Victorian Election 1999



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Information and Research Services

Research Paper

No. 19 1999-2000

Victorian Election 1999

Scott Bennett , Politics and Public Administration Group

Gerard Newman, Statistics Group

11 April 2000

Contents

Symbols and Abbreviations

Victoria—Some History

Victoria Goes to the Polls, 1999

The Standing of the Kennett Government

The Labor Challenge

The Campaign Battle

The Outcome—Legislative Assembly

The Outcome—Legislative Council

Electorates of interest

Brighton

Frankston East

Geelong

Gippsland East

Gippsland West

Gisborne

Mildura

Mitcham

Niddrie

Swan Hill

Warrnambool

The Frankston East Supplementary Election

A New Government

The Verdict

Government Performance

A Radical Conservative Government

The Premier and Governmental Style

Services

The Urban-Rural Divide

The impact of preferential voting

A Protest Vote?

The Election that Would not Die

End of the Coalition

The Kennett Resignation and the Burwood By-election

The Resignation of Pat McNamara

The State of the Parties

The Labor Party

The Liberal Party

The National Party

Three-cornered Contests

Conclusion

A matter of timing?

Implications?

Endnotes

Table 1 Legislative Assembly, State Summary

Table 2a Legislative Assembly: District Summary

Table 2b Legislative Assembly: District Summary

Table 3 Legislative Assembly: District Details

Table 4 Legislative Assembly: Two Party Preferred Vote

Table 5 Legislative Assembly: Electoral Pendulum

Table 6 Legislative Council, State Summary

Table 7 Legislative Council, Composition After 1999 Election

Table 8 Legislative Council: Province Summary

Table 9 Legislative Council, Province Details

Table 10 Legislative Council: Two Party Preferred Vote

Table 11 Legislative Council: Electoral Pendulum

Table 12 Legislative Assembly By-elections 1996 to 1999

Table 13 Legislative Council By-elections 1996 to 1999

Table 14 Legislative Assembly Elections 1950-1999

Symbols and Abbreviations

 

Introduction

The 1999 Victorian election was one of the most remarkable State elections of the last 50 years. It removed the apparently impregnable Liberal-National Coalition Government, it produced the retirement of two of the three party leaders, and it pitchforked into office a party that was remarkably unprepared—a number of its new ministers were sworn into executive office before being sworn in as parliamentarians. It was also an election that was unusually prolonged.

This paper gives a brief assessment of the major parties prior to polling day. It concludes that there were signs of the Kennett Government being in some danger but that these were largely ignored by the media. They, and many politicians, seemed to be influenced by particular opinion polls that suggested the Coalition Government was certain of victory. One intriguing aspect of the election result was the question of whether this was due to a protest vote against the Kennett team. The results of the election are described as are particular seats of more than usual interest. Major factors in the outcome are analysed, with the conclusion that it was a shift of votes in rural and regional electorates that was largely responsible for the narrow Labor victory. This was a reminder of the important impact that the rural-urban divide has long had upon our politics. Finally, the paper takes the story well past polling day to the Frankston supplementary election, the Burwood by- election, the end of the Coalition Government and the resignation of the National Party leader. Victorian election 1999 was later described as the election that would not end.

 

Victoria—Some History

Prior to the mid-1950s Victorian politics was the most unsettled in the country. This was brought about largely by a distribution of electorates which heavily favoured ru ral areas but produced a party balance in Parliament that made it very difficult for any party to gain a parliamentary majority. A chronically unstable parliamentary situation was made more uncertain by the presence of a strong Country Party, which was able to govern as a minority government on occasion, sometimes with the support of the ALP. The Country Party had generally poor relations with the main non-Labor party, making coalitions generally unwelcome. Coalitions were in fact barred for a time by the Liberal Party.(1) All of this was combined with the presence of the electorally-weakest of all Labor branches. The first Labor Government to last more than four months did not emerge until May 1927 and the first majority Labor Government came to power only in December 1952.

In May 1955 Victorian politics stabilised with the election of a majority Liberal and Country Party(2) Government led by Henry Bolte. Aided by a redistribution that greatly benefited the Liberals while seriously weakening the Country Party, Bolte won six e lections from 1955 to 1970. Apart from his final victory in 1970, when Labor won 4.7 per cent more of the vote than the Government, Sir Henry (he was knighted in 1966) was rarely put under any real pressure from the Labor Opposition which suffered a great deal of infighting and unrest.(3) The period of stable Liberal government continued under Dick Hamer, with victories in three elections during the 1970s. Hamer was replaced by Lindsay Thompson in 1981.

Government changed hands in 1982 when a reformed and newly-disciplined Labor Party took office from Thompson. John Cain led his party to its first majority victory since that of his father nearly thirty years before, forming only the second majority Labor Victorian government since the party's creation. The stability of the Liberals was now replaced by that of Labor which won elections in 1982, 1985 and 1988. Cain's successor, Joan Kirner, was defeated in the election of 1992, when 'the unprecedented sequence of financial crises sent the government's popular appeal into freefall'.(4)

By the time the Kennett Government came to power, the old animosities between the Liberal and National Parties had been put aside and a coalition formed, due largely to the fact that a one-vote-one-value redistribution appeared to make it difficult for the Liberal Party to win enough seats to govern on its own—something that was not borne out in the event. Winning office in 1992 with a very healthy combined first preference vote, the Kennett-McNamara team showed little sign of losing popular support in the following election. Polls suggested that the Government had maintained its support due to its strong leadership, its restoration of confidence in the Victorian economy and the continuing 'Guilty Party' stigma attached to the Labor Party. Indeed, the Coalition's 1996 election tactic was basically one of reinforcing in voters' minds the perception that Labor was responsible for any economic problems being suffered by the State. Kennett and his team therefore continued the stability that had been a mark of Victorian politics since the advent

of Henry Bolte's first government and which had seen just the two changes of government in over forty years.(5) Most observers expected this stability to be maintained whenever Premier Kennett ch ose to call the 1999 election.

Victoria Goes to the Polls, 1999

On 24 August, Kennett announced that the 1999 Victorian election would be held on the 18 September. The election was for 88 Legislative Assembly seats and half (22) of the Legislative Counci l seats. There had been no redistribution since the previous election. Three Legislative Council by-elections, for the provinces of Ballarat, Melbourne and Melbourne North were to be held concurrently with the general election. Some observers wondered if the Premier had chosen the date so as to have the campaigning lost in Victoria's annual dose of football fever. It would be, said the Herald Sun, a '25-day footy finals campaign'.(6)

The Standing of the Kennett Government

In its first term, the Kennett Go vernment caught public attention with its radical approach to many aspects of government. Taking full advantage of its control of both houses of Parliament, the Government began a massive downsizing of the public sector, as well as an extensive privatising of government resources. It created controversy over the establishment of the Grand Prix track and its relationship with Crown Casino, and a lot of rural unrest was brought about by the suddenness and extent of local government changes. The important question in the 1996 Victorian election, therefore, was whether the Premier's preparedness to advance controversial policies was likely to see his government lose support at the ballot box. In the Commonwealth election of 2 March that saw the Howard Government come to power, the Liberal Party vote actually fell in Victoria, causing some observers to wonder if this were due to a backlash against the Kennett Government.(7)

If this was so, then there was no indication of this influencing voters in the Victorian State election held four weeks after the Commonwealth poll. In 1992 the Coalition first preference vote had been 52 per cent; four years later this had barely moved to 50.7 per cent. It was a quite remarkable stabilising of the vote, considering the many controversies surrounding the Government. This seemed to be recognised by the Premier, who described the 1996 victory as 'probably the most profound electoral result in any state or federally in this country in the last 50 years'.(8)

Dominating Victorian politics between 1992 and 1999, Premier Kennett was the latest in a long line of strong leaders to hold the top job at the State level. With his strong self-belief, his preparedness to ignore convention in his determination to push the State in a certain direction, and his refusal to be deflected by criticism, Kennett not only dominated his State's politics, but he had the highest national profile of contemporary Premiers. He was very much in the mould of the strong, autocratic leader who has played such an important role in government and politics of the States in this country:

Premiers with powerful personalities exerting tight control over their state domains are ... a characteristic of state politics. ... They have not been content to be first among equals; they have developed a presidential-like status, with their cabinets and governments relegated to supporting roles. They bestride the politics of their states.(9)

According to Professor Brian Costar, this most recent of boss-Premiers had elevated the practice of executive dominance 'to an art form'.(10) With this type of Premier, there is always the chance that the very dominance of the leader may become an election issue, but it clearly had not done so to any great extent in 1996. Few expected 1999 to be any different.

The Kennett Government thus entered the campaign extremely confident of its chances, despite the loss of six Ministers who did not recontest their seats: Alan Stockdale (LP, Treasurer), Phil Gude (LP, Deputy Leader, Education), Marie Tehan (LP, Conservation), Jan Wade (LP, Attorney-General), Tom Reynolds (LP, Sport) and Bill McGrath (NP, Police). A sign of the Premier's confidence came at the opening of the campaign, when he ruled out a debate with the Leader of the Opposition describing such an event as 'irrelevant' to the final result.(11)

The Labor Challenge

The 1996 election had re-confirmed the domination of the lower house by the Coalition, wit h the Liberals (49) and the Nationals (9) winning 58 of the 88 Assembly seats (65.9%). Labor, which had failed to win even 40 per cent of the vote when losing office in 1992, increased its vote by over 4 per cent to 43.1 per cent. This still left it well behind the Coalition, for it only managed to win back two seats, and the Labor total of 29 left it 16 short of control of the Legislative Assembly.

According to Graham Hudson of the University of Melbourne, Labor's performance since its 1992 defeat had done little to inspire confidence that it would be soon back on the government benches.(12) Its leaders were ineffectual in withstanding the Kennett onslaught, and none had produced electorally-popular policies. The Victorian branch of the ALP has had a long history of internal problems, which have tended to divert the leadership from either the job of government or opposition, and this tendency could be seen during  
1992-99. This was particularly difficult for John Brumby, leader between 1993 and 1999, and played a part in his eventual departure from the leadership. Brumby had not helped his cause, however, by seeming to be unable to control the factional wars. Brumby had also frustrated some Labor members with his apparently defeatist approach to the party's 1996 chances. As he explained it, 'gaining six seats would be good, 12 would be fantastic, and 18 exceptional'. Such an attitude, however realistic, seemed to suggest the impossibility of denting the Coalition's position in the Parliament.(13)

Despite all of this, during 1996-99 there were some signs that Labor might enter the next election with rather more confidence than in 1996:

• As noted above, there had been an increase in its vote of 4.7 per cent at the 1996 election, and its first preference vote of 43.1 per cent placed it within reach of the Coalition.
• In addition, the largest swings to Labor in 1996 tended to be in safe Coalition seats making many of them marginal. The Coalition was therefore more vulnerable in 1999 than it had been in 1996.
• The Government had come under a lot of criticism from rural communities for what were described as its 'Melbourne-centric' policies.(14) As a measure of this, the independent candidate, Russell Savage, surprised by winning the safe Liberal rural seat of Mildura in 1996. Savage had gained barely one-third of the vote, but won with the help of ALP preferences.
• When former Liberal leader Alan Brown resigned his seat of Gippsland West to assume the position of Victorian Agent-General in London, the Liberals lost the seat to the independent, Susan Davies, in a by-election in February 1997. The Liberal first preference vote fell by 16.3 per cent.
• In December 1997 a by-election for the Melbourne seat of Mitcham was brought about by the resignation of Liberal sitting member Roger Pescott. In a rare example of dissension in Coalition ranks, Pescott's 'open letter' to the Premier accused Kennett of authoritarian leadership, and pointed to various examples of what Pescott called 'bad government', including Kennett's high-handed treatment of the Auditor-General's office.(15) The Mitcham by-election attracted 17 candidates, saw the Liberal vote fall by 23.5 per cent, Labor's first preference vote climb by 5.8 per cent, and a 16 per cent two-party-preferred swing against the Government, with loss of the seat. Observers wondered if this by-election signalled the end of the potency of the 'Guilty Party' slogan used to such great effect in the 1992 and 1996 general elections.(16)
• Peter McLellan, Liberal MLA for Frankston East, left the party in July 1998, also making a strong criticism of the leadership of Kennett as he did so. Unlike Pescott, however, on this occasion the dissident remained in Parliament, sitting on the cross-benches as an independent.(17)
• During 1998 opinion polls began to suggest that Labor might have a better chance in the next State election than most observers were prepared to concede. AgePolls for May-June and July-August, for instance, suggested that the ALP was actually ahead of the Government in two-party-preferred terms.(18)
• Labor's preselections had produced some younger, seemingly well-qualified candidates, including former ABC presenter, Mary Delahunty (who had won Northcote in a 1998 by- election), former mayor, Richard Wynne, the lawyers, Stuart Moss and Jenny Mikakos, Candy Broad, former ALP assistant national secretary, and Justin Madden, Australian Football League (AFL) footballer and former President of the AFL Players' Association.

There were signs, therefore, that the Government might be more vulnerable than many media observers believed, but within the Labor Party there developed a belief that any slip in the Kennett Go vernment's standing had occurred in spite of Labor's efforts. There was a general disillusionment with Brumby's leadership, even within the leader's own faction, that produced a dangerous level of instability. Brumby finally conceded that a change was necessary, resigning in March 1999. He was replaced by Steve Bracks, MLA for Williamstown since 1994. It was a move that has been described as 'poll-driven'.(19)

Despite all of this, it was the common view of the media that the Government was certain of victory, probably by quite a wide margin. In fact, a February 1999 Newspoll that described the Coalition as 11 per cent ahead, had some observers wondering if the Labor Party might actually lose seats.(20) In addition, the polls showed a great deal of community ignorance of the Leader of the Opposition, though to one writer, 'the biggest problem for Labor was not so much their unknown leader, as the great popularity of the Premier'.(21) One journalist summed up the general media view that Bracks was:

Labor's sacrificial lamb, a good-looking guy in a suit who would inevitably be flattened by the Kennett steamroller.(22)

Such a view was echoed by former ALP federal secretary, Bob Hogg, who asserted in late August that it:

... stretches credibility too far for Bracks to look voters in the eye and say we can/will win this election.(23)

The Campaign Battle

In many State ele ctions, the standing of the Premier is often central to the result. As head of the State's administration, as effective leader of the State branch of the governing party, as the State's 'ambassador' in relations with the Commonwealth, and as its roving 'trade commissioner' in the endless quest to bring capital to the State, the Premier is often seen as crucial to his or her party's electoral chances. When a government is performing well, the importance of the Premier can occasionally be spelled out in a campaign slogan: 'Hamer Makes it Happen', 'Wran's Our Man', and 'Now, more than ever, Queensland needs Joh and the Nationals', were slogans of our recent past that thrust the Premier firmly before the voters.

