Senator HILL --What responsibility does the AFP accept for the appalling failure to protect the Iranian Embassy?

Senator Tate --The report in relation to this incident has been tabled in parliament. First of all, it indicates a chronology of events and from that there are conclusions drawn as to deficiencies in the operation of the various agencies which were concerned, including the Australian Federal Police, and there is an indication of the steps taken to remedy any defects so identified.

Senator Evans put down a statement on the report on the incident at the Iranian Embassy and that was put into the Senate on Tuesday, 28 April of this year. As I say, it outlines a chronology. It certainly indicates, for example in relation to the AFP, a certain revision of procedures, including those which ensure that the national office of ASIO, rather than the ACT regional office, and the PSCC are advised of incidents, or potential incidents, concerning missions. Quite clearly, that might have been a better path to take with this incident.

Senator HILL --I do not remember that report. I certainly do not remember a report that sets out courses of action to be taken as a result of the evident deficiencies.

Senator Tate --I have got it here in Hansard, Senator. As I say, it goes into--

Senator HILL --Was that the immediate one from Ministers within a week or so? If it is that one I do not think it said much at all. Perhaps I should ask some more specific questions. Is it in fact the case that Iranian Embassy officials notified the AFP some hours before the attack of the potential security threat?

Mr Bates --No, that is not the case.

Senator HILL --Could you tell me whether you were contacted by the Iranian Embassy?

Mr Bates --No, we were contacted by the Australian Protective Security organisation.

Senator HILL --Did it tell you that it had been contacted by the Iranian Embassy with suggestions of a security threat?

Mr Bates --Yes, that is so.

Senator HILL --And that was some hours before the attack took place?

Mr Bates --That is correct.

Senator HILL --What was your action, or reaction, to that?

Mr Bates --Action was immediately taken to upgrade the patrol presence in and around the embassy and in fact the special intelligence duty officer was called out and attended and took information. He in fact worked into the early hours of the morning assessing the information as best he could and as a result of contact with the regional office of ASIO--

Senator HILL --I am sorry, would you take it more slowly. You are saying that he assessed the information. Did he make contact with the Iranian Embassy?

Mr Bates --As I recall, yes, he did make contact with the Iranian Embassy and--

Senator HILL --When was that?

Mr Bates --In the early hours of the morning.

Senator HILL --Right.

Mr Bates --I have not got the time in front of me but it would have been somewhere in the vicinity of 7 a.m. that he spoke with the regional officer from ASIO about the information.

Senator HILL --So this duty officer, who obviously has a particular responsibility in these types of matters, contacted the Iranian Embassy direct and took advice.

Mr Bates --Yes.

Senator HILL --I suppose he spoke to the Protective Services people as well?

Mr Bates --Yes.

Senator HILL --And then in the early hours of the morning he spoke to the relevant people at ASIO as well?

Senator Tate --I think there is some confusion, first of all on my part and then I think on Mr Bates's part. The document I was referring to as being placed in the Parliament, as you identified, is the document that was put down by Ministers on 28 April. Within that there is a chronology of events set out. That indicates that the AFP was first notified, as I read it, by the APS at about 3.30 on the morning of the incident. At 3.50, according to this chronology, the AFP directed its patrols to include Iranian Embassy locations. At 8.30 the AFP discussed the situation with ASIO ACT regional office.

Senator HILL --It sounds as if your report is deficient in that actions were taken in the meantime.

Senator Tate --That what?

Senator HILL --Mr Bates tells us that in the meantime, before then, the specialist officer of the AFP was called out and had met with the Iranian Embassy staff.

Senator Tate --That is not right. I do not think Mr Bates has the report in front of him, and I do not believe that that recollection by Mr Bates--

Mr Bates --I am now looking at the report and, in fact, the special intelligence officer was the person who came out and spoke with the people. I can assure the senator of that.

Senator HILL --With the Iranian Embassy people?

Mr Bates --Yes.

Senator HILL --What time was that?

Mr Bates --It would have been 9.30.

