Mr HAYES (6:49 PM) —The Workplace Relations Amendment (Better Bargaining) Bill 2005 is another manifestation of the government’s extreme and unfair industrial relations agenda, and I am proud to be able to stand before this chamber today and oppose it. While the title of the bill may seem harmless, and it must seem a bit curious that Labor would be opposing a bill that is named ‘better bargaining’, a cursory glance at its details reveal why this piece of legislation must be opposed. The bill is not about producing a more harmonious employment relationship. It is not about promoting a better bargaining environment. This bill is about weakening the bargaining position of working Australians and strengthening the position of their employers. This bill will do nothing to promote good-faith bargaining or to facilitate the better resolution of industrial disputes. The bill merely creates an environment that effectively removes the right of employees to take industrial action but, funnily enough, it will not apply the same degree of discipline to employers.

I note with interest the second reading speech of the Minister for Employment and Workplace Relations in which he outlines that the intent of this bill is ‘to facilitate the use of workplace bargaining processes, to make them more user-friendly and as fair as possible’. After reading the provisions of the bill I have to wonder who the minister might have had in mind when he decided he wanted to make a better and more user-friendly bill. It certainly was not the average, hardworking Australian worker. The minister intends to make the system user-friendly for employers and stack the deck in favour of them when it comes to nutting out the key provisions of the employment relationship. In short, the bill will do a number of things: firstly, it will restrict the right of employees to take protected industrial action; secondly, it will grant third parties the right to intervene in industrial disputes; and, thirdly, it will overturn the decision of the Australian Industrial Relations Commission in the Emwest case which enabled bargaining on matters and protected industrial action during a certified agreement under certain and particular circumstances. It also extends the capacity of the Australian Industrial Relations Commission to suspend a bargaining process where there is protracted industrial action, but it introduces a new provision restricting the same Industrial Relations Commission from acting to become involved in the process of dispute resolution by preventing the commission from exercising powers under section 170MX. It also allows for damages to be sought if a bargaining period is suspended and industrial action continues.

I am sure that all members would have read the report in yesterday’s Australian that indicated that 75 per cent of respondents to an ACTU survey said the government’s industrial relations proposals would not deliver better pay and 62 per cent did not believe more jobs would be created. The most telling aspect of the survey was that 62 per cent of people said they believed they would be worse off under individual contracts. The ‘Save Kevin Andrews’ committee must be working overtime to get the next round of advertising ready to go after these latest results.

I am sure that, once people become aware of the environment to negotiate individual contracts which the government will impose through this bill, they will have even greater reason to fear negotiations. The most interesting aspect of the bill is the fact that, once again, the government is introducing one rule for one group and a vastly inferior set of conditions for another group.

Recently I brought to the attention of the House the case of Boeing workers in Newcastle, members of the Australian Workers Union. These workers have been locked out for a number of weeks because, after having worked under individual contract arrangements for the last four years, when their agreements were up for negotiation they decided they no longer wanted to be under individual contracts but wanted a collective agreement. They had tried individual contracts and they did not work for them, so they decided that a collective agreement was the way to go. The result of this negotiating effort with Boeing has created an almost intractable industrial dispute, not about terms and conditions; it is intractable because the employer wants to impose individual contracts or in this case Australian workplace agreements and the employees want a collective arrangement. This has resulted in a lockout—an employer initiated industrial action. These people have exercised their choice. They want a collective agreement, but all they have is a locked gate.

Now let us consider the position faced by the Boeing workers in the light of the government’s brave new world of negotiation as introduced under this bill. We have a group of employees exercising their rights to a collective agreement, we have an employer who has decided that that is not the way it wants to go and we have an industrial dispute. Since February this year, Boeing has consistently refused to negotiate a collective agreement. The employees want a resolution to the dispute. They have been locked out of the premises now for in excess of nine weeks. They are quite happy to consent to this matter being arbitrated by the Australian Industrial Relations Commission, the tried and tested industrial umpire. These workers are not militant; all they want is a collective arrangement. How would the provisions of this bill deal with their situation?

One option is to have an application for a suspension of the bargaining period heard by the Australian Industrial Relations Commission. Without a bargaining period in place, any industrial action becomes illegal. This could result in action being taken against individual workers for the recovery of damages. That would be not an insignificant result. Another option is that a third party may intervene in the dispute by applying to the Australian Industrial Relations Commission for a suspension of the bargaining period. If granted, it would have the same effect on the individual employees. Another option is to have the Minister for Employment and Workplace Relations apply to the Australian Industrial Relations Commission to have the bargaining period suspended. But none of these things will occur, for reasons I will outline later.

I am sure that people are wondering, if the FA18 jet fighter planes that Australia relies on to protect its borders are not being serviced, why the minister would not intervene in this one particular dispute. Why would a supplier of Boeing, someone who would be granted rights as a third party to intervene, not apply for a suspension of the bargaining period, one might wonder. The disappointing thing is that none of these options will find their way into the Boeing dispute as the bill specifically excludes employer-initiated industrial action—lockouts—where they have been instigated in pursuit of an Australian workplace agreement negotiation. It seems odd that a better bargaining bill would not contain a provision that would actively bring both parties to the negotiating table to settle the matter once and for all.

This bill gives the go-ahead to companies like Boeing to lock its workers out provided there is an Australian workplace agreement agenda afoot. Under the provisions of this bill, if the dispute occurs during an AWA negotiation, the employer is entitled to lock people out. It seems staggering that a better bargaining bill would not have a provision to initiate better bargaining in a situation like this. It is yet another situation in which the relative bargaining position of the employer is given primacy over the relative bargaining position of the employee.

