Note: Where available, the PDF/Word icon below is provided to view the complete and fully formatted document
Consequences for Australian trade of British entry to the European Economic Community: address to the House of Representatives, Canberra

Download PDFDownload PDF


IP 1

1 I I I 1 i




20TH AUGUST ,, 1970,,




Recently; have visited a number of countries,

including most of our major trading partners, for investigations

and discussions on A•stralia's future trade prospects.

My prime purpose was to assess the possible

consequences for Australian trade in agricultural exports

if Britain succeeds in her application to join the European

Common Market. I wanted to make sure that the problems

likely to face Australia as a result of enlargement of the

Common Market were fully comprehended, and to form views on

the best course of action for Australia in its own interests.

In addition, there were a number of bilateral

issues of some importance to Australia's trade which also

required attention.

On no occasion has the Australian Government argued

that Britain should not join the Common Market because of the

problems for Australian industries which might be created.

The real crux of this matter is the operation of the

Common Market tariffs and other regulations in relation to the

importation of agricultural products . which Australia exports,

and upon which some of our most important industries are based.



My greatest concern is with the operation of the

variable levy system in its application to agricultural

products which Australia normally exports in bulk to


The variable levy system does not apply to wool

which is regarded as a id r7 a 'raw` rPi'at i a1 hiiitted


Among the items which would be affected by variable

levies are wheat and other agricultural grains, dairy products,

sugar, frozen beef and eggs.

They are items which the Common Market countries

in Europe can themselves produce.

Under the Common Agricultural Policy, the Community

decides what shall be the price for locally produced foodstuffs

such as butter, or sugar, or wheat of a certain grade. Then

the Common Agricultural Policy operates automatically to

impose Customs Import Duties, called Variable Levies, at

whatever level is necessary from day to day to ensure that

an import would not be competitive with the local product

sold at the determined price.

Wherever the Community itself, under the incentive

of high support prices, produces sufficient for its own

requirements, importation of these items is not possible.

This is the end purpose for which the system was



f f


As Australia has never had an important trade with

the present Six countries of the Community, this system has

not hurt us significantly up to the present.

The United States, which did have a significant

trade in some of these items with the Six, has been hurt very


The whole purpose of my observations are to deal

with the situation if Britain, our biggest and historic

market for foodstuffs, were to be admitted to the Common

Market with the same Common Agricultural Policy preserved,

with the obvious consequence that our sales to Britain

of many of our most important and historic items of trade

would be brought to a complete end.

There are other objectionable aspects of the

operation of the C.A.P. to which I will refer.

Some processed primary products where Britain has

constituted a principal market and which are threatened by

having applied to them the existing tariffs of the Common

Market are also of great importance to Australia, indeed

some manufactures are also important. For example, fresh,

canned and dried fruits and jam, and aluminium, at present

enter the U.K. duty free.

4 —,

But if Britain were to join the Common Market

on terms which meant that the present Common External

Tariff of the Common Market applied to Britain, itain these duties would be raised to such a level as would put

Australian exports at a very serious disadvantage compared

with exports to Britain from elsewhere in the Common Market

and from other areas which would receive rreferrred treatment.

To inform the House and the country of_What I

think might be done by Australia to safeguard our trade

as much as possible, in the event of British entry to the

European Economic Community, is the purpose of this


The history of the operation of the C.A.P. makes it inc ontrovertibly clear that if the variable levy mechanisms of the Common Market are applied to ensure that the existing

E.E.C. domestic prices apply also to agricultural imports

into Britain, Ireland, Denmark and Norway, the results will

be fatal for exporters of many of our agricultural products.

I found no one in London or Brussels,-the hoadquarters the who seriously do de p ied this or tte?'ted to argue tothe contrary,

r f .

In the ; .a. `.^1,' t'^ ^, ) -i


Uc n '. _vri aa_l _ first applie d

the ^^ j ^1


to join t11 B. o ^_ .., _.0 l` '^ f Yi1T:eY]t 6 ill ::r "'t:' T1G^ Boardo and

producers have i ruieced. a i olicz of diversi f fi L':.

for markets ' h e i GUJ_''- ll—D.i commodities Leu threatened,,

Delp' to '' a . - tense O

of our but-her excoata, 6O of our cammed fruit, and about

These er2ae z. , o .. D_ci. Lr_- s I almost

a third of ou r fresh f r 71 ,? dried fruit and su''ar exports,.

