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'A pebble in Indonesia's shoe': recent developments in East Timor.
Major Issues i
Invasion and Resistance 1600s- 1974 2
Still- born Independence 1974- 1975 3
Development, Change and Social Tension 5
Indonesia's Development Program 5
The Social Effect of Immigration 7
Timorese versus Outsiders 8
East Timor Today: An Upsurge in Violence 10
Protests during APEC, November 1994 10
Riots and Killings 11
The 'Ninja' Gangs 12
An 'atmosphere of fear and suspicion' 12
A New Resistance Movement 13
Few Remaining Guerillas 13
A New Urban Movement 14
The Santa Cruz Massacre 15
The Timorese Diaspora 15
The Role of the Church 16
Indonesia's East Timor Problem 17
Internal Security and Economic Development 17
The 'Opening up' of East Timor 18
Increased Accountability 20
Australia, Indonesia and East Timor 21
East Timor and Australia's Relations with Indonesia 21
The International Court of Justice Case 22
A New Influx of Refugees? 24
The Mantiri Affair 25
Australia's East Timor Policy 25
Conclusion: A Search for Solutions 26
Independence versus Autonomy 27
A Beginning of Negotiations? 27
The Way to a Settlement 28
The situation in East Timor today is tense and full of potential for conflict and violence. Indonesia has failed to win acceptance of its rule from most of the Timorese population, resentment against military and civilian outsiders is growing, and an increasingly assertive nationalist movement is facing a military apparatus intent on enforcing its rule. Especially since the Dili massacre of November 1991, there has been continued reports of conflict emanating from the territory.
The last twelve months have seen an upsurge of violence in East Timor and in Timorese protests against Indonesian rule. The most clear sign of the conflict to the outside world was the occupation of part of the US Embassy compound in Jakarta by a group of East Timorese students during the APEC summit in November last year. Within East Timor there have been repeated protests broken up by the Indonesian security forces, and killings of Timorese by the army. In addition there have been riots between Timorese and settlers from various parts of Indonesia. The United Nations Special Rapporteur said that he saw an 'atmosphere of fear and suspicion' in East Timor and that people were afraid to talk to him about the human rights abuses that they and their families had suffered.
Many Timorese feel marginalised and oppressed in their own homeland. Large numbers of people from various parts of Indonesia have settled in East Timor and their prominent role in business and government has been a source of resentment. Indonesia has pumped a large amount of investment into the province and improved education, health and infrastructure, but few East Timorese have benefited from this investment. East Timor remains an underdeveloped and poverty- stricken province with the lowest per capita GDP in Indonesia. Although education has improved markedly, there are few jobs because most positions in government and industry are occupied by Javanese and other Indonesians.
The Indonesian strategy to control East Timor through a combination of development spending and tight internal security has failed to win acceptance of Indonesian rule or to stamp out resistance. The domination of both the economy and government by military and civilian outsiders has squeezed out opportunities for the emergence of an East Timorese business class or an administrative and political elite with a stake in Indonesian rule.
Resistance to Indonesian rule has in recent years changed from a guerilla campaign to a movement of unarmed civil protest. This movement was encouraged by the international attention brought by the Dili massacre. Although the remaining guerilla resistance is no longer a military challenge, it does provides inspiration to a new generation of young Timorese who do not remember the events of 1975 but who have gone on to swell the ranks of the urban movement.
The Indonesian government felt confident enough to open the territory to the outside world in 1989, but this has only increased world attention and provided opportunities for the resistance. The most significant effect of the changes since 1989 and the increased world attention to East Timor since the Dili massacre of 1991 has been to make the army more accountable for its actions in the territory. The new National Human Rights Commission has proved more active and independent than many observers had predicted.
The East Timor issue has long been an irritant for Australian- Indonesian relations. Since 1994 there has been the International Court of Justice case brought by Portugal over the Timor Gap Treaty, the controversy over the proposed appointment of General Mantiri as Indonesian Ambassador to Australia, and the ongoing issue of Timorese refugees. Although bilateral relations between Australia and Indonesia are excellent, and economic, strategic and cultural connections are growing, the Timor issue continues to hover in the background as a potential source of friction. Australia therefore has an interest in a solution to the conflict in East Timor.
There is now some discussion within powerful circles in Indonesia of a change of policy on East Timor, and there have been calls for some form of autonomy for the territory. There will be no major change on East Timor policy, however, unless it is strongly supported by President Suharto, who recently quashed suggestions that his government might be considering autonomy. The UN- sponsored discussions between the Indonesian and Portuguese governments and between Timorese from inside and outside East Timor is at least a tacit admission by Indonesia that East Timor is a special problem requiring the involvement of parties outside Indonesia.
There is unlikely to be progress towards a settlement until Indonesia sees that it has more to gain in reconsidering the status of East Timor than in maintaining its current policy. This could be found in a negotiated formula that did not require major constitutional concessions on Indonesia's part, but provided a significant change in the day to day conditions of the people of East Timor. This would include demilitarisation, limiting immigration from outside East Timor and facilitating a greater role in provincial government and administration by East Timorese.
There are, however, few signs that President Suharto is prepared to move in this direction in the foreseeable future, and any major change may not come until his successor is in power. In the absence of change, the most likely scenario for East Timor is continuing tension and a cycle of sporadic and probably intensifying violence, with clashes between hostile groups on an ethnic and religious basis in urban areas, and between Timorese nationalists and the security forces throughout the territory of East Timor.
A turning point in the politics of East Timor came when two Yorkshire Television journalists managed to smuggle out film of the massacre of civilians in Dili on 12 November 1991. This refocussed the world's attention on the fact that many Timorese were still resisting their incorporation into Indonesia. This renewed attention not only told the story of the violence associated with the Indonesian presence in East Timor, but also showed that with the impossibility of opposing the Indonesians militarily, the Timorese had shifted their resistance from the forests to the streets of Dili. The attention has itself encouraged the Timorese to continue efforts to maintain an urban- based unarmed movement of resistance to Indonesian rule. The incident also caused a loss of face for the Indonesian military when an official inquiry found that the army's claims about the number killed in Dili were false. The reality of this conflict, so close to Australia's northern borders, continues to be brought home to the Australian government with reports of killings and repression inside East Timor and with issues such as the Portuguese case against Australia in the International Court of Justice, controversy over the appointment of General Mantiri as Ambassador to Australia in June 1995, and the quandary of how to deal with East Timorese refugees in Australia.
Events in 1994 and 1995 have sent contradictory signals to international observers hoping for a resolution of the conflict in East Timor. For most of 1994 there were indications that the Indonesian authorities were reconsidering their strategy for integrating East Timor into Indonesia by coercion and that they might even be prepared to consider opening negotiations about some form of special autonomy for the territory. Yet as 1994 neared its close there was an upsurge in violence in East Timor, culminating in the killing of six Timorese civilians by Indonesian soldiers. In addition, President Suharto publicly contradicted signs coming from lower levels of the government that a special status for East Timor might be contemplated.
