD’s compliance section that day, DSD was able to take immediate remedial action and no communications were collected.

Two legacy incidents from 2012 involved the continued collection on an Australian person after a presumption of nationality had been found to be incorrect, due to a technical error in the collection system. This continued collection was inconsistent with the ministerial authorisation requirements in the ISA. DSD has advised that the collection system in question is no longer in use by DSD, and similar technical problems are unlikely to occur with the current systems in use.

While it is regrettable the legacy incidents were not reported to me sooner, I am pleased DSD has focused on improving staff understanding of compliance requirements, through improved compliance guidance and training for staff. During the first half of 2014, DSD continued to report to me any significant compliance issues as they occurred.

I was also pleased to see that, in most cases, DSD analysts proactively reported incidents to their internal compliance section in a timely and appropriate manner, even where doing so would bring attention to a mistake on their part. This speaks well of DSD’s compliance culture.

At the end of the 2013-14 reporting period, DSD was in the process of adding a number of additional safeguards to technical systems as part of overall improvements designed to minimise compliance incidents.

Legacy privacy rules cases

Several of the legacy incidents reported to me during 2013-14 involved overturned presumptions of nationality under the privacy rules. While no issues were identified with DSD’s application of the privacy rules in these cases, several of the incidents occurred prior to an amendment to the privacy rules approved by the then Minister for Defence in October 2012, which removed the requirement for DSD to consult with me about the actions taken to protect the privacy of the Australian person concerned. In most cases, however, DSD took appropriate action to protect the privacy of the Australian person at the time the incorrect presumption was first identified.

DSD has implemented a number of changes to internal procedures on reporting under the privacy rules since these incidents. I will continue to monitor DSD’s response to compliance incidents over the 2014-15 reporting period through regular inspection activity, and ongoing engagement with DSD staff.

Monitoring DIGO

During 2013-14 we conducted several inspection visits to DIGO, including DIGO’s online records of its collection activities. As in past years, this office focused on DIGO’s compliance with the terms of each ministerial authorisation issued to the agency by the Minister for Defence, noted the time taken to cancel collection activities when the grounds for the ministerial authorisation had materially changed, and reviewed the accuracy of reports provided to the Minister for Defence following the expiry or cancellation of a ministerial authorisation.

My staff also closely examined the adequacy of DIGO’s attempts to determine the nationality of individuals or entities before initiating targeted collection activities (to establish whether or not a ministerial authorisation was required). We also examined the extent of cooperation between DIGO and other intelligence collection agencies when seeking intelligence about the same target or requesting a joint ministerial authorisation.

No significant errors or breaches were identified. Based on these inspection activities, I am

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confident DIGO takes its statutory obligations under the ISA seriously and has put in place robust systems to encourage compliance.

My staff and I discussed specific compliance issues with the Director DIGO and with relevant DIGO officers at several meetings.

Monitoring DIO and ONA

As has been the practice of this office over many years, we continue to exercise a ‘light touch’ approach to the activities of ONA and DIO. As these agencies do not collect covert intelligence, their activities are far less likely than those of the collection agencies to intrude upon the personal affairs of Australian persons.

We aim to review ONA and DIO’s compliance with their privacy guidelines at least twice a year. In 2013-14 we undertook two inspection visits to DIO and one to ONA. A further visit to ONA planned for June 2014 was postponed to the next reporting period due to competing priorities.

These inspections revealed that ONA and DIO are generally compliant with the requirements of their privacy guidelines and that they each take their privacy responsibilities seriously. The few non-compliance issues identified tended to be questions of nuance or administration, rather than whether or not relevant intelligence information about Australian persons or entities should be included in their products.

My staff also engaged with ONA and DIO on wider Australian intelligence community issues and, in the case of the Public Interest Disclosure scheme, to gather information relevant to the Commonwealth Ombudsman.

My office also conducted a review of DIO’s implementation of recommendations from a 2012 inquiry examining DIO’s analytical integrity. This review activity is covered on page 17.

Cross-agency inspections

Use of assumed identities

Part 1AC of the Crimes Act 1914 and corresponding State and Territory laws enable ASIO and ASIS officers to create and use assumed identities in carrying out their functions. The legislation protects authorised officers from civil and criminal liability where they use an assumed identity in a circumstance that would otherwise be considered unlawful. Similarly, the legislation provides protections to the Commonwealth, State and Territory agencies responsible for providing the evidence of an assumed identity in this context.

The legislation also imposes reporting, administration and audit regimes on those agencies using assumed identities. ASIO and ASIS are required to conduct six-monthly audits of assumed identity records and provide the IGIS with an annual report containing information on the assumed identities created and used during the year. The Director-General of Security and the Director-General of ASIS provided reports covering the activities of their respective agencies for the 2012-13 reporting period. Nothing in the reports caused me concern.

This year, my staff also inspected ASIS’s assumed identity records. No issues of concern were identified during the inspection, and I was satisfied that ASIS is complying with Commonwealth, State and Territory legislation. I have asked ASIS to provide me with copies of their internal audit reports in addition to the annual report in future, as is ASIO’s current practice. Provision of this additional level of detail will strengthen existing oversight mechanisms.

ASIS advised of a breach of its internal policy in 2014 where equipment was purchased without first obtaining an assumed identity. This was due to a staff member not understanding the requirements. ASIS has put procedures in place to ensure this does not happen again.

Access to sensitive financial information by intelligence agencies

The Anti-Money Laundering and Counter Terrorism Financing Act 2006 (the AML/CTF Act) provides a

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PART T WO / PERFORMANCE legal framework in which designated agencies are able to access and share financial intelligence information created or held by the Australian Transaction Reports and Analysis Centre (AUSTRAC). All intelligence agencies and the office of the IGIS are designated agencies for the purposes of the AML/CTF Act.

The IGIS is party to an MOU with AUSTRAC. This MOU establishes an agreed understanding of IGIS’s role in monitoring agencies’ access to, and use of, AUSTRAC information.

In oversighting the agencies’ use of AUSTRAC information, we check that there is a demonstrated intelligence purpose pertinent to the agencies’ functions, that access is appropriately limited, searches are focused, and information passed to both Australian agencies and foreign intelligence counterparts is correctly authorised.

ASIO

Early in the reporting period I finalised my annual statement for 2012-13 to the Attorney-General on the outcome of my compliance monitoring activities in ASIO, concerning access to, and use of, AUSTRAC information in the previous reporting period.

I noted that ASIO was not compliant with AUSTRAC’s guidelines on the storage of certain AUSTRAC information. ASIO subsequently began negotiations with AUSTRAC to reach a solution and has since been provided with a waiver from the CEO of AUSTRAC in respect of the storage requirements on the condition that ASIO implement internal user access controls to this sensitive information.

During my 2013-14 inspection program, a breach of Section 133(1) of the AML/CTF Act was identified whereby ASIO communicated AUSTRAC information to a foreign intelligence agency without first receiving appropriate undertakings for the protection and use of the information. This breach will be included in my next annual statement to the Attorney-General.

ASIS

Early in the reporting period I finalised my annual statement for 2012-13 to the Minister for

Foreign Affairs on the outcome of my compliance monitoring activities in ASIS, concerning access to, and use of, AUSTRAC information in the previous reporting period.

In that annual statement I noted two areas of shortcoming in 2012-13; the first in relation to the accurate receipt of AUSTRAC information within ASIS and the second regarding deficiencies in relation to reporting movements of currency into or out of Australia.

Inspections by my office throughout 2013-14 have indicated that shortcomings by ASIS in relation to recordkeeping have continued and this will be included in my statement to the Foreign Minister. No deficiencies regarding movements of currency into or out of Australia were observed in 2013-14.

Summary of IGIS financial performance and resources for outcomes

OIGIS received an unqualified audit report from the Australian National Audit Office for its 2013-14 financial statements. A summary of this office’s financial performance can be found on the next page.

The office operated within available resources in 2013-14 and ended the year with a surplus of $226 333.

In relation to expenditure, the most significant budget variances consisted of $18 000 allocated for security clearances for ongoing staff members, $13 000 allocated for potential software licences and a $4000 difference in relation to losses on the disposal of assets. Changes in the government bond rate at the end of financial year resulted in a $25 000 downward movement in reported leave liabilities and consequently reduced employee expenses. Also, the original budget anticipated a pay rise from 1 July 2014 for staff. The pay rise, which has not occurred, had been expected to increase the reported leave liabilities at end of financial year by approximately $12 000.

Appropriation funding decreased slightly from $2 180 000 in 2012-13 to $2 179 000 in 2013-14 as a result of savings measures. During 2013-14

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significant other revenue was received including $139 000 inquiry funding.

Net equity increased from $1 401 888 in 2012-13 to $1 653 529 in 2013-14. Movements in equity included a $226 333 increase in retained surplus and a $9308 increase in the asset revaluation reserve following an asset revaluation exercise conducted at 30 June 2014. Contributed Equity also increased from $447 000 in 2012-13 to $463 000 in 2013-14. Movements in Contributed Equity included capital funding of $69 000 received offset by a reduction of $53 000 following the repeal of an unspent 2004-05 equity injection.

The following tables can be found in Annex 3:

Table 3.1 - Agency Resource Statement and Resource for Outcomes 2013-14, and

Table 3.2 - Expenses and Resources for Outcome 1.

OIGIS has one outcome and one program.

Trends in finances

Significant changes to the finances of the office during 2013-14 included:

u A $74 301 increase in own-source revenue

due to significant inquiry funding received in 2013-14 ($139 000) offset by a decline in other s.31 revenue.

u A $146 574 decrease in employee expenses.

The decrease was partly due to a staff redundancy incorporated in the 2012-13 figures. Movements in the government bond rate and significant levels of leave taken during 2013-14 also contributed to the decrease in employee expenses.

u A $30 100 increase in supplier expenses.

Increases in expenditure included $7376 in legal expenses, $7516 in security vetting expenses, $10 300 in overseas travel and $10 693 increase in staff training.

u A $33 842 increase in suppliers payable due

mainly to outstanding reimbursements to home agencies for seconded staff.

u A $25 418 increase in other payables due to

leave liabilities to be transferred in relation to departing staff.

2013-14 OUTCOME 1 $

2012-13 OUTCOME 1 $

Change from previous year

Revenue from Government 2 179 000 2 180 000 -

Other income 274 548 200 247 + 37%

TOTAL INCOME 2 453 548 2 380 247

Employee expenses 1 916 059 2 062 633 - 7%

Supplier expenses 270 683 240 583 + 12%

Other expenses 40 473 39 608 + 2%

TOTAL EXPENSES 2 227 215 2 342 824

OPERATING RESULT 226 333 37 423

Financial assets 2 437 208 2 106 737 + 15%

Non-financial assets 63 735 89 984 - 41%

Liabilities 847 414 794 833 + 6%

NET ASSETS = A + B - C 1 653 529 1 401 888

A

B

C

33 Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security Annual Report 2013-14

PART THREE / MANAGEMENT AND ACCOUNTABILITY

PART THREE: MANAGEMENT AND ACCOUNTABILITY Corporate governance

Organisational structure

Senior positions occupied during 2013-14 were as follows:

Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security (Statutory officer)

Dr Vivienne Thom

Assistant Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security (SES Band 1)

Mr Jake Blight

Senior management committees

The OIGIS Audit Committee is the only senior management committee for the agency. The functions of this committee are detailed in the ‘Internal audit and risk management’ section of this chapter.

Corporate and operational planning

OIGIS’s corporate and operational planning processes are straightforward in nature, reflecting the small size and specialist function of the office.

The office addresses these matters through: u an annual forward planning process to set

strategic priorities

u weekly meetings between the IGIS and senior

staff members, to review and document operational priorities

u monthly meetings between the IGIS and all office

staff, during which internal guidelines, procedures and governance issues are discussed

u a forward plan for inspection activities in each

intelligence agency, which is determined in consultation with the relevant agency head (in accordance with s. 9A of the IGIS Act).

Internal audit and risk management

The membership and functions of the Audit Committee are structured according to the guidance in s.46 of the Financial Management and Accountability Act 1997 and the Financial Management and Accountability Regulations 1997. At 30 June 2014 the members were Mr Matthew King (Treasury) as Chair, Mr Trevor Kennedy (Attorney-General’s Department) and Mr Jake Blight (OIGIS) as members. The Inspector-General attends the meetings as an observer.

34 Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security Annual Report 2013-14

PART THREE / MANAGEMENT AND ACCOUNTABILITY

The Audit Committee meets on a periodic basis to consider matters including:

u risk management

u internal control

u financial statements

u compliance requirements

u internal audit

u external audit

u governance arrangements.

