Mr GEORGIOU (5:30 PM) —by leave—The Collins class submarine project is a massive endeavour in terms of its expenditure, its complexity and its potential contribution to Australia's defence. Its significance for Australia's defence is underscored by the fact that the Defence Corporate Plan 1996-2000 states that the introduction of the Collins class submarines into service is a key strategy in achieving Defence's foremost objectives of making the ADF capable of defeating any attack which could be credibly mounted against Australia. Unfortunately, the JCPAA report identified a number of significant shortcomings in the project. The strategic consequence of these shortcomings in the project and its management is a gap in Australia's defence posture at a time of uncertainty and change in the immediate strategic environment.

On the evidence before the committee, the scenario was for a smooth handover from Oberon to Collins, given that the agreed scheduled delivery matched the progressive decommissioning of our six Oberons. It is now transparent that this has not happened. Events set in train back in 1987 mean that today, midway through 1999, not only does Australia lack the submarine capacity that it has already paid for, but our defence capacity has indeed been diminished from what was provided by the Oberon fleet over the past two decades. To put it bluntly, the first Collins submarine was due to be fully operational by 1996 and, by the current year, we were due to have five new submarines deployed to full capacity. And what do we have? We have none that are fully operational. It will be, on Navy estimates, a further three years at least before the six Collins submarines will be in a state of full operational capacity.

It was never intended that Australia's operational submarine fleet would fall below three; the fact is that today it is one: the Oberon class HMAS Otama. In hard terms, we have spent $5 billion in the process and yet have only a single 20-year-old boat in readiness—a boat that was intended to have been pensioned off. Indeed, as the committee was told, in the event of a problem with the Otama, we have not a single submarine which is at the level defined by Navy as that required to deploy in a wartime operational situation. The head of the inquiry launched into the project, Sir Malcolm McIntosh, commented recently: `It is barely enough for the submarine to go to sea safely, and you certainly couldn't possibly go to war in it.' Australia now lacks an effective submarine force and is presented with a strategic gap.

The unintended consequences flowing from the problems with the Collins project are significant. No amount of bureaucratic obfuscation should be permitted to hide the fact that one of the most disconcerting aspects of the hearings was the need to cut through Defence's damage control and bureaucratic mantras—and I do appreciate my honourable friend's comments about naval culture. Too often, Defence's responses were not transparent and straightforward.

Commonsense dictates that the pursuit of leading edge technology needs to be supported with high quality risk management. This did not happen. The project pursued the former but the latter was not achieved. It is now too late to turn back the clock. What has happened has happened, but the problems do need to be recognised, deficiencies do need to be remedied, and it is still not too late to learn.

The committee's report and its recommendations seek to establish a clearer picture of what went wrong, why and how in future it could be avoided. The recommendations, in their entirety, address this, especially recommendation No. 6. These recommendations represent an opportunity to ensure that appropriate procedures are put in place for the future. It is important, as recommendation No. 6 provides, that realistic allowances be made for contingencies and delivery schedules for major Department of Defence projects and changeovers in platform types.

In a positive sense, it is to be sincerely hoped that very real and tangible lessons have been learned from the Collins experience. I would like to thank my colleagues on the committee, the committee secretariat and, in particular, Jennifer Hughson and Tiana Gray for their work in producing a very substantial report.