Despite this historical tendency, the Victorian Government campaign in 1999 was probably unprecedented in the intensity of its focus on the political head of government. In a move reminiscent of Queensland's Joh Bjelke-Petersen (NP, 1968-87) at the height of his powers, Premier Kennett worked to ensure that he, and only he, was the spokesperson for the Government, when he issued a blanket ban on campaign comments by all Ministers bar himself. This was not achieved, largely due to the presence of the Nationals' Deputy Premier, Pat McNamara, who was certainly not silenced, but it effectively kept all of the Liberal Ministers out of the mainstream media. Not since the criticism of the Greiner 'one- man band' in the 1991 New South Wales election, has there been as much adverse comment about the domination of a campaign by a Premier.

The Liberals went further, however, when they attracted a great deal of attention by their creation of a Web-site geared entirely to the personality of the Premier. This was shown clearly in the fact that its internet address featured just the Premier's forename: 
www.jeff.com.au. Apart from listing party policies, the site devoted much of its space to detailing the campaign activity of the Premier, and a sustained reading of the site would have suggested very much that the Victorian Government equalled Jeff Kennett. It even gave space to the Premier's dog. So unusual was the site as a campaigning tool, that it was seen as a probable pace-setter in campaigning throughout Australia. There was even a degree of adverse comment on the ordinariness of the Victorian Labor Party's site, which was concerned solely with policy matters, with no attention being paid to the leader.

Opinion polls showed Kennett so comfortably ahead of Bracks as 'preferred Premier', that the Labor leader and his advisers judged that there was no campaign mileage to be gained out of attacking the Premier. It was felt to be far more important to emphasise that Labor was now free of the baggage of the Cain-Kirner years.(24) The focus of Labor's campaign was therefore on policy questions and the promise of 'transparent' government. This featured three inter-related aspects:

• Labor spoke at length about what it described as its new and attractive policies.
• The Opposition did all it could to draw attention to weaknesses in the Government's administrative performance, with particular attention being paid to such matters as the Intergraph ambulance difficulties, school closures, hospital problems, police numbers, the reduction in the independence of the Auditor-General's office and the increased restrictions placed on freedom of information.
• Alert to the general unhappiness of many rural communities concerning their 'neglect' by the Government, Labor did all it could to remind voters of closed schools, diminished rail services, movement of local government councils to distant towns and other major regional complaints. To symbolise its concern it opened its campaign in Ballarat, and pledged a $170 million infrastructure fund for regional Victoria.

Overriding this was Labor's p romise of 'A new style of leadership', wherein Bracks promised to be both 'socially progressive' and 'financially conservative'. In an effort to convince voters of this, Labor had the independent firm, Access Economics, 'sign off on the challenging party's election promises. Labor also was keen to emphasise that its leader was 'a nice bloke'.(25)

By polling day the general view of observers seemed to be that the Kennett Government was certain of being elected. More seemed to believe the final AC Neilson Agepoll, which had the Government ahead by ten percentage points 50-40 per cent, than the final Newspoll result which suggested the Government and Opposition were locked together on first preferences, with Labor ahead on a two-party-preferred basis.

The Outcome—Legislative Assembly

The Opposition (30 seats) entered the election needing 15 seats to gain control of the Legislative Assembly. The Coalition (Liberal 46 seats, National 9) seemed impregnable, despite the Liberal loss of Mildura, West Gippsland, and Mitcham since 1996. Even Malcolm Mackerras, almost the only commentator prepared to tip an increase in Labor seats—he spoke of seven being picked up—still asserted that no one expected Labor to be in government after the election.(26)

The seats that changed hands were as follows:

The Labor Party contested all 88 seats, with its vo te of 45.5% being 2.4 per cent higher than in 1996. It gained 11 seats (excluding Frankston East), its total of 41 being four short of an absolute majority.

The Liberal Party won 36 of the 81 seats it contested. It lost 11 to Labor and won a seat from the National Party. Its first preference vote of 42.2 per cent was a fall of just 1.8 per cent, though it did contest three fewer seats than in 1996.

The National Party contested 12 seats, winning seven, a nett loss of two seats, one to the Liberal Party and one to an independent. Its share of the vote fell 1.8 per cent to 4.9 per cent, despite its contesting two more seats in 1999.

Independent candidates won three seats. (For more details see Table 1)

Of the other parties and groups, the Australian Democrats won fewer votes in 6 electorates than Pauline Hanson's One Nation Party (PHON) did in 4. The average PHON vote was 6.9 per cent, a reminder of the party's potential to cause trouble to the big three when it has a higher electoral profile than on this occasion. In the rural seat of Rodney, Dorothy Hutton, a PHON candidate for an outer-Sydney seat in the March 1999 New South Wales election, managed 10.8 per cent.

The Outcome—Legislative Council

There are 44 Members of the Victorian Legislative Council. Th e Members represent 22 electoral provinces with two Legislative Councillors representing each province. Each province is made up of four Legislative Assembly electorates. Legislative Councillors serve for two terms of the Legislative Assembly. At any general election half of the Legislative Council provinces fall vacant; the other half falling vacant at the next general election. The voting method is preferential voting.

The normal half-Council election saw Labor (42.2%) win eight of the 20 provinces it contested. The party won three Liberal seats: Ballarat, Chelsea and Geelong. The Liberal Party (39.7%) won 11 of 19 provinces it contested, and the National Party (7.3%) won the three provinces it contested. The Labor and Liberal vote was lower than in the Assembly election. Many of these lost votes may well have been gathered by the Australian Democrats, whose Statewide vote of 6.8 per cent indicated that the party seems to be seen by voters primarily as an upper house player, even in an election where preferential voting is used.

In the three by-elections, Labor won Ballarat from the Liberal Party and retained Melbourne and Melbourne North.

The party balance after the election was, therefore, Liberal 24 seats (a loss of four seats on 1996), Labor 14 seats (+4) and the National Party 6 seats (no change).

Electorates of interest

Brighton

Brighton had been held by the retiring Treasurer, Alan Stockdale. With such a safe Liberal seat becoming vacant, the party's preselection was likely to determine who would be the next MLA. Brighton quickly became the battleground for a struggle between forces led by the Premier and others supportive of the Commonwealth Treasurer, Peter Costello. In the event, Kennett's support for the Small Business Minister, Louise Asher, an MLC seeking to move to the lower house, proved decisive, though not before a very public struggle was conducted. As expected, Asher won the seat comfortably in the general election, but the fall in the Liberal first preference vote of 8.8 per cent was one of the largest shifts of Liberal votes in the metropolitan area.(27)

Frankston East

This was the seat held by the rebel Liberal, Peter McLellan, who had left the party in the previous year to sit as an Independent. McLellan had won the seat for the Liberals in 1992, but resigned after clashes with the Premier over various issues including WorkCover, privatisation and the effort to reduce the importance of the Auditor-General. In a re-run of the aborted Commonwealth election for Newcastle in 1998, McLellan's death on the morning of the election meant that Frankston East voters would have to wait for a supplementary election, on 16 October (see below, p. 13-14).

Geelong

If Labor was to do well, it needed to win back seats in areas it once held. Geelong was just such an area, and the Opposition nominated Ian Trezise, son of N eil, Geelong football legend, MLA for Geelong West (1964-91) and Minister in the Cain Government. Geelong was held by Ann Henderson, Minister for Housing and Minister responsible for Aboriginal Affairs. She had increased the Liberal vote by over six per cent in the previous election, winning the seat on first preferences (52.6%) and seeming to make it much more likely to be retained. Despite this, Geelong turned out to be the ultimate cliff-hanger. Henderson's vote fell by 5.1 per cent, the Labor vote barely moved (+0.1%), but the seat went to preferences, where Trezise eked out a win by just 16 of the 30 984 formal votes that had been cast. If just nine of Labor's Geelong voters had shifted to the Government, the Coalition would probably have retained office.

Gippsland East

One difficulty in analysing State elections is that the most easily found information tends to relate to general State-wide issues. In focussing on the broad picture, however, commentators can sometimes fail to notice the existence of l ocal issues that are important enough to turn many voters away from the major parties. Occasionally a sitting member can be defeated by a spectacular movement of such votes—in 1988 the Labor Party lost the safe Labor seat of Swansea in New South Wales over the controversial issue of the Swansea Bridge. In Gippsland East an issue that had caused much local unhappiness was the virtual disappearance of water running in the Snowy River. Craig Ingram, a concerned local resident, decided to stand in an effort to draw attention to the Snowy issue. As in the Swansea case, the single issue campaigner did much better than he expected. The National sitting member's vote fell by 16.9 per cent, with Ingram's vote of 24.8 per cent leaving him in third position. Preferences from three other candidates pushed him into second place, and Labor's second preferences produced a massive 15.4 per cent two-candidate-preferred margin for the political novice. The National Party and its predecessors had held the seat since 1920.(28)

Gippsland West

In the 1996 State election, the endorsed Labor candidate, Susan Davies, managed just one- third of the first preferences votes, finishing a distant runner-up to former Liberal leader Alan Brown (57.7%). When running as an independent in the 1997 by-election, Davies' percentage of the vote actually declined by 0.6 per cent, but aided by the preferences of the four other candidates, who stripped 16.3 per cent off the Liberal vote, she squeaked into the seat by 159 votes. In 1999 Davies was only able to increase her first preference vote by 3.1 per cent despite being the sitting MLA. She was helped greatly by the Liberal vote falling a further 3.4 per cent from the by-election figure and won the seat on preferences by an eventual margin of eight per cent.(29)

Gisborne

Tom Reynolds, the Member for Gisborne, and Minister for Sport and Rural Development, retired at this election. Premier Kennett participated in the resulting preselection, making it clear that he wished it to be won by Rob Knowles, Minister for Health and Aged Care. Knowles, fifth in the Ministerial list, was spoken of as Kennett's preferred successor as party leader, but had the disqualification of having a seat in the Legislative Council. After much intra-party argument, Knowles gained preselection for a seat that Reynolds had retained in 1996 with a first preference vote of 55.7 per cent (itself a drop of 7.2 per cent). In 1999, the Liberal vote dropped a further 13.8 per cent and although Labor's vote also fell (0.4%), its candidate Joanne Duncan managed to win on preferences—the Liberals thus lost a seat held since 1967. Apart from its vote suffering because of the general drop in regional areas, the Liberal Party was reported to have suffered from voter resentment at the government's inattention to concerns over a noisome waste treatment plant, as well as resentment at Knowles being brought in as a headquarters-anointed candidate.(30)

Mildura

In 1996 the loss of Mildura by the Liberals to an independent was seen by the party as a one-off, fluke result. As is typical in the occasional independent victory, Russell Savage had gained only a modest first preference vote (35.7%), but picked up the lion's share of preferences to win the seat by just 1.8 per cent. During his term in Parliament, Savage was portrayed as standing up for his rural constituents, while also managing to anger the Premier on a number of well-publicised occasions. Although the Liberal Party had expected to win back the seat, Savage's first preference vote increased by 8.7 per cent in the general election, and he secured over 56 per cent of the two-candidate-preferred vote. The Liberal vote fell by 19 per cent, most of which probably went to the National Party (19.7%) which nominated a candidate, unlike 1996.(31)

Mitcham

As already noted, Mitcham was the scene of a remarkable by-election in December 1997 when an enormous swing saw Labor's Tony Robinson win the seat narrow ly from Andrew Munroe (LP) and 15 other candidates. In the 1982 State election it was the movement of eastern suburb electorates, such as Mitcham, to Labor, that was considered to have been crucial in returning Labor to office. In 1999, observers believed that if Labor could not win a parcel of such seats, then its chances would be slim. It was therefore important for Robinson to hold the seat in another contest with Munroe. In the event, Labor did not recover ground in this part of Melbourne, though Mitcham was held by just 343 votes after preferences. The seat may well have been decided on the votes of an independent who campaigned against Government proposals for the Eastern Freeway extension. He won 4.8 per cent of the vote and directed his second preferences to Labor.(32)

Niddrie

In normal circumstances the electorate of Niddrie, held by Rob Hulls for the ALP by a margin of 8.8 per cent, would not feature in a listing of electorates of interest. On this occasion, however, the electorate was in the news because of the origins of the Liberal candidate, Susannah Kruger. Hulls, former MHR for Kennedy (Qld, 1990-93), and one of the more colourful of Labor's Assembly members, had been forced to apologise to two young women, one of whom had been Kruger, after he had a verbal altercation with them earlier in the year. At the time of the announcement of the election, Kruger received publicity by approaching the Liberal Party and offering herself as a candidate, despite her apparent lack of any political experience. How would she fare against a no-holds-barred politician like Hulls? The answer was quite clear, due to the fact that each of the 1996 and 1999 contests had only two candidates. Kruger's vote of 43.2 per cent was a fall of 2.4 per cent, giving Hulls a 13.6 per cent margin.(33)

Swan Hill

In 1996 Swan Hill was one of the safest Coalition seats, having been retained by Barry Steggall (NP) with a first preference vote of 59 per cent. Three years later, local schoolteacher and former St Kilda football star, Ca rl Ditterich, stood as an independent, apparently at the urging of Russell Savage in neighbouring Mildura. The picture was made more interesting by the decision of Bill Croft of PHON to stand. Croft had won 12 per cent of the vote in Mallee in the 1998 Commonwealth election. Like Savage, Ditterich and Croft both emphasised government neglect of the bush. Although Ditterich won only 22.6 per cent of the vote, he forced the sitting member to preferences as a consequence of his vote falling by 13.8 per cent, and briefly seemed to have a chance of winning the seat. Eventually, Steggall won with a 52.8 per cent two-candidate-preferred vote. Croft had managed only 5.1 per cent of first preferences.

Warrnambool

Water was also a problem for the Government in Warrn ambool, the seat of retiring Police Minister, Bill McGrath (NP). A rise in water charges for local farmers had become a controversial issue. With the retirement of the Minister, the Liberal Party nominated John Vogels, to the Nationals' chagrin (see below p. 25). Despite this competition the National Party expressed its confidence of retaining the seat. In the event its vote fell by an extraordinary 40.3 per cent to just 17.5 per cent. The Liberal candidate topped the poll with 40.2 per cent and won easily on preferences.(34)

The Frankston East Supplementary Election

After the counting of all seats except Frankston East, the Government held 43 seats, Labor held 41 and independents held 3 (Gippsland East, Gippsland West, Mildura). The Frankston East supplementary election, to b e held on 16 October, therefore assumed great importance. If the seat was retained by the Liberal Party, the Government would have half the lower house numbers, and would need only the support of one of the independents to control the Assembly—Craig Ingram seemed the least hostile to Premier Kennett. If Labor could win the seat, it would then be in a position of being able to govern with the support of the three independents, but a loss by Labor would have meant that it could not form a government that had any realistic chance of survival. In addition, the supplementary election was likely to be seen as an opinion poll upon the standing of the Government and might therefore play a part in influencing the independents when considering their future actions in the Parliament. During the election, they had, in fact, made it clear that the result in the supplementary election would do just that.