This paper examines why, after twenty years of seemingly fruitless struggle, many Timorese continue to oppose Indonesia rule and how a new generation with little or no memory of the invasion of 1975 has gone on to sustain Timorese nationalism. The paper discusses the failure of the Indonesian development spending to gain the support of the Timorese and the impact on East Timorese society of the influx of thousands of civilian and military outsiders who now dominate the economy and government of the territory. It also discusses the differences within the Indonesian government over the question of East Timor and the various strategies which have been developed to deal with the problems of incorporating the territory and overcoming international criticism. The paper concludes that the factors which have led to the recent upsurge of violence in East Timor will continue to grow and that the issue of East Timor will remain an obstacle in the development of closer relations between Australia and Indonesia until a settlement is found.
Invasion and Resistance 1600s- 1974
It is well known that East Timor was occupied by the Portuguese for many centuries, but it is rarely appreciated just how tenuous was Portuguese control until the beginning of this century. Portuguese traders were originally attracted to Timor in the sixteenth century by its rich stands of sandalwood. They built fortified coastal trading posts, mainly in the east of the island, and had to compete for control over the island with the Dutch. Local Timorese leaders, on the other hand, became adept at exploiting conflicts amongst the foreigners, and their repeated attempts to resist foreign control were a constant threat to European colonists.1 For 300 years the Portuguese presence barely extended into the hinterland and it was not until the beginning of this century that Portugal finally subjugated the interior. This was achieved only after the bloody suppression of organised rebellion and a full- scale uprising from 1910 to 1912. Similar developments took place in Dutch- held territory, and the two colonial powers signed an agreement in 1915, dividing the island between them. Portuguese development of East Timor nevertheless remained very limited, particularly after the onset of the Depression in the 1930s.2
East Timor experienced further invasion in 1942 when 20 000 Japanese troops invaded in response to the landing of 400 Australian and Dutch commandos. The Japanese feared the commandos (who had landed against the wishes of the Governor, and in violation of Portuguese neutrality) were the advance guard of an larger Allied force. The Dutch and Australians held down large numbers of Japanese forces, but only with the support of the Timorese population. This support was given at great cost to the Timorese people who suffered grievously from Japanese retribution, especially after the commandos were evacuated in 1943. Timor also endured serious damage from Allied bombing. Estimates of the loss of life in East Timor during the war range from 40 000 to 60 000, around 10 to 15 per cent of the population.3
The Portuguese re- occupied a devastated East Timor in 1945, with many people on the verge of starvation. The economy began to recover by the 1960s and there was an increase in Portuguese economic and social investment. About 50 per cent of school- age children were in primary schools by 1973, although secondary education remained limited. A small number of students attended university in Portugal. The political police kept a watchful eye for dissidence, but the colony remained largely cut off from the outside world. The tiny size of the educated elite with nationalist ideas meant that East Timor was peaceful while the Portuguese were tied down in bloody anti- guerilla warfare in their colonies in Mozambique and Angola.
Still- born Independence 1974- 1975
The situation was transformed in April 1974 when the overthrow of the dictatorship in Lisbon threw open the question of East Timor's political future and allowed nationalist ideas to be openly expressed for the first time. There was a flurry of political debate and organisation in East Timor, leading to the formation of a range of political parties. The most important of these were Fretilin (Revolutionary Front for an Independent East Timor) UDT (Timorese Democratic Union) and Apodeti (Timorese Popular Democratic Association).
Fretilin was led by younger members of the educated elite of East Timor, and won widespread support throughout the countryside with its advocacy of rural development, land reform and mass literacy. After some initial hesitancy, Fretilin advocated rapid decolonisation and independence, and by the end of 1974 came under the influence of communist groups from Portugal and began to adopt the symbolism and rhetoric of the liberation movements in Mozambique and Angola. The leadership of UDT was drawn from more conservative elements of the educated elite, landowners and some traditional rulers of Timor and initially called for some form of association with Portugal as a stage to ultimate independence. By the end of 1974 UDT was talking of immediate independence, but by then was being overtaken by Fretilin as the most popular party. Apodeti was formed by a group of Timorese who had had contact with Indonesian government agencies since the 1960s. They advocated integration with Indonesia, but attracted fewer supporters than Fretilin or UDT. A number of other organisations appeared during this period (including one calling for integration with Australia), but remained marginal.4
From the time of its own independence in 1949, Indonesia had disavowed any claim on the territory of East Timor because it was not part of the former Dutch East Indies. The Sukarno government had been too preoccupied with the dispute with the Netherlands over possession of Irian Jaya (West Papua) and with confrontation with Malaysia over the status of Borneo to take any interest in the small economically- backward Portuguese territory. This policy was maintained by President Suharto's New Order regime after 1965. Confronted with the massive challenges of overcoming the economic chaos inherited from the Sukarno regime and of maintaining the unity of the diverse Indonesian archipelago, the fiercely anti- communist Suharto government was content to leave the equally anti- communist Portuguese government in control in East Timor.
With the rapidly changing political situation in Portugal and East Timor from 1974, however, the Indonesian government began to view developments in East Timor with increasing interest and concern. Against a background of Cold War global tensions, and with the fall of Saigon in April 1975 seeming to presage a rise in communist influence throughout Southeast Asia, the Suharto government feared the establishment of a radical regime in East Timor. Suharto's government had been established after the bloody suppression of the Communist Party of Indonesia in 1965, and in its view, an independent East Timor would be the conduit for a return of communist influence to Indonesia and a source of support for separatist movements in places such as Irian Jaya and Aceh in northern Sumatra. Although individuals such as Foreign Minister Adam Malik may have been prepared to support East Timorese independence (and indeed gave a written undertaking to this effect to Fretilin representatives in June 1974), the weight of opinion in Jakarta, particularly amongst the powerful military, was that East Timor should be integrated into Indonesia. To this end Indonesia launched Operasi Komodo, which comprised a campaign to win international diplomatic support for its position, an intelligence and propaganda operation against Fretilin and UDT and in support of Apodeti, and from mid- 1975, a series of military actions in East Timor. In June 1975, an Australian journalist in Dili wrote that 'the Damocles sword of Indonesian intervention' was hanging over East Timor.5
Relations between Fretilin and UDT went through rapid changes during 1975 as the threat of Indonesian intervention loomed and with rumour and suspicion rife throughout the territory. The two parties formed a shaky coalition in January 1975 based on a program of independence and rejection of integration with Indonesia, and by March were formulating proposals for a transitional government. Tensions between Fretilin and UDT came to the surface, however, as right- wing elements in UDT attacked the radical rhetoric of some Fretilin leaders, and the latter questioned the commitment to independence on the part of many in the UDT. On 11 August 1975 UDT attempted to seize control in Dili by force. Although UDT was able to win over most Timorese members of the Portuguese police to its side, Fretilin soon countered with the support of the bulk of the military and overwhelmed the UDT. Unable or unwilling to regain command of the situation, the Portuguese Governor retreated to an island off the coast of East Timor. The leaders of UDT and Apodeti fled to Indonesia and Fretilin was in full control of most of East Timor by September 1975.6
The Indonesian government moved quickly before Fretilin could consolidate its administration and develop international relations. The Indonesian army (Armed Forces of the Republic of Indonesia - ABRI), including armoured and artillery units, had been crossing the border at least since September 1975, (including the attack on Balibo in late October where 5 newsmen working for Australian television were killed7) and in mid- November it launched a full- scale invasion. With Indonesian forces on the road to Dili the Fretilin administration unilaterally declared East Timor's independence on 28 November 1975. Ideas that this new status would assist East Timor on the diplomatic stage were to be dashed, however, when, on 7 December, less than 24 hours after a visit to Jakarta by US President Ford and Secretary of State Kissinger, Indonesian forces moved on Dili.8