Senator Tate --That is right, 9.30. That is not the early hours of the morning, which is precisely the point that Senator Hill and I are making. The time of 9.30 is well after the cock crows.

CHAIRMAN --Minister, I have to interrupt you briefly to allow for a short adjournment for Hansard to change its tape. At the same time I seek to incorporate some questions on notice from Senator Knowles. Is it the wish of the Committee that the questions be incorporated in Hansard? There being no objection, it is so ordered.

[The questions appear at the conclusion of today's proceedings.]

Short adjournment

Senator RICHARDSON --In the absence of Senator Hill, I wish to ask Mr Bates: you said that there was `increased surveillance', did you not?

Mr Bates --I said that there was an increased number of patrols.

Senator RICHARDSON --Do you have a laid-out series of steps you take, depending upon how grave the threat is assessed to be? Is there a laid-down set of rules and regulations that say, `If we think the threat is bad we will do such and such, and if it is a very bad threat we will do a bit more.'? Are there guidelines for this, or is this entirely something that you determine as each incident crops up?

Mr Bates --No, there are certainly laid-down procedures. In fact, depending upon the incident itself, the national anti-terrorist plan would be activated at a local level. There are procedures that are stepped through from that point of view, again in terms of upgrading patrols and also of notifying particular people and organisations. That continues through, depending on the incident itself.

Senator RICHARDSON --If you upgraded patrols, what more would you have to have been told about the gravity of the situation to have the next tier of the guidelines brought into play?

Senator Tate --I will hazard an answer to that. The AFP, at about a quarter to nine in the morning, asked the Australian Protective Service whether a static guard should be provided. In other words, there was a recognition that there was a degree of seriousness which might require the placing of a static guard, and the AFP officer obviously had that in mind as a proper response and asked. He was advised by APS that DFAT did not require one, because a little earlier the Australian Protective Service had contacted DFAT; the APS suggested extra staffing or resources, meaning by that the provision of a static guard. The DFAT officer, on the information available to him, did not think that it was necessary to post a static guard.

It was not for the AFP to make that judgment. It was proper, and it indicates good sense, to ask the question of APS, which had asked it, as it had thought, of the proper officer in DFAT. It came back to the AFP that a static guard was not required and that the increased patrolling was the way to go. Then the AFP, at 9.30, telephoned the Iranian Embassy to discuss increased security. The Embassy said, `Yes, we would like to discuss increased security' and the Embassy suggested that the meeting should take place at 1 o'clock in the afternoon. It set the time, not the AFP; we would have been ready at any time, virtually. As you would know, the APS and the AFP each made patrols. The last APS patrol to pass the Embassy, the mission, went by at 20 to 12. AFP made its last patrol past there at 11.45. No problems were noted. The incident occurred at about midday.

Senator RICHARDSON --Does that mean that the AFP does not actually make an assessment of the threat? Is it your role to ask other agencies how great the threat might be, using their intelligence? I take it that that is the position you are outlining.

Mr Bates --One of the most important aspects was the contact of ASIO. As a result of that contact and a subsequent meeting which was going to be arranged, a proper threat assessment was to be made based upon the information we had received and, indeed, any information that it might have had or could have found out fairly quickly.

Senator RICHARDSON --But the import of my question, Mr Bates, is to ask who is responsible for making the assessment. I understand that one has to be made, but who actually makes it?

Senator Tate --Let us suppose that certain inquiries had been made in a more timely way, or at all, by the AFP or the APS earlier in the day. Suppose that, for example, instead of going to the ASIO regional office, which is a perfectly sensible thing to do, they had gone to the central office in order to short-circuit the time it took for the regional office of ASIO to pass the matter to the central office to get this threat assessment business under way, or that the AFP had contacted the Protective Services Coordination Centre. Then that threat assessment procedure would have been undertaken in a much more timely way, though whether it would have been completed by midday is a moot point. In the report put in to the Parliament by Ministers we note that the AFP, for example, did not advise ASIO until 8.30, nor did it advise the Protective Services Coordination Centre.

