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Wednesday, 6 September 1939
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Mr MENZIES (Kooyong) (Prime Minister) by leave - On Sunday last the 3rd September, shortly after 8p.m. in Australian time, the Prime Minister of Great Britain announced that the time limited by a notification to the German Government had expired and that Great Britain was at war with Germany. An hour or two later, a proclamation was issued in the Commonwealth of Australia, declaring the existence of a state of war in Australia. In order that honorable members may have before them, and in order that we may have on record, some accurate statement of the affairs leading up to this tragic consequence, I am to-day laying on the table a White Paper, which contains the relevant documents exchanged between the Governments, together with such explanatory matter as may serve to connect one document with another. Nobody can foretell the course of events. Nobody can foretell howthis war is going to be fought, what special dangers Australia may encounter, or what are the best services which we can render to Great Britain and the Empire; but we do know that we are together in this struggle, and we are confident that our unity and determination, being based upon justice, arc bound to succeed.


Mr MENZIES - Before referring to the documents which are contained in the White Paper, I should like, with the permission of the House, to make reference to a few preliminary matters which, although preliminary in point of recitation, are in fact, of tremendous importance.

In the first place, I should like very briefly to remind honorable members of the extraordinary succession of promises, and of broken promises, with which we have been confronted in recent years, because, until one understands those, one is at some loss to understand the mentality of any ruler of a great country who could plunge the world into war as Herr Hitler, I venture to say, has plunged the world into war. We are all, of course, possessed of a lively recollection of the fact that in the last few years, during the Hitler régime, we have seen the downfall of Austria as an independent State; we have seen the downfall of Czechoslovakia as an independent State; and we are to-day witnessing an attempt by arms to destroy the independence of the Polish State.

Each of those matters, each of those excursions on the part of Germany, has been preceded by promises of so categorical a kind that the grossest breach of each of them had to be committed before the subsequent move could take place. On the 30th January, 1934, Herr Hitler, speaking in the Reichstag, said this about Austria -

I must in the most formal manner reject the further assertion of the Austrian Government that any attack against the Austrian State will be undertaken or is even planned by Germany.

In May of 1935, speaking in the same place, he said -

Germany neither intends nor wishes to interfere in the domestic affairs of Austria, to annex Austria, or to attach that country to her.

At the same time, and in the same speech, he said that the German Government would scrupulously maintain every treaty voluntarily signed, even though it was concluded before the accession of that Government to power and office; in particular, they would uphold and fulfil all obligations arising out of the Locarno Treaty. I refer to that speech, because, as honorable members know, notwithstanding those quite categorical statements, Germany in March of last year marched into Austria, absorbed that territory, and brought to an end the independent existence of Austria; and notwithstanding the statement made about the Locarno Pact, Germany, subsequent to that statement, remilitarised the Rhine, the demilitarisation of which was not only provided for by the Treaty of Versailles, but was also specifically reaffirmed by the three contracting parties, including Germany, in the Pact of Locarno. On the 7th March, 1936, speaking again in theReichstag, Hitler said - and I draw attention to these words -

I feel that after three years I can now regard the struggle for German equality as concluded to-day. Therefore, I think that the principal cause of our withdrawal from Europe's collective co-operation has ceased to exist. . . . We have no territorial demands to make in Europe.

Subsequent to that, demands were made upon the Czechoslovak State in relation to those Germans who were living in the Sudeten country on the fringes of Old Bohemia. In relation to that matter Hitler again made a speech on the 26th September of last year, two days before the day of crisis that we all remember. He then said this -

And now the last problem confronts us, which must be solved and which will be solved. It is the last territorial claim which I have to make in Europe, but it is a claim from which I do not recede and which I will fulfil, God willing.

A strange blasphemy, I venture to say, for, in four days' time, he was to stand at Munich to make a joint announcement to the world with the Prime Minister of Great Britain that the methods of peace were thenceforward to be resorted to and none other, and within a few months he was to go beyond the limits of the settlement arrived at at Munich and complete the total destruction of the independence of the whole of the Czechoslovak State!

So we have, as clearly as anybody could have it, a series of statements made by the leader of the German people, from time to time, in relation to various problems, all of which have been dishonoured.