Accounts of the Indonesian invasion have testified to brutality and large- scale destruction from 1975 until the early 1980s, when Fretilin was largely contained as a military force. The numbers of people who died in the fighting or from disease and starvation during the campaigns to isolate the people from Fretilin is the subject of continuing controversy. Catholic Church sources estimated deaths between 1975 and 1980 to be from 100 000 to 200 000.9 Recent official Indonesian publications admit to 30 000 deaths, while other Indonesian spokespeople have at different times cited figures of 60 000 and 120 000. Indonesian census figures show a loss of 70 000 people or over 130 000 people between 1973 and 1980, depending on whether the base is taken from the Portuguese government census or the Catholic diocesan census.10
Development, Change and Social Tension
Indonesia's Development Program
Whenever the Indonesian government is criticised in international forums for its policies and practices in East Timor, one of its first lines of defence is to point to the economic development which has taken place in East Timor since 1975 and the amount of investment which Indonesia has poured into improvements in education and infrastructure.11 The promotion of economic development is, moreover, not merely rhetoric for foreign consumption but is embedded in Indonesia's view of its role in East Timor. As the Indonesian academic, Hadi Soesastro, has argued, the Indonesian government's special attention to developing East Timor has been:
... justified on the belief that economic development was the key to solving the East Timor Problem. In other words, economic development was seen as the principal instrument for integrating East Timor into Indonesia, economically as well as politically.12
East Timor has been allocated, on a per capita basis, by far the largest amount of Indonesian government development finance, exceeding even that for Irian Jaya.13 Much of this allotted money has not actually been disbursed into the province due to administrative deficiencies,14 but real efforts have been made to bring about development in the territory. Indeed, when compared with Portugal's neglect of its colony and the economic and social backwardness that characterised Portuguese rule, the Indonesian presence has brought major changes and development to East Timor.
According to Indonesian government statistics, for example, the Portuguese had built just 47 elementary schools, 2 middle schools and one high school in Timor, while integration into Indonesia has resulted in the establishment of 579 elementary schools, 90 middle schools, 39 high schools and 3 colleges. Similar figures are cited for health services. One of the biggest changes has been the building of 536 kilometres of paved roads throughout the territory.15 In agriculture, the Indonesian government said it has given priority to increasing acreage under production, while modernising methods and spreading irrigation.16 In trade and industry, official figures state that 300 commercial licences have been issued since integration, compared with the 67 which were extant at the time of integration. Promotion of industrial growth has, according to the government, been 'largely directed toward processing agricultural products and promotion of local handicraft industries including straw and textile weaving' and there is the 'intention' of developing assembling and manufacturing industry.17
East Timor nevertheless remains an underdeveloped and poverty- stricken province, with the lowest GDP per capita in Indonesia.17 The economy is overwhelmingly agrarian, and since much of the province suffers from low rainfall, productivity is low by Indonesian standards. Even from this low base, food production fell disastrously during the late 1970s and large numbers of people are reported to have died in famine conditions.18 Production of crops did not return to the levels of 1973 until the mid- 1980s, and the livestock numbers may still not have recovered from the destruction and disruption of the anti- Fretilin war.19 On most other social indicators, East Timor ranks the poorest or amongst the poorest in Indonesia. Despite investment in education, East Timor still has 50 per cent illiteracy, the highest rate in the country. The infant mortality rate of 106 per 1000 is one of the highest in Indonesia. Housing conditions are by far the worst in the country, with less than a third of houses being built of modern durable building materials.20
Of greater political significance, however, is the fact that the Indonesian- sponsored development has occurred in a way which has created new social problems and tensions. The rhetoric of development and the reality of economic changes have fostered new expectations amongst the people of East Timor which have been either frustrated or only half fulfilled. Young East Timorese do not compare their situation with conditions prevailing under the Portuguese, but with the standards and opportunities available to their counterparts in the rest of Indonesia. For example, while increased education has probably been the most beneficial effect of Indonesian rule, it has created the new problem of educated unemployment. A 1989 study by a research team from Gadjah Mada University in Java, carried out with the support of the provincial government, reported that, from 1979 to 1987, the percentage of secondary or tertiary graduates who had found employment ranged from a high of 21 per cent to a low of less than 4 per cent.21 The Governor of East Timor, Abilio Soares, admitted that the unemployment problem was 'very severe'.22 The obvious potential for trouble for the authorities in the presence of jobless youth on the streets of Dili and other towns has prompted various responses from representatives of the Indonesian government, but mostly in terms of security and control rather than as a social issue. Young people are, at best, seen as being 'easily exploited' for political purposes. 23 The Governor has even said that Dili's population should be reduced by moving people into the countryside.24
The Social Effect of Immigration
In the best of circumstances, the opportunities for educated Timorese would probably be limited, as they so often are in developing countries. But when young Timorese perceive that the few openings available are being taken by people from outside the territory, the issue inevitably takes on a sharper political edge. The Bishop of East Timor, Carlos Ximenes Belo, has spoken of lack of job opportunities for the educated as one of the issues motivating those who joined the demonstration at Santa Cruz Cemetery in 1991:
Those young people had long been complaining that there was no work for them after leaving school. ... All the teachers are from outside, all the civil servants are from outside. Go into any government office and all the employees are from outside. For the simplest jobs in road- building, they bring in people from outside. And these workers bring their children and their brothers and sisters.25
These sentiments were an echo of those of a group of secondary school students, interviewed by the Gadjah Mada University research team:
What's the good of school if there's no way we are going to get a decent job? These days all office jobs are closed to us. If the Kakinwil [Head of the Regional Administrative Office] is a newcomer, he will only be interested in having his relatives, or at least people from the same region as him, working in the office.26
Immigration from other provinces of Indonesia, has become inseparable from the other effects of Indonesian development policies in East Timor. Some of the immigration has been part of the official transmigration program, under which people from heavily populated islands such as Java are assisted in resettling in sparsely inhabited regions in eastern Indonesia. Most of the influx, however, has been of people moving on their own volition from nearby islands such as Sulawesi. Small business and petty trading, which usually absorbs much surplus labour in developing countries, has consistently been in the hands of non- Timorese. In Portuguese times, small business was dominated by Chinese. While many Chinese were killed or fled during the upheavals of the late 1970s, their place was not taken by Timorese but by Indonesian immigrants, mainly from Sulawesi. A study of Dili traders in 1989 found that only 20 per cent were local people.27
Observers of the Indonesian development program have also raised the issue of quality and access to the services provided by the Indonesians. The study by Timorese- Indonesian economist Joao Mariano Saldanha (a supporter of integration), concluded that student- teacher ratios in East Timor were very poor and that teachers in the province tended to be young, inexperienced and of low educational standard. Similarly, he found that while the number of doctors per head of population in East Timor was quite good, people in the territory complained that the doctors were inexperienced and lacking in dedication, particularly since many are on compulsory assignment in East Timor under a Presidential Instruction.28 An Australian volunteer health worker, Simon de Faux, who spent two months working for the Catholic Church in East Timor in early 1995, reported that people go to poorly equipped church clinics rather than use Indonesian- run facilities. This suggests that the problem is not just one of quality but that the Timorese are suspicious of anything associated with the Indonesian authorities.29 This impression is reinforced by evidence from other visitors to East Timor,30 including a Jakarta- based Australian journalist who reported empty government schools existing alongside 'flourishing' Catholic institutions.31