Perhaps to that extent--to answer Senator Hill's initial question--some fault lies with the AFP in its response. But when one looks at the whole period before the incident erupted at midday, one has to say, I believe, that the AFP did act in a responsible way by seeking to notify the ASIO regional office and by seeking from APS whether a static guard should be placed or not. It got a response which was dependent on the APS conversation with DFAT.

Senator HILL --It still does not really answer Senator Richardson's question: which of all these bodies is ultimately responsible for assessing a threat?

Mr Bates --The PSCC is the central coordinating agency.

Senator Tate --The Protective Services and Security Coordination Centre.

Senator HILL --Is it the Centre's job to assess the threat?

Mr Reaburn --No. It is the Centre's job to organise the assessment of a threat. In the circumstances that you are describing--where there is actually time to sit down and do an assessment of this kind--threat assessments are conducted by the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation. It is the agency responsible. That is not to say that any operational agency could not, as part of its own operational response, make limited or preliminary or transitional assessments of the way it sees the possibility of a threat and react accordingly. However, the agency responsible for providing Government with threat assessments is ASIO.

Senator HILL --In an operational circumstance?

Mr Reaburn --In normal circumstances ASIO would provide a threat assessment in advance. In other words, it is looking at possibilities, probabilities, things of that kind. Operational responses are then geared in the light of that kind of probability set. If you are dealing with an immediate operational response, that is a matter that invariably is handled by operational agencies, quite properly.

Senator RICHARDSON --But is it not the case that with so many cooks stirring this broth no-one is actually cooking it? When one goes back and looks at the incident, it is difficult to understand at exactly what point which organisation should have taken a further step. It would seem, from what Senator Tate has said, that the Australian Federal Police, in making the calls that it made, contacted pretty well everyone you could imagine ought to be contacted. But one is still left with the thought that with everyone contacting everyone else, who is supposed to say to themselves, `Hang on, there's a bit of a problem here, we had better go and do something'?

Senator Tate --As the Ministers said in their report to the Parliament, none of the agencies concerned--the AFP, the APS, ASIO or DFAT--had the commonsense to telephone the Protective Security Coordination Centre. Even while they were waiting for a full ASIO threat assessment, based on overseas cables and what they knew about activity in Australia, whether it was likely to be coordinated or an imitation of events overseas, they could still have said, `Just as a holding matter, until we get the threat assessment, for God's sake, let us put a static guard on'. But I believe that the key fault in this whole matter was that the PSCC was not alerted.

Senator HILL --So, the body responsible for coordinating the response was not informed of the problem, by any of the agencies?

Senator Tate --That is right.

Senator RICHARDSON --That goes back to the guidelines for the response, does it not?

Senator Tate --Yes.

Senator RICHARDSON --Is there a guideline that says, `Thou shalt call . . . '?

Mr Bates --The answer to that is, clearly, yes.

Senator HILL --Would all of these agencies have had that guideline?

Mr Bates --Without doubt. As the Minister said, from our point of view, we failed.

Senator HILL --It sounds as though not only you failed, but all of the agencies failed.

Mr Bates --I would accept that too.

Senator Tate --All the agencies failed to contact that particular organisation.

Senator RICHARDSON --I am only alleging that.

Senator Tate --You may think that of course it is in my portfolio and therefore I would say this, but I do believe the AFP officers made the right contact with ASIO and certainly made the right contact with the Iranian Embassy and certainly asked the right questions of the APS.

Mr Bates --The AFP officer wrongly assumed that ASIO would make contact with PSCC.

Senator RICHARDSON --But probably ASIO is going to say that it wrongly assumed that the AFP had already done that, or the APS or whatever, is it not?

Mr Bates --But that was the assumption. In the light of this meeting that was going to occur, the officer wrongly assumed that PSCC would be notified by ASIO.

Senator RICHARDSON --The only ones that got it right were SBS.

