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International terrorism: recent developments and implications for Australia.
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The Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia -,1.,, ;" . , . % .
International Terrorism Recent Developments and Implications for Australia
Current Issues Brief Number 5 1985-86
Legislative Research Service Department of the Parliamentary Library
The Par1 iament o f the Commonwealth o f Austral i a
International Terrorism: Recent Developments and Imp1 ications --.-^------ for Australia
B r i a n G. Martin Foreign A f f a i r s Group Legislative Research Service
1.egislative Research Service Current Issues Brief Number 5 1985-86
I S S N 0726-3244
* Commonwealth o f A u s t r a l i a 1985
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Pub1 i shed by t h e Department o f t h e P a r l i amentary L i b r a r y , October
1985.
Contents
Introduction 1
Factors Shaping the Current Situation 1
A Brief H i story o f Pol i tical Terrorism 3
The Problem o f Definition 4
Recent Devel opments In Pol i tical Terrori sm 5
The Reaction o f Democratic States t o Terrorism 10
The Australian S i t u a t i o n 1 7
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I n t e r n a t i o n a l Terrorism
INTRODUCTION
The phenomenon o f t e r r o r i s m has gained renewed prominence o v e r t h e past year as a r e s u l t
o f such dramatic events as t h e attempted
a s s a s s i n a t i o n o f t h e B r i t i s h Prime M i n i s t e r and her Cabinet b y t h e
I r i s h Republican Army ( I R A ) i n Brighton, t h e h i j a c k i n g o f a TWA
a i r c r a f t t o B e i r u t , and t h e s p a t e o f bombings a g a i n s t N A T O
i n s t a l l a t i o n s i n Europe. Moreover, as t h i s l a s t development
i n d i c a t e s , t h i s p e r i o d has witnessed t h e recrudescence o f t e r r o r i s t
a c t i v i t i e s b y groups such as West Germany's Red Army F a c t i o n (RAF) and France's A c t i o n D i r e c t e . These developments i n t u r n have c o n t r i b u t e d t o a wide r a n g i n g p o l i c y debate w i t h i n t h e United States Government
over t h e a p p r o p r i a t e l e v e l o f response t o such a c t s o f t e r r o r i s m .
They have a l s o d i r e c t e d f u r t h e r a t t e n t i o n t o t h e dilemmas which
t e r r o r i s m poses f o r t h e i n t e r n a t i o n a l p o l i t i c a l system, e s p e c i a l l y f o r
those s t a t e s which a r e f u n c t i o n i n g democracies.
A u s t r a l i a , h i t h e r t o , has been l i t t l e a f f e c t e d by t h e i s s u e o f
t e r r o r i s m , and t h e phenomenon had n o t been a major problem i n t h i s
country. Nevertheless, s i n c e
1980 several i n c i d e n t s have drawn t h e
A u s t r a l i a n Government's a t t e n t i o n t o t h e problem, which was considered i n d e t a i l by t h e Hope Royal Commission. Moreover, some form o f
r e l a t i o n s h i p between c e r t a i n A u s t r a l i a n c r i m i n a l s and i n t e r n a t i o n a l
t e r r o r i s t s has been suggested by r e c e n t a l l e g a t i o n s o f l i n k s between
A u s t r a l i a n n a r c o t i c smugglers and an unnamed Middle East t e r r o r i s t
organi s a t i o n .
Thi s paper addresses t h e f o l 1 owi ng i ssues : t h e h i s t o r i c a l
evol u t i o n o f pol i t i c a l t e r r o r i s m ; t h e s u b s t a n t i a l probl ems i n v o l v e d
i n p r o v i d i n g a precise, value-neutral and w i d e l y accepted d e f i n i t i o n
o f t h e problem; and t h e r e c e n t developments i n i n t e r n a t i o n a l
t e r r o r i s m t o g e t h e r w i t h t h e impact of t e c h n o l o g i c a l and socio-economic changes on t h e phenomenon. The s p e c i f i c problems faced by democratic s t a t e s i n t h e i r attempts t o combat t e r r o r i s m and a t t h e same t i m e
m a i n t a i n t h e d e s i r e d democratic s t r u c t u r e s o f t h e i r s o c i e t i e s a r e
surveyed, and t h e f i n a l s e c t i o n considers t h e A u s t r a l i a n s i t u a t i o n and
discusses, i n p a r t i c u l a r , t h e n a t u r e o f t h e A u s t r a l i a n Government's
response t o t h e perceived t h r e a t o f t e r r o r i s m and t h e c i v i l r i g h t s
i s s u e s t o which
i t may g i v e r i s e .
FACTORS SHAPING THE CURRENT SITUATION
P o l i t i c a l t e r r o r i s m has had a l o n g h i s t o r y as a t a c t i c i n both
n a t i o n a l and i n t e r n a t i o n a l p o l i t i c s , b u t it i s o n l y over t h e past 15
years t h a t i t has begun t o be perceived as a s e r i o u s t h r e a t t o Western
democracies. The processes of techno1 o g i c a l and s o c i a l change have enhanced t h e appeal o f t e r r o r i s m as an e f f e c t i v e p o l i t i c a l weapon.
The r a p i d development of i n t e r n a t i o n a l communications has increased t h e o p p o r t u n i t i e s a v a i l a b l e t o t e r r o r i s t groups f o r v i o l e n t a c t i o n s
which can secure immediate worl d-wide pub1 i c i ty. Recent devel opments
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International Terrorism
i n arms technology have made available t o t e r r o r i s t groups compact destructive hardware such as miniaturised weapons, and have given r i s e t o the possibility of nuclear terrorism. Indeed the dependence of Western industrialised societies on a decreasing number of c r i t i c a l
processes and 1 ocations h a s greatly enhanced the t e r r o r i s t s ' potential t o wreak economic havoc in such societies by means of selective sabotage.
Moreover, i t can be argued t h a t substantial changes i n social attitudes over the l a s t 20 years, particularly as regards the nature
of a u t h o r i t y , have helped t o c r e a t e conditions which a r e more
conducive t o terrorism t h a n a t any other time i n the recent past. I n
t h i s period the legitimacy of a l l forms of a u t h o r i t y including State
authority, has been thoroughly questioned and the concept of authority i t s e l f has come t o be regarded as something t h a t must be earned rather t h a n something which automatically pertains t o either a particular group or a system o f government. Such c r i t i c a l attitudes towards authority can provide a favourable milieu f o r political t e r r o r i s t s . Many of these belong t o groups which consider themselves the victims of the existing international political order (of which the Western democracies form a n intrinsic p a r t ) , and therefore seek t o deny the
legitimacy o f t h a t order as a means o f advancing t h e i r own particular cause.
I n f a c t , c e r t a i n aspects o f t h e c u r r e n t s t a t e o f
international relations tend t o favour political terrorism. Since the end o f the Second World War most of the t e r r i t o r i e s colonised by Europe have emerged as sovereign nations, often a f t e r a period of prolonged guerrilla warfare against the colonial power. As a result such newly independent Third World nations have sometimes come t o equate terrorism w i t h independence struggles, a n d are frequently extremely c r i t i c a l of t h e p o l i t i c a l p o s i t i o n s of t h e Western
democracies, many of whom are, i n f a c t , t h e i r former colonial masters. This s i t u a t i o n i n p a r t explains the relative ineffectiveness of
repeated attempts t o g a i n agreement i n international forums (such as the United Nations) on a n acceptable definition o f political terrorism and on co-operative action t o combat i t . A recent example of t h i s
clash of values was the resolution of the United Nations General Assembly passed i n December 1983 which called f o r world-wide action t o combat international terrori sin. A1 t h o u g h the resol ution condemned terrorism ' w h i c h endangers or takes innocent 1 ives or jeopardises
fundamental freedoms' , i t a l s o reaffirmed the 'legitimacy' o f the struggle of national liberation movements a g a i n s t 'colonial and racist regimes and other forms o f alien domination.'Cl]
1. The Canberra Times, 2 1 December 1983.
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International Terrorism
A BRIEF HISTORY OF POLITICAL TERRORISM
Terrorism as a political t a c t i c has had a long history and i t has been
practised by a great variety of individuals, groups and governments f o r revolutionary, conservative and reactionary purposes. The use of t o r t u r e by the State and the Inquisition in Mediaeval Europe can be described as t e r r o r i s t in intent as can the a c t i v i t i e s of the
Assassins i n the Middle East d u r i n g the twelfth century. However, the modern term ' t e r r o r i s m ' d e r i v e s from t h e period of t h e French
Revolution when Robespierre and the Jacobins used t e r r o r as a n
i nstrument of pol icy (the ' regime de 1 a terreur' ) against i 1 1-def i ned 'enemies of the revolution' during the years 1793 a n d 1794. In the l a t t e r half of the nineteenth century terrorism was
used e x t e n s i v e l y by b o t h t h e a n a r c h i s t a n d n i h i l i s t movements.
