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Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security
30/11/2018

O'SHEA, Ms Elizabeth, Board Member, Digital Rights Watch

WHITE, Mr Nathaniel, Senior Legislative Manager, Access Now

Evidence was taken via teleconference—

[10:26]

CHAIR: Welcome. Do you have any comments to make on the capacity in which you appear?

Ms O'Shea : I'm representing a broad coalition of civil society organisations who made a submission in response to this bill.

CHAIR: Thank you. Although the committee does not require you to give evidence under oath, I should advise you that this hearing is a legal proceeding of the parliament and therefore has the same standing as proceedings of the respective houses. The giving of false or misleading evidence is a serious matter and may be regarded as a contempt of parliament. The evidence given today will be recorded by Hansard and attracts parliamentary privilege. I now invite you to make an opening statement before we proceed to discussion.

Ms O'Shea : Thank you for the opportunity to appear before this committee. I'd also like to thank my colleagues Dr Suelette Dreyfus, Angus Murray and Justin Clacherty, who have already provided evidence to this committee representing the alliance of non-profit organisations of which Digital Rights Watch is a member. Digital Rights Watch's mission is to ensure that Australian citizens are equipped, empowered and enabled to uphold their digital rights. We campaign, lobby and advocate for a digital environment in which human rights are respected.

The history of this bill is deeply worrying. It shows a failure of the democratic process. After an incredibly short consultation period by the Department of Home Affairs on the exposure draft of the bill, we saw less than two weeks pass before the government introduced a largely unchanged bill that was immediately referred to this committee. I'd note that we were not consulted on this bill prior to this process commencing.

We were also appalled to see direct interference into the work of this committee from both the Minister for Home Affairs, Peter Dutton, and Prime Minister Scott Morrison. Conflating terrorism with encryption, as the ministers have attempted to do through the media, is dangerous and wrong. The actions by the Australian government throughout this process show an alarming disrespect for the fundamental principles of a liberal democratic society which include consultation, engagement, and public consideration and participation.

Law enforcement and intelligence agencies already have considerable powers at their disposal to deal with the threat of terrorism. The claim that strong encryption hampers their efforts to do their job has not been justified in any meaningful way. Protecting our digital infrastructure, which strong encryption does, is critical to our economy and society, and introducing threats to that protection, which this bill does, puts us all at risk. Pretty much the only people in favour of it are those who will gain powers from it. The bill is an example of law enforcement and intelligence agencies putting their interests above those they are supposed to serve. We should never presume that increased powers for such agencies is synonymous with national security. We have been told this bill is necessary to protect national security, but I would argue that the opposite is true. Our national security depends on strong encryption and this bill puts that at risk.

For the past few months, Digital Rights Watch has had the privilege of working alongside many other organisations opposing this bill. The scale and diversity of this opposition is, frankly, unprecedented. It includes human rights organisations, trade unions, cryptographers, academic security experts, businesses and industry groups, technology companies and telecommunications providers. I urge this committee to heed the warning that is being offered by this diverse coalition.

We've also seen the Australian public express their concern about the legislation in considerable numbers, which is particularly notable given the technical complexity contained in this bill. Facilitated through my own organisation's efforts to inform and engage the public, a total of 14,981 people personally wrote to the home affairs department speaking out in defence of strong encryption and their right to communicate and use digital technology securely. This is an issue that voters understand and take seriously. Polling undertaken by the Alliance for a Safe and Secure Internet revealed that 84.8 per cent of Australians believe it is important that anything the government does to combat crime should not create weaknesses in Australia's online security systems, nor make it easier for criminals and terrorists to cause further harm to everyday Australians. People are not foolish enough to think that fearmongering around terrorism justifies compromising our digital infrastructure. Australians understand that encryption is not a barrier to a safe society—quite the opposite; it's a form of protection against criminal acts. Encryption helps protect our digital infrastructure, including our banking system, our health services, our electricity distribution systems and communications systems. If we weaken it for one purpose, we weaken it for all purposes, including enabling bad actors and we do so at our peril.