The major parties therefore put all of their resources into winning the seat, for it was eminently winnable for both si des—in 1996 McLellan's first preference vote had been 4.6 per cent ahead of his Labor opponent, though later preferences had pushed that out to a margin in excess of 6 per cent. In addition, the presence of 14 non-major party candidates on the ballot paper seemed to make it more of a lottery than would usually be the case. Leader of the Opposition Bracks made little alteration to his election pitch, but Premier Kennett caught the headlines by a sudden announcement of more money to be given to the local hospital. He attracted some criticism by the apparent ease with which he expressed his preparedness to modify some of his Government's policies despite his strong defence of them in the general election. He also made an unprecedented apology for his political style which, he acknowledged, may have antagonised some people.

The result was quite convincing, for Labor's Matt Viney won the seat on first preferences, a rise of 7.1 per cent to 51.4 per cent. The Liberal vote fell substantially by 7.3 per cent, to 41.6 per cent. Labor now held 42 of the 88 Legislative Assembly seats, three short of an absolute majority.

A New Government

On 27 September shortly before the Frankston East election the three independent MLAs released their 'Independents' Charter Victoria 1999', stating they wanted written responses to the Charter from the party leaders by the Tuesday prior to polling day for the supplementary election. Stating their determination to remain independent and outside any 'formal part of any government', the independents expressed their willingness to support a government which publicly undertook to:

• Promote 'open and accountable government'
• Improve 'the democratic operation of Parliament'
• Establish 'clear plans, strategies and targets to address the urgent needs of Rural Victoria'
• Offer assurances of increased levels of cooperation with Independent Members, and improved codes of conduct between government and other Members of Parliament
• Permit no more privatisation of public assets 'at least until after a full independent inquiry has reported to Parliament on the social and economic costs and benefits of planned and existing privatisations'.

The independents also expressed their willingness to provide political stability by voting with the government on ap propriation and supply bills and all motions of no confidence, 'unless there is evidence of fraud, misappropriation or illegal activities'.(35)

After negotiations with both sides, on 18 October the independents announced their support for Labor,(36) and tw o days later the Bracks Labor Government was sworn in by Governor Gobbo. There were 18 ministers, none with prior ministerial experience and eight of whom were women—a record proportion for any State or Commonwealth government. Four of the new Ministers, Candy Broad, Justin Madden, Bronwyn Pike and Marsha Thomson accepted office prior to their taking their Parliamentary seats for the first time. Only two, Peter Batchelor and Sherryl Garbutt, had been in Parliament at the time of the defeat of the previous Labor Government in 1992.

The Verdict

Government Performance

Three factors seem to affected voters' perceptions of the Kennett Government's performance.

A Radical Conservative Government

In many ways the Kennett Government was ground-breaking. The extent of innovation was great , and the preparedness to tread where others had refused to go marked it out as a ministry prepared to test public patience. The Kennett Government has, in fact, been described as 'a genuine revolution in the relationship between the public and private sectors and between society and the State'.(37) Its radical reorganisation of local government, for instance, dealt with a political issue that had seen its predecessor unwilling to take on vested regional interests, while its embrace of the Crown Casino was in stark contrast to the timidity of the Liberal Government of Dick Hamer. The swathe cut through the public service, which included the closure of schools and hospitals, was very controversial, and the pushing of outsourcing eclipsed any other Australian government's efforts. Such a record may well have been a double-edged sword, for although it would have pleased many in the community, it probably antagonised many more. Woodward and Costar have noted that State governments 'cannot … assume that having good credentials as economic managers will suffice [to ensure their re-election]'. In saying this they drew a parallel between the governments of Jeff Kennett and Wayne Goss.(38)

Here also it would not have taken very many votes to be loosened for the Government's position to become uncertain.

The Premier and Governmental Style

Although the opinion polls consistently gave Premier Kennett a very favourable rating, there seems to have been no doubt that his political style was controversial. His crash- through approach to government, his unpreparedness to tolerate criticism and his muzzling of ministers during the campaign, were all well-publicised examples of his leadership style. Woodward and Costar have stated that this became a 'major' issue after the Herald Sun ran a front page story on the Premier's gagging of his team.(39) Prior to the election, Gary Morgan stated that his research suggested that many voters saw the Premier's confidence as arrogance. He cited Kennett's decision to ignore Bracks as a 'crucial mistake', suggesting that, '[w]hen you ignore the opposition they have a field day'.(40) It seems quite likely, therefore, that some votes shifted because of an unhappiness with Kennett's mode of operation.

On the other hand, it was claimed that the Premier's brash style won him many supporters among young males aged 18-25 years.(41) The use, and the style of, the 'jeff' website was seen as a means of attracting this part of the electorate. Kennett was often heard on various Melbourne rock radio stations, where his 'Jeff f……. rules, OK!' adverts were also to be heard. In hindsight, the danger may have been that in pitching so public a message to this demographic segment, he may have alienated support from others. There was some evidence of middle-aged voters being less keen on the Premier than younger voters.(42) The hostile journalist, Pamela Bone, claimed in the Age before the election that '[Liberal] party strategists knew many traditional Liberal voters would be shocked, not only by the language [of the adverts] but the sentiment behind them'. Dame Beryl Beaurepaire, Liberal grande dame, was said to have described them as 'a pity'.(43)

Services

It is a truism of State and Territory elections that the performance of the government in the provision of services plays a very important part in explaining election results. Poll evidence suggests that service delivery was a significant issue in this election. When surveying voters' views prior to the election the Herald Sun claimed that nearly eight voters in 10 were unhappy at the state of hospitals, nearly two-thirds unhappy at changes in schools, and over three-quarters dissatisfied at the central place that gambling had assumed in Victoria.(44) A Morgan poll, published in the final weeks of the campaign, suggested that whilst voters preferred the Government as the manager of the economy (58% favoured the Government and 14% favoured the Opposition), by contrast Labor was preferred in the areas of health (55-15), education (51-18) and law and order (53-18).(45) As we have seen the Government did not lose many votes overall, but a few disgruntled voters unhappy with particular services and prepared to shift their vote because of this, may well have made the difference between a narrow defeat and a comfortable parliamentary majority for the Coalition.

The fact that during the campaign the Premier announced a number of significant initiatives relating to government services suggests that he may have realised the potential for the loss of votes in this area. In his policy speech much was made of the provi sion of more teachers and nurses, as well as a promise for faster hospital treatment—perhaps these promises were seen as an implicit recognition that there were some serious weaknesses in the provision of these services or that the changes had gone further than voters were prepared to accept.

A potential problem for a State government that cuts back the provision of services by its own agencies is that it runs the risk of suffering an electoral backlash if the new providers are not up to the mark. For the Kennett Government this may have been symbolised by three aspects of outsourcing that gained it unwelcome publicity. First, there were a number of stories of ambulances failing to answer calls quickly, some of which produced claims of patients dying because of these delays. The second matter involved the creation of private gaols, where claims were made of inefficiency, and of inmates being able to abscond easily. Finally, there was the pending introduction of high tolls to be paid on new privately-run motorways, and the conversion of older public roads into the motorway system.

The Urban-Rural Divide

The Government seemed well aware that the question of services seemed particularly to affect rural and regional residents. The Premier had reportedly made 27 visits to country areas during January-August 1999 for a significant number of the Government's marginal seats were outside of Melbourne.(46) Coalition relationships had become strained over policies that appeared to be uncaring of the position of rural people, while being very much capital city-centred. Some policies, in particular, earned unwelcome criticism. The massive reshaping of local government, which removed many government offices from country towns and was said to have reduced the quality of service, and the plans to privatise the State Electricity Commission, for example, both put strains upon the Coalition, for the National Party was uncomfortable with such changes.(47) Some cases, such as the closure of the Mortlake hospital in 1994, took on a symbolic importance, as they seemed to illustrate how the Government did not understand the needs of country people. As the editor of a country newspaper put it: 'you tear the heart out of any community when a hospital shuts'.(48)

The division between town and country has been a key part of Australian electoral politics since the advent of elected legislatures in the nineteenth century. The importance of this division has been seen most obviously in the continuing electoral health and political significance of the (Country) National Party that emerged during the second decade of this century. Generally, this has worked to the disadvantage of the Labor Party. In the 1999 Victorian election, however, the belief that the Kennett Coalition Government had neglected rural areas seems to have been crucial in accounting for the marked success of the ALP in rural electorates. A paper by two Victorian academics states that 'The backlash against the government in rural and regional Victoria was decisive'.(49) In Melbourne the Government lost just three seats, on a vote fall of 2.3 per cent, but in the thirty-two non- metropolitan seats the combined Liberal-National vote fell by 6.1 per cent, with nine seats lost by the Coalition—eight to the ALP and one to the successful independent in Gippsland East. There was a 4.7 per cent swing to Labor in provincial city electorates.(50) Surprisingly, National leader McNamara put this down to an inability to counter the 'folksy' and 'country boy' image of Bracks, who had been raised in Ballarat.(51) Despite this unusual claim of a Labor politician apparently sounding more sympathetic to the bush than were the Nationals, the loss of rural votes and seats was presumably much more to do with a longer-term rural unhappiness with the Government. In two general elections the Government parties had in fact lost 12 of the 26 regional seats that they gained in 1992. At the same time, just six of the 35 Melbourne seats were lost to Labor. This suggests that Bracks' election as party leader had little to do with the final result, and that regional Victorian voters had begun to resent what they saw as 'big-city' neglect some years before.(52)

The impact of preferential voting

This election is a reminder that occasionally the preferential voting method can have an impact upon the result of an election.

Labor won the election despite being behind the Coalition on first preferences. Sometimes su ch a result can be an indication that many votes have been wasted—large majorities built up in safe seats can be a problem for a party. This occurred to Labor in the 1954 Commonwealth election when it failed to win government despite topping 50 per cent on first preferences. A variant of this occurs then a party can win a significant number of seats by securing enough second or later preferences from other candidates although its opponents win a greater number of first preferences. This second example was said to have been crucial to Labor's 1990 Commonwealth election victory.

It also seems to have been very important in Victoria in 1999. In five seats (Carrum, Geelong, Gisborne, Mitcham, Seymour) Labor trailed its major opponent on first preferences. The average margin was 1.7 per cent. In all cases Labor won the seat on preferences, despite their opponent's first preference figure averaging 47.7 per cent in four of the seats. Only in Gisborne, where the Liberal first preference vote was 41.9 per cent, was the Government candidate some distance from the figure needed for victory. This suggests that although quite a number of voters shifted from the Coalition parties many of these voters did not find the Labor Party attractive enough to receive their first preference. Instead, they voted for a third candidate but put Labor ahead of the Coalition on their later preferences. It was hardly a ringing endorsement of the Labor Party.

The importance of preferences was also evident in Gippsland East and Gippsland West, both won by independents. In Gippsland East the first preference count had the National candidate (35.9%) 11.1 per cent ahead of Craig Ingram—who in fact was third after the first preference count. Despite this the National was defeated comfortably on preferences. In Gippsland West the gap was narrower, but again the Liberal candidate (38%) lost a lead, and Susan Davies won comfortably on preferences.

It is therefore clear that if a different voting method had been in use, the result would have been different. First-past-the-post, for instance, would have produced a comfortable majority for the Kennett Government.

A Protest Vote?

It has been noted that if a State administration continues to deliver benefits to the electorate then it is likely to remain in office. It does seem that, generally, a State government's administrative performance has to be very bad for it to be voted out by the voters.(53) The 1999 Victorian election must make analysts think again about some of the 'truths' of State-level electoral politics, for on the eve of the election it appeared that the Kennett Government was in much better electoral standing than the challenging Labor party. It had experienced some community unrest over aspects of its administration of the State's services, but polls seemed to be saying it was still held in high regard.

Was this result, then, simply a 'protest' vote against the Kennett Government? In this context, 'protest' is meant to suggest that some voters, resentful about some aspect of the Government's performance, but not wanting its actual defeat, voted against it to give it and its leader (in the words of an unnamed senior Liberal), 'a bit of a kick up the arse on a few things'.(54) Was it, in the words of Denis Napthine, successor to Kennett as leader of the Liberal Party, 'a protest vote gone wrong'?(55) Such a view is well summed up by the Liberal MLA for Mordialloc, Geoff Leigh, who described the election result as 'one of the great accidents of history'.(56) The journalist Mike Steketee has even used such a view to wonder if the publication of opinion polls ought to be controlled close to an election, as is done in some European countries.(57)

Despite the fact that such views have been heard on similar occasions—after the near- defeat of the Greiner (NSW, L-NP, 1991) and Goss (Qld, ALP, 1995) Governments for example—such views are essentially unprovable. It is impossible to know when a vote against a government is 'genuine' and when it is 'not-genuine', that is, a 'protest' vote. All that electoral analysts can do is ascertain just how many votes shifted in an election—the reasons for each shift are impossible to establish with any accuracy. One possible test of the 'protest vote' view might be the Frankston East and Burwood by-elections. If voters in these electorates were concerned that a 'protest vote' had gone too far, they could at least have shown their support for the Liberal Party. In both cases, however, there was a further movement of voters away from the Liberals.

To a marked degree, elections deal with expectations. If enough people are certain of a particular result—in this case the comfortable return of a government—then there is a need to explain away a different outcome. Despite the impossibility of really know ing what motivates the individual voter, journalists and politicians together can find comfort in the notion of the 'protest' vote: in the words of one journalist, 'Saturday's poll may well go down as the election that defied all predictions, producing the mother of all protest votes'.(58) To state such a conclusion, however, is not to prove it.

The Election that Would not Die

Apart from having to wait for four weeks after polling day to learn the Frankston East result, three other important post-polling day events formed part of the story of the 1999 Victorian election.

