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Tuesday, 6 December 1960


Mr MENZIES (Kooyong) (Prime Minister and Minister for External Affairs) . - by leave - I do not propose in this statement to endeavour to deal with the whole field of foreign affairs. Time would not permit of such an exercise. But I think it might be useful to say something about certain of the key points, and to isolate, for purposes of discussion, some of the points of danger.

There is really not very much new to be said about the relations between the Soviet Union and the Western world, though I will take the opportunity of setting down something about the great problem of disarmament. I think that it has been the general view of honorable members that some good, and perhaps much good, might come of a Summit meeting. As we know, this failed to materialize in May, since when there have been allegations and counterallegations for the reason of the failure. 1 remain optimistic about the chances of securing a Summit meeting. It will be remembered that when I moved in that direction at the recent General Assembly, I was supported by three of the four nuclear powers - the United States, Great Britain and France - and not opposed by the fourth - the Soviet Union.

After these events, Mr. Khrushchev told me personally that he favoured a Summit meeting and indicated that he thought that first and foremost disarmament, and then other matters such as the Berlin problem, the position of Germany, and nuclear tests could usefully be discussed. No one of us will suppose that a Summit meeting could solve all the outstanding problems; but we would hope that it could make a start and in that way begin to melt the ice which clogs up international relations so much.

Meanwhile, within the Communist world itself, there are clear signs of strain between the Soviet Union and Communist China. It seems clear that they do not entirely agree on broad Communist policy. The Soviet Union has adopted the policy of peaceful co-existence, meaning by this, to be perfectly plain about it, that it does not desire to resort to war as the direct instrument foi forwarding the Communist cause, but that it prefers the weapons of propaganda, tied economic aid, and internal subversion. It appears that Communist China, on the other hand, is disposed to reject the idea of peaceful co-existence and to pursue the classical Communist belief that in the struggle against capitalism, violence remains the vital instrument.


Mr Uren - Who said that?


Mr MENZIES - I said it just now. When I make a reference to the Communists there are always one or two honorable members whom I do not expect to agree with me. Most people will, however.

A meeting of Communist Parties was recently held in Moscow, at which we assume, and indeed have reason to believe, that an attempt was made to resolve these disagreements. The official communique, of course, says nothing of disagreements, but such indications as we have suggest that the Sino-Soviet differences may not have been resolved.

Having said this, I simply indicate that in the course of my present statement I will say something about developments in Africa, with particular reference to Nigeria, the Congo and South Africa; something about the two immediate trouble spots in South-East Asia, Laos and South Viet Nam; and something about the position of West New Guinea, where potentially dangerous incidents appear to be either threatened or actually occurring.

There has, in the course of this year, been a remarkable development of new, independent nations in Africa, most of whom have already been admitted to the membership of the United Nations. We genuinely welcome these new nations and we look forward to developing and maintaining with them happy and helpful relations. With many of them, of course, we have had only the slightest of contact; but our knowledge of them will grow either through the United Nations or directly as the years go on. We have, of course, High Commissioners in Ghana and Nigeria, the two Commonwealth countries. We have also been represented at independence celebrations in such countries as Cameroun, Togo, Somalia, the Congo Republic, Mauritania and Malagasy.