We have numerous concerns with specific elements of the bill, all of which you'll find in our submission. In particular, we're concerned that it introduces a seemingly scopeless definition of 'designated communication providers' and a very long list of agencies that can use the powers. It excludes any judicial review process to scrutinise the exercise of these powers. The safeguards that are included are so poorly drafted that they are essentially rendered meaningless. It creates an extremely worrying precedent in terms of labour rights by compelling individual workers to be effectively co-opted into working for national security projects with no right to refuse or speak out publicly, even if they had moral or legal concerns about the work that they were being asked to do. It opens the door for law enforcement to obtain metadata of journalists without having to abide by the protections that were added to the data retention legislation at the time that was passed.

This bill in its current form would legislate powers that are excessively broad, poorly defined and lack sufficient accountability and transparency, and this committee is on notice of that. At a bare minimum, the bill should be narrowed to minimise the threat it poses to cybersecurity and the risks that would require violations of foreign law. The safeguards should be redrafted to make them meaningful, and this should include the requirement of judicial scrutiny and a right of appeal and a limit of requirements that result in undue secrecy. Passed in its current form, this bill will see us sleepwalk into a digital dystopia.

I welcome questions from members of the committee, but, before I go to that, I believe my colleague Nathan White would also like to make an opening statement.

Mr White : Thank you for the opportunity to address the Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security, and thank you for allowing me to speak with you remotely. I regret that I cannot be with you in person, as the eyes of the world are on this committee in anticipation of the decisions you will soon make. Access Now is an international civil society organisation established in 2009 to defend and extend digital rights of users at risk around the world. At Access Now, digital security is one of our primary focus areas. We operate a 24/7 digital security helpline that works with individuals and organisations around the world to keep them safe online, including improving digital security practices and providing rapid response emergency assistance.

We have done extensive work related to cybersecurity, integrity of communications systems, government hacking and the importance of encryption. I have previously testified before your colleagues on the Joint Committee on Law Enforcement. Today, I'm not physically with you in Canberra, but I could be.

Thanks to the security systems and protocols built into my devices and services, including encryption, I'm able to log in remotely to my work computer from anywhere in the world. I can confirm the identity of my co-workers, and I can access any of the information that I need. Travelling to Canberra, I would certainly miss my family, but I also carry a device which contains all of my personal photos, and, wherever I am, I can open a window into our kitchen or even my daughter's bedroom to say goodnight—and, thanks to encryption, I know that this window is secure against criminals and voyeurs. I feel safe carrying these expensive electronics with me because they have security systems carefully designed by some of the smartest engineers over the years, and that means these devices are mostly useless to thieves and, as such, street-level theft is down.

However, while my devices are mostly useless to a thief, they would be a bonanza of investigatory leads to a properly trained law enforcement officer. With my phone, an officer can get almost anything stored in the cloud, including photos, contacts, notes and instant messages. With a warrant, you could access my physical location going back years. With judicial approval, you can even read my emails. You can learn what apps I'm using and from there get metadata to find out exactly whom in the world I've been speaking with, when, where and for how long.

And this is if the user practises perfect personal security. Usually people are not perfect, and law enforcement is able to exploit those mistakes to get even more data. In the most extreme cases, law enforcement agencies like the American FBI have been able to purchase exploits to completely unlock devices. Granted, these digital leads can be complicated. Not all members of law enforcement know what data is available, how to access it, how to use it or how to preserve it for the courts. And getting data from companies overseas can be even more difficult.

But digital evidence is not going away. Our lives are increasingly digital, and we're just beginning to grasp the Internet of Things, artificial intelligence and virtual realities. The challenges facing law enforcement are complicated, and encryption is only one small piece of the puzzle. There are many thoughtful ways to make sure that law enforcement has the tools it needs to address crime in the 21st century. In fact, your colleagues on the joint committee on law enforcement are engaged in such a discussion. Unfortunately the legislation before this committee does not reflect these nuanced issues.

I encourage you to work slowly and deliberately to consider the full complexities of this debate and to question whether sacrificing the security on which we all rely is worth the short-term benefits this bill might bring. I thank you again for allowing me to participate in these proceedings, and I look forward to any questions you may have.

CHAIR: Thank you, Mr White and Ms O'Shea.

Mr DREYFUS: Thanks very much for your detailed written submissions and for appearing before the committee today. This is a question for both of you. One of the remarkable things about this bill is how consistent a lot of the criticism has been from a range of different stakeholders with vastly different interests. We have large multinational tech companies, smaller Australian based technology exporters, civil rights organisations, cybersecurity organisations and cybersecurity experts, and I think you mentioned cryptographers in your list before, Ms O'Shea. I've got perhaps two questions. Is that usual, and what is it about this bill that has united such a disparate group of organisations and individuals?