The cold. z:- r d .i_c j- that t there are j L, a is no alternative t j ^e 4

mark-eta for some of i>-._ , r )_.coduo^ . ,. Furthermore, ore we ar o. i:ii

ignor e the effect t of --.!'1e C,D-kat.•"')_r.!. .i ;i u S _Gtri_ t .. ice. _.... Policy u lei

the prices of ezDorta we can expect l l"'. 1 ' T v T_ a_,,_, s outside Uh z'

U K. Therefore should _..d. Britain enter the E.E. C:: on any th;ir,

like the e U —x St ^n terra and conditions for agricultu e9

Australia will face the -. Issi.-bi.l ,t^% of serious economic

and social d f"i'. l l a ^_._ significant areas because

producers will he unable - a dispose of theirgoods.

In other words althougf we ha y s had consi derablLe

success r •- - r in divers i7 L _5.. ^' a-Y1. := our ey-D 1 i^t trade d and although, a consequence, our derendence on the U,K, market - i n b a l ance

payments ayments t er ms has dec='. in ed, the loss of the British

market for certain maj or urimary commodities will

threaten the very e:x s enlce of major sectors of

Australia s p . , Y .1 .. r of L ^ 1 :I_ C. i a>'G:C p and major Source 7' : E? a:} :i_ foreign exchange earning



When the European Common Market was formed, it

had the support of all the Free 'World as a major step in

the unification of Europe. We were told, and we hoped,

although with misgivings -- that the Common Market would not

prove to be self-centred but would take its place in world

trade in a manner designed to be beneficial to the development

of freer world trading. In the event, it can now be seen

that, in the field of E.E.C. agricultural production, where

Australia and other important agricultural exporters are

particularly interested, the adoption by the Common Market

Countries of the present Common Agricultural Policy has led

to a radical increase in the barriers to agricultural trade

and the creation of a virtually impenetrable barrier around

six countries of Europe for many products.

The agricultural policies of the European Common

Market are so designed as not to allow imports of any commodity

which can be produced. within the Six unless there is a deficit

between production and demand. Effectively, the variable

import levy system has meant that, no matter how efficient

the external producer, no matter at what price commodities

might be offered to the Common Market by much more efficient

producers, a levy is placed on those goods large enough to

ensure that imports do not compete with them below the floor

price. Under the application of these policies, which operate

automatically, production has increased rapidly in volume.

The floor prices to Community producers bear no relationship

to the cost of production by more competitive producers



. . 7,

elsewhere in the \Florld. For instance the floor price for wheat is approximately 70% above the world price. Similarl--the floor price of frozen beef is over 60% higher than the

world price and in the case of butter over 250; higher..

Moreover these guaranteed floor prices are not I i.rnLt-e d 'L,,-,

production ho supply domestic requirements.

These hif;h guaranteed floor prices have so stimulated production within the Common Market and have so depressed

consumer demand that surpluses have been built up, in butter,

in wheat, in sugar, as examples.

At this point the so-called Common Agricultural

Policy of the Six operates a system of export subsidies

designed to enable the surpluses to be dumped in other markets

at whatever price it is necessary to quote in order to achieve

a sale.

The level of export subsidy necessary to sell the

surplus can be ex traordinarily high - well over 100 per cent. in some cases. This is paid for collectively by the Community

in a manner that does not reduce in any Sway the return to the

farmer. Because it is paid from a common purse, there are

few pressures for any reduction in the level of support within

the Market.

I do not wish to say that the conduct of the Common

Market countries in export sales of agricultural products is

completely reckless,

I do not know exactly how to describe it.


r ,

-:. 8.

Where sufficient export sales of surplus production

can be made in normal competition with other exporters without

distortion of world prices, I believe this is done and can be

justified. But there is no general willingness of the

Community countries to confine themselves to normal competition..

