Mr KERR (9:00 PM) —I make these very quick points and ask the Attorney to respond at the conclusion. The first point is that it is not true that anybody in this House would not wish to criminalise the urging of another ‘by force or violence’. Many people see it as an appropriate thing to protect the freedom of ideas and to criminalise actions. Of course, there are boundaries. If you are in a position where you incite somebody to commit violence, that is a very different circumstance, but ‘force’ has a very wide connotation. Gandhi, for example, in promoting civil disobedience in India promoted the use of passive force to prevent the civil administration of that country carrying out its civil functions. If advocacy of that form of civil disobedience is caught, it would not be covered by the defence that is provided—that is, lawfully procuring a change. We are very much straying towards the danger of criminalising the act of thinking about, rather than the conduct of, criminal action.

The second point I would like the Attorney to respond to is: how will we deal with the application of control orders? I imagine that these will not be that frequent in their application, but currently there are only two statuses of civil society. There are those who have been the subject of criminal conviction. That carries a consequence, perhaps imprisonment. The consequence of a conviction is known and certain civil liabilities flow from it. Those who have not been the subject of a conviction are presumed innocent, but now a person will have a judgment of a court that they are suspected of a crime. What are the consequences for a person who is formally adjudged to be a suspect, but not adjudicated guilty by his or her peers by trial? What are the implications for antidiscrimination law? Can a person be excluded from employment if they are adjudicated to be a ‘suspect’ in criminal conduct? Will a person be capable of being excluded from civil organisations, churches, clubs and the like? What is the consequence for defamation—where normally a person is presumed to have a good reputation—when such a judgment is made?

All these consequential matters have not been addressed at all in the debate, to the best of my knowledge. I would appreciate it if, in the concluding stages of this debate, those matters could be addressed by the Attorney. I think they potentially open up a very large category in opening up this question that has never hitherto been part of the Australian legal system: what it means to be a person adjudicated a suspect in these offences. I will keep my remarks very brief because I know other members have not had the opportunity to speak in the debate.