Government Response to the Report on Australian Wool Innovation Limited Application and Expenditure of Funds Advanced under the Statutory Funding Agreement dated 31 December 2000

Introduction

Following questioning at Senate Estimates Committee on 26 May 2003, this issue was referred to the Senate Rural and Regional Affairs and Transport Legislation Committee.

The Australian Government Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry, along with the Australian Wool Innovation Limited (the Company), WoolProducers, a former director of the Company and the former managing director appeared before the Committee. The Department also provided a significant amount of material to assist the Committee's deliberations.

The Minister for Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry (the Minister) and the Company extended the original Statutory Funding Agreement (SFA) on two occasions. Firstly, it was extended in December 2003 for three months to allow time for the Committee to report and it was again extended in March 2004 to allow time for the Government to consider its response to the Committee's report.

Below is the Government's response to the Report on Australian Wool Innovation Limited Application and Expenditure of Funds under the Statutory Funding Agreement (the report).

Recommendation 1.

The Committee recommended that:

The question whether AWI used company money to campaign for sitting directors during the 2002 Board election, in breach of Corporations Law, should be referred to the Australian Securities and Investments Commission.

Government Response:

Agreed. The Minister will write to the Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC) providing a copy of the report and drawing to ASIC's attention the views of the Senate Committee.

Recommendation 2.

The Committee recommended that:

The Statutory Funding Agreement should have a condition that all the company's expenditure (not only the expenditure of `the Funds') should be controlled by the Statutory Funding Agreement.

Government Response:

Not agreed. The Government accepts that the SFA should cover all expenditure from the Funds (those being statutory levies and Commonwealth matching payments) and that this should be extended to monies derived from the Funds. The Government will refine the definition of Funds in future agreements accordingly. However, the Government does not consider that the SFA should cover expenditure from funds that the Company obtains from other industry sources.

Recommendation 3

The Committee recommended that:

The Minister should direct AFFA to pursue compliance and other reports pursuant to all Statutory Funding Agreements.

Government Response:

Agreed. The Minister wrote to the Secretary of the Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry asking that he ensure that all the obligations of Statutory Funding Agreements are being enforced.

Recommendation 4.

The Committee recommended that:

The Minister should give consideration to referring any breaches of the Corporations Act by AWI to the Australian Securities and Investments Commission.

Government Response:

Agreed. See response to Recommendation 1.

Recommendation 5.

The Committee recommended that:

Prior to a new SFA being agreed with AWI the Minister should review the effectiveness of remedies for breaches of the agreement currently available through the Wool Services Privatisation Act 2000.

Government Response:

Agreed. The Minister obtained advice from the Australian Government Solicitor (AGS) on this issue and revised the SFA accordingly. AGS has advised that the revised draft SFA “contains the remedies exercisable by the Commonwealth that we would expect to see in an agreement of this nature”.

Recommendation 6.

The Committee recommended that:

The definition of `agri-political activity' should be amended to explicitly include internal as well as external political activity.

Government Response:

Agreed. The Government will amend future agreements accordingly.

Recommendation 7.

The Committee recommended that:

The SFA should incorporate a requirement mandating that expenditure be consistent with the strategic plan, the operational plan and the R&D Guidelines.

Agreed.

Recommendation 8.

The Committee recommended that:

The Minister should give consideration to incorporating conditions in existing and future Statutory Funding Agreements as suggested by recommendations 2, 6, 7 and other relevant suggestions in this report.

Government Response:

Agreed on the basis of the Government's response to Recommendations 2, 6 and 7. The Government will, of course, consider other relevant suggestions in the report as appropriate.

Senate Committee Report Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade References Committee Bali 2002—Security threats to Australians in South East Asia

Government Response

General Response to the Report:

The increased threat of global terrorism since 11 September 2001 has changed the international security environment for all Australians. Given this environment, the Government continues to attach the highest priority to the provision of accurate and properly assessed travel advice about potential safety and security-related risks. Travel advice enables the millions of Australians who journey overseas each year to make their own informed decisions about travel. It is incumbent upon Government to ensure that the advice remains credible in the public mind and is not blunted by a perception that risk is being overstated. To this end, the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT), together with the Australian Intelligence Community, will continue to review the way in which assessed threats are presented and disseminated to the Australian traveller. Elements of the report prepared by the Senate Committee inquiry into security threats to Australians in South East Asia will prove a useful reference point in assisting in this process.