In this reporting period the Committee also considered the steps taken in preparation for the commencement of the Public Governance, Performance and Accountability Act 2013 (the PGPA Act).

The Committee reviews the Risk Management Plan annually based on its assessment of the office’s risk performance over the period. The Risk Management Plan includes controls designed to mitigate risks including the following:

u personnel related risks

u accidental or intentional loss of information

u segregation of duties

u failure or compromise of information technology

systems

u physical security of the office and facilities

u corporate liability

u fraud prevention, detection and management

u corporate compliance requirements.

Through its various mitigation strategies, the residual risk accepted by the office is maintained within the low-medium levels in each of the categories listed above.

Implementation of the revised Protective Security Policy Framework

The Australian Government’s Protective Security Policy Framework provides a structure for Australian government agencies to proportionately and effectively manage security risks and provide the necessary protection of the Government’s people, information and assets. The

governance arrangements and core policies in the framework describe the higher-level protective security outcomes and identify mandatory requirements my office must meet.

As at 30 June 2014, we were fully compliant with 32 of the 33 mandatory requirements and partially compliant with one. A risk mitigation strategy is in place for the partially compliant requirement.

Ethical standards and fraud control

We maintained our commitment to ethical standards by ensuring staff were aware of the relevant requirements. We held an information session for staff and displayed posters prominently in the office concerning changes to the APS Values that took effect from 1 July 2013.

Nominated staff attended APSC Ethics Advisors network meetings. All OIGIS staff must meet the standards required to hold a Positive Vet clearance which includes, among other things, consideration of an individual’s maturity, responsibility, and honesty. Financial management and accountability requirements for the Office were set out in Chief Executive Instructions (CEIs), which were issued by the Inspector-General under the Financial Management and Accountability Act 1997. In preparation for the commencement of the PGPA Act the CEIs were reviewed to be replaced by Accountable Authority Instructions.

Delegations were updated to take account of changes associated with the PGPA Act. Staff are required to sign a statement that they have read and understood all new delegations.

The Office’s procurement policy and guidelines establish clear standards of ethical behaviour for all staff responsible for procurement.

While the Risk Management Plan is comprehensive in that it includes fraud prevention, detection and management, the office also maintains a separate Fraud Control Plan, updated annually, which explores in greater detail risks of that type and how they are managed.

Employment of SES Officers

The office has one SES position filled by Mr Jake Blight. The terms and conditions of Mr Blight’s employment, including salary, are set out in a

35 Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security Annual Report 2013-14

PART THREE / MANAGEMENT AND ACCOUNTABILITY Section 24(1) determination and are based broadly on SES remuneration within the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet.

Employment of persons for a particular inquiry

Section 35(2AA) of the IGIS Act requires me to report on the employment under s. 32(3) of any person to perform functions and exercise powers for the purposes of a particular inquiry, and any delegation under s. 32AA to such a person. No person was employed under s. 32(3) in the reporting period.

Reports by the Auditor-General, Parliamentary Committees, the Commonwealth Ombudsman or an agency capability review

There were no reports on the operation of the office (other than the report on financial statements) by any of the above bodies. It should be noted that the office is not within the jurisdiction of the Commonwealth Ombudsman.

The office has received an unqualified audit report from the Australian National Audit Office (ANAO) in relation to its financial statements.

Further details of OIGIS interaction with parliamentary committees are available in the Overview section of this report.

Management of human resources

Organisational profile

At 30 June 2014, the office had 12 ongoing APS employees located in the Australian Capital Territory (not including the Inspector-General). Two employees worked part-time.

This compares to 11 ongoing and 2 non ongoing APS employees located in the Australian Capital Territory at 30 June 2013.

The office has a staffing strategy of maintaining a number of positions for staff who are on temporary transfers from other agencies. At the end of the reporting period four of the ongoing staff were on temporary transfer. This allows the

office to acquire skills that are available in other agencies and provides valuable development opportunities for employees. One of these employees returned to their home agency at the end of the reporting period — this position will not be filled.

The profile of the organisation is summarised in the following two graphs:

SES Band 1 OIGIS

Broadband 4

2014

(EL2)

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

OIGIS

Broadband 3 (EL1)

OIGIS

Broadband 2 (APS4-APS6)

Part Time Ongoing Full Time Ongoing

Female Male

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

SES Band 1 OIGIS

Broadband 4 (EL2)

OIGIS

Broadband 3 (EL1)

OIGIS

Broadband 2 (APS4-APS6)

Gender Balance as at 30 June 2014 (by employment level)

36 Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security Annual Report 2013-14

PART THREE / MANAGEMENT AND ACCOUNTABILITY

Employment frameworks

At 1 July 2013, all non-SES staff were employed under the OIGIS Enterprise Agreement 2011-2014. One SES staff member was employed under a section 24(1) determination.

The salary range available to APS employees in OIGIS throughout 2013-14 is provided at Annex 2.

The only notable non-salary benefit for OIGIS non-SES staff is a taxable annual allowance in recognition of the requirement to undergo regular and intrusive security clearance processes necessary to maintain a Positive Vet clearance, as well as other restrictions placed on employees as a result of reviewing the activities of the intelligence agencies. The annual allowance was $1093 per annum as at 30 June 2014.

Training and staff development

We continued the internal training program introduced in early 2012. The program of short training sessions, run once a fortnight, ensures that staff develop and maintain specialised knowledge and skills, and supplements on the job training. Topics covered in 2013-14 included:

u Public Interest Disclosure legislation

u IGIS Act secrecy provisions

u The role of the Commonwealth/Immigration

Ombudsman

u Approaches to compliance

Two staff members enrolled in a Certificate IV in Government (Investigations). Staff were also provided with regular opportunities throughout 2013-14 to attend other training courses and seminars relevant to their roles. A studies assistance scheme is also available to reimburse employees for approved courses of study.

Performance pay

OIGIS does not have a performance based pay scheme.

Other information

Purchasing

All procurement and purchasing activities conducted by the office were in accordance with the Commonwealth Procurement Rules.

Consultants

Generally a small number of consultants may be engaged each year by the office on an ‘as-required’ basis. Consultants are used where short-term resources are inadequate or specialist expertise is required. The security requirements of the office and the specialist nature of the consultancy work often means that consultants are directly sourced.

Where the work is more general in nature the office will, where appropriate, access consultants selected by PM&C through an open tender or panel selection process.

The decision to engage a consultant is made in accordance with the FMA Act and related regulations including the Commonwealth Procurement Rules and relevant internal guidelines.

Total actual expenditure on consultancy contracts for 2013-14 was $15 993 (GST inclusive). This represents two consultancy contracts for legal services and one relating to the revaluation of assets. This compares to consultancy expenditure of $7000 (GST inclusive) in 2012-13.

Annual reports contain information about actual expenditure on contracts for consultancies. Information on the value of contracts and consultancies is available on the AusTender website

ANAO Access Clauses

No contracts for greater than $100 000 were entered into during the reporting period, which did not provide for the Auditor-General to have access to the contractor’s premises.

37 Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security Annual Report 2013-14

PART THREE / MANAGEMENT AND ACCOUNTABILITY Exempt contracts

No contracts have been entered into during the reporting period that have been exempt from publishing on AusTender.

Legal services

Expenditure on legal services fluctuates from year to year and is largely dependent upon the nature of the inquiries undertaken.

In 2013-14 one legal advice was obtained from Australian Government Solicitors, to a total cost of $7626 (GST inclusive). Advice was also sought from counsel in one matter with costs totalling $7486 (GST inclusive).

The total expenditure for legal services compares to $7000 (GST inclusive) in 2012-13.

Information Publication Scheme

The Information Publication Scheme (IPS) applies to Australian Government agencies that are subject to the FOI Act. The IPS specifies categories of information that agencies must publish online. Agencies can also choose to publish other information under the IPS. As an exempt agency under the FOI Act, the scheme does not apply to OIGIS.

Indexed file lists were published on OIGIS’s website in the reporting period in accordance with the Senate Continuing Order No 10 (Harradine Order).

Freedom of information

This office is an exempt agency for the purposes of the FOI Act.

Advertising and market research

OIGIS did not incur any expenditure on recruitment advertising, advertising campaigns, market research, polling or direct mailing during the reporting period.

Ecologically sustainable development and environmental performance

The office, through its co-location with PM&C, continues to benefit from that Department’s commitment to energy saving measures. This includes the large number of energy and water saving measures, designed to reduce greenhouse emissions, which are incorporated into the building in which we are among the occupants (1 National Circuit). These measures include, but are not limited to, energy efficient lighting, heating and cooling.

Due to the small size of the office, PM&C does not separately measure the utilities used by OIGIS and provides these utilities free of charge. For this reason, ecologically sustainable development and details of environmental performance are not specifically quantified in this report.

Nonetheless, the office is committed to ensuring that its activities are environmentally responsible. While the majority of the office’s infrastructure is provided and maintained by PM&C, there are a number of areas for which I am directly responsible in which I take into account the environmental impact and act accordingly to minimise it. These include:

u recycled paper was used for around 98 per

cent of the office’s photocopying, facsimile reports and document printing in 2013-14

u staff configure printers to default to

double-sided print

u all unclassified office paper and cardboard

waste is recycled

u empty toner cartridges are recycled, except

where security considerations apply.

38 Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security Annual Report 2013-14

PART THREE / MANAGEMENT AND ACCOUNTABILITY

Disability reporting

Since 1994, Commonwealth departments and agencies have reported on their performance as policy adviser, purchaser, employer, regulator and provider under the Commonwealth Disability Strategy. In 2007-08, reporting on the employer role was transferred to the Australian Public Service Commission’s State of the Service Report and the APS Statistical Bulletin. These reports are available at www.apsc.gov.au. From 2010-11, departments and agencies have no longer been required to report on these functions.

The Commonwealth Disability Strategy has been overtaken by the National Disability Strategy 2010-2020, which sets out a ten year national policy framework to improve the lives of people with disability, promote participation and create a more inclusive society. A high level two-yearly report will track progress against each of the six outcome areas of the Strategy and present a picture of how people with disability are faring. The first of these reports will be available in late 2014, and can be found at www.dss.gov.au.

Work health and safety

Due to its small size, the office does not have a Health and Safety Committee. Instead, health and safety matters are addressed at all-staff meetings, Audit Committee meetings, and, as the need arises, directly with me through team leaders and the Health and Safety Representative. During 2013-14 a new representative was appointed and completed the relevant five-day training course.

No notifiable incidents resulting from undertakings carried out by the office have occurred during the year that would require reporting under the Work Health and Safety Act 2011 (WHS Act).

No investigations were conducted relating to undertakings carried out by the office and no notices were given to the office under Part 10 of the WHS Act.

39 Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security Annual Report 2013-14

PART FOUR: FINANCIAL STATEMENTS

PART FOUR: FINANCIAL STATEMENTS

40 Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security Annual Report 2013-14 40

PART FOUR: FINANCIAL STATEMENTS

41 Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security Annual Report 2013-14 41

PART FOUR: FINANCIAL STATEMENTS

42 Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security Annual Report 2013-14 42

PART FOUR: FINANCIAL STATEMENTS

43 Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security Annual Report 2013-14 43

PART FOUR: FINANCIAL STATEMENTS OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR-GENERAL OF INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY STATEMENT OF COMPREHENSIVE INCOME for the year ended 30 June 2014

Notes

2014 $

2013 $

NET COST OF SERVICES

Expenses Employee benefits 3A 1 916 059 2 062 633

Supplier 3B 270 683 240 583

Depreciation and amortisation 3C 37 999 39 608

Loss on asset disposal 3D 2 474 -

Total Expenses 2 227 215 2 342 824

Own-Source Income

Own-source revenue Other revenue 4A 172 548 98 247

Total own-source income 172 548 98 247

Gains Other gains 4B 102 000 102 000

Total gains 102 000 102 000

Total own-source income 274 548 200 247

Net Cost of services 1 952 667 2 142 577

Revenue from Government 4C 2 179 000 2 180 000

Surplus attributable to the Australian Government 226 333 37 423

OTHER COMPREHENSIVE INCOME

Items not subject to subsequent reclassification to net cost of services

Changes in asset revaluation surplus 9 308 -

Total comprehensive income attributable to the Australian Government 235 641 37 423

The above statement should be read in conjunction with the accompanying notes.