The newest Commonwealth country, Nigeria, seems to me to afford a splendid example of how self-government should be achieved. It is a large country, the most populous of the African nations. It has the advantage of being led by men of uncommon training and distinction. It is noteworthy that already a Nigerian, the Economic Minister, has been chosen as chairman of the United Nations Reconciliation Commission to go to the Congo. Nigeria has been moving by stages towards complete self-government over a period of years and has therefore developed an efficient administrative machine. I believe that it will serve as a great stabilizing influence in a continent which is as yet unhappily vexed by some internal conflict. I have in mind, of course, the tragic events which have occurred in the Congo, to which I shall direct some specific attention a little later. But, before doing so, I would like to offer one or two, perhaps trite, remarks about most of the new African nations. They have gained political independence, which is a proud and dignified state of life. But some of them at least are not yet economically independent. This presents the world with a prob!e:n, the solution of which will call for wise and generous statesmanship. True political independence must be built on sound economic foundations; otherwise the nation may incur the risk of social discontent and disorder and perhaps invite unwelcome and undesirable intervention from outside. Such countries will need substantial economic and technical help to develop their economies and to strengthen their administrative system. Aid of this kind should be available " without strings ". It would be offensive to these new nations to treat them as pawns in an international contest or as destined to pass into one orbit or another. Their independence must be genuine and the judgments they form on international relations or on association with other countries must be their own. So far the Australian Government is making some contribution through the United Nations technical assistance programmes which are being substantially increased, through other existing international programmes, and through the International Bank. In addition, we have already offered a number of fellowships and scholarships to African countries. A special course of foreign service training has been in progress during the past year in which young men from Ghana, Sierra Leone, Malaya and the West Indies have taken part. Commonwealth finance ministers decided in September to establish a special Commonwealth scheme for help to Commonwealth countries. Naturally the details of this scheme are not yet fully worked out.

Time will not premit me to speculate about future developments of nationhood in Africa though it is, of course, well known that political independence is not far off for Sierra Leone, Tanganyika, Uganda and Kenya. I have learned to-day that the constitutional review conference of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland has just opened in London under the chairmanship of Mr. Macmillan. This conference will have the advantage of the patient and far-reaching examination recently conducted by the Monckton commission.

I turn now to the Congo. The situation in the Congo is still confused, difficult and dangerous. In his annual report to the United Nations, the Secretary-General said that the United Nations had a duty by " preventive diplomacy " - that is his phrase - to localize conflicts and to establish its presence in areas where there was a " power vacuum " - also his phrase - and where attempts by East or West to establish their influence would risk conflict.

By July such a situation arose in the Congo where the Belgian transfer of power was followed by violent disorders. The Congolese Government asked the United Nations to intervene to assure order, to supervise the withdrawal of the Belgians and to give material aid.

The Security Council on 14th July called on the Government of Belgium to withdraw its forces and gave a mandate to the Secretary-General to provide the Congo with military assistance until the national security forces might be able fully to meet their tasks. Later the Council unanimously paid tribute to the work of the SecretaryGeneral. On 9th August, it confirmed his authority while re-affirming that the United Nations force in the Congo would not be a party to any internal conflict, constitutional or otherwise. In the result, the United Nations has in fact been acting as a stabilizing force. As honorable members will recall, this was not to Mr. Khrushchev's liking. By mid-September he had begun bitter attacks on United Nations operations in the Congo. In spite of this a special session of the General Assembly by a vote of 70 to nil, with only the Soviet bloc abstaining, fully supported the mandate given by the Security Council. In spite of this overwhelming vote, the Soviet Union has continued to attack the SecretaryGeneral and has refused to pay its proper share of the cost of the operations. The real reason for this Soviet attitude is not that the Secretary-General has acted under Western influence - he has been notably independent - but that the United Nations has shown in the Congo that it can bring together an effective force. By preventing chaos it has been a serious obstacle to Communist ambitions.

The United Nations is, of course, not the only means of solving domestic disorder which a State itself cannot settle. There may be occasions when a State may prefer to invoke the help of its neighbours or look to more distant friends for help in dealing with internal problems just as it is entitled to request support in its exercise of its inherent right of self-defence. But in the Congo, memories of colonial status are recent and neighbouring countries find themselves called upon to devote most of their resources to their own urgent development. If therefore in the case of the Congo we are to avoid a contest between opposing groups for influence through aid programmes, clearly all aid should be channelled through the United Nations.

