Save Search

Note: Where available, the PDF/Word icon below is provided to view the complete and fully formatted document
 Download Current HansardDownload Current Hansard    View Or Save XMLView/Save XML

Previous Fragment    Next Fragment
Monday, 10 October 2005
Page: 68


Mr RUDD (5:00 PM) —From time to time a country confronts national security challenges that require long-term analysis, long-term planning and long-term preparation. One of those challenges is avian influenza, a virus which, in the view of the WHO, has the potential to mutate into a global flu pandemic with potentially a massive loss of life, a massive impact on the global economy and a massive impact on global, regional and national security.

Let us remember that this avian influenza virus first rose to international consciousness back in 1997, when it hit Hong Kong. Since then, it has spread to some 10 countries and has resulted in some 60 deaths. That is why governments around the world in recent years have been preparing for this contingency. We have had a debate here so far today about the level of domestic preparedness; I do not propose to go there. But I am concerned about preparedness within the region and what we as a country are doing specifically to assist countries in the region to deal with this challenge.

What has alarmed me is that, in the seven years since avian influenza first emerged into the international debate through the Hong Kong experience, we have had statements like the following from the foreign minister. Last year, 2004, Mr Downer said:

Well, I’m not a scientist but, I suppose it’s conceivable it could come to Australia but I think that’s, frankly, a little unlikely and I haven’t been advised that there’s a real threat that it will come to Australia.

Mr Downer then said last year, on the question of what Australia could do to help the region to prepare for avian influenza:

Australia will do what it can, which might not be very much, but we will certainly do what we can to try and help our regional partners address this issue.

On the economic impact to Australia, Foreign Minister Downer last year said:

Well it’s obviously got the potential to have—it has had some effect on our chicken trade.

I am not quite sure what he was referring to there, but he went on to say:

We are not importing chickens from a number of countries in the region that have been affected by bird flu or avian flu, but other than that it shouldn’t have any effect, we hope it won’t. I just make this point—we hope very much that it won’t have any effect on tourism and business in Asia more generally.

The House needs to be aware of the fact that the foreign minister made these statements some seven years after avian influenza first arrived with a bang in Hong Kong. Until very recently, all we have seen from the foreign minister is complacency, complacency, complacency. This is not just my view. Today’s Daily Telegraph, for example, says:

The Office of National Assessments and the Department of Foreign Affairs should have been buzzing with bird flu warnings for the past five to eight years.

If that buzz wasn’t there, they were not doing their jobs as principal advisers to the Government on international matters which affect Australia.

Further:

If the ONA and Downer’s own department were in fact doing their jobs, it is difficult to understand why the Government’s response was not more comprehensive.

The Daily Telegraph goes on specifically to criticise the complacency reflected in Mr Downer’s public statements as recently as last year. I am concerned equally about the level of complacency—tinged, I have to say, with arrogance—contained in the remarks just made in this debate by the member for Bowman concerning domestic preparedness. Let us wait and see how prepared we are. That is why earlier this year I decided that we had to raise the alarm regarding what Australia was doing within the region. In the address-in-reply debate earlier this year, in March, I said:

The region needs ... a comprehensive regional strategy to deal with the threat posed by avian flu. The strategy would include as a priority an urgent audit of the capacity of our neighbours in the region to detect, investigate, diagnose and report the virus. The strategy should demonstrate a detailed approach on how to manage and control any outbreak once detected.

I went on to say:

Given the potential harm to Australia’s health and economic security, the government must demonstrate leadership within the region—

and I specifically called upon the government to deploy the AusAID budget accordingly. Still, nothing much happened. That is why in early September I released a five-point action plan for the region, calling for the following: firstly, a regional ministerial forum on avian influenza to do the sorts of things I was outlining in March; secondly, on top of that, to use our aid budget to assist in the establishment of a comprehensive community-level surveillance network across South-East Asia to enable us to spot this disease when it first emerges—because speed is of the essence; thirdly, to provide greater diagnostics assistance through the excellent capacity we have at present at the Animal Health Laboratory at Geelong; fourthly, to contribute to and to establish a regional compensation fund to assist chicken farmers to destroy their flocks; and, fifthly, consular agreements with affected countries. (Time expired)