The Government notes the Committee's conclusion that `there was no clear warning in the form of specific intelligence which, if identified and acted upon, would have provided an opportunity to prevent the Bali bombings or to act to protect those there at the time'. The Government also endorses the Committee's finding that the Bali disaster was not `a result of some culpable lapse by Australian Government agencies or individual officials'.

The Government also welcomes the finding that `anyone reading the travel advice, even just the headline summary ... would understand that there was a generic terrorist risk, that bombs had exploded in the past, including where tourists gathered, and that further explosions may be attempted'.

As the Committee notes, none of the statements by the Government in the month leading up to the attacks reflected information about Bali or any prior knowledge of a terrorist attack on bars or nightclubs. If the Government had had such information, it would have acted to prevent the attacks.

It is important to note that the Committee has put to rest claims that relevant information had been made available to the Government, or that threat advice was ignored. As the Committee says, “these reports and allegations were either simply erroneous or lacked foundation, or were highly contestable opinions”.

While the Committee comments that the specific reference to Bali may have inadvertently reinforced what it describes as a prevailing, erroneous view that Bali was a safe haven, it also acknowledges the clarity of hindsight in coming to this judgment.

The Government reiterates that the factual statement in the travel advice that “tourist services are operating normally elsewhere in Indonesia, including in Bali” was included as a response to a very common question asked by Australian travellers when they saw that civil unrest and violent demonstrations were taking place in other parts of Indonesia. It was not intended to detract from the first sentence of the travel advice highlighting the risk of terrorism throughout Indonesia.

Recommendation 1

The Committee recommends that, with a view to ensuring the country's future arrangements between intelligence assessments, threat assessments and travel advisories are optimal, consideration should be given to the establishment of an independent commission of inquiry with specific terms of reference to address these and related matters.

The Government does not support the establishment of an independent commission of inquiry to consider the relationship between intelligence assessments, threat assessments and travel advisories. The Committee's report has already acknowledged that `in its travel advisories DFAT employed the relevant level of warning and language that corresponded to the threat being conveyed by the intelligence agencies' at the time of the Bali bombings.

Government Senators on the Committee have already noted that they could not fathom how, `given the extensive evidence canvassed in the Report', it could be asserted that the travel advice (at the time of the bombings) could be considered inadequate.

A further commission of inquiry would either duplicate work already done or replicate the functions of existing Senate processes. Questions about intelligence before the Bali bombings were addressed in the Blick Inquiry and questions concerning the travel advice have been thoroughly reviewed by the Senate inquiry.

As the Committee acknowledges, the Government has worked, since Bali, to strengthen even further its arrangements for the production and dissemination of travel advice. Shortly after the Bali bombings, at Mr Downer's initiative, the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) took steps to strengthen its consultative arrangements with ASIO, which produces threat assessments, to provide additional assurance that intelligence information is fully integrated into our public advice.

Flowing from this initiative, the arrangements that now exist between DFAT and ASIO for the declassification of intelligence material for use in the preparation of travel advice are well integrated. A number of substantial enhancements have been put in place, including:

Recommendation 2

The Committee recommends that the government, in consultation with the travel industry further develop and oversee a code of practice which would, among other things, make it mandatory for travel agents/advisers to provide to overseas travellers, at the time a booking is made, a copy of both DFAT's Travel Advice for the destination concerned and ASIO's threat assessment for the country itself. Travellers must be advised to consult the DFAT Travel Advice 24 hours prior to their departure.

The Government acknowledges the importance of ensuring that travel advice is widely disseminated to Australian travellers. The Government does not, however, support mandatory obligations on travel agents nor can the Government agree to the public release of classified ASIO threat assessments. These threat assessments are already fully reflected in the travel advice, which constitutes an unclassified report on security-related threats in overseas destinations.

As part of the Government's efforts to encourage industry promotion of travel advisories, the Minister for Foreign Affairs and the Australian Federation of Travel Agents (AFTA) launched the Charter for Safe Travel on 11 June 2003. The Charter meets the objectives intended in the Committee's recommendation without the cost and increased resources required by a legislative approach and mandatory obligations. Market survey work conducted as part of the smartraveller campaign shows that approximately 90 per cent of travel agents already claim to encourage their customers to access government travel advisories.