The political and constitutional situation within the Congo rs still most unsettled. I will just mention one or two striking aspects of it. First, there is the position of Mr. Lumumba, who was Prime Minister when the Congo received its independence, but was subsequently dismissed by President Kasavubu. As honorable members are aware, the positron of Mr. Kasavubu has been recognized by the seating of his delegation in the General Assembly by 53 votes, including our own, to 24. The personal fate of Mr. Lumumba, who is now under arrest, appears to be at present a matter of great uncertainty, though he is still - technically, at any rate - a deputy in the Congolese Parliament. Secondly, the Army Chief of Staff, Colonel Mobutu, proclaimed the temporary " neutralization " - that is his word - of the Congolese Parliament and its political leaders and the establishment by him of a college of commissioners to administer the country pending the restoration of more normal government. Thirdly, there is the position of Mr. Tshombe, Prime Minister of Katanga Province, who does not accept the authority of Leopoldville but who, we hope, would co-operate in a united Congo, which badly needs the economic strength and resources of Katanga if it is to become selfsupporting. There have been similar tendencies in Kasai Province, which is also a relatively rich area.

There are hopes that the position may begin to clear. The General Assembly has appealed to the Congo to seek a speedy solution. A reconciliation commission has been established, consisting of a majority of the African and Asian members of the Secretary-General's advisory committee. In addition to this, President Kasavubu himself has said that he envisages a " roundtable conference " of Congolese political leaders. The economic and administrative aspects of the problem are, of course, tremendously important. The United Nations military forces and technical task force have been hampered by the absence either of a suitable ministry or of the elements of a proper system of administration.

The General Assembly has appealed for voluntary contributions to a fund for the Congo for these purposes. Australia has great sympathy for this troubled country. We have already made a modest response to calls for specific practical help through medical teams and otherwise. We shall be prepared to meet our share of the cost of maintaining the United Nations forces which are in the Congo; at present they are of the order of 20,000 drawn from fourteen different countries. The costs of this force will be high. We have decided to make a contribution of 750,000 dollars to the United Nations Congo Fund. The great danger still is that this territory may become the centre of international rivalries. The Soviet Union and other meddlers have in their own hands the means of avoiding such a disaster.

I turn now to Commonwealth affairs - comrades, all round. There have been important developments affecting the Commonwealth. Nigeria is now a Commonwealth country and we have appointed a High Commissioner to Lagos. Cyprus has become an independent republic and may ask to become a member of the Commonwealth.

South Africa, at the recent referendum, decided to adopt a republican constitution. This has given rise to discussion about the effect of this step on South Africa's continuing membership of the Commonwealth. In the past, the fact that a Commonwealth country has become a republic has not led to its exclusion from the Commonwealth. But feelings in many places run high about

South Africa and it is therefore desirable that the relationship between a Republic of South Africa and the Commonwealth should be considered quietly and carefully. Our own view is that it should be the subject of joint deliberation among the governments of the Commonwealth before individual government decisions are publicly stated. There will be a favorable opportunity for such consultation at the next Prime Ministers' Conference. No doubt the position of Cyprus might be considered at the same time.

The whole question of the future constitution of the Commonwealth is clearly important and not without difficulty since we may expect over a relatively short period of years to have more British countries, now colonies, achieving independence and seeking admission to the Commonwealth. The questions involved received some attention at the last Prime Ministers' Conference when an official committee was set up to study them. We will no doubt have further thought given to the matter in March.

I turn now to Laos. The preservation of Laotian independence is important both for its own sake and because the loss of Laos to communism would expose other SouthEast Asian countries to serious threat. With a population of probably not more than 2,500,000 and with long and vulnerable frontiers, Laos has struggled to maintain its integrity against constant pressures from Communist China and Communist North Viet Nam and against internal Pathet Lao insurgency. We believe that any government of Laos which desires to retain genuine independence has two tasks. The first is that, while maintaining a determination not to submit to communism, Laos should avoid giving its powerful Communist neighbours even the flimsiest excuse for interference. This is why neutrality as distinct from military alliances has seemed the only practical course for the country. The second task is that of settling the internal troubles. Some fighting between the forces of the government and of General Phoumi have already taken place. While the Government of Souvanna Phouma controls the administrative capital, Vientiane, anti-government but nonCommunist supporters of General Phoumi control the royal capital of Luang Prabang

This is' the tragic situation. The Communists alone, working through the Pathet Lao, profit from the division and fighting between the non-Communists.