This is yet another example of the government travelling down the path to the creation of a one-sided industrial relations system. This government has no intention of introducing a system in which disputes are resolved; rather this bill will hinder the genuine bargaining process because its objects are firmly embedded in the government’s extreme industrial relations agenda.

As demonstrated in the Boeing example that I cited earlier, employers will be granted yet another ‘get out of jail free’ card in the bargaining process through the exclusion of employer initiated lockouts under AWA negotiations. This is another example of how the government, even if it does not get its whole industrial relations agenda over the line, will set things up so that, by design through a number of incentives hidden in the system, its obsession with having AWAs introduced on a broad scale will still be achieved. Rational employers will be encouraged to offer AWAs as it will give them the prime bargaining position and all the various rights that go along with it. Under the provisions of this bill employers will be able to initiate lockouts when the negotiations get a bit tough. You can rest assured that they will use this new found bargaining strength, and actions such as those involving Boeing will not be isolated examples.

To prove that, recent research conducted at Sydney University indicates the growing use of lockouts. The research, undertaken by ACIRRT—the Australian Centre for Industrial Relations Research and Training—indicates that, over the period 1994 to 1998, 18,700 days were lost due to lockouts. When the period between 1999 and 2003 is examined, we find that 194,500 days were lost due to lockouts—an increase of some 940 per cent. On the other hand, when examined over the same period, there has been a decrease of 12 per cent in days lost due to strike action initiated by employees. Dr Chris Briggs, the senior researcher for ACIRRT, said:

He went on to note that 91 per cent of lockouts happen under the federal industrial system, and this bill is giving the green light for them to happen more and more frequently. It seems that the government has a view that the ability for working Australians to withhold the one thing that they can withhold during a bargaining period is somehow unfair. The government seems to hold the view that Australian workers will take industrial action at the drop of a hat. That is just not true.

I have been involved in industrial relations for many years in a number of capacities and I have never seen industrial action taken just on a whim. Wages and conditions are key aspects of the employment relationship, no matter on what side of the bargaining table you might find yourself. They are the terms under which an employee decides to supply their labour and under which an employer decides to purchase it. Accordingly, the negotiation of wages and conditions is of paramount importance to both parties. This bill takes away the right of employees to withdraw the biggest card they hold—their labour.

Strikes and other forms of industrial action are certainly not taken lightly. Under the decentralised system of industrial relations that we have, the right to strike and other forms of industrial action are part of the bargaining process. But, from my experience, labour is only withdrawn as a last resort. The right to withdraw labour should remain a basic right for Australian workers. It should remain a basic right because when the negotiations reach an impasse it is virtually the only thing they have left to prompt further action. The right to strike is not only a right that should be preserved; it is a right that was reconfirmed to employees by the Australian Industrial Relations Commission when they handed down their decision in the Emwest case.

The removal of the right to strike and of the capacity to collectively bargain is yet another example of contraventions of ILO conventions. While my opposition to this bill is obvious, I suggest an alternative approach that would improve the position of all involved in negotiations and actually produce a bargaining system that would achieve outcomes, not hinder them. For instance, I do not see the need to remove the consequential effects where a case has been made out for suspension or termination of a bargaining period. Power already exists under section 170MX of the Workplace Relations Act, which provides for the commission, as soon as practicable, to begin to exercise the use of conciliation powers under section 170MY and arbitration, if it determines it necessary to resolve the dispute, under section 170MX. If a case is made that there should be suspension of a bargaining period or a bargaining period should be terminated, there are provisions under the act presently that grant power and jurisdiction to the Australian Industrial Relations Commission to intervene, to conciliate and/or to arbitrate.

In other words, there are powers afoot to allow the Australian Industrial Relations Commission to intervene with a view to resolving a particular dispute—a dispute which, in the nature of this case, would be intractable with little likelihood of being resolved through the negotiating process. Bear in mind that the Australian Industrial Relations Commission—via not only its charter under the act but also its members—is required to act without fear or favour when it comes to exercising those powers. Maybe arbitration by the Australian Industrial Relations Commission is the only reasonable way to resolve the issues between Boeing and its employees at Williamstown.

There is a common theme when it comes to negotiations that have reached a stalemate. It is similar to one of my own reasonably recent experiences with the NRMA. For a period of about 12 months the NRMA and its work force were involved in a long and protracted industrial dispute. Calls were being made on radio—Alan Jones and John Laws were invoked. There were concerns about women not being able to access breakdown facilities if they were caught late at night in their cars. Calls were being made about children being locked in cars. So, whilst it may not have been a threat to the national economy, there were certainly concerns for people who access that service.

The dispute involved workers in more than one state, so on the face of it it was an interstate dispute. The Australian Industrial Relations Commission was approached for assistance. The only thing it could do was render informal mediation. It was restricted because there was a bargaining period in place. The commission was restrained from suspending that bargaining period unless there was a threat to the national economy. Oddly enough, the dispute was resolved through access to the New South Wales industrial relations system. Here is a company and their employees in the Australian industrial relations jurisdiction, but the only way to resolve this dispute was for both parties to go off hand in hand to the New South Wales Industrial Relations Commission, which in turn decided to impose arbitration, or at least to give notice that it would arbitrate within a period of time. That had a remarkable and sobering impact on that particular dispute that had being going on for over 12 months. It brought the parties together, back to the negotiating table to sit down and resolve their differences before the independent umpire would impose a resolution to the dispute. The fact that there was that facility there caused that— (Time expired)