For example, I am told that Community butter is

being offered delivered Hong Kong as low as 20 Australian

cents per lb -- a price which would represent about 17

Australian cents at the point of export in Europe. This

would be butter which had been paid for under the C.A.P.

at, I am told, the equivalent of about 70 Australian cents.

This is what is called predatory dumping" at its unbridled

worst — "'Predatory because it forces the traditional

supplier out of his historic market.

The operation of this policy in agriculture means

that traditional suppliers, excluded from the Common Market

by the levy system, have to face the increased competition

amongst themselves in the residual markets outside Europe.

Even more importantly, they then face aggressive

dumping, subsidised by the financial strength of the Common

Market, which could drive the prices down and ultimately

force them out of the residual markets, or sell at disaster

prices. This process of disruption is already in evidence

and is gathering momentum. Furthermore the Community has

not shown any great willingness to contribute to stability

of international trade in agriculture by participation. in

international commodity arrangements.




The Community sat in throughout the negotiations

of the world Sugar Agreement but the E.B.C. alone of all

participants declined to commit itself to the concept of

any limitation or quota as to the quantity that it would

sell on world markets. This notwithstanding that the

quantity which each country committed itself not to exceed

in world markets was the whole central point of achieving

price stability in sugar.

Similarly, when, a year ago, the International

Grains Arrangement was close to failure in providing

stability of competition in wheat in world markets, the

Community was the only exporter-Member which sent a

representative without any authority to enter into commitments.

This has been the experience with the agricultural

policy of the Common Market. Many countries have found

their trade with the E.E.C. seriously affected. Australia's

trade has been traditionally with Britain, not with the

Six of the present European Community. But as long as

Britain, the largest world market for many agricultural

products, provided a reasonably open market, the damage to

world trade in agricultural products, due to Common Market

policies, has been tolerable to us.

if Grclat Britain, tz:e lar ent free mar , ct fog u.:,

in the. world today, is successful in its


appl cati on to join the ;ctrr_on Market, with the present Common AgryCUltLl l liuy; Me position could become disastrous for many a; 'iCul rural products. Australia s trade would be seriously hurt, as would that of every

other exporter of the kind of agricultural -foodstuff

products, which we export.

The countries of the Common Market would then

account for over 4C; of international trade W- surrounded by the present Common Market virtually unscaleable wall for many a gr icultural_ ^rrdu,;'.and capable, with a seemingly unlimited purse, of driving others out of the

residual markets with predatory export subsidies.

However, the Common Market does not stop with

six countries, or even with ten countries. ALreaay "Association Agreements" have been concluded with former

French colonies in Africa, and other countries are likewise

negotiating a rrangements involving preferential import treatment with this trading giant — Spain, Greece, Israel,

Turkey, Austria, even Yugoslavia. Ultimately the whole of

Europe and vast areas of Africa threaten to come within

the restrictive sphere of this massive new trading bloc.

Indeed, I was told overseas that if the present total

applications for association and special arrangements were

to succeed there would be some 70 nations involved within

the Community orbit.

. f

— 11

This is done by means of special arrangements for

association and pr eferential arrangements — new preferences established contrary to the principles of absolutely equal

trading opportunity set forth in the GATT. In the jargon, this is called multilateralism.

There are three elements which we must oppose :-

a variable levy system amounting to virtual

embargoes on some agricultural products which

are produced in the European Common Market 9

predatory subsidised dumping in residual markets;

es tablishment of new preferences by bringing

additional countries within the Market as


All these, in my view, are contrary to the principles of

GATT and the i nternational principles of lair trading.

There is the even more basic c ontravention of the essence o.i GATT — in my view. The disposition of the

Common Market to erect around the borders of the enlarged

Common Market the same virtually unscaleable walls of

protection for certain agricultural products as already

exist in the Common Market itself. This seems completely

incompatible with the pr inciple enunciated in GATT that Common Markets should not be formed at the expense of

increasing the barriers to trade against third countries.