The imperative need inside Laos is for unity among non-Communists so that the real enemies of Laos and Laotian neutrality - the Communists - can be isolated and resisted. We have a deep interest in these matters. The maintenance of Laotian independence will be a symbol of a nation's resistance to communism in Asia. An aggressive communism in Asia pressing out to the borders of the Asian continent represents a menace to us. Nobody would doubt that the result in Laos will be important to the security of countries like Viet Nam, Cambodia and Thailand, whose safety is one of the aims of the South-East Asian Treaty.

There are many current criticisms of the policy of the government of South Viet Nam on the ground that it is too authoritarian, too highly centralized, and that it is not undertaking necessary reforms. But I point out that reforms are not easy to introduce in the face of heavy Communist pressure. President Diem is beyond question a man of courage and resource. His Government is not only subject constantly to hostile propaganda from Hanoi but is also faced by greatly increased Communist insurgency throughout the countryside.

Recently the President survived an armed revolt from a small group within the army. It is, I think, important that we should have a sympathetic and intelligent interest in the difficulties which this country has struggled with since 1954. In order to maintain resistance and development, the republic has been obliged to maintain large armed forces. Its policy, to an extent which has been criticized, found it necessary to curtail the political liberties enjoyed in more fortunate countries. It has had to battle against rebels who are masters of guerrilla warfare. It has had to do all these things in a difficult terrain with large areas of swamp and jungle and with long and exposed frontiers.

I am sure that the resolution which the Vietnamese people have shown in these last six years, the increasing political experience of their leaders and continued Western aid and encouragement can carry the republic through its present difficulties.

The House has previously debated the Australian attitude towards the future of West New Guinea. The policy of the Government is well known and needs no re-statement. There are, however, two recent developments which should be recorded. The first is that the Prime Minister of Malaya, in a series of conversations in various countries, has been putting forward proposals with respect to the future of West New Guinea. He was good enough to convey to me the kind of thing he had in mind and I promptly conveyed to him the attitude of the Australian Government. Since the Prime Minister has not, so far as I know, published his proposals, I am not at liberty to disclose them. But I should say that I have made it clear that we adhere strongly to the principle that the future of the Territory should be one satisfying its inhabitants and determined in accordance with their freely expressed wishes. This principle is, of course, the basis of our own policy in Papua and New Guinea. Clearly it is also the basis of the Netherlands Government's declared policy in its territory and of recent constitutional developments in both countries. In addition, I have made it clear that whatever discussions might in future occur between the Netherlands and Indonesia these should not be influenced by threats of force.

It is interesting to note that while abroad, the Prime Minister of Malaya had discussions at The Hague with Dr. de Quay, the Prime Minister of the Netherlands. They issued a communique^ in these terms -

Talks were of an exploratory nature and were held in a very friendly atmosphere. The Netherlands Government greatly appreciates the activities and constructive interest in this matter on the part of Tunku Abdul Rahman. The Prime Minister of the Federation of Malaya noted with satisfaction that the Netherlands Government are willing, to subject their policies in Netherlands New Guinea to the scrutiny and judgment of the United Nations. It was agreed that the Prime Minister of the Federation of Malaya, who has already held similar talks on this issue with other governments as well as with the Secretary-General of the United Nations, would in the light of the outcome of these various talks consider whether at a later stage further talks might be useful. In such an event, he will inform the Netherlands Government accordingly.