Certain Russian anarchi st 1 eaders , such as Bakuni n , Kropotki n and Nechayev, provided a theoretical rationale for the use of terrorism, w h i c h they described as 'propaganda by deed'. In f a c t , Nechayev in his Revol-utionary Catechism (1869) provided one of the most famous
(and influential) definitions of the psychology of the revolutionary:
The revolutionary i s a man under vow. He ought t o occupy himself e n t i r e l y with one exclusive i n t e r e s t , with one
t h o u g h t and one passion: the Revolution... He has only one
aim, one science: destruction... Between him and society
there i s war t o the death, incessant, irreconcilable... He
must make a l i s t of those who are condemned t o death, and expedite t h e i r sentence according t o the order of t h e i r
re1 a t i ve i n i q u i ties.[2]
I n the l a t e nineteenth century and early twentieth centuries terrorism was used by Russian revolutionaries (the People's Will, Narodnaya Volya, 1878-1881), by anarchist groups in France, Italy, Spain, and t h e United States, and by radical national g r o u p s i n
Ireland ( t h e F e n i a n s ) , Macedonia ( I M R O - Internal Macedonian
Revolutionary Organisation) , Serbia (the Black Hand) and Armenia. After the Second World War there was a resurgence o f t e r r o r i s t
a c t i v i t i e s associated w i t h t h e a n t i - c o l o n i a l a n d independence
movements, such as the I r g u n and Stern Gang in Palestine, the FLN in Algeria, the Mau Mau in Kenya, the Eoka in Cyprus, and the NFL in
Vietnam. A1 though these subsequent movements had quite different aims from those of anarchism i t can be argued t h a t they, together with
contemporary t e r r o r i s t organisations, owe a phi1 osophical debt t o the Russian anarcho-terrorists of the l a t e nineteenth century.
2. George Woodcock, Anarchism: A History of Libertarian Ideas and Movements , Harmondsworth , Pengui n , 1983 9 P.160.
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International Terrorism
THE PROBLEM OF DEFINITION
Despite i t s we1 l-establ ished historical pedigree the phenomenon of p o l i t i c a l t e r r o r i s m s t i l l lacks a precise a n d widely accepted
definition. The reason for t h i s i s obvious: the concept o f
'terrorism' i s b o t h political and pejorative. What might appear as an evil act of terrorism t o people i n an affluent Western society may
seem l i k e a reasonable and legitimate political action t o a liberation or rebel movement operating i n the poverty-stricken and desperate conditions prevalent i n the T h i r d World. As B r i a n Jenkins, a leading United States authority on political terrorism, p o i n t s o u t :
Some governments are prone t o label as terrorism a l l violent acts committed by t h e i r political opponents, while a n t i -
government extremists frequently claim t o be the victims of government terror. What i s c a l l ed terrorism t h u s seems t o
depend on point o f view. Use of the term implies a moral
judgement, and i f one party can successfully attach the label ' t e r r o r i s t ' t o i t s opponent, then i t has indirectly persuaded others t o adopt i t s moral viewpoint. Terrorism i s what the bad guys do.[31
T h u s the overtly political and pejorative aspects o f the term ' t e r r o r i s m ' help t o determine i t s usage. I n t h e f i r s t place
governments, in t h e i r desire t o monopolise political legitimacy, attempt t o argue t h a t political terrorism i s the exclusive province of anti-governmental forces. This ignores the fact that in certain
polities - Nazi Germany, Fascist Italy, many of the military regimes of L a t i n America, and the Soviet Union under S t a l i n - the systematic use of t e r r o r has been a n integral p a r t of the political process.
Moreover, c e r t a i n governments e i t h e r t a c i t l y support or condone vigilantism against t h e i r political and/or social enemies; f o r
example, the 'death squads' which either have been o r are operating i n A r g e n t i n a , Brazil, El Salvador and Indonesia.[4] Again, governments frequently dismiss the actions of pol itically-motivated t e r r o r i s t s as merely the aimless violence of criminal madmen. This i s merely an
attempt t o deny t o the t e r r o r i s t s any possible legitimacy w i t h the
population they are trying t o influence by t h e i r actions. Indeed,
most modern legal systems do not recognise ' p o l i t i c a l ' crimes as
d i s t i n c t from ' p u r e l y ' criminal a c t s , a n d so governments c a n
successfully portray acts w h i c h t e r r o r i s t s regard as political acts
against the State as merely criminal activities.
3. D. Carlton and S. Schaerf (eds). International Terrorism and
World Security, London, Croom Helm, 1975, p.14. 4. Amnesty International , Amnesty International Report 1984, London, Amnesty International, 1984, pp.125-9, 131-3, 148-53, 225-30.
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International Terrorism
However political terrorism i s seldom mindless or i r r a t i o n a l , and normally has a number of carefully defined objectives. Although i t s primary effect i s t o create fear and alarm, i t s objectives may
involve gaining specific concessions, obtaining maximum publicity for a 'pol i t i c a l cause, del iberately p r o v o k i n g repression and counter-
terrorism t o bring a b o u t the collapse of a government, creating
widespread social disorder and demoral isation, and enforcing obedience and/or building u p morale within the t e r r o r i s t organisation.
Given the confusion, and deliberate obfuscation, surrounding the concept of terrorism, perhaps the best , value-neutral definition of t h e phenomenon i s t h a t provided by G r a n t Wardlaw, one of
Australia's leading authorities on the subject. Wardlaw s t a t e s :
Political terrorism i s the use, o r threat o f use, of violence
by an individual o r a g r o u p , whether a c t i n g for or in
opposition t o established authority, when such action i s
designed t o c r e a t e extreme anxiety a n d / o r fear-inducing effects in a target g r o u p larger t h a n the immediate victims
with the purpose of coercing t h a t g r o u p i n t o acceding t o the
political demands of t h e perpetrators.[5]
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN POLITICAL TERRORISM
Certain developments over the past three years would seem t o indicate t h a t p o l i t i c a l t e r r o r i s m , f a r from d e c l i n i n g , will remain a
significant problem i n international relations f o r a t l e a s t the next decade. I n the l a t e 1970s and early 1980s there was a certain
optimism t h a t political terrorism had begun t o decline from i t s peak in the mid 1970s. There had been a series of successes against major
t e r r o r i s t organisations in the period 1979 t o 1982, notably the arrest of the Baader-Meinhoff group in West Germany and the destruction of the Red Brigade networks in I t a l y .
However, t h e number o f t e r r o r i s t groups a n d t e r r o r i s t
incidents began t o increase a f t e r 1982. I n t h a t year, according t o
United States State Department figures quoted by Grant Wardlaw i n the Sydney Morning Herald, t h e r e were 117 groups representing 7 1
nationalities which claimed responsibility f o r t e r r o r i s t incidents, the second largest t o t a l since 1968.[6] The London Times reported
t h a t there was a total of 1112 t e r r o r i s t incidents w o r l m e i n 1983.
Moreover, n o t only has the incidence of political terrorism increased, i t has also been responsible for a higher casualty rate. Whereas i n
5. G r a n t Wardlaw, P o l i t i c a l Terrorism : Theory, T a c t i c s , a n d
Counter-Measures, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1% P.16. 6. The Sydney Morning Herald, 24 May 1983.
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International Terrorism
1970 t e r r o r i s t i ncidents were directed against peopl e and property i n a b o u t equal proportions, in 1981 eighty percent of such incidents were directed against people, This, i n p a r t , r e f l e c t s a change i n
t e r r o r i s t t a c t i c s which i s due, i r o n i c a l l y , t o t h e success of
governments' anti-terrorist strategies. Most major t e r r o r i s t groups have abandoned embassy takeovers and skyjackings , because of the p r o h i b i t i v e r i s k s involved, a n d have returned t o t h e c l a s s i c
strategies of bombings and assassinations.[7] However, the hijacking of TWA Flight 847 t o Beirut, the huge bomb blast a t Frankfurt airport, and the mysterious crash of a n Air I n d i a jumbo j e t o f f the coast of
Ireland, a l l of which occurred i n June 1985, would seem t o suggest that a i r c r a f t and a i r p o r t f a c i l i t i e s have once a g a i n become the
targets o f a t least some t e r r o r i s t groups.
I n l a t e 1984 a n d early 1985 there appeared t o be a resurgence of t e r r o r i s t attacks i n Europe against political and military targets. The most dramatic o f these incidents was the attempt by the IRA t o
assassinate Prime Minister Thatcher and her Cabinet by means of a bomb attack d u r i n g the Conservative Party's annual conference a t Brighton in mid October 1984. The I R A bomb, which killed f o u r people and
wounded 32 others, prompted a far-reaching review o f United Kingdom s e c u r i t y arrangements a n d the c r e a t i o n o f a new a n t i - t e r r o r i s t
i n t e l l i g e n c e u n i t t o combat I R A g u e r r i l l a a c t i v i t y . [ 8 ] These
incidents also included over forty petrol bomb and arson incidents against NATO and industrial targets i n West Germany i n December 1984 a n d Januar 1985, a n d a mortar a t t a c k on s i x N A T O ships i n
An ominous recent development i n international a f f a i r s has been the increasing use of terrorism as an instrument o f State policy. I t has been estimated t h a t about twenty-four percent of a l l t e r r o r i s t
incidents in 1983 (270 o u t of 1112) received some form of State
sponsorship.[lO] Among the most notable of those s t a t e s which have used terrorism as a n extension of t h e i r foreign policy are Libya,
Iran, S y r i a , Iraq a n d North Korea (DPRK). The most serious recent
examples of State-sponsored terrori sm i ncl ude the bombing of the headquarters o f t h e French a n d United S t a t e s elements o f t h e
multinational peacekeeping force i n Beirut i n October 1983 by the Iranian-supported Hazeballah g r o u p ; the North Korean involvement i n the t e r r o r i s t attack on the senior S o u t h Korean Government delegation while on an official v i s i t t o Burma i n October 1983; and the
a c t i v i t i e s of the Libyan People's Bureau i n London a g a i n s t Libyan
Portugal . t 9 Y
7. The Times, 1 2 March 1984. 8. The Australian, 16 October 1984; The Canberra Times, 24 October 1984.
9. The Age, 30 January 1985; The Sydney Morning Herald, 2 February 1985. 10. The Times, 12 March 1984.
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International Terrori s m
d i s s i d e n t s , which culminated in t h e shooting of anti-Gaddafi
demonstrators and a British policewoman i n S t James's Square i n April 1984.