Under the voluntary Charter, travel agents recognise their shared commitment with the Government to assist Australians overseas to travel safely. While it is the responsibility of the individual traveller to prepare adequately for overseas travel, travel agents who join the Charter recognise the invaluable part they can play to assist this preparation. As part of their service to their clients and to the Australian public, they commit to:

The Charter currently has more than 1,600 members and the Government remains focused on heightening the Charter profile and increasing its membership. In July 2003, the Australian Federation of Travel Agents (AFTA) made partnership with the Charter a requirement of AFTA accreditation, which will see all members of AFTA (currently 2,223) joining the Charter by the end of 2005. The Government has made it a priority to work closely with AFTA in order to spread awareness of travel advisories and safe travel messages. This includes regular editorial contributions to the AFTA Traveller magazine and active participation in the AFTA General Conference.

Since the launch of smartraveller, DFAT officers have participated in sixteen holiday and travel expos in capital cities across Australia to work with industry to promote travel advisories. DFAT staff have also provided training to a large number of travel agents in Sydney and Melbourne, as well as 100 branch managers from the Student Travel Association (STA), about travel advice.

In May 2004 the Government established the smartraveller Consultative Group, comprising DFAT and travel industry representatives, to provide a forum for advancing the aims of the Charter, enable the travel industry to offer suggestions on improving the presentation, format and clarity of travel advice, and strengthen the reach of key smartraveller messages.

Of course, the Government does not rely solely on the travel industry to disseminate travel advice. Through the $9.7 million smartraveller campaign, travel advice is brought to the public's attention through print media, television, and the internet. The travel advice is available through the internet, an automated telephone service and via smartraveller kiosks located at Australian international airports and passport offices. Market survey work indicates that 70 per cent of Australians intend to consult the Government's advice prior to travel. The Government now receives on average 160,000 hits a week on the smartraveller website and 46,000 Australians are enrolled to receive travel advice updates by email subscription.

Travel advice is kept current and, where the situation at a destination is fluid, frequently updated. While viewing the travel advice 24 hours before departure is a useful measure, Australian travellers are encouraged to subscribe to the travel advice on the internet and to register their presence overseas through the on-line registration process. In this way, significant changes to travel advice can be brought to the attention of Australian travellers.

Recommendation 3

The Committee recommends that DFAT subject a representative selection of its Travel Advice to examination by an independent assessor with qualifications and experience in linguistics, literacy and communication. The assessor shall report to the minister on the intelligibility and accessibility of the language in which information is conveyed in travel advisories.

The Government recognises the importance of using plain language and a readily comprehensible system of grading of risk in different locations in its travel advice. DFAT routinely reviews the presentation, format and general approach to travel advice on a regular basis, particularly given the Government's concern to ensure that the advice remains credible in the public mind. In response to feedback from the travelling public and the travel industry, DFAT is implementing a range of changes to travel advisories. In particular, the travel advice is being made clearer through the introduction of new sub-headings to differentiate safety and security threats, putting them in plain English and introducing other textual changes. For lower risk countries, DFAT is adjusting language to make it clearer that the behaviour being recommended equates to that which is practised in Australia.

This is an ongoing process of reform which will include in its next phase consultation with linguistics and communication experts with a view to improving the intelligibility and accessibility of travel advice language.

Recommendation 4

The Committee recommends that

The Government does not support this recommendation. The Government has concluded that financial and other assistance should continue to be considered on a case by case basis, focusing on specific needs, such as that which has been provided by the Government to date for the survivors of the Bali tragedy.

The Government is sympathetic to the suffering of the Bali victims and their families and provides a wide range of ongoing assistance to meet the health care and other needs of those affected by the Bali tragedy rather than a general lump sum assistance scheme. The Government was responsive to the immediate needs of victims and families and provided substantial assistance, including with the cost of airfares and accommodation for people travelling to Bali as a result of the attack or who needed to travel within Australia to provide support to loved ones in hospital as well as assisting with the cost of funerals. In addition, the Government donated $1 million to the Australian Red Cross Bali Appeal, which was launched in October 2002 to assist Australians directly affected by the Bali bombings and, through the Indonesian Red Cross (PMI), to assist the Balinese people in their disaster recovery and preparedness.