Senator HILL --But the Australian Protective Services, which I think is under this division as well, is it not, had made the assessment that a static guard should be put in place.

Senator Tate --No, APS phoned DFAT and suggested that extra resources or staffing ought to be provided, meaning by that, certainly in the mind of the APS officer, that a static guard ought to be provided. The DFAT officer did not consider that one needed to go beyond the increased patrolling that was being undertaken. On the information available to him he did not think that a static guard was required.

Senator HILL --On the basis of the recommendations of Mr Codd, what has changed?

Senator Tate --The major change has been that the APS and the AFP are now within the one portfolio. We believe that will lead over a period of time--it is very early days, of course--to greater cooperation and collaboration, although I do not want to suggest that there has been a lack of that, between the agencies. There is also a review being undertaken within each agency, though it was pretty quickly after this event of course, of the steps they need to take to ensure that their officers are properly trained and aware of a better process of carrying out what they should have done in relation to notifying the PSCC. The other matter is that the Federal Justice Office, within the portfolio, now has the tasking of the Australian Protective Service in so far as the protection of embassies and diplomats all around Australia are concerned--

Senator HILL --So who does?

Senator Tate --We do now within the AG's Department, within the Federal Justice Office, whereas before it was DFAT.

Senator HILL --Who in the Federal Justice Office?

Senator Tate --That is just a part of the Attorney-General's Department. There were too many departments running around, that was the point.

Senator RICHARDSON --Perhaps there were too many agencies. Is it the case that this difficulty might point to a need to change the status of the APS in so far as it relates to the Australian Federal Police? Should it be brought further into it rather than simply into the Department?

Senator Tate --That was considered in the aftermath of this particular event, but it was considered that at the moment the best step to take was to try to bring the various elements within the one portfolio at least, and that is what has been done at this stage. There is scope for a closer collaboration between the APS and the AFP, and that will undoubtedly emerge. But if you are suggesting that the APS, for example, should be brought in under the Commissioner of the Australian Federal Police in that sort of structure, the Government did not consider that that was a necessary step to take.

Senator RICHARDSON --Was it considered as an option?

Senator Tate --Yes.

Senator RICHARDSON --What was the Australian Federal Police's view of that?

Senator Tate --Imperial.

Senator RICHARDSON --Are you telling me that the Australian Protection Service's view was colonial?

Senator Tate --It refused a colonial dependent status, I can assure you. It was not pursued with any great vigour or with a sense of being really open at this time.

Senator HILL --Was it the recommendation of Mr Codd?

Senator Tate --Yes. In fact, he recommended the structure which the Government is now implementing.

Senator HILL --If this happened again, whose responsibility would it be to make the operational threat assessment? It is taking a long time to get an answer, which is not very comforting.

Senator Tate --I am just trying to make an--

Senator HILL --Hopefully all these agencies know it without needing to discuss it.

Senator Tate --No doubt they do.

Senator HILL --They do not.

Senator Tate --If the incident occurred, the APS, having received a phone call from the Embassy--if that is what happened in this case--would contact the Protective Security Coordination Centre which is part of the Federal Justice Office within the Attorney-General's portfolio.

Senator HILL --Which is what it was supposed to do last time.

Senator Tate --Yes, but in this case it is quite clear that the PSCC within the FJO has the task of responding to the inquiry from the APS as to whether, for example, a static guard should be placed. You do not go to DFAT.

Mr A. Rose --I am not sure whether you will consider that this will clarify it, but the function that the DFAT officer had and the money that DFAT had have been transferred as a result of these changes to the PSCC--the body that should have been told first up. They are the ones who will now make the decision whether that static guard goes or not. In other words, the resource that the PSCC was looking to have placed in front of the Embassy will now be provided by the body that has the coordination function that was not told the time before.

Senator RICHARDSON --Would it not be more simple, more efficient, to have the Australian Federal Police as the agency to do all this? We seem to have a lot of agencies. Where they all ring each other up, would it not be a bit easier if there were just one that did it?