44 Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security Annual Report 2013-14 44

PART FOUR: FINANCIAL STATEMENTS

OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR-GENERAL OF INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY STATEMENT OF FINANCIAL POSITION as at 30 June 2014

Notes

2013-14 $

2012-13 $

ASSETS

Financial Assets Cash and cash equivalents 6A 207 005 203 783

Trade and other receivables 6B 2 230 203 1 902 954

Total financial assets 2 437 208 2 106 737

Non-Financial Assets Property, plant and equipment 7A & 7B 63 735 86 643

Other non-financial assets 7C - 3 341

Total non-financial assets 63 735 89 984

Total Assets 2 500 943 2 196 721

LIABILITIES

Payables Suppliers 8A 38 800 4 958

Other payables 8B 78 226 52 808

Total payables 117 026 57 766

Provisions Employee provisions 9A 730 388 737 067

Total provisions 730 388 737 067

Total Liabilities 847 414 794 833

Net Assets 1 653 529 1 401 881

EQUITY

Parent Entity Interest Contributed equity 463 000 447 000

Reserves 16 105 6 796

Retained surplus 1 174 424 948 092

Total parent entity interest 1 653 529 1 401 888

Total Equity 1 653 529 1 401 888

The above statement should be read in conjunction with the accompanying notes.

45 Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security Annual Report 2013-14 45

PART FOUR: FINANCIAL STATEMENTS

OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR-GENERAL OF INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY STATEMENT OF CHANGES IN EQUITY for the year ended 30 June 2014

The above statement should be read in conjunction with the accompanying notes.

1. Appropriation Act (No. 2) 2004-2004 repealed by the Statute Stocktake (Appropriations) Act 2013 with effect from 1 July 2014.

Retained Earnings

Asset Revaluation Surplus

Contributed Equity/Capital

Total Equity

201 4 $

201 3 $

201 4 $

201 3 $

201 4 $

201 3 $

201 4 $

201 3 $

Opening balance Balance carried forward from previous period

948 09

1

910 668

6 796

6 796

447 000

447 000

1 401 88

7

1 364 464

Adjusted

opening balance

948 09

1

910 668

6 796

6 796

447 000

447

000

1 401 88

7

1 364 464

Comprehensive Income Other comprehensive income

-

-

9 309

-

-

-

9 309

-

Surplus for the period

2 2 6 333

37 423

-

-

-

-

2 2 6 333

37 423

Total

comprehensive income

2 2 6 333

37 423

9 309

-

-

-

23 5 642

37 423

of which: Attributable to the Australian Government

2 2 6 333

37 423

9 309

-

-

-

23 5 642

37 423

Transactions with owners Contribution by Owners Equity Injection

- Appropriation

- repealed

1

-

-

-

-

(53 000)

-

(53 000)

-

Departmental Capital Budget

-

-

-

-

69 000

-

69 000

-

T otal transactions with owners

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

Closing balance as at 30 June

1 17

4 424

9 48 0

91

16 105

6 796

463 000

447 000

1 65

3 529

1 401

887

Closing balance attributable to the Australian Government 1 174 424 948 091 16 105 6 796 463 000 447 000 1 653 529 1 401 887

46 Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security Annual Report 2013-14 46

PART FOUR: FINANCIAL STATEMENTS

OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR-GENERAL OF INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY CASH FLOW STATEMENT for the year ended 30 June 2014

Notes

2013-14 $

2012-13 $

OPERATING ACTIVITIES

Cash received Appropriations 2 262 487 2 236 999

Net GST received 8 637 7 131

Other cash received 401 110 63 568

Total cash received 2 672 234 2 307 698

Cash used Employees (1 923 498) (2 010 657)

Suppliers (349 938) (227 042)

Section 31 receipts transferred to OPA (401 110) (63 568)

Other - -

Total cash used (2 674 546) (2 301 267)

Net cash from operating activities 10 (2 312) 6 431

INVESTING ACTIVITIES

Cash received Proceeds from sales of property, plant and equipment - -

Total cash received - -

Cash used Purchase of property, plant and equipment (2 723) -

Total cash used (2 723) -

Net cash from (used by) investing activities (2 723) -

FINANCING ACTIVITIES

Cash received Contributed equity 8 257 -

Total cash received 8 257 -

Net cash from financial activities 8 257 -

Net increase in cash held 3 222 6 431

Cash and cash equivalents at the beginning of the reporting period 203 783 197 352

Cash and cash equivalents at the end of the reporting period 10 207 005 203 783

The above statement should be read in conjunction with the accompanying notes.

47 Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security Annual Report 2013-14 47

PART FOUR: FINANCIAL STATEMENTS SCHEDULE OF COMMITMENTS as at 30 June 2014

2014 $

2013 $

BY TYPE Commitments Receivable Net GST receivable on commitments 25 654 26 324

Total Commitments Receivable 25 654 26 324

Commitments Payable Other Commitments Other 272 971 272 971

Operating Leases 9 216 16 589

Total Other Commitments 282 187 289 560

Net Commitments by Type 256 533 263 236

BY MATURITY Commitments Receivable Within I year 5 634 5 634

Between 1 to 5 years 20 020 20 690

More than 5 years - -

Total operating lease income 25 654 26 324

Commitments Payable Operating Lease Commitments Within 1 year 7 373 7 373

Between 1 to 5 years 1 843 9 216

More than 5 years - -

Total Operating Lease Commitments 9 216 16 589

Other Commitments Payable Within I year 54 594 54 594

Between 1 to 5 years 218 377 218 377

More than 5 years - -

Total Other Commitments Payable 272 971 272 971

Net Commitments by Maturity 256 533 263 236

Note: Commitments are GST inclusive where relevant.

The above schedule should be read in conjunction with the accompanying notes.

OIGIS in its capacity as a lessee holds one motor vehicle operating leases. The lease has contracted monthly payments of $614.42 and expires 13 September 2015.

OIGIS also holds agreements with PM&C requiring an annual payment of $50,600 for IT support services and $3,994 for payroll services. These agreements are in place for the current and following four years.

48 Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security Annual Report 2013-14 48

PART FOUR: FINANCIAL STATEMENTS

NOTES TO AND FORMING PART OF THE FINANCIAL STATEMENTS for year ended 30 June 2014

Note 1 - Summary of Significant Accounting Policies

1.1 Objectives of the Office of the Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security

The Office of the Inspector General of Intelligence and Security (OIGIS) is an Australian Government controlled not-for-profit entity. The objective of OIGIS is to meet the following outcome:

Independent assurance for the Prime Minister, senior ministers and Parliament as to whether Australia’s intelligence and security agencies act legally and with propriety by inspecting, inquiring into and reporting on their activities.

OIGIS’s activities contributing towards this program are classified as departmental. Departmental activities involve the use of assets, liabilities, income and expenses controlled or incurred by OIGIS in its own right.

The continued existence of the OIGIS in its present form and with its present programs is dependent on government policy and on continuing funding by Parliament for OIGIS’s administration and programs.

1.2 Basis of Preparation of the Financial Statements

The financial statements are general purpose financial statements and are required by section 49 of the Financial Management and Accountability Act 1997.

The Financial Statements and notes have been prepared in accordance with: • Finance Minister’s Orders (or FMO) for reporting periods ending on or after 1 July 2011; and • Australian Accounting Standards and Interpretations issued by the Australian Accounting Standards Board (AASB) that apply for the reporting period.

The financial statements have been prepared on an accrual basis and in accordance with the historical cost convention, except for certain assets and liabilities at fair value. Except where stated, no allowance is made for the effect of changing prices on the results or the financial position.

The financial statements are presented in Australian dollars and values are rounded to the nearest dollar.

Unless an alternative treatment is specifically required by an accounting standard or the FMOs, assets and liabilities are recognised in the statement of financial position when and only when it is probable that future economic benefits will flow to the entity or a future sacrifice of economic benefits will be required and the amounts of the assets or liabilities can be reliably measured. However, assets and liabilities arising under executor contracts are not recognised unless required by an accounting standard. Liabilities and assets that are unrecognised are reported in the schedule of commitments.

Unless alternative treatment is specifically required by an accounting standard, income and expenses are recognised in the Statement of Comprehensive Income when and only when the flow, consumption or loss of economic benefits has occurred and can be reliably measured.

1.3 Significant Accounting Judgments and Estimates

In the process of applying the accounting policies listed in this note, OIGIS has made the following judgments that have the most significant impact on the amounts recorded in the financial statements.

• Leave provisions involve assumptions on the likely tenure of existing staff, future salary movements and future discount rates.

1.4 New Australian Accounting Standards

Adoption of New Australian Accounting Standard Requirements

No accounting standard has been adopted earlier than the application date as stated in the standard.

49 Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security Annual Report 2013-14 49

PART FOUR: FINANCIAL STATEMENTS NOTES TO AND FORMING PART OF THE FINANCIAL STATEMENTS for year ended 30 June 2014

New/revised standards, interpretations and amending standards that were issued prior to the sign-off date and are applicable to the current reporting period did not have a financial impact, and are not expected to have a future financial impact on the entity.

AASB 13 Fair Value Measurement has been adopted for the first time resulting in new disclosures (refer Note 5).

Future Australian Accounting Standard Requirements

New/revised standards, interpretations and amending standards that were issued prior to the sign-off date and are applicable to the future reporting periods are not expected to have a future financial impact on the entity.

AASB 1055 Budgetary Reporting applicable from 1 July 2014 will result in significant changes in disclosure requirements.

1.5 Revenue

Revenue from Government

Amounts appropriated for departmental appropriations for the year (adjusted for any formal additions and reductions) are recognised as Revenue from Government when OIGIS gains control of the appropriation, except for certain amounts that relate to activities that are reciprocal in nature, in which case revenue is recognised only when it has been earned. Appropriations receivable are recognised at their nominal amounts.

Other Types of Revenue

Revenue from the sale of goods is recognised when: • the risks and rewards of ownership have been transferred to the buyer; • the agency retains no managerial involvement or effective control over the goods; • the revenue and transaction costs incurred can be reliably measured; and • it is probable that the economic benefits associated with the transaction will flow to the entity.

Revenue from rendering of services is recognised by reference to the stage of completion of contracts at the reporting date. The revenue is recognised when: • the amount of revenue, stage of completion and transaction costs incurred can be reliably measured; and • the probable economic benefits associated with the transaction will flow to the entity.

The stage of completion of contracts at the reporting date is determined by reference to the proportion that costs incurred to date bear to the estimated total costs of the transaction.

Receivables for goods and services, which have 30 day terms, are recognised at the nominal amounts due less any impairment allowance account. Collectability of debts is reviewed as at end of reporting period. Allowances are made when collectability of the debt is no longer probable.

1.6 Gains

Resources Received Free of Charge

Resources received free of charge are recognised as gains when, and only when, a fair value can be reliably determined and the services would have been purchased if they had not been donated. Use of those resources is recognised as an expense.

The main resources received free of charge in 2013-14 are office space (from the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet) and the installation and maintenance of the OIGIS owned internal secure computer network (from Defence Signals Directorate).

50 Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security Annual Report 2013-14 50

PART FOUR: FINANCIAL STATEMENTS

NOTES TO AND FORMING PART OF THE FINANCIAL STATEMENTS for year ended 30 June 2014

Contributions of assets at no cost of acquisition or for nominal considerations are recognised as gains at their fair value when the asset qualifies for recognition, unless received from another Government agency or authority as a consequence of a restructuring of administrative arrangements.

Sale of Assets

Gains from disposal of assets are recognised when control of the asset has passed to the buyer.

1.7 Transactions with the Government as Owner

Contributed Equity

Amounts appropriated which are designated as ‘equity injections’ for a year (less any formal reductions) and Departmental Capital Budgets (DCBs) are recognised directly to contributed equity in that year.

1.8 Employee Benefits

Liabilities for ‘short-term employee benefits’ (as defined in AASB 119 Employee Benefits) and termination benefits expected within twelve months of the end of the reporting period are measured at their nominal amounts.

The nominal amount is calculated with regard to the rates expected to be paid on settlement of the liability.

Other long-term employee benefits are measured as net total of the present value of the defined benefit obligation at the end of the reporting period minus the fair value at the end of the reporting period of plan assets (if any) out of which the obligations are to be settled directly.

Leave

The liability for employee benefits includes provision for annual leave and long service leave. No provision has been made for sick leave as all sick leave is non-vesting and the average sick leave taken in future years by employees of OIGIS is estimated to be less than the annual entitlement for sick leave.

