(1)   Can a complete and comprehensive description be provided of what will be blocked under the mandatory Internet filter.

(2)   Can the Australian Communications and Media Authority (ACMA) provide guidance on whether the following commercially-offered movie download services comply with the requirements of the Broadcasting Services Act 1992:

(a)   Foxtel download service (MA 15+);

(b)   TIVO Blockbuster download service; and

(c)   Bigpond Movies (MA 15+, R 18+, RC).

(3)  

(a)   Can ACMA provide details of what approved age verification services that comply with the Broadcasting Services Act 1992 exist and have been registered; and

(b)   do they rely on credit cards; if so, how are they affected by people being able to get a credit card when under the age of 18.

(4)   Can the Minister or Enex TestLab provide a complete and comprehensive description of how the filters were implemented for the trial, given that the report did not mention this matter.

(5)   What other countries have a similar policy in place to that being proposed in Australia where it is mandatory:

(a)   for an Internet Service Provider (ISP) to filter content; and

(b)   for ISP customer’s to have their Internet service filtered.

(6)   Which of the listed countries in (5) above filter more than child abuse material as being proposed in Australia.

(7)   When will the names of the vendor technologies that participated in the trial be made public; if not, how can ISPs know which technologies ‘worked’ and which ones to implement.

(8)   Will the ISPs be required to obtain spare filters in case their current ones fail and/or become irreparable; if so, who will pay for these.

(9)  

(a)   Can details be provided of the maximum cost ISPs will be permitted to pass onto customers, with the rest of the costs absorbed by the ISP; and

(b)   will this be a lump sum figure, or a percentage.

(10)   What will be the cost to taxpayers of the policy:

(a)   in the first year of implementation; and

(b)   for the first 10 years.

(11)   Given that such an expensive and intrusive policy should have clear goals and objectives and that the Minister has stated that the policy ‘may reduce accidental exposure’ to Refused Classification (RC) content, can figures be provided on how much reduced exposure the policy intends to achieve.

(12)   (a)   What is the Minister’s acceptable over-blocking rate; and

(b)   is, for example, a 1 per cent over-blocking rate, that is, 10 000 incorrect blocks in a million, acceptable.

(13)   If the systems result in what the Minister would define as unacceptable over-blocking, what will be the Minister’s next course of action.

(14)   Given that the report of the trial notes that ‘It has been suggested by some stakeholders that 10,000 URLs may be a tipping point’:

(a)   does the department ever expect the blacklist to exceed this number of Uniform Resource Locators (URLs); if so, will further tests be conducted to test the censorware capabilities of filtering more than 10 000 URLs; and

(b)   will the blacklist be restricted to under 10 000 URLs as a result of the knowledge from the trial.

(15)  

   (a)   Do any of the proposed filters log usage data; if so, will any of these be operational in any ISPs; and

   (b)   will there be any safeguards to protect the privacy of users.

(16)   Will measures be put in place to prevent high traffic sites from being blacklisted.

(17)   (a)   Does the Minister expect high traffic sites such as YouTube, to take down content deemed RC, while being completely legal to view almost anywhere in the world; if not, what measures will be put in place to prevent access to RC content which happens to be hosted on a high traffic site.

(18)   What is the definition of a high traffic site for the purposes of the censorware tests.

(19)   Will the system deal with individual web pages, or will entire web sites be blocked.

(20)   (a)   Will filtering also apply to businesses and homes without children; if so, can the Minister explain the discrepancy between the document released 5 days prior to the election, which said that filters only apply to computers accessible to children.

(21)   Will web site owners be allowed to seek compensation for incorrect blocks which directly affected their income; if so, how will this occur.

(22)   What evidence does the department have on the frequency and occurrence that people (and children) are inadvertently exposed to RC content.

(23)   Aside from the trial, what industry engagement was pursued as part of the Minister’s ‘evidence-based approach’.

(24)   Will ACMA or another government body continue classifying prohibited content (MA 15+ to RC), in addition to the proposed system.

(25)   As the Government has noted that URLs from ‘overseas agencies’ will be added to the blacklist, http://www.dbcde.gov.au/online safety and security/cybersafety_plan/internet_service_provider_ isp_filtering,

(a)   have these agencies previously agreed to this;

(b)   which agencies does this include; and

(c)   will the URLs obtained from these agencies be classified by the Classification Board.