The government has also provided a range of other financial assistance and ongoing support to those affected including meeting medical and other costs associated with injuries that are not otherwise covered by Medicare and private health insurance, such as for counselling and rehabilitation, and assisting with the costs of travel and accommodation and providing support to those attending the first anniversary commemorations in Bali and Canberra. The government will continue to monitor the needs of those affected by the tragedy and to provide ongoing assistance, such as emergency financial assistance and personal support, to those affected through a network of family liaison officers.

Government Response to the Report of the Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade

`Watching Brief on the War on Terrorism'

The Government thanks the Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade for its inquiry into and report on the preparedness of Australian, state and territory governments and agencies to respond to and manage the consequences of a terrorist attack in Australia. The Government's response to the report's five recommendations is outlined below.

Recommendation 1: The Committee recommends that the Government review the rationale for emergency response equipment allocations to the States and Territories under the National Counter Terrorism Agreement, taking into account the relatively more significant requirements of the larger jurisdictions.

Response: Agree in part.

Under the Agreement on Australia's National Counter-Terrorism Arrangements signed on 24 October 2002, all jurisdictions recognise their joint responsibility in contributing to the development and maintenance of a nation-wide capability to counter terrorism. The nation-wide counter-terrorism capability is developed through utilisation of the policing and emergency management capability funded by the states and territories; and operational and policy capacity of relevant Australian Government agencies funded by the Commonwealth. This is supplemented by a special fund to maintain and develop the nation-wide counter-terrorism capability, provided and administered by the Australian Government on the basis of advice from the National Counter-Terrorism Committee (NCTC).

In addition, from time to time the Australian Government provides specific targeted funding allocations to address identified priority areas. For example, as part of the 2004-05 Budget, the Government announced a proposed cost-shared funding arrangement with the states and territories, up to the value of $30 million, for a package of emergency management measures focussing on urban search and rescue capability. The Government is currently working with the jurisdictions in developing this package.

Prior to the establishment of the NCTC, the Standing Advisory Committee on Commonwealth/State Cooperation for Protection Against Violence (SAC-PAV) administered funding to enhance counter-terrorism capabilities in jurisdictions. The essence of these earlier arrangements was `equity' in the provision of various training courses, exercises and equipment to ensure that all states and territories were being equally developed. However, some funding was also directed on a justifiable needs basis. For example, in the lead up to the Sydney 2000 Games, NSW Police received additional funding for exercises and equipment. This was the also case in the lead up to the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting in Queensland.

The NCTC has recognised a greater need to move from the previous `equity' model, to that of a `justifiable needs' model. The NCTC Constitution, Attachment D Statement of Financial Guidelines, states that the special fund is allocated by the Australian Government to `... provide a basic viable counter-terrorism capability, built upon extant state and territory capabilities, commensurate with the general level of risk to Australia.' This special fund is allocated `... where there is a justifiable and demonstrable need for expenditure. Parity in expenditure should only occur as a means to ensure the balancing of the nation-wide counter-terrorism capability.'

To underpin this change from an `equity' model to a `justifiable needs' model, the NCTC has embarked on a programme of defining the basic viable national counter-terrorism capability, from which the requirements for the various counter-terrorism capabilities can be measured in all jurisdictions. This will enable the NCTC to continue to assist states and territories to develop their counter-terrorism capabilities to the defined basic viable level.

Accordingly, the Government is reviewing capability requirements and defining minimum viable capabilities to provide a basis for funding allocation decisions. However, the aim will be to efficiently allocate resources across all jurisdictions to build a basic viable counter-terrorism capability, rather than to focus on particular additional requirements of the larger jurisdictions.

Recommendation 2: The Committee recommends that DOTARS should carry out a security risk assessment of Hobart airport to determine whether 24 hour surveillance capacity is required.

Response: Agree: all airport security risk assessments are subject to ongoing review.

The security risk assessment of individual airports, including Hobart Airport, is an ongoing iterative process, rather than a single event or activity. This process is conducted by the Office of Transport Security in the Department of Transport and Regional Services (DOTARS) in close consultation with the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation and the Attorney-General's Department to determine, amongst other things, the appropriate level of surveillance capacity required. In reviewing individual security risk assessments, existing threat levels in the aviation sector and the national counter-terrorism alert level are taken into consideration.