One reason f o r the r i s e of State-supported international
terrorism i s the increasing f l u i d i t y in international relations. This i s due i n part t o the increased uncertainty of Great Power dominance of international a f f a i r s and the need t o take account of the interests of less-powerful s t a t e s and important non-state bodies, such as the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries ( O P E C ) and the Palestine Liberation Organisation ( P L O ) . As a result of t h i s diffusion of
international power i t would appear t h a t traditional measures of r e s t r a i n t i n i n t e r n a t i o n a l a f f a i r s may become l e s s e f f e c t i v e .
Moreover, a s the costs of conventional and low-level warfare become prohibitive, i t i s possible t h a t a n increasing number of s t a t e s might well resort i n the future to sponsorship of terrorism as a form of
'surrogate warfare'. Some observers believe t h a t t h i s situation h a s already arisen. A t a press conference in Los Angeles i n mid February 1985, United S t a t e s Senator Arlen S p e l t e r made t h e following
observation :
There m u s t be a n international reappraisal of responses t o
terrorism because terrorism has become a form for the waging of what used t o be war. Today i t i s really a substitute f o r
war with t e r r o r i sm being t h e exerci s e of i n t e r n a t i o n a l
objectives short of w h a t has been traditionally defined t o be war. [ 111
The emergence of such a phenomenon as 'surrogate warfare' i s a cause f o r major concern since i t has the potential t o undermine the existing system of international relations on which the Western democracies rely for the predictable conduct of state-to-state re1 ations.
I n the last few years significant evidence has emerged of i ncreased co-operation among t e r r o r i s t groups from diverse pol i tical , geographic a n d e t h n i c backgrounds. Such co-operation embraces t r a i n i n g , weapons procurement, target reconnaissance, and t e r r o r i s t operations. Prior t o the Israeli incursion i n t o Lebanon i n 1982, the PLO training camps provided instruction f o r t e r r o r i s t groups from such countries as Ire1 a n d , the Nether1 ands, Norway, Japan, Turkey, Italy and Germany. R i g h t - w i n g t e r r o r i s t s have established t h e i r own co- operative networks. One such network b r o u g h t together K1 aus Barbie' s Neo-Nazi group in Bolivia, I t a l i a n neo-Fascists, the Italian P 2 Masonic Lodge, and the Spanish 'Guerrillas of Christ the King'. The 1 a t t e r organi sation , a1 t h o u g h not we1 1 k n o w n , was responsible for the assassination of many leading Basque separatists in the 1970s.[12) 11. United States Information Service ( U S I S ) , Pacific Wireless File, 12- The Australian, 24 September 1983. no. 42, 15 February 1985.
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I n t e r n a t i o n a l Terrorism
A major reason f o r t h i s co-operation i s t h e sheer f i n a n c i a l
c o s t o f m a i n t a i n i n g t e r r o r i s t organisations and mounting t e r r o r i s t
operations. According t o Grant Wardlaw:
Modern t e r r o r i s t s need p l e n t y o f money, and m a j o r
i n t e r n a t i o n a l groups need budgets r i v a l 1 i n g those o f major
business corporations. Money i s t h e f u e l o f i n t e r n a t i o n a l
t e r r o r i s m . [ 13)
Such t e r r o r i s t budgets can i nvol ve hundreds of m i 11 i o n s of dol 1 a r s ,
e s p e c i a l l y t h e f i n a n c i n g o f t h e operations o f c e r t a i n p o l i t i c a l
o r g a n i s a t i o n s i n t h e Middle East. Co-operation between r a d i c a l groups i s one attempt t o keep f i n a n c i a l overheads down and t o ensure t h e
r a t i o n a l use of expensive resources. Indeed t h e h i g h c o s t s of
m a i n t a i n i n g t e r r o r i s t organisations has l e d t o some o f these groups
becoming i n c r e a s i n g l y i n v o l v e d i n such o v e r t l y c r i m i n a l a c t i v i t i e s as
bank robberies, e x t o r t i o n , kidnappings and t h e drug-trade. This
l a t t e r development has g i v e n r i s e t o what t h e US Drug Enforcement
A u t h o r i t y (DEA) terms t h e phenomenon o f ' n a r c o - t e r r o r i s m ' - t h e co-
o p e r a t i o n between drug t r a f f i c k e r s and i n t e r n a t i o n a l t e r r o r i s t s . The
DEA c l aims t h a t numerous t e r r o r i s t grou s worl d-wide finance t h e i r
major f a c t o r i n t e r r o r i s m and/or armed dissidence i n Turkey, I t a l y ,
Colombia and Burma. The DEA, moreover, i d e n t i f i e s Cuba and Nicara ua
I n mid 1985 i t was a l l e g e d t h a t an A u s t r a l i a n drug syndicate had
purchased up t o 10 tonnes o f cannabis r e s i n , worth an estimated A$40 m i l l i o n , from an unnamed t e r r o r i s t o r g a n i s a t i o n i n t h e Middle East and
imported it i n t o A u s t r a l i a i n March 1984. This a l l e g a t i o n was
f o l l o w e d by t h e a r r e s t of over t h i r t y members o f t h e syndicate by t h e
A u s t r a l i a n Federal P o l i c e i n mid August 1985. According t o D r Grant
Wardlaw t h e t e r r o r i s t group i n v o l v e d i s probably a PLO s p l i n t e r group
o p e r a t i n g o u t o f t h e Bekaa V a l l e y i n eastern Lebanon, where such
groups a r e i n v o l v e d i n growing and exporting hashi sh under Syrian
p r o t e c t i o n . A t t h e same t i m e it was r e p o r t e d t h a t f i v e members of
j u s t such a PLO s p l i n t e r group had been convicted by a B r i t i s h c o u r t
on charges o f smuggling drugs and buying guns w i t h t h e proceeds.[l51 The f o r g i n g of such 1 i n k s between n a r c o t i c s t r a f f i c k e r s and t e r r o r i s t s
c a r r i e s serious imp1 i c a t i o n s f o r t h e attempts by Western governments t o achieve e f f e c t i v e i n t e r n a t i o n a l c o n t r o l s over drug smuggling.
operations through i l l e g a l drug sales, an
a t h a t such drug f i n a n c e i s a
as important ' p i r a t e havens' f o r drug smuggling and arms running.[ 9 4 1
Since t h e 1970s t h e development of nuclear weapons techno1 ogy and t h e p r o l i f e r a t i o n of nuclear power p l a n t s has g i v e n r i s e t o t h e
prospect o f nuclear terrorism. There a r e a number o f ways i n which a
13. The A e, 24 May 1983.
14. d i r e l e s s F i l e , no. 150, 2 August 1984.
15. The A u s t r a l i a n , 16 August 1985; The A u s t r a l i a n , 1 7 August 1985.
- 9 -
International Terrorism
dedicated g r o u p of t e r r o r i s t s could obtain a nuclear capability. They could steal a nuclear weapon from one o f the numerous military storage areas, particularly i n Western Europe; or they could seize a nuclear f a c i l i t y and t h r e a t e n t o r e l e a s e r a d i o a c t i v e material i n t o t h e
atmosphere unless t h e i r demands were met; or they could construct t h e i r own crude nuclear device using readily available d a t a ( i n 1975 a student a t the Massachusetts Institute of Technology designed a technically conceivable nuclear bomb). However, t o date, no t e r r o r i s t
g r o u p has exploited t h i s capability, a situation which in part
reflects such groups' self-imposed constraints and t h e i r conservatism in t h e i r preferred methods of violence. Nevertheless there i s no
guarantee t h a t such a situation of self-denial will obtain i n the
f u t u r e , p a r t i c u l a r l y i f t h e r e a r e s i g n i f i c a n t changes i n t h e
organisational structure and political objectives of t e r r o r i s t groups. As a result many Governments have taken steps t o meet j u s t such a n eventuality. In the United States, for example, a Nuclear Emergency Search Team (NEST) , composed of 250 atomic p h y s i c i s t s , weapons
designers and bomb-disposal experts, was set u p in 1975. By the early 1980s NEST had dealt with 20 cases i n which there seemed a real danger t h a t a nuclear device would be exploded, although all b u t one proved t o be hoaxes, and i n that case the perpetrator was caught.[l6]
Another development o f the 1980s has been the r i s e of so- called single-issue terrorism. There have been indications t h a t some radical elements within ecological , anti-nuclear and animal rights groups, frustrated w i t h the 1 imitations of peaceful protest, have
turned t o more violent methods of publicising t h e i r causes. According t o newspaper reports i n l a t e 1983 an 'animal rights m i l i t i a ' i n the
United Kingdom had been responsible for over eighteen bombs and incendiary devices sent t o politicians and leading scientists. The same reports noted t h a t a French g r o u p , the Committee for the
Liquidation of Computers, was responsible f o r bombing attacks on d a t a - processing centres i n Toulouse, Dusseldorf and West Berlin; and in Switzerland radical ecologists had begun a campaign of firebombin nuclear power plants and sending l e t t e r bombs t o politicians.[17] I these a c t i v i t i e s prove t o be a permanent feature of contemporary
terrorism, then they would pose speci a1 probl ems for democratic
societies. Unlike international t e r r o r i s t g r o u p s , such single-issue groups a r e composed o f predominantly middle-class c i t i z e n s of democratic s t a t e s who have rejected the processes of democratic politics in the pursuit of a single political ideal.
3
16.
17.
The Bulletin, 8 March 1983; Wardlaw, op.cit. , pp.175-80; Martha c. Hutchinson, 'Defininq Future Threat: Terrorism and Nuclear Proliferation'-, in Yonah Alexander et. a l . , (eds), Terrorism:
Interdi sci pl i nary Perspectives , New Y o r k , h e John Jay Press , 1977, pp.298-316; Louis R. Beres , Terrorism and Global Security: The Nuclear Threat, Boulder, Colo., Westview Press, 1979, passim. The Austral i a n , 24 September 1983.