End of the Coalition

Mention has already been made of the long history of poor relations between the two major non-Labor parties, typified by the words of long-time Liberal Premier, Sir Henry Bolte, who once described the Country Party as 'a mob of political prostitutes who will go to bed with anybody'.(59) Despite the fact that the 1992-99 Kennett Government was the longest surviving coalition in Victorian history, relations between the long-time antagonists was at times very strained. This was partly due to the inevitable tensions that exist in Liberal-National coalitions wherever they are established, but it was given particular feeling because of the relative strengths of the parties. The Liberal Party actually won a majority of seats in the 1992 and 1996 elections, and the Coalition was formed by the grace of the Premier—himself a determined opponent of coalition in the 1980s. Not all Liberals were pleased with this.(60)

The relationship was also strained by many of the policies followed by the Kennett Government that appeared to be unsympathetic to the needs of rural people (see above, pp. 17-18). In the aftermath of the unexpected defeat, it therefore seemed inevitable that the formal coalition would crumble. On 22 October, a meeting between National MPs and the party's State Council duly reported that henceforth there was 'no coalition agreement between the Liberal and National Parties in Opposition'.(61)

Such a decision was in part a recognition that tensions existed in both camps. For the Nationals there was also the feeling that they were fighting for their very existence. In 2000, the National Party holds just seven Legislative Assembly seats and six in the Legislative Council—nine per cent of the Parliament. Fifty years ago the respective figures were 20 and 13 in a smaller Parliament, for 32 per cent of the total membership. For the Liberals there were the continuing resentments felt in that party over the very notion of coalition. In an echo of Henry Bolte's words, one unnamed Liberal MLA claimed after the election that, 'The Nationals like to stay for the night but don't like to get married'.(62)

Eventually a memorandum of understanding was signed. It was designed to satisfy disgruntled National supporters, while apparently accepting the probable need to work together in the future:

• Although the formal coalition is at an end for the time being, there will be a combined Opposition front bench.
• There will be an Opposition front bench team of 22 (out of a total Assembly representation of 43).
• Five of these 22 will be from the National Party.
• The parties will remain 'separate and distinct'.
• The party leadership will meet weekly, and shadow Cabinet will meet regularly.
• Backbench members will sit in separate party blocs. The Liberal party will be the official Opposition, and the National Party 'the Third Party'.
• The National Party Leader will have a place at the Legislative Assembly table with the Leader and Deputy Leader of the Liberal Party.(63)

The Kennett Resignation and the Burwood By-election

Jeff Kennett submitted his resignation from Parliament on 2 November, thus precipitating the by-election for his seat of Burwood that was held on 11 December. Both the Labor and Liberal Parties put a great deal of effort into winning a seat that had been held by the Liberals since its re-creation in 1976. Labor's candidate was Bob Stensholt, the defeated candidate in the general election, while the Liberals surprised by their by-passing of prominent party member, Helen Kroger, for Lana McLean.

The Liberal Party seemed to be on the back foot throughout the campaign. McLean proved unexpectedly controversial. Among other matters, she had been involved in a local planning dispute and she was apparently involved in a legal dispute with the Commonweal th Bank. She even earned notice during the campaign for her criticism of a junior basketball referee. The party also earned media criticism for some of its claims, such as the prediction that a Labor victory would encourage the government to set up a chain of heroin injecting rooms across all suburbs of Melbourne. At the same time, Labor seemed to concentrate its efforts on the discrediting of McLean rather than discussing policy. When the fact of Stensholt having not mentioned his brief career as a seminarian was noted by the Liberal Party, an Age journalist criticised the 'grubby' campaigning efforts of both sides, 'Why such crowded gutters in Burwood?', he asked.(64) The picture in the by-election was made more uncertain by the nominations of a Green candidate and of Stephen Mayne, former Kennett media adviser, who had earlier had a well-publicised falling-out with his employer.

The Labor Party won Burwood comfortably after preferences, though the result was probably brought about more by voter disillusionment with their opponents than enthusiasm for a party which had never held the seat. Even in a climate of support and interest for a new government, Labor's first preference vote of 45.1 per cent was only 3.6 per cent higher than in the general election. As in the case of the general election itself, it was a reminder of the relatively small increase in the Labor vote over the State as a whole (see below, p. 22). By contrast, the Liberal vote fell to its lowest in over twenty years, with its 40.5 per cent being ten per cent lower than in September. Mayne pointed to a probable disillusionment with both major parties: in the general election the combined Labor-Liberal vote was 97 per cent, but in the by-election this fell by 11.4 per cent.(65)

The Resignation of Pat McNamara

Soon after the election, the National Party leader, Pat McNamara, announced that he would soon leave the leadership, and would probably leave the Parliament by Christmas. It seemed likely that there would be a by-election for his seat of Benalla in the new year, possibly February. The 1999 Victorian election therefore seemed still to have some life, particularly as a swing of 7.5 per cent would see the National Party lose a seat that it has held since 1943.

In due course McNamara handed over the reins to Peter Ryan in November, but did not say anything about his resignation from the Parliament. However, in the immediate aftermath of the Burwood by-election, reports began to be heard of McNamara coming under pressure to remain in the seat, at least for a few more months.(66) Were the seat to be won by the Government, this would be the first time Labor has held a seat whose history can be dated back to the first decade of this century. Such a result would give Labor half of the Legislative Assembly, a significantly stronger position than before the resignation of Kennett. Loss of Benalla would also further weaken the Nationals' parlous parliamentary position. McNamara remains in Parliament at the time of writing.

The State of the Parties

The Labor Party

Labor is fortunate to be occupying the government benches in the Legislative Assembly. Its vote of 45.5 per cent, which was a modest increase of only 2.4 per cent on the 1996 figure, was actually 1.6 per cent behind its Coalition opponents. L abor's total of first preferences is the lowest by a winning party since the final Hamer victory in 1979. The election result might actually tell us more about the disillusionment of voters with the Coalition Government, than their support for their challengers. Many voters abandoned the Coalition, but a significant number chose to give Labor their second preference, rather than their first. In the seat of Seymour, for example, Labor trailed the Liberal sitting member on first preferences, but won the seat by just 462 votes after the distribution of Australian Green preferences.

On a more positive note, Labor's vote of 45.5 per cent was its second increase in successive elections, and was a healthy 7.1 per cent above its dark days of 1992—which had been its worst vote for 25 years. The ALP needs to use the advantages of office to prepare the ground to win majority government in its own right and gain a safer parliamentary position—as did the New South Wales party between the elections of 1995 and 1999. It has to work to win more seats east and south of the Yarra, for history suggests that its hold on its regional gains will be harder to maintain than its hold over its metropolitan seats. The increase in its Melbourne vote was only 2.6 per cent, and its total metropolitan vote of 49.6 per cent gives significant room for improvement—in 1982 John Cain's Labor Party won 54.7 per cent of the Melbourne vote. There is room for growth outside of the capital as well. Despite Labor picking up so many regional seats, its overall vote was only 38.1 per cent, 4.8 per cent lower than in 1982. It must ensure that its policies are seen as 'bush-friendly', if it is to retain these seats.

Of course, the length of time that Labor has in office may be insufficient to build up any degree of extra support, for its biggest problem will be ensuring that it retains the government reins. A minority government, propped up with some reluctance by independents, which has to face a Legislative Council controlled by the Opposition, is likely to see an early election as a strong possibility. Whether it could win majority control of the Assembly may well depend on a great many variables that are out of its control.(67) Not the least of its problems is the great difficulty it will have in gaining control of the Legislative Council while the two-member province electoral system is retained.

The Liberal Party

The Liberal Party's new leader, Denis Napthine, has moved to indicate a new style of leadership: '1 can't imagine a denis.com'. He quickly signalled this in symbolic fashion. The Victorian Liberals under the succes sive leadership of Henry Bolte, Dick Hamer, Lindsay Thompson and, initially, Jeff Kennett, had always had caucus election for most of their front bench. In 1988 this had been scrapped by Kennett, who took over the responsibility himself—as is done in other divisions of the party. In turn, Napthine has reinstated caucus election with a few positions chosen by the party leader.(68)

Like the ALP, the Liberals can face the next few years with some optimism. With a new leadership team, and presumably a forthcom ing review of its policies, it should be encouraged by the fact that its 1999 State-wide vote fell by only 1.8 per cent. In fact, its first preference vote was higher than any vote managed by Sir Henry Bolte from 1955 to 1970, when the party was reliant on Democratic Labor Party preferences in a great many seats. The party is very strong in Melbourne, so that its main aim must be to regain the seats it held in regional Victoria—for instance, it lost both Ballarat East and Ballarat West, as well as the two Legislative Council Ballarat contests.

Overall, the Liberal Party is well-placed to launch a bid to regain office at the next election, providing the early, emotional views of some members ('the worst ever loss in the history of the Victorian section'(69)) do not lead to any widespread party blood-letting with resulting poor publicity. If such blood-letting does occur, past history suggests that the earlier it is done before the next election, the better.

The National Party

The National Party's position i s far less healthy. Despite its running of two more candidates than in 1996 its vote fell. Its State total of 4.9 per cent was the party's lowest on record—50 years ago its vote was exactly 10 percentage points higher. It currently holds just seven of the 88 seats; fifty years ago it held 20 of 75 seats. Its chances of growth appear to be non-existent. A steady decline in regional seats presents it with a dilemma familiar to branches in New South Wales and Queensland. One chance of growth is to contest near-metropolitan seats, but its abject failure when it attempted to do so in Victoria in the mid-1980s does not bode well for such a tactic if it were to be tried again.(70)

In the immediate future, the party must work to regain Gippsland East. The task of pushing the Liberals out of Warrnambool might be rather more difficult. Elsewhere, it possibly needs to reconsider its opposition to three-cornered contests, for to do so wo uld enable it to mount a serious challenge in the Liberal-held regional seats, as well as in the regional seats its coalition partner has just lost.

The Nationals must hope that the Bracks push to introduce proportional representation for Legislative Council elections can be stopped. On its current vote, it would be hard-pressed to retain its six seats, assuming that the upper house remained the same size. Were it to be reduced, as has been flagged by Labor, and as occurred in Tasmania in 1998, the task of gaining any upper house representation would be very much harder than it is at present.

The Nationals also have a dilemma over the matter of coalition with the Liberal Party. Despite the view of Pat McNamara that the advantages in being involved in government decision-making justified joining a coalition, others have suggested that 'the experience of power in the Kennett years can be said to have been at best a mixed blessing'.(71) The party presumably suffered by being part of the 'Melbourne-centric' Kennett Government, and a return to a coalition government would leave it open to a similar problem in the future. Ryan has pledged to visit rural Victoria to listen to its concerns, but it has been argued that this may be too late: 'The time to communicate with rural communities and then deliver meaningful, effective policies was between 1992 and the 1999 election'.(72)

Three-cornered Contests

Three-cornered contests used to be an important component of Coalition electoral contests. In recent years, however, the National Party, ever-mindful of its declining number of seats, has criticised the Liberal Party for its continued enthusiasm for them—as was heard after the 1999 New South Wales election.(73) In a similar fashion, McNamara expressed his annoyance at the number of 'pointless' three-cornered contests in Victoria in 1999. A journalist summed up what he called 'one of the many lessons' learned from the campaign, namely that the partners had spent 'too much energy and resources' fighting such three-cornered battles.(74) The evidence does not seem to bear out such a view.

There were five such contests in this Legislative Assembly election, three in Liberal (or former Liberal) seats, and two in National seats. None of these seats had three-cornered contests in 1996. There were none in the Legislative Council contests.

In Gippsland West and Mildura the three-cornered contests in former Liberal seats were actually caused by the nomination of National Party candidates. In both, the combined Liberal-National vote topped the first preference vote of the winning independent, suggesting that the theory that three-cornered contests maximise the combined Coalition vote, was borne out. In neither case, however, did the Coalition vote top 50 per cent, and this no doubt was of vital importance in aiding the independent victories. In both cases, however, the three-cornered contest tactic appears to have been justified.

In Polwarth, a Liberal seat that runs west from the electorates of Geelong North and Geelong, the Liberal candidate ( 41% ) saw 10 percentage points stripped from the party's 1996 vote. As the National candidate (16.6%), was a prominent ex-Geelong AFL player, it is quite likely that it was his nomination that forced the Liberal sitting member to preferences. The margin between the two Coalition partners was so great—and the National vote so low—that it can be argued that if there was a 'pointless' three-cornered contest, this was it. It was forced, though, by the National Party.

As we have seen the Coalition lost a larger proportion of votes in rural Victoria than in metropolitan electorates. In Wimmera, however, the Coalition figure jumped from 56.9 per cent in 1996 (National only) to a combined Liberal and National vote of 63.5 per cent. Assuming that a National candidate standing alone would have had a reduced vote, the three-cornered contest quite clearly maximised the Coalition vote, as the theory suggests it should. The impact upon the ALP was such that it received less than one-quarter of the vote and was excluded from the contest at the penultimate count. The final count was therefore between National and Liberal, with the National candidate retaining the seat by a 15 per cent margin.

We have seen earlier that the National Party had come under criticism in Warrnambool over water charges. Despite this, the 'intrusion' of a Liberal Party candidate presumably helped the Coalition vote to top 57 per cent—though the National's 17.5 per cent was a drop of 40.3 per cent on the previous result. The question here is whether the National standing alone could have won this seat that is normally not friendly to the ALP. Labor's candidate received just 31.5 per cent, so it is unlikely that enough of the vote that went to the Liberals would have shifted to Labor if a Liberal candidate had not been on the ballot paper. As no other candidate topped 6 per cent, it is in regard to this seat, alone, that McNamara's complaint—as a National spokesperson—has some justification. From the Liberal perspective, however, the fact that the Liberal Party was able to nominate an attractive candidate for the seat meant that Warrnambool did not slip out of Coalition hands as might have happened.

Conclusion

A matter of timing?

The Victorian Liberal Party, the most successful division of the party that Robert Menzies created over 50 years ago, will probably mull over two tantalising questions for some time to come:

• Should Kennett have gone earlier? A combination of good polls, plus Labor's leadership tensions, suggests that the Premier should probably have gone to the people earlier, possibly as early as May or June. The delay meant that the new leadership was able to stake out a position as a reasonable, 'new' face of Labor that could increasingly claim to have put the party's internal problems behind it.(75)
• It seems clear that if Kennett had timed his departure from the Liberal leadership—and hence the Premiership—as soon as it was clear that he had lost his parliamentary majority, then at least Russell Savage, and possibly Craig Ingram, would have supported a minority Liberal-National Government. Indeed, as late as the Monday after the Frankston East by-election, Savage suggested that an earlier Kennett resignation would have swung independent support behind the Coalition: 'They had a great chance to do it but they didn't'.(76)

Implications?

There are several implications that can be drawn from the Victorian election.

