Mr KING (7:55 PM) —It was on 1 October 2001 that the Intelligence Services Act was passed, establishing the constitutionality and accountability of some critical intelligence agencies in this country—in particular, the Australian Secret Intelligence Service, the Defence Signals Directorate and ASIO, the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation. That legislation was important, because it established for the first time a proper foundation in law for the secret intelligence agencies which hitherto had been the subject of ministerial direction and exercise of prerogative powers, and ministerial and administrative powers. However, it had been thought—indeed presciently, I might add—that it was time to put these bodies on a proper footing. It is interesting that the September 11 tragedy occurred prior to the enactment of the Intelligence Services Act 2001, but it is also fair to say that it did not take into account the events of 2001 itself. That, of course, was a cataclysmic event, and I want to come to that in a moment.

I wish to draw the attention of the House to a couple of features of the original statute which the Intelligence Services Amendment Bill 2003 is amending, because they do establish an important foundation for the conduct of Australia's intelligence agencies. The functions of ASIS, the subject of the amendment before the House, are particularly relevant and are threefold. The first function is to obtain, in accordance with government requirements, intelligence about the capabilities, intentions or activities of people outside Australia; the second function is to conduct counterintelligence activities; and the third function is to liaise with intelligence or security services.

I suppose the word `intelligence' in this context gives rise to interesting observations about spooks and what they do. The fact that Peter Ustinov recently passed away even gives rise to some humorous observations about the clandestine activities of intelligence services and their agents. But it could never be suggested that those observations apply to ASIS—or not as far as we are aware in this country. What is important is that that intelligence gathering concerning the capabilities, intentions or activities of people or organisations outside Australia is at the heart of the role of ASIS. As a counter to that is its counterintelligence role. As I understand the nature of counterintelligence activities, they particularly involve the organisation infiltrating where it can the organisations of intelligence agencies from competing or rival countries and providing information to government in a way that could not ordinarily be done through straightforward intelligence activities.

The third function of ASIS is to liaise with overseas agencies. It seems to me to be important to point out the limits that currently exist on the activities of those agencies. The first limitation is that the activities must occur outside Australia. That is important, because ASIS has had a particular role in the context of the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, the relevant ministerial oversight body in respect of the activities of ASIS, subject of course to the provisions of the operation of the Inspector-General of Security and Intelligence.

The second interesting limitation relates to the privacy arrangements which are set out in section 15 of the statute. When the Intelligence Services Act was brought into effect in October 2001, the privacy arrangements were very much at the heart of the concern of many people in this place so far as the future operation of ASIS was concerned—and, indeed, that of DSD and ASIO. It is fair to say that the Australian community has always been a little suspicious of secretive or clandestine agencies such as ASIS—and, I respectfully suggest, properly so in a democracy such as ours. Therefore it was appropriate, when establishing ASIS on a proper footing, to have regard to those concerns in the community. The third limitation, which is critical for present purposes, was that ASIS must not plan for or undertake paramilitary activities or activities involving violence against the person or the use of weapons, as provided for in section 6(4) of the statute—and those words speak for themselves.

That being the foundation of ASIS, which is the critical intelligence organisation, as we sit here tonight the question is: what has changed to make the relevant amendments necessary? The first critical change came with the cataclysmic events of September 11 and October 12 and, indeed, the recent events in Madrid, Spain. These events have made the work of such agencies dangerous and even more imperative and important than it was before. The limitation referred to in section 6(4) obviously gives rise to concern, because to limit in that way an agency which is gathering information to assist the Australian government in the protection of the Australian people would certainly hinder its operations. That indeed was the opinion of the report of the Parliamentary Joint Committee on ASIO, ASIS and DSD. That committee comprised parliamentarians who were very experienced—particularly in this area. It was chaired by the Hon. David Jull and had as members the Hon. Kim Beazley, Mr Stewart McArthur MP and the Hon. Leo McLeay—all very experienced in their concern for and consideration of the national interest in relation to intelligence gathering and, in particular, the limitations that have been placed upon ASIS as a result of the changed international environment to which I have referred.

I do not wish to go into the detail of what happened on September 11 or in the Bali bombings. I have done that on another occasion. Members of this House would well know that from my area of Australia, the eastern suburbs of Sydney, more were killed in the Bali bombings than from any other area of that size in the country, and I attended many of the funerals of those who were killed. So I feel very strongly about the importance of ensuring that those people did not die in vain.

