Note: Where available, the PDF/Word icon below is provided to view the complete and fully formatted document
 Download Full Day's HansardDownload Full Day's Hansard    View Or Save XMLView/Save XML

Previous Fragment    Next Fragment
Tuesday, 7 December 1965


Mr SNEDDEN (Bruce) (AttorneyGeneral) . - by leave - I move -

1.   In sub-clause (1.), omit ", or within such further time as the Commissioner, within that period, allows ".

2.   In sub-clause (3.), omit ", or within such further time as the Commissioner, within that period, allows ".

3.   At the end of the clause add the following sub-clause - " (8.) A person referred to in sub-section (4.) of this section may, before the expiration of the time within which, apart from this sub-section, the particulars are required to be furnished, apply in writing to the Commissioner for an extension of that time and, where such an application is made, the time within which the particulars are required to be furnished shall not be taken to expire -

(a)   whether or not the application is granted - before the expiration of fourteen days after the date on which the Commissioner informs the applicant in writing of his decision on the application; or

(b)   if the application is granted - before the expiration of the period of the extension granted by the Commissioner.".

The first amendment proposes to delete the words " or within such further time as the Commissioner, within that period, allows". In the Bill as it stood clause 42(1.) would enable more time to be given to people to register agreements. This is now to be achieved in a different way. The provision will appear as sub-clause (8.). The first and second amendments are consequential upon the third amendment which inserts new subclause (8.). The new sub-clause will provide a much improved method of handling this particular problem. As the Bill reads at present there are 30 days in which an agreement is to be registered, but the Commissioner may, within that period, allow a further period of time in which to register. Representations were made that the Commissioner would not have time to deal with all applications within 30 days. It was suggested that there should be an amendment to enable the Commissioner to grant an extension of time provided the application for the extension was made within 30 days. This had much merit, but it did not appeal to the Government because it would inevitably have meant that after the 30 days a person who had not registered would be in breach of the Act but that by an extension given at a later time the Commissioner would, in effect, be pardoning an offence that had been committed. For this reason the Government decided that the best way to handle the matter was to provide that the liability to register would not materialise, provided the party applied within the 30 day period for an extension, until the Commissioner gave his reply. Let me put it more obviously. Let us suppose there was an agreement which should be registered within 30 days. For some reason the party seeks an extension of time and applies for it on the 20th day. The obligation to register is held in suspense, so to speak, until the Commissioner gives his decision. If the Commissioner gives his decision on the 40th day then the obligation to register does not materialise until 14 days after the Commissioner refused the application or, alternatively, until such greater time as the Commissioner has allowed expires.

Amendments agreed to.

Clause, as amended, agreed to.

Clause 43. (3.) The penalty for an offence against this section is a fine not exceeding One thousand pounds. (4.) It is a defence to a prosecution for an offence against this section if the person charged satisfies the Court that -

(a)   he did not, within the time allowed for the furnishing of the particulars, advert to the question whether particulars of the agreement, variation or determination were required by any law to be furnished to the Commissioner, and that his failure to advert to that question was not attributable to a desire to avoid, or to indifference to, his obligations;

(b)   he reasonably relied on another party, or on a trade association of which he was a member, to ensure that the required particulars were duly furnished; or

(c)   he believed in good faith that particulars of the agreement, variation or determination furnished to the Commissioner by him within the time allowed complied with the requirements of the law, and that either the particulars, or the necessary further or amended particulars, were duly furnished (except as regards time) by himself or another party before the institution of the prosecution or he did not know or suspect, before the institution of the prosecution, that there had been default in compliance with the requirements of any law with respect to the furnishing to the Commissioner of particulars of the agreement, variation or determination.







Suggest corrections