— 12 ^-

These developments have not gone unnoticed elsewhere

in the world, au tr;_ l; a is not alone in facing the threat of

serious damage t0 lie ag i u. turaa.i trade if the Common Market

is enlarged .r tb_out modification of the present levels of

protection. Co fa_' ; Australia, because she has never b een

a major traditional eu Arli'er to the E.E.C., has not felt the

same brunt of 'Common Market agricultural policies as have

some other countries. The United States, for instance, has

already suffered a drop of 20 per cent in her exports to

the .E 0 , in three years of certain agricultural commodities

subject to variable levies. This trend seems certain to

continue and the scope of damage enlarge.

For this reason, the EOE,C. restrictions in

agricultural products have contributed to a new counter

protectionist attitude within the United States Congress,

which now has before it a. new measure -- the Mills Bill -which could incorporate quite significant fu=ether restrictions on world trade.

This reflects also a confrontation which has

developed bilaterally between the United States and Japan

on the question of imports of textiles.

Clearly the F,E,C o ts denial of trade opportunities by its GOA,F< is seen by other countries as discriminatory

and inconsistent with the principles and objectives of GATT.

Judging the situation as I have seen it from the vantage point of my recent visit, unless effective action is

taken soon, this coul6 lead to confrontations, acts of

retaliation and threats of further restrictions.




Mil d

_ 13 -

Looking ahead, this could mean that we face the

prospect of a retreat into trade blocs, with snowballing

restrictions on trade, with clear economic loss to every

country in the long run, with the "little" no longer able

to look to the rule of law to obtain their trade rights.

In this type of trade confrontation countries like Australia

cannot fail to be adversely affected.

Following the kind of development which I now see

in the course of taking shape, Australia would be outside

any of the major trading blocs.

The Comecon countries, that is the economic

linkage of the communist countries, represent one giant

trading bloc within the world which, in respect of agricultural

products, does not import a dollar's worth that is not actually

required unless it is for a pure political motive.

The L.E.C. as it now stands, and more so with its

proposed enlargement, constitutes an even more formidable

bloc so far as our agricultural exports are concerned.

This is the moment of time, not a moment later,

when we and others should visualise what the European

Economic Community could grow into as a trading bloc:

the six present countries;

the four present applicants to join as members:

Britain, Ireland, Denmark and Norway;

the Associated territories, the former French



4^^^^^ ^'i^ 6 i i S





^ S

special arrangements with Spain, Greece, Turkey,


the possible addition of Austria;

the special arrangements, for example, in meat

with Yugoslavia.

Here is a giant economic bloc whose total trade between

nations inside, and with the outside world, would perhaps

represent 50 per cent of the total world trade. The central

core of this, the E.E.C., has a policy in respect of the

agricultural products we export not to permit the import

of a dollar's worth of an item which would compete with

domestic production at prices below the very high floor

prices established by the C.A.P. In effect, to permit no

competition at all in the real sense.

But apart from the enlarged E.E.C. and the Comecon

countries there are other restrictive trade areas in

existence or ih the making.

There are special trading arrangements between the

United States and Canada. And, in respect of an item, sugar,

in which we are the second-biggest exporter in the world,

special arrangements between the United States and the

Latin American countries. Here is the third bloc., less

complete but with many of the elements of favouring trade

with those within the area as against the rest of the world.


x I


Our future - more than that of the large, developed countries - depends on external tr ding and particularly trade in agriculture. This is already the most difficult area. Australia's interest and, we believe, the world's interest is to try to ensure that trading blocs, where they exist, and J countries cutsido such blocs, return to principles and rules laid down in the GATT.

Only by the rule of lave cansmall countries hope to receive a fair deal in world trade. Only by the observance of the rule of law can the big prevent or avoid serious disruption and loss to themselves as well as to others, of all the gains made since iorld ,° gar II in the field of i nt ernational trade.

Clearly one of

return to order in world

Already a giant in world

become a super-giant,

the key elementss in any move to a trade must be the E.E.C. itself.

trade terms, it now threatens to

Yet although it is the largest single world trader, it lacks co hesiveness in its attitude to, and ability to formulate, external trade policies. There is no single

definable source of power within the Community to whom

third countries can appeal. The very st r ucture of the Community - composed as it is of six - and perhaps ten -different G overnments -- means that it develops a policy only

out of c ompromise. Exper i ence is that once developed its policies are not susceptible to any change.