Ms O'Shea : I would say about that that this is a remarkably unprecedented coalition of people who have come out against this bill. We as civil rights organisations are often quite critical of how technology companies conduct themselves and how they approach the question of privacy, but we see common cause on this issue, and the fact of that, I think, is remarkable and ought to be noted by the committee. I think there is a lot of scope to do proper consultation and consideration of the comments made by this broad coalition of voices, and it's frankly astonishing to me that the process for considering this bill is not being devoted to that task more fulsomely.

I think part of the frustration of civil society is that, time and time again, we see situations where technological projects or policies are put in place, and decision-makers and lawmakers fail to take proper account of and listen to the voice of experts in the field and make use of the rich expertise that exists within Australia on these kinds of topics. Instead we see rushed policy—and this bill is a prime example of that—pushed through before the consequences of doing so are fully considered. So I do think it is something to note.

You do not need to agree with the statements of a human rights lawyer in order to accept that there are serious criticisms of this bill. You can listen to significant technology companies that operate globally and to cryptographers who have extensive experience and understanding of how cryptography works.

You can speak to national security experts. There is a huge number of them who have made comments on this kind of policy generally, but also, more specifically, in relation to this legislation. You can see how common it is that national security experts think that this is a bad precedent. There was a panel of more than 100 cybersecurity experts polled by The Washington Post. The poll showed strong objections to any attempt to provide law enforcement with a backdoor access to encryption protocols. So it's not just civil society organisations that are speaking out against this, but also people who have deep knowledge and expertise in this field. I think the committee should acknowledge that and take it on board, and, at the very least, afford itself the time to properly consider those criticisms and find a way to accommodate that in the process of considering this bill.

Mr DREYFUS: Thanks, Ms O'Shea. Mr White, did you want to add to that very full answer from Ms O'Shea?

Mr White : Sure. I would just like to suggest that the only people you have not heard from are the people who don't realise how this bill will impact them. We live in an increasingly digital world where all of us rely on the same security tools. We all have the same threats of data breaches, our data being stolen, our data being lost, cybercriminals stealing our identity. We all have an interest in seeing stronger security, and there's a real concern that the bill will actually lead to weaker security. This will impact everyone, regardless of where they work or where they live.

Mr DREYFUS: Do either of you, Ms O'Shea or Mr White, have anything good to say about this bill?

Mr White : The committee process has been excellent. I have appreciated the opportunity to participate with this process on multiple occasions. I appreciate the efforts that have been made to provide that opportunity, including by having me on the phone today.

Ms O'Shea : I think it would be fair to say that civil society understands what the intentions of this bill are. But intentions are one thing; what the law actually does and what it enables is quite another. You should actually create legislation that is fit for purpose, not legislation that does not reflect what the intentions are as publicly stated. The idea that is sometimes put, that civil society doesn't appreciate the difficulties faced by law enforcement, is an unfair critique.

I think everybody supports secure systems that are, in a technical age, fit for purpose in terms of protecting people from hacking and nefarious activities. We can work towards achieving that, but this is not the process to do it. This bill does not do that job, and the way in which concerns have been raised without proper time and space to consider them—in fact, the intervention by Minister Dutton and Prime Minister Morrison is very alarming. I think we ought to take every opportunity we can to think about this properly before we rush this bill through on the basis of rhetoric around crime and terrorism, otherwise we're going to introduce a number of unintended consequences, which are hugely problematic for our digital infrastructure.

Senator McALLISTER: Thanks, both of you, for your evidence. I want to ask about a specific issue that's raised in the Access Now submission. You talk about a social problem, not a technical problem, which is that, as I understand it, a diminution of trust in the overall security architecture of the internet could lead to individuals and companies failing to take steps that they're presently willing to take to protect their own devices or systems. You provide an example, which is a failure to patch something. This is an interesting idea that we haven't really explored elsewhere in the committee. I think what you're saying is that if people are distrusting of some of the commercial actors in the system, because they fear they may be collaborating with governments to access encrypted information, they will fail to protect themselves in ways that they are presently willing to do. Is that correct?