• The urban-rural divide remains an important part of Australian politics. Given the right circumstances, as in Victoria in 1999, even if few votes move in metropolitan electorates a significant movement of votes in the bush can decide an election result. This recent Victorian election is a reminder of New South Wales 1976. In that election Labor's ability to retain the seats it held outside of the cities, and to pick up the rural seat that gave it a one-seat parliamentary majority, brought Neville Wran to power.
• It is clear that the growing volatility of the Australian electorate means that no government, whether at Commonwealth or State level, can be seen as impregnable. The past decade has seen governments defeated in New South Wales, Victoria, Queensland, South Australia, Tasmania and the ACT as well as in the Commonwealth election of 1996.
• A related point is that even governments with very large majorities can see these quickly disappear. This occurred to Premiers Greiner, Goss and Kennett, with Greiner resigning before the end of his term, Goss losing power after a by-election defeat and Kennett's recent loss of power.
• Governments that undertake a large-scale reform program run the risk of bringing about a voter backlash, no matter how much the economic circumstances of the time suggest the need for such reform.
• Victoria 1999 reminds us that the use of preferential voting can sometimes have an important impact upon the result of an Australian election.

 

Endnotes

1. Peter Aimer, Politics, Power and Persuasion. The Liberals in Victoria , James Bennett, Syd ney, 1974, pp. 150 - 4.
2. At this time, a symbol of the less-than-friendly relations between the non-Labor parties was the decision of the Liberal Party in 1949 to call itself the Liberal and Country Party. The party only dropped the word 'Country' in 1965.
3. James Jupp, 'Victoria: Left, Right and Centre', in Andrew Parkin and John Warhurst, ed., Machine Politics in the Australian Labor Party , George Allen and Unwin, Sydney, 1983, pp. 69 - 72.
4. Brian Costar and Nicholas Economou, 'Elections and Electoral Change 19 82 - 92', in Mark Considine and Brian Costar, ed., Trials in Power. Cain, Kirner and Victoria 1982 - 1992 , Melbourne University Press, Melbourne, 1992, p. 261.
5. Leanne White, 'The Fourth Estate and the Kennett Government', in Brian Costar and Nicholas Economou, eds, The Kennett Revolution. Victorian Politics in the 1990s , University of New South Wales Press, Sydney, 1999, p. 33.
6. Herald Sun , 25 August 1999.
7. Ardel Shamsullah, '"The Policy of Confidence": Politics in Victoria 1992 - 98', in Costar and Economou, The K ennett Revolution , p.  6.
8. Australian , 1 April 1996.
9. Ernie Chaples, Helen Nelson and Ken Turner, 'The Wran model in perspective', in Ernie Chaples, Helen Nelson and Ken Turner, eds, The Wran Model. Electoral politics in New South Wales 1981 and 1984 , Oxford University Press, Melbourne, 1985, p. 245.
10. Brian Costar, 'Laboring against the Jeff factor', Sunday Age , 29 August 1999.
11. Age , 25 August 1999.
12. Graham Hudson, 'The ALP: Labouring in Opposition', in Costar and Economou, The Kennett Revolution , p. 99.
13. Brumby q uoted in Hudson, op. cit., p. 100.
14. Nicholas Economou and Brian Costar, 'The Electoral Contest and Coalition Dominance 1992 - 98', in Costar and Economou, The Kennett Revolution , p. 131.
15. Shamsullah, op. cit., p. 13.
16. Economou and Costar, 'The Electoral Contest … ', p. 130; Age , 12 November 1997.
17. Age , 27 July 1998.
18. Australian , 25 February 1999.
19. Shamshullah, op. cit., p. 11; Hudson, op. cit., p. 109.
20. For speculation that Labor could lose seats, see Australian , 25 February 1999, Age , 25 August 1999.
21. Age , 25 August 1 999.
22. Allan Attwood, 'A true believer takes his chance while cameras roll', Age , 20 September 1999.
23. Age , 26 August 1999.
24. Age , 25 August 1999.
25. Age , 28 August 1999.
26. Australian , 25 August 1999.
27. Age , 17, 18 July 1999, Weekend Australian , 3 - 4 July 1999.
28. Sunday A ge , 24 October 1999.
29. Age , 9 September 1999.
30. Herald Sun , 6 September 1999; Age , 20 September 1999.
31. Sunday Herald Sun , 5 September 1999; Age , 10 September 1999.
32. Weekend Australian , 28 - 29 August 1999; Sunday Age, 5 September 1999; Herald Sun , 8  September 1999 ; Age , 20 September 1999.
33. Herald Sun , 25 August 1999; Australian , 26 August 1999.
34. Age , 25 August 1999.
35. Independents' Charter Victoria 1999, http://home.vicnet.au/~susandavies/Charterfinal.htm
36. Age , 18 October 1999.
37. Robert Manne, Sydney Morning Herald , 13 Se ptember 1999.
38. Woodward and Costar, op. cit., p. 15.
39. Dennis Woodward and Brian Costar, 'Another Case of Electoral Volatility? The 1999 Victorian Election', unpublished paper, 1999, p. 3.
40. Bulletin , 7 September 1999.
41. Financial Review , 17 September 1999, Couri er Mail , 18 September 1999.
42. Age , 28 August 1999.
43. Pamela Bone, 'Why some Liberals can't abide Kennett', Age , 16 September 1999; Anne Henderson, 'Rewards go to grassroots pollies', Australian , 30 September 1999.
44. Herald Sun , 27 August 1999.
45. Herald Sun , 10 Sep tember 1999.
46. Age , 25 August 1999.
47. Anne Vince, 'Amalgamations', in Brian Dollery and Neil Marshall ed., Australian Local Government. Reform and Renewal , Macmillan, Melbourne, 1997, p. 160; Brian Costar, 'Coalition Government: An Unequal Partnership', in Cos tar and Economou, The Kennett Revolution , pp. 93 - 4; Bill Russell, 'Rebuilding Victoria after Kennett', Dissent , Summer 1999/2000, p. 56.
48. Editor, St Arnaud North Central News , quoted Costar, 'Coalition Government … ', p. 92.
49. Woodward and Costar, op. cit., p. 9.
50. ibid, p.16.
51. Age , 20 September 1999.
52. See Tim Colebatch, 'Behind the rural revolt', Age , 18 October 1999; for other articles on the rural view of the Kennett Government, see Weekend Australian , 28 - 29 August 1999, Bulletin , 5 October 1999.
53. Scott Bennett, Affa irs of State: politics in the Australian States and Territories , Allen and Unwin, Sydney, 1992, p. 187.
54. Australian , 2 - 8 December 1999.
55. Age , 18 December 1999.
56. Age , 25 October 1999.
57. Mike Steketee, 'Felled by the polls', Australian , 2 - 8 December 1999.
58. Tony Pa rkinson, 'Can-do Premier undone', Age , 20 September 1999.
59. Quoted in Brian Costar, 'The National Party Campaign', in Brian J. Costar and Colin A.  Hughes ed., Labor to Office. The Victorian State Election 1982 , Drummond, Blackburn, p.  70.
60. Bennett, op. cit., p. 7.
61. Financial Review , 23 October 1999.
62. Age , 27 October 1999.
63. Age , 29 October 1999.
64. Age , 9 December 1999.
65. Age , 16 December 1999.
66. See, for example, Australian , 12 January 2000.
67. Virginia Trioli, 'End of the line', Bulletin , 26 October 1999, pp. 42 - 3.
68. Age , A ustralian , 27 October 1999.
69. Bernie Finn, former MLA for Tullamarine, Age , 22 December 1999.
70. Ardel Shamsullah, 'Politics in Victoria: Parliament, Cabinet and the Political Parties', in Considine and Costar, op. cit., pp. 16 - 17.
71. Age , 21 December 1999.
72. ibid.
73. For the New South Wales National Party's complaints, see Scott Bennett and Gerard Newman, 'New South Wales Election 1999', Research Paper No. 22 , Department of the Parliamentary Library, Canberra, 1999, pp. 14 - 15. See also Scott Bennett, Winning and Losing . Australia's National Elections , Melbourne University Press, Melbourne, 1996, pp.  52 - 3.
74. Ewin Hannan, 'Running on empty in Liberal country', Age , 18 December 1999.
75. Adam Kilgour, Executive Director of CPR Communications & Public Relations Pty Ltd, who worke d on the Labor campaign, was one observer who believed the delay was a 'major' mistake by the Premier, see 'How Bracks won it', Age , 22 October 1999.
76. Bulletin , 26 October 1999.

 

Table 1 Legislative Assembly, State Summary

Enrolled 3 130 338

(a) After the Burwood by-election, ALP 43 and LP 35.

(b) Figures in brackets represent change from position prior to 1999 election.

 

 

Table 2a Legislative Assembly: District Summary

Number

Table 2 a Legislative Assembly: District Summary

Number continued

Note: Party winning seat shown in bold.

 

Table 2b Legislative Assembly: District Summary

Per cent

Table 2b Legislative Assembly: District Summary

Per cent continued

Note: Party winning seat shown in bold.

 

 

Table 3 Legislative Assembly: District Details

Albert Park  Enrolled 39 365

First Preference Votes

Thwaites J * ALP 18 997 56.4 -0.6

Rushford R LP 14 671 43.6 +4.1

 

Formal  33 668 97.1  -0.7

Informal   989 2.9 +0.7

 

 

 

Altona  Enrolled 36 589

First Preference Votes

Kosky L * ALP 21 545 64.7 +7.9

Lambrinakos S LP 11 774 35.3 -1.4

 

Formal  33 319 96.2 -0.9

Informal  1 303 3.8 +0.9

 

 

 

Ballarat East  Enrolled 32 526

First Preference Votes

Traynor B * LP 13 886 46.3 -2.0

Howard G ALP 16 100 53.7 +5.8

 

Formal  29 986 97.7 -0.7

Informal   706 2.3 +0.7

 

 

 

Ballarat West  Enrolled 32 893

First Preference Votes

Verlin J # LP 14 910 49.0 -0.5

Overington K ALP 15 527 51.0 +5.2

 

Formal  30 437 97.6 -0.6

Informal   744 2.4 +0.6

 

 

 

Bayswater  Enrolled 35 427

First Preference Votes

Bristow J HP 1 380 4.3 +4.3

Craven S ALP 13 732 42.5 +1.4

Ashley G * LP 17 165 53.2 -2.8

 

Two Party Preferred

Craven S ALP 14 623 45.3 +2.8

Ashley G * LP 17 654 54.7 -2.8

 

Formal  32 277 97.6 -0.5

Informal   786 2.4  +0.5

 

 

 

 

Bellarine  Enrolled 34 423

First Preference Votes

Erler K ALP 14 289 44.5 +0.1

Menheere-Thompson E AD 1 930 6.0 +6.0

Spry G * LP 15 875 49.5 -6.1

 

Two Party Preferred

Erler K ALP 15 495 48.3 +3.8

Spry G * LP 16 599 51.7 -3.8

 

Formal  32 094 98.2 -0.1

Informal   599 1.8 +0.1

 

 

 

Benalla  Enrolled 34 087

First Preference Votes

Allen D ALP 13 013 42.6 +19.0

McNamara P * NP 17 543 57.4 -1.5

 

Formal  30 556 96.4 -1.6

Informal  1 128 3.6 +1.6

 

 

 

Benambra  Enrolled 35 378

First Preference Votes

Plowman T * LP 18 016 57.1 -5.8

Murdoch B ALP 13 561 42.9 +9.9

 

Formal  31 577 97.1 -0.9

Informal   931 2.9 +0.9

 

 

 

Bendigo East  Enrolled 34 094

First Preference Votes

Rivendell B AG  1 552 4.9 +4.9

John M * LP 14 123 44.2 -8.1

Thorpe A ARP  828 2.6 +2.6

Allan J ALP 15 478 48.4 +6.6

 

Two Party Preferred

John M * LP 15 004 46.9 -8.1

Allan J ALP 16 977 53.1 +8.1

 

Formal  31 981 98.3 -0.4

Informal   567 1.7 +0.4

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Bendigo West  Enrolled 34 932

First Preference Votes

Cameron B * ALP 18 315 56.4 +12.7

Howard A IND 1 092 3.4 +3.4

Hall A AG 1 391 4.3 +4.3

Cappy F LP 11 679 36.0 -7.0

 

Two Party Preferred

Cameron B * ALP 19 893 61.3  +9.6

Cappy F LP 12 582 38.7 -9.6

 

Formal  32 477 98.1 -0.4

Informal   638 1.9 +0.4

 

 

 

Bennettswood  Enrolled 32 822

First Preference Votes

Wilson R # LP 16 715 56.1 -2.0

Andrews M ALP 13 103 43.9 +4.4

 

Formal  29 818 97.6 -0.5

Informal   733 2.4 +0.5

 

 

 

Bentleigh  Enrolled 34 492

First Preference Votes

Maloney C ALP 13 831 44.0 +0.1

Brunton N AG 1 139 3.6 +3.6

King G DLP  492 1.6 +1.6

Barber M IND  296 0.9 +0.9

Peulich I * LP 15 679 49.9 -3.9

 

Two Party Preferred

Maloney C ALP 15 090 48.1 +2.8

Peulich I * LP 16 300 51.9 -2.8

 

Formal  31 437 97.3 -0.7

Informal   865 2.7 +0.7

 

 

 

Berwick  Enrolled 44 452

First Preference Votes

Dean R * LP 21 958 53.9 +0.8

Reed P ALP 17 248 42.4 -0.3

Rowe M DLP 1 519 3.7 +3.7

 

Two Party Preferred

Dean R * LP 22 376 54.9 -0.4

Reed P ALP 18 348 45.1 +0.4

 

Formal  40 725  97.0 -0.4

Informal  1 241 3.0 +0.4

 

 

 

 

 

 

Box Hill  Enrolled 34 099

First Preference Votes

Waters J HP 1 356 4.4 +4.4

Thorn C ALP 12 166 39.5 +1.2

Clark R * LP 17 299 56.1 -3.0

 

Two Party Preferred

Thorn C ALP 13 067 42.4 +2.7

Clark R * LP 17 754 57.6 -2.7

 

Formal  30 821 97.9 -0.4

Informal   671 2.1 +0.4

 

 

 

Brighton  Enrolled 34 221

First Preference Votes

Del Porto A IND 5 920 19.4 +19.4

Dunsmuir I  ALP 6 973 22.8 -7.3

Asher L # LP 17 701 57.9 -8.8

 

Two Party Preferred

Dunsmuir I ALP 10 529 34.4 +2.5

Asher L # LP 20 061 65.6 -2.5

 

Formal  30 594 97.9 -0.4

Informal   664 2.1 +0.4

 

 

 

Broadmeadows  Enrolled 36 559

First Preference Votes

Marr G IND 1 022 3.2 +3.2

Tay P LP 6 889 21.7 -1.7

Brumby J * ALP 22 718 71.7 0.0

Haidar A IND  789 2.5 +2.5

Kaliniy J IND  269 0.8 +0.8

 