-^ 16 -

Furthermore, because of its structure, and I suspect

because of its recent formation, there is as yet no sign of a

realisation in the Member States of the E.E.G. that being an

economic giant in the world, brings with it responsibilities

just as much as it brings advantages.

Responsibility to support and strengthen GATT as

the only international institution governing world trade.

Responsibility to ensure that there are liveable

opportunities for the smaller countries of the world.

Responsibilities which should derive from an

understanding that even the "big' will suffer from trade


Equally clearly, the United States is another

key element in the liberalisation of world trade. Therefore

in the United States I put it to the leaders of the

Administration and. the Congress that it was for them to

consider whether their responsibilities of world leadership

should not require them to take the initiative in seeking

to have restored to world trade a real sense of order. A

return to the principles which the U.S.A. first sponsored

and which were so carefully built up in GATT and elsewhere.

I pledged Australian participation in a move

towards having the major international trade problems

facing the world today examined as a matter of urgency in

the GATT. I said that while this would of course be in

- 17w

Australia's interests, it would more importantly, to be in

the interest of the world in relieving the tensions which

must inevitably develop if there is violent conflict in

this field of trade.

There are grave dangers in bilateral confrontations

to settle major issues. In the first place, this attitude

inevitably invites erosion of the GAT'. If the machinery

of GATT is not to be the instrument used for settling the

issues it was devised to deal with, inevitably GATT as an

international authority must become outmoded and ineffective.

If important differences are to be settled by major bilateral

confrontations and not by GATT, then the "little infractions"

of trade rules will go by default, and there will be a growing

disregard for GATT.

If great trade differences are to be dealt, with by

major bilateral confrontations, this is the course which

will regenerate the heat and international tensions of the

Thirties, which the world sought to avoid by providing GATT

as the rule of law alternative to the rule of economic


If we and others seek to have the major problems

caused by enlargement of the E.E.C. considered in GATT, we

must similarly be prepared to submit our own problems to

international scrutiny.

- 18 e

I do not suggest that we should seek internationally

to dictate to any country whether or not it can take action

to meet its own domestic problems. GATT itself does not do


But we should seek to ensure that the contractual

rights of other countries to fair treatment are recognised

and the principles of trade liberalism survive.

I use the word 1'contractual 7' deliberately. Members

of GATT are known as Contracting Parties, because they contract

as a member of GATT to forgo certain freedoms in trade. These

are balanced by certain contractual rights.

This I regard as the most important issue in

international trade today. I spoke of it in Ottawa,

Washington, London and Brussels.

Of course it was a major part of my mission to

London and Brussels to explain as clearly as I could the

implications for Australia, in particular, should the Common

Market be enlarged on terms which applied to our trade with

Britain the same restrictions at present applying in the

Common Market.

It is imperative that potential damage to Australian

interests should be explained before, rather than after the

terms and conditions of any enlargement are finally

determined by the parties involved.

- 19

In London, I saw to it that the Prime Minister

and other Ministers directly concerned were fully aware of

the real problems which could be caused to a number of

important Australian industries - the dairy, wheat, sugar,

meat, and fruit industries and a number of others.

I did not find in Britain any evidence that the

British Government was prepared to stipulate conditions

which would give a protection to the interests of her

Commonwealth trading partners, except perhaps in relation

to sugar and to the special problems of New Zealand. I said

that, while I was not in London as a supplicant, Australia

strongly expected that Britain would ensure that our

interests would not be overlooked. This was because of

our historic association with Britain in all fields, but

particularly in trade. I reminded the British that up

until 1967 Britain was Australia's largest single supplier of

imports and also our biggest customer.

As I have already said, I made it clear that the

Australian Government is not opposing the enlargement of the

Common Market to include Britain and the other applicant

countries. But, equally, I made it clear that if the terms

and conditions of such entry offend the basic objectives

and principles expressed in GATT, Australia would have no

alternative but to join with others similarly affected, to

require terms and conditions consistent with GATT.

- 20 T

Australia did not enter GATT nor remain a Member

without a clear understanding that those c oui tries which

contract to Membership, surrender some of their freedoms in

trade matters in the general interest. The GATT embraces

rules to protect the interests of all Members, against

damaging actions of other Members. We have observed our

obligations loyally. We will insist on our protective

rights. This i have made clear in each country where I

have had discussions about the policies and practices of

the Community.

I wont to Brussels to make clear to the President

and Members of the European Economic Commission the Australian

trade interest as at present affected by predatory dumping of

Community surpluses in our markets, and by the progressive

extension of what are, in effect, now preferences to those

countries which have been given, or may be given, nn association

with the Community. Most particularly I spelt out in clear

terms the consequences for Australia's historic trade with

Britain if the present Common Agricultural Policy were

applied in its present terms in the Community enlarged by

Britain's entry.

I was not encouraged by the reaction there, to

believe that, in respect of agriculture, third countries can

expect from the Commission any initiative. for a major

departure from the current Common Agricultural Policy.


+i i;r 'd^^ ^^i

^a1 1 a ^

n' a i ^ .I


21 -


The Commission as such has no power or interest

in altering the Common Agricultural Policy. It merely

carries out its responsibilities to the letter of the

existing Common Agricultural Policy Regulations as

devised and adopted by the Council of Ministers of the

Six nations compromising the Community.

If there is to be any change in these regulations,

to accord with the spirit and intention of GAIT, the changes

will have to be initiated in, and supported by the

individual Members in the capitals of the Six Countries.

Accordingly, as a first step, I left with the

Commission an Aide Memoire, setting out in forthright terms

the Australian position and our belief that third countries

have the right to expect protection of their trading

opportunities in accordance with G-ATT. But in addition

I also had representations made in the same strong terms

to all the Governments of the Six I fully acquainted the

Government of Britain with that I had done.

In all the representations I made in Europe, and

elsewhere, I made special mention of the serious implications

which the proposed enlargement of the E. E.0. could have for

the developing Territory of Papua and New Guinea.

Britain at present is the market for 30% of the

exports of the Territory. These products .would lose the

preferential entry into the U.K. which most now enjoy and

face restrictions on entry into the B.B.C. while comparable


- 22 -

products of the African countries associatedwith the E.E.C.

would be given a preference. I therefore asked that the

products of Papua/Neva Guinea should not be placed at a

disadvantage compared with the produce of other developing


in Brussels I was the guest of the Belgian

Government and, apart from discussion of our bilateral

trade, I took the opportunity personally to put squarely

before the Belgian Government the serious effects of the

C.A.P. policies of the Common Market, particularly if

enlarged, on Australia's trading prospects.

It was as a result of the worrying impressions

I had gained in Europe, that I decided that before returning

to Australia I should visit the Governments of Canada and

the United States of America.

These two nations are similarly interested in the

problems raised by the E.E.C. Agricultural Policies and its

prospective enlargement.

I stated to their leaders my assessment of the

seriousness of the problems, the likely consequences to

world trade, and my thinking on an initiative by third

countries to ensure that some balance should be brought

back into GATT.

^ R

- 2

While GATT has been successful in freeing trade

in industrial goods, it has been largely ineffective in the

field of agricultural trade. Unless there are some

modifications of the restrictions on agricultural products,

some countries affected may feel they must no longer be

bound by GATT obligations preventing increases in

industrial tariffs.

I was received at the highest level in both

Canada and the United States. I am sure that the Governments

of those two countries are seriously concerned at the

situation confronting all of the agricultural exporters

which would be affected.

I am sure that my visit and the discussions it

provided were quite valuable in focussing thought on their

future courses of action.

There are a number of other countries which

should similarly be concerned about the whole future of

world trade.

The establishment of new preferences with various

developing countries must be of concern to countries like

India, which are outside the E


The threatened exclusion of agricultural products

must be tremendously damaging to Argentina and other

developing countries which are relying heavily on

agricultural trade.


24 -

I am most strongly of the view that persuasive

arguments pointing out the damage to Australia and other

agricultural exporters are absolutely ineffective if

directed, as I did direct them, to the Members of the

European Economic Commission.

The policies and practices of the Common Agricultural

Policy are too well entrenched within the Six to be susceptible

to alteration by persuasion from outside.