Proliferation'-, in Yonah Alexander et. a l . , (eds),
Interdi sci pl i nary Perspectives , New Y o r k , h e John 1977, pp.298-316; Louis R. Beres, Terrorism and Globa The Nucl ear Threat , Boulder , Col o., Westvi ew Press, 197 The Austral i a n , 24 September 1983.
Terrorism: Jay Press,
11 Security: '9, passim.
- 10 -
International Terrori s m
THE REACTION OF DEMOCRATIC STATES TO TERRORISM
During the 1970s many West European democracies experienced terrori s t a t t a c k s o n t h e i r r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s a n d i n s t i t u t i o n s . This was
particularly so i n the Federal Republic o f Germany and Italy where the a c t i v i t i e s of the Red Army Faction ( R A F ) and the Red Brigades came very close t o paralysing the institutions of government. The R A F , better known as the Baader-Meinhoff Gang from the names o f i t s two
leaders Andreas Baader and Ulrike Meinhoff, grew out of the Berlin student demonstrations o f 1967 a n d 1968. I t had a rather eclectic
revolutionary philosophy, which combined anarchist , anti-bourgeois and anti-Establ ishment values, and pursued a t e r r o r i s t campaign u n t i l 1972 when most of the original leaders were arrested. Various successor groups continued the RAF's t e r r o r i s t a c t i v i t i e s , achieving t h e i r most
signal , t h o u g h short-1 ived , success with the kidnapping and subsequent murder of Hans-Martin Schleyer, the President of the Federal Union of German Industry, and the related hijacking of a Lufthansa j e t t o
Mogadishu by the Popular Front f o r t h e Liberation of Palestine ( P F L P ) i n l a t e 1977. A l t h o u g h these events a t the time virtually paralysed
German political and governmental l i f e , the RAF was crippled shortly thereafter by a series o f arrests o f members o f i t s support networks. One legacy of t h e RAF's t e r r o r i s t a c t i v i t i e s i n the 1970s was the
extension and elaboration of the internal security system, and the
consequent increase in the powers of the S t a t e . Indeed, the manner in which certain aspects of t h i s system have been implemented, notably the Berufsverbot (which i s designed t o exclude pol i t i c a l extremists from employment by the S t a t e ) , has been a matter of continuing
controversy. [ 181
I n I t a l y , the Red Brigades emerged in the early 1970s from the ranks of disillusioned middle-class students w i t h the avowed aim of establ i shi ng Communism through armed struggle. They waged a viol ent anti -Estab1 i shment campaign and engaged in open warfare w i t h extreme right wing groups w h i c h were also terrorising Italy in t h e
1970s. With the arrest and subsequent t r i a l of the leadership,
including Renato Curcio, i n 1976 the Red Brigades engaged i n a series o f t e r r o r i s t actions designed t o secure t h e i r release which culminated i n the k i d n a p p i n g and murder of the former Christian Democrat Prime Minister, Aldo Moro, i n 1978. However, the Mor0 assassination damaged
-~ ~
18. Christopher Dobson and Ronald Payne, The Weapons o f Terrorism: I n t e r n a t i o n a l Terrorism a t Work, L o n d o n , M a c m i l l a n , 1979,
p p . 1 5 3 - 4 - Keesing's Contemporary Archives, 7 April 1978,
pp.28914->4; Geoffrey Pridham, 'Terrorism and the S t a t e i n West Germany d u r i n g the 1970s: A Threat t o Stability or a Case of
Political Over-Reaction?' i n Jul i e t Lodge (ed.) , Terrorism: A Challenge t o the State, Oxford, Martin Robertson, 1981, pp.11-56.
- 11 -
I n t e r n a t i o n a l Terrorism
t h e B r i g a d i s t s ' p u b l i c image and l e d t o d i v i s i o n s w i t h i n t h e i r ranks
over t h e e f f i c a c y o f t h e t e r r o r i s t strategy. These developments
t o g e t h e r w i t h t h e a n t i - t e r r o r i s t measures passed by t h e I t a 1 i a n
Government l e d t o a marked decrease i n t e r r o r i s t a c t i v i t i e s by t h e
e a r l y 198Os.[19]
As t h e examples o f West Germany and I t a l y i n d i c a t e t h e
methods o f p o l i t i c a l t e r r o r i s m a r e anathema t o t h e p r i n c i p l e s on which
democratic s o c i e t i e s a r e founded and can have a c o r r o s i v e e f f e c t on
democratic i n s t i t u t i o n s . As Paul W i l kinson, a prominent B r i t i s h
a u t h o r i t y on p o l i t i c a l t e r r o r i s m , p o i n t s o u t :
The essence o f l i b e r a l democracy i s t h a t i t guarantees the
m a x i m i s a t i o n o f i n d i v i d u a l r i g h t s t o l i f e , l i b e r t y and
p r o p e r t y within t h e framework o f t h e Rule o f Law. L i b e r a l
democrats b e l i e v e i n t h e s a n c t i t y o f i n d i v i d u a l l i f e and
1 i b e r t y . T e r r o r i s t movements, on t h e o t h e r hand, b e l i e v e
t h a t t h e i r p o l i t i c a l ends j u s t i f y any means: by d e f i n i t i o n
t h e y a r e ready t o t r e a t t h e i r f e l l o w c i t i z e n s as expendable,
mere fodder f o r t h e i r cause. For t h e t e r r o r i s t t h e r e a r e no
i n n o c e n t s , no non-combatants. E v e r y one o f us... i s
p o t e n t i a l l y a candidate f o r t h e t e r r o r i s t s ' dominion o f
death.[20]
Wilkinson s p e c i f i e s f i v e ways i n which p o l i t i c a l t e r r o r i s t campaigns
d i r e c t l y c h a l l e n g e d e m o c r a t i c s o c i e t i e s . Such campaigns a t t a c k
democratic values and i n s t i t u t i o n s , and attempt t o undermine t h e r u l e
of law. They a l s o t h r e a t e n t h e b a s i c human r i g h t s o f t h e innocent by
t h e i r r e f u s a l t o recognise any non-combatants i n t h e i r s t r u g g l e s w i t h
t h e State. Moreover, such movements can be manipulated by h o s t i l e
powers t o undermine democratic s t a t e s , and t h i s i s c e r t a i n l y one
consequence o f t h e phenomenon of State-sponsored t e r r o r i sm. F i n a l l y p o l i t i c a l t e r r o r i s m has t h e e f f e c t o f d i v e r t i n g scarce resources away
from v i t a l areas o f s o c i a l w e l f a r e and towards such s e c u r i t y concerns
as p r o t e c t i n g p o l i t i c a l l e a d e r s , g u a r d i n g s t r a t e g i c l o c a t i o n s ,
p r o v i d i n g a i r p o r t s e c u r i t y etc. Wilkinson has noted t h a t t h e c o s t of
s e c u r i t y measures i n Northern I r e 1 and t o t h e B r i t i s h Government about 1.5 b i l l i o n pounds s t e r l i n g ) was equal
t o t h e t o t a l r e d u c t i o n c aimed
by t h e UK from i t s European Community Budget c o n t r i b u t i o n . The
d i v e r s i o n of resources on a l a r g e scale over t h e l o n g t e r m c o u l d have
an adverse e f f e c t on s o c i a l j u s t i c e and e q u i t y w i t h i n democratic
soc i e t i es .
19. Dobson and Payne, op.cit., pp.188-90; The Sydney Morning Herald,
20. Paul W i l k i n s o n , ' T e r r o r i s m , t h e Mass Media and Democracy',
12 May 1984.
Contemporary Review, J u l y 1981, p.35.
- 1 2 -
Internat'ional Terrori s m
I t i s well understood by democratic states t h a t the best way t o contain terrorism i s through concerted international agreement and co-operation. Hence the seven nations attending the London Economic Summit in June 1984 issued a declaration s u p p o r t i n g the strengthening of existing anti-terrorist measures and the development o f 'effective
new ones', including closer co-operation between the various national security forces i n the exchange of intelligence, the review o f weapons sales t o nations s u p p o r t i n g terrorism, and the expulsion o f known
t e r r o r i s t s . This merely supplements earlier anti-terrorist measures contained i n the Declarations of the previous summits i n Bonn (1978), Venice (1980) and Ottawa (1981).
