Save Search

Note: Where available, the PDF/Word icon below is provided to view the complete and fully formatted document
 Download Current HansardDownload Current Hansard    View Or Save XMLView/Save XML

Previous Fragment    Next Fragment
Tuesday, 3 August 2004
Page: 31825


Mr McCLELLAND (4:13 PM) —I think the strongest point in the minister's argument—which is one that the government repeatedly return to—is that if there had been no invasion of Iraq Saddam Hussein would not have been expunged, I think the word was, from world politics. The trouble with that argument, of course, is that in early March 2003 the Prime Minister said—and I think it was in this House—that if it were not for the threat of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq, or words to this effect, the prospect of regime change would not in itself justify the invasion of Iraq. The problem that we face in the world, but that we specifically face as an Australian people, is that there was no game plan for that scenario—that is, the regime game plan.

In what I think it is fair to say is a pretty soft critique of the government's actions, what I believe are nonetheless the most damning passages in the Flood report indicate that we essentially invaded Iraq on the basis of two joint reports prepared by ONA and DIO. As noted, those two joint reports were short pieces: one was two pages and one was 3½ pages. Private security agencies advising clients with interests in Iraq were doing much more than the Australian government required before making a decision to send Australian men and women to risk injury and possible death in a war in Iraq. In terms of the game plan for expunging Saddam Hussein from the international political scene, the Flood report says frankly in respect of those two documents, one of two pages and one of 3½ pages:

One or both of these documents might have also covered areas relevant to Australia's interests on which there was little intelligence assessment: the strategic cost implications for Australia of contributing to military action against Iraq, the likely strategic costs and issues involved in post-Saddam Iraq, and the impact of military action on the safety of Australia and Australians.

The member for Brand today asked the Prime Minister why those agencies were not required to advise the government on what one would think, in terms of any basic management of a military action, had to be questions. The trouble is that those questions were never asked, because we went in there on a false premise. Again in question time today the Prime Minister and the Minister for Foreign Affairs hung their hats on the Flood report's conclusion that `on the basis of the available information, ONA and DIO drew the most likely conclusions'. This is the problem: we are talking about the inadequacy of that available information, which again was criticised by the Flood report as being `ambiguous and incomplete'. The Flood report did conclude—and this is unquestionably a fact in the document:

ONA's judgment, while reasonably argued, has not been borne out by what has been found in Iraq ...

It is a fact that there have been no weapons of mass destruction found in Iraq. Clearly the government went to war on a false premise. There is no escaping that logic at all.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs accused us of attacking public servants. There is no attack of public servants, because again, in respect of issues of accountability of our intelligence agencies, as must necessarily be the case, the Flood report said:

... fundamentally it is ministers—with their high level of control over agencies—on whom much of the responsibility will fall.

That is in terms of issues of accountability. The Flood report goes on to say that ministers and their staff:

... should be alert to signs of sub-optimal practice, both in terms of propriety and efficiency.

If a government is requesting advice about whether we send Australian men and women to war and does not ask those obvious questions about the scenarios after the hot conflict is over, it is gross inefficiency, not on the part of the public servants but on the part of those ministers who have responsibility over those agencies, including the Minister for Foreign Affairs.

In terms of spin, there is no hesitation about using these organisations. If you read between the lines of the Flood report, there is a subtle critique which refers to the Prime Minister seeking ONA's assistance in vetting his speeches on, I think, five occasions. If you read between the lines, the Flood report is somewhat critical that those drawing on the material—that is, material checked by the intelligence agencies—should be clear about the role played by the intelligence agency so that there is no room for inference that the speech as a whole, or all the conclusions drawn from the intelligence, have the intelligence agency's imprimatur. So, if there is any argument that our security agencies have been compromised in terms of the use made of their services, that statement—again, reading between the lines—is a criticism of the government for seeking to endorse its political rhetoric by reliance on those agencies.

In terms of the ultimate outcome, we are entitled to frame these questions: have the war in Iraq and Australia's participation in the war in Iraq made the world less safe or more safe? Indeed, has our involvement in the war in Iraq, on a premise that was clearly wrong on the basis of the facts as identified in the Flood report, made Australians more or less vulnerable to terrorist attacks? Quite frankly, I think that to pose those two questions is to answer them. We are seeing spin on the part of this government, not only in terms of foreign policy and military action but also, as I have indicated in my statements today, in terms of the measures that the government is continuing to announce in respect of homeland security. Of course there has been a significant increase in funding of national security measures since the September 11 attacks. In particular, as the Flood report identifies, we probably did not pull our fingers out sufficiently hastily until after the Bali bombings. Be that as it may, it would be the grossest of neglect on the part of any modern government not to increase resourcing of national security measures.

What we resent, however, is the government shamelessly claiming in headlines enhancements to national security measures when in fact all they are doing in many instances is announcing a continuation of existing programs and in some instances, indeed, camouflaging reductions in programs by bundling some programs up into others. There was a classic example just last week when the Prime Minister with great fanfare flew into Karratha—indeed, probably diverting the activities of Coastwatch surveillance aircraft—and held the relevant press conference under the heading `Strengthening Australia's border protection' to announce a $135 million commitment to Coastwatch. The trouble is that later that day the Minister for Justice and Customs, responding to one of my comments, said, `There has been no reduction in funding of Coastwatch.' In other words, all this fanfare to claim a strengthening of Australia's border protection, which included diverting planes from their task, was merely to commit to an extension or a lack of reduction of an existing program. We are seeing that repeatedly with a number of issues that I have identified in a press release today.

When it comes to national security, Australians are entitled to the facts. Australians are not fools. They will not be taken for mugs. They expect and are entitled to expect additional national security measures—but they are entitled to know when they are additional and not simply a gilding of the lily by the reannouncement of an existing program. (Time expired)