In rural areas there is evidence that Timorese have been dispossessed of their land by migrants, or by Indonesian army officers and Timorese working for army officers. Large numbers of peasant families were displaced from their homes and moved into 'strategic hamlets' during the anti- Fretilin campaigns of the 1980s to separate them from the guerillas, and have been unable to resume occupation because they lack the necessary documentation to prove title. Some Timorese owned land under Portuguese title which was transferred to conform with new Indonesian regulations of 1990 and 1991, but the vast majority of land was occupied by traditional owners without written title. At the time of the introduction of the 1990 regulations, commentators reported that the new system was being used to take over Timorese land, particularly that of exiles, and feared the takeover would extend to traditional owners.32 Accounts since then have been ambiguous. The Australian aid worker, Simon de Faux, told of seeing Timorese being forced from fertile farming land by Indonesian migrants who were provided with housing by the authorities, while the locals had to be content with inferior land.33
Timorese versus Outsiders
One result of the apparent maldistribution of benefits from development in East Timor has been the growth of the kind of racial stereotypes and suspicions which often emerge when ethnic groups take on particular roles in an economy and society. A common Indonesian opinion of the East Timorese is that they are lazy and unable or unwilling to take on new responsibilities and opportunities; that their condition is their own fault. The Gadjah Mada research team found that:
Teachers ... often feel fed up with the excessive disobedience of the pupils. They walk in and out of class when the teacher is explaining a lesson, physically resist teachers and often do not turn up at school. ... The conclusion which teachers and officials draw from the situation is that East Timorese students do not have the desire to study.34
Indonesian development officials were said to be exasperated at the 'laziness' of Timorese villagers who were reluctant to participate in schemes promoting the use of new farming methods and inputs. The researchers concluded that these problems stemmed from a perception amongst Timorese that Indonesian programs were controlled by ABRI, that any benefits from risky experiments would be 'pocketed by local officials' or ABRI officers.35
Many East Timorese have come to regard any initiative of the Indonesian authorities as suspect. They see ABRI as 'excessively interfering in economic and development matters' for its own benefit and thus being 'responsible for the region's economic stagnation'.36 Particular venom is directed against the civilian newcomers from other parts of Indonesia who are branded as being 'only interested in making money'. They have become known as 'Battalion 702', those who 'start at seven, do nothing till 2 and then go home'.37 The Gadjah Mada team wrote that:
Within indigenous East Timorese circles a feeling of hatred has arisen towards the Makassarese and Bugis [from Sulawesi]. They are seen as a new group of extortioners who stand in the way of their economic advancement.38
This observation, made in 1989, foretold of the violence which was to break out in 1994 between Sulawesi traders and Timorese.
The overall social and political impact of Indonesia's efforts to bring about economic development in East Timor appears to be two- fold; a sullen submission to Indonesian policy combined with apathy and non- cooperation with many government programs, and a resentment or even hatred towards non- Timorese settlers in the territory. The Gadjah Mada researchers observed that such behaviour could not be separated from the politics of the Timorese response to Indonesian rule. In the matter of indiscipline and unco- operativeness with authority, they reached the carefully phrased conclusion that:
One strong tendency in East Timorese society is the transfer of rebellious attitudes from the military to the civilian sphere.39
In other words, while the Timorese cannot resist the military without dire consequences, individual representatives of Indonesian authority or civilian outsiders can be defied more easily. Similarly, while the Indonesian authorities and some foreign commentators have minimised the significance of the clashes with migrant traders by labelling it communal or ethnic violence, it can equally be seen as a manifestation of Timorese anger about the takeover of their territory by foreigners. When Indonesian police and soldiers intervene to protect the outsiders, it only strengthens the perception that they are an instrument of Indonesian invasion.
The resentment and anger caused by social dislocation and ethnic division have manifested themselves in recent times in continuing organised expressions of East Timorese nationalism, such as demonstrations, which are inevitably put down by the Indonesian authorities and in outbreaks of violence and rioting with inter- ethnic overtones. This cycle of violence and repression strongly suggests that the Indonesian strategy for winning the East Timorese people's acceptance of integration into Indonesia has failed and that resistance to Indonesian rule will continue to grow.
East Timor Today: An Upsurge in Violence
The situation in East Timor has been tense ever since the Dili massacre of 12 November 1991, and has been steadily deteriorating for over a year. On 28 June 1994, for instance, two Indonesian soldiers entered a village church on the outskirts of Dili during a Mass and threw communion wafers on the floor and stamped on them. The military commander of East Timor published an apology for the provocative behaviour of the soldiers, but when about 250 Timorese students attempted to hold a protest at Dili University three days later their demonstration was broken up by troops and police. The Foreign Ministry said that 15 demonstrators were injured, while a East Timorese resistance spokesperson said that 43 people were injured, arrested or missing.40
Protests during APEC, November 1994
The East Timor issue was brought into international limelight by 29 Timorese students who occupied a corner of the grounds of the US Embassy in Jakarta on 12 November 1994. The date was significant not only because it was the third anniversary of the Santa Cruz massacre of November 1991, but because foreign press attention was focussed on Jakarta for the first day of the Asia- Pacific Economic Co- operation (APEC) summit. After twelve days, the students agreed to leave the compound only after they were granted political asylum in Portugal.41
The day after the start of the US Embassy occupation, pro- independence demonstrations were held in East Timor itself, including at the site of the 1991 massacre and outside the residence of Bishop Belo. On 15 November, about three hundred university students joined a demonstration inside the campus of the University of East Timor. A group of high school students marching to join the university demonstration was attacked by riot police. Over the next two weeks police broke up demonstrations outside Dili Cathedral and on the university campus.42
During this period, the presence of foreign news media in Jakarta and Dili for the APEC summit probably moderated the actions of the Indonesian authorities. While protests were attacked by police, there was no army involvement and protesters were dealt with relatively lightly. Over one hundred people were taken in for questioning but most were released. The media were able to report on protests, although reporters and film crews often received hostile treatment from officials. Four foreign journalists were expelled from East Timor on legal technicalities, and an Australian tourist was forced to leave East Timor after he videoed police violence against demonstrators.43 As foreign journalists departed the country with the end of the APEC summit, the Indonesian authorities began moving against those who they claimed were behind the unrest of the previous fortnight. By the end of November thirty people had been arrested. On 27 January 1995, another demonstration at the University was broken up by the security forces, with 27 people arrested and charged. These people were later sentenced to prison terms of up to 17 months and more.44
Riots and Killings
Tensions between Timorese and Indonesian migrants have recently been bursting into the open. In Dili on 12 November 1993 there was a riot following the stabbing murder of a Timorese man by a Bugis trader from South Sulawesi. In the town of Bacau on 1 January 1995 a similar incident sparked off a riot, with shops in the local market being set on fire. The army fired on the rioters and twenty- one people were hospitalised, four as a result of bullet wounds. At least one and as many as three people were reported to have been killed in the shooting.45 Many of the Bugis left Bacau after the clashes, but reports from the town in July said there was an outbreak of violence between Timorese and Javanese traders leading to one death and a number of serious injuries.46
On 12 January 1995 six Timorese were killed by Indonesian soldiers at a village in Liquica district outside Dili. The day before, troops had clashed with pro- independence guerillas, an encounter which left one soldier wounded. The next day, troops under the command of a military intelligence officer entered the village in search of the guerillas, and on finding none, took six people out of the village and shot them. The first army version of events claimed that the six were Fretilin guerillas or their active supporters who had been killed in an exchange of fire when the army attempted to capture a guerilla hideout.