However, a l t h o u g h there i s general agreement on the need for international co-operation t o el iminate terrori sm, achieving such co- operation has proved t o be a n almost insurmountable problem. Attempts t o get an international accord on terrorism passed through the United
Nations have invariably foundered over d i f f i c u l t i e s of definition, with many Third World nations equating political terrorism with self- determination, and the reluctance of nations t o give u p t h e i r r i g h t t o g r a n t asyl um t o those who commi t politically motivated offences.[Zl] Moreover, even those nations t h a t wish t o obtain a n anti-terrorism
convention frequently d i f f e r on t h e methods t o be used i n combating terrorism. In the 1970s a number of European democracies adopted a ' s o f t ' approach towards terrorism and chose n o t t o enforce their laws against t e r r o r i s t s f o r f e a r of p r o v o k i n g a n incident aimed a t
themselves. Such abdication of legal responsibility merely compounded the threat posed by political terrorism t o these same democratic
societies. The d i f f i c u l t i e s i n obtaining co-operative a c t i o n from among even those democratic nations which were agreed on the need t o combat terrorism, was a g a i n revealed by the 1984 London Economic Summit. According t o news reports the European and Japanese members were extremely cautious o f even discussing the possibility of t a k i n g specific measures against terrorism as suggested by the United States. As a r e s u l t , the advocacy of 'active defence' measures by US Secretary of State George Schultz was n o t reflected i n the f i n a l communique on terrori sm.[22]
The great difficulty i n achieving an effective international response t o the problem o f pol i tical terrori s m has generated feel i ngs of frustration, and a sense of impotence, among some politicians i n democratic nations. These feelings are heightened by the apparent
inability of democratic states t o respond effectively t o the threat of terrorism, as revealed by the ineffectiveness of United States'
21. The Canberra Times, 21 December 1983; P a u l W i l k i n s o n , 'Terrorism: International Dimensions' , Conflict Studies, No. 113, November
22. The Sydney Morning Herald, 26 June 1984. 1979, p.15.
- 13 -
International Terrorism
response t o b o t h the seizure of i t s diplomats in Teheran as political hostages i n 1979 and 1980, and to the recent hijacking of TWA Flight 847 by the Islamic Jihad t e r r o r i s t group t o Lebanon. I n these
circumstances the view t h a t nations threatened by political terrorism have a right t o engage i n pre-emptive attacks o n known t e r r o r i s t s has gained currency i n some quarters. Secretary of State George Shultz was perhaps m a k i n g a n oblique reference t o such a p o s s i b i l i t y when he
said:
Can we as a country - can the community o f free nations -
stand in a solely defensive posture and absorb the blows
dealt by t e r r o r i s t s ? I t h i n k n o t . From a practical
s t a n d p o i n t , a purely passive defence does not provide enough of a deterrent t o terrorism and the States t h a t sponsor i t .
I t is time t o t h i n k long, h a r d , and seriously about more
active means of defence - a b o u t defence through appropriate preventive o r pre-emptive actions against terrori s t groups before they strike.[23J
Over the past year M r Schultz has emerged as a strong advocate o f the use of military retaliation against terrorists. I n an address t o the
University of Hawaii's East-West Center i n mid J u l y 1985 he reiterated his view t h a t international terrorism poses a most serious threat t o
democratic s t a t e s and continued:
W e [the Western democracies) must realise t h a t we are under a continuing attack. W e must cooperate t o deter and punish b o t h the t e r r o r i s t s and those who support them and offer them safe haven. E241
The p o s s i b i l i t y of democratic s t a t e s t a k i n g extra-legal
action i n response t o political terrorism was more clearly spelt out by Lord C h a l f o n t when he chaired the Second Conference on
International Terrorism hosted by the Jonathan Institute i n Washington i n June 1984. I n his closing remarks Lord Chalfont made the following observations:
I f our i n t e l l igence s e r v i c e s d e t e c t preparations for a
t e r r o r i s t attack on our countries, or on our embassies, or on our citizens, the most draconian a c t i o n should be taken t o
prevent t h a t t a k i n g place.
If t h a t means clandestine operations t o eliminate the
t e r r o r i s t s before they can k i l l us, then they should not be
ruled out. And i f a t e r r o r i s t attack can be prevented then
those who sponsor i t , or shelter i t s perpetrators will n o t be
23. The Sydney Morning Herald, 26 June 1984. 24. The Age, 19 J U l Y 1985.
- 14 -
I n t e r n a t i o n a l T e r r o r i srn
immune from a t e r r i b l e r e t r i b u t i o n . If t h a t poses problems
of i n t e r n a t i o n a l l a w o r problems of t h e s a n c t i t y of t h e
borders o f i n t e r n a t i o n a l States, t h e n these a r e circumstances
w i t h which I have l e s s o f a problem t h a n I have w i t h t h e
s p e c t a c l e o f a busload o f m u t i l a t e d c h i l d r e n o r an unarmed
woman p o l i c e o f f i c e r d y i n g i n a pool o f blood i n a London
s t r e e t .[25]
The U n i t e d States i n e a r l y 1984 c a r r i e d o u t an e x t e n s i v e
r e v i e w o f i t s a n t i - t e r r o r i s m p o l i c y which i n v o l v e d d i s c u s s i o n of such
e x t r a - l e g a l a c t i o n s as t h e a u t h o r i s a t i o n of ' h i t squads' t o
a s s a s s i n a t e known t e r r o r i s t s . I n t h e e v e n t t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s
pol icymakers r e j e c t e d these suggestions, a1 though p r o v i s i o n was made f o r t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s t o l a u n c h m i l i t a r y a t t a c k s a g a i n s t t e r r o r i s t
camps and bases i n c e r t a i n u n s p e c i f i e d instances.CZ61 However,
d e s p i t e t h i s pol i c y d e c i s i o n , t h e Washin ton Post r e p o r t e d on 12 May
1985 t h a t t h e Central I n t e l l i g e n c e - * h a d gency h i r e d a Lebanese
t e r r o r i s t group t o a c t a s i t s c o u n t e r - t e r r o r i s t i n s t r u m e n t , and t h a t
t h i s group had been r e s p o n s i b l e f o r a c a r bomb which k i l l e d 80 people
and wounded 200 i n B e i r u t i n March 1985.[27] Although t h e U n i t e d
S t a t e s Government emphasi sed t h a t t h i s i n c i d e n t was n o t a u t h o r i sed by i t s e l f , s e n i o r members o f t h e A d m i n i s t r a t i o n , a n i m a t e d b y t h e
i n a b i l i t y of t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s t o s p e e d i l y r e s o l v e t h e TWA h i j a c k i n g
c r i s i s, have n o t d i scounted t h e p o s s i b l e use of unorthodox measures
such as kidnapping t e r r o r i s t 1 eaders i n deal i n g w i t h terrorism.CZ8)
I n 1 a t e June 1985 President Reagan appointed h i s V i c e - p r e s i d e n t ,
George Bush, t o head a n e w l y - c o n s t i t u t e d U n i t e d S t a t e s a n t i - t e r r o r i s t
t a s k f o r c e . A t t h e same t i m e , t h e U n i t e d States House Foreign A f f a i r s
Committee adopted a B i l l aimed a t improving s e c u r i t y a t f o r e i g n
a i r p o r t s which would a l l o w t h e American P r e s i d e n t t o suspend f o r e i g n
a i d and m i l i t a r y e x p o r t s t o n a t i o n s who r e f u s e r e q u e s t s t o b r i n g t h e i r
a i r p o r t i n s t a l l a t i o n s up t o U n i t e d States' s e c u r i t y standards.[29]
I n these circumstances i t c o u l d be argued t h a t t h e r e i s a
danger t h a t democratic s t a t e s might o v e r r e a c t t o t h e t h r e a t posed b y
p o l i t i c a l t e r r o r i s m and thus, i n a d v e r t e n t l y , b r i n g about t h e v e r y
c o n d i t i o n s w h i c h t h e t e r r o r i s t s a r e t r y i n g t o a c h i e v e ( s o f a r
u n s u c c e s s f u l l y ) by t h e i r a c t i v i t i e s . I n t h i s c o n t e x t it i s i m p o r t a n t
t o n o t e t h a t t o d a t e t h e a c t u a l p h y s i c a l damage caused by t e r r o r i s t s
has n o t been great. O f t h e estimated 1019 i n c i d e n t s o f i n t e r n a t i o n a l
t e r r o r i s m between 1968 and 1977, c a s u a l t i e s occurred i n o n l y 303
i n c i d e n t s , w i t h most l i v e s l o s t i n a small number o f p l a n e crashes and
major a s s a u l t s .
25 26. 27. 28. 29.
The A u s t r a l i a n , 29 June 1984. The Wall S t r e e t Journal, 12 Marc
The Canberra Times, 26 May 1985. e, 1 2 J u l y f'985; The Age,
9 The ge, 26 June 1985. :h 1984. 15 J u l y 1985.
- 15 -
I n t e r n a t i o n a l T e r r o r i sm
T h i s i s n o t t o deny t h a t p o l i t i c a l t e r r o r i s m generates a
c o n s i d e r a b l e amount o f fear because i t i s b e l i e v e d t o be a t h r e a t n o t
o n l y t o i n d i v i d u a l l i f e and p r o p e r t y b u t t o t h e v e r y e x i s t e n c e o f t h e
democratic S t a t e system i t s e l f . However, it can be argued t h a t
p o l i t i c a l t e r r o r i s m p e r se need n o t pose a s i g n i f i c a n t t h r e a t t o t h e
e x i s t e n c e of democratic s t a t e s , and t h a t i t i s t h e o v e r r e a c t i o n of
t h e s e democratic s t a t e s t o t h e perceived t e r r o r i s t t h r e a t , i n t h e form
o f u n n e c e s s a r i l y s t r i n g e n t c o u n t e r - t e r r o r i s t measures, t h a t c o u l d pose
a g r e a t e r t h r e a t t o democratic freedoms and i n s t i t u t i o n s .