(26)   Are the proposed censorware systems inconsistent with the Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act 1979, whereby it is currently illegal for an ISP to intercept user requests; if so, is the Minister pursuing amendments to the Act to allow the censorware to legally intercept and block access to content.

(27)  

   (a)   Does the Minister have any evidence on the lifespan of the proposed filters, given the ongoing improvements in network technologies; and

   (b)   will the filters, for example, have to be replaced every few years to cope with increasing data flowing through an ISP network as a result of faster broadband connections, and subsequently, more data processed by the filters.

(28)   What assistance will be provided to ISPs that have little knowledge of how to install filtering technologies within their networks.

(29)   Will all of the URLs on the ACMA prohibited blacklist be submitted to the Classification Board to determine whether the content is RC.

(30)   What is the period of time in which the Classification Board will be required to resolve a particular complaint.

(31)   What is the current typical cost of an ACMA investigation into a URL that is reported as potential prohibited or prohibited content where the content:

(a)   is referred to the Classification Board; and

(b)   is not referred to the Classification Board.

(32)   Is legal advice obtained in relation to complaints outsourced; if so, what is a typical fee for this advice.

(33)   How many URLs have currently been rated RC by the Classification Board.

(34)   Can a full breakdown of the current ACMA blacklist be provided using the same subcategories as reported in the published online complaint statistics on the ACMA web site, including:         MA 15+ - Violence;         MA 15+-Sex;         MA 15+ - Themes;         MA 15+-Drug Use;         MA 15+ - Nudity;         MA 15+-Language;         R 18+ - Violence;         R 18+-Sex;         R 18+-Themes;         R 18+-Drug Use;         R 18+ - Nudity;         R 18+-Language;         X 18+ - Actual sexual activity;         RC - Crime - promotion/instruction;         RC - Violence - depiction;         RC - Paedophilia - promotion/instruction;         RC - Child - depiction;         RC - Bestiality - depiction;         RC - Sexual violence - depiction;         RC - Sexual fetish - depiction;         RC - Sexual fantasy - depiction;         RC - Drug use - promotion/instruction;         RC - Terrorist material;         RC - Publication;         Cat 1 - Publication; and         Cat 2 - Publication.

(35)   What number of URLs in the category ‘RC - Child - depiction’ are on the ACMA blacklist because:

(a)   they describe or depict in a way that is likely to cause offence to a reasonable adult, a person who is, or appears to be, a child under 18 (whether the person is engaged in sexual activity or not); as per section 3, item 1(c) of the National Classification Code; and

(b)   they describe or depict child abuse or child sexual abuse.

(36)   How many URLs on the ACMA blacklist are related to computer games that are rated RC.

(1)   The Government has announced that it will require all ISPs to block identified Refused Classification material which is hosted overseas on the Refused Classification Content list.         The Refused Classification Content list will comprise overseas-hosted URLs that are the subject of a complaint to the Australian Communications and Media Authority and found to be Refused Classification. The Refused Classification Content list will also incorporate lists of URLs of child abuse material obtained from highly reputable overseas agencies.         A full description of the Refused Classification definition is found with reference to the Classification (Publications, Films and Computer Games) Act 1995 (the Act), the Code and the relevant guidelines in combination.         With regard to Refused Classification material, the National Classification Code provides that material would be classified Refused Classification if it:

   The Classification Guidelines set out further criteria for classifying material as Refused Classification. In addition, section 9A of the Act provides that material that advocates the doing of a terrorist act must be classified Refused Classification.

   *  Under the Government’s ISP filtering policy the approach to filtering online computer games will be developed following the outcomes of the Minister for Home Affairs consultations on whether there should be an R18+ category for computer games. Computer games will be excluded from the Refused Classification content list until this process is complete.

   (2)   (a), (b) and (c) The Australian Communications and Media Authority can investigate complaints about online content suspected to be prohibited content under the Broadcasting Services Act 1992 but cannot otherwise provide advice about whether a particular item of content is prohibited content. Investigations conducted under the Broadcasting Services Act 1992 consider specific items of content, rather than entire services. If an item is prohibited content as defined by clause 20 of Schedule 7 to the Broadcasting Services Act 1992, the Australian Communications and Media Authority must give the content host a take-down notice, directing the host to take steps to ensure it does not host the prohibited content.

   Under clause 20(1)(a) of Schedule 7 to the Broadcasting Services Act 1992, content that is classified Refused Classification or X18+ will be prohibited content.