Mr White : Yes. It's important to begin with the idea that it is really difficult to build secure systems; in fact, we're actually very, very bad at it. We can do simple things and make them secure, but people want complicated things; they want phones that have lots of doodads and lots of bells and whistles. The more complexity we add to a system, the more difficult it becomes to secure from a technical perspective. It also becomes more difficult because it's more difficult for the user to understand what is happening.

If you think about where most of the cyberthreats of stealing data and infecting devices come from, they don't come from the zero day exploits where super-smart cybercriminals had built something that no-one had ever thought of before. Most devices are able to be hijacked by attacking a device that hasn't been updated yet. We constantly get notices to update our phones and our computers, and a lot of people don't do it: they want to wait; they want to take their time; they don't want to do it; or they're using their computer at that moment and it would be a hassle to do it. So there are millions of devices around the world that are using out-of-date and, in some cases, unsupported software, and those are the ones that are most easily targeted for being hacked. That's under the ideal circumstances right now, where we can say 'update immediately'. As soon as an update exists, the system you're using is broken and people can reverse-engineer the update to attack what you have.

If we give cause for any reason to not trust the update system, not trust updates as they come out or not trust companies to give you updates that will help secure your system, we're going to have fewer people updating their systems. That may be useful for cybercriminals and it may be useful for law enforcement, if they are able to get into an individual's phone, but it could have large, devastating consequences for larger institutions like hospitals or servers or anybody who's running any kind of enterprise software. If those systems are not updated, we are going to have impacts that are hard to foresee.

Senator McALLISTER: Thank you. To conclude this discussion: why do you think that this legislation may make it less likely that people will update their systems once updates become available?

Mr White : If this legislation was passed, I think it would cause people to think that the updates they are receiving are not updates meant to secure their devices but could be updates written by law enforcement in order to turn their devices into surveillance devices.

Senator McALLISTER: Thank you.

Senator MOLAN: I have only one question; both of you may like to address it. Are there any circumstances that civil society organisations can imagine where assistance and access to encrypted systems, such as this bill involves, may be justifiable?

Mr White : Sorry, I didn't quite catch the end of what you said.

Senator MOLAN: Are there any circumstances that civil society organisations can imagine where assistance and access to encrypted systems, which this bill envisages, might be justifiable? I'm trying to think my own way through the objectives of this bill, and I was wondering what your views of civil society organisations were.

Mr White : I have to say: I don't think that I can come up with an example where this sort of legislation would be justified. I know we like to think of the ticking timebomb scenario, where we have to get into the bad guy's device or an explosion is going to go off. The bill, as it is written, either would not be able to provide that access or would provide that access in a way that completely undermines our entire digital ecosystem. I say that because I understand that there are sections that say this won't be used to create anything with a systemic weakness. There are several issues with that. First of all, 'systemic weakness' is not defined. Further, if it was defined, there would always be disagreements among technologists and policy people over whether or not something is a systemic weakness. The bill currently doesn't have anything in it that would allow a technologist to go a judge and make their case for why an action is a systemic weakness.

Further, even if all of that were to be fixed in the bill and something were to pass—if the Attorney-General were to go to a company, say Apple, and say: 'This is just one device. We need to get onto this one phone to find out where the bomb is,' in order to be able to comply with that, Apple would need to build the infrastructure to deliver something to that individual phone that would be able to do something. Regardless of what that something is, building the infrastructure to deliver that—we'll call it exploit or malware—to an individual phone is something that can be replicated across the system. Once you know that that avenue exists, you will be putting a target on that company for every nation state, every cybercriminal and every individual hacker in the world to be able to find that and exploit it. I guarantee you that will happen, because it already exists in the world. There are grey and black markets where exploits for these devices can be sold for literally millions of dollars. If you force a company to build that, people will find it. They will be able to take advantage of it and they will use it to steal from all of us. So I'd say that, even under the most extreme circumstance, even when we might really want to do everything we can to make sure law enforcement has immediate access to the data they want, it's simply not possible to do it without having systemic effects.

Ms O'Shea : I think I understand the motivation of the question: in granting broad or extreme powers, is there a way to think about how they could be confined so that they could only be used in very specific circumstances? From a lawmaker's perspective, I understand how one of the ways we might think about this is imposing warrants on the use of a particular power, for example. I think the problem with this bill is that there is no way to confine the use of the power to an individual circumstance. As I said in my testimony, once you create a weakness in the system for one purpose, it can be used for any purpose. There's no appropriate way, from a legislative perspective, to confine the cryptographic reality of that situation.