Let me come to the heart of the matter in relation to the amendments now before the House. The first amendment to which I wish to draw attention concerns the operation of section 6(4), which relates to the limitation on the carriage of weapons. The way in which the amendment operates is somewhat curious. Subsection 4 in schedule 1 of the amending bill provides that that section—which is the original section which I have read out—does not prevent the provision of weapons or training in the use of weapons or in self-defence techniques in accordance with schedule 2. So it does not seek to amend section 6(4) at all, but what it does then, in that portion of the statute which deals with so-called limits on the provision of weapons and training, is provide the following under the heading, `Schedule 2—Limits on provisions of weapons, training etc.:

1 Provision of weapons, training etc.

(1) The provision of a weapon, or training in the use of a weapon ... is not prevented by subsection 6(4) if it is provided:

(a) to a person who is a staff member or agent of ASIS; and

(b) for the purpose of enabling the person:

(i) to protect himself or herself; or

(ii) to protect a staff member or agent of ASIS; or

(iii) to protect a person who is co-operating with ASIS ... or to provide training.

Of themselves, those provisions appear to be rather limited in their scope and offer only limited additional protection to service officers. However, it is important to note that subsection (2) of the additional provisions provides as follows:

(2) The use of a weapon or self-defence techniques is not prevented by subsection 6(4) if:

(a) the weapon or techniques are used:

(i) for a purpose covered by paragraph (1)(b); or

(ii) in training ...

(b) in a case covered by any of subparagraphs (1)(b)(i) to (iii)—the weapon or techniques are used outside Australia; and

(c) guidelines have been issued by the Director-General ... and

(d) the weapon or techniques are used in compliance with those guidelines.

So what are the protections for the Australian public, having regard to the privacy and other civil liberties issues which I raised or adverted to earlier? The first is that the activities of carrying and using weapons must only occur outside Australia subject to this one limitation: where there is the training of staff members or agents of ASIS, that may occur within Australia without ministerial approval and without any guidelines issued by the director-general; so those limitations that otherwise apply have no operation.

I suppose it is appropriate to permit the training of ASIS officers within Australia without ministerial approval or without restrictions upon the guidelines issued by the director-general. I would certainly support it, although on balance I would say this to those who administer ASIS in the future: the issue should be carefully monitored. We cannot allow an over-mighty subject anywhere to have complete freedom in relation to the use of firearms, especially as in this case there is no requirement to obtain a licence, permission or indeed registration for the training in the use of those weapons. But then we come to the actual use of weapons or self-defence techniques themselves. These can only occur outside Australia—not within Australia; outside Australia—and then subject to ministerial approval, subject to use in accordance with guidelines issued by the director-general and subject to complete compliance with those guidelines.

I have mentioned concerns that we should not put in place a clandestine organisation not normally subject to the law of this country—or indeed any other country—which has powers that are unusual or not consistent with normal democratic policing techniques. It seems to me that the protections that are being put in place by the proposed schedule 2—and in particular by items 1(1) and 1(2) in that proposed schedule—are satisfactory, both in the interests of the Australian people as a whole and in regard to our responsibilities to ensure that, when those operatives are working outside Australia gathering intelligence or are involved in counterintelligence or in liaising with foreign agencies, the limitations placed upon their use by this amending legislation are appropriate.

For those reasons, I therefore support the amendments. I commend the honourable member for Fadden's committee, which I know has worked very hard in coming up with these amendments, and I commend the members of that committee. But I would make this final comment: in establishing this important power for these agencies, those who are ultimately responsible for monitoring the use of those powers, the use of those weapons and indeed the use of the various self-defence and other techniques which they are now entitled to use—which they were not entitled to have or use before—should be carefully monitored. The guidelines themselves should be the subject of consideration by the Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security from time to time. In my respectful submission to the House, the minister too, through an appropriate mechanism, should ensure that both the inspector-general and the director-general are carrying out their activities in a way that is consistent with the general interests of the Australian people, their concern for privacy—as in section 15 of the original statute—and, at the same time, the civil liberties of all Australians and those who these laws are ultimately designed to protect. I support the bill.