The leave liabilities are calculated on the basis of employees’ remuneration at the estimated salary rates that will be applied at the time the leave is taken, including OIGIS’s employer superannuation contribution rates to the extent that the leave is likely to be taken during service rather than paid out on termination.

The liability for long service leave has been determined by using the short hand method per the FMOs. The estimate of the present value of the liability takes into account attrition rates and pay increases through promotion and inflation.

Superannuation

Staff of OIGIS are members of the Commonwealth Superannuation Scheme (CSS), the Public Sector Superannuation Scheme (PSS), the PSS accumulation plan (PSSap) and other industry super funds outside the Commonwealth.

The CSS and PSS are defined benefit schemes for the Australian Government. The liability for defined benefits is recognised in the financial statements of the Australian Government and is settled by the Australian Government in due course. This liability is reported in the Department of Finance’s administered schedules and notes.

The PSSap is a defined contribution scheme.

OIGIS makes employer contributions to the employees’ superannuation scheme at rates determined by an actuary to be sufficient to meet the current cost to the Government. OIGIS accounts for the contributions as if they were contributions to defined contribution plans.

51 Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security Annual Report 2013-14 51

PART FOUR: FINANCIAL STATEMENTS NOTES TO AND FORMING PART OF THE FINANCIAL STATEMENTS for year ended 30 June 2014

The liability for superannuation recognised as at 30 June represents outstanding contributions for the final fortnight of the year.

1.9 Cash

Cash and cash equivalents includes cash on hand and any deposits in bank accounts with an original maturity of 3 months or less that are readily convertible to known amounts of cash and subject to insignificant risk of changes in value. Cash is recognised at its nominal amount.

1.10 Financial Assets

OIGIS classifies its financial assets as ‘loans and receivables’.

Financial assets are recognised and derecognised upon trade date.

Effective Interest Method

The effective interest method is a method of calculating the amortised cost of a financial asset and of allocating interest income over the relevant period. The effective interest rate is the rate that exactly discounts estimated future cash receipts through the expected life of the financial asset, or, where appropriate, a shorter period.

Loans and receivables

Trade receivables, loans and other receivables that have fixed or determinable payments that are not quoted in an active market are classified as ‘loans and receivables’. Loans and receivables are measured at amortised cost using the effective interest method less impairment. Interest is recognised by applying the effective interest rate.

Credit terms are net 30 days (2012-13: 30 days).

Impairment of financial assets

Financial assets are assessed for impairment at the end of each reporting period.

1.11 Financial Liabilities

Financial liabilities are classified as other financial liabilities.

Financial liabilities are recognised and derecognised upon ‘trade date’.

Other Financial Liabilities

Supplier and other payables are recognised at amortised cost. Liabilities are recognised to the extent that the goods or services have been received (and irrespective of having been invoiced).

Settlement is usually made net 30 days.

1.12 Contingent Liabilities and Contingent Assets

Contingent liabilities and contingent assets are not recognised in the statement of financial position but are reported in the relevant schedules and notes. They may arise from uncertainty as to the existence of a liability or asset or represent an asset or liability in respect of which the amount cannot be reliably measured. Contingent assets are disclosed when settlement is probable but not virtually certain and contingent liabilities are disclosed when settlement is greater than remote.

OIGIS has no contingencies to report in either 2012-13 or in 2013-14.

No contingent rentals exist.

52 Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security Annual Report 2013-14 52

PART FOUR: FINANCIAL STATEMENTS

NOTES TO AND FORMING PART OF THE FINANCIAL STATEMENTS for year ended 30 June 2014

1.13 Acquisition of Assets

Assets are recorded at cost on acquisition except as stated below. The cost of acquisition includes the fair value of assets transferred in exchange and liabilities undertaken. Financial assets are initially measured at their fair value plus transaction costs where appropriate.

Assets acquired at no cost, or for nominal consideration, are initially recognised as assets and income at their fair value at the date of acquisition, unless acquired as a consequence of restructuring of administrative arrangements. In the latter case, assets are initially recognised as contributions by owners at the amounts at which they were recognised in the transferor agency’s accounts immediately prior to the restructuring.

1.14 Property, Plant and Equipment

Asset Recognition Threshold

Purchases of property, plant and equipment are recognised initially at cost in the statement of financial position, except for purchases costing less than $2,000, which are expensed in the year of acquisition (other than where they form part of a group of similar items which are significant in total).

Revaluations

Fair values are determined by market selling price.

Following initial recognition at cost, property plant and equipment are carried at fair value less subsequent accumulated depreciation and accumulated impairment losses. Valuations are conducted with sufficient frequency to ensure that the carrying amounts of assets do not differ materially from the assets’ fair values as at the reporting date. The regularity of independent valuations depends upon the volatility of movements in market values for the relevant assets. A full revaluation was conducted at 30 June 2014 by an independent valuer.

Revaluation adjustments are made on a class basis. Any revaluation increment is credited to equity under the heading of asset revaluation reserve except to the extent that it reverses a previous revaluation decrement of the same asset class that was previously recognised in the surplus/deficit. Revaluation decrements for a class of assets are recognised directly in the surplus/deficit except to the extent that they reverse a previous revaluation increment for that class.

Any accumulated depreciation as at the revaluation date is eliminated against the gross carrying amount of the asset and the asset restated to the revalued amount.

Depreciation

Depreciable property plant and equipment assets are written-off to their estimated residual values over their estimated useful lives to OIGIS using, in all cases, the straight-line method of depreciation.

Depreciation rates (useful lives), residual values and methods are reviewed at each reporting date and necessary adjustments are recognised in the current, or current and future reporting periods, as appropriate.

Depreciation rates of depreciable assets are based on useful lives of 1 - 14 years (2013: 1 - 47 years).

Impairment

All assets were assessed for impairment at 30 June 2014. Where indicators of impairment were identified an assessment of recoverable value has been undertaken and the value of the assets adjusted accordingly.

53 Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security Annual Report 2013-14 53

PART FOUR: FINANCIAL STATEMENTS NOTES TO AND FORMING PART OF THE FINANCIAL STATEMENTS for year ended 30 June 2014

Derecognition

An item of property, plant and equipment is derecognised upon disposal or when no further future economic benefits are expected from its use or disposal.

1.15 Intangibles

Previously OIGIS’s intangibles have consisted of purchased software only. These assets were carried at cost less accumulated amortisation and accumulated impairment losses. Software is amortised on a straight-line basis over its anticipated useful life. Software is assigned a useful life of 4 years (2013: 4 years).

All software assets were fully amortised as at 30 June 2009.

1.16 Taxation

OIGIS is exempt from all forms of taxation except Fringe Benefits Tax (FBT) and Goods and Services Tax (GST).

Revenues, expenses and assets are recognised net of GST except: • where the amount of GST incurred is not recoverable from the Australian Taxation Office; and • for receivables and payables.

1.17 Legal Compliance

The Australian Government continues to have regard to developments in case law, including the High Court’s most recent decision on Commonwealth expenditure in Williams v Commonwealth (2014) HCA 23, as they contribute to the larger body of law relevant to the development of Commonwealth programs. In accordance with its general practice, the Government will continue to monitor and assess risk and decide on any appropriate actions to respond to risks of expenditure not being consistent with constitutional or other legal requirements.

Section 83 of the Constitution provides that no amount may be paid out of the Consolidated Revenue fund except under an appropriation made by law. During 2012-13, the Department of Finance received additional legal advice that indicated there could be breaches of s83 under certain circumstances with payments for long service leave, goods and services tax (GST) and payments made under determinations of the Remuneration Tribunal.

The agency has reviewed its processes and controls over payments for these items and determined that there is a low risk of the certain circumstances mentioned in the legal advice applying to the agency. The agency has conducted testing of payments and found no breaches of Section 83 in respect of these items.

Note 2 - Events after the Reporting Period

There are no significant events occurring after the Reporting Period requiring disclosure.

54 Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security Annual Report 2013-14 54

PART FOUR: FINANCIAL STATEMENTS

NOTES TO AND FORMING PART OF THE FINANCIAL STATEMENTS for year ended 30 June 2014

Note 3 - Expenses

2014 $

2013 $

Note 3A - Employee Benefits

Wages and salaries 1 495 856 1 438 086

Superannuation: Defined benefit plans 218 309 221 102

Defined contribution plans 53 396 48 226

Leave and other entitlements 148 498 278 343

Redundancy payment - 76 876

Total employee benefits 1 916 059 2 062 633

2014 $

2013 $

Note 3B - Suppliers

Goods and Services Consultants 800 -

ICT support 46 000 46 000

Legal expenses 13 739 6 363

Printing non publications 7 837 8 969

Resources received free of charge: Notional Rent Charge 102 000 102 000

Notional Audit Fees 18 000 18 000

Notional IT Support Costs 4 545 4 545

Stationery 5 452 9 572

Training 20 186 9 493

Travel 13 577 3 494

Other 33 888 27 737

Total goods and services 266 024 236 173

Goods and services are made up of: Provision of goods - external entities 7 727 12 294

Rendering of services - related entities 211 009 189 189

Rendering of services - external entities 47 288 34 690

Total goods and services 266 024 236 173

Other supplier expenses Workers compensation premiums 4 659 4 410

Total other supplier expenses 4 659 4 410

Total supplier expenses 270 683 240 583

2014 $

2013 $

Note 3C - Depreciation and Amortisation

Depreciation - Property, plant and equipment 37 999 39 608

Total depreciation and amortisation 37 999 39 608

55 Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security Annual Report 2013-14 55

PART FOUR: FINANCIAL STATEMENTS NOTES TO AND FORMING PART OF THE FINANCIAL STATEMENTS for year ended 30 June 2014

2014 $

2013 $

Note 3D - Loss on Disposal of Assets

Infrastructure, plant and equipment 2 474 -

Total loss on disposal of assets 2 474 -

Note 4 - Own-Source Income

OWN-SOURCE REVENUE

2014 $

2013 $

Note 4A - Other

Inquiry Funding 139 741 -

Leave Liability Transfers - 53 454

Employee FBT Contributions Other

8 329 1 933

13 200 9 048

Resources Received Free of Charge: Australian National Audit Office 18 000 18 000

Defence Signals Directorate 4 545 4 545

Total other own-source revenue 172 548 98 247

2014 $

2013 $

Note 4B - Other Gains

Resources Received Free of Charge: Department of Prime Minister & Cabinet 102 000 102 000

Total other gains 102 000 102 000

REVENUE FROM GOVERNMENT

2014 $

2013 $

Note 4C - Revenue from Government

Appropriations: Departmental Appropriation 2 179 000 2 180 000

Total revenue from government 2 179 000 2 180 000

Note 5 - Fair Value Measurement

The following table provides an analysis of assets and liabilities that are measured at fair value. The different levels of the fair value hierarchy are defined below:

Level 1 - Quoted prices (unadjusted) in active markets for identical assets or liabilities that the entity can access at measurement date. Level 2 - Inputs other than quoted prices included within Level 1 that are observable for the asset or liability, either directly or indirectly. Level 3 - Unobservable inputs for the asset or liability.

56 Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security Annual Report 2013-14 56

PART FOUR: FINANCIAL STATEMENTS

NOTES TO AND FORMING PART OF THE FINANCIAL STATEMENTS for year ended 30 June 2014

Note 5A - Fair Value Measurements

Fair value measurements at the end of the reporting period by hierarchy for assets and liabilities in 2014

Fair value measurements at the end of the reporting

period using

Fair Value

Level 1 inputs

Level 2 inputs

Level 3 inputs

Non

- Financial Assets

Property, plant and equipment 63 735 - 30 035 33 700 Total Non

- Financial Assets

63 735

-

30 035

33 700

Total Fair Value

measurements of assets in the statement of financial

position

63 735 - 30 035 33 700

The OIGIS’s assets are held for operational purposes and not held for the purposes of deriving a profit. The current use of all controlled assets is considered their highest and best use.

57 Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security Annual Report 2013-14 57

PART FOUR: FINANCIAL STATEMENTS NOTES TO AND FORMING PART OF THE FINANCIAL STATEMENTS for year ended 30 June 2014

Note 5B - Level 1 and Level 2 Transfers for Recurring Fair Value Measurements

There were no transfers between levels during 2013-14.