Following international attention on the killings, the official National Human Rights Commission, set up by the Indonesian government in 1993, carried out an investigation and reported that the six people killed were not guerillas but 'non- combatant civilians'. The Commission said 'there were actions of intimidation and torture by the security apparatus' and that the deaths occurred 'as a result of shootings that were contrary to law'.47 An inquiry by the ABRI Military Honour Council also concluded that, contrary to the soldiers' report, those killed were civilians.48
In July and August 1995 there were further shooting incidents. On 27 July a police commandant in a village in Bacau district was fired at and wounded. ABRI soldiers responded by gathering together the villagers and conducting a house- to- house search, during which two youths were shot dead.49 According to other reports, six other people were killed in a number of occurrences in Dili and Bacau districts.50 Riots broke out in Dili and other centres in early September after reports circulated alleging that Indonesian Muslims had made insulting remarks about Catholicism. Hundreds of youths were reportedly involved in the riots during which market stalls were burnt down and other property destroyed.51
The 'Ninja' Gangs
A particularly sinister manifestation of the tensions in East Timor has been the appearance of roving gangs of masked men, known as 'ninjas', who have intimidated independence supporters, damaged property, killed animals, stoned houses and carried out night- time raids on homes.52 According to one report, 8 pro- independence activists have been murdered by the 'ninjas' and at least 30 people have 'disappeared'.53 This is not the first time that such gangs have surfaced in East Timor. They were particularly active during October 1991, in the period leading up to the Dili massacre. Many Timorese claimed that the ninjas were sponsored by Indonesian military intelligence, a claim denied by the ABRI Commander of the province, Colonel Syahnakri, who even accused the pro- independence movement of creating the ninjas to ferment conflict. People in some areas of Dili responded to the threat by forming neighbourhood vigilante groups to defend themselves against the gangs.54
An 'atmosphere of fear and suspicion'
Those who visit East Timor rarely fail to be struck by what the United Nations Special Rapporteur called 'the atmosphere of fear and suspicion' he observed during his mission to investigate human rights abuses in East Timor in July last year.55 The Special Rapporteur, Mr Bacre Waly Ndiaye, found it difficult to interview people whose relatives had died in the 1991 Dili massacre. The Report of his mission said:
The fear of families still prevents them from making their case known publicly. This was illustrated by the difficulties the Special Rapporteur encountered in trying to persuade victims or witnesses of human rights violations to meet with him in order to testify, and the precautions taken before, during and after such meetings. The Special Rapporteur clearly sensed terror among many East Timorese he had the opportunity to meet.56
The Special Rapporteur found that the police investigation into the killings at Santa Cruz were not designed to bring the perpetrators to justice but to hunt down independence supporters. In the words of the Report:
...it appears that the witnesses interrogated by the police were questioned on their involvement in the organisation of the demonstrations rather than on possible unlawful acts carried out by members of the security forces, or on the identity of the killed and disappeared.58
This situation takes on special meaning when one considers the disparity of the punishment meted out to those prosecuted after the Santa Cruz events. Not one of the soldiers who were accused of having acted 'without command and beyond acceptable norms' was charged with homicide. One was charged with assault - for cutting off the ears of a demonstrator. Their sentences ranged from 8 to 18 months.59 On the other hand, 13 civilians prosecuted for their involvement in the peaceful protest were sentenced to terms of up to life imprisonment. As the Special Rapporteur observed, 'the victims ... were, in fact, those really blamed for the killings'.60
Simon de Faux's account presented a particularly disturbing picture of conditions in East Timor because it conveyed the impression not only of fear but of daily occurrences of violence and intimidation. He said he had 'found [him]self in the middle of a dirty war' where 'torture was quite common'. He told of treating victims of electric shock and water torture and women who had been repeatedly raped by Indonesian soldiers.61 Allegations of widespread rape by Indonesian soldiers were also made by Timorese women at the UN Women's Conference in Beijing in September 1995.62
In these difficult circumstances, relations amongst East Timorese themselves inevitably deteriorated. The Indonesian use of informers within the Timorese community has fostered suspicion, paranoia, and occasional violence as different groups of people accuse each other of being spies. Bitter divisions emerge amongst people attempting to deal with the Indonesian presence in different ways, with those who co- operate with the authorities being seen as traitors, while those who defy the Indonesians are open to the charge of stirring up futile conflict.
A New Resistance Movement
Although many Timorese may be willing to reconcile themselves to being a province within Indonesia, few can be found who support current Indonesian policy in the territory. A supporter of Apodeti, for example, the party which had supported integration with Indonesia in 1975, was recently quoted as saying that he did not support 'this kind of integration'.63 While the Indonesian government continues to make statements claiming that the people of East Timor overwhelmingly support unity with Indonesia, the Timorese fear of speaking to foreigners or to anyone in authority is eloquent testimony to the reality of Indonesian rule.
Few Remaining Guerillas
The guerilla resistance movement, led, until his arrest in 1993, by Xanana Gusmao (one of the few surviving original leaders of Fretilin), continues to maintain a presence in remote mountainous parts of the country. ABRI claims there about 200 guerillas still active in the countryside.64 The movement is severely limited in its capacity for action, partly by acute logistical problems in maintaining supplies of food, arms and ammunition, but also by the fear of reprisal on local people. Anyone suspected of providing material assistance or information to the guerilla resistance is liable to be beaten, arrested, interrogated, tortured or killed. The Liciqua killings, for example, came about because of a local army commander's desire for revenge after a clash with the guerillas. Therefore it appears that the number of active fighters is kept deliberately low, but that there is a wider network of supporters engaged in support tasks and acting as a reserve which can be drawn upon to replace those captured or injured or which can be mobilised if the availability of weapons or other circumstances allows.65
A New Urban Movement
In recent years the East Timorese resistance to Indonesian rule has been transformed from a guerilla struggle to an urban- based movement of unarmed civil protest. The guerillas still provide a symbol of resistance and source of inspiration, but the driving force of the movement is now located in the towns. The rising urban population of East Timor, together with the growth of both education and unemployment amongst young people, have provided the basis for a political movement which, given the opportunity, has taken to the streets of Dili and other towns in recent years. This development was, in part, made possible by the 'opening up' from 1989, which loosened controls over movement and reduced the most overt excesses of the security forces, while at the same time allowing visits by journalists and official and non- government agencies from other countries.