The inference to be drawn from all this is, of course, and has been throughout the last few weeks, of a most grievous kind. The only inference which people of intelligence could draw from this extraordinary history has been that, although the word may have been given, there would undoubtedly, so long as force or the threat of force could prevail, be a succession of attacks on independent States in Europe and, by steady degrees of expansion, an overlordship of Europe by Germany to the destruction of independent communities and, what is much more serious, the destruction of liberal principles of government.

Now I turn to the immediate issue. I have referred to those other matters because they throw a lurid light on the mentality of the man with whom we have been dealing. I say " the man " because, even now that we are in the shadow of this war, I venture to say that there must be many millions of people in Germany who have liberal minds and who have no desire whatever for war. So I speak of their ruler - the man who has been able to plunge them into war, and the man who, undoubtedly, could have kept them at peace had he desired peace.

The problem of Danzig and the Corridor has of course been an almost constant source of irritation. We all know that from the very time that the Polish Corridor came into existence there have been debates about it among the German people. It is interesting to recall that the driving of the Corridor through to the sea, in order to give Poland access to the sea, which was necessary to complete Poland's real independence, was one of the fourteen points of President Wilson upon which the peace negotiations proceeded at the end of the last war. But there have always been irritation and differences of opinion about it.

In 1934, Germany and Poland entered into a pact of non-aggression. They agreed mutually to renounce all force, and they also agreed to the free negotiation of any contentious questions affecting their mutual relations. That pact was designed and expressed to last for a period of ten years. On the 20th February, 1938, Herr Hitler said in the Reichstag -

The Polish State respects the national conditions in Danzig -

That is the free city of Danzig under the League of Nations -

and Germany respects Polish rights. It has thus been possible to clear the way for the understanding of this problem of German and Polish relations and to enter into sincere and friendly collaboration.

In September of the same year, Herr Hitler made the speech to which I have already referred in which he said that he had no further territorial claims to make in Europe. On the 31st March of this year, Czechoslovakia having been absorbed and the agreement at Munich having been dishonoured, the Government of the United Kingdom, in an earnest desire to bring this process to an end, and to provide some means of security and peace for Europe, and, through Europe, for the world, gave a guarantee to Poland and mutual undertakings were exchanged with the Government of Poland. The result of that was that, on the 28th April last, Germany denounced the 1934 pact with Poland, which, as honorable members will recall, was a pact of non-aggression, on the ground that it was invalidated by the AngloPolish agreement. I have found, in reading these documents, and honorable members will find in reading them, how extraordinarily difficult it is to get into the mind of the other man; but I find it impossible to get inside the mind of a government that can say, " Our pact of non-aggression is invalidated because you have entered into a pact against aggression ". Yet that was the position. Because Poland received from Great Britain a guarantee that its integrity would be respected, Germany withdrew its guarantee that Polish integrity would be respected - one of the strangest incidents, I would have thought, in modern European history.

On the 10th July, the Prime Minister of Great Britain, Mr. Chamberlain, said, in the House of Commons -

We have guaranteed to give our assistance to Poland in the case of a clear threat to her independence which she considers it vital to resist with her national force, and we are firmly resolved to carry out this undertaking.

From that time, events have moved rapidly - not always with clear certainty, but always with great speed. So we come to the events chronicled in the White Paper which is in the hands of honorable members. It will be found that the first document on page 1 of that White Paper is a letter written on the 22nd August 1939, by Mr. Chamberlain to Herr Hitler. I commend this letter to honorable members because while it was courteously phrased - and it is some satisfaction to realize that throughout the whole of this correspondence there has been a courteous and moderate expression of views by Great Britain, however clearly those expressions have been set forth - it also made it abundantly and properly clear that Great Britain did not intend to depart from its obligations to Poland and that Germany should not make any rash or unwise assumption that it could once more destroy the independence of a state without provoking war. I direct attention to the following paragraph in that letter : -

It would be a dangerous illusion to think that, if war once started, it will come to an early end, even if a success in any one of the several fronts on which it will be engaged should have been secured.

From the second document, a letter from Herr Hitler dated the 23rd August, I read paragraph 1 as numbered in that letter. It is as follows : -

Germany has never sought conflict with England and has never interfered in English interests. On the contrary, she has for years endeavoured, although unfortunately in vain, to win England's friendship. On this account she voluntarily assumed in a wide area of Europe limitations on her own interests which from a national political point of view it would have otherwise been very difficult to tolerate.