Those were the terms of the communique. It is not to be taken from this communique that the Netherlands Government is offering to submit the question of sovereignty to the United Nations. It has made it quite clear that it is not doing so. Honorable members will recall that the Indonesian claim to sovereignty of West New Guinea has not been based primarily upon legal considerations. For this reason Indonesia has consistently declined to submit its claim to the International Court.

The second development is the recent landing of some Indonesians in West New Guinea. On 21st November the Netherlands Ministry of Home Affairs announced that a small armed group of Indonesians landed on the south-west coast of Dutch New Guinea in mid-November and some were apprehended. On 29th November the same Ministry announced that the Dutch Navy had intercepted and apprehended in waters around Dutch New Guinea an Indonesian vessel which was intended to supply an earlier group of infiltrators. There have been several reports of Indonesian public statements on these infiltrations, the most recent of which was by an official spokesman of the Indonesian Navy who on 2nd December, a few days ago, said, "So far as I know the Indonesian armed forces have never conducted infiltrations into" Netherlands New Guinea.

At the same time there have been several references by the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Dr. Subandrio - whom many honorable members will recall as a distinguished visitor to Australia last year - to the possibility of an armed clash with the Netherlands in the future over West New Guinea. I have, of course, studied what Dr. Subandrio said. I hope that his remarks do not repudiate previous assurances given by both President Sukarno and Dr. Subandrio regarding the intentions of the Indonesian Government not to use force to obtain a solution of the dispute over West New Guinea. Indeed, Sir, I think I am right in saying that since I wrote those words earlier in the week there Isas been word confirming that he repeats that attitude.

On 4th December, in discussing these and related matters with the Australian Ambassador. Dr. Subandrio said that his comments to the Ambassador on recent events did not mean any change in the Indonesian policy of pursuing their claim by peaceful means.

There have been, of course, Sir, various Indonesian suggestions that the Dutch, by making some small reinforcement of their defences in West New Guinea, have acted provocatively. One has only to point out that the forces available to the Netherlands in West New Guinea are a tiny fraction of those actually under arms in Indonesia to show how unreal these allegations are.

We certainly have no evidence in fact or any reason to support the strange notion that the Netherlands proposes to launch an attack on Indonesia. Suggestions so fanciful do not help the understanding of the real nature of the problem.

Finally, Sir, I turn to the problem of disarmament. Australians share the almost universal concern at the continued increase in armaments, including nuclear armaments. There is a sort of psychological control present when nuclear weapons are, as at present, confined to four nations. But there will no doubt be a constant pressure so long as the threat of war exists to have such weapons made available to other nations.

We believe that if the number of countries possessing such weapons were substantially increased, or if they fell into irresponsible hands, the world would live in a state of great dread. The threat to use them could indeed become a weapon of blackmail in pursuit of territorial or other gains. As I have frequently said myself, armaments are much more the result than the cause of international tension.

I should like to remind honorable members that one of the great causes of tension in the Western world is the continued enslavement of the once free powers of middle Europe by the Soviet Union. It would, I think, be idle to suppose that the making of some agreement, leading even to a substantial reduction in armaments, can bring genuine peace to Europe or reconcile the enslaved nations to their slavery.

Disarmament is therefore a matter to be approached not as an exercise in rhetoric, or as a piece of detached idealism, but as a hard, practical matter. We have ourselves emphasized that disarmament in the nuclear field alone would not end the threat of war, but might very well increase it since the Communist powers have such predominance in conventional weapons and forces. Disarmament must occur in all fields, and as it proceeds be accompanied at all stages by full inspection and control.

It is, of course, impossible to discover what is the real aim of a dictatorship since it is subject to no probing or questions of public opinion and does not have to engage in democratic debate. We are, therefore, without the means of answering confidently any question about what is in Mr. Khrushchev's mind. It is permissible to believe that his stated desire for disarmament may be to a point genuine. He is engaged in some raising of the standard of living of his own people; in certain branches of science and technology his country has made great strides. The more these results are achieved, the more criticism will begin to evolve inside the Soviet Union and the more resentment there may be at the vast size of the burden of armaments and the enormous concentration of what, after all, must be limited scientific resources on warlike affairs.

