Mr MURPHY (9:32 AM) —It is timely that the Privacy Amendment (Private Sector) Bill 2000 comes before parliament, as it is directly related to recent revelations of breaches of the public confidence and the public interest for which this government is squarely responsible. I refer to the recent breaches in public confidence, including the former Senator Colston affair, the radiologists MRI scan scam and the Reith telecard affair. These three breaches have greatly angered the people of Australia. It is not the seriousness of the offences alone that has angered the Australian community but the lengths gone to to hide those breaches from the public. Thank God for the watchdog—the media.

The moral reasoning behind the introduction of this legislation is that Australia is a signatory to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the ICCPR. Australia's first attempt to comply with its obligations under this bill resulted in the ill-fated Australia Card in the 1980s. The Australia Card failed to be introduced because it was seen as an intrusion into privacy. However, the residual part of the privacy package survived and became known as the Privacy Act 1988, which we have today. The provisions of that act essentially regulate the management of private information in the hands of Commonwealth government agencies. From the outset then, the original purpose of the Privacy Act was compromised. Whilst it afforded more rights in the hands of individuals, it did not and does not make provision for powers to preserve the public interest.

What is the purpose of today's bill? The purpose is to protect individual rights against advances in technology, principally information technology, which may collect, disseminate and analyse information about a person and hence constitute intelligence against that person. This bill seeks to fulfil its obligations under the ICCPR by making provisions that cover the collection, dissemination and analysis of privately held as well as publicly held data.

What moral goods are in issue here and do these moral goods conflict with other goods? There are two positive goods in question: first, an individual's right to privacy and, second, the necessity for Australia to fulfil its moral and legal obligations. Competing against these goods is something I have already mentioned: the public interest. I do not for one moment suggest that the Australia Card was the proper way to provide for the preservation of the public interest. However, I note that in the existing Privacy Act there is precious little public policy rationale that balances the two goods of the individual's interests and our obligations under an international instrument as against the good of preserving the public interest.

I have referred to gap analysis in this house on a previous occasion. Gap analysis is looking at changes to the legislative scheme that exists before an amendment is made, then looking at the scheme after the amendment is made. In this case, the pre-existing law on privacy was a weighted scheme of mutual obligations between citizen and state. Bills Digest 193 of 1999-2000 cites the two rationales for this bill: a positive reason for this bill being analogous to a `human rights' argument, and, secondly, a so-called `pragmatic' argument of financial and trade implications that would affect Australia if we did not become signatories to this bill.

These two arguments truly sum up the liberalism that is the hallmark of this government's attitude to practically every bill it has raised during the last two terms of Commonwealth government. This government first looks to the line of least resistance—that is, the line of law-making that reaches the least amount of resistance from a public morality perspective. This is so even if the law itself would trammel fundamentally matters of grave importance in the public interest. I will in a moment demonstrate the logical consequences of this government's reasoning. With the benefit of the Colston example, which is in all the newspapers this morning, I will show how the existing privacy legislation works—or should I say does not work—in light of this government's misguided policies. For now, it is only necessary for me to say that the rationale for this bill is neither a human rights argument nor a pragmatic one about financial repercussions against Australia if we do not bend to the letter of the backdoor legislation called external affairs powers through the use of international instruments to make laws without the mandate of the public.

What is the intention of the Bills Digest in drawing our attention to privacy being increasingly considered a human right? It is clear from the Bills Digest summary that privacy, like other post-industrial phenomena under the banner of human rights, includes a growing number of so-called rights which in effect deny the good operation of government. Prior to this post-industrial liberalism contaminating our legislative scheme, the duty relationship of the state was as mediate right holder over the citizen. This relationship was based on the intrinsic dignity of the individual, rather than the present case that some international instrument says privacy is a right. Who says privacy is a human right? The answer given by the government is that an OECD instrument says it is. What sort of answer is that? Are our rights as individuals to be determined by the OECD? Or are our rights to be determined by something higher than what is effectively an international trade lobby? It is no less true that a human being's dignity must be preserved by virtue of the disclosive truth that `man is made in God's image'. However, this disclosive truth has been sidelined by this new, false god called the categorical imperative of the international instrument; that is, because the OECD says it is true, therefore it must be true. How false this new god is. Why should this parliament serve it? We must not.

The practical distinction between the human dignity model of moral law and the law afforded by the ratification of international instruments such as the IPP is that the international instrument is imbalanced. In the human dignity model, a system of mutual obligation exists—that is, an individual's immediate rights are measured in proportion to the powers obtained by the state and vice versa. This bill and the Privacy Act are imbalanced in favour of the private person, including corporations. So, too, is the issue of the so-called pragmatic reasoning for today's bill—that is, the bill is moved so as to ensure that pragmatic economic and trade pressures require the safe collection, storage and security of personal information for trade to be preserved. It is this so-called pragmatic argument with which I am particularly concerned. This argument is again making a priority of what is called pragmatism to justify this bill being passed.

There is a point at issue which is most sinister in this bill. I mentioned earlier that the bill is drafted so as to more fully comply with the ICCPR. In addition, Bills Digest No. 193 notes:

In a previous speech in this House I made a statement on the encroachment of globalisation. In that speech, I referred to the abortive effort of this government to fulfil its obligations to ratify domestic legislation in compliance with another international instrument to which Australia is a party—the Multilateral Agreement on Investment. In the MAI, an explicit attempt was made by this government to introduce legislation that would make it an offence to have legislation which hindered the free flow of capital.

It is interesting to note that both the IPPs and the MAI are OECD instruments. It is the OECD that is behind the policy rationales this government is pursuing with such vigour. Both the IPP and the MAI are built on an ethical foundation that private interest is paramount over public interest. Both seek to create a world where the government of the day must adhere to the private interest. In both instruments, the private interest is paramount. This line of reasoning appeals to notions of liberalism. Liberalism, especially of this present government, appeals to some people's senses. Some people think: `A thing is good to me, therefore it is good.' This line of thinking reduces everything to a `right'—`It is my right to do this or that.' Rights based legislation is defective, for it denies any meaningful analysis of means or end and, therefore, law based on the morality of obtaining means. The government is building a legislative scheme on rights alone. This government is denying the possibility of categorical imperatives that are immutable duty relationships between the citizen and the state. There are ontological truths based on the philosophy of mutual obligation. Citizens are duty bound to their country. We all abide by social contracts that we will prescribe to behave according to a minimum socially accepted code of conduct. This is the criminal code. By denying the ability to prosecute on behalf of the public interest, this government is denying the operation of the public interest. This government is saying that it is simply too hard to implement the public interest; so, in effect, this government is abandoning the public interest.

What is necessary for the good operation of government? It is necessary for all law to be balanced. On the one hand, it is never permissible for a public or national interest to override a person's dignity—that is dictatorship. Nor is governance of a country capable of cohesion if an individual's so-called rights are so great as to dash the prosecution of the state in enforcing the public interest. True, this balancing of competing public and private interests is a delicate balancing act, and often one side of the scale will tip to the detriment of the other. Indeed, it is always a series of perpetual adjustments with the development of extrinsic variables such as technology—the catalyst mentioned here today and the reason behind this bill.

I put to this House that the scales of the current legislative scheme in the Privacy Act and ancillary legislation are tipped against the public interest and in favour of the private interest. I say this specifically with many public interest issues in mind such as the travel rorts scandal of former Senator Mal Colston, the Reith $50,000 telecard affair and the billion dollar radiologists MRI scan scam.

What is the relevance of these three scandals to the bill before us today? I turn to the issue of former Senator Colston. Following the Attorney-General's reply to my question on notice No. 1154 of 15 February 2000, I asked the Attorney-General a further question, No. 1573, on 29 May 2000 on the application of the IPPs to the prosecution of former Senator Colston. The Attorney-General admitted that details of travel expenditure involve expenditure of public money and is a matter within the public interest and, hence, raise issues of protection of public revenue for the purposes of the Privacy Act 1988. The Attorney-General noted that disclosure of the former senator's medical records `is not reasonably necessary for the protection of the public revenue'. Under the IPP, the Attorney-General said that this policy did not compel him to disclose the names and reports of the two eminent and independent medical specialists, and concluded by saying that there is `insufficient public interest to justify the release of the information'. The Attorney-General just did not believe there was sufficient public interest and relied on the information privacy principles to deny me access to this information. In his media statement on 5 July 1999, the director noted:

On 4 September 2000 I asked the Attorney-General a further question on notice, No. 1925. This question was answered on 19 October 2000. At question (7) of question on notice No. 1925, I put to the Attorney-General:

The Attorney General answered:

At question (10), I asked:

The Attorney-General answered:

In light of the information privacy principles and how the director has applied them, can any member of this House explain how the public interest can be satisfied, given the Attorney-General's admission that the matter would be reconsidered if evidence contrary to earlier advice could be obtained? How is that evidence to be obtained but through an initiative of the Director of Public Prosecutions himself? My further question 13(e) asked:

The Attorney-General answered:

Yesterday was 19 months to the day since 7 April 1999, since any medical evidence of former Senator Colston's condition was put before the DPP. However, I quote from today's media:

On 22 June 2000, at 12.13 p.m. precisely, my electorate officer, Ms Susan Sheather, received a telephone call in my office here in Parliament House from a woman who identified herself as Mrs Dawn Colston. She attempted to intimidate Ms Sheather and threatened to blow the whistle on all Labor Party members of parliament if I were to continue to ask questions in parliament about her husband. I have not noticed Mrs Dawn Colston tendering any evidence to the DPP, the parliament or anywhere else in respect of the behaviour of any members of this parliament, and I invite her to do so. She should know something about it.

