Mr WILKIE (11:28 AM) —In speaking to this report, I note that it was less than 12 months ago that the Howard government unnecessarily placed Australian Defence Force lives at risk in the US-led war against Iraq based on a fallacy—a fanciful fallacy, cleverly manipulated and deceptively exaggerated by the Prime Minister in the prewar scare campaign. The government were so selective in the review of the intelligence evidence they received that they had convinced all involved in the debate that Saddam Hussein had a mammoth stockpile of weapons of mass destruction. That mammoth stockpile has, of course, never been found. Perhaps if the Prime Minister, the Minister for Foreign Affairs and the Minister for Defence were less subjective in their assessment of the intelligence provided to them, had taken their Bush and Blair blinkers off and read a little more carefully the advice provided to them by Australian intelligence agencies, Australia would not have committed to war—a war that did not have United Nations sanction.

To highlight a few examples of where the government chose to ignore intelligence advice, in September 2002 the Office of National Assessments reported that intelligence was `slight on the scope and location of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction activities'. But at the same time the Prime Minister was declaring on the 7.30 Report on 9 September 2002:

Australia's intelligence agencies provided initial advice that did not pre-empt large stocks of weapons of mass destruction, and the Defence Intelligence Organisation has always expressed doubts about any production of biological or chemical weapons beyond 1991. However, as the parliamentary committee report points out, the government presentations prewar all `seemed to suggest large arsenals and stockpiles, endorsing the idea that Iraq was producing more weapons and that the programs were larger and more active than before the Gulf War in 1991'. Of course, by early May 2003, not one single weapon of mass destruction had been found in Iraq. At this stage, even the United Nations Chief Weapons Inspector, Hans Blix, was questioning intelligence information sources. Even in mid-June 2003, the Prime Minister was continuing with his same line of reasoning and justification for involving Australia in the war against Iraq. When asked if he thought weapons of mass destruction would be found in Iraq, he replied:

Where did they go, Prime Minister? You can hardly think that Saddam Hussein could fit 819 Scud B missile launchers in his back pocket as soon as the United Nations weapons inspectors knocked on his front door.

The Howard government chose to tell half-truths to the Australian public in their premature assessment and commitment to the war with Iraq. The government were warned before the war that there was an unclear assessment of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction, and Australian intelligence agencies provided hardly any explicit assessment of the question of the immediacy of the threat imposed by Saddam Hussein. The Howard government were told in October 2002 by the ONA, via Greg Thielman from the US Bureau of Intelligence and Research, that claims about Iraq importing uranium from Africa for a nuclear program were not correct. However, in his ministerial statement of 4 February 2003, the Prime Minister said:

Minister Downer also massaged the facts for political expediency. Mr Thielman says the Howard government were told before the war that the imported aluminium tubes were not destined for Iraq's nuclear program. But the Minister for Foreign Affairs went on later to say:

The government simply chose to read what they wanted in the intelligence assessments provided to them. They went ahead and committed Australian Defence Force personnel to a US led war based on inconclusive information provided in good faith by Australian intelligence agencies. The Prime Minister admits that the intelligence basis on which he took Australia to war may have been inaccurate. He said on 3 February this year:

I could go on. There are numerous examples of where advice from the ONA was glossed over by the government to compel the Australian public to think that Australia was doing the right thing by following the US lead. Perhaps the Prime Minister had dug a hole too deep for himself in mid-2002 when he addressed the US Congress, effectively committing Australian troops to support an US led incursion, while selectively considering advice from his own national intelligence sources.

The opposition has noted the government's recent not-so-subtle shift away from the weapons of mass destruction reasoning for going to war and their new focus on Saddam Hussein, who had to be removed to save Iraq's innocents. Once the weapons of mass destruction interpretation of intelligence was exposed as the fallacy that it was, Mr Howard quickly backflipped to justify Australia's involvement by walking the humanitarian line of reasoning. It bewilders me no end. The Iraq war is now all about military intervention to dispose of a dictator who was in breach of humanitarian rights. Noone would disagree that Iraq is better off without Saddam Hussein, but using this argument to justify war does not stand up without the weapons of mass destruction.

Whilst not advocating this course of action, if you use the government's new-found logic, why then shouldn't Australia pursue a similar course of action against Zimbabwean President Robert Mugabe? Perhaps his breach of international human rights warrants a similar type of war as that against Saddam Hussein. The Minister for Foreign Affairs said on 26 March last year:

The foreign minister has also acknowledged that in Zimbabwe seven million people are in desperate need of food. It is a graphic picture—one that the Minister for Foreign Affairs paints clearly. However, given the argument now used to justify the Iraq war, wouldn't the Howard government have been right if they had used military intervention to quash Mugabe? But no; on this occasion the Prime Minister thought about seeking some special intelligence on the Mugabe regime and, just to be sure, he sent the Australian cricket team to Zimbabwe. Perhaps Ricky Ponting, Adam Gilchrist or another member of the Australian World Cup cricket team was sent to Zimbabwe on double duty: intelligence gathering between overs, perhaps.

It is not fair to be flippant about Australia's World Cup cricket champions in this way. But, going on his past record, I would say that the Prime Minister treated the Iraq assessments of the Office of National Assessments and the Defence Intelligence Organisation in the same way he would treat an intelligence assessment by a member of the World Cup cricket team: with scant regard. The sudden turnaround by the government, with the legal justification for war on the grounds of possession of weapons of mass destruction debased and the new focus now firmly on the regime of Saddam Hussein, brings me to the point that the Prime Minister and his trigger-happy government should have acknowledged right from the beginning: the war action was unnecessary. Iraq could have been disarmed peacefully, without loss of life and without risking the lives of Australian Defence Force personnel.

The United Nations resolutions did not authorise action against Iraq without Security Council consent. Perhaps, in hindsight, a diplomatic resolution, originally called for by the opposition, would have been a better choice. Given the failure to locate the stockpiles of chemical and biological weapons and the failure to date to establish any evidence of the rebuilding of Iraq's nuclear weapons capability, the opposition was right in taking a resolutory rather than a reactionary position.

The matter of intelligence on Iraq's weapons of mass destruction was referred to the Parliamentary Joint Committee on ASIO, ASIS and DSD in June last year. I welcomed the decision although, along with many others, I questioned the terms of reference of the inquiry and was also curious as to why the Prime Minister believed that the consideration was premature. Surely after the UK and US realised the insufficiencies in their intelligence, wouldn't it be obvious that Australia's intelligence information would be compromised? As the opposition knew all along, the Howard government jumped the gun. They were so keen to deploy Australian troops to Iraq that they failed to listen to their own specialists. The joint committee report at section 4.82 finds:

Clearly the government exaggerated the urgency of the situation in Iraq and further consultation with Australian intelligence sources would have been more suitable. The committee report states:

However, the report goes on to conclude in section 5.17:

As I said before, the government presented a scenario of massive stockpiles of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq. However, Australian intelligence agencies did not think that the amount would constitute anything more than small stocks. There is a clear gap here between what the government claim and what the Australian intelligence community advised.

I welcome the findings and recommendations of the committee's report and I agree that there needs to be a further inquiry. The government's handling of the prewar intelligence assessments provided to them needs to be assessed. As I have outlined, these assessments were massaged to suit the policy decisions of the government of the day. An independent assessment of the process that led to Australian commitment to the war in Iraq needs to be able to fully expose individual representations to the government from agency personnel and how the government used selective information for their own purposes. Furthermore, the agencies themselves need to be reviewed. Recommendation 1 of the committee's report states that the capacity of the Office of National Assessments needs to be evaluated, especially in the current global climate. Government intelligence agencies need to be independent to provide advice that protects our national security and protects the Australian public. These recommendations are fine; however, government policy in these matters should not be the basis for assessments. As the Prime Minister said in March 2003, prior to announcing that Australian troops would join US military action against Iraq:

Just last week, figures showed that the liberation of Iraq claimed an estimated 55,000 lives, including 9,600 civilians. These numbers will grow as unexploded cluster bombs are detonated in urban areas by ill-fated civilians. The joint committee, chaired by the Liberal member for Fadden, David Jull, should be commended on their work. I agree with the chair's opening statements in the report, where he makes the following observations in relation to the inquiry and its recommendations for a further inquiry:

In other words, they were gagged. Further, the committee notes:

The committee has also unanimously agreed that Australia's intelligence assessments prior to the war in Iraq were flawed and that the government chose to pursue military intervention regardless of prewar acknowledgement that the intelligence provided was compromised. I believe there is a need for a royal commission into this whole sordid affair, an independent commission of inquiry to review material and interview witnesses to fully assess the process of representation to the government on issues of national security. Sadly, the inquiry announced by the government falls well short of what is required. Its terms of reference are limited to intelligence agencies and not the manipulation of the facts by government. An inquiry will not have the powers of a royal commission.

I am reminded of an episode of Yes Minister in which the minister, following a departmental leak, calls for an inquiry. Sir Humphrey stuns both the minister and Bernard by suggesting an independent inquiry. When the minister departs, Bernard asks Sir Humphrey: `Why an independent inquiry? Surely such an inquiry with a mind of its own may actually get to the truth of the matter.' Humphrey is not fazed. He advises Bernard that an independent inquiry is a little bit like a freight train: `Both have a mind of their own, but lay down the tracks and that's the path they follow.' Sadly, that is what this government have done with the terms of reference for this further independent inquiry. They have laid down the rails in order to get to the destination they want. What I want to see exposed is the truth.