On the other hand, Khrushchev can see great advantages for his own country in its struggle for power if he can divide his opponents, persuade their people that the Soviet Union genuinely desires disarmament, and so create in them an unwillingness to sustain the necessary burdens. It is, Sir, to put it quite shortly, all very confusing.

One reason I have for believing that there is more propaganda than substance in the Soviet view is that at the last Assembly Khrushchev himself, having previously ordered his representatives out from the Ten-Power Disarmament Committee in June, came along to the General Assembly to advocate that there should be a negotiation on disarmament in the General Assembly. This, I think, threw a murky light on his tactics. Nobody with a genuine desire for concrete negotiations on disarmament could think the General Assembly, with its 100 delegations - meaning not less than 1,000 delegates and alternates - an appropriate meeting ground for genuine negotiation. This great problem requires deliberation, reflection, honest exchange. It can be negotiated only in a body of limited numbers.

That what T will call the Western Powers desire disarmament is quite clear. The whole Western social, political and economic system depends for its success on peace. Its free institutions and the free spirit of its people are not well suited to having a sustained " cold war ". Yet, we cannot disarm unilaterally, nor can we be directly or indirectly parties to any disarmament agreement unless we know that it contains sufficiently strong means of inspection and control as to make us not entirely dependent on Soviet good faith. The Western Powers will insist that while they are disarming they must be able to see that others are also doing so. This means not only being able to see how many weapons are being destroyed, but also how many remain behind. Because of the secrecy surrounding Communist military capacity and intentions, and because of the lack of confidence now existing, the West has always insisted on proper supervision to be ready to operate when disarmament begins and to apply it as it proceeds. This, Sir, is " disarmament with controls ", not, as the Communist professes to believe, " controls without disarmament ".

Attempts to negotiate disarmament agreements have now been in progress for over a decade in the United Nations. Recently they have been conducted in a Ten-Power Committee whose composition was agreed upon to meet Russian demands. The Communist delegates, as I have said, walked out at the very time when they knew Western proposals of a positive kind were about to be submitted. We think that the committee of ten should resume its activities; for what is wanted if there is to be any measure of disarmament is not speeches at a large public meeting, but honest negotiations at close quarters.

The Western proposals are based on the following fundamental principles - I state them quite briefly -

1.   Disarmament should be carried out in stages during which nuclear and conventional disarmament should be so balanced that no country or group of countries obtain at any stage a significant military advantage.

2.   Compliance with disarmament obli gations will be effectively verified both as to quantities destroyed and quantities remaining.

3.   Provisions for such inspection, veri fication and control must form an integral part of any agreement on disarmament.

4.   Transition from stage to stage shall be dependent on assurance that the measures in the preceding stage have been satisfactorily implemented.

The West in June presented a detailed plan based on these principles. With the concurrence of honorable members, I incorporate this informative document in " Hansard ". I have taken this subject last in chronological order, but it is, of course, of obvious and overwhelming importance to the world. The plan is as follows: -

The ultimate goal is a secure and peaceful world of free and open societies in which there shall be general and complete disarmament under effective international control and agreed procedures for the settlement of disputes in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter.

General and complete disarmament in a secure, free and peaceful world requires -

1.   The disbanding, through progressive stages, of all armed forces of all States and the prohibition of their re-establishment in any form whatsoever, except for those contingents of agreed size required for the purpose of maintaining internal order and ensuring the personal security of citizens and for agreed contingents for the international peace force.

2.   The cessation of the production of all kinds of armaments, including all means for delivering weapons of mass destruction, and their complete elimination from national arsenals, through progressive stages, except for those armaments agreed upon for use by an international peace force and agreed remaining national contingents.

3.   Strict and effective international control, from beginning to end, of the carrying out of all disarmament measures, to ensure that there are no violations.