   Under clause 20(1)(b) of Schedule 7 to the Broadcasting Services Act 1992, content that is classified R18+ will be prohibited content if it is not subject to a restricted access system that meets the requirements of Part 3 of Restricted Access System Declaration 2007.

   Under clause 20(1)(c) of Schedule 7 to the Broadcasting Services Act 1992, content that is classified MA15+, not in the form of text and still images, provided on payment of a fee as part of a commercial enterprise, and not subject to a restricted access system which complies with Part 2 of Restricted Access System Declaration 2007, will be prohibited content.

   (3)   Neither the Broadcasting Services Act 1992 or the Restricted Access Systems Declaration 2007 provide a mechanism whereby an ‘age verification service’ is required to be registered.

   The Restricted Access Systems Declaration 2007 sets out minimum requirements for access-control systems that provide access to age restricted content. The applicable requirements differ dependent on whether the content that the applicant is accessing is classified MA15+ or R18+. The Australian Communications and Media Authority is able to consider whether an access-control system complies with the declaration only in the context of an investigation under Schedule 7 to the Broadcasting Services Act 1992.

   For R18+ content, an access-control system must:

   The risk analysis of the kind of proof of age to be submitted must identify and assess any risk that evidence of age submitted to the access-control system - such as a credit card - could be held or used by a person other than the person it purports to identify, or, a person who is younger than the age which the form of evidence attributes to the person being identified.

   The quality assurance measures for an R18+ access-control system require the access-control system to remove, without delay, an applicant’s access to R18+ content if it is determined that the applicant is not at least 18 years of age.

   To date, the Australian Communications and Media Authority has not found that online content which has been classified R18+ was prohibited content due to deficiencies in the proof of age required by the access-control system.

   (4)   The filters were implemented by each participating ISP and their chosen filter vendor. Enex TestLab was not involved in the procurement, provisioning or administration of the filters. Where this information was provided to the Department of Broadband, Communications and the Digital Economy, this was done so on a confidential basis.

   (5)   (a) and (b) In Italy, filtering of a blacklist of child sexual abuse websites is mandated by a legislative amendment which came into force in March 2006 and a Ministerial decree signed in January 2007. It applies to all ISPs.

   On 29 March 2010 the European Commission announced that Member States will be obliged to ensure that access to websites containing child pornography can be blocked.

   In Belgium, it is reported that new gaming laws (yet to be approved by the Senate) will require ISPs to block illegal gaming sites listed on a blacklist maintained by the Belgian Gaming Commission.

   In addition, filtering technologies have been implemented on a voluntary basis in a number of other democratic countries, including Canada, Finland, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom and the United States.

   During consultations on the implementation of ISP-level filtering in Australia, a number of ISPs, including Telstra, have indicated their belief that filtering should be implemented on a mandatory basis through the implementation of legislation.

   (6)   See response to 2583 (5).

   It is reported that Belgian ISPs will be required to block illegal gambling sites.

   The Italian National Centre against Child Pornography, within the Ministry of Communications, distributes a blacklist of child sexual abuse websites to ISPs. In addition, a blacklist of betting and gambling websites is provided by the Autonomous Administration of State Monopolies.

   (7)   A wide range of internet content filtering technologies have been available commercially from filter suppliers for many years.

   Although the filtering technologies have been anonymised in Enex TestLab’s ISP filtering report, the filtering technologies are described in detail. ISPs may compare filtering solutions offered by filter vendors with the descriptions outlined in the report if they wish.

   The vendors of the filtering technologies can advertise that their products were utilised during the pilot if they wish. At least one vendor has done so to date.

   In order to meet their mandatory ISP filtering obligations, ISPs will be able to choose a technology that suits their particular circumstances.

   (8)   See response to 2578 (1).

   (9)   (a) and (b) It is not the Government’s intention for ISPs to pass on costs to customers. Introduction of filtering by ISPs in other western democracies has been achieved without imposing additional costs on to customers and there is no reason why Australian ISPs cannot do the same.

   (10) (a and b) The Government allocated $125.8 million for its cyber-safety package in the 2008-09 Budget. Forward estimates beyond 2011-12 are not included in this figure and at this stage have not been forecast beyond 2013-14.

   The new measures announced by the Government to enhance its existing cyber-safety program over the financial years 2009-10 to 2013-14 are all funded from within the existing cyber-safety funding.

   The breakdown of funding for ISP filtering (Administered and Departmental) is as follows: