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Wednesday, 1 November 2000
Page: 18865


Senator CHRIS EVANS (5:19 PM) —I rise to speak against that proposition. I will not speak at great length, but I think it is important to respond to that. The House has rejected the first amendment moved by the opposition to the Tobacco Advertising Prohibition Amendment Bill 2000, as I understand it, on the grounds of the following advice received from the Australian Government Solicitor:

There are significant risks that the High Court will regard those provisions as invalid, at least insofar as they prohibit an advertisement which promotes a tobacco manufacturer in the context of discussions on political matters.

I also understand from media reports that the Australian Democrats will not continue their support for the Labor amendment and will be voting with the government not to insist on the amendment.

I note also that the Australian Government Solicitor's opinion which was referred to has not been made available to the opposition. However, I would like to make three basic points. Firstly, the Labor amendment does not prohibit an advertisement which promotes a tobacco manufacturer in the context of discussions on political matters. It explicitly allows a tobacco manufacturer to place advertisements in their own name. The issue raised yesterday by the government was that perhaps the amendment might stop a group of manufacturers getting together and placing an advertisement together, and this possibility was taken into account by the further amendment made by the opposition. The sole difference between the government's position and the opposition's position is that our version requires the tobacco manufacturer to advertise in their own name. The government version allows third parties to advertise on behalf of the tobacco companies—that is, to display banners and other material to promote the name of the manufacturer in exchange for the sponsorship money received. The freedom to communicate by tobacco companies is not infringed by this limitation.

Secondly, advice provided by the shadow Attorney-General makes a relevant point about the application of the Lange High Court decision to this matter. He advises that the effect of the Senate amendment would require tobacco manufacturers to identify themselves in any publication or advertisement that comments on government or political matters. The freedom of political communication is not absolute. Legislation or executive action that constrains the way in which political communications are made is subject to a test of reasonableness. The test was identified by the High Court in the case of Lange as follows:

... if the law effectively burdens that freedom—

of communication—

is the law reasonably appropriate and adapted to serve a legitimate end the fulfilment of which is compatible with the maintenance of the constitutionally prescribed system of representative and responsible government—

The Senate amendment would arguably not be regarded as an unreasonable restriction on the way in which tobacco manufacturers make political comment. There is ample Commonwealth precedent for the requirement that organisations and individuals identify themselves with particular political communications. It is, for example, part of the fabric of the Commonwealth electoral law that parties and individuals who wish to make political comment are required to identify themselves in a prescribed way on each occasion that political communication is made. Such a requirement is entirely reasonable, as people have a legitimate right to know the source of information and comment on political matters. This information about the source of political comment is necessary in order to properly evaluate the contribution. For this reason, it is my view that the Senate amendment is an entirely reasonable restriction on the freedom of political communication.

The third issue on which I wish to comment is the government's claim that the legislation as a whole will be imperilled by the prospect of a challenge to section 9(1B). The act contains a detailed provision in section 4A to ensure the validity of each section of the act. This is expressly stated to apply to amendments adopted after the commencement of the act. Accordingly, even if a challenge were mounted to the Senate amendment and found to be partly or wholly invalid in relation to a particular advertisement, this clause means that no other section of the act would be impacted.

The opposition does not believe the government has made out a good case that the proposed amendment is legally defective. It certainly is not the case that if this section were challenged at some stage in the future it would impact on any other measure. I think if the government were genuine in its desire to end political sponsorships in the same way that all other sponsorships are now prohibited, it would have worked constructively with the opposition to redraft the relevant section to end this practice. The bottom line is that there was no political will on behalf of the government to end that practice, and it is unfortunate, therefore, that the bill will proceed without us successfully ending that sponsorship practice. As I say, I am concerned and disappointed that the Democrats have chosen to fold their cards, as it were, so quickly. But I accept that, unless Senator Allison has some more up-to-date information than what I have read in the press, we will not get their support to insist on the amendment.