I direct honorable members' attention to that. On the 23rd August, Herr Hitler is saying in this highly unreal fashion that Germany had voluntarily limited itself in Europe and ought to be given gome credit for it. I content myself by pointing out that on that very date Germany's territory and population were both greater than they were before 1914. This limitation of which he speaks was a strange sort of limitation since it had brought him Austria, Czechoslovakia, the remilitarization of the Rhine and a rearmed Germany. A strange limitation indeed, that left him with vastly greater territory and vastly greater population and vastly greater military resources! Then Herr Hitler goes on in the letter to set out what must be now distressingly familiar to all of us after some months of reading of them - allegations about appalling terrorism and atrocities of which, mark you, the German people have invariably been the "victims at the hands of small neighbouring states." He ends up by saying -

I have all my life fought for Anglo-German friendship. The attitude adopted by British diplomacy at any rate up to the present has however, convinced me of the futility of such an attempt.

Then those letters, not very promising if honorable members read them, not containing very much hope of settlement in their terms, were followed by a conversation between Sir Nevile Henderson, the British Ambassador at Berlin, and Herr Hitler. In the course of that conversation, Herr Hitler gave Sir Nevile Henderson a message to the British Government, a message which was so substantially better in point of tone that when we read of it here we had great hopes that reason might at last be prevailing on these matters. Honorable members will read it and they will see underneath all the veneer of boast and self-satisfaction that one perhaps could be led to expect some possibility of peaceful settlement not only in Danzig and the Corridor but also in Europe itself. The British Ambassador took that message to London. He flew to London on the morning of Saturday, the 26th August, which was after all, only a week before war occurred, and he gave a full account of it to the Government of the United Kingdom, which considered it on the Sunday, when it had, no doubt, the benefit of the views of all of the dominion governments. At any rate I can say for myself that I took the opportunity on that Sunday to convey to the British Government what I thought were the views not only of the Government of Australia but also of the great majority of the people of Australia. What I said to Mr. Chamberlain I repeated in substance on subsequent occasions in relation to the circumstances as they developed. I suggested that he and the British Government should make it clear to Herr Hitler that we regarded the merits of Danzig and the Corridor as quite open to argument and that we should use our influence with Poland to procure some form of arbitrament or adjustment, so long as Germany was prepared to play its part, but we felt that the time was opportune for a general European settlement which would recognize Germany's obligations to Italy and ours to France. That had been mentioned in the German despatch. And we welcomed references to possible future limitation of armaments, because we felt that the present state of affairs must lead to a serious economic breakdown, in which Germany would suffer as much as any country. I went further and suggested that it should be emphasized that there was amongst all the British peoples a genuine desire for good relations with Germany, but this desire was not inconsistent with the determination to fight Germany in what seemed a just cause, yet it would be a tragedy if we should fight, each believing his cause to be just when unprejudiced discussion and desire to understand each other's point of view might have avoided it; and that, from that point of view, a clear statement by Herr Hitler of his aims and desires should if possible be obtained. I went on to say that I would not dismiss proposals made by Herr Hitler simply because they were vague or occasionally meaningless, but that it was essential our approach to the whole problem should be liberal and generous so long as generosity was at our own expense and not at the expense of others. I said that we must not connive at a Polish settlement which would leave Poland at such a disadvantage in the negotiations as would render it probable that its future history would resemble that of Czechoslovakia.


Mr MENZIES That, sir, is the full substance of the point of view which was developed by the Australian Government in relation to this matter, and I venture to believe - I dare to believe - that that represents the general view of the great majority of the Australian people. Well, the British Government had that advice, that point of view, before it. It had its own point of view. It considered this matter with great care on the Sunday. It completed its reply to Hitler on the Monday morning, and that reply, which will be found in Document 4, was taken back to Berlin. I think that it will be agreed by those who read it that the reply does express a liberal and generous approach to this problem. It was not a truculent document. It was a document which exhibited a really earnest desire to arrive at a settlement. It indicated that any settlement arrived at must be guaranteed by other Powers, and it emphasized the view that if there is to be any proper settlement of the Polish problems there must be direct discussions between the German Government and the Polish Government on a basis that would include the safeguarding of Polish essential interests - a settlement procured by international guarantee.

