Mr KERR (11:11 AM) —by leave—I move opposition amendments Nos 1 to 3:

(1) Page 1 (after line 4), insert:

Part 1—Preliminary

(2) Page 2 (after line 18), insert:

Part 2—Establishment of Commonwealth Law Enforcement Committee

4 Establishment and membership

(1) As soon as practicable after the commencement of the Act and after commencement of the first session of each Parliament, a joint committee of members of the Parliament, to be known as the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Commonwealth Law Enforcement, must be appointed.

(2) The Parliamentary Joint Committee must consist of 10 members, of whom:

(a) 5 must be senators appointed by the Senate; and

(b) 5 must be members of the House of Representatives appointed by that House.

(3) The appointment of members by a House must be in accordance with that House's practice relating to the appointment of members of that House to serve on joint committees of both Houses.

(4) A person is not eligible for appointment as a member if he or she is:

(a) a Minister; or

(b) a Parliamentary Secretary; or

(c) the President of the Senate; or

(d) the Speaker of the House of Representatives; or

(e) the Deputy President and Chairman of Committees of

the Senate; or

(f) the Deputy Speaker of the House of Representatives

(5) A member ceases to hold office:

(a) when the House of Representatives expires or is dissolved; or

(b) if he or she becomes the holder of an office referred to in a paragraph of subsection (4); or

(c) if he or she ceases to be a member of the House by which he or she was appointed; or

(d) if he or she resigns his or her office as provided by subsection (6) or (7), as the case requires.

(6) A member appointed by the Senate may resign his or her office by writing signed and delivered to the President of the Senate.

(7) A member appointed by the House of Representatives may resign his or her office by writing signed and delivered to the Speaker of that House.

(8) A House may appoint one of its members to fill a vacancy among the members of that Parliamentary Joint Committee appointed by that House.

5 Powers and proceedings

(1) Subject to this part, matters not covered in this Act relating to the Parliamentary Joint Committee's powers and proceedings must be determined by resolution of both Houses.

(2) The Committee and any subcommittee thereof established pursuant to resolution of both Houses, shall have power to send for persons, papers and records.

(3) Individuals and agencies requested to provide information under subsection (2) or any other provision of this Act shall comply with the terms of such a request save that individuals and agencies requested to provide such information shall not be required to disclose information on current operational matters if, in the opinion of the individual or the agency head, such disclosure would be likely to prejudice the conduct of a current operation or investigation.

(4) The Committee and any subcommittee thereof shall have power to acquire, consider and make use of the evidence and records of the Joint Committee on the National Crime Authority appointed during the thirty-ninth and previous Parliaments.

(5) Any inquiry being conducted by the Joint Committee on the National Crime Authority at the time of the commencement of this Act shall stand referred to the Committee, and the Committee shall report the findings of the inquiry to the Parliament.

6 Duties

The Parliamentary Joint Committee's duties are:

(a) to consult with Commonwealth Law Enforcement Agencies which exist or which may be established including the Australian Federal Police, the Director of Public Prosecutions, the Australian Customs Service, the National Crime Authority, the Office of National Assessment, the Australian Bureau of Criminal Intelligence, the Australian Transaction Reports and Analysis Centre, and the Australian Securities and Investment Commission; and

(b) to consult with other Commonwealth agencies having a law enforcement function which exist or which may be established including the Australian Defence Forces, the Australian Taxation Office, the Australian Quarantine Inspection Service, the Department of Immigration and Multicultural Affairs and the Department of Social Security; and

(c) to assess:

(i) the strategic environment of the Commonwealth's law enforcement agencies and the resources needed to meet identified threats;

(ii) the cooperative environment in which those agencies operate; and

(iii) the mechanisms needed to ensure that those agencies are accountable to the Parliament and the public; and

(d) to report from time to time to both Houses on the assessments in (c) and

(e) from time to time, to inquire into and, as soon as practicable after the inquiry has been completed, to report to both Houses on Commonwealth law enforcement issues and on the cooperative arrangements between Commonwealth and States law enforcement agencies.

(3) Schedule 2, after item 35 (after line 27), insert:

National Crime Authority Act 1984

35A Sections 52, 53, 54 and 55

Repeal sections.

These amendments take up the point that was mentioned by the Attorney-General in relation to the detailed proposals we are putting forward for a parliamentary oversight committee for law enforcement. I must say that I am disappointed at the Attorney's peremptory rejection of this proposal. The case he makes is a thin one. It may be that on further reflection the government is prepared to reconsider its position in relation to this matter. I believe there is considerable merit in establishing a parliamentary joint committee which has responsibility for not just one specific area of Commonwealth law enforcement interest but in the larger interests of how we have those law enforcement arrangements coordinated and made most effective so that there is a relationship between law enforcement and this parliament.

I was puzzled by the Attorney's comment that he saw this as perhaps an intrusion into the traditional role of the executive. That may have some force in the sense that this parliament has hitherto not had available to it a committee which examines this range of issues. But it is no intrusion into the executive's role in relation to foreign affairs that this parliament has a committee charged with responsibilities in relation to defence, nor indeed in relation to the responsibilities of the Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs that it has a joint committee charged with examination of matters relating to migration. Those committees do undertake important tasks, usually with a very much bipartisan basis, in examining challenges that emerge that this parliament itself has national constitutional responsibility for. No area of this parliament's responsibility is more important than having a proper, forward looking response to the issues that present to us in the area of law enforcement.

There are a number of Commonwealth agencies which do have responsibilities with regard to these issues, of course pre-eminently the Australian Federal Police. That is why the opportunity is being taken in this legislation to address these particular amendments. Of course, the Australian Customs Service, the National Crime Authority, the Office of National Assessment, the Australian Bureau of Criminal Intelligence and the Australian Defence Force have some interest and responsibility in these matters, as do the Director of Public Prosecutions, the Australian Taxation Office, which has large investigative and prosecutorial roles, the Australian Quarantine and Inspection Service, the Department of Immigration and Multicultural Affairs, the Department of Social Security, the Australian Transaction Reports and Analysis Centre and the Australian Securities and Investments Commission.

There is no process in this parliament at the moment that enables those agencies to bring to the parliament's attention any concerns in relation to the law enforcement regime. This parliament also has no process available to it to address the second point we are proposing this committee have responsibility for—that is, the assessment of the strategic environment of the Commonwealth's law enforcement agencies, their cooperation mechanisms for accountability and the resources that are needed to meet identifiable threats.

When we were in government, the Commonwealth law enforcement review identified the need for long-term strategic intelligence assessment, and the public discussion of those matters was of great significance. We are not suggesting necessarily that these matters be addressed in public; that would be a matter for the committee in its determination. These committees of their nature have government majorities, and so much of those long-term strategic matters which have any sensitivity which might be agitated could be discussed in that private domain. They need not get out.

Indeed, I think almost everyone, including the minister, would say that the Joint Committee on the National Crime Authority which has served this parliament has in the broad been a very successful contributor to the work of the National Crime Authority and to the cooperation that is extended between the parliament and the authority. Similar remarks to what I am making now have been made by the former chair of the National Crime Authority and by former ministers. (Time expired)