Mr BRENDAN O'CONNOR (12:52 PM) —I too rise to make some comments upon the inquiry by the Parliamentary Joint Committee on ASIO, ASIS and DSD into the handling of prewar intelligence on Iraq. I agree with many of the comments made by Labor members in commending the members and the secretariat of the parliamentary joint committee. It is important to note that this report is a great example of the parliament operating effectively and in a nonpartisan way to try to elicit the facts from what is a very blurred subject—that is, what did go on and what intelligence was being received and handed to our government before the decision was made by the Prime Minister and the executive to embark upon a war without the sanction of the United Nations and, as we know now, without the main justification for embarking upon that war? It is incumbent upon parliamentary committees to inquire properly into these matters. There can be no greater decision for any government of any nation than to prosecute a war against another sovereign state. Therefore, it is critical that we analyse dispassionately any deficiencies and commend any strengths of our processes in making such important decisions.

I think it is fair to say that, notwithstanding the fact that the report was handed down unanimously, there are some clear concerns that have to be raised in this forum and in the public domain at large. The fact is that, firstly, it is clear that the evidence upon which the Prime Minister relied to embark upon a war was not unequivocal and was not certain. Indeed, it is important to note that the Prime Minister, the Minister for Foreign Affairs and other members of the government made comments prior to going to war that exaggerated or contradicted in some areas the intelligence they were receiving from our agencies. That is not to say that the agencies' conduct was perfect or that the system that we have in place is by any means perfect. But I think if we are to blame anybody for some of the deficiencies that led to the reasoning behind the government's decision, we have to look at the way in which the Prime Minister chose to use information that he was receiving and that his cabinet were receiving to make these decisions.

I think that, as members have already indicated, it is fair to say that we have had the Prime Minister revise history since the official end of the war. We have had the Prime Minister shift fundamentally from the need to remove so-called weapons of mass destruction from the hands of Saddam Hussein, from his regime—because, in the Prime Minister's view, it posed a threat to our nation and our citizens—to the need for regime change. It does not take a scholar to glean from all of the public comments by the Prime Minister, either in the parliament or elsewhere, prior to making the decision to send our young men and women to war, that regime change featured very little in his consideration. That may well be because he did not believe he would be able to convince the public at large that we should send thousands of our young men and women so far away to fight in a war, prosecute a war, on that basis. There is no doubting that the regime that has come to an end was an awful, autocratic, violent regime. I think all members of the House are happy to see that regime come to an end. But there is a question of accountability. I think there has been a failure on the part of the Prime Minister to properly deduce from the information received and then to properly deliberate upon this matter.

In the short time I have before this debate is adjourned, I would like to point out some of those failures that were recorded in the report. The report says that there are four intelligence issues—uranium for Africa, importation of aluminium tubes, mobile biological laboratories and UAVs for biological weapons programs—that were considered fundamental to the existence of weapons of mass destruction and the capacity of Iraq to use them.

The first three issues were used at various stages by the Howard government—the Prime Minister in particular—to establish his case for weapons of mass destruction. Indeed, the report says in sections 1.38 to 1.49 that these issues were either wrong or disputed or both. And the fourth issue remains unproven. So it would appear that the Prime Minister had already failed to have proper regard to the caveats placed by the intelligence agencies on those matters before using them as some of the reasons at least for this country embarking upon a war.

I would like to proceed with some other matters which go to further intelligence failures—that is, between the agency and the government, and indeed some of the areas where I think the government misled the parliament and the Australian people—but I am mindful of the time. I do not want to be cut off mid-sentence, but there are a whole host of things I wish to comment on once this matter returns to the House. I therefore seek leave to continue my remarks when the debate is resumed.

Leave granted; debate adjourned.

Main Committee adjourned at 1.00 p.m.