Senator HILL --We are talking about a pretty simple response: a policeman on the gate.

Senator Tate --But whether you want to put a policeman on the gate and waste all that specific training which is directed to enable him or her to act as a police officer as opposed to a guarding officer--

Senator HILL --This is following calls in the middle of the night from the Embassy saying it is concerned.

Senator Tate --The APS got the call.

Senator RICHARDSON --That is my problem.

Senator Tate --The APS contacted the AFP and the AFP increased its patrols and then later in the morning made the perfectly sensible inquiry as to whether a static guard was required.

Senator HILL --I must say that you are not making me feel much more confident that it would be handled better next time.

Senator Tate --I believe it would, because first of all you cut out DFAT, and all the agencies are within the one portfolio.

Senator HILL --It is a pity, because DFAT is now monitoring the public news service and would have learnt in these circumstances at half past six in the morning that Iranian embassies were being attacked around the world. So now in your new super slick procedures you do not have that information.

Senator Tate --I think ASIO also subscribes to those international wire services.

Senator HILL --It was apparently not utilising that facility on this particular night, but it will in the future.

Senator CALVERT --It might be safer for ASIO to ring the fire brigade next time.

Senator HILL --It is a very serious matter.

Senator Tate --I know it is. That is why there has been a transfer of functions and I believe that the lines of communication are much more straightforward now. Mr Bates or Mr Whiddett can tell us about what steps have been taken within the AFP to ensure that personnel are going to adhere to what they are meant to do in relation to these sorts of events, according to the anti-terrorist plan or whatever it is.

Mr Bates --One of the most important things, apart from the AFP procedures themselves being revised, to reinforce the action that should have taken place, is to ensure that the national office of ASIO be notified--not the ACT regional office. But as the Minister has said, one of the key things in all that has occurred has been the relocation of APS within the portfolio. With that relocation, and the clear recognition of that relocation, I believe the interface between AFP and the APS would ensure that this sort of situation does not occur again. In fact, as you remarked before, I think you would find about four agencies contacting PSCC.

Senator HILL --I hope you are right.

Senator Tate --So do I. We are acting on the best advice to us on how to reorganise the situation and that is what we have done.

Senator HILL --You obviously took the decision that you would not make Mr Codd's review public.

Senator Tate --A decision was taken, yes.

Senator HILL --Why was that? You do not think the public might be entitled to a boost of confidence in this area?

Senator Tate --I am happy to discuss it with Ministers if you wish, Senator. That is all I can do. I will give you an undertaking to discuss it with the relevant Ministers. It was a document for Cabinet discussion. That is the point of the Codd report, as opposed to the statement we put in to the Parliament. It was prepared to enable the Cabinet to come to a decision and that way give it a status which may not make it proper to release it. I will discuss it.

Senator HILL --But it was promoted as a step that would be taken to ensure greater protection to the public in the future.

Senator Tate --I am assuring you that we are acting in accordance with that report.

Senator HILL --Can I ask about the Gillespie matter. I want to ask specifically, Mr Bates, about this question as to whether there was coordination between the AFP and Coastwatch. I put to you the assertions that have been put down in the Parliament. On Monday 13 July at 11.55 p.m. Mrs Gillespie was visited by two Federal Police officers assigned to the case. The children's stepfather asked the officers whether authorities such as Coastwatch had been alerted--this was on Monday 13 July just before midnight. He was assured that they had been. Was that the case?

Mr Bates --I believe there has been a clear misunderstanding between the Gillespies and the police officers. You would appreciate that the Government has caused an inquiry to be carried out. I believe the confusion has come about by the word `Portswatch' as against `Coastwatch'. In fact, I would suggest quite strongly to you, knowing the way the police officers would work, that Coastwatch would probably be the last thing that would be in their minds. Portswatch would be foremost in their minds because the first course of action those officers would have taken was to ensure that all of the ports--the airports and the seaports around this country--were notified and the information updated. In all of that, of course, Customs is involved, and Coastwatch is a part of Customs. The other aspect in relation to it all is: what would we have told Coastwatch, anyway?