Two Party Preferred

Tay P LP 8 019 25.3 +0.4

Brumby J * ALP 23 651 74.7 -0.4

 

Formal  31 687 94.3 -2.7

Informal  1 898 5.7 +2.7

 

 

 

Bulleen  Enrolled 33 760

First Preference Votes

Manassa D HP  890 2.9 +2.9

Miras C ALP 9 810 32.3 -1.1

Trafficante R AG 1 832 6.0 +6.0

Kotsiras N # L P 17 843 58.7 -4.7

 

Two Party Preferred

Miras C ALP 11 662 38.4 +3.0

Kotsiras N # LP 18 709 61.6 -3.0

 

Formal  30 375 96.9 -0.5

Informal   982 3.1 +0.5

 

Bundoora  Enrolled 36 747

First Preference Votes

Mason N NLP  807 2.4 -0.5

Garbutt S * ALP 18 375 54.4 +3.9

McCabe C LP 14 612 43.2 -3.3

 

Two Party Preferred

Garbutt S * ALP 18 942 56.1 +3.5

McCabe C LP 14 852 43.9 -3.5

 

Formal  33 794 97.2 -0.8

Informal   973 2.8 +0.8

 

 

 

Burwood  Enrolled 34 668

First Preference Votes

Bunn M NLP  734 2.3 -0.9

Kennett J * LP 17 455 55.5 -1.7

Stensholt B ALP 13 062 41.5 +2.0

Abolish Child Support ACS  194 0.6 +0.6

 

Two Party Preferred

Kennett J *  LP 17 858 56.8 -1.8

Stensholt B ALP 13 585 43.2 +1.8

 

Formal  31 445 97.6 -0.7

Informal   789 2.4 +0.7

 

 

 

Carrum  Enrolled 38 150

First Preference Votes

Bray D AG 1 896 5.5 +5.5

Lindell J ALP 16 099 4 6.3 +0.4

Lean D * LP 16 770 48.2 -1.1

 

Two Party Preferred

Lindell J ALP 17 444 50.2 +1.0

Lean D * LP 17 321 49.8 -1.0

 

Formal  34 765 97.5 -0.5

Informal   899 2.5 +0.5

 

 

 

Caulfield  Enrolled 37 601

Fi rst Preference Votes

Shardey H * LP 18 947 58.5 +0.2

Simon H ALP 13 460 41.5 +3.0

 

Formal  32 407 96.9 -0.7

Informal  1 024 3.1 +0.7

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Clayton  Enrolled 36 653

First Preference Votes

Lok C LP 12 441 38.3 0.0

Lim H * ALP 20 037 61.7 +6.2

 

Formal  32 478 95.6 -1.3

Informal  1 503 4.4 +1.3

 

 

 

Coburg  Enrolled 35 338

First Preference Votes

Carli C * ALP 18 877 64.7 -1.5

Rush E AG 2 547 8.7 +8.7

Hr ycek M LP 7 765 26.6 -4.8

 

Two Party Preferred

Carli C * ALP 20 951 71.8 +4.9

Hrycek M LP 8 232 28.2 -4.9

 

Formal  29 189 95.9 -1.0

Informal  1 248 4.1 +1.0

 

 

 

Cranbourne  Enrolled 41 084

First Preference Votes

McCormack C IND 2 379 6.3 +6.3

Perera J ALP 14 892 39.5 -1.5

Rowe G * LP 20 444 54.2 -4.8

 

Two Party Preferred

Perera J ALP 16 708 44.3 +3.3

Rowe G * LP 21 002 55.7 -3.3

 

Formal  37 715 97.4 +0.1

Informal   997 2.6 -0.1

 

 

 

Dandenong  Enrolled 46 056

First Preference Votes

Miller A LP 18 297 44.2 +0.1

Pandazopoulos J * ALP 23 129 55.8 +6.2

 

Formal  41 426 96.0 -0.4

Informa l  1 733 4.0 +0.4

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Dandenong North  Enrolled 33 802

First Preference Votes

Lenders J # ALP 16 406 53.9 +3.3

Harris G IND 1 820 6.0 +6.0

Emmanouil G LP 11 908 39.2 -6.8

Klimek F ARP  276 0. 9 +0.9

 

Two Party Preferred

Lenders J # ALP 17 634 58.0 +5.8

Emmanouil G LP 12 775 42.0 -5.8

 

Formal  30 410 95.9 -1.1

Informal  1 302 4.1 +1.1

 

 

 

Doncaster  Enrolled 35 902

First Preference Votes

Fyfi eld S AG 1 497 4.6 +4.6

Perton V * LP 19 707 60.8 -3.1

McCallum J ALP 10 579 32.6 -0.3

Dawe G HP  629 1.9 +1.9

 

Two Party Preferred

Perton V * LP 20 518 63.3 -1.6

McCallum J ALP 11 892 36.7 +1.6

 

Formal  32 412 97.3 -0.3

Informal   915 2.7 +0.3

 

 

 

Dromana  Enrolled 36 014

First Preference Votes

Dixon M * LP 17 900 54.4 +3.5

Thompson D ALP 13 542 41.2 +7.0

Crea P DLP  951 2.9 +2.9

Charlwood J NLP  490 1.5 +0.6

 

Two Party Preferred

Dixon M * LP 18 480 56.2 -1.9

Thompson D ALP 14 403 43.8 +1.9

 

Formal  32 883 97.6 -0.8

Informal   799 2.4 +0.8

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Eltham  Enrolled 40 355

First Preference Votes

Engish J IND  546 1.5 +1.5

Jennings M IND 1 310 3.5 +3.5

Hanney P ALP 14 325 38.5 +0.2

Rosenfeldt W NLP  98 0.3 -0.8

Whitehead J AG 1 237 3.3 +3.3

Phillips W * LP 18 696 50.3 -4.4

Carter S AD  966 2.6 +2.6

 

Two Party Preferred

Hanney P ALP 17 315 46.4 +3.2

Phillips W * LP 19 960 53.6 -3.2

 

Formal  37 178 97.6 -0.9

Informal   907 2.4 +0.9

 

 

 

Essendon  Enrolled 34 636

First Preference Votes

Maddigan J * ALP 18 489 58.5 +7.6

Saunders K LP 13 135 41.5 -1.7

 

Formal  31 624 97.4 -0.3

Informal   839 2.6 +0.3

 

 

 

Evelyn  Enrolled 36 733

First Preference Votes

Gillam C IND 1 824 5.4 +5.4

Fyffe C # LP 18 367 54.8 -5.1

Marquez-Bridger N AL P 11 480 34.2 +0.8

Houlihan R IND 1 862 5.6 +5.6

 

Two Party Preferred

Fyffe C # LP 19 957 59.5 -3.2

Marquez-Bridger N ALP 13 571 40.5 +3.2

 

Formal  33 533 97.0 -0.6

Informal  1 042 3.0 +0.6

 

 

 

Footscray  Enrolled 34 174

First Preference Votes

Lynch D LP 9 533 32.4 +2.6

Mildenhall B * ALP 19 916 67.6 -0.4

 

Formal  29 449 95.1 -0.7

Informal  1 503 4.9 +0.7

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Forest Hill  Enrolled 34 556

First Pr eference Votes

Richardson J * LP 17 583 55.9 -3.8

Buxton J ALP 12 895 41.0 +3.3

Hardiman S HP 1 000 3.2 +3.2

 

Two Party Preferred

Richardson J * LP 17 974 57.1 -3.2

Buxton J ALP 13 503 42.9 +3.4

 

Formal  31 478 97.5 -0.6

Informal   816 2.5 +0.6

 

 

 

Frankston  Enrolled 33 431

First Preference Votes

Borg F IND  626 2.1 +2.1

Koch D ALP 10 083 33.2 -0.4

Kelsall H AG 1 850 6.1 +6.1

McCall A * LP 17 778 58.6 -5.7

 

Two Party Preferred

Koch D ALP 11 891 39.3 +4.7

McCall A * LP 18 399 60.7 -4.7

 

Formal  30 337 97.9 -0.3

Informal   635 2.1 +0.3

 

 

 

Frankston East  Enrolled 28 877

First Preference Votes

Vogt M AG  486 1.9 +1.9

Bunyan I I ND  72 0.3 +0.3

McClure M IND  77 0.3 +0.3

McLean C # LP 10 632 41.6 -7.3

Rankin S IND  131 0.5 +0.5

Anderson R IND  95 0.4 +0.4

Pavlekovich-Smith I IND  13 0.1 +0.1

Viney M ALP 13 127 51.4 +7.1

Clark G IND  21 0.1 +0.1

Hoser R IND  11 0.0 +0.0

Burleigh G IND  140 0.5 +0.5

Crea P DLP  93 0.4 +0.4

Clarke L NLP  24 0.1 -1.0

Eames L IND  319 1.2 +1.2

Dawn D IND  58 0.2 +0.2

Coppard J IND  263 1.0 +1.0

 

Two Party Preferred

McLean C # LP 11 603 45.4 -7.7

Viney M ALP 13 953 54.6 +7.7

 

Formal  25 562 95.2 -2.6

Informal  1 280 4.8 +2.6

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Geelong  Enrolled 33 830

First Preference Votes

Faris R IND 1 292 4.2 +4.2

Grose L IND  641 2.1 +2.1

O'Dea J IND  331 1.1 +1.1

Henderson A * LP 14 719 47.5 -5.1

Trezise I  ALP 14 001 45.2 +0.1

 

Two Party Preferred

Henderson A * LP 15 484 50.0 -3.5

Trezise I ALP 15 500 50.0 +3.5

 

Formal  30 984 97.5 -0.3

Informal   802 2.5 +0.3

 

 

 

Geelong North  Enrolled 34 379

First Pref erence Votes

Kennett B LP 12 176 39.1 -2.9

Loney P * ALP 19 000 60.9 +2.9

 

Formal  31 176 96.4 -0.6

Informal  1 158 3.6 +0.6

 

 

 

Gippsland East  Enrolled 33 075

First Preference Votes

Buckley B IND 1 70 4 5.7 +5.7

Ingram C IND 7 439 24.8 +24.8

Bolitho B ALP 8 177 27.3 -1.3

Treasure D * NP 10 776 35.9 -16.9

Freshwater M PHON 1 911 6.4 +6.4

 

Two Candidate Preferred

Ingram C IND 17 317 57.7 

Treasure D * NP 12 690 42.3 

 

Formal  30 007 97.4 -0.9

Informal   812 2.6 +0.9

 

 

 

Gippsland South  Enrolled 32 761

First Preference Votes

Sayers M IND 4 411 14.7 +14.7

Ryan P * NP 15 130 50.5 -17.2

Emanuel H ALP 9 955 33.2 +4.7

Clarke R NLP  456 1.5 -2.3

 

Two Party Preferred

Ryan P * NP 17 238 57.5 -11.9

Emanuel H ALP 12 740 42.5 +11.9

 

Formal  29 952 97.4 -0.9

Informal   800 2.6 +0.9

 

 

 

 

Gippsland West  Enrolled 32 796

First Preference Votes

Taylor P ALP 5 487 18.1 -15.1

Head W NP 1 973 6.5 +6.5

Richardson M NLP  128 0.4 +0.4

McRae G LP 11 502 38.0 -19.8

Lowry M IND  385 1.3 -7.7

Davies S * IND 10 819 35.7 +35.7

 

Two Candidate Preferred

McCrae G LP 13 934 46.0 

Davies S * IND 16 360 54.0 

 

Formal  30 294 97.4 -0.9

Informal   821 2.6 +0.9

 

 

 

Gisborne  Enrolled 36 390

First Preference V otes

Mowatt R AD 1 260 3.7 +3.7

Reynolds G IND  643 1.9 +1.9

Duncan J ALP 13 589 40.4 -0.4

Dunn D IND 3 394 10.1 +10.1

Knowles R # LP 14 084 41.9 -13.8

Hall L AG  678 2.0 +2.0

 

Two Party Preferred

Duncan J ALP 17 371 51.6 +9.4

Knowles R # LP 16 277 48.4 -9.4

 

Formal  33 648 97.2 -0.9

Informal   981 2.8 +0.9

 

 

 

Glen Waverley  Enrolled 31 984

First Preference Votes

Smith R * LP 18 410 63.2 -1.6

Dalby R ALP 10 738 36.8 +4.0

 

Formal  29 148 97.6 -0.6

Inform al   714 2.4 +0.6

 

 

 

Hawthorn  Enrolled 36 943

First Preference Votes

Baillieu T # LP 20 548 62.6 +1.7

Wickiramasingham N ALP 10 635 32.4 +3.3

Dawborn K HP 1 650 5.0 +5.0

 

Two Party Preferred

Baillieu T # LP 21 042 64.1 +0.5

Wickiramasingham N ALP 11 791 35.9 -0.5

 

Formal  32 833 97.6 -1.1

Informal   792 2.4 +1.1

 

 

 

Ivanhoe  Enrolled 33 205

First Preference Votes

Poynton L HP  358 1.2 +1.2

McLean D  LP 12 788 42.5 -5.0

Langdon C * ALP 15 079 50.1 +0.8

Clarke L NLP  132 0.4 -2.8

Roberts R AG 1 737 5.8 +5.8

 

Two Party Preferred

McLean D LP 13 413 44.6 -3.8

Langdon C * ALP 16 679 55.4 +3.8

 

Formal  30 094 97.2 -0.7

Informal   858 2.8 +0.7

 

 

 

Keilor  Enrolled 42 091

First Preference Votes

Seitz G * ALP 22 3 38 58.7 -0.3

Burns H IND 2 875 7.6 +7.6

Fenech J LP 12 851 33.8 -3.5

 

Two Party Preferred

Seitz G * ALP 23 529 61.9 +0.3

Fenech J LP 14 481 38.1 -0.3

 

Formal  38 064 95.1 -0.7

Informal  1 967 4.9 +0.7

 

 

 

Kew  Enrolled 35 644

First Preference Votes

Hale P HP 1 380 4.3 +4.3

McIntosh A # LP 19 594 61.8 -1.9

Lewes J ALP 10 751 33.9 +1.1

 

Two Party Preferred

McIntosh A # LP 20 247 63.8 -1.2

Lewes J ALP 11 478 36.2 +1.2

 

Formal  31 725 97.6 -0.6

Informal   795 2.4 +0.6

 

 

 

Knox  Enrolled 39 768

First Preference Votes

Wells K DLP 1 408 3.8 +3.8

Smith C ALP 14 684 40.1 -0.1

Lupton H * LP 20 481 56.0 -0.9

 