Most Western democracies have i n t r o d u c e d some form o f s p e c i a l l e g i s l a t i o n i n o r d e r t o deal w i t h increased l e v e l s o f t e r r o r i s m a t t h e
domestic l e v e l . While t h e r e might be a temporary need f o r such
l e g i s l a t i o n , i t has been argued t h a t such l e g i s l a t i o n should b e
c a r e f u l l y monitored i n o r d e r t o ensure t h a t it does n o t u n n e c e s s a r i l y
i n f r i n g e t h e c i v i l r i g h t s of t h e s t a t e ' s c i t i z e n s n o r be used t o
suppress 1 e g i t i m a t e p o l i t i c a l d i ssent. The h i s t o r y o f t h e U n i t e d
Kingdom's s p e c i a l l e g i s l a t i o n , t h e Prevention o f T e r r o r i s m (Temporary
P r o v i s i o n s Act 1974 and 1976, suggests t h a t t h e r e a r e grounds f o r
___1A_ concern. c c o r d i n g t o o f f i c i a l Home O f f i c e f i g u r e s a t o t a l o f 4834 persons were a r r e s t e d under t h e p r o v i s i o n s o f t h i s Act between November 1974 and June 1980, and almost n i n e t y p e r cent o f these were r e 1 eased w i t h o u t b e i ng charged o r havi ng an excl u s i on o r d e r made a g a i n s t them. These f i g u r e s would suggest t h a t t h e r e may be some substance t o t h e a l l e g a t i o n s made by such groups as t h e N a t i o n a l Council f o r C i v i l L i b e r t i e s t h a t t h e p o l i c e a r e using t h e i r powers under t h i s Act t o engage i n ' f i s h i n g e x p e d i t i o n s ' f o r i n t e l l i g e n c e g a t h e r i n g and t o harass those groups h o l d i n g ' o b j e c t i o n a b l e ' p o l i t i c a l views.[30] I n 1983 L o r d J e l l i c o e c o m p l e t e d a r e v i e w o f t h i s l e g i s l a t i o n i n which he argued t h a t t h e r u l e o f l a w must be s t r i c t l y upheld i n t h e face o f t e r r o r i s t attempts t o undermine it. This i n v o l v e d ensuring t h a t re1 evant safeguards were b u i 1 t i n t o a n t i - t e r r o r i s t l e g i s l a t i o n . Therefore he recommended t h a t t h e e x i s t i n g l e g i s l a t i o n be r e p l a c e d by a new Act which would have a f i v e - y e a r l i m i t and be s u b j e c t t o annual review.[31] A f r e q u e n t response t o t h e increased i n c i d e n c e o f t e r r o r i s m i s t h e expansion o f t h e a c t i v i t i e s of t h e S t a t e ' s s e c u r i t y s e r v i c e s and t h e c r e a t i o n o f groups w i t h s p e c i a l a n t i - t e r r o r i s t e x p e r t i s e , such as t h e B r i t i s h Special A i r Service (SAS) and t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s ' D e l t a Force. Although such a development might be considered necessary i n a s i t u a t i o n o f e s c a l a t i n g t e r r o r i s t violence, such as i n Northern I r e l a n d , i t a l s o represents a p o t e n t i a l t h r e a t t o t h e c i v i l l i b e r t i e s of t h e s t a t e ' s p o p u l a t i o n . The p o s s i b i l i t y t h a t s e c u r i t y o r g a n i s a t i o n s may use t h e i r increased powers t o i n h i b i t t h e expression o f 1 e g i t i m a t e p o l i t i c a l d i s s e n t cannot be d i scounted. 30. Wardlaw, o . c i t , p.129. 31. The Econo*9 February 1983.
- 16 -
I n t e r n a t i o n a l T e r r o r i s m
A dramatic example o f t h e tendency towards o v e r r e a c t i o n b y
S t a t e s e c u r i t y s e r v i c e s and o f t h e t h i n l i n e which d i v i d e s counter-
t e r r o r i s t f r o m e x p l i c i t l y t e r r o r i s t a c t i v i t i e s was t h e a l l e g e d
involvement o f t h e French secret service, t h e DGSE ( D i r e c t i o n Generale De S e c u r i t e E x t e r i e u r e ) , i n t h e bombing o f t h e e c o l o g i s t o r g a n i s a t i o n
Greenpeace's vessel, t h e Rainbow Warrior, i n Auckland harbour on 10 J u l y 1985. Despite c o n t i n u i n g argument as t o who ordered t h e
o p e r a t i o n , t h e r e i s l i t t l e doubt t h a t those i n v o l v e d i n i t , i n c l u d i n g
t h e couple a r r e s t e d by t h e New Zealand p o l i c e , a r e a l l members o f t h e
DGSE. Even t h e o f f i c i a l i n v e s t i g a t i o n conducted by Bernard T r i c o t a t
t h e behest o f President M i t t e r r a n d , whi 1 e denying DGSE i nvol vement i n t h e a f f a i r , d i d i d e n t i f y t h e s i x people i m p l i c a t e d i n t h e bombing as
DGSE agents. Indeed, t h e DGSE (and i t s predecessor t h e SDECE) has i n
t h e p a s t been i nvol ved i n numerous scandal s i n c l u d i ng pol i t i c a l
kidnapping (such as t h a t o f t h e Moroccan o p p o s i t i o n l e a d e r Ben Barka
i n 1965), and i s a1 leged t o have been i n v o l v e d i n h e r o i n smuggling,
and i n an attempt t o d i s c r e d i t a former French President (Georges
Pompidou). The 'Rainbow W a r r i o r ' a f f a i r r a i s e s serious questions
about t h e degree o f c o n t r o l which a democratic S t a t e should e x e r c i s e
over i t s s e c u r i t y services, and t h e l e g i t i m a c y o f j u s t i f y i n g a c t i o n s
a s b e i n g i n t h e ' n a t i o n a l i n t e r e s t ' which i n v o l v e murder and t h e
v i o l a t i o n o f t h e s o v e r e i g n t y o f a f r i e n d l y democratic state. I n f a c t
some commentators i n France have a l r e a d y made a judgement on t h i s
m a t t e r when t h e y denounced t h e bombing o f t h e 'Rainbow W a r r i o r ' as an e x e r c i s e i n S t a t e t e r r o r i s m . The New Zealand Prime M i n i s t e r , M r David
Lange, d i smi ssed t h e T r i c o t r e p o r t a s ' u t t e r l y i n c r e d i b l e' , and
r e i t e r a t e d h i s b e l i e f of French o f f i c i a l involvement i n t h e a f f a i r .
I n t h e c o u r s e o f e x p r e s s i n g h i s Government's o u t r a g e o v e r t h e
i n c i d e n t , M r Lange made t h e f o l l o w i n g observations:
The f a c t i s t h a t we had operators o f French Government
i n t e l l i g e n c e agencies i n New Zealand f o r some t i m e and
spending a t a conspicuous l e v e l . The French Government, o f
course, i s i nvol ved.
I t i s t o t a l l y u n a c c e p t a b l e t h a t a Government s h o u l d
a u t h o r i s e , a t t h e h i g h e s t l e v e l s , such c l a n d e s t i n e i l l e g a l
a c t i v i t i e s i n t h e t e r r i t o r y o f a f r i e n d l y country.[32]
32. The A u s t r a l i a n , 24-25 August 1985; The Guardi 1985: The Svdnev Mornina Herald. 21 Ausust " " - -9 T i meS -29 AUgUS e A u s t r a l i a n , 2
Aae. 28 ?uaust 198: l ? ~ ~ ' A u ~ ~ r a l i an. 28 A uqus
The A u s t r a l i a n , 24-25 August 1985; The Guar 1985; The Sydney Morning Herald, 21 -9 Times 23 -29 August 1985; Th e A u s t r a l i a n , 27 A u g u s t 7 9 8 b - 'Th e
&, 28 August 1985; The A u s t r a l i a n , 28 A ugust 1985. a
7
t
n Week 985: Augus 1985.
,ugust i onal -
- 17 -
I n t e r n a t i o n a l T e r r o r i sin
THE AUSTRALIAN SITUATION
Although A u s t r a l i a has not, so f a r , been g r e a t l y i n f l u e n c e d by
i n t e r n a t i o n a l t e r r o r i s m , it c o u l d be a f f e c t e d , a t some f u t u r e date, b y
t h e developments which have been o u t l i n e d i n t h e e a r l i e r s e c t i o n s o f
t h i s paper. I n r e c o g n i t i o n o f t h i s p o t e n t i a l , t h e A u s t r a l i a n
Government h a s g i v e n g r e a t e r a t t e n t i o n t o t h e q u e s t i o n o f
i n t e r n a t i o n a l p o l i t i c a l t e r r o r i s m over t h e l a s t few years, and has
voiced i t s d i s q u i e t a t t h e r e c e n t upsurge i n such t e r r o r i s m . I n t h e
course o f a statement issued i n l a t e June which denounced t h e TWA
h i j a c k i n g and appealed f o r t h e r e l e a s e o f t h e hostages, t h e M i n i s t e r
f o r F o r e i g n A f f a i r s , M r Hayden, made t h e f o l l o w i n g o b s e r v a t i o n s :
Governments a r e now a l l t o o f r e q u e n t l y f o r c e d by t e r r o r i s t
a c t s t o make c r u c i a l d e c i s i o n s i n v o l v i n g t h e l i v e s o f t h e i r
c i t i z e n s h e l d c a p t i v e o r threatened by t e r r o r i s t s .
