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Parliamentary Joint Committee on the Australian Commission for Law Enforcement Integrity
Integrity testing

BAILEY, Ms Jane, Executive Director, People, Business Support and Stakeholder Relations, Australian Crime Commission

GRACE, Mr Peter, Manager, Integrity and Security, Australian Crime Commission

SCHEETZ, Ms Carolyn, National Manager, People, Security and Integrity, Australian Crime Commission


CHAIR: I welcome representatives from the Australian Crime Commission. You have lodged a public submission with the committee which we have numbered as submission No. 11. Would you like to make any amendments or additions to that submission?

Ms Bailey : No thank you, Madam Chair.

CHAIR: I invite you to make an opening statement after which the committee will ask questions.

Ms Bailey : Thank you. I would just like to thank the committee for the opportunity. Mr Lawler passes on his apologies. He would have been here today, but he had a prior engagement in Victoria. We submitted our submission to you on 17 August. I guess our position is that we are a rather unique agency, combining public service and law enforcement in the one agency in the fight against serious and organised crime.

Our focus on integrity has always been across the broad spectrum of our employees and staff working with us. We think we have a robust integrity regime in place but we recognise the opportunities and threats and risks that come from the world we work in. We are always interested in understanding about how there is a better way to ensure integrity in our organisation and to take forward mitigation strategies around the risks that we see emerging.

CHAIR: Have you had the opportunity to gauge whether staff members of the ACC would be supportive of a move towards integrity testing?

Ms Bailey : We talk about integrity testing in our annual employee survey and get feedback from staff about how they feel about the integrity and their confidence that they feel in working for the agency. We noticed this time in our staff survey there is a particular increase in people feeling that working for the ACC was a particularly good thing, and that they liked it, they appreciated it, and they respected the agency. I think that is a strong indicator. We have quite an active integrity regime where we engage our staff constantly in it. We have a CEO who has a very direct view about integrity and conveying that to the staff on most occasions. The CEO actually put our submission out to the staff last week and said that we were appearing before the committee, and that this was our position. The feedback has not been direct, but I think I could speak for the staff in saying that, with the value they place on working for the ACC and the work we do, they would feel particularly betrayed by any lapse in integrity in our agency at a personal level. I think one of our best protections for our agency against failures of integrity is the personal commitment our staff have to that agency and the work we do. But, we have not polled them specifically on that yet.

CHAIR: I note that your agency supports the introduction of a targeted integrity testing for ACC. Have you formed a specific belief that random integrity testing would not be appropriate, or just that you have only really considered the targeted testing?

Ms Bailey : As I said, we would always be interested in better ways to ensure integrity, and we recognise that we work in a risky environment, that we ask our people to be particularly opportunistic and risk taking in their work. To do the work we do requires that. I would never rule anything out. In looking at what I say about the agency and what we as an executive see, and what the staff tell us, there is a high level of commitment to the purpose, which is to disrupt serious and organised crime. Therefore, I think the idea that you could randomly test people may have some appeal, but I think actually for us the issue is how we better understand if there is any particular issue or person in the agency who has, through human frailty or corruption, damaged the agency and its reputation by their actions. While I would not rule it out, I just think it is probably more suitable to the size of our agency to view it for the targeted lens initially.

CHAIR: Given that misconduct could be a precursor to corruption, would you support testing across a range of behaviours like misconduct through to serious corruption?

Ms Bailey : I think we already have a number of tools, being an APS agency and having the dismissal powers now for the CEO. Our approach usually is if we identify misconduct, to understand what are the facts of the matter and what are the rights of reply or basis of the allegations and are they true or otherwise. If there is misconduct, we have a range of sanctions under the Public Service Act that we would apply. That could go from anything from a reprimand to a fine to termination of their employment. Misconduct in those areas can be dealt with, and we have a very significant focus on doing that. I think for us a targeted regime in terms of integrity testing would be where we had formed a belief that a person who worked for us had become a target of an investigation. So they had actually crossed the line into being part of the investigation that we were conducting. I would think targeted would be in that sense where we came to form a view that this was not misconduct but actually their activities had now taken them into the sphere of potentially being a target in an investigation by us or another law enforcement agency. That is where I would see the targeted integrity testing being of value, should that ever happen in our agency.

Mr HAYES: Just following on from that, I gather that if the person becomes a target of an ongoing investigation subject to possible criminal charges that would go beyond three years, you could actually use your controlled powers?

Ms Bailey : The controlled operations powers, yes.