The first manifestation of this movement came with the six- hour visit to East Timor by Pope John Paul in October 1989. Following an open air mass conducted by the Pope, a group of 50 to 10066 Timorese youth unfurled pro- independence banners, actions which reportedly received a sympathetic response from the rest of the congregation.67
The day after the demonstration 40 people were arrested and interrogated and, according to reports, some were tortured to obtain confessions about their activities.68 Despite the consequences for the demonstrators at the mass, a similar protest was staged by a small group of young people outside the hotel of the US ambassador during a visit to Dili in January 1990. Journalists' reports of the protest illustrated both the fear and the determination shown by the demonstrators, and the brutality of the response by the Indonesian security forces once the ambassador had left the scene. Two people were reported to have been killed by police.69 In September of the same year an open air mass by the Papal Nuncio in Jakarta was interrupted by demonstrators.70
The strategy behind these protests was to use the visits of foreign dignitaries to bring international attention to the reality of continuing opposition to Indonesian rule, with the perhaps naive hope that the visitors would bring pressure to bear on the Indonesian government. There was also a hope that the presence of foreigners would provide a degree of protection against police and army repression. These demonstrations were partly the work of an organised clandestine movement with connections with the guerillas, but they could only occur because of a generally anti- Indonesian milieu in East Timor and a network of especially young people prepared to openly state their support for independence.71 The Santa Cruz Massacre
The protest which led to the Santa Cruz massacre of 12 November 1991 was a public assertion of Timorese nationalism by the new urban movement which was to have the greatest single impact on developments in East Timor. Expectations had risen strongly amongst many Timorese with the prospect of a visit from a Portuguese parliamentary delegation in 1991. Hopes were dashed, however, when the Indonesian government refused to allow certain journalists to accompany the delegation, and the visit was cancelled. According to one account, the cancellation led to a feeling of 'desperation as well as sense of vestigial opportunity' because there were still a large number of foreign media representatives in the territory.72 In this atmosphere about 1000 to 1500 young people joined a protest march following a mass at Dili's Motael church on 12 November 1991 and unfurled pro- independence and pro- Fretilin banners made in secret to greet the Portuguese delegation. The demonstrators marched to Santa Cruz cemetery where a youth killed by Indonesian troops two weeks before was buried. Shortly after their arrival, however, they were fired upon by over 200 soldiers who trapped the protesters inside the walls of the cemetery. Systematic shooting by the troops at the cemetery and in other parts of Dili for several hours afterwards resulted in 200 or more people being killed.73
The Santa Cruz massacre was a turning point in the balance of forces in East Timor. First of all, it was a major setback for the Indonesian government's efforts to portray the situation in East Timor as normalised and to convince the world that most Timorese accepted integration into Indonesia. While many Timorese had died from Indonesian bullets in the past, the broadcasting of the massacre of innocent civilians across the world's television screens transformed the attitudes of many influential people. One US Congressman, for example, said that he decided to support calls for a suspension of aid to Indonesia after he viewed the now- famous footage of the massacre smuggled out of East Timor by two British journalists.74 Secondly, the international reaction to the massacre gave heart to many Timorese who had despaired at the world's indifference to their plight. Despite the loss of so many young lives, the resistance movement was given a vital lesson about the power of global media exposure. These events appear to have cemented the commitment of the movement to the strategy of urban protest.
The Timorese Diaspora
The Timorese nationalist movement has received sustenance from the thousands of Timorese refugees overseas, mainly in Portugal and Australia, but also in other parts of the world. With the renewed prominence of the issue, their involvement has become even more important. Members of Fretilin and other active supporters of independence, most notably Jose Ramos- Horta, have maintained a consistent voice in international forums calling for self- determination for East Timor, and/or for dialogue with Indonesia for some form of special status for the territory. To these people one should also add the East Timorese students in Indonesia who have attempted to increase the profile of the East Timor issue within Indonesia itself. In particular this has involved liaising with Indonesian human rights organisations, passing on information about events inside East Timor.75
The Role of the Church
The Catholic Church has also come to play an important role in giving voice to East Timorese nationalism. The Vatican does not recognise Indonesian rule, and the Church in the territory is administered directly from Rome rather than as part of the Indonesian Church. In recent years, however, the Vatican has become very guarded in its criticisms of human rights abuses and no longer makes statements in explicit support of East Timorese independence. The visit of the Pope in 1989 was interpreted by many people inside and outside Indonesia as suggesting de facto recognition of integration. The Vatican made no comment on the arrest and torture of those involved in the demonstration after the mass in Dili.76 When receiving the new Indonesian ambassador to the Vatican on 17 June 1995, the Pope expressed his 'fervent hope' that the Indonesian government would take measures to respect human rights and cultural values in East Timor but did not raise the issue of the status of the territory.77
But whatever the stance of the hierarchy, Catholicism has been a central part of Timorese efforts to maintain a separate identity. Estimates of the number of those baptised under Portuguese rule range from less than a quarter to less than a third of the population.78 Since 1975, however, Catholicism has come to be a symbol of difference within a predominantly Muslim Indonesia and the Church now claims the adherence of most Timorese. Paradoxically, the rapid conversion of East Timor to Catholicism was partly a product of the Indonesian doctrine of Pancasila which dictates that all Indonesians must subscribe to some recognised religion (the traditional 'animism' of most Timorese before 1975 not being regarded as such). Adherence has also been strengthened by the Church's special role in the provision of health, education and other social services.
The local Church within East Timor has been a consistent voice for the people of the territory and has provided the only authorised political space which is relatively free of Indonesian control. Until recently, successive bishops were one of the few lines of communication to the outside world, supplying credible information about the situation in East Timor. At the local level, the parish priest is often the sole influential figure able to speak up for the people against abuse and the arbitrary exercise of power. The Bishop of East Timor, Carlos Belo, has been a consistent critic of human rights abuses and of the social and economic impact of Indonesian rule. His home and the cathedral in Dili have often provided sanctuary to Timorese fleeing the Indonesian security forces. The Bishop is limited in his capacity to intervene directly in politics, and has often been subject to surveillance, death threats, and various forms of harassment. Church activities have been the springboard for most of the open expressions of opposition to Indonesian rule in recent years, but church authorities have also been a moderating influence on the movement, sometimes calling a halt to demonstrations.