Two Party Preferred

Smith C ALP 15 611 42.7 +0.6

Lupton H * LP 20 962 57.3 -0.6

 

Formal  36 573 97.5 -0.5

Informal   943 2.5 +0.5

 

 

Malvern  Enrolled 35 940

First Preference Votes

Doyle R * LP 21 129 66.6 +0.2

Wallace J ALP 10 583 33.4 +2.8

 

Formal  31 71 2 97.8 -0.3

Informal   697 2.2 +0.3

 

 

 

Melbourne  Enrolled 41 000

First Preference Votes

Pike B # ALP 20 572 59.3 +5.7

McLean L LP 12 122 35.0 +4.2

Jorquera J IND 1 986 5.7 +5.7

 

Two Party Preferred

Pike B # ALP 22 112 63.8 -2.1

McLean L LP 12 568 36.2 +2.1

 

Formal  34 680 96.3 -0.7

Informal  1 334 3.7 +0.7

 

 

 

Melton  Enrolled 44 047

First Preference Votes

McGeary J LP 15 294 38.7 +0.8

Nardella D # ALP 24 237 61.3 -0.8

 

Formal  39 531 95.5 -1.2

Informal  1 862 4.5 +1.2

 

 

 

Mildura  Enrolled 33 191

First Preference Votes

Mansell A NP 6 015 19.7 +19.7

Danson P LP 7 998 26.2 -19.0

Savage R * IND 13 551 44.4 +8.7

Zigouras J ALP 2 572 8.4 -9.5

Joyce T AD  391 1.3 +1.3

 

Two Candidate Preferred

Mansell A NP 11 039 43.9 

Savage R * IND 14 110 56.1 

 

Formal  30 527 97.6 -0.7

Informal   763 2.4 +0.7

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Mill Park  Enrolled 41 456

First Preference Votes

Davenport A LP 12 405 33.0 +1.0

D'Angelo R NLP  924 2.5 +1.0

Andrianopoulos A * ALP 24 307 64.6 +4.5

 

Two Party Preferred

Davenport A LP 12 864 34.2 -1.8

Andrianopoulos A * ALP 24 772 65.8 +1.8

 

Formal  37 636 96.1 -0.4

Informal  1 541 3.9 +0.4

 

 

 

Mitcham  Enrolled 34 479

First Preference Votes

Robinso n T * ALP 14 411 45.2 +4.7

Petherbridge T HP  894 2.8 +2.8

Munroe A LP 15 043 47.2 -6.4

Aubrey C IND 1 529 4.8 +4.8

 

Two Party Preferred

Robinson T * ALP 16 110 50.5 +5.8

Munroe A LP 15 767 49.5 -5.8

 

Formal  31 877 97.8 -0.3

Informal   729 2.2 +0.3

 

 

 

Monbulk  Enrolled 33 627

First Preference Votes

Scurfield L NLP  258 0.8 -0.5

Voigt W CDP  414 1.4 +1.4

McArthur S * LP 15 206 49.8 -2.7

Wood L ALP 12 266 40.2 +2.0

Holtham R AG 1 928 6.3 +6.3

Feltham F D LP  443 1.5 +1.5

 

Two Party Preferred

McArthur S * LP 16 241 53.2 -2.0

Wood L ALP 14 306 46.8 +2.0

 

Formal  30 515 97.2 -0.8

Informal   870 2.8 +0.8

 

 

 

Mooroolbark  Enrolled 34 835

First Preference Vot es

Elliott L * LP 19 509 60.9 0.0

McCrorey D ALP 12 549 39.1 +2.7

 

Formal  32 058 97.3 -0.6

Informal   896 2.7 +0.6

 

 

 

 

 

Mordialloc  Enrolled 32 829

First Preference Votes

McLeod R ALP 14 200 47.8 +5.8

Leigh G * LP 15 515 52.2 -1.2

 

Fo rmal  29 715 96.9 -1.2

Informal   955 3.1 +1.2

 

 

 

Mornington  Enrolled 36 840

First Preference Votes

Nicholson V IND 2 816 8.4 +8.4

Cornelius G ALP 12 198 36.3 -0.8

Plunkett S IND  783 2.3 +2.3

Cooper R * LP 17 821 53.0 -6.2

 

Two Party Preferred

Cornelius G ALP 14 880 44.3 +5.6

Cooper R * LP 18 733 55.7 -5.6

 

Formal  33 618 97.6 -0.4

Informal   813 2.4 +0.4

 

 

 

Morwell  Enrolled 33 737

First Preferen ce Votes

Tyler P LP 11 040 35.3 +35.3

Hamilton K * ALP 17 366 55.4 +4.0

Hoppner H IND 2 912 9.3 +9.3

 

Two Party Preferred

Tyler P LP 12 856 41.1 -6.2

Hamilton K * ALP 18 457 58.9 +6.2

 

Formal  31 318 97.8 -0.1

Informal   700 2.2 +0.1

 

 

 

Murray Valley  Enrolled 34 790

First Preference Votes

Jasper K * NP 20 899 65.9 -5.3

Leschen Z ALP 10 811 34.1 +8.4

 

Formal  31 710 97.0 -1.4

Informal   990 3.3 +1.4

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Narracan  Enrolled 31 688

First Preference Votes

Fozard M AD 1 534 5.3 +5.3

Mathieson R IND  504 1.8 +1.8

Maxfield I ALP 13 074 45.6 +3.7

Dowling C SP 1 292 4.5 +4.5

Andrighetto F * LP 11 925 41.6 -5.8

Robinson H IND  355 1.2 +1.2

 

Two Party Preferred

Maxfield I ALP 15 063 52.5 +4.1

Andrighetto F * LP 13 261 47.5 -4.1

 

Formal  28 684 96.8 -1.3

Informal   939 3.2 +1.3

 

 

 

Niddrie  Enrolled 33 802

First Preference Votes

Kruger S LP 13 525 43.2 -2.4

Hulls R * ALP 17 761 56.8 +2.4

 

Formal  31 286 96.2 -0.7

Informal  1 252 3.8 +0.7

 

 

 

Northcote  Enrolled 35 695

First Preference Votes

Richardson E LP 8 124 26.0 -2.2

Duffy S IND 2 480 7.9 +7.9

Delahunty M * ALP 20 681 66.1 +6.5

 

Two Party Preferred

Richardson E LP 8 552 27.3 -2.8

Delahunty M * ALP 22 733 72.7 +2.8

 

Formal  31 285 96.0 -0.2

Informal  1 306 4.0 +0.2

 

 

 

Oakleigh  Enrolled 34 347

First Preference Votes

Barker A ALP 15 060 49.2 +3.4

McGregor S IND  452 1.5 +1.5

Eboli L IND  268 0.9 +0.9

Walters S AG 1 107 3.6 +3.6

McGill D * LP 13 5 58 44.3 -3.1

Schlager R NLP  148 0.5 -0.5

 

Two Party Preferred

Barker A  ALP 16 286 53.3 +4.1

McGill D * LP 14 262 46.7 -4.1

 

Formal  30 593 96.5 -1.1

Informal  1 118 3.5 +1.1

 

 

 

Pakenham  Enrolled 35 194

First Preference Votes

Scoullar D AG 2 571 7.9 +7.9

Maclellan R * LP 17 202 53.2 -5.0

Dean F IND  637 2.0 +0.3

Anderson J ALP 11 949 36.9 +0.8

 

Two Party Preferred

Maclellan R * LP 18 284 56.5 -4.6

Anderson J ALP 14 059 43.5 +4.6

 

Formal  32 359 97.6 - 0.4

Informal   802 2.4 +0.4

 

 

 

Pascoe Vale  Enrolled 31 045

First Preference Votes

Aghajani V LP 9 569 35.1 -2.9

Campbell C * ALP 17 725 64.9 +4.9

 

Formal  27 294 96.1 -0.9

Informal  1 098 3.9 +0.9

 

 

 

Polwarth  Enrolled 33 217

First Preference Votes

Crook B IND 4 574 14.8 -3.8

Brown S AG 1 161 3.8 +3.8

Couch P NP 5 116 16.6 +16.6

Garland S ALP 7 393 23.9 -4.5

Mulder T # LP 12 668 41.0 -10.0

 

Two Party Preferred

Garland S ALP 12 237 39.6 -2.3

Mulder T # LP 18 675 60.4 +2.3

 

Formal  30 912 97.8 -0.3

Informal   686 2.2 +0.3

 

 

 

Port land  Enrolled 29 156

First Preference Votes

Jackson L ALP 8 016 29.4 -5.1

Kempton P IND 7 153 26.2 +26.2

Napthine D * LP 12 093 44.4 -11.3

 

Two Party Preferred

Jackson L ALP 12 394 45.5 +5.9

Napthine D * LP 14 868 54.5 -5.9

 

Formal  27 262 98.1 -0.2

Informal   515 1.9 +0.2

 

 

 

 

 

 

Prahran  Enrolled 39 089

First Preference Votes

Salter W AG 2 282 6.9 +6.9

Burke L * LP 16 789 51.0 -1.8

O'Reilly J ALP 13 056 39.7 -3.9

Dawson M N LP  164 0.5 -3.1

Murphy F DLP  609 1.9 +1.9

 

Two Party Preferred

Burke L * LP 17 785 54.0 -0.6

O'Reilly J ALP 15 126 46.0 +0.6

 

Formal  32 900 97.3 -0.4

Informal   904 2.7 +0.4

 

 

 

Preston  Enrolled 33 794

First Preference Votes

Dickins M NLP 1 052 3.5 +1.2

Padgett R LP 8 769 29.3 -4.6

Leighton M * ALP 20 087 67.2 +3.3

 

Two Party Preferred

Padgett R LP 9 384 31.4 -3.3

Leighton M * ALP 20 522 68.6 +3.3

 

Formal  29 908 95.7 -0.1

Informal  1 339 4.3 +0.1

 

 

 

Richmond  Enrolled 41 466

First Preference Votes

Jolly S IND 4 213 12.0 +12.0

Tran D LP 10 716 30.6 +0.6

Wynne R # ALP 20 121 57.4 -4.8

 

Two Party Preferred

Tran D LP 11 837 33.8 +1.2

Wynne R # ALP 23 204 66.2 -1.2

 

Formal  35 050 96.3 -0.9

Informal  1 348 3.7 +0.9

 

 

 

Ripon  Enrolled 31 732

First Preference Votes

Helper J ALP 15 579 52.6 +8.8

Elder S * LP 14 045 47.4 -5.0

 

Formal  29 624 97.8 -0.5

Informal   668 2.2 +0.5

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Rodney  Enrolled 32 526

First Preference Votes

McCulloch M ALP 8 565 28.4 +8.7

Maughan N * NP 18 329 60.8 -2.8

Hutton D PHON 3 257 10.8 +10.8

 

Two Party Preferred

McCulloch M ALP 10 358 34.4 +10.5

Maughan N * NP 19 793 65.6 -10.5

 

Formal  30 151 97.8 -0.6

Informal   692 2.2 +0.6

 

 

 

Sandringham  Enrolled 34 629

First Preference Votes

Thompson M * LP 19 478 62.5 -0.3

Munt J ALP 11 693 37.5 +3.2

 

Formal  31 171 97.4 -0.9

Informal   828 2.6 +0.9

 

 

 

Seymour  Enrolled 35 717

First Preference Votes

Hardman B ALP 15 410 46.9 +2.9

Rule D # LP 15 675 47.7 -4.8

Romagnesi J AG 1 797 5.5 +5.5

 

Two Party Preferred

Hardman B ALP 16 672 50.7 +4.9

Rule D # LP 16 210 49.3 -4.9

 

Formal  32 882 97.4 -0.7

Informal   879 2.6 +0.7

 

 

 

Shepparton  Enrolled 33 823

First Preference Votes

Boyle W ALP 7 616 24.6 -3.2

Kilgour D * NP 12 355 3 9.0 -26.0

Hazelman C IND 10 965 35.4 +35.4

 

Two Candidate Preferred

Kilgour D * NP 16 724 54.1 

Hazelman C IND 14 212 45.9 

 

Formal  30 936 97.3 -0.3

Informal   865 2.7 +0.3

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

South Barwon  Enrolled 36 107

First Preference Votes

Paterson A * LP 16 892 50.7 -8.4

Crutchfield M ALP 12 468 37.4 -0.6

Paull J AD 1 891 5.7 +5.7

Lauren T IND  598 1.8 +1.8

Gannon M IND  215 0.6 +0.6

Chenery S AG 1 233 3.7 +3.7

 

Two Party Preferred

Paterson A * LP 18 222 54.7 -5.5

Crutchfield M ALP 15 076 45.3 +5.5

 

Formal  33 297 97.8 -0.4

Informal   761 2.2 +0.4

 

 

 

Springvale  Enrolled 35 438

First Preference Votes

Liu-Hyland B IND 1 680 5.3 +5.3

Campbell J LP 11 152 35.4 -2.7

Bisset R IND  398 1.3 +1.3

Holding T # ALP 18 230 57.9 +2.9

 

Two Party Preferred

Campbell J LP 12 322 39.2 -2.9

Holding T # ALP 19 114 60.8 +2.9

 

Formal  31 460 95.5 -1.2

Informal  1 476 4.5 +1.2

 

 

 

Sunshine  Enrolled 38 506

First Preference Votes

Morgan S LP 9 100 27.0 -2.7

Languiller T ALP 19 826 58.8 -8.8

Barker I * IND 4 780 14.2 +14.2

 

Two Party Preferred

Morgan S LP 10 062 29.9 -1.0

Languiller T ALP 23 643 70.1 +1.0

 

Formal  33 706 94.4 -0.8

Informal  1 987 5.6 +0.8

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Swan Hill  Enrolled 30 088

First Preference Votes

Schorel G IND  257 0.9 +0.9

Ditterich C IND 6 192 22.6 +22.6

Williams D ALP 5 511  20.1 +2.7

Maher B IND 1 435 5.2 +5.2

Croft B PHON 1 383 5.1 +5.1

Steggall B * NP 12 378 45.2 -13.8

Bonney L IND  219 0.8 +0.8

 

Two Candidate Preferred

Ditterich C IND 12 925 47.2 

Steggall B * NP 14 450 52.8 

 

Formal  27 375 96.3 -2.0

Informal  1 066 3.7 +2.0

 

 

 

Thomastown  Enrolled 35 416

First Preference Votes

Gidley M LP 8 212 26.1 -1.3

Batchelor P ALP 23 305 73.9 +3.0

 

Formal  31 517 95.5 -1.0

Informal  1 479 4.5 +1.0

 

 

 