Note 5C - Valuation Technique and Inputs for Level 2 and Level 3 Fair Value Measurements

Level 2 and 3 fair value measurements - valuation technique and the inputs used for assets and liabilities in 2014 Category (Level 2 or

Level 3) Fair Value Valuation Technique(s)1 Inputs

used

Range (weighted average)2

Non-Financial Assets Property, plant and equipment

Level 2 assets included office equipment and furniture

Level 3 assets included computer equipment and office furniture

Level 2

Level 3

30 035

33 700

Market comparables

Market comparables and depreciated replacement cost

Sale prices of comparable assets

Sale prices of comparable assets in

limited market and quotes for

replacement assets adjusted for life of asset

NA

NA

1. No change in valuation technique occurred during the period. 2. Significant unobservable inputs only. Not applicable for assets or liabilities in the Level 2 category.

Recurring Level 3 fair value measurements - valuation processes

OIGIS procured valuation services from B&A Valuers and relied on valuations provided by B&A Valuers. B&A Valuers provided written assurance that the values determined are in compliance with AASB 13.

Following initial recognition at cost, property plant and equipment are carried at fair value less subsequent accumulated depreciation and accumulated impairment losses. Valuations are conducted with sufficient frequency to ensure that the carrying amounts of assets do not differ materially from the assets’ fair values as at the reporting date. The regularity of independent valuations depends upon the volatility of movements in market values for the relevant assets. A full revaluation was conducted at 30 June 2014 by an independent valuer.

Impairment testing is undertaken each year including years in which no revaluation is undertaken.

Recurring Level 3 fair value measurements - sensitivity of inputs

The significant unobservable inputs used in the measurement of the Level 3 assets include quotes obtained from suppliers for similar assets in new condition adjusted for the consumed economic benefit of the asset. Significant changes in any of those inputs would result in a significantly different fair value measurement.

58 Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security Annual Report 2013-14 58

PART FOUR: FINANCIAL STATEMENTS

NOTES TO AND FORMING PART OF THE FINANCIAL STATEMENTS for year ended 30 June 2014

Note 5D - Reconciliation for Recurring Level 3 Fair Value Measurements

Recurring Level 3 fair value measurements - reconciliation for assets Non-financial assets Property, plant and equipment Total

Opening balance 27 341 27 341

Total gain recognised in other comprehensive income1 6 359 6 359

Closing balance 33 700 33 700

1. These gains are included in the Statement of Comprehensive Income under ‘Changes in asset revaluation surplus’.

OIGIS’s policy for determining when transfers between levels are deemed to have occurred can be found in Note 1.

Note 6 - Financial Assets

2014 $

2013 $

Note 6A - Cash and cash equivalents

Cash on hand or on deposit 207 005 203 783

Total cash and cash equivalents 207 005 203 783

2014 $

2013 $

Note 6B - Trade and other receivables

Appropriations receivable: For existing programs 2 223 593 1 898 227

Total appropriation receivable 2 223 593 1 898 227

Other Receivables: GST receivable from the Australian Taxation Office 153 245

Other receivables 6 457 4 482

Total other receivables 6 610 4 727

Total trade and other receivables (gross) 2 230 203 1 902 954

Less Impairment Allowance: Other -

Total trade and other receivables (net) 2 230 203 1 902 954

Receivables are aged as follows: Not overdue 2 230 203 1 902 825

All receivables are expected to be recovered in less than 12 months.

59 Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security Annual Report 2013-14 59

PART FOUR: FINANCIAL STATEMENTS NOTES TO AND FORMING PART OF THE FINANCIAL STATEMENTS for year ended 30 June 2014

Note 7 - Non-Financial Assets

2014 $

2013 $

Note 7A - Property, plant and equipment

Other property, plant and equipment: Fair value 63 735 163 659

Accumulated depreciation - (77 016)

Total property, plant and equipment 63 735 86 643

All revaluations are independent and are conducted in accordance with the revaluation policy stated in Note 1.16. The most recent revaluation was conducted by the B&A Valuers as at 30 June 2014.

All assets were examined for indicators of impairment during the stocktake completed on 30 June 2014 and none were found. No items of property plant and equipment are expected to be sold or disposed of within the next 12 months.

Note 7B - Reconciliation of the Opening and Closing Balances of Property, Plant and Equipment (2013-14)

Item

Other property, plant & equipment $

Total $

As at 1 July 2013 Gross book value 165 059 165 059

Accumulated depreciation and impairment (78 416) (78 416)

Net book value as at 1 July 2013 86 643 86 643

Additions by purchase 8 258 8 258

resources received free of charge - -

Revaluations and impairments recognised in other comprehensive income 9 308 9 308

Depreciation expense (37 999) (37 999)

Disposals (2 475) (2 475)

Other - -

Net Book Value 30 June 2014 63 735 63 735

Net Bank Value as at 30 June 2014 represented by: Gross book value 63 735 63 735

Accumulated depreciation and impairment - -

60 Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security Annual Report 2013-14 60

PART FOUR: FINANCIAL STATEMENTS

NOTES TO AND FORMING PART OF THE FINANCIAL STATEMENTS for year ended 30 June 2014

Note 7B - Reconciliation of the Opening and Closing Balances of Property, Plant and Equipment (2012-13)

Item

Other property, plant & equipment $

Total $

As at 1 July 2012 Gross book value 165 059 165 059

Accumulated depreciation and impairment (38 809) (38 809)

Net book value as at 1 July 2012 126 250 126 250

Additions by purchase - -

resources received free of charge - -

Depreciation expense (39 608) (39 608)

Disposals - -

Other - -

Net Book Value 30 June 2013 86 643 86 643

Net Bank Value as at 30 June 2013 represented by: Gross book value 165 059 165 059

Accumulated depreciation and impairment (78 416) (78 416)

61 Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security Annual Report 2013-14 61

PART FOUR: FINANCIAL STATEMENTS NOTES TO AND FORMING PART OF THE FINANCIAL STATEMENTS for year ended 30 June 2014

2014 $

2013 $

Note 7C - Other Non-Financial Assets

Prepayments - 3 341

Total other non-financial assets - 3 341

All other non-financial assets are expected to be recovered in less than 12 months.

Note 8 - Payables

2014 $

2013 $

Note 8A - Suppliers

Trade creditors and accruals 38 800 4 958

Total suppliers 38 800 4 958

Supplier payables expected to be settled within 12 months: Related entities 28 882 3 203

External parties 9 918 1 755

Total 38 800 4 958

Supplier payables expected to be settled in greater than 12 months: Related entities - -

External parties - -

Total - -

Total supplier payables 38 800 4 958

2014 $

2013 $

Note 8B - Other Payables

Salaries and wages 48 968 45 514

Superannuation 8 411 7 294

Other 20 847

Total other payables 78 226 52 808

Total other payables are expected to be settled in: No more than 12 months 78 226 52 808

Total other payables 78 226 52 808

Note 9 - Provisions

2014 $

2013 $

Note 9A - Employee Provisions

Leave 730 388 737 067

Total employee provisions 730 388 737 067

Employee provisions are expected to be settled in: No more than 12 months 106 878 129 171

More than 12 months 623 510 607 896

Total employee provisions 730 388 737 067

62 Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security Annual Report 2013-14 62

PART FOUR: FINANCIAL STATEMENTS

NOTES TO AND FORMING PART OF THE FINANCIAL STATEMENTS for year ended 30 June 2014

Note 10 - Cash Flow Reconciliation

2014 $

2013 $

Reconciliation of Cash and cash equivalents as per Statement of Financial Position to Cash flow statement

Report cash and cash equivalents as per: Cash Flow Statement 207 005 203 783

Statement of Financial Position 207 005 203 783

Difference - -

Reconciliation of net cost of services to net cash from operating activities: Net cost of services (1 952 667) (2 142 577)

Add revenue from Government 2 179 000 2 180 000

Less income tax expense

Adjustments for non-cash items Depreciation/amortisation 37 999 39 608

Loss on disposal of assets 2 474 -

Write-off of assets -

Movements in assets and liabilities Increase/(Decrease) in provision of employee liabilities (6 679) (46 156)

Increase/(Decrease) in other payables 25 418 2 527

Increase/(Decrease) in supplier trade creditors 28 308 (14 604)

(Increase)/Decrease in appropriation receivables (317 623) (6 568)

(Increase)/Decrease in other assets (1 975) (4 108)

(Increase)/Decrease in other prepayments 3 341 (2 157)

(Increase)/Decrease in GST receivable 92 466

Net cash from (used by) operating activities (2 312) 6 431

63 Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security Annual Report 2013-14 63

PART FOUR: FINANCIAL STATEMENTS NOTES TO AND FORMING PART OF THE FINANCIAL STATEMENTS for year ended 30 June 2014

Note 11 - Senior Executive Remuneration

2014 $

2013 $

Note 11A - Senior Executive Remuneration Expense for the Reporting Period

Short-term employee benefits: Salary 544 682 511 066

Annual leave accrued - -

Total short-term employee benefits 544 682 511 066

Post-employment benefits: Superannuation 82 538 79 082

Total post-employment benefits 82 538 79 082

Other long-term employee benefits: Annual Leave Accrued 39 404 39 405

Long Service Leave (2 802) 34 258

Total other long-term employee benefits 36 602 73 663

Termination benefits - -

Total senior executive remuneration expenses 663 822 663 811

Notes:

1. Note 11A was prepared on an accrual basis. 2. Note 11A excludes acting arrangements and part-year service where remuneration expensed for senior executive was less than $195,000. 3. Note 11A relates to senior executives employed during the year.

64 Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security Annual Report 2013-14 64

PART FOUR: FINANCIAL STATEMENTS

NOTES TO AND FORMING PART OF THE FINANCIAL STATEMENTS for year ended 30 June 2014

Note 11B - Average Annual Reportable Remuneration Paid to Substantive Senior Executives During the Reporting Period

201 4

Average annual reportable remuneration

1

Substantive Senior Executives

No.

Reportable Salary

2

$

Contributed Superannuation

3

$

Reportable Allowances

4

$

Bonus Paid

5

$

Total

Reportable

Remuneration $

Total

reportable

remuneration (including part

- time arrangements):

Less than $1

95 ,000

1

156 550

24 716

-

-

181 266

$ 47 0,000 to $4

9 9,999

1

385 818

58 765

-

-

444 583

Total

2

542 368

83 481

-

-

625 849

201 3

Average annual reportable remuneration

1

Substantive Senior Executives

No.

Reportable Salary

2

$

Contributed Superannuation

3

$

Reportable Allowances

4

$

Bonus Paid

5

$

Total

Reportable

Remuneration $

Total

reportable

remuneration (including part

- time

arrangements):

Less than $1

95 ,000

1

149 512

25 745

0

0

175 257

$390,000 to $419,999

1

3 60 423

53 212

0

0

413 635

Total

2

509 935

78 957

0

0

5 88 892

Notes:

1. This table reports substantive senior executives who received remuneration during the reporting period. Each row is an averaged figure based on headcount for individuals in the band. 2. ‘Reportable salary’ includes the following: a) gross payments (less any bonuses paid, which are separated out and disclosed in the ‘bonus paid’ column);

b) reportable fringe benefits (at the net amount prior to ‘grossing up’ to account for tax benefits); c) exempt foreign employment income; and d) reportable employer superannuation contributions

65 Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security Annual Report 2013-14 65

PART FOUR: FINANCIAL STATEMENTS

NOTES TO AND FORMING PART OF THE FINANCIAL STATEMENTS for year ended 30 June 2014 3. The ‘contributed superannuation’ amount is the average cost to the entity for the provision of superannuation benefits to substantive senior executives in that reportable remuneration band during the reporting period.

4. ‘Reportable allowances’ are the average actual allowances paid as per the ‘total allowances’ line on individual’s payment summaries. 5. ‘Bonus paid’ represents average actual bonuses paid during the reporting period in that reportable remuneration band. The ‘bonus paid’ within a particular band may vary between financial years due to various factors such as individuals commencing with or leaving the entity during the financial year.

Note 11C - Average Annual Reportable Remuneration Paid to Other Highly Paid Staff during the Reporting Period

OIGIS had no other highly paid staff during 2013-14 (2012-13: nil).

66 Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security Annual Report 2013-14 66

PART FOUR: FINANCIAL STATEMENTS

NOTES TO AND FORMING PART OF THE FINANCIAL STATEMENTS for year ended 30 June 2014

Note 12 - Remuneration of Auditor

Financial statement audit services were provided free of charge to OIGIS by the Australian National Audit Office.

Fair Value of the services provided 2014 2013

Financial statement audit services $18 000 $18 000

No other services were provided by the auditors of the financial statements.