CHAIR: Thanks, Ms O'Shea and Mr White. Can you tell us a little bit about the Alliance for a Safe and Secure Internet, which I know has made public comments about this bill, and Digital Rights Watch's involvement with it?

Ms O'Shea : I can. In the wake of this extremely truncated period of consultation and consideration of this bill, Digital Rights Watch and a number of other civil society organisations have come together with a diverse array of partners in the Alliance for a Safe and Secure Internet. They include companies and industry bodies which, in many circumstances, civil society organisations are not aligned with and are in fact critics of. I think the fact that we've aligned together to present a united front that this bill ought not be passed in its current form is testament to the serious nature of this bill and the incredible potential that is represented by it to undermine the security of the internet.

The alliance includes people with expertise in human rights, like me, but it also includes companies that provide everyday services to lots of people around the world and have extensive experience in working with law enforcement. We know that companies already work with law enforcement on a daily basis to assist them to do their work in ways that civil society organisations might be critical of. But I think that diverse perspective highlights how problematic this bill is. Despite the fact that we come from quite different sections of society, we're all opposed to the bill in its current form.

CHAIR: Are Google and Facebook members of the alliance?

Ms O'Shea : They're represented by an industry association of which they're members.

CHAIR: So a proxy of sorts?

Ms O'Shea : I suppose so, yes.

CHAIR: Does that sit well with Digital Rights Watch, given Facebook's harvesting of data with Cambridge Analytica, Facebook's sale of personal data to Huawei and Google's Project Dragonfly, which of course is an attempt to re-enter the Chinese market and accommodate the Chinese regime's censorship regulations?

Senator BUSHBY: Social control.

CHAIR: Does that sit comfortably with Digital Rights Watch?

Ms O'Shea : If those are implied criticisms of those projects then we share a common view that there's plenty to criticise these companies for. We also share a view that this bill is deeply dangerous, and I think the committee is on notice of that. The fact that these companies and human rights organisations have a united front against this bill tells you something, and it also tells you who the only people in favour of it are. I do not think it's the job of lawmakers, when intelligence agencies and law enforcement agencies ask for powers, to acquiesce to that request. Their job is to think through carefully what the implications are of giving them those powers and to protect the public and protect national security, as defined by the protection of our digital infrastructure. I don't think it is enough to say that this bill is necessary for the protection of national security. That's because what you exclude from the definition of national security is secure digital infrastructure, and that is increasingly relevant to the idea of national security in Australia.

CHAIR: Just to put it on the record, I would be on a unity ticket with Digital Rights Watch around concerns with some of the big tech companies and the way they use our personal data, for example. My question is: if we were to jettison this bill, who is going to police or regulate the nefarious elements who use encrypted means to plan criminal activity, terrorist attacks and the like? Essentially, that data is held by a lot of these big companies. There's a series of end-to-end encrypted apps that people communicate on. We know that the ones WhatsApp, Signal and Telegram were mentioned in the previous hearing with Senetas. In the absence of democratic governments exercising their duty to protect the sovereignty and the security of the people they represent, who is going to do it if they don't? I'm not confident that the big tech companies, who have access to a lot of this information, will do it. My view is, as we are increasingly seeing, profit is driving their behaviour.

Ms O'Shea : The first thing I would say about that is that I do agree that you have a duty to protect the safety and security of the Australian population. Weakening encryption is the opposite of that duty. It in fact opens us up to risks of hacking by state-sponsored hackers and by all sorts of nefarious criminals. It would be a mistake to assume that passing this bill is a uniform advance of the protection of the Australian public. We have made it quite clear—on the record and on the number of occasions, and previous evidence has received will also confirm this—that, in fact, this is a bill that generates risks for our national security because it undermines the strength of our digital infrastructure.