To g i v e
way t o t e r r o r i s t demands, however, o n l y encourages f u r t h e r
a c t s o f t e r r o r i s m and undermines t h e f a b r i c of i n t e r n a t i o n a l
r e l a t i o n s . The use o f t e r r o r i s m a g a i n s t innocent c i v i l i a n s
must n o t b e p e r m i t t e d t o become an a c c e p t e d norm i n
i n t e r n a t i o n a l r e l a t i o n s and negotiations.C331
The f i r s t annual r e p o r t o f t h e A u s t r a l i a n S e c u r i t y
I n t e l l i g e n c e O r g a n i s a t i o n ( A S I O ) , which was p u b l i s h e d i n May 1984,
p r o v i d e s t h e f i r s t c l e a r i n d i c a t i o n from o f f i c i a l sources o f t h e
e x t e n t o f t h e p o t e n t i a l t e r r o r i s t t h r e a t t o A u s t r a l i a . Although t h e
r e p o r t g e n e r a l l y considered t h e t h r e a t from t e r r o r i s t groups t o be
low, it d i d r e v e a l t h a t A u s t r a l i a should no l o n g e r be seen as b e i n g
immune f r o m t h e i n f l u e n c e o f overseas t e r r o r i s t groups, n o t a b l y t h o s e
f r o m t h e Middle East. There i s a very r e a l danger t h a t A u s t r a l i a
might become an arena f o r t e r r o r i s t a t t a c k s r e l a t e d t o overseas
p o l i t i c a l d i s p u t e s i n which A u s t r a l i a has no d i r e c t involvement. T h i s
has a l r e a d y begun t o occur on a small scale. AS10 noted i n i t s r e p o r t
t h a t t h o s e groups l i k e l y t o employ v i o l e n c e i n p u r s u i t o f t h e i r
p o l i t i c a l aims i n c l u d e d ' P a l e s t i n i a n and Armenian t e r r o r i s t groups'
and Yugoslav s e p a r a t i s t s ( f o r example, t h e C r o a t i a n Brotherhood)
AS10 b e l i e v e s t h a t , o f these, t h e major t h r e a t i s posed by ' s u p p o r t e r s
o f Armenian t e r r o r i s m i n A u s t r a l i a ' . I n December 1980 t h e J u s t i c e
Commandos o f t h e Armenian Genocide were b e l i e v e d t o have been
r e s p o n s i b l e f o r t h e murder o f t h e T u r k i s h Consul-General i n Sydney.
Moreover, AS10 b e l i e v e s t h a t ' v i o l e n c e - p r o n e elements i n t h e pro-
P a l e s t i n i a n community' were responsi b l e f o r t h e bombi ngs o f t h e
I s r a e l i Consul ate-General and Hakoah C1 ub i n Sydney i n December 1982. [ 341
33. M i n i s t e r of Foreign A f f a i r s , News Release No. M 1 1 1 , 28 June 1985. 34. A u s t r a l i a n S e c u r i t y I n t e l 1 i g e n c e O r g a n i s a t i o n , Annual. R e p o r t
1982-83, 1984, p.17.
- 18 -
I n t e r n a t i o n a l Terrorism
The a c t i v i t i e s o f Yugoslav s e p a r a t i s t s , e s p e c i a l l y t h e a n t i -
communi s t Croatian Brotherhood, have compl i c a t e d A u s t r a l i a ' s re1 a t i o n s w i t h Yugoslavia over t h e past few decades. The C r o a t i o n Brotherhood, according t o news r e p o r t s , i s dedicated t o t h e overthrow o f t h e
Yugoslav Government, and i n 1978 several people a l l e g e d t o be members
o f t h e group were a r r e s t e d and charged w i t h conspiracy. I n t h e
f o l l o w i n g year, 1979, Croatian t e r r o r i s t s were a l l e g e d t o be i n v o l v e d
i n a s e r i e s o f bomb a t t a c k s and assassination p l o t s i n Sydney.[35]
Successive A u s t r a l i a n Governments have blamed t h e h i s t o r i c animosity between Croats and Serbs as t h e reason f o r t h i s t e r r o r i s t a c t i v i t y ,
although members o f t h e Croatian community c l a i m t h a t t h e i r animus i s
a g a i n s t t h e communist S t a t e o f Yugoslavia r a t h e r than t h e Serbs.
Whatever t h e reason, t h e Yugosl av Government continues t o take a
s e r i o u s view o f such a c t i v i t i e s . During a v i s i t t o Yugoslavia i n
August 1984, M r Hayden, t h e A u s t r a l i a n Foreign M i n i s t e r , received a
complaint from t h e Yugoslav a u t h o r i t i e s t o t h e e f f e c t t h a t h i s
Government was ' n o t [being] s t e r n enough i n c u r b i n g emigre a c t i v i t i e s
a g a i n s t t h e Yugoslav Communi s t system' .[361
The A u s t r a l i a n Government has responded c a u t i o u s l y t o t h e
p o t e n t i a l t h r e a t from t e r r o r i s m . I n t h e wake
o f t h e H i l t o n bombing
t h e A u s t r a l i a n Government appointed M r J u s t i c e Hope t o conduct a
P r o t e c t i v e S e c u r i t y Review which he completed i n e a r l y 1979. I n t h i s
r e p o r t M r J u s t i c e Hope recommended against t h e p r o v i s i o n o f increased p o l i c e powers t o combat t e r r o r i s m on t h e grounds t h a t t h e e x i s t i n g
powers were adequate. This recommendation perhaps a1 so r e f 1 ected M r J u s t i c e Hope's awareness o f t h e t h r e a t t o c i v i l . l i b e r t i e s posed by
draconian c o u n t e r - t e r r o r i s t l e g i s l a t i o n . As he s t a t e d i n h i s r e p o r t :
I n some o t h e r overseas c o u n t r i e s i n which t e r r o r i s m i s a more
p r e s s i n g problem than i n A u s t r a l i a , s t r o n g measures have been used t o counter t h e problem. Many o f these measures a r e
r e s t r i c t i v e o f o r a n t i p a t h e t i c t o c i v i l l i b e r t i e s . They
i n c l u d e new means o f s u r v e i l 1 ance o f c i t i z e n s , r e s t r i c t i o n s
on access t o l a w y e r s , a b o l i t i o n o f t r i a l b y j u r y and
employment b a r r i e r s on suspected t e r r o r i s t sympathi sers.[371
A1 though t h e A u s t r a l i a n Government has enacted no domestic l e g i s l a t i o n s p e c i f i c a l l y d e s i g n e d
t o c o u n t e r t e r r o r i s m , i t d i d
promulgate t h e Crimes (Foreign I n c u r s i o n s and Recruitment) Act i n
1978, which i s designed t o prevent t h e r e c r u i t m e n t and t r a i n i n g of
mercenaries and/or t e r r o r i s t s i n Austral i a f o r operations against
f o r e i g n governments. This Act has most r e c e n t l y been invoked i n t h e
case o f an A u s t r a l i a n , M r Gary Scott, who has been accused of t r a i n i n g
OPM (Free Papua Movement) i r r e g u l a r s i n t h e i r i ndependence s t r u g g l e
__ - ~~ ~-
35. The Sydney Morning Herald, 12 May 1984. 36. Reuter's, 14 August 1984. 37. m a , Par1 iament, P r o t e c t i v e S e c u r i t y Review Report, 1979,
pp.46-7.
- 19 -
I n t e r n a t i o n a l Terrorism
against Indonesia. According t o
M r J u s t i c e Hope, i n h i s 1977 Report
on S e c u r i t y and I n t e l l igence, t h e A u s t r a l i a n Government has t h e power under t h e e x t e r n a l a f f a i r s power contained i n s e c t i o n 5 l ( x x i x ) of t h e
A u s t r a l i a n C o n s t i t u t i o n t o i n v e s t i g a t e and d e a l w i t h t e r r o r i s m
d i r e c t e d a g a i n s t a i r c r a f t and a g a i n s t d i p l o m a t i c and consular premises and persons.[38] Legal a c t i o n against t e r r o r i s m can a l s o be t a k e n
under t h e r e l e v a n t s e c t i o n s o f t h e Commonwealth Crimes Act
1914,
e s p e c i a l l y P a r t I 1 d e a l i n g w i t h offences against t h e Government (which i n c l u d e s e c t i o n s on treachery, sabotage, unlawful military d r i l l i n g ,
s e d i t i o u s i n t e n t i o n , and i n t e r f e r e n c e w i t h p o l i t i c a l l i b e r t y ) , and
P a r t I I A d e a l i n g w i t h unlawful associations. The emergency powers
l e g i s l a t i o n o f c e r t a i n States a l s o c o n t a i n s sections which c o u l d be
used t o counter t e r r o r i s m , n o t a b l y Queens1 and's S t a t e Counter-Disaster O r g a n i z a t i o n Act 1975-1978 ( s e c t i o n 6(d)) and t h e Northern T e r r i t o r y ' s D i s a s t e r Act 1982 ( s e c t i o n 4 ) .
The A u s t r a l i a n Government has a1 s o t a k e n c e r t a i n
a d m i n i s t r a t i v e measures t o counter any p o t e n t i a l t e r r o r i s t i n c i d e n t .
A Special Inter-Departmental Cornmi t t e e on P r o t e c t i o n Against Violence (SIDC-PAV) has been s e t up by t h e Commonwealth Government under t h e chairmanship o f t h e Special M i n i s t e r o f State, w i t h t h e f u n c t i o n o f
p r o v i d i n g contingency planning and c o - o r d i n a t i o n o f p o l i c y r e g a r d i n g
c o u n t e r - t e r r o r i s t a c t i v i t i e s . I n 1976 t h e Federal Government a1 so
c r e a t e d a P r o t e c t i v e Services Co-ordination Centre (PSCC). This body has t h e dual f u n c t i o n o f p r o t e c t i n g p u b l i c f i g u r e s , i n c l u d i n g f o r e i g n
d i g n i t a r i e s , who a r e considered p o t e n t i a l kidnap o r a s s a s s i n a t i o n
t a r g e t s , and p r e p a r i n g and c o - o r d i n a t i n g contingency arrangements f o r t h e p r e v e n t i o n and e l i m i n a t i o n o f t e r r o r i s t i n c i d e n t s . I n t h e wake of
t h e TWA h i j a c k i n g , t h e A u s t r a l i a n Government, i n mid J u l y 1985, began a major r e v i e w of c o u n t e r - t e r r o r i sm measures throughout A u s t r a l i a , and t h e Prime M i n i s t e r , M r Hawke, promised h i s c o u n t r y ' s complete co-
o p e r a t i o n i n any i n i t i a t i v e s t o counter i n t e r n a t i o n a l t e r r o r i s m .