Note 13 - Financial Instruments

2014 $

2013 $

Note 13A - Categories of Financial Instruments

Financial Assets

Loans and Receivables Loans and receivables Cash and cash equivalents 207 005 203 783

Trade receivables 6 457 4 482

Total financial assets 213 462 208 265

Financial Liabilities Other liabilities measured at amortised cost Payables - Suppliers 38 800 4 958

Total financial liabilities 38 800 4 958

Note 13B - Net Gains or Losses on Financial Assets

There were no net gains or losses on financial assets.

Note 13C - Net Gains or Losses on Financial Liabilities

There were no net gains or losses on financial liabilities.

Note 13D - Fair Value of Financial Instruments

OIGIS’s aggregate net fair values of (identified) financial instruments are the same as their carrying amounts.

Note 13E - Credit Risk

OIGIS has endorsed policies and procedures for debt management (including the provision of credit terms), to reduce the incidence of credit risk. In most instances debtors for OIGIS are other government entities and therefore represent minimal credit risk.

The carrying amount of financial assets, net of impairment losses, reported in the statement of financial position represents the Agencies maximum exposure to credit risk.

67 Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security Annual Report 2013-14 67

PART FOUR: FINANCIAL STATEMENTS NOTES TO AND FORMING PART OF THE FINANCIAL STATEMENTS for year ended 30 June 2014

Credit quality of financial instruments not past due or individually determined or impaired

Not Past Due Nor Impaired 2014

Not Past Due Nor Impaired 2013

Past due or Impaired 2014

Past due or Impaired 2013

Loans & Receivables Cash and cash equivalents 207 005 203 783 - -

Trade receivables 6 457 4 482 - -

Total 213 462 208 265 - -

Note 13F - Liquidity Risk

OIGIS’s financial liabilities only include payables. Any exposure to liquidity risk is based on the notion that OIGIS will encounter difficulty in meeting its obligations associated with financial liabilities. This is highly unlikely due to appropriation funding and internal policies and procedures put in place to ensure there are appropriate resources to meet its financial obligations.

Maturities for non-derivative financial liabilities 2014

On Demand $ Within 1 year $

1 to 5 years $

Greater than 5 years $

Total $

Other Liabilities at amortised cost Payable - Suppliers 38 800 38 800

Total 38 800 38 800

Maturities for non-derivative financial liabilities 2013

On Demand $ Within 1 year $

1 to 5 years $

Greater than 5 years $

Total $

Other Liabilities at amortised cost Payable - Suppliers 4 958 4 958

Total 4 958 4 958

Note 13G - Market Risk

OIGIS holds only basic financial instruments that do not expose the agency to certain market risks.

68 Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security Annual Report 2013-14 68

PART FOUR: FINANCIAL STATEMENTS

NOTES TO AND FORMING PART OF THE FINANCIAL STATEMENTS for year ended 30 June 2014

Note 14 - Financial Asset Reconciliation

2014 $

2013 $

Financial Assets

Total financial assets as per statement of financial position 2 437 208 2 106 737

Less: non-financial instrument components:

Appropriation Receivable 2 223 593 1 898 227

GST Receivable 153 245

Total non-financial instrument components 2 223 746 1 898 472

Total financial assets as per financial instruments note 213 462 208 265

69 Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security Annual Report 2013-14 69

PART FOUR: FINANCIAL STATEMENTS

NOTES TO AND FORMING PART OF THE FINANCIAL STATEMENTS for year ended 30 June 2014

Note 15 - Appropriations

Table A - Annual Appropriations (‘Recoverable GST exclusive’)

201 4

Appropriations

Appropriation applied in 2014 (current and prior

years) $

Variance

3

$

Appropriation Act

FMA Act

Annual Appropriation $

Appropriations Reduced

1

$

AFM

2

$

Section 30

$

Section 31 $

Section 32

$

Total

Appropriations $

DEPARTMENTAL Ordinary Annual Services 2 248 000 - - - 401 110 - 2 649 110 2 270 744 378 366 Other Services Equity

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

Total Department

al

2 248

000

-

-

-

401 110

-

2 64

9 110

2 2 70 744

3 78 366

Notes:

1 Appropriations reduced under Appropriations Acts (No. 1, 3 & 5) 2013-14: sections 10, 11 and 12 and under Appropriation Acts (No. 2, 4 & 6) 2013-14: sections 12, 13, and 14. Departmental appropriations do not lapse at financial year-end. However, the responsible Minister may decide that part or all of a departmental appropriation is not required and request the Finance Minister to reduce the appropriation. The reduction in the appropriation is effected by the Finance Minister’s determination and is disallowable by Parliament. 2 Advance to the Finance Minister (AFM) - Appropriation Acts (No. 1, 3 & 5) 2013-14: section 13 and Appropriation Acts (No. 2, 4 & 6) 2013-14: section 15.

3 Variance between Total Appropriation and Appropriation Applied is due to increased section 31 receipts.

70 Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security Annual Report 2013-14 70

PART FOUR: FINANCIAL STATEMENTS

NOTES TO AND FORMING PART OF THE FINANCIAL STATEMENTS for year ended 30 June 2014

201 3

Appropriations

Appropriation applied in 2013 (current and prior

years) $

Variance $

Appropriation Act

FMA Act

Annual Appropriation $

Appropriations Reduced

1

$

AFM

2

$

Section 30

$

Section 31 $

Section 32

$

Total

Appropriations $

DEPARTMENTAL Ordinary Annual Services

2 190 000 (10 000) - - 63 568 - 2 243 568 2 236 999 6 569

Other Services Equity

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

Total Department

al

2 1 9 0 000

(10 000)

-

-

63 658

-

2 2 4 3 568

2 236 999

6 569

Notes:

1 Appropriations reduced under Appropriations Acts (No. 1, 3 & 5) 2012-13: sections 10, 11 and 12 and under Appropriation Acts (No. 2, 4 & 6) 2012-13: sections 12, 13, and 14. Departmental appropriations do not lapse at financial year-end. However, the responsible Minister may decide that part or all of a departmental appropriation is not required and request the Finance Minister to reduce the appropriation. The reduction in the appropriation is effected by the Finance Minister’s determination and is disallowable by Parliament.

An Instrument to Reduce Appropriations (No. 1 of 2013-2014) was published on 13 August 2013. The effect of this instrument is to formally reduce the Annual Appropriation Act (No. 1) by $10,000. The revenue from government figure in the Statement of Comprehensive Income reflects this change.

2 Advance to the Finance Minister (AFM) - Appropriation Acts (No. 1, 3 & 5) 2012-13: section 13 and Appropriation Acts (No. 2, 4 & 6) 2012-13: section 15.

71 Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security Annual Report 2013-14 71

PART FOUR: FINANCIAL STATEMENTS

NOTES TO AND FORMING PART OF THE FINANCIAL STATEMENTS for year ended 30 June 2014

Table B: Departmental Capital Budget (‘Recoverable GST exclusive)

2014 Capital Budget Appropriations

Capital Budget Appropriations applied in 201

4

(current and prior years)

Variance $

Appropriation Act

FMA Act

Total Capital Budget Appropriations $

Payments for Non-financial Assets

3

$

Payments for other Purposes $

Total Payments $

Annual Capital Budget

$

Appropriations reduced

2

$

Section 32

$

Departmental Ordinary Annual Services -

Departmental Capital Budget

1

69 000 - - 69 000 2 723 - 2 723 66 277

Total Departmental 69 000

-

-

69 000 2 723

-

2 723 66 277

Notes

1 Departmental Capital Budgets are appropriated through Appropriation Acts (No 1, 3, 5). They form part of ordinary annual services, and are not separately identified in the Appropriation Acts. For more information on ordinary annual services appropriations, please see Table A: Annual Appropriations. 2 Appropriations reduced under Appropriation Acts (No 1, 3, 5) 2013-14: sections 10, 11, 12 and 15 or via a determination by the Finance Minister. 3 Payments made for non-financial assets include purchases of assets, expenditure on assets which has been capitalised, costs incurred to make good an asset

to its original condition, and the capital repayment component of finance leases.

72 Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security Annual Report 2013-14 72

PART FOUR: FINANCIAL STATEMENTS

NOTES TO AND FORMING PART OF THE FINANCIAL STATEMENTS for year ended 30 June 2014

2013 Capital Budget Appropriations

Capital Budget Appropriations applied in 201

3

(current and prior years)

Variance $

Appropriation Act

FMA Act

Total Capital Budget Appropriations $

Payments for Non-financial Assets

3

$

Payments for other Purposes $

Total Payments $

Annual Capital Budget

$

Appropriations reduced

2

$

Section 32

$

Departmental Ordinary Annual Services -

Departmental Capital Budget

1

- - - - - - - -

Total Departmental

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

Notes:

1 Departmental Capital Budgets are appropriated through Appropriation Acts (No 1, 3, 5). They form part of ordinary annual services, and are not separately identified in the Appropriation Acts. For more information on ordinary annual services appropriations, please see Table A: Annual Appropriations. 2 Appropriations reduced under Appropriation Acts (No 1, 3, 5) 2012-13: sections 10, 11, 12 and 15 or via a determination by the Finance Minister. 3 Payments made for non-financial assets include purchases of assets, expenditure on assets which has been capitalised, costs incurred to make good an asset to its original condition, and the capital repayment component of finance leases.

73 Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security Annual Report 2013-14 73

PART FOUR: FINANCIAL STATEMENTS NOTES TO AND FORMING PART OF THE FINANCIAL STATEMENTS for year ended 30 June 2014

Table C: Unspent Departmental Annual Appropriations (‘Recoverable GST exclusive)

Authority

2014 $

2013 $

Appropriation Act (No 2) 2004-051 - 53 000

Appropriation Act (No 1) 2010-11 - DCB 1 874 10 131

Appropriation Act (No 1) 2011-12 - DCB 9 000 9 000

Appropriation Act (No 1) 2012-13 - 1 826 096

Appropriation Act (No 1) 2013-14 2 142 718 -

Appropriation Act (No 1) 2013-14 - DCB 69 000

Cash 207 005 203 783

Total Departmental 2 429 597 2 102 010

1. Appropriation Act (No. 2) 2004-2004 repealed by the Statute Stocktake (Appropriations) Act 2013 with effect from 1 July 2014. The effect has been reflected in the Statement of Financial Position in Contributed Equity.

Note 16 - Compensation and Debt Relief

No ‘Act of Grace’ payments were expensed during the reporting period, (2012-13: nil).

No waivers of amounts owing to the Australian Government were made pursuant to subsection 34(1) of the Financial Management and Accountability Act 1997 during the reporting period, (2012-13: nil).

No payments were made under the ‘Defective Administration Scheme’ during the reporting period, (2012-13: nil).

No ex-gratia payments were provided for during the reporting period, (2012-13: nil).

No payments were made under section 73 of the Public Service Act 1999, (2012-13: nil).

Note 17 - Reporting of Outcomes

There is only one outcome for OIGIS as detailed in the objectives in Note 1.1.

Note 17A - Net Cost of Outcome Delivery

Outcome 1 Total

2014 2013 2014 2013

$ $ $ $

Departmental Expenses 2 227 215 2 342 824 2 227 215 2 342 824

Own-source income 274 548 200 247 274 548 200 247

Net cost/(contribution) of outcome delivery 1 952 667 2 142 577 1 952 667 2 142 577

74 Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security Annual Report 2013-14 74

PART FOUR: FINANCIAL STATEMENTS

NOTES TO AND FORMING PART OF THE FINANCIAL STATEMENTS for year ended 30 June 2014

Note 18 - Net Cash Appropriation Arrangements

2014 $

2013 $

Total Comprehensive Income (loss) less

depreciation/amortisation expenses previously funded through revenue appropriations1 273 640 77 031

Plus depreciation/amortisation expenses previously funded through revenue appropriation (37 999) (39 608)

Total comprehensive income (loss) as per the Statement of Comprehensive Income 235 641 37 423

1. From 2010-11, the Government introduced net cash appropriation arrangements, where revenue appropriations for depreciation/amortisation expenses ceased. Entities now receive a separate capital budget provided through equity appropriations. Capital budgets are to be appropriated in the period when cash payment for capital expenditure is required.

75 Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security Annual Report 2013-14 75

PART FOUR: FINANCIAL STATEMENTS

76 Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security Annual Report 2013-14

PART FIVE: ANNEXURES

PART FIVE: ANNEXURES

77 Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security Annual Report 2013-14 7777

PART FIVE: ANNEX 1

Annex 1: Summary of Inquiries and Complaints Table 1.1 IGIS Act Inquiries actioned between 1 July 2013 and 30 June 2014

Agency Source Inquiry Date initiated Date finalised Duration

(days)

ASIS IGIS The provision of weapons

and the training in and use of weapons and self-defence techniques by ASIS

15 April 2013 29 November 2013 228

ASIO IGIS The attendance of legal

representatives at ASIO interviews

1 May 2013 24 January 2014 268

ASIO/DIAC/ AFP Prime Minister

The matter of an Egyptian irregular maritime arrival who was the subject of an Interpol red notice [Mr E]

6 June 2013 13 March 2014 280

ASIS IGIS The management of

weapons by ASIS in a particular location

10 June 2014 Ongoing

Table 1.2 Summary of complaints handled administratively by OIGIS between 1 July 2013 and 30 June 2014

Agency Number of

complaints

From public From intelligence agency employee or ex-employee

ASIO (visa security assessments)

487 487 0

ASIO (all other complaints)

13 8 5

ASIS 2 0 2

DSD 2 2 0

DIGO 0 0 0

DIO 0 0 0

ONA 0 0 0

TOTAL Complaints 504 497 7

78 Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security Annual Report 2013-14 787878

PART FIVE: ANNEX 2

Annex 2: Salary ranges for APS Employees in OIGIS in 2013-14 OIGIS Band APS Level Salary Range

1 July 2013-30 June 2014 ($)

SES Band 1 SES Band 1 179 4587

OIGIS Band 4 EL2 133 967

130 796

128 258

119 013

112 564

OIGIS Band 3 EL1 107 810

104 635

96 710

OIGIS Band 2 APS6 89 973

87 199

84 027

80 063

APS5 76 101

74 513

72 531

70 155

APS4 68 569

66 586

65 003

63 021

OIGIS Band 1 APS3 61 038

59 453

57 866

56 680

APS2 55 092

53 509

51 129

49 543

APS1 48 355

46 373

45 184

45 138

7 The salary reported in the 2012-13 annual report was incorrect and should have been reported as $174 232.

79 Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security Annual Report 2013-14 797979

PART FIVE: ANNEX 3

Annex 3: Agency resource statements Table 3.1 Agency Resource Statement and Resources for Outcomes 2013-14

Actual available appropriation for 2013-14 $’000

(a)

Payments made 2013-14 $’000 (b)

Balance remaining 2013-14 (a) - (b)

Ordinary Annual Services

Departmental Appropriation P rior year departmental

appr opriation

D epartmental appropriation

S31 R elevant Agency Receipts

2 049

2 248

410

2 038

238

-

11

2 010

410

T otal 4 707 2 276 2 431

A dministered expenses - - -

T otal - - -

Total ordinary annual services A 4 707 2 276 2 431

Other services

Departmental non-operating - - -

Total - - -

Total other services B - - -

Total available annual appropriations 4 707 2 276 2 431

Special appropriations - - -

Total special appropriations C - - -

Special accounts - - -

Total special accounts D - - -

Total resourcing A + B + C + D

4 707 2 276 2 431

Less appropriations drawn from annual or special appropriations above and credited to special accounts and/or CAC Act bodies through annual appropriations

- - -

Total net resourcing for agency 4 707 2 276 2 431

80 Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security Annual Report 2013-14 808080

PART FIVE: ANNEX 3

Table 3.2 Expenses and Resources for Outcome 1

Outcome 1: Independent assurance for the Prime Minister, senior ministers and Parliament as to whether Australia’s intelligence and security agencies act legally and with propriety by inspecting, inquiring into and reporting on their activities

Budget 2013-14 $’000 (a)

Actual expenses 2013-14 $’000

(b)

Variation 2013-14 $’000 (a) - (b)

Program 1.1: Office of the Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security

Departmental expenses

Or dinary annual services

( Appropriation Bill No.1) 2 178 2 179 (1)

R evenue from independent sources 150 (150)

Special appr opriations

Special A ccounts

Expenses not r equiring appropriation in the Budget year

131 163 (32)

Total for Program 1.1 2 309 2 492 (183)

Outcome 1 Totals by appropriation type

Departmental expenses

Or dinary annual services

( Appropriation Bill No.1) 2 178 2 179 (1)

R evenue from independent sources 150 (150)

Special appr opriations

Special A ccounts

Expenses not r equiring appropriation in the Budget year 131 163 (32)

Total expenses for Outcome 1 2 309 2 492 (183)

Budget 2013-14

Actual 2013-14

Average Staffing Level (number) 12 12 -

81 Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security Annual Report 2013-14 818181

PART FIVE: ANNEX 4

Annex 4: Requirements for Annual Reports Description Requirement Part of Report Page

Letter of transmittal Mandatory Preliminary i

Table of contents Mandatory Preliminary ii-iii

Index Mandatory Annex 86-92

Glossary Mandatory Preliminary iv

Contact officer(s) Mandatory Preliminary inside front

cover

Internet home page address and internet address for report Mandatory Preliminary inside front

cover

Review by agency head Mandatory Overview 3-5

Summary of significant issues and developments Suggested Overview 1-5

Overview of agency’s performance and financial results Suggested Overview 1-5, 31-2

Outlook for following year Suggested Overview 5

Significant issues and developments - portfolio Portfolio departments - suggested

Overview N/A

Role and functions Mandatory Overview 1, 4, 5

Organisational structure Mandatory Management &

Accountability

33

Outcome and programme structure Mandatory Performance 6-7, 80

Where outcome and programme structures differ from PB Statements/PAES or other portfolio statements accompanying any other additional appropriation bills (other portfolio statements), details of variation and reasons for change

Mandatory Performance N/A

Portfolio structure Portfolio

departments - mandatory

N/A N/A

Review of performance during the year in relation to programmes and contribution to outcomes Mandatory Performance 6-32

Actual performance in relation to deliverables and KPIs set out in PB Statements/PAES or other portfolio statements

Mandatory Performance 6-32

Where performance targets differ from the PBS/PAES, details of both former and new targets, and reasons for the change

Mandatory N/A N/A

Narrative discussion and analysis of performance Mandatory Performance 6-32

Trend information Mandatory Performance 15-16, 32

82 Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security Annual Report 2013-14 828282

PART FIVE: ANNEX 4

Description Requirement Part of Report Page

Significant changes in nature of principal functions/services Suggested N/A N/A

Performance of purchaser/provider arrangements If applicable, suggested Management & Accountability

34, 36

Factors, events or trends influencing agency performance

Suggested Overview 1-5, 18

Contribution of risk management in achieving objectives Suggested Management & Accountability

3, 33-34

Performance against service charter customer service standards, complaints data, and the department’s response to complaints

If applicable - mandatory N/A N/A

Discussion and analysis of the department’s financial performance Mandatory Management & Accountability

31-2

Discussion of any significant changes in financial results from the prior year, from budget or anticipated to have a significant impact on future operations

Mandatory Management & Accountability 31-2

Agency resource statement and summary resource tables by outcomes Mandatory Annex 79-80

Agency heads are required to certify that their agency complies with the ‘Commonwealth Fraud Control Guidelines’

Mandatory Preliminary i

Statement of the main corporate governance practices in place Mandatory Management & Accountability

33-5

Names of the senior executive and their responsibilities Suggested Management & Accountability

33

Senior management committees and their roles Suggested Management & Accountability 33

Corporate and operational plans and associated performance reporting and review Suggested Management & Accountability

33, 4

Internal audit arrangements including approach adopted to identifying areas of significant financial or operational risk and arrangements to manage those risks

Suggested Management & Accountability 33, 4

Policy and practices on the establishment and maintenance of appropriate ethical standards Suggested Management & Accountability

34

How nature and amount of remuneration for SES officers is determined Suggested Management & Accountability

34-5

Significant developments in external scrutiny Mandatory Management & Accountability 4, 35

Judicial decisions and decisions of administrative tribunals and by the Australian Information Commissioner

Mandatory Overview 4

83 Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security Annual Report 2013-14 838383

PART FIVE: ANNEX 4

Description Requirement Part of Report Page

Reports by the Auditor-General, a Parliamentary Committee, the Commonwealth Ombudsman or an agency capability review

Mandatory Management & Accountability 4, 35

Assessment of effectiveness in managing and developing human resources to achieve departmental objectives

Mandatory Management & Accountability 35-6

Workforce planning, staff turnover and retention Suggested Management & Accountability 35-6

Impact and features of enterprise or collective agreements, individual flexibility arrangements (IFAs), determinations, common law contracts and Australian Workplace Agreements (AWAs)

Suggested Management & Accountability 34-5, 36

Training and development undertaken and its impact Suggested Management & Accountability

36

Work health and safety performance Suggested Management &

Accountability

38

Productivity gains Suggested Management &

Accountability 3-4, 12, 18

Statistics on staffing Mandatory Management &

Accountability

35

Enterprise or collective agreements, IFAs, determinations, common law contracts and AWAs Mandatory Management & Accountability;

Annex 2 Salary ranges

34-5, 36

Performance pay Mandatory Management &

Accountability

36

Assessment of effectiveness of assets management If applicable - mandatory N/A 31-2

Assessment of purchasing against core policies and principles Mandatory Management & Accountability

34, 36

Summary statement detailing the number of new consultancy services let during the year; the total actual expenditure on all new consultancy contracts let during the year (inclusive of GST); the number of ongoing consultancy contracts that were active in the reporting year; and the total actual expenditure in the reporting year on the ongoing consultancy contracts (inclusive of GST). A statement noting that information on contracts and consultancies is available through the AusTender website.

Mandatory Management & Accountability 36

Absence of provisions in contracts allowing access by the Auditor-General Mandatory Management & Accountability

36

Contracts exempted from publication in AusTender Mandatory Management & Accountability 37

84 Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security Annual Report 2013-14 848484

PART FIVE: ANNEX 4

Description Requirement Part of Report Page

Financial Statements Mandatory Financial

Statements

39-75

Work health and safety (Schedule 2, Part 4 of the Work Health and Safety Act 2011) Mandatory Management & Accountability

38

Advertising and Market Research (section 311A of the Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918) and statement on advertising campaigns

Mandatory Management & Accountability 37

Ecologically sustainable development and environmental performance (section 516A of the

Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999)

Mandatory Management & Accountability 37

Compliance with the agency’s obligations under the Carer Recognition Act 2010 If applicable, mandatory

N/A N/A

Grant programmes Mandatory N/A N/A

Disability reporting - explicit and transparent reference to agency-level information available through other reporting mechanisms

Mandatory Management & Accountability 38

Information Publication Scheme statement Mandatory Management & Accountability 37

Correction of material errors in previous annual report If applicable - mandatory

N/A N/A

Agency Resource Statements and Resources for Outcomes

Mandatory Annex 3 79-80

List of requirements Mandatory Annex 4 81-4

85 Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security Annual Report 2013-14 858585

PART FIVE

86 Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security Annual Report 2013-14 868686

INDEX Index A

Accountable Authority Instructions, 34

address and contact details, inside front cover

Administrative Appeals Tribunal, 1, 14-15

administrative tribunals, 1, 4

advertising and market research, 37

agency resource statements, 79-80

alcohol consumption, 11

analytic independence inquiry of 2012-13, implementation of recommendations, 17

ANAO see Australian National Audit Office

Anti-Money Laundering and Counter Terrorism Financing Act 2006, 30-1

Archives Act 1983

IGIS role in FOI and Archives matters, 1, 14-15

asset management, 31-2

Assistant Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security, 7, 33

assumed identities, 30

Attorney-General, 2, 22, 23, 31

ASIO submissions to, 18

reporting on warrants to, 19

Attorney-General’s Guidelines, 18, 20

Audit Committee, 33-4, 38

Auditor-General, 35 see also Australian National Audit Office

audits

independent auditor’s report, 31, 35

internal audit, 33-4

AusCheck, 14

AusTender, 36, 37

Australian Federal Police, 4, 9-10

Australian Geospatial-Intelligence Organisation see Defence Imagery and Geospatial Organisation (DIGO)

Australian Government Solicitors, 37

Australian Human Rights Commission referrals to OIGIS, 13

Australian Intelligence Community see intelligence agencies

Australian National Audit Office

access clauses, 36

and accountability of AIC agencies, 1

audit report, 31, 35

Australian persons, communication and retention of intelligence on see privacy rules compliance

