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Tuesday, 17 June 2003
Page: 16578


Mr CREAN (Leader of the Opposition) (2:09 PM) —My question is to the Prime Minister. Can the Prime Minister confirm that the Office of National Assessments briefed the Minister for Foreign Affairs on 18 and 19 June 2002 on the terrorist threat in our region? In response to a specific question that he asked about possible targets, was the foreign minister told that Bali, Riau and Singapore were assessed to be attractive targets for Jemaah Islamiah, which was identified as the primary regional terrorist threat, and that international hotels, nightclubs, airlines and airports were assessed as being high on terrorist target lists? What action did the foreign minister take to provide this information, which he received four months before the Bali bombing, to the Australian travelling public?


Mr HOWARD (Prime Minister) —I can confirm to the Leader of the Opposition that the foreign minister has issued a statement today attesting that he was provided with an ONA briefing on regional terrorism on 18 and 19 June 2002. That has been the subject of a submission to a Senate inquiry by the Office of National Assessments. The submission confirms that there was no intelligence warning of any kind about the attack on Bali—it confirms it.



The SPEAKER —The member for Griffith!


Mr HOWARD —And it confirms, in that sense, the finding of the Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security, Mr Bill Blick, which was the subject of an unclassified report tabled in this parliament and a classified report that has been made available in full to the Leader of the Opposition. The ONA submission confirms that there was no intelligence warning of a possible terrorist attack in Bali. That is, as I said, consistent with the Blick report. During an ONA briefing on regional terrorism that took place on 18 and 19 June, one ONA analyst, in response to a question from Mr Downer, commented that Bali, Riau and Singapore could be attractive targets—


Mr Rudd —Were assessed to be attractive targets!


The SPEAKER —The member for Griffith!


Mr Rudd —Read it properly!


The SPEAKER —Member for Griffith, for the third time!


Mr HOWARD —This observation was based on speculation about what Jemaah Islamiah had the potential to do, not on any intelligence—I repeat, not on any intelligence. In some 20 written ONA reports on terrorism compiled between this briefing and the Bali attack, there was not one mention of the possibility of an attack in Bali. Significantly, ONA did not include this observation in any of its written assessments. Moreover, during the briefing, Mr Downer expressly asked whether the ONA analysts' observation about Bali required a change in the department's already strong travel advice for Indonesia. ONA's response to the direct question was that there was no specific intelligence about any such threat. As a result, no change was made to the travel advice. Security warnings in the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade travel advisories are based on careful assessments of available intelligence. At the time of the Bali attack, our travel advisory for Indonesia was consistent with other Western countries such as the US and the United Kingdom. It warned Australians of the potential for terrorist bombings, including in areas frequented by tourists.