Law enforcement has considerable powers at its disposal to do its job. They are always limited in some capacity by the various rules that we put in place. Those are processes of courts, as well as other legislative prohibitions on things they can and can't do. They have the operate in a difficult environment, and they know how best to do their job. But it is fair to ask why we should put the entire digital security of Australia at risk for the passage of this bill, especially in circumstances where we haven't thought through the implications of it in its entirety. This is a 176-page bill. It has been in public for a short number of months, and now we have the Prime Minister and Minister Peter Dutton pushing hard to get this passed by the end of the year. We need to take the time to slow down, think about it properly and consider all of the unintended consequences so that we don't sleepwalk into a situation where we have put Australia's security at risk.

CHAIR: You could say that the tech companies have been very successful in advocating publicly that this is an encryption bill when in fact a closer reading of it suggests that it's absolutely not that. It's the Telecommunications and Other Legislation Amendment (Assistance and Access) Bill 2018. Again, I come back to 317ZG of the bill, which specifically precludes system-wide decryptions. I can refer to subsection (1)(a) and (b). On your reading of it, does that not prohibit system-wide decryption?

Ms O'Shea : Once again, the committee has had considerable evidence put before it in the numerous submissions that have been made by a diverse range of organisations and individuals, as well as the previous testimony by Senetas just prior to mine. I do not think that safeguard is worth the paper that it's written on. Systemic weakness is not defined. Part of the problem with systemic weakness is that it can only really be defined in retrospect. You can have all the intentions in world that are honourable and good and designed for a certain purpose but post-fact realise that in fact what you have done is introduce systemic weakness. I think it is not possible to put a protection in there that is meaningful. Certainly, in its current form it is not meaningful. I note also that the prior testimony to mine from Senetas is that there are plenty of organisations who are willing to workshop this. It is stunning to me that the government wouldn't take the opportunity to do that and would, in fact, try to rush this through quickly.

I would also note that the other safeguard that is contained in the bill refers to the prohibition on preventing a company from patching a weakness when it's identified. There are interesting examples of why that, again, is not meaningful. The WannaCry worm that caused havoc in the United Kingdom, including shutting down parts of the NHS and diverting ambulances, was the result of a weakness that was identified in Microsoft's systems by the NSA, the most sophisticated national security agency in the world, arguably. They lost control of that weakness, and only at that moment did they tell Microsoft that the weakness existed. So Microsoft didn't know about the weakness in order to patch it. They subsequently tried to, but by then it was too late. In fact, criminals are able to wreak havoc in our civilian infrastructure that relies on digital technology. So what I would say about that is that it's all well and good to say the government will not prevent a company from patching a weakness when they find it, but if they refuse to disclose that weakness to the company then that protection, that safeguard in the bill, is rendered meaningless. So I think the two safeguards that are currently in the bill are drafted so poorly that we cannot expect they will be in any way meaningful in a situation where we need them.

CHAIR: So oversight from the Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security on the TANs and the TCNs wouldn't be enough to satisfy your concerns?

Ms O'Shea : No, it would not. I'm not sure what the problem is, for example, with introducing judicial scrutiny of these powers. If the case that they're needed is so compelling, I wonder why this wasn't considered and included in the bill. It seems like a startling omission, especially given that, in other jurisdictions that are comparable, such things exist. So, no, I do not think there are sufficient safeguards and scrutiny available in the bill to give confidence to the public that this will be used without those problems and without the problems that we've seen, for example, in relation to the metadata regime, such as scope creep and misuse of these bills, let alone the security of information that might be created and developed, tools that might be created using these powers and how they will be stored. So I do not think there are sufficient safeguards or protections for the public in this bill, no.

CHAIR: I have one last question. Do you have a view on Senetas's request in the previous testimony for an exemption from this bill?

Ms O'Shea : It's not for me to advocate for Senetas's interests. I don't think an exemption would solve the problem for the rest of us. The broad powers within the bill are undeniable, and the scope that they create to do things to undermine the security of our digital infrastructure is not able to be circumvented with exceptions like this. I don't think it's sufficient to exclude one company from the application of a broad set of legislative powers like this and say that we should be satisfied. We're putting the general public's security and privacy at risk for the interests of law enforcement and intelligence agencies. That's the fundamental premise of the bill, and to tinker around the edges by excluding companies from it would be an insufficient response to the criticism that's been received by the committee and the government generally on this bill.

CHAIR: Thanks very much, Ms O'Shea and Mr White, for appearing before the committee. You will get a copy of the transcript and an opportunity to make corrections to it. Thank you very much.

Committee adjourned at 11:03