The reply to that document, which was handed over late in the evening of the 28th August, was delivered by Herr Hitler to Sir Nevile Henderson at 7.15 p.m. on Tuesday, the 29th August. These dates I suggest are of great importance. At 7.15 p.m. on the 29th August, Herr Hitler handed his reply to Sir Nevile Henderson in Berlin. That reply is set out in Document 5. I do not propose to read it. It is rich in reference to the national dignity and honour of the German people. It is rich in reference to barbaric occasions of maltreatment which cry to high heaven, but it does ultimately go down into something specific, because it says this, as honorable members will see on page 12 -

Though sceptical as to the prospects of a successful outcome, they are nevertheless prepared to accept the English proposal and to enter direct discussions.

This is on the evening of the 29th August. Later on this passage occurs -

The German Government desire in this way to give to the British Government and to the British nation a proof of the sincerity of Germany's intentions to enter into a lasting friendship with Great Britain. The Government of the Reich feel, however, bound to point out to the British Government that in the event of a territorial re-arrangement in Poland they would no longer be able to bind themselves to give guarantees or to participate in guarantees without the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics being associated therewith.

Then this is said in conclusion -

The German Government accordingly in these circumstances agree to accept the British Government's offer of their good offices in securing the despatch to Berlin of a Polish emissary with full powers. . . .

Honorable members will notice that, on the evening of the 29th, this document is given to the British Ambassador at Berlin. It has to be sent by him to the British Government in London. It must be considered by that government, which must then communicate, if it so desires, with the Polish Government, which must itself have some opportunity to consider the proposal. Although that is the position, the note goes on -

They count on the arrival of the emissary on Wednesday, the 30th August, 1939. . .

That is the very next day, although the note is handed over to the British Ambassador on the night of the 29th. The note continues -

The German Government will immediately draw up proposals for a solution acceptable to themselves and will if possible place these at the disposal of the British Government before the arrival of the Polish negotiator.

That is another point which I emphasize. At the time this note was handed over, the German proposals, on which so much play was made afterwards, had not been drafted, and therefore no representative of the Polish Government could possibly know what they were. Notwithstanding this, the Polish negotiator was to arrive in Berlin the next day with authority to commit his government, although he had no knowledge of the proposals, and had no instructions from his government regarding them! As a method of negotiation, I cannot imagine anything more absurd. When the note was handed over to Sir Nevile Henderson, he pointed out that as it required the Polish representative to attend in Berlin the next day, it was demanding what was not possible. The reply of Herr Von Ribbentrop was that this provision was intended only to stress the urgency of the matter in view of the fact that the two armies were standing face to face. The British Ambassador transmitted this note to the British Government and, on the next day, the British Foreign Minister sent a telegram to Sir Nevile Henderson. This telegram, which is published as document 6, is as follows : -

We shall give careful consideration to German Government reply, but it is of course unreasonable to expect that we can produce a Polish representative in Berlin to-day, and German Government must not expect this. It might be well for you at once to let this be known in the proper quarters through appropriate channels. We hope you may receive our reply this afternoon.

On the same day, the 30th August, at 2.45 p.m., the Prime Minister, Mr. Chamberlain, sent a message to Hitler, through the British Ambassador at Berlin. This message, document 7, is as follows: -

We are considering the German Note with all urgency and shall send an official reply later in the afternoon. We are representing at Warsaw how vital it is to reinforce all instructions for avoiding frontier incidents and I would beg you to confirm similar instructions on the German side. I welcome the evidence in the exchanges of views which are taking place of the desire for Anglo-German understanding of which I spoke yesterday in Parliament.

That was at a quarter to three on the 30th August. At 5.30 p.m. on the same day, the Foreign Minister instructed the Ambassador in Berlin as follows: -

In informing the German Government of the renewed representations which have been made in Warsaw, please make it clear that the Polish Government can only be expected to maintain an attitude of complete restraint if the German Government reciprocate on their side of the frontier and if no provocation is offered by members of the German minority in Poland. Reports are current that Germans have committed acts of sabotage which would justify the sternest measures.