A u s t r a l i a n Governments have, on t h e whole, shown themselves s e n s i t i v e t o t h e need t o ensure t h a t t h e o p e r a t i o n s o f t h e s e c u r i t y
s e r v i c e s do n o t unnecessarily encroach on t h e proper f u n c t i o n i n g o f a
democratic society. The problem was most r e c e n t l y summed up by t h e
t h e n Attorney-General, Senator Gareth Evans, i n a speech t o t h e
V i c t o r i a n Council o f C i v i l L i b e r t i e s i n May 1984. Senator Evans made
t h e f o l l o w i n g p o i n t :
The n a t u r e o f t h r e a t s t o s e c u r i t y , and hence t o freedom, i s
such t h a t t h e means necessary t o combat those t h r e a t s can,
unless p r o p e r l y c o n t r o l l e d , present t h e i r own t h r e a t - i n
some ways more serious - t o c i v i l ' l i b e r t i e s . I f freedom i s
38. Royal Commission on I n t e l l igence and Security, F o u r t h Report, v o l . 1, p.62.
- 20 -
International Terrorism
the goal t o which security i s directed, then the means have t o be organised in such a way t h a t they don't overtake the
end .[39]
I n the same speech Senator Evans emphasised t h a t ASIO's functions i n counter-terrorist a c t i v i t i e s must be s t r i c t l y 1 imited t o matters of intelligence, with a clear demarcation between i t s role and the
operational role of the Federal and State police forces. The former Attorney-General (Senator Evans) has stressed the need t o strengthen the system of ASIO's accountability t o the Government which would, i n t e r a l i a , a l l o w for better mechanisms for p a r l iamentary scrutiny
such as the creation of a Joint Parliamentary Committee on National Security. Earlier i n the same year the Australian Labor Party had
already made the suggestion i n i t s submission t o the Hope Royal Commission t h a t a Joint Parl iamentary Committee on National Security be established.l40] A l t h o u g h M r Justice Hope concluded t h a t such a parl iamentary committee was neither necessary nor appropriate, the
Government f i n a l l y decided t h a t i t met a real need. As M r Hawke stated i n Parl iament i n 1 ate May 1985:
The Government.. . believes a further improvement [ i n the accountability of the security services] can be obtained by directly involving the Parliament - on b o t h sides a n d in both Houses - i n imposing the discipline o f a n external scrutiny
o f the intell igence and security agencies quite independent of the Executive. While the Government has been conscious a l s o o f t h e need t o protect i n t e l l i g e n c e a n d s e c u r i t y
information, i t believes t h a t appropriate arrangements can be made t o ensure t h a t a small b u t informed parliamentary
committee w o u l d operate e f f e c t i v e l y i n t h e public
i n t erest. [ 41 1
The Liberal and National Parties opposed the creation of such a
committee and the then Leader of the Opposition, M r Peacock, strongly criticised the idea i n Parl iament. However, the Opposition parties d i d agree t o serve o n such a committee i f ' a n d when i t was
establ i shed.[42]
39.
40.
41. 42.
National Security and Civil Liberties , address by the Attorney- General , Senator the Hon. Gareth Evans, Q . C . , t o the Annual
General Mee-ting o f the V i c t o r i a n Council for Civil Liberties, Melbourne. 17 Mav 1984. Australia; Labor Party, Submission t o the Royal Commission on Australia's Security and Intelligence Agencies, I-ebruary Im
D.7. Lustral i a , House of Representa.ti ves , Debates, 22 May 1985. Leader of the Opposition, Press R e m 22 May 1985; The
Canberra Times, 23 May 1985.
- 21 -
I n t e r n a t i o n a l Terrorism
D e s p i t e such i n d i c a t i o n s o f o f f i c i a l concern, t h e r e have been
instances where t h e A u s t r a l i a n s e c u r i t y s e r v i c e s ' c o u n t e r - t e r r o r 1 s t
o p e r a t i o n s have come c l o s e t o i n f r i n g i n g c i v i l l i b e r t i e s . I n October
1983 t h e A u s t r a l i a n Secret I n t e l l igence Service (ASIS) conducted a
s e c r e t a n t i - t e r r o r i s t e x e r c i s e i n t h e Sheraton H o t e l , Melbourne, i n
t h e course o f which t h e h o t e l manager was threatened by armed and
masked s e c r e t s e r v i c e t r a i n e e s . T h i s i n c i d e n t was t h e s u b j e c t o f a
Royal Commission i n q u i r y which c r i t i c i s e d t h e planning and s u p e r v i s i o n o f t h e e x e r c i s e and recommended, i n t e r a l i a , t h a t such exercises i n
p u b l i c places should o b t a i n p r i o r p o l i c e clearance and t h a t :
no e x e r c i s e should be conducted by A S I S which would harm o r
alarm members o f t h e p u b l i c , and A S I S t r a i n e e s should be so
i n s t r u c t e d 4 4 3 1
As a r e s u l t o f t h e Sheraton Hotel i n c i d e n t t h e Federal Government,
f o l l o w i n g t h e recommendations made by M r J u s t i c e Hope i n h i s r e p o r t on A u s t r a l i a ' s S e c u r i t y and I n t e l l igence Agencies, has decided t h a t ASIS
should n o t h o l d weapons nor should i t m a i n t a i n a c a p a b i l i t y f o r
s p e c i a l o p e r a t i o n s o r s p e c i a l p o l i t i c a l action.[44] S i m i l a r a n t i -
t e r r o r i s t exercises conducted b y t h e Special A i r Service (SAS) on o i l
r i g s i n t h e Bass S t r a i t were t h e s u b j e c t o f complaints by t h e
Amalgamated Metals Foundry and Shipwrights Union and t h e E l e c t r i c a l Trades Union i n t h e course o f 1984. Again, i n e a r l y May 1985, a
f u r t h e r SAS a n t i - t e r r o r i s t e x e r c i s e conducted i n t h e Sydney suburb of
Balmain was t h e s u b j e c t of some controversy when several members of t h e p u b l i c , i n c l u d i n g a Federal Labor M.P., M r Baldwin, became
i n a d v e r t e n t l y involved. M r Baldwin subsequently wrote a l e t t e r o f
p r o t e s t t o t h e M i n i s t e r o f Defence, M r Beazley, i n which he voiced h i s
d i s q u i e t concerning t h e methods used by t h e SAS members i n v o l v e d i n
t h e exercise.[45]
It can be argued t h a t such cases emphasise t h e n e c e s s i t y o f
t h e democratic s t a t e t o ensure t h e s t r i c t a c c o u n t a b i l i t y o f i t s
s e c u r i t y organisations. As M r J u s t i c e White s t a t e d i n h i s r e p o r t t o
t h e South A u s t r a l i a n Government on Speci a1 Branch S e c u r i t y Reco'rds :
The p r i c e o f some s e c u r i t y measures might w e l l be t o o high.
When p e r i p h e r a l s e c u r i t y risks have been d r i v e n o u t by t h e
over-zeal ous s e c u r i t y measures, t h e second s t a t e o f t h e
n a t i o n may be worse than i t s f i r s t . [ 4 6 ]
43. Royal Commission on A u s t r a l i a ' s S e c u r i t y and I n t e l l i g e n c e
Agencies, Report on t h e Sheraton Hotel I n c i d e n t , February 1984, p.69. 44. A u s t r a l i a , House o f Representatives, Debates, 22 May 1985. 45 The A e, 9 May 1985. 46: d b e r r a Times, 1 7 February 1984.
- 2 2 -
International Terrori
CONCLUSION
This paper has addressed the issues raised by the renewed ipteres: Df Western governments i n the phenomenon o f internat'onal terror's: an3 the threat which i t i s believed t o pose t o Itlestern iie7:ocra:ic
societies. Despite a h i g h level o f concern, however, no generally
accepted definition of w h a t constitutes terrori s;n has ,onerged, and many of the definitions which have been attempted are n o t free o f
ambiguity. This problem of definition i s o f coLirse directly related t o the fact that terrorism i s , i n r e a l i t y , a coyglex political
phenomenon which embraces a multiplicity o f aims a n d fonis o f action. Such a complex issue a n d i t s concomitant definitional problens carry serious i m p 1 ications for the attempts by idestern goverrxnents t~ formulate effective counter pol icies. Perhaps the m s t fundanent21
problem which terrorism poses f o r the \Jestern democracies j s the need t o balance t h e i r response t o a perceived threat t o the golitical
institutions o f their respective societies or t o the safety o f the'r
citizens w i t h the preservation of the i n d i v i d u a l arid collective r i g h t s
o f the citizens o f the societies thus threatened.
October 1985
Current Issues Briefs recently publ ished by the Legis1 a t i v e Research Service
1985
No. 1 Brown, G . , ' A Short Guide t o Nuclear Weapons a n d Warfare
- Termi no1 ogy ' . No. 2 Beyer, M. , 'The World Sugar Market and Prospects f o r a New No. 3 Marker, ' I n d u s t r i a l R o b o t s i n A u s t r a l i a : A n International Sugar Agreement' Introduction . No. 4 Makinda, S., 'The Coup i n Sudan: Internal and International Imp1 i cat i ons ' No. 5 Angley, J , , 'The New S o u t h Wales Doctors' Dispute'. No. 6 Fraser, D . , 'Television and the S a t e l l i t e : the story so f a r ' . 1985-86 No. 1 Angley, J . , 'Identification Cards: the major issues'. No. 2 Fraser, D . , 'Television and the S a t e l l i t e : 11. The Current Issues' No. 3 Leigh, M., 'Brunei Darussalam: the price of consent', No. 4 F O X , CJ., 'Australia's External Debt'. I f you wi sh t o receive copies of any o f the above publ ications p l ease contact the Publications Officer, Department o f the Parliamentary Library, Kurrajong Annex, Barton ACT 2600, or phone 72 7551.