Tu llamarine  Enrolled 39 652

First Preference Votes

Beattie L ALP 18 346 50.6 +6.5

Fraser P AG  996 2.7 +2.7

Grenfell R SP  719 2.0 +2.0

Finn B * LP 15 561 42.9 -5.4

Mulholland J DLP  668 1.8 +1.8

 

Two Party Preferred

Beattie L ALP 19 502 53.8 +6.9

Finn B * LP 16 751 46.2 -6.9

 

Formal  36 290 96.8 -1.0

Informal  1 210 3.2 +1.0

 

 

 

Wantirna  Enrolled 37 964

First Preference Votes

Abraham C ALP 13 301 38.1 +2.3

Wells K * LP 21 57 9 61.9 -0.3

 

Formal  34 880 97.4 -0.6

Informal   931 2.6 +0.6

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Warrandyte  Enrolled 34 386

First Preference Votes

Orr D ALP 10 630 33.6 +3.2

Honeywood P * LP 19 395 61.2 -0.2

Roberts P NLP  288 0.9 -0.3

Sto ckdale K HP 1 357 4.3 +4.3

 

Two Party Preferred

Orr D ALP 11 571 36.5 +0.4

Honeywood P * LP 20 096 63.5 -0.4

 

Formal  31 670 98.1 -0.4

Informal   620 1.9 +0.4

 

 

 

Warrnambool  Enrolled 34 226

First Pref erence Votes

Blair G AG  740 2.3 +2.3

Walsh G # NP 5 550 17.5 -40.3

O'Brien R IND  435 1.4 +1.4

Vogels J LP 12 739 40.2 +40.2

Lindop M IND 1 864 5.9 -6.7

Reekie R ALP 9 993 31.5 +2.9

Wilson B ARP  379 1.2 +1.2

 

Two Party Preferred

Vogels J LP 18 682 58.9 -4.9

Reekie R ALP 13 018 41.1 +4.9

 

Formal  31 700 97.1 -1.1

Informal   962 2.9 +1.1

 

 

 

Werribee  Enrolled 41 644

First Preference Votes

Gillett M * ALP 22 652 59.1 +12.8

Manson C AG  913 2.4 +2.4

Impso n G IND  353 0.9 +0.9

McLaren D LP 14 120 36.9 -6.7

Backhouse W IND  258 0.7 +0.7

 

Two Party Preferred

Gillett M * ALP 23 540 61.5 +10.8

McLaren D LP 14 754 38.5 -10.8

 

Formal  38 296 96.9 -0.6

Informal  1 221 3.1 +0.6

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Williamstown  Enrolled 34 501

First Preference Votes

Dyson N IND 1 341 4.4 +4.4

Evers-Buckland A LP 8 877 28.9 -4.3

Bracks S * ALP 20 468 66.7 +2.8

 

Two Party Preferred

Evers-Buckland A LP 9 671 31.5 -2.9

Bracks S * ALP 21 011 68.5 +2.9

 

Formal  30 686 96.4 -0.2

Informal  1 155 3.6 +0.2

 

 

 

Wimmera  Enrolled 32 652

First Preference Votes

Hallam D IND 1 446 4.8 +4.8

Cross G LP 9 450 31.1 +31.1

Mackley B PHON 1 630 5.4 +5.4

Liston L IND  792 2.6 +2.6

Power L ALP 7 230 23.8 +3.0

Delahunty H # NP 9 866 32.4 -24.5

 

Two Candidate Preferred

Cross G LP 12 904 42.4 

Delahunty H # NP 17 510 57.6 

 

Formal  30 414 97.2 -1.4

Informal   878 2.8 +1.4

 

 

 

Yan Yean  Enrolled 38 305

First Preference Votes

Smith L IND 1 371 3.9 +3.9

Rigby B NLP  341 1.0 -1.5

Tivendale H LP 15 397 43.5 -3.7

Haermeyer A * ALP 18 265 51.6 +1.4

 

Two Party Preferred

Tivendale H LP 16 204 45.8 -2.6

Haermeyer A * ALP 19 170 54.2 +2.6

 

Formal  35 374 97.1 -0.6

Informal  1 048 2.9 +0.6

 

 

 

Table 4 Legislative Assembly: Two Party Preferred Vote

 

Table 4 Legislative Assembly: Two Party Preferred Vote continued

 

 

Table 5 Legislative Assembly: Electoral Pendulum

Note: Swing to lose for Independent held seats based on two candidate preferred vote.

 

Table 6 Legislative Council, State Summary

Enrolled 3 130 338

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Table 7 Legislative Council, Composition After 1999 Election

(a) Adjusted for 1999 By-election results. Ballarat Province changed from LP to ALP.

 

Table 8 Legislative Council: Province Summary

Note: Party winning seat shown in bold

 

Table 9 Legislative Council, Province Details

Ballarat  Enrolled 133 541

First Preference Votes

Clark D # LP  55 834 46.4 -5.3

Lutz G AD  6 853 5.7 +1.8

Hadden-Tregear D ALP  57 655 47.9  +6.4

 

Two Party Preferred

Clark D # LP  58 568 48.7 -5.7

Hadden-Tregear D ALP  61 774 51.3 +5.7

 

Formal   120 342 97.3 -0.9

Informal   3 383 2.7 +0.9

 

 

 

Central Highlands  Enrolled 144 842

First Pref erence Votes

Stoney G * LP  70 353 53.3 -0.8

Mitchell R ALP  61 686 46.7 +8.9

 

Formal   132 039 96.8 -0.9

Informal   4 368 3.2 +0.9

 

 

 

Chelsea  Enrolled 135 896

First Preference Votes

Smith B ALP  57 949 47.5 +5.3

Good M IND  2 185 1.8 +1.8

Bennett J AD  5 250 4.3 -0.4

Wilding S * LP  56 642 46.4 -4.3

 

Two Party Preferred

Smith B ALP  62 501 51.2 +4.5

Wilding S * LP  59 525 48.8 -4.5

 

Formal   122 026 96.4 -1.1

Informal   4 621 3.6 +1.1

 

 

 

Doutta Galla  Enrolled 158 446

First Preference Votes

Madden J # ALP  93 833 65.6 +7.8

Daw P LP  49 202 34.4 -1.8

 

Formal   143 035 95.1 -0.6

Informal   7 441 4.9 +0.6

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Eas t Yarra  Enrolled 141 354

First Preference Votes

Birrell M * LP  72 041 56.8 -0.5

Harcourt P AD  13 236 10.4 +1.5

Walpole D ALP  41 644 32.8 +2.6

 

Two Party Preferred

Birrell M * LP  76 560 60.3 -1.8

Walpole D ALP  50 356 39.7 +1.8

 

Formal   126 921 97.5 -0.8

Informal   3 308 2.5 +0.8

 

 

 

Eumemmerring  Enrolled 159 504

First Preference Votes

Dickson L CDP  4 492 3.1 +0.5

Blades R IND  5 017 3.5 +3.5

Berk D AD  5 161 3.6 -0.5

Rich-Phillips G # LP  65 426 45.4 -3.4

Baldovino C ALP  64 024 44.4 +1.4

 

Two Party Preferred

Rich-Phillips G # LP  72 518 50.3 -2.5

Baldovino C ALP  71 602 49.7 +2.5

 

Formal   144 120 95.8 -1.0

Informal   6 243 4.2 +1.0

 

 

 

Geelong  Enrolled 138 739

First Preference Votes

Whitehead A AG  5 568 4.4 +4.4

Hodge R AD  6 540 5.1 +0.6

Carbines E ALP  57 389 44.9 +1.6

Hartigan B * LP  58 390 45.7 -5.5

 

Two Party Preferred

Carbines E  ALP  65 790 51.4 +4.7

Hartigan B * LP  62 097 48.6 -4.7

 

Formal   127 887 97.4 -0.3

Informal   3 350 2.6 +0.3

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Gippsland  Enrolled 131 261

First Preference Votes

Treasure D IND  11 1 79 9.4 +9.4

Seabrook P IND  3 957 3.3 +3.3

McCubbin J AD  6 802 5.7 +1.0

Davis P * LP  46 447 38.9 +38.9

Wishart D ALP  47 503 39.8 +6.2

O'Brien J IND  3 516 2.9 +2.9

 

Two Party Preferred

Davis P * LP  60 046 50.3 -10.7

Wishart D ALP  59 358 49.7 +10.7

 

Formal   119 404 96.5 -1.4

Informal   4 330 3.5 +1.4

 

 

 

Higinbotham  Enrolled 136 171

First Preference Votes

Strong C * LP  69 024 56.4 -0.4

Tucker C AD  53 414 43.6 +35.8

 

Formal   122 438 96.9 -1.0

I nformal   3 892 3.1 +1.0

 

 

 

Jika Jika  Enrolled 147 692

First Preference Votes

Mikakos J # ALP  87 169 65.7 +10.4

Dunn A LP  45 415 34.3 +0.4

 

Formal   132 584 96.1 -0.3

Informal   5 390 3.9 +0.3

 

 

 

Koonung  Enrolled 146 767

First Preference Votes

Kir M AG  4 480 3.4 +3.4

Legg K ALP  51 052 38.2 +2.7

Atkinson B * LP  71 158 53.3 -3.2

Alesich S AD  6 908 5.2 -0.4

 

Two Party Preferred

Legg K ALP  58 137 43.6 +3.2

Atkinson B * LP  75 248 56.4 -3.2

 

Formal   133 598 97.2 -0.7

Informal   3 915 2.8 +0.7

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Melbourne  Enrolled 152 440

First Preference Votes

Handsaker S AD  13 517 10.3 +1.9

Romanes G # ALP  73 484 56.0 +1.1

McGraith S LP  44 220 33.7 +0.2

 

Two Party Preferred

Romanes G # ALP  83 865 63.9 +0.1

McGraith S LP  47 313 36.1 -0.1

 

Formal   131 221 96.0 -0.9

Informal   5 460 4.0 +0.9

 

 

 

Melbourne North  Enrolled 142 672

First Preference Votes

De Bono G LP  42 115 33.5 -2.5

McClure M IND  4 909 3.9 +3.9

Thomson M # ALP  78 663 62.6 +4.9

 

Two Party Preferred

De Bono G LP  44 484 35.4 -2.9

Thomson M # ALP  81 196 64.6 +2.9

 

Formal   125 687 94.9 -1.4

Informal   6 777 5.1 +1.4

 

 

 

Melbourne West  Enrolled 146 908

First Preference Votes

Darveniza K # ALP  79 460 60.8 +13.2

Barnes D AD  7 682 5.9 +2.8

Borg A LP  43 561 33.3 -0.2

 

Two Party Preferred

Darveniza K # ALP  84 297 64.5  +3.3

Borg A LP  46 404 35.5 -3.3

 

Formal   130 703 95.8 -0.4

Informal   5 801 4.2 +0.4

 

 

 

Monash  Enrolled 151 995

First Preference Votes

D'Andrea R IND  4 165 3.4 +3.4

Coote A # LP  62 295 51.2 -0. 5

Willox J ALP  45 926 37.8 -0.7

Peters J AD  9 211 7.6 +1.0

 

Two Party Preferred

Coote A # LP  67 158 55.3 +0.5

Willox J ALP  54 246 44.7 -0.5

 

Formal   121 597 96.8 -0.8

Informal   4 009 3.2 +0.8

 

 

 

North Eastern  Enrolled 136 517

First Preference Votes

Davis L ALP  43 958 35.4 +9.8

Lee B AD  10 148 8.2 +4.2

Baxter B * NP  70 020 56.4 +19.4

 

Two Party Preferred

Davis L ALP  49 395 39.8 +9.1

Baxter B * NP  74 727 60.2 -9.1

 

Formal   124 126 97.0 -0.8

Informal   3 889 3.0 +0.8

 

 

 

North Western  Enrolled 132 305

First Preference Votes

Kidd J ALP  49 952 41.1 +7.3

Bishop B * NP  62 789 51.6 -5.6

Van Diesen A AD  8 855 7.3 +1.6

 

Two Party Preferred

Kidd J ALP  54 332 44.7 +6.3

Bishop B * NP  67 257 55.3 -6.3

 

Formal   121 596 97.7 -0.4

Informal   2 913 2.3 +0.4

 

 

 

Silvan  Enrolled 138 275

First Preference Votes

Tunstall M ALP  48 266 38.2 +3.5

R askovy S IND  1 471 1.2 +1.2

Leeper A AD  7 375 5.8 -0.1

Olexander A # LP  66 992 53.1 -2.9

Levick R CDP  2 116 1.7 +1.7

 

Two Party Preferred

Tunstall M ALP  54 475 43.2 +3.6

Olexander A # LP  71 662 56.8 -3.6

 

Formal   126 220 97.2 -0.6

Informal   3 685 2.8 +0.6

 

 

 

South Eastern  Enrolled 146 734

First Preference Votes

Kingsford S AG  5 972 4.4 +4.4

Bowden R * LP  70 597 52.6 -4.0

Armstrong R AD  6 551 4.9 0.0

Binney M ALP  51 147 38.1 -2.7

 

Two Party Preferred

Bowden R * LP  76 088 56.7 -3.4

Binney M ALP  58 148 43.3 +3.4

 

Formal   134 267 97.2 -0.6

Informal   3 807 2.8 +0.6

 

Templestowe  Enrolled 143 222

First Preference Votes

Evans R AG  46 7 76 36.1 +36.1

Forwood B * LP  69 383 53.5 -1.3

Millane B AD  13 568 10.5 +1.8

 

Two Candidate Preferred

Evans R AG  57 426 44.3 

Forwood B * LP  72 294 55.7 

 

Formal   129 727 97.0 -0.7

Informal   3 944 3.0 +0.7

 

 

 

Waverley  Enrolled 135 806

First Preference Votes

Morgan P AD  9 869 8.1 +1.2

Brideston A * LP  57 252 47.0 -3.9

Morris S ALP  54 573 44.8 +4.3

 

Two Party Preferred

Brideston A * LP  61 735 50.7 -4.1

Morris S ALP  59 959 49.3 +4.1

 

Formal   121 694 96.3 -1.1

Informal   4 686 3.7 +1.1

 

 

 

Western  Enrolled 129 251

First Preference Votes

Hallam R * NP  71 778 59.5 +59.5

Mitchell P ALP  42 151 35.0 +1.8

McDonald L ARP  6 617 5.5 +5.5

 

Two Party Preferred

Hallam R * NP  74 660 61.9 -2.8

Mitchell P ALP  45 884 38.1 +2.8

 

Formal   120 546 97.8 -0.4

Informal   2 737 2.2 +0.4

 

 

 

Table 10 Legislative Council: Two Party Preferred Vote

(a) Two Party Preferred votes not available due to absence of ALP candidate.

 

Table 11 Legislative Council: Electoral Pendulum