For this reason I could not hold any hope of

achieving effective alterations in those policies even by

addressing persuasive arguments one by one to the Six

Governments responsible for the development of the C.A.P.

Therefore, any stand Australia takes must be on

the ground of impairment or threatened impairment of our

rights under GATT.

I believe our rights have already been impaired

by the policies of the EEC in respect of both predatory

dumping, and the proliferation of special preferential

deals with many other countries not really part of the

Common Market or members of its Customs Union.

Furthermore, our rights are threatened with even

more serious impairment from the likely terms and conditions

of the proposed enlargement of the Common Market.

It is this that has brought me to the conclusion

which I most strongly hold.

- 25 ^.

Only by a c onfrontation in the

other third countries similarly affected

would there be any chance of getting sucl

the Cocmon A. ricultura:i_ Policy and + ,^ ar? ^ oth e r preserve fair trading opportunities,

GATT where we and

have clear rights,

1 modifications of

practices as wo,,ld

In accordance with GATT, the barriers to trade which determine trade opportunities must be comparable with those which we faced when the Co_ rias C.s creates., and

before the Com mon Agri cultural Polio,- devised.

We !nest P' ake is clear that those of us who have submitted ourselves to obligations within GATT, are determined

not to have our trade rights eroded away. This attitude is

most validly based b ,t ,. upon the spirit and upon the actual

Articles of the GATT.

I have reacz!ed the cord u; ion that recourse to the

GATT provides the only prospect of avoiding serious damage

to the trade of Australia and any other countries, should

the EEC be enlarged to include Britain and at`he "ap l t


Recourse to GATT may or may not be successful.

But GATT was designed to be the inte rnational instrument to achieve fair-trading o pportunities. Whatever the outcome, I believe we and others must try and put GATT

to the use it was intended. Eve n if this stretches GATT

to breaking point.


< <,w s course of _?cal oXi in retard

to t h e Proposed -, i . y ^, .,, _ . of .^. ,_ ?^^OS^t^ L..i^ ;fitxxs ^i.i, v. the Common Market, must be to do all it can to obtain the co--opera fi,

-! on of coun tries

outside the g enlares Gc:<_ io , if ''i_ hot, as individual _" 4i _.. U4 v 9 G ]... well .1.-!. U Y.J 1..M.^ 4.t r^.. T1/ d,^u^^.t l Members s Of the Common 1 r e J n to ensure these y oin


s ♦ t^

o Adherence 1;,0 the A ri 7. 7 laid down in the Q-ATlt

that neither the formation, nor the enlargement of a

CustomsUnicmi s: c, :.. increase barriers to the trade of third countries,

2 0 Roc0"]LIJ t LoYI of the usedto so modify

restrictive elements of the Co_:.;'.on:A A,Q-ci_c ul L.ura.l Policy, that a;gmi_ .r'. ;, ,: a=L trade is not obstructed and exporters of agricultural products denied the

benefits, of trade l berai which have been

obtained by exporters oh industrial products.

3.Jj Sup ;or c t> e nc,- . _. of c al co y r practical 11nc) t y

arran omen s, perhaps oh the kind put forward

for beef during ^f^ the ,_^ ^ ll<....0 ; i^,^.i , r Round, .^'.7 t ensure e:.i i rCi reasonable access to the markets of the EEC

for products subject to the vagaries and restrictions of variable levies.

4. Support for international commodity y arrangements where these can assist orderly marketing of bulk

agricultural commodi ;,


- 27 -

5. Agreement on action to ensure that the interests of

third countries will be protected against predatory

dumping of surpluses arising from within the enlarged


6. Action to ensure that exports from the Territory

of Papua/New Guinea are not placed at a disadvantage

relative to imports into the expanded Community from

other developing countries receiving preferential


7. Action to ensure that the EEC, having formed a Common

Market does not expand its sphere of trade influence by

various means, such as he creation of new preference

areas or entering into various discriminatory

associational arrangements based on either political

or economic grounds.

8. The need for a special very high level Ministerial

Session of GATT to be held to consider these matters

before the negotiations for the enlargement of the

Common Market have reached a definitive stage.