That instruction appears in document 8. On the same day, at ten minutes to seven - honorable members will note how constantly the British Government applied itself to this problem - the Foreign Minister instructed the Ambassador in Berlin to stress the unreasonableness of the German request for the attendance of a Polish plenipotentiary, and suggested that the ordinary diplomatic procedure should he followed of inviting the Polish Ambassador to call, and of handing over to him the German Government's proposal. That was a good suggestion, since peace was surely worth a few hours of discussion. Peace was surely worth conducting the discussion in such circumstances as would enable the matter to be fairly considered as between countries negotiating as equals. On the same day, the 30th August, the British Government replied to the German Note. That reply is contained in document 10, and I direct special attention to it. When we realize that it was delivered within 36 hours of the outbreak of war, this document, becomes the most positive evidence of the willingness of Great Britain to further the ends of peace, and of its unwillingness to see war result. The Note acknowledges the friendly references in the German Note. It notes that the German Government accepts the British proposal, and is prepared to enter into direct negotiation with the Polish Government. It then goes on to say -

His Majesty's Government . . . understand . . . that the German Government are drawing up proposals for a solution. No doubt they will be fully examined during the discussion. It can then be determined how far they are compatible with the essential conditions which His Majesty's Government have stated and which in principle the German Government have expressed their willingness to accept.

His Majesty's Government are at once informing the Polish Government of the German Government's reply. The method of contact and arrangements for discussions must obviously be agreed with all urgency between the German and Polish Governments, but in His Majesty's Government's view, it would be impracticable to establish contact so early as to-day.

His Majesty's Government, fully recognizing the need for speed in the initiation of discussions, share the apprehension of the Chancellor arising from the proximity of the two mobilized armies standing face to face. They would accordingly most strongly urge that both parties should give assurances that during negotiations no aggressive military movements will take place.

The Polish Government was informed of that, and agreed with the suggestion regarding the frontier. When Sir Nevile Henderson presented the reply to Von Ribbentrop at midnight, on the 30th August, he suggested that Von Ribbentrop should invite the Polish Ambassador to Berlin to call, and that he should then be given the German proposals for transmission to his Government with a view to immediate negotiation. Honorable members would be surprised to find that it was an unusual suggestion that a foreign minister should send for the ambassador of a foreign country stationed for that purpose in his city and say to him: "Here are the proposals of the German Government for the settlement of our troubles. Will you convey them to your government and obtain a reply?" But Von Ribbentrop's only reply to that was what we now know as the sixteen proposals. He read them out very rapidly in German. He refused to hand over a copy, and he said that it was too late to give them to the British Ambassador since the Polish representative had not reached Berlin at midnight. He refused to invite the Polish Ambassador to see him, but he hinted that the matter might be different if the Polish Ambassador asked for an interview. That was at midnight on the 30th August. When the reply of the Polish Government to the British Ambassador at Warsaw was handed over on the afternoon of the 31st August, the Polish Foreign Minister said " Contact with the German Government would be established by the Polish Ambassador at Berlin." The Polish reply contained a guarantee by the Polish Government that there would be no violation of the German frontier during the negotiations provided that, the German Government gave a similar guarantee. On the same day, the 31st August, the British Foreign Minister instructed the Ambassador at 11 o'clock at night to inform the German Government that the Polish Government was taking steps to establish contact through the Polish Ambassador in Berlin with the German Government. That evening, the evening of the 31st August, a little before that communication had been made, the Polish Ambassador at Berlin obtained an interview with Von Ribbentrop regarding the British suggestion that direct discussions between the German Government and the Polish Government should be initiated. During that interview - that is, the interview on the evening of the 31st August - no German proposals were communicated to the Polish Ambassador.

After the interview, the Polish Ambassador was unable to report to his Government the result of his conversation with Von Ribbentrop because he found that the German Government had terminated communication between Germany and Poland. So that, on the night of the 31st August, while you have the Polish Ambassador in direct contact with the German Foreign Minister, there was no communication of the proposals to him; he was not even able to tell his Government about the unsatisfactory result of his discussion, because by the time the conversation finished, communication was cut off. And communication with Poland having been cut off, what came next? What came next was that the detailed German proposals for the settlement of the Polish-German differences were broadcast from a German wireless station. I may tell honorable members that all of these documents that preceded this were secret documents exchanged through diplomatic channels and not offered to the public. They were on the face of them designed to produce peace or a settlement of the differences. But these events having occurred, the German Government went on the air and then broadcast to the world proposals, a copy of which it had refused to give to the British Ambassador when he saw Herr von Ribbentrop at midnight on the 30th August. Simultaneously with the broadcast, the German State Secretary handed to the British Ambassador at Berlin a document setting out the detailed text of the German proposals. That document honorable members will find in the White Paper as Document 13. I am not going to read it for one moment though it would repay study; but I do want to draw attention to a passage early on page 17, remembering, as honorable members will, that these proposals were broadcast to the world about 9 p.m. on the 31st August. The document contains this statement -

In making these proposals, the Reich Government are, therefore, actuated by the idea of finding a lasting solution which will remove the impossible situation created by frontier delineation.

