Mr HAWKER (12:49 PM) —I join with the member for Calwell in speaking to the tabling of this report on the loss of HMAS Sydney and I would certainly support the remarks that he has made. The work of the Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade has been first class. I particularly endorse his comments about Senator MacGibbon, who has done an outstanding job in chairing what has been a very difficult inquiry and one that—as I think those of us who have had any involvement would realise—raised high emotions and one that worked under some very difficult circumstances in trying to get the facts, of which some will never be known.

Overall the inquiry has shown that parliamentary committees—in particular, the Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade—can do some very worthwhile work, even given the time delay in trying to look at what was a very tragic occasion in Australia's maritime and wartime history.

As has been pointed out, the HMAS Sydney was lost with all hands on 19 November 1941. This accounted for more than 35 per cent of the Royal Australian Navy servicemen killed in action between 1939 and 1945. For 12 days after the incident the government issued no less than 11 censorship notices preventing the publication of details before the Prime Minister was prepared to confirm on 1 December that the Sydney had indeed been sunk. With no explanation given as to how the Sydney and her crew had disappeared, rumours of government cover-ups began. Suspicions were heightened for a number of reasons: firstly, the delay in making the official announcement, despite widespread public rumour; secondly, the lack of any real explanation when the announcement did come; thirdly, the secrecy which surrounded the official investigation of the disaster which continued into January 1942; and, fourthly, the many obvious questions which the government failed to publicly address.

As the member for Calwell has pointed out, the committee in its report made 18 recommendations to cover a range of issues that were raised during the inquiry and which the committee felt were important to respond to. Clearly, in those recommendations a very serious attempt has been made through the parliament to try to address the many concerns that are raised by those who keep asking, quite validly, questions as what really did happen and why we still seem to know so little about this terrible tragedy that occurred to what was the pride of the Australian Navy of the time.

I would like to talk a little about references to the need to open up the archives. In the first recommendation the committee asks that the public have full access to all the material. It is quite amazing the amount of material that is there on the Sydney itself. What is still not known is to what extent there is material there that people are still unaware of that may shed further light on that tragic day in November 1941.

There have been several publications since the Second World War. For example, in 1981 Michael Montgomery published Who Sank the Sydney. He gave that account based on the archival material made available to the public in 1972. Montgomery's account reflected his strong conviction that a cover-up had indeed occurred. Several more volumes on the disaster followed in subsequent years with differing views on what had occurred on that fateful day, including the more recent one, Tom Frame's HMAS Sydney. Loss and Con troversy. This book, which was published in 1993, also looked at the issue of suppressed documentation, calling the sinking `a grand conspiracy of deception within officialdom'.

Conspiracy theorists maintain that somewhere in official government archives there must exist documents that provide answers to many of the unanswered questions. Suspicions that documentary evidence had been destroyed, misplaced or concealed led to the committee examining the issue of archival material as part of the inquiry. As such, the committee recommended that the Australian government review the operations of the Archives Act 1983 with regard to making available to the public all material relating to World War II, including the 21.6 kilometres of material on the shelves relating to the Sydney.

It is a staggering amount of material and one would appreciate that the sheer logistics of assessing that material is a major task. However, we believe that that recommendation is one that should be followed up to assist those who still have many concerns, including the relatives and successors of those who tragically lost their lives on that occasion, together with many other friends and relations. It is not an unreasonable recommendation.

Until 1966 access was restricted to records at least 50 years old. This 50-year rule, as it was known, was changed in December 1970 when the then government introduced a 30-year rule. This change saw the introduction of several changes to the rules governing public access to government materials, allowing materials about the events of World War II to become accessible. However, not all records were publicly available from that time. Access to such records was discretionary with documents needing to be checked for sensitivity. Departments could withhold exceptionally sensitive papers, the disclosure of which would be contrary to the public interest, whether on security or other grounds. Furthermore, departments could withhold documents containing information supplied in confidence the release of which might constitute a breach of good faith, and information about individuals the disclosure of which would cause distress or embarrassment to living persons. It is with those caveats that the changes were brought into place.

In 1984, with the proclamation of the Archives Act, the discretion of government agencies to unilaterally refuse access to these records was removed. The Archives Act now gives the public a right of access to government records over 30 years old, with an exception for those records falling into certain categories. The Archives Act overrides the secrecy provisions in almost all other legislation for records over 30 years old. The committee believes that it is unlikely that any material relating to the Second World War retains a degree of sensitivity that warrants exemption. Although most of this material is considered to be accessible, difficulties arise as the materials cannot be accessed until cleared on a piece-by-piece basis.

The committee believes the decision should be taken to make all material relating to the Second World War open to public access on a blanket basis. This would place the onus on individuals to undertake archival research into the loss of the HMAS Sydney free of restrictions which in the past have fuelled suspicions that material is being withheld.

Obviously, the report will not put an end to much of the speculation surrounding the loss of the HMAS Sydney. However, allowing historians to access the wealth of information being held on the Sydney and on the Second World War may finally achieve that and more light may be shed on the whole subject.

This has been a very big inquiry by the committee. As I say, 18 recommendations have been made and they have been canvassed already in part. It shows that the recommendations to government do take into account the whole range of submissions provided and give a very serious and sober assessment of what can be done, albeit many years later.

I have great pleasure in supporting the tabling of this report and will certainly be recommending to the government that they respond to these 18 recommendations favourably. We hope that those who feel such loss will gain some solace from what is being offered.