Recommendation 3: The Committee recommends that the National Counter Terrorism Committee ensure, by means of a National Agreement if necessary, the interoperability of communications for police and emergency services across Australia.

The Committee also recommends that EMA negotiate with the states to pursue memoranda of understanding with commercial broadcasters to provide emergency messages to the community similar to those being arranged with the ABC. The Committee urges the completion of memoranda of understanding as a matter of priority.

Response: Agree in part.

The Australian Government recognises that these are important issues and agrees to the intent of recommendation 3. Given their complex nature, however, the development of long-term solutions will require the coordination of a number of government agencies and departments, ongoing negotiation with the states and territories and with communications authorities such as the Australian Communications Authority and the Australian Broadcasting Authority.

To this end, the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet is currently working with a number of key government departments and agencies to consider a range of government communications issues, including communications interoperability and the broadcast of emergency messages, with a view to determining which agencies are best placed to develop and implement solutions. The states and territories are being closely consulted as part of this process to ensure their views are taken into account and that consistent approaches are adopted to issues which impact across jurisdictions.

Recommendation 4: The National Counter Terrorism Committee should assess and report on the arrangements put in place between state and territory authorities and the private owners of critical infrastructure within each jurisdiction to ensure the adoption of best practice security principles for infrastructure protection.

Response: Agree.

The Australian Government has been working closely with state and territory governments and with private sector owners of critical infrastructure to ensure that protective security arrangements are appropriate, consistent and accord with best practice. Draft National Guidelines for the Protection of Critical Infrastructure from Terrorism (the national guidelines) have been developed in consultation with these parties and are now at an advanced stage.

In December 2002, the NCTC finalised the Principles for a National Counter-Terrorism Strategy for Critical Infrastructure Protection (the principles document), which sets out the responsibilities of governments and government agencies in order to ensure consistency. The NCTC also commissioned the development of the national guidelines, which build upon the principles document, and on the cooperation between business and government on critical infrastructure issues.

This cooperation has been facilitated through the Trusted Information Sharing Network for Critical Infrastructure Protection (TISN), which brings together all levels of government, key security agencies, and industry representatives to exchange information and develop cooperative arrangements for protecting infrastructure under an all-hazards approach. Key priorities for the TISN include the identification of critical infrastructure, the identification and mitigation of risks and the promotion of best practice arrangements.

On 25 June 2004, the Council of Australian Governments (COAG) agreed that the draft national guidelines should be the subject of industry consultation. The consultation process included consideration of the national guidelines by the TISN and has now been completed.

It is intended that the information provided in the guidelines will be consistent in its approach with principles of good corporate governance, and with an emphasis on undertaking risk assessments and appropriate planning. The draft guidelines will not be prescriptive for the private operators and owners, but are intended to help businesses put in place appropriate protocols and security arrangements. Given that a large proportion of critical infrastructure is owned and operated by the private sector, it was important to ensure that these businesses provided input into the development of the national guidelines.

The national guidelines will shortly go to COAG for final endorsement, subject to which they will be distributed to the owners and operators of critical infrastructure and to the Australian, state, territory and local governments, which will work closely together to encourage the private sector to adopt them.

Recommendation 5: The committee recommends that the Department of Transport and Regional Services (DOTARS) should review the security arrangements in place at all airports subject to its regulation on a regular basis and report on them in DOTARS annual report.

Response: Agree in part.

DOTARS continuously assesses security arrangements at airports through a programme of compliance audits. DOTARS is reviewing its procedures for measuring aviation security performance in the DOTARS annual report in light of the Government's response to the recommendations in the 2003 Australian National Audit Office Report on Aviation Security. However, there would be risks associated with including information about aviation security arrangements in a publicly available document such as the department's annual report.