Australian Secret Intelligence Service (ASIS)

assumed identities, 30

AUSTRAC information access and use, 31

complaints, 13, 77

employment related matters, 13

IGIS briefings for ASIS officers, 7

inquiries relating to, 10-11, 77

inspections of, 24-6, 30, 31

ministerial authorisations to collect intelligence, 24-5

new powers proposed, 5

privacy rules, 23-5

procedural changes as a result of IGIS recommendations, 11, 25

recordkeeping, 31

review of operational files, 25

role and functions, 2, 23

weapons use and issues, 10-11, 26

Australian Security Intelligence Organisation (ASIO)

analytic independence inquiry of 2012-13, implementation of recommendations, 17

assumed identities, 30

AUSTRAC information access and use, 31

complaints (non visa-related), 13, 77

87 Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security Annual Report 2013-14 878787

INDEX complaints (visa-related), 8-10, 12, 77

employment related matters, 13-14

exchange of information with foreign liaisons, 21-2

IGIS briefings for ASIO officers, 7

information sharing, 9-10

information use within ASIO, 22

inquiries relating to, 4, 8-10, 77

inspections of, 18-22, 31

investigations by, 19

legal representation at ASIO interviews, 4, 8-9

management of Mr E (asylum seeker) case, 9-10

Preservation Notices (telecommunications data), 21

procedural changes as a result of IGIS recommendations, 9, 10, 22

questioning and detention warrants, 20

recordkeeping, 17, 18, 19

role and powers, 2, 5, 18, 21

taxation information access, 21

telecommunications data and interceptions, 19-21

warrant operations, 19-20

Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Act 1979 (ASIO Act), 2, 13, 18, 21

breaches of, 19, 20

Australian Signals Directorate see Defence Signals Directorate (DSD)

Australian Taxation Office (ATO), 21

Australian Transaction Reports and Analysis Centre (AUSTRAC), 30-1

Aviation Security Identification Cards, 14

B

Blight, Jake, 7, 33, 34

briefings

for IGIS by agencies, 7

by IGIS for agency officers, 7

business processes, 3

C

changes in agency procedures see procedural changes as a result of IGIS recommendations

Chief Executive Instructions, 34

codes of conduct, 34

collaboration

Immigration/ASIO/AFP, 8, 9-10

OIGIS/Ombudsman, 13

Commissioner of Taxation, 21

Commonwealth Disability Strategy, 38

Commonwealth Ombudsman, 4, 13, 30, 35

complaints handling, 11-14

contacts handled administratively, 16

employment-related matters, 13-14

non visa-related, 13, 16, 77

numbers and trends, 15-16, 77

OIGIS engagement with other agencies, 13, 14

role of IGIS, 1, 11-12

summary, 77

timeliness, 17

visa-related, 8-10, 12, 15-16, 77

see also inquiries

consultants, 36

contact details, inside front cover

contracts, 36-7

corporate and operational planning, 33

corporate governance, 33-5

court decisions, 4

Crimes Act 1914, 30

cross-agency inspections, 30-1

currency movements, 31

Cybercrime Legislation Amendment Act 2012, 21

88 Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security Annual Report 2013-14 888888

INDEX

D

Defence Imagery and Geospatial Organisation (DIGO), 2

complaints handled administratively by OIGIS, 77

inspections of, 29-30

privacy rules, 23-4

role, 2-3

Defence intelligence agencies, 2-3

Defence Intelligence Organisation (DIO)

analytic independence inquiry (2012-13), implementation of recommendations, 17

complaints handled administratively by OIGIS, 77

inspections of, 30

privacy guidelines compliance, 30

recordkeeping, 17

role, 2-3

Defence Signals Directorate (DSD), 2

complaints handled administratively by OIGIS, 13, 77

inspections of, 26-9

ministerial authorisations to collect intelligence, 26-9

privacy rules, 23-4, 27, 29

procedural changes as a result of IGIS recommendations, 27, 28-9

recordkeeping, 28, 29

role, 3

TIA Act compliance, 28

delegations (administrative), 34

deliverables, 6

Department of Defence, 2 see also Minister for Defence

Department of Immigration and Border Protection see Immigration

Department of Immigration and Citizenship see Immigration

Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, 36, 37

Director-General of ASIS, 11, 24, 25, 26, 30

Director-General of Security (ASIO), 21, 30

disability reporting, 38

E

ecologically sustainable development, 37

effecting change in agencies see procedural changes as a result of IGIS recommendations

Egyptian irregular maritime arrival, and actions of Commonwealth agencies, 4, 9-10

employment (OIGIS), 34-5, 36

employment-related grievances within intelligence agencies, 13-14

engagement of IGIS with intelligence agencies, 7

enterprise agreements, 36

environmental performance, 37

ethical standards, 34

exchange of information see information sharing

exempt contracts, 37

expenditure, 31, 80

expert evidence provision, 1

external scrutiny, 4, 35

F

financial intelligence information, 21, 30-1

Financial Management and Accountability Act 1997, 33, 34

financial performance

agency resource statements, 79-80

summary, 31-2

financial statements, 35, 39-75

firearms, 11

foreign agencies, exchange of information with, 21-2, 27

foreign conflicts, Australians involved in, 20

fraud control, i, 34

89 Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security Annual Report 2013-14 898989

INDEX freedom of information

IGIS role in FOI and Archives matters, 1, 14-15

OIGIS as exempt agency (FOI Act), 37

Freedom of Information Act 1982, 1, 14, 37

functions

intelligence agencies, 2-3

OIGIS, 1, 4, 5

funding, 31-2, 79-80

future (outlook), 5

G

glossary, iv

H

Health and Safety Representative, 38

highlights of year, 3-4

human resources management, 35-6

human rights and discrimination matters, 22

human source operations (ASIO), 18

I

identities, assumed, 30

Immigration

information sharing and recordkeeping, 8, 9-10

inquiries relating to, 4, 8-10

procedural changes as a result of IGIS recommendations, 10

immigration detention, 4

independent auditor’s report, 31, 35

Information Commissioner, 1, 4

Information Publication Scheme, 37

information sharing

Immigration/ASIO/AFP, 8, 9-10

inquiries

completed, 4, 8-11, 77

employment of persons for a particular inquiry, 35

implementation of recommendations see procedural changes as a result of IGIS recommendations

inquiry function and powers, 1, 7-8

legal representation at ASIO interviews, 4, 8-9

numbers and trends, 15

ongoing, 11, 77

requested by Prime Minister, 9-10

timeliness, 16-17

workload, 4

inspections

agencies subject to ISA Act, 23-4

ASIO activities, 18-22, 31

ASIS activities, 24-6, 30, 31

AUSTRAC access and use, 30-1

cross-agency inspections, 30-1

DIGO activities, 29-30

DIO privacy guideline adherence, 30

DSD activities, 26-9

forward plan, 33

ONA privacy guideline adherence, 30

overview of activities, 18

role of IGIS, 1

Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security, 33

briefings, 7

review of year, 3-5

role and powers, 1, 4, 5

submissions to inquiries and reviews, 5

Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security Act 1986, 1, 13

intelligence agencies, 2-3

AUSTRAC information access and use, 30-1

complaints (non visa-related), 13, 16

complaints against agencies see complaints handling; inquiries

cross-agency inspections, 30-1 see also inspections

effecting change in agencies see procedural changes as a result of IGIS recommendations

employment-related grievances, 13-14

90 Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security Annual Report 2013-14 909090

INDEX

engagement with, 7

inspection of, 23-31

limits to functions, 23

oversight of, 1, 5

public interest disclosure scheme, 4, 14, 16, 30

regular points of contact (officers), 7

roles and functions, 2-3

Intelligence Services Act 2001 (ISA), 2, 3

agencies subject to ISA Act see intelligence agencies

breaches of, 11, 13, 16, 24-5, 26, 29

limits on intelligence agencies’ functions, 23

privacy rules, 23-5

internal audit, 33-4

Internet home page, inside front cover

Interpol red notices, 4, 9, 10

irregular maritime arrivals

complaints about security assessments, 15

inquiry concerning actions of Commonwealth agencies concerning Mr E, 4, 9-10

J

judicial decisions, 4

K

key performance indicators, 6-7

key strategies, 6

L

leadership groups addressed by Inspector-General, 7

learning and development, 36

legacy incidents, 27, 28-9

legal representation at ASIO interviews, 4, 8-9

legal services, 37

legislation (enabling Act), 1

legislative changes, 4

letter of transmittal, i

M

management and accountability (OIGIS), 33-8

Maritime Security Identification Cards, 14

market research, 37

memoranda of understanding, 13, 21, 31

Minister for Defence, 3, 26, 27, 28, 29

Minister for Foreign Affairs, 2, 31

ministerial authorisations to collect intelligence, 23-30

N

National Disability Strategy, 38

national intelligence priorities, 23

national security, 2, 3, 5, 10

National Security Committee of Cabinet, 23

National Security Legislation Amendment Bill (No. 1) 2014, 5

nationality, presumption of, 23, 24-5, 27, 29

natural disasters, 3

non-salary benefits, 36

notifiable incidents (WHS), 38

O

Office of National Assessments (ONA)

complaints handled administratively by OIGIS, 77

inspections of, 30

privacy rules compliance, 30

role, 2

Office of National Assessments Act 1977 (ONA Act), 2

Ombudsman, 4, 13, 30, 35

operational files, review of, 25

operational planning (OIGIS), 33

organisational structure, 33

outcome and program, 6-7

91 Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security Annual Report 2013-14 919191

INDEX financial performance summary, 31-2

performance report, 6-32

resources for outcome, 79-80

outlook, 5

outreach program, 7

overview by Inspector-General, 3-5

P

Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security, 1, 5

parliamentary oversight of OIGIS, 4, 35

performance indicators, 6-7

performance pay, 36

performance report, 6-32

personal information in ASIO files, 22 see also privacy rules compliance

personal security see protective security

planning (OIGIS), 33, 34

Portfolio Budget Statements, 6

portfolio relationship, 1

powers of IGIS, 1 see also roles and functions (IGIS)

presentations and outreach, 7

Preservation Notices (stored telecommunications data), 21

Prime Minister, 1, 2, 5

inquiry requests, 9-10

see also Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet

priorities

risk-based approach to prioritising work, 3

privacy rules compliance, 22, 23-5, 27, 29, 30

procedural changes as a result of IGIS recommendations, 17-18

AFP, 10

ASIO, 9, 10, 22

ASIS, 11, 25

DSD, 27, 28-9

Immigration, 10

procurement, 34, 36

program, 6-7

protection for complainants/information providers, 8

protective security, 34

Public Governance, Performance and Accountability Act 2013, 34

Public Interest Disclosure Act 2103, 4

Public Interest Disclosure scheme, 4, 14, 16, 30

Public Service Act 1999 code of conduct provisions, 13

purchasing, 34, 36

Q

questioning and detention warrants, 20

R

recordkeeping

ASIO, 17, 18, 19

ASIS, 31

DIO, 17

DSD, 28, 29

Immigration, 9-10

value of, 13

remuneration

APS employees, 36, 78

non-salary benefits, 36

SES, 34-5

resources for outcome, 79-80

risk management, 33-4

risk-based approach to prioritising work, 3

roles and functions

intelligence agencies, 2-3

OIGIS, 1, 4, 5

92 Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security Annual Report 2013-14 929292

INDEX

S

salary ranges, 78

security

defined, 2

clearances for OIGIS staff, 36

policy for use of information holdings within ASIO, 22

protective security, 34

visa applicant checks see visa security assessment processes

self-defence techniques, 10-11, 26

Senate Legal and Constitutional Affairs References Committee, 5

Senate Standing Committee on Finance and Public Administration, 4

senior executive, 33

Senior Executive Service (SES) officer remuneration, 34-5

senior management committees, 33

staff, 35-6, 80

strategies, 6

structure (organisational), 33

study assistance, 36

submissions to inquiries and reviews, 5

T

Taxation Administration Act 1953 (TAA), 21

taxation information, 21

Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act 1979 (TIA Act), 5, 19-21, 28

telecommunications interception warrants, 19-20

telecommunications locational information or subscriber data, 20-1

tendering see purchasing

Thom, Vivienne, 1, 33 see also Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security

training and development, 36

trends

finances, 32

inquiries and complaints, 15-16

tribunal decisions, 4

V

visa security assessment processes

complaints handling, 12

complaints numbers and trends, 15-16

interviews, 4, 8-9

new processes, 12

shortcomings addressed, 9-10

W

warrant operations by ASIO, 19-20

weapons use and issues, 10-11, 26

website address, inside front cover

whistleblower protection scheme see Public Interest Disclosure scheme

Work Health and Safety Act 2011, 38

work health and safety (OIGIS), 38

workload, 4, 5, 18

workplace agreements, 36

Y

year in review, 3-5

Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security Annu Al RepoRt 2013-2014

ANNUAL REPORT

2013-2014