This is put forward late in the evening of the 31st August as a statement at that time of the German desire to procure a settlement. This document then handed to the British Ambassador has to be conveyed to London. The utterly fraudulent character of that statement can best be understood when we remember that it was only a few hours later that the German army invaded Poland. Literally a few hours, four, five or six hours, before that invasion occurs, we find the German Government solemnly saying in a diplomatic communication to the British Government handed to the British Ambassador in Berlin : " The Reich Government are, therefore, actuated by the idea of finding a lasting solution, and these are the terms on which we think it could be found ". At the time when the proposals were broadcast, no copy of them had been communicated to the Polish Government at all, and no copy was in the possession of the British Government.

Mr Beasley Would it be correct to say that there had never been any communication of those proposals?

Mr MENZIES There had never been any communication of those proposals to the Polish Government until they were actually broadcast, after which the German Government wasted no further time, as it would say, in its determination to march in. So far as Great Britain was concerned, the communication, if one could call it such, had been a very hurried reading in German to the British Ambassador, who speaks German, but who, like those who have some acquaintance of a foreign language, could not be expected to follow a document read at high speed in a foreign language. Apart from that, there was no communication to the British Government until the broadcast. The handing of the document to the British Ambassador took place at a time when circumstances rendered it physically impossible for that document to go to London to be considered by the British Cabinet, and for any action to be taken in relation to it. In the early morning of the 1st September following the broadcast late in the previous evening, Herr Hitler issued a proclamation to the German army stating that Poland had refused a peaceful settlement, and had appealed to arms. He had therefore decided to meet force with force. On the same morning, German troops crossed the Polish frontier at a number of points, and commenced general military operations against Poland. Thereafter, as document No.14 shows, the British Government gave notice that unless there was a withdrawal of troops on the part of Germany, Britain's obligation and undertaking to Poland would come into force, and would be honoured. The result of this I mentioned at the beginning of my statement.

To honorable members and to the people of Australia I just make one general comment on these documents. It is, I believe, abundantly clear to anybody who reads this history, that, had Germany not desired war, there would not be a war to-day in Europe.


Mr MENZIES That, putting on one side all the fine points, all the argument to and fro which may be built up on these documents, is a clear-cut condemnation of Germany in relation to the present tragic condition of Europe and the world.

Mr Gander Blame Hitler, not the German people.

Mr MENZIES I agree with the honorable member entirely. As I said at the outset, I cannot believe that what we may term Hitlerism, as exhibited in these negotiations, can possibly represent the free will and free decision of any civilized community. In conclusion, all I want to say is this: I unhesitatingly ask for the support of this House, both Government and Opposition, in the carrying on of our responsibilities in relation to this war.


Mr MENZIES I believe that support will be forthcoming because we are all Australians here, and we are all British citizens.


Mr MENZIES However long this conflict may last, I do not seek a muzzled Opposition. Our institutions of parliament, and of liberal thought, free speech, and free criticism, must go on. It would be a tragedy if we found that we had fought for freedom and fair play and the value of the individual human soul, and won the war only to lose the things we were fighting for. Consequently I shall welcome criticism, but I do want to emphasize that our great task, however long this struggle may endure, is in common. If we remember that, all criticism will find its right place and its true perspective.

As the honorable member opposite has suggested, we have no bitterness against the plain and private citizens of Germany and I hope we will not feel called upon, at any stage, to disfigure what I believe to be a noble cause by any hymns of hate. We are in this war to win it and as quickly as possible. My prayer is that it may be won so quickly as to permit a just peace, a peace that will really end war and not a peace which will sow the dragon's teeth of bitterness and hatred and distrust. I lay on the table the following paper: -

Text of Documents exchanged between the United Kingdom and German Governments from 22nd August, 1939, to the outbreak of war, 3rd September, 1939,

and move -

That the paper be printed.

Ordered -

That Standing Order 119 be suspended to enable the debate to proceed without interruption.

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