Further, her husband is supposed to have a terminal illness. I do not wish former Senator Colston ill but, after 19 months, is it reasonable for the DPP to reconsider reopening this matter? I say that in light of reports that, since 7 April 1999, former Senator Colston has been seen dining out. He has been seen travelling inside and outside Queensland. He is well enough to write letters to the editor of the Brisbane Courier-Mail. However, we are advised that he is not well enough to stand trial. Why does it have to come to this point, when the application of the information privacy principles should so thwart the operation of justice as to make a mockery of the judicial system and turn privacy powers into a game of cat and mouse?

Why must the only notice of protection of the public interest in the Reith telecard scandal first come to the attention of the public through the media release of the Canberra Times? The telecard scandal went for six months without either rectification or discipline. Had it not been for the excellent journalism of the Canberra Times, we might never have discovered the $50,000 of alleged public theft at all. Now the figure could be even higher. And who knows what other unaccounted rorts, errors, omissions, et cetera, are going on, yet to be discovered?

The DPP continues to pursue the scoundrel Christopher Skase, and rightly so, who is seen regularly on television in a wheelchair complete with a mask and oxygen cylinders to give him life support. In other words, the DPP thinks Christopher Skase—a respiratory cripple—is fit enough to stand trial, but not former Senator Malcolm Arthur Colston, who is obviously active. What a joke the DPP is! As I have said, I have been pursing this matter with questions on notice since 15 February this year and it is like drawing blood out of a stone.

The IPPs discriminate against the public interest. I have personally witnessed the effects of the application of the IPPs in the context of the many questions I have asked in the Colston affair. We are still left wondering what evidence was relied upon by the director in refusing to pursue prosecution. Only public outcry and humiliation against Minister Reith compelled him to pay back the $50,000. The public demands accountability. The public wants justice. The public abhors politicians who have their snouts in the trough. This bill capitalises on the same information privacy principles that have contaminated public accountability. Whether public or private, this bill must make adjustment for a well-balanced role, through proportionate statutory reserve powers in the hands of government, for people to have access to information when there are public moneys or a matter of public interest at stake. Otherwise, we are creating a world where privacy may deny accountability, against the public interest. This new world of globalisation is precisely what the OECD and the corporate world want—a world where the corporations are increasingly non-accountable to the public. In the Colston affair, it is a government agency—namely, the DPP—that is judge, jury and executioner of the application of the IPPs. In this legislation it will be self-serving industry groups that will be responsible for prosecuting voluntary industry codes of conduct in compliance with the IPPs. Who watches the watchdog?

The DPP may sit there and simply deny the information under `privacy' because he believes there is insufficient public interest to release. However, the Attorney-General has on record contradicted him by establishing a test under fresh evidence that should be applied. Moreover, the likely outcome of the DPP's treatment of this matter is that, unless we persist with a line of questioning as I have done over the greater part of this year, the matter would be dead and buried. This seems to be the DPP's approach—let the sleeping dog lie. He is utterly uninterested in prosecuting this cause in the public interest. He just hopes the whole matter will go away. I am fortified to some extent that in today's newspapers he seems to be resurrecting his interest. So too there is a case of deja vu in the matter of the Reith telecard scandal. The government knew of the scandal before it made the front pages of the Canberra Times. However, it chose to do nothing. Not until the public outcry over the wrongness of the act did the government act.

What is the likely repercussion of this bill? It is a case of the same application of so-called privacy provisions in the private sphere. For who can ensure that the public interest will not be trammelled by determinations of the Privacy Commissioner or, worse still, an approved code adjudicator? This government is obsessed by privatisation, to the extent that even the adjudicators may be non-accountable persons. With regard to my questions to the Attorney-General, I believe that I have been denied information of significant public interest on matters involving the Commonwealth being defrauded of significant revenue. I am a federal member of parliament and I was denied this information. What hope does the public itself have in dealing directly with the Privacy Commissioner or any other government agency?

The IPPs as applied have demonstrated that they do not serve society or even the individual. They ignore collective powers and ensure that fraud against the Commonwealth, abuse of public revenues and other offences against the public interest cannot be prosecuted. In light of these demonstrated examples, I urge the government to make provisions that ensure that a balanced approach to privacy can work within a system of mutual obligation and not a system we currently see of individual exclusivity from public accountability. I oppose the bill. Finally, I draw to the attention of the DPP my question on notice No. 2145 in today's Notice Paper—again to the Attorney-General—in relation to the Colston affair. I reckon he should have a hard look at my questions.