Indonesia's East Timor Problem
Internal Security and Economic Development
The Indonesian government's strategy for the integration of East Timor into Indonesia has rested on a combination of tight control over internal security and efforts to promote economic and social development. From the time of the occupation of the territory, Jakarta has regarded the question of East Timor's status as a province of Indonesia as not negotiable. This has meant the ruthless suppression of any expression of East Timorese nationalism, or 'anti- integrationism' in Indonesian terminology. East Timor was accorded the status of a normal province in a constitutional sense, but was provided with special financial support to facilitate economic growth and to improve social indicators such as education and health. It was assumed that the material benefits of integration, particularly when compared with the backwardness inherited from the Portuguese, would convince the majority of East Timorese of the desirability of integration, and isolate them from those who might be foolish enough to continuing resisting the security apparatus.
It is debateable whether such a strategy would succeed even if both of its goals were attained, that is, if Timorese nationalism could be smothered by Indonesian arms and money. In any case, the reality is that both elements have encountered major problems in implementation. Although ABRI is not seriously threatened by either guerilla resistance or by civil unrest, the heavy- handedness of the security forces has ensured that violence and intimidation continues to neutralise any goodwill which may be earnt through development spending. Secondly, as was discussed above, the benefits of economic growth in East Timor have flowed only very partially through to the indigenous people of the territory. There is an increasing perception, particularly amongst younger Timorese, that their jobs, resources, land and human rights are being stolen by outsiders, whether in uniform or civilian garb.
The Indonesian armed forces maintain a dwifungsi [dual function] role of protecting national security and promoting socio- political development, the latter role allowing it to become involved in development and business projects. Having played a key role in Indonesia's independence struggle and in the establishment of Suharto's New Order after 1965, the army has rejected the notion of subordination to civilian government and regards itself as possessing a special legitimacy beyond that conferred by the government of the day.79 ABRI's participation in economic and civic development has often had the effect of stultifying the growth of civilian institutions, a view which has, on occasions, even been expressed within powerful circles in Indonesia.80 Given the paucity or even absence of civilian institutions in East Timor, this role and outlook allows ABRI to treat East Timor as a political and economic fiefdom and minimises the likelihood that support for integration can be fostered. The educated unemployed who seem to be at the forefront of urban unrest are precisely the people who could, if allowed to develop their potential, provide the leadership for integrationist sentiment in East Timor. Instead, the domination of both the economy and government by military (and civilian) outsiders has squeezed out opportunities for the emergence of an East Timorese business class or an administrative and political elite with a stake in Indonesian rule.
The 'Opening up' of East Timor
Until the beginning of 1989 the Indonesian government pursued a policy of keeping East Timor a closed province. Outsiders required entry permits and had to carry travel licences and residents had to obtain travel licences to move about the province. Closure of the province was, from the army's point of view, essential for the success of the campaign against Fretilin. The policy enabled the people to be separated from the guerillas they might support and it kept the territory free from the prying eyes of foreign journalists, diplomats and human rights organisations which might reveal the extent of violence and suppression.
As Fretilin became marginalised as a serious military threat, agencies within the Indonesian government began to question the policy of closure because of the problems it was creating for Indonesia internationally. The continuing refusal to allow foreigners into East Timor was portrayed by many in the international community as proof of Indonesian oppression of the people of East Timor. What, it was asked, did Indonesia have to hide? For Jakarta, such questions were becoming an ever greater embarrassment. Many in the government were keen to shed the image of an authoritarian military regime, and wanted to promote an international perception of a politically liberalising, newly industrialising country with a major role to play in regional bodies such as ASEAN and in international forums such as the Non- Aligned Movement (NAM). The issue of East Timor was an impediment to such goals.81
ABRI, of course, had little time for arguments about the foreign relations implications of a closed East Timor. They strongly resisted any suggestion that the 'security approach' to the East Timor problem was a failure, and thought that opening the province would only give encouragement to those elements who wanted to resist integration and thereby weaken the unity of Indonesia. They were also reluctant to forego the economic opportunities offered by their position in East Timor. Not surprisingly, the Foreign Minister, Ali Alatas, was amongst the most consistent opponents of ABRI's position and supported opening East Timor to the outside world. He is widely quoted as having described the issue of East Timor as a 'pebble in Indonesia's shoe'. Others argued for a change on economic and financial rather than foreign policy grounds. In the words of the economist Hadi Soesastro:
...the maintenance of East Timor's status as a special 'closed' province results, it is feared, in a variety of abuses by the authorities and excessive rents enjoyed by particular companies. ... It is now believed by many that, unless the 'closed' policy is modified, the enormous volume of financial resources pumped in by the central government will not be effective in promoting East Timor's development objectives.82
The then Governor of East Timor, Mario Carrascalao, was initially reluctant to support opening the province for fear that economic opportunities would be taken from the local people by better educated and more entrepreneurial outsiders. He apparently changed his view because he saw opening up as a way of weakening the position of the military.83 Similar considerations probably motivated President Suharto to come out in support of the new policy, given that one of his long- term objectives has been to reduce the power of ABRI in the Indonesian polity.84
The new policy was decided on in late 1988 and came into effect at the beginning of 1989. The existing hardline military commander of East Timor was replaced by Brigadier General Rudolph Warouw who eliminated many of roadblocks limiting travel in East Timor, reduced the incidence of torture and interrogation, released political prisoners and attempted to make the officers and men under his command more accountable.85 Joao Mariano Saldanha considered the new changes to be 'a Christmas present for the people of East Timor'.86
As a way of escaping Indonesia's dilemma in East Timor, however, the opening up policy has been of limited success. The apparent liberalisation was probably instrumental in furthering Indonesia's foreign policy objectives, including winning the long sought after Chairmanship of NAM. But in other respects many of the fears and criticisms of the policy's opponents have proven to be accurate. The expected influx of private investment has not eventuated, with the initial expressions of interest coming to be known in East Timor as 'Future Company'.87 ABRI's prediction that the nationalist movement would be given space to develop has also been partly fulfilled with the rise of public protest in Dili and other urban centres. The international media exposure of the subsequent suppression of dissent has undone much of the diplomatic advantage gained from opening the province.
It is highly unlikely, however, that there will be a return to the policy of a closed East Timor. This is first of all because the international opprobrium that would follow such an action makes it very unpalatable for President Suharto. But, secondly, the issue has now become part of the manoeuvring for influence between ABRI leaders who want to preserve their special position within the Indonesian state (inherited from the independence struggle in the 1940s and the struggle against the Communist Party and separatist movements in the 1950s and 1960s), and those such as Foreign Minister Alatas who articulate a vision of Indonesia as a modern outward- looking regional power. This finds particular expression in the rivalry between, on the one side, Suharto and Technology Minister Habbibie and, on the other, many senior ABRI officers. ABRI has blamed the upsurge in Timorese resistance since 1989 on the new policy championed by Alatas and his supporters. As the ABRI spokesman told the press: 'If soldiers are continually prevented from taking action because of human rights considerations, who is going to secure peace and stability in the area?'.88 Supporters of the open policy counter that it is only because ABRI is unable or unwilling to contain dissent peacefully or even able to maintain discipline in its own ranks that events such as the Santa Cruz massacre and the Liquica killings occur. There have even been suggestions that some ABRI officers have deliberately provoked incidents so as to both flush out anti- integrationists and to discredit the 'softer' line.89
Whatever ABRI's discomfort with the current policy towards East Timor, the territory will probably remain open. In practice, the policy tends to be applied strictly or liberally as incidents of violence occur. A crackdown following events such as the Santa Cruz massacre has led to expulsions of journalists and a reluctance to grant visas or to allow internal movement, but as the situation has stabilised from ABRI's point of view, a more permissive regime has been allowed.
