Mr KERR (9:49 AM) —Before the adjournment last night I mentioned that there were a number of important recommendations that the Joint Committee on the National Crime Authority made, which have been accepted by the government. I will refer to only two of those in detail. I believe the most important is recommendation 14. It states that the bill should be amended to explicitly provide that examiners have to satisfy themselves in each case, before they exercise the coercive powers under the act, that it is appropriate and reasonable to do so and that they must indicate in writing the grounds for their having such an opinion. This means that when a task force builds a case that somebody ought be compelled to provide testimony under the very significant but exceptional powers that are given, currently to the National Crime Authority and now to the Australian Crime Commission, that an independent examiner—that is, an experienced legal practitioner appointed to have independent discretion in relation to these matters—will have to be provided with information by the task force as to why it is appropriate to exercise those coercive powers. Those powers are extraordinary and override the normal right that every person has to remain silent in their own self-interest in relation to any police investigation.

When an examiner forms the view that it is appropriate to exercise coercive powers, they must then record their reasons for having that view. This does three things. Firstly, it will concentrate the task force's mind on the importance of building an appropriate case. Secondly, it means the examiner must assess the adequacy of those grounds. The act of committing those grounds and his reasons—albeit, I imagine, not in an extended form but in a form which at least sustains a record of his reasoning—will provide a safeguard because the act of expressing those grounds and reasons in writing means that there must be reflection and concentration on the task by the examiner.

Thirdly, another benefit is that there will be an audit trail. So if there are any later suggestions that these powers have been used too frivolously or in ways which are capricious, there will be a record which can be examined. That is probably, of all the recommendations, the one which will be key to the community having an assurance that the work of the parliamentary committee was premised on an attempt to get a secure balance between the rights of law enforcement broadly and of individuals, whose individual rights and interests can be so importantly affected by the work of the commission.

I also want to briefly address recommendation 7, although in doing so I want to say that the recommendations about the structure and the way in which the organisation will now be much more effectively managed, by reason of the changes that have been recommended and accepted, should not be dismissed as unimportant. Recommendation 7 is that all complaints against staff of the ACC can be investigated by the Commonwealth Ombudsman. The latter words of that recommendation are `as a minimum'. The reason I draw attention to those words is that there is a body of opinion, which was expressed to the committee looking at this bill, that there needs to be a stronger and consistent integrity and complaints regime that would apply to those who will be working within the ACC. The government's response indicates that it is happy to accept that the Ombudsman would have that role, but two issues then arise: firstly, the resources available to the Ombudsman to undertake that task and, secondly, the effectiveness of the existing integrity regime that applies within the Ombudsman's office.

I have twice spoken in recent weeks about my concerns about the way in which the office of the Ombudsman appears to be structured so that apparent conflicts of interest exist between senior investigative staff—or at least the relationships that exist between those officers and those in internal investigations within the AFP may be seen to be too close. I have become aware of one particular matter, that in relation to Mr Wheeler, which appears to have been dealt with within the Ombudsman's office in a way which gives rise to the profoundly disturbing inference that there was a determination within the office of the Ombudsman that that complaint not be fully and effectively examined in an independent and fully satisfactory way.

I have set out some of my concerns in those speeches and I do not wish to cover that ground again. In order to supplement what I said then, I should refer to two further matters. In those speeches I mentioned that there had been a series of less than easy exchanges in relation to Mr Wheeler's attempts to obtain materials under FOI. Those materials go to his complaint that his matter had not been dealt with in an appropriate and impartial way and that there had been impropriety in the Ombudsman's investigation. I have spoken to the Minister for Science, the member for Gippsland, who is at the table. I propose at the end of this speech to seek leave to table a piece of correspondence from Mr Wheeler to the Deputy Ombudsman, dated 11 November, in which he sets out his further request for FOI materials. In that letter, you will see what plainly appears to be buck-passing and evasion on the substance of that request.

The reason this is so important is that one of the documents I referred to earlier is a note already obtained by Mr Wheeler under FOI. That document appears to suggest—on its face, it plainly suggests—that a senior officer of the Ombudsman directed the investigating staff not to put allegations of misconduct against a senior serving Australian Federal Police officer. Mr Wheeler's further requests under the FOI Act are to obtain the balance of materials which Mr Wheeler suspects would support his view that in fact there was a substantial degree of misconduct in the way in which his complaint was investigated and there was impropriety within that office. Of course, until those documents are discovered to him those suspicions will remain very disturbing. I have drawn conclusions in relation to the materials already exposed which are adverse to the Ombudsman's office and the staff involved. On their face they seem to justify those conclusions. The failure to produce the balance of the documents I think is quite disturbing.

I also mention that, as a result of the two speeches I gave in this House—the first on 23 October and the second on 11 November—the Commonwealth Ombudsman directed correspondence to me indicating that he intended to himself make a review of the office's investigation of the complaint that Mr Wheeler had made. He refers to the criticisms that I have made and the damaging impact of my remarks on the reputation of his office and he seeks from me certain materials. I have responded to Mr McLeod, thanking him for that correspondence and indicating that I am pleased that he is instituting a review of those matters. With no want of respect, I also reasserted my view that an external examination of both the individual case I referred to and the institutional arrangements within the Ombudsman's office is now necessary. I seek leave to table both Mr Wheeler's letter and the exchange of correspondence between the Ombudsman and me. (Time expired.)

Leave granted.