Government Response to Report 53 of the Joint Standing Committee on Treaties

The Government thanks the Committee for its consideration of the treaties tabled, and gives the following responses to the Committee's recommendations 7, 10 and 11:

Agreement on Medical Treatment for Temporary Visitors between the Government of Australia and the Government of the Kingdom of Norway

Recommendation 7

The Department of Health and Ageing is aware of the limitations on data collection and monitoring of medical treatment under the reciprocal health agreements. The Department will maintain consultations with the States and Territories with a view to improving data collection. Similarly, the Department will consult with Norway, and other countries covered by health agreements, on the monitoring of medical costs for Australians in those countries.

Convention on Highly Migratory Fish Stocks in the Western and Central Pacific Ocean

Recommendation 10

In international treaty negotiations dealing with risk, the Australian Government places emphasis on the need for science-based assessments of such risk. Where scientific evidence is insufficient or unavailable and there are serious threats involved, a precautionary approach may be appropriate. The Government is aware of the definitional and commercial uncertainty that can be associated with the term “precautionary approach” and notes the Committee's recommendation. Article 6 of the Convention (Application of the precautionary approach) recognizes this uncertainty and seeks to enunciate the procedures for application of the precautionary approach under the Convention (including by way of detailed reference to relevant sections of United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 (UNCLOS) and the Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of the United Nations

Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 relating to the Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks —UNFSA). This aims to place some discipline and rigour on the use of a precautionary approach under the Agreement.

Recommendation 11

The Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry, as the lead agency in the Preparatory Conference process for the Convention on the Conservation and Management of Highly Migratory Fish Stocks in the Western and Central Pacific Ocean acknowledges the benefits that members of the Commission being parties to the United Nations Fish Stocks Agreement offers to the effective management of stocks in the region. Consequently, within Regional Fisheries Management Organisations, the Department will broadly promote the comprehensive regime for the conservation and management of straddling and highly migratory fish stocks afforded by the United Nations Fish Stocks Agreement.

Government Response to Report 55 of the Joint Standing Committee on Treaties

The Government thanks the Committee for its consideration of the treaties tabled, and gives the following responses to the Committee's recommendations 3 and 6:

Double Taxation Agreements

Recommendation 3

The Government acknowledges the Committee's concern and its role in the treaty making process. The Government will make every effort to ensure that the Committee has due time to consider all treaty actions before relevant implementing legislation is introduced. The Government notes, however, that due to the national interest, this may not always be possible. It remains open for Parliament to delay considering such legislation until the Committee has reported.

In order to reduce the incidence of enabling legislation being introduced to Parliament before the conclusion of the Committee's review, the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet will write to portfolio Legislation Liaison Officers about treaty enabling legislation.

Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants (POPs)

Recommendation 6

The Government will ensure that consultation takes place with all State and Territory Governments and other stakeholders in relation to the development of a National Plan of Implementation and a National Action Plan dealing with unintentionally emitted POPs. These National Plans fulfil obligations under the Stockholm Convention. The Government will continue to undertake consultation throughout implementation of the Stockholm Convention, consistent with its approach in consideration of ratification.

Government Response to Report 60 of the Joint Standing Committee on Treaties

Dr Andrew Southcott MP

Chair

Joint Standing Committee on Treaties

Parliament House

CANBERRA ACT 2600

Dear Dr Southcott

I have received a copy of the Joint Standing Committee on Treaties' Report 60 for Treaties tabled on 2 March 2004 and would like to thank the Committee for their deliberations on Australia's withdrawal from the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD).

I accept the Committee's Recommendation 5 and propose to proceed with formally withdrawing from the Agreement Establishing the International Fund for Agricultural Development.

I would like to clarify my Department's position in response to Recommendation 4 which questions whether remarks in paragraph 5.65 of Report 60 were made by Departmental officials and whether this is the Department's approach to treaty making. At a meeting on 27 November 2003 with three IFAD staff who have Australian citizenship, Australian Embassy officials confirmed that the decision to withdraw had been made at Ministerial level. The IFAD staff were advised that this decision would be put to the JSCOT which would make its own conclusions and provide appropriate advice to the Government, and that Government would then make a decision as to how to respond to that advice.

Up to and during that meeting, there appeared to have been a continuing misunderstanding by IFAD staff that my decision to proceed with withdrawal was still under consideration.

Embassy staff confirmed that my decision had been made, but that there was still a treaty withdrawal process that had yet to take its course.

I trust this satisfies the Committee with regard to Recommendation 4 of Report 60.

Yours sincerely

Alexander Downer