Mr HAYES: I suppose your organisation probably enjoys significant powers, amongst law enforcement agencies generally, as do your officers, through controlled operations and through being a coercive jurisdiction. Can you see that there is a move for the public to at least have the surety that the ACC and its officers are above reproach?

Ms Bailey : I think it would be fundamental to our continued existence that people would have confidence in us. I think we have quite a strong regime. Obviously we have our legislative requirements. We have a board, as you know, who determines where we can use our coercive powers, and I think that is quite an important thing for the public to understand. It is not just at our whim; we have to meet the board's threshold. We have ACLEI, from their integrity position; we have our parliamentary joint committee; we have the intergovernmental committee that oversees what we do and has rights of veto and others on our determinations. We have the Ombudsman. We report at least quarterly or half-yearly on our telephone interceptions, listening devices, surveillance devices and controlled operations. I agree there is probably almost never too much oversight, but I guess my point would be: if that is not enough to give people confidence and having a good record in that, and people and the government think there is more we could do, certainly we would consider it. I do think we have quite an extensive framework around how we exercise our exceptional powers.

Mr HAYES: Now that the CEO of the organisation shares similar powers as the police commissioners of state and territory police forces in terms of commissioner's confidence provisions and the right of dismissal, that also bolsters that power, I imagine?

Ms Bailey : Absolutely. That was a specific dilemma that we faced. Necessarily, if you terminate people's employment through the industrial lens, which is true and correct, people at the review point in that can sometimes form a view about the seriousness of people's conduct because they might not always see the risk through the same lens as we do of serious and organised crime. If the CEO has lost confidence and they are dismissed after a code of conduct investigation, the process for review would be different from the process for the review for other public servants. It is just to identify that, unfortunately in our world, I suppose the potential for someone to more seriously compromise Australia is higher than many other public servants.

Mr HAYES: Therefore the CEO can actually dismiss a person for lack of confidence in that respect. What about with respect to personnel who are seconded from state and territory police forces to the Australian Crime Commission? If he had similar concerns there, presumably he cannot exercise a dismissal power, but does he terminate their secondment?

Ms Bailey : The arrangements we have with the police commissioners on our board is that before any police officer is seconded to the ACC, the commissioner warrants their integrity. If an incident occurs while they are with the ACC, the position is that they are returned and dealt with by their home force professional standards integrity regime.

Mr HAYES: In terms of a concern by the CEO and he chose to use the targeted integrity testing, would that apply also to seconded police in the temporary employ of the ACC?

Ms Bailey : There is some degree of complexity, so I would want to be able to support this with further information on notice. The definition of who is a member of staff of the ACC is quite complex in our act, so it contemplates public servants as CEO examiners, but people who participate in our determinations also become members of staff of the ACC. There is a little bit of individual case by case decision making as to whether they are covered by our act. I think with seconded police who are clearly seconded under a particular section, there is an arrangement for what happens in an integrity regime. I would be speculating, but I would have thought if it was a serious enough issue, it would be a discussion between the CEO and the police commissioner of the jurisdiction, and the decision would be made as to which was the appropriate way to deal with it. I suppose if it was, heaven forbid, a composite view of ACC staff and a seconded officer involved in some allegations, and there was a decision about any integrity test, I imagine that might have to be held jointly by the CEO and the commissioner to understand how that integrity test would play out. I think it would have to be a decision in terms of the coverage and the case by case circumstances. I would not exclude them, but I think it would have to be negotiated.

Mr HAYES: So that would be negotiated on the basis of the gravity of suspicion against a person?

Ms Bailey : Yes. I imagine in most cases if there was a reasonable suspicion that a seconded police officer was in some way involved in criminal activity, the issue would be that that would be a conversation between the CEO and their commissioner of police, and that person would be returned to their home force and dealt with by their commissioner, because they are still exercising their state police powers when they are seconded to us. I think that is what the agreement would come to. The only area we would have to talk about on a case by case basis would be if there was a composite of ACC staff and seconded police, as I said, and how some integrity testing was to be managed to get the most effective outcome.

Mr HAYES: I just wonder about the efficacy of that with the CEO of the ACC making a unilateral decision to source out a commissioner of a state or territory police force to discuss a concern about what could be seen to be technically a seconded employee of the ACC.

Ms Bailey : I guess there is a degree of nuance that would have to be undertaken. The simple fact now is that if an allegation is made about anybody who is working with us, or in fact just a member of another law enforcement agency, and that information comes to the Crime Commission's attention, we would disseminate that to the police commissioner involved. We do not form a view about whether that would be true or not, but in the interests of all of us maintaining the integrity of our agencies, that is standard procedure from us.

Mr HAYES: I note from your submission that you are attracted to targeted as opposed to random integrity testing, and you would also see that where it was exercised by the ACC, it be done in cooperation or overseen by the ACLEI commissioner himself?

Ms Bailey : That is right. I think the ACLEI commissioner and the commission have been very useful for us in terms of driving forward the integrity regime in the ACC. I think having that independent integrity commissioner there with the powers that he has, working with us but having the power to refer issues to them, works very well. I think it is always useful to have that external oversight. He is the Integrity Commissioner. He may refer it back to us and suggest we do it, but I would certainly see that the commissioner would have the first view about the issue we are dealing with.

Mr HAYES: I suppose from the ACC's point of view, it is probably considered a no-brainer; you have the ability to conduct controlled operations with authority on designated targets, and this ensures that you also have the ability to apply similar sorts of techniques to investigating internal issues of corruption?

Ms Bailey : I think it would be about being significant, in terms of what Ms Chidgey said about meeting the threshold of controlled operations certificates. There is quite a high threshold about how we can undertake those activities. This suspicion would have to be of the same level. What I am saying, colloquially, is you now had reason to suspect a member of your staff had become a target of your investigation or another law enforcement jurisdiction's investigation. That is how I see the targeted one. Below that, I think you would deal with it through the tools we have now, such as the dismissal powers, the code of conduct investigation, or the return of allegations to state police forces, but my previous comments relate to if you formed a view that you had a serious integrity breach in your agency.

Mr HAYES: In terms of your existing regimes applying through the ACC, do you get to look at or assess any of your employees' financial status?

Ms Bailey : Yes. In the pre-screening of our employees, we collect financial information, and we make a view just about whether there are any risks for us. Our approach is about risk mitigation; understanding our risks and what we are doing to mitigate them. We do pre-employment screening before people apply for their security clearance as a way of understanding any connections with criminals that we might want to deal with in the first instance, or just to understand ourselves about how much we know about our people and whether there are any risks with their lifestyle, finances or associations that we just need to be aware of. We do not judge people on those things. They have an obligation to update us about changes in their affairs.

Mr HAYES: That is at the point of engagement?

Ms Bailey : That is the point of engagement. Now that security clearance is moved to the defence agency, we do that as a pre-employment screening process.

Mr HAYES: I am sure ICAC did the same thing, but some of those things change, I guess.

Ms Bailey : Yes, and I guess it is ever vigilant. We now employ an organisational psychologist to help us with the pre-employment screening of our staff. Certainly in our agency you have to be aware that there would be people trying to infiltrate us or people whose characteristics are not an ideal fit for our world. We are building sort of a front door where we can satisfy ourselves. Then I think it is really about managing our staff once they are in our agency in a lifetime sense about an open environment to disclose changes, to speak of their associations or to reveal things that change in their life. We encourage people not to tolerate failures of standards or integrity. The best defence that I see for our agency is the 617 people who work there today and if one of them was corrupt, that would be a terrible blow to the 616 people in our agency. We have all the rules and policies, but in the end we have to ask our people to live to the highest standards and encourage that open disclosure and that environment where people feel they can.

Mr HAYES: Thank you.

Senator PARRY: The commissioner wrote on page 3 at item 18, in the first dot point, that if any integrity testing was going to take place, it would be in consultation. If ACLEI decided to conduct an investigation, it would take place with ACC's knowledge and involvement. What happens if the suspicion relates to senior management?

Ms Bailey : I would probably have to leave the CEO out of this, but even then, I could imagine a way around, but let me just assume I am leaving the CEO out of this. I think that could be managed. We deal with very sensitive internal matters now, and they are quarantined and cut off from people. The number of people who know about most of the issues in this agency would be sitting at this table. So, quarantining them I think is doable. You can quarantine it in our agency, especially in our world. While we all take responsibility for the standards and the behaviour of our people, we also do not cross the lines. If I am dealing with integrity issues, that is not a matter that is discussed other than with the CEO and myself generally in the agency. I imagine if it was about me, he would have that conversation. I think you can quarantine it. We have a culture already of having a small group and maintaining a lot of privacy. Because of our staff, the whole spectrum from allegations made that are unfounded to the serious corruption issues are things that require respect and privacy to deal with them appropriately.

Senator PARRY: I accept what you say. But, if we are talking about an integrity test that ACLEI decides, and if ACLEI becomes the lead agency to do this, and that is how Mr Lawler has indicated, and he has 'I recommend', so that is a recommendation that he strongly has, would ACC accept the fact that there may be an occasion where ACLEI might want to conduct an integrity test without the knowledge of ACC management?

Ms Bailey : Yes. I think they have that jurisdiction, and they would do it. They would make that decision based on the seriousness and the reach of the allegation. I expect that is exactly what they would do. I understand that there have been cases in the past referred to ACLEI, although not by us, and that is a matter for them to investigate and take action on. If we identified the integrity issue and forwarded it to ACLEI, the general process is that we then continue to have a dialogue about what will happen.

Senator PARRY: That would make sense, if it is internally generated.

Ms Bailey : Yes, but again, they do not have to report it. If it was referred from another third party, we do not get told about that.

Senator PARRY: Just moving to a different area, if integrity testing were to become a part of the day to day life of ACC as well as other agencies, information would have to be one of your biggest areas that you would have to guard against. Have you thought about or discussed internally some of the models or integrity tests that you may wish to conduct if it did happen?

Ms Bailey : We have had some preliminary discussions. We have not really discussed it through an integrity lens. We have discussed it through a risk lens. We recognise that probably the most valuable commodity we hold is the intelligence we hold about serious and organised crime. In our risk framework and in our risk committee at the executive level, we talk a lot about that. One of our constant high risks is how we maintain the integrity of our information, both from infiltration from outside, accidental disclosure or, in the worst of cases, deliberate disclosure of information. We talk about it through the risk lens. In terms of integrity testing, we have covered that issue, but not specifically through it. We are now ramping up our whole view of how do we more holistically audit the activities across the agency in relation to the data that we hold, where it goes, how often it is accessed and those sorts of things. In the past we have had sort of more auditing processes, but we are considering both from a security perspective and from an integrity perspective and now, I guess, more holistic auditing across our data holdings.

Senator PARRY: There has been no role play or discussion as to any fixed type of integrity test?

Ms Bailey : No, not at this point.

Senator PARRY: I am curious to know how you would get around information technology in particular and information without using any form of entrapment. You would have to be an outsider making contact with an insider on the pretext of and offering I suppose some form of inducement for information to be passed. This is one of the more difficult areas that I am trying to work out as to how you would do that form of integrity testing around your particular agency.

Ms Bailey : I think that is true. I think also because our act contains such strict provisions about the secrecy provisions, everybody who works for us understands that our business is not business you discuss anywhere outside the ACC. There is already a high expectation because of the secrecy provisions in our act that the custodianship of the information is highly guarded. There is that expectation that you are not talking about your work anywhere outside, and you do not respond to anyone asking for information unless it is through the process. Our legal team describes our act as the doors are shut, and if you want to open the door to let information out of this agency, there is a process. The dissemination process is quite detailed. It has to be approved by an SES officer. There is quite a detailed process to protect the secrecy of our information and to open the door. So, allowing for failures of common sense or of human frailty, mostly I am satisfied that there are checks and balances in place. But you are right; cyber does present a challenge to us in terms of all that it brings with it.

Senator PARRY: I will leave it there, with the added question: if you do think of a way or an integrity test that we may be interested in hearing or understanding, could you provide that on notice?

Ms Bailey : We will indeed.

Senator PARRY: Thank you.

Senator SINGH: In the ACC's report, you refer to ACLEI's 2009 Resistance to corruption report and you outlined quite a proactive integrity framework that ACC already has in place. How do you see integrity testing fitting with that existing framework? Would any of that framework drop off as a result of having integrity testing? Is the view of ACC that targeted integrity testing is the way to go, as opposed to random and targeting, a result of the integrity framework already having a number of random audit components in it? If not, how do you come to this decision that random integrity testing is not necessary? We have become aware that there are other jurisdictions that see the value of both random and targeted integrity testing. I am interested to know how integrity testing fits with that framework, and whether some of your framework would not remain, and how you came to the decision of not wanting to include random integrity testing?

Ms Bailey : I think our view of integrity testing is the whole framework. We are about the integrity of our people, our systems, and our processes. This framework that we have put in place already is designed to put the right boundaries around the way our people work and the way we exchange information and the custodianship we have of that information. To do that properly, you have to have some random elements, such as the SES random audits of police diaries or car vehicle logs. We are not saying a random approach is not useful, but if asked in the construct of what we do already, and for the size or our agency, I think to do more than this in a random way, it would have to be quite a significant step up. Obviously you could not do random controlled operations. That would be thoroughly against the law. If this is not enough—and I am always open to the 'this is not enough'—and you had someone who came to your attention as being potentially corrupt, the targeted integrity testing I think is the tool that you would use to determine their criminality.

This is about understanding that everybody who works in the organisation understands there is oversight and audit, both random and planned, and that we take steps in our agency, for example, not holding exhibits of drugs or weapons on our premises, and only very minor amounts of cash. We do not hold things on our premises that could be at risk. We try to minimise risk. While there is always a place for some random auditing, my view is to have a whole random integrity regime—and maybe I am just imagining that to be bigger than what you are, so that might be a disconnect—would be quite a big thing to do on an agency of 600 people. I think this is quite good at working out where our pressure points and risks are. I see the integrity testing that is being contemplated here as just dealing with those real outlier risks where people become targets of an investigation, as I said, where they have crossed the line and are now conducting criminal activities themselves. There may be a more general view of integrity testing on top of this, but I see that as why I think targeted as opposed to random.

Senator SINGH: Do I understand you answer to mean that there is a resourcing issue but there is also an extensive framework in place already that is creating that culture of random audits?

Ms Bailey : And planned, both planned and random audits.

Senator SINGH: To create a culture of good?

Ms Bailey : We try to focus on seeing the threats and the risks in our world, both in the world we deal with and in our agency. We look at what is the risk; what is the likelihood of this happening, and what might be the things we do about it? Through the lens of the risk of compromise of our integrity, that is a very high risk if it happened to the agency, but do we think these strategies are demonstrating that we have enough controls in place? My view is at this point, yes, but I can never rule out human frailty or corruption. That would be where I think, if you had something else to add to this, it would be a targeted integrity testing capacity.

Senator SINGH: Targeted integrity testing would therefore be a fairly minimal part of your overall integrity framework?

Ms Bailey : My take on that, as I said, is when we had enough evidence to suggest that a staff member was now involved in criminal activities, probably in an operation that we and one of our partners were doing, and we needed to prove that criminality of what they were doing.

CHAIR: Just to follow up on that, if you had a suspicion about someone but not enough under the current laws in order to carry out a controlled operation, would you see that as a situation in which you would like to be able to do targeted testing?

Ms Bailey : In the first instance, if we had that suspicion, we would refer that to the Integrity Commissioner. The act requires if we suspect there is significant corruption or a breach of integrity, we would have to refer it to the ACLEI commissioner, and then he has a range of tools he could use to investigate that matter for us. If he came back and said—which I do not think he would—that he could not investigate that, and we perceived the risk to our agency to be too significant, that is the time I could see that we would want to work with them on an integrity testing regime. In the first instance, if I had that suspicion about a person, that would definitely go to the Integrity Commissioner as 'this appears to be a problem', and then they would take it from there. Mostly, if it was a serious allegation, they would deal with it. If it was a lesser threshold allegation, they do sometimes return them to us saying, 'You investigate it and tell us what you find and we will decide what to do.' Nothing would change in that, except that they might want to say to us, 'We want you to run this integrity test using controlled operations or telephone interception for this purpose' and I guess that is where you would want to be able to do it if they asked you to do it in that case.

Senator WRIGHT: I think you were in the room and you probably heard the exchange with the Attorney-General's Department representative about the need for additional legislation?

Ms Bailey : Yes.

Senator WRIGHT: I see that the submission from the ACC indicates some scenarios where the view is that the existing law would not cover what was needed. What is your view about that?

Ms Bailey : I think we made two points. We do not have a unilateral right to investigate any sort of crime. We are constrained by what our board authorises us to deal with. If it did not fall within the remit of those areas, we would not be able to exercise our powers at all. Secondly, we just comment from our experience in litigation that the conduct of investigators can be quite a contentious thing in trying to pursue a case. You just need to be sure that you were designing integrity tests in a way that would stand up to the rightful scrutiny of the courts. Beyond that, the law is really a matter for Attorney-General's, and that is fine, but we just comment that you would have to be very mindful of that because of that. So, the two things that operate for us are: if it is not a board approved area of involvement, we cannot do it; and secondly, a controlled operation is an important tool in law enforcement's ability to deal with serious and organised crime. They are highly regulated in use, but they are risky because of how you do them. If it was not well designed, you could find yourself in a whole lot of litigation.

Senator WRIGHT: Can I take it from that that you are saying what would be important would be clarity, to give you those clear indications and parameters, as well as the design of testing?

Ms Bailey : It is true today that if we did a controlled operation, we would have to have a lot of internal governance and very clear purpose for what purpose we are seeking that power. It is very targeted. I do not want to give too much away, but it is quite specific. It is not just, 'I think'. You would have to be sure that you had that level of detail and parameters.

Senator WRIGHT: But in a sense I imagine that is supported by the fact that the legislation is so specific?

Ms Bailey : Yes.

Senator CAMERON: If there was to be an integrity change within the commission for testing—I am not saying there is any change in your integrity; I think your integrity is fine.

Ms Bailey : I will only get better, I assure you.

Senator CAMERON: How long would it take to implement?

Ms Bailey : We are very agile and adaptive. I guess if it was the government's view that we should do that, we would work with ACLEI and our partners to do what was required. It is hard for me to estimate that, except to say we have a team already who are dedicated to integrity assurance in our agency. We do all this work. Whatever the regime was given to us, we could all talk about whether we would have enough resources and all those things, but leaving that aside, if that was the decision, the agency would do what it has to do to meet the requirements.

Senator CAMERON: What process would you use with your employees prior to implementation?

Ms Bailey : The way we work now with our employees is, pre-employment with the ACC, we are very keen for people to join us, but they need to think about whether they are the right fit for our organisation for a whole range of reasons. Some people do find us a little bit too intrusive in their lives. We necessarily are quite intrusive in financial affairs, their associations, their other life, and everyone has families and lives and connections, that is not a problem. It is just that we are intrusive in understanding that. We are probably one of the few public service agencies I suspect that has a secrecy provision that has a criminal kind of consequence. You will know a lot of quite sensitive information that some people do not feel comfortable having access to.

I can say that most of the people who work here understand the risks of our world, and what we are trying to do for Australia requires everybody to be highly focused and put the organisation before themselves. That is genuinely how I think people feel in our agency. They would say, I think—and I should not verbal the staff—that we do not want one bad person to ever work in this place. So whatever it takes to understand that is what it wants. But, I am also highly of the view that you set the policies, you set the procedures, you be the role model, but you actually set the standards of asking everyone to be the best person they possibly can in the agency. We cannot just live by rules. That was the point of ACLEI's view of our integrity regime. They said: you need to continue the journey from a rules based environment to one of values. People do this because that is their personal view of how to behave, and they do not tolerate people who do not behave that way. In an organisation that is always a journey. I would want to reassure our staff that the only reason we would be doing integrity testing, if it was to be random, was to satisfy ourselves that no one is going to compromise their good work.

Senator CAMERON: We have had submissions that say culture is not sufficient. What I was asking you was just a practical question: if you did implement integrity testing, would you tell your employees, would you train your employees in integrity testing, because you are not a huge organisation. Just how would you go about it?

Ms Bailey : If there was an integrity regime introduced we would definitely tell our staff what it was, what our obligations were and what we thought would be done. The teams that Peter and Carolyn lead spend a lot of the year going around working with our staff saying, 'This is how we are seeing integrity, these are the issues.' We would not walk away from that. When we introduced the dismissal powers, it was the same; we talked to the staff about why we needed to do this. It is not a commentary on our staff; it is a protection for them. I think you can only be open and honest. I agree that you can never say culture is enough, but I also think that rules are never enough so you have got to find some way of making both things work together. You have got to have the rules and the policies in place that say if people do not do it, you have a place to go back and say, 'That is why your behaviour is not appropriate.' But, you also have to have a view that we cannot be everywhere and that the people we hire and the people who do our work are highly engaged in a risky world. They have got to have a sense of how they—

Senator CAMERON: I suppose Rupert Murdoch said that when he hired some people, that the culture was fine and everything was good.

Ms Bailey : I would not comment on Mr Murdoch's position.

Senator CAMERON: I am not asking you to. It was just a comment, a throwaway line.

Ms Bailey : The nature of our work is investigating serious and organised crime and not much of that work actually involves the kind of day-to-day activities that most other public servants do. It is a different workforce and I think we have got to make sure that we have got the right people with the right risk understanding, who understand the culture and can understand the organisation. Again, you have got to understand, and I understand more than anyone else, that there is human frailty, there is corruption and wherever in the world we live in there is potential. So, you have got to understand the risk.

Senator CAMERON: Thank you.

CHAIR: I would like to thank representatives from the Australian Crime Commission for taking the time to speak to us today.

Ms Bailey : Thank you, Madam Chair.

CHAIR: During the course of our inquiry, which has only just begun, we may have further questions and so come back to you later.

Ms Bailey : Certainly, we would be happy to answer them.