Mr GARRETT (3:24 PM) —I appreciate the observations and arguments put forward by members on all sides of the House to the motion on racial and religious tolerance moved by the member for Cook. This is a difficult question but, on balance, I do not believe the motion should be supported by the House. As I understand it, it is aimed at future New South Wales legislation, which has been drafted on the basis of the Victorian Racial and Religious Tolerance Act—an act which has been in effect since 2002 and which aims to restrict public behaviour that incites hatred or serious contempt for a person’s racial or religious background. That seems reasonable enough.

Yes, it is true—as the member for Macquarie and the member for Banks have pointed out—that freedom of speech is all important. Yet, a number of exceptions under the act seek to guarantee freedom of speech. The act is looking at those public expressions—whether by graffiti, commentary or publication—that promote or foment racial and religious vilification. The exceptions under the act are for conduct and discussion entered into reasonably and in good faith in relation to a number of matters—for example, genuine debate by a range of means on art or for scientific, academic and religious purpose—that go to private conduct. Fair and accurate reporting of religious issues are all provided for under this act. So the benchmark for the maintenance of free speech would seem to have been considered by the draftsperson when the act was drawn up.

I appreciate very much that members value freedom of speech in this House, but with freedom of speech comes responsibility. The question is: why is the member for Cook opposing legislation of this kind being implemented in New South Wales? The member offers three reasons. The first is the effect of legislation to limit freedom of speech. I have just addressed, at least to some extent, some of those objections. The second is the creation of religious tension where there was none. The third is that the legislation makes no distinction between religion and race where one is personal or inherited—and I will return to that later.

The genesis of the member’s argument lies in concerns that have been raised in the religious community following the ‘Catch the Fires’ case, which was brought under this legislation. In this case a successful action was brought against defendants who were found to have acted in a way that was likely to incite a feeling of hatred for Muslims. The actions included claims that Muslims had preferred treatment when applying as refugees and that Muslims were, in effect, taking over Australia. In evidence given, one of the defendants claimed that they were an authority on Muslim matters when it was found that they were not. There was more evidence given to that end and the finding was clear and unambiguous. Given the heightened anxiety that surrounds world events, mentioned by members in the House, and with the prospect of possible future terrorism, such a final calming hand by legislation seems all the more desirable, especially as it draws the distinction between civil and criminal acts and has appropriate remedies.

The member for Banks mentioned Archbishop Peter Watson of Melbourne, and I could not agree more with him when he said, ‘We should avoid making uninformed and unbalanced characterisations of each other’s faith.’ I acknowledge that a number of initiatives advance this process. They include interfaith dialogue, increased religious education and many others. But, in the event that extreme behaviour and vilification continues in the public domain, which this legislation is intended to redress, legislation of this kind, carefully drafted and reasonably applied, can play an important role as the final barrier to inflamed and ultimately dangerous vilification continuing unabated.

The fact is that religious tension activated the legislation: the legislation has not activated religious tension. Indeed, the problem has been with us for some time—regrettably, perhaps more so, with the changed conditions following September 11. The act, rather than assuming a parity of culture and religion in the way the motion implies, merely addresses the certain effects actions would have if vilification of religion were to take place. Indeed, my own view is that religious and cultural identities intermingle. Freedom of religious belief and expression is a primary tenet of the democratic system, but such freedom does not forgive incitements and vilifications simply because someone is a Sikh, a Muslim or a Christian. This act makes that necessary balance law and, if prudently drafted, it will do the same in New South Wales.