Senator Woodley asked the Minister representing the Minister for Transport and Regional Services, upon notice, on 26 August 1999:

(1) How many screen fades or failures have occurred at Australian air traffic control towers during the implementation of the Australian Advanced Air Traffic System (TAAATS), dating from its commencement to the present date.

(2) (a) Where and on what dates did these screen fades or failures occur; (b) at what locations; and (c) what were the ramifications (for example, which planes from which airlines were required to go into holding patterns, change their landing plans et cetera).

(3) (a) Which air traffic control towers using TAAATS have been supplied with backup systems; and (b) which have not.

(4) Can an assurance be given that no further TAAATS sectors will be commissioned without backup systems immediately in place.

(5) Does the Government have any plans to sell or market the model for TAAATS system.

Senator Ian Macdonald (Regional Services, Territories and Local Government) —The Minister for Transport and Regional Services has provided the following answer to the honourable senator's question:

Airservices Australia has advised the following:

(1) There have been 10 screen-related failures or instances of reduced screen functionality in control towers since the start of TAAATS commissioning in August 1998.

(2) (a) and (b) These failures or reduced functionality occurred as follows:

Note (i) Occurred outside tower operating hours

(ii) Occurred during curfew hours

(c) All of these failures were short term and did not generate any safety incidents. Airservices advises that it has no reports of any delays to aviation operations caused by these failures.

(3) (a) and (b) The TAAATS system features high levels of redundancy, and all TAAATS tower staff are trained for, and capable of, backup modes of operation. All TAAATS Towers are supplied and fitted with multiple operational radar screens/displays and a bypass function automatically provides continued access to local radar data in the event of a main system failure. Additionally, Sydney Tower staff have access at each console to the display of local radar data via a separate system which is totally independent of TAAATS.

(4) Commissioning decisions are made on a case by case basis and take into account the circumstances of particular sectors including the associated detailed safety risk assessments. Where the safety assessment identifies the need for particular mitigating strategies such as back-up systems, these are provided and activated as necessary.

(5) The TAAATS system comprises a number of elements, most of which are not the intellectual property of Airservices. However, Airservices has expertise associated with the operational and system support aspects of TAAATS, eg training, systems engineering and technical support. These capabilities are being sought by other countries and, where appropriate, Airservices is actively involved in bids with other organisations to introduce TAAATS based systems in other countries.