(1) Can the Minister confirm the report in the Washington Post of 25 April 2003 that, nearly 3 weeks after the United States of America (US) forces reached Iraq's most important nuclear facility, the Bush Administration has yet to begin an assessment of whether tons of radioactive material there remain intact.

(2) Is the Minister aware that, before the war began, the vast Tuwaitha Nuclear Research Centre held 3 896 pounds of partially-enriched uranium, more than 94 tons of natural uranium and smaller quantities of caesium, cobalt and strontium, according to reports compiled through the 1990s by inspectors from the International Atomic Energy Agency.

(3) Is the Minister aware that this material would be immensely valuable on the international black market, the uranium being in a form suitable for further enrichment to `weapons grade', the core of a nuclear device.

(4) Is the Minister aware that these materials have been sought by terrorists seeking to build a so-called dirty bomb, which uses conventional explosives to scatter dangerous radioactive particles.

(5) Is it the case that the US Administration has no idea whether any of Tuwaitha's potentially deadly contents have been stolen, because it has not dispatched investigators to appraise the site.

(6) Is the Minister aware that, according to officials at the Pentagon and the US Central Command, Iraq's Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) 120 acre Tuwaitha facility, 11 miles south of Baghdad, lay unguarded for at least 4 days and that there is evidence that looters made their way through buildings at the facility.

(7) (a) What is the Minister's understanding of the role that the US Defense Department, other government agencies or US nuclear experts will have in assessing the Tuwaitha facility; and (b) when it is expected that this assessment will take place.

(8) Would such an inspection and assessment of any nuclear material that might be missing, including the breaking of tamper-proof seals on more than 409 barrels of radioactive material, be done in conjunction with the IAEA, as is required under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.

(9) Is the site now safeguarded by the US Administration's Central Command's Sensitive Site Exploitation Planning Team, as reported; if so, are Australian troops involved.

(10) Is the Government concerned at the comments by Mr Corey Hinderstein, Deputy Director of the Institute for Science and International Security, when told US nuclear experts had not yet been to Tuwaitha: `I would have hoped that they would try to assess as quickly as possible whether the site had been breached. If there is radiological material on the loose in Iraq, with the chance that it may be transferred across borders, it would be extremely important to know that [in order] to prevent it from crossing a border or being transferred to a terrorist or another state'.

(11) Given the concerns previously expressed by the Prime Minister about Iraq providing chemical, biological or nuclear material to terrorists, what representation has the Government made to the US Administration about this situation.

(1) CENTCOM announced on 16 May that a specially-trained, 11-strong US Army team would soon begin a detailed assessment of the Tuwaitha site.

(2) There is no need to confirm the details of publicly available documents.

(3) I am advised that the IAEA allowed Iraq to keep these materials because they considered that the material was unfit for use in nuclear weapons development without complex, costly and time-consuming enrichment.

(4) Radioactive sources may be used in a so-called dirty bomb. I am advised that the uranium compounds stored at Tuwaitha would not be capable of inflicting significant radiological damage if used in a radiological dispersion device.

(5) Refer to part (1).

(6) Yes.

(7) (a) and (b) The US Government has implemented and is overseeing a series of activities to locate and assess evidence of Iraq's Weapons of Mass Destruction programs. The specifics of the assessment program are a matter for the US administration.

(8) Australia favours the early reinstatement of the IAEA to resume its safeguards responsibilities at the Tuwaitha nuclear facility, in line with Iraq's Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty safeguards agreement.

(9) Arrangements for the security of sensitive sites are a matter for the US administration. The Australian Government does not comment on the exact location of its troops on deployment.

(10) The Government does not comment on speculative statements.

(11) The Government has discussed the situation at Tuwaitha with the United States, including our support for early reinstatement of the IAEA to resume its safeguards responsibilities.