Senator Tate --Wait there. You were not asked that.

Senator HILL --Gillespie says that he asked the officers whether authorities such as Coastwatch had been alerted. Are you saying to me that he did not ask that? You said that there was confusion between Portswatch and Coastwatch. Who was confused?

Mr Bates --I am only trying to allude to the fact that, in the conversation, the police officers and the Gillespies became confused. I am not saying that the Gillespies--

Senator HILL --Let us go back to square one. Did the AFP alert Coastwatch?

Mr Bates --The answer is no.

Senator HILL --At no time?

Mr Bates --At no time.

Senator HILL --What is the explanation for that?

Mr Bates --The explanation for that is that there was no reason to notify Coastwatch.

Senator HILL --Because?

Mr Bates --There was no specific information or intelligence to task Coastwatch.

Senator HILL --So they did alert Portswatch?

Mr Bates --That is correct.

Senator HILL --They did alert the Customs Service, because that is related; is that correct?

Mr Bates --Yes.

Senator HILL --But not Coastwatch, because they did not see any reason to. Did they understand that Gillespie was asking whether they would alert Coastwatch?

Senator Tate --That is the question.

Mr Bates --That is the question, and that is one of the aspects that the inquiry will look at. I know what the officers have said in all of this. They are saying that at no stage was Coastwatch mentioned. Portswatch was mentioned and talked about.

Senator HILL --All right. It is said that on the night of Monday, 13 July, Mrs Gillespie was also asked during that meeting whether the royal family had access to yachts or light planes. You have told me that there was no reason to alert Coastwatch. She told them that they probably had, and again asked the officers whether Coastwatch had been notified of the search. If the police were asking her about whether the father had access to yachts, why do you therefore say there was no reason to advise Coastwatch?

Senator Tate --Let me be quite clear. I am not saying that the Gillespies did not speak in terms of Coastwatch and the AFP perhaps answered in terms of Portswatch or something like that. There seems to be a confusion which will have to be sorted out by Mr Glenn when he reviews the matter for the purposes of making his report. So I am not saying that there is bad faith in the assertions by either side in their recollection of that conversation. But if it is said--and I did not know this--that the Gillespies were asked about any yacht that he might have had access to and if the answer was that they did not know of any such yacht or vessel, then you do not have a particular task to give to Coastwatch to look for a yacht or vessel of a particular description or name. I think that was the answer that I gave to you in the Parliament, that Coastwatch was not alerted, in the sense that there was no task to be given to it to look for one particular named or described vessel off the coast.

Senator RICHARDSON --If Coastwatch were to be warned of an impending departure which was considered to be improper, the AFP would always have to give it details of the method of escape or some description. So I take it that, if I simply rang Coastwatch and said, `I know this mob are going to try to flee the country in the next few days; I do not know how, but they are going to be on a boat or a plane.', there is not much that Coastwatch could do, is there?

Mr Bates --That is exactly right. Often Coastwatch is asked by the AFP about quite specific information on intelligence, which enables the tasking to be carried out. But without that information, as you say, it is impossible.

Senator Tate --But in any case, I do not think either Mr Bates or I should pre-empt Mr Glenn deciding whether further reasonable steps might have been taken. That is the exact point of the commission that he has been given by the Attorney-General. You are putting Mr Bates and me in a somewhat difficult position because we might be defending or accusing the AFP unnecessarily.

Senator HILL --No. We are just seeking to determine the facts. Mr Glenn can draw whatever conclusions he likes. Again, on the night of Thursday, 23 July, it is alleged that Mrs Gillespie asked whether Coastwatch had been alerted. She was assured by Assistant Commissioner Walter Williams of the Australian Federal Police that it had. Was there another misunderstanding in that regard?

Senator Tate --I do not know.

Senator HILL --Mr Bates?

Mr Bates --Yes. As best as I am informed, that is the case. Again, we would have been talking about Portswatch.