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Tuesday, 21 June 1904


Mr GROOM (Darling Downs) - I would direct the attention of the Prime Minister to the fact that even if the paragraph were amended as proposed, an anomaly would remain. It will be remembered that when the honorable and learned member for Corinella was dealing with paragraph c he asked that the words " and to specify, the organizations or persons to whom such penalties shall be paid " be omitted. His contention was that circumstances might vary, and that it would be inadvisable to specify in the award itself the persons who should receive the penalties for a breach of it. He considered it desirable to provide that, on a subsequent application, the Court, which would then have a full knowledge of the circumstances, should be able to direct to whom the penalties for a breach that had actually occurred, should be paid. Those words were omitted from the paragraph, and under it the Court, in making an award, will have power only to specify the maximum penalty for a breach of it. Under paragraph /, any practice, rule, or custom settled by an award may become a common rule, and the common rule will have a wider application than an award ; yet, in paragraph g, it is proposed to leave it to the Court to determine in making that common rule the persons to whom the penalties for a breach of it shall be paid.


Mr McCay - The Prime Minister should follow the course adopted in regard to paragraph c.


Mr GROOM - That is so. To remove the anomaly, it would be necessary to omit 1 all the words as to specifying the persons to whom the penalties shall be paid. It is desirable, however, that there should be power, as in the case of a breach of an award to specify the persons to whom these penalties shall be paid when a breach of the common rule has been committed. The Prime Minister -will recognise that the conditions governing the common rule are practically the same as those governing an award ; and that any individual injured by a breach of the common rule should be entitled to receive the penalty fixed in respect of it just as he would be in the case of a breach of an award.


Mr DUGALD THOMSON (NORTH SYDNEY, NEW SOUTH WALES) - The paragraph is to be recommitted.


Mr GROOM - But I wish to make the paragraphs consistent. At present the provisions relating to the common rule are wider than those applying to an award. Only one order could be made as regards parties to a dispute, but a much more drastic order might be made in reference to persons who were not parties.


Mr Watson - I think I can meet the difficult v.


Mr GROOM - I would ask the Prime Minister whether he thinks that the word "award," used in its full sense, includes the words " common rule ?' '


Mr Glynn - Under clause 37, I think it does.


Mr GROOM - Paragraph c, of clause 37, provides that the award of the Court shall be binding on - all organizations and persons on whom the award is declared by the Court to be binding.


Mr Glynn - Those words are not required, because what the honorable and learned member has pointed out follows.


Mr GROOM - That is the point which I desire to bring under the notice of the Prime Minister. It would not be well for us to leave these matters to the Court to interpret. Throughout clause 46 we deal with an award and a common rule as if they were absolutely distinct. An award is something which is binding between the parties to the dispute, but a common rule may be declared to be. binding on persons who are not. We have been using a distinction in phraseology, whereas if an award includes both an award and common rule there need be no further declaration following paragraph g.


Mr Glynn - These words should be struck out.


Mr GROOM - I think that they should, in order that the paragraph may be brought into harmony with paragraph c. If the word "award" does not cover "common rule,", then it will be necessary to make a consequential amendment in clause 52, in order to enable a person who is aggrieved by a breach of a common rule to recover the penalty provided in a Court of summary jurisdiction, in any place to which it extends.







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