4.   The establishment of effective means for enforcement of international agreements and for the maintenance of peace.

CONTROLLING PRINCIPLES.

1.   Disarmament under effective international control shall be carried out in such a manner that at no time shall any 'State, whether or not a party to a Treaty, obtain military advantage over other States as a result of the progress of disarmament.

2.   General and complete disarmament shall proceed through three stages containing balanced, phased and safeguarded measures with each measure being carried out in an agreed and strictly defined period of time, under the supervision of an International Disarmament Control Organization, within the framework of the United Nations.

3.   Each measure within each stage shall be initiated simultaneously by all participating States upon completion of the necessary preparatory studies and upon establishment of the arrangements and procedures necessary for the International Disarmament Control Organization to verify the measures on an initial and continuing basis.

4.   Transition from one stage to the next shall be initiated when the Security Council of the United Nations agrees that all measures in the preceding stage have been fully implemented and effective verification is continuing, and that any additional verification arrangements and procedures required for measures in the next stage have been established and are ready to operate effectively.

5.   The treaties shall remain in force indefinitely subject to the inherent right of a party to withdraw and be relieved of obligations thereunder if the provisions of the treaty, including those providing for the timely installation and effective operation of the control system, are not being fulfilled and observed.

6.   The International Disarmament Control Organization shall comprise all participating States whose representatives shall meet as a conference periodically as required. There shall in addition be a control commission and a Director-General. The specific responsibility and authority of the conference, control commission and the DirectorGeneral, the staffing arrangements and criteria, the responsibilities of participating States to the organization, and provisions for any necessary preparatory or interim group to aid in the establishment of the organization shall be specified in the treaty.

7.   The specific arrangements, procedures and means required for effective initial and continuing verification of satisfactory performance of each measure by the International Disarmament Control Organization shall be specified in the treaties. These shall provide for all necessary means required for effective verification of compliance with each step of each measure. Verification of each agreed disarmament measure shall be accomplished in such a manner as to be capable of disclosing, to the satisfaction of all participating States, any evasion of the agreement. Specifically, from the initiation of implementation of each agreed disarmament measure, there shall be effective verification by the International Disarmament Control Organization; verification shall be in no way dependent upon declarations by States for its effectiveness; verification shall include the capability to ascertain that not only do reductions of armed forces and armaments in agreed amounts take place, but also that retained armed forces and armaments do not exceed agreed levels at any stage.

TASK OF THE TEN-NATION COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT.

The task of the Ten-Nation Committee on Disarmament is to work out a treaty for general and complete disarmament under effective international control governed by the foregoing controlling principles as follows: -

1.   Negotiate and agree upon a treaty, to be acceded to in the first instance by the States represented on the Ten-Nation Disarmament Committee, embodying the first stage of the programme. This stage shall consist of those initial and controllable measures which can and shall be undertaken without delay by the States participating in the committee to preclude the expansion of their armed forces; to bring to a halt the growth of their weapons stockpiles; to reduce the levels of their armed forces and armaments to the extent possible without jeopardy to their security; and to provide measures for protection against surprise attack.

2.   In the course of negotiating such a treaty, arrange for and conduct the necessary technical studies to work out effective control arrangements for measures to be carried out in the programme. These studies shall provide an agreed basis for proceeding with implementation of the measure studied in the appropriate stage. Among the early studies shall be a technical examination of the measures necessary to verify control over, reduction and elimination of agreed categories of nuclear delivery systems, including missiles, aircraft, surface ships, submarines and artillery.

3.   After reaching agreement on a treaty on the first stage of the programme, prepare for submission to a world disarmament conference an agreed draft treaty on the second and third stages of the programme as set forth below, in accordance with the foregoing controlling principles.

4.   Thereupon, arrange for a world-wide conference of all States, to be held at the earliest possible time, for the following purposes: -

(a)   Accession to the treaty covering stage one by States which have not already done so;

(b)   Accession to the treaty covering stages two and three by all States.







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