The most significant effect of the changes since 1989 have been to make ABRI more accountable for its actions in East Timor, a trend which has been strengthened by developments since 1991. The striking example of this was the very fact that the presence of foreign media meant that the Santa Cruz massacre came to the attention of the international community in a way which would never have happened before 1989. This forced ABRI to call a military honour council to investigate the events of 12 November 1991 and the Indonesian government to establish a National Commission of Inquiry. The Commission of Inquiry turned into a humiliation for ABRI when it contradicted the ABRI finding of the number of people killed, and found that the soldiers' actions had 'exceeded acceptable norms'.90
A very important initiative was the establishment, in June 1993, of an official National Human Rights Commission. The foundation of such a body institutionalised the Indonesian government's recognition of the notion of human rights as a legitimate objective for the Indonesian state, contrary to the assertion sometimes made by powerful voices in Asian countries that the idea of human rights is an alien construct imposed by the West. The Commission was criticised by the United Nations Special Rapporteur as being poorly resourced and having insufficient independence, but its independence of mind has surprised many observers and it has become a new factor in the political equation with the potential to limit the actions of the Indonesian authorities in East Timor.91 The recent establishment of a permanent office of the Commission in Dili will strengthen its potential to increase accountability.92
The strengths and limitations of the Human Rights Commission were made clear after the Liquica killings. The Commission visited East Timor twice after the killings and brought down findings which were highly critical of the soldiers' actions, but made statements expressing its support and understanding of ABRI's role in the province. The result of the findings of the Commission and that of a military honour council was that two soldiers were charged with ordering the killings and others disciplined over their role in the incident. The two soldiers were found guilty by a Military Court and sentenced to 4 years imprisonment.
These developments are small steps in a positive direction, but they will not have a major impact without significant reductions in troop numbers and a lowering of ABRI's profile in East Timor, including the withdrawal of the army from non- security activities. A liberalised political atmosphere in the territory is a precondition for any progress on economic and social questions and towards negotiations to end the political conflict and the violence it has brought. The key question is, however, whether President Suharto is willing to take the risks associated with such a strategy. The government fears that an easing of the military presence would lead to an upsurge in nationalist activity, with possible implications for separatist movements in Irian Jaya and Aceh. Despite some liberalisation in recent years, the New Order regime is still very uncomfortable with free public debate and with independent political activity and organisation. The recent closure of some independent news magazines and the continuing suppression of labour organisations and Islamic groups suggests that persuading the government to take a new approach in East Timor would be a formidable task within the current balance of forces in Indonesian politics.
Australia, Indonesia and East Timor
East Timor and Australia's Relations with Indonesia
In meetings with then Prime Minister Whitlam in 1974 and 1975, the Indonesian government gained the impression that the Australian government understood Indonesia's position and would not oppose East Timor's integration into Indonesia, notwithstanding Australia's concerns that the rights of the Timorese should be respected.93 From 1978, successive Australian governments have recognised the Indonesian incorporation of East Timor. The Fraser government gave de facto recognition in January of that year and de jure recognition in the following December. ALP policy dropped calls for East Timorese self- determination in 1984, and in 1985 the Hawke government reaffirmed Australia's recognition of Indonesian sovereignty over the territory. In 1989, the governments of Indonesia and Australia signed the Timor Gap Zone of Cooperation Treaty which allowed for the exploitation of oil and gas reserves in the sea between Timor and Australia, a treaty which was widely seen as a confirmation of Australia's recognition of Indonesian sovereignty in East Timor and either commended or condemned as a tangible result of Australia's policy.
Australia and Indonesia have in recent years built up increasingly close connections founded not just on good bilateral diplomatic relations but on a range of common economic, strategic and other interests. Trade and investment between the two countries have been rapidly increasing, (total trade exceeded $3 billion in 1994), development assistance and defence co- operation is growing and there is an expanding web of regional connections through bodies such as ASEAN and APEC.94 A major qualitative change in Indonesia- Australia connections in recent years has been the growth of people- to- people contacts. Australia is now the most important destination for Indonesian students studying overseas (and Indonesia the largest source of foreign students in Australia) and Australia is a major destination for tourists from the growing Indonesian middle class.95
Despite the growing ties between Australia and Indonesia, the issue of East Timor has been the largest single recurrent irritant in relations between the two countries since 1975. The Australian government's recognition of Indonesian sovereignty has been opposed by significant sections of Australian public opinion and increasing international attention has been focused on the human rights issues raised by the Indonesian presence in the territory. Notwithstanding the oft- cited friendship between the countries' respective Foreign Ministers, there has been a series of incidents in the last twelve months disturbing relations between Indonesia and Australia, all of which have all revolved around the issue of East Timor.
The International Court of Justice Case
In 1991 Portugal submitted a case to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in the Hague against Australia over the Australian government's signing of the Timor Gap Zone of Cooperation Treaty with Indonesia in 1989. The Treaty is an agreement allowing exploration for, and exploitation of, petroleum resources in the Timor Sea by delineating three zones where Australia and Indonesia have either sole or joint control. Portugal had long wanted to take Indonesia to the ICJ over the East Timor issue, but was unable to because Indonesia does not recognise the jurisdiction of the Court. When Australia signed a treaty with Indonesia which directly involved East Timorese territory, it provided Portugal with an opportunity to test the standing of any international treaty Indonesia might make with respect to East Timor and, in the process, to reaffirm its claim to exercise responsibility for East Timor. Australia and Portugal submitted their respective cases to the ICJ in February 1995 and the Court's decision was handed down on 30 June 1995.
Portugal's case to the ICJ was that in signing the Timor Gap Treaty, Australia had failed: to observe the right of the people of East Timor to self- determination; to respect Portugal's rights and obligations in East Timor as the administering Power; and to abide by UN resolutions on Timor.96 Australia's case was that signing the Treaty was not inconsistent with recognition of the East Timorese people's right to self- determination. Australia argued that the real issue was Portugal's rights in East Timor and that therefore contended that Portugal's dispute was with Indonesia not Australia. Australia argued it could not be said to be in breach of international law unless the ICJ found that Indonesia's presence in East Timor was illegal. Since Indonesia was not party to the case, Australia submitted that the Court could not make a decision on the matter.97
The Court, by a 14 to 2 vote, upheld Australia's position that it could not adjudicate on the dispute. Contrary to Australia's submission, the Court found that there was actually a dispute between Australia and Portugal. It concluded, however, that Australia's conduct could not be ruled upon without first deciding whether Indonesia or Portugal could lawfully have signed the Timor Gap Treaty. To do so would involve making a decision on a dispute between States without the consent of one of the States (Indonesia), an action which would violate one of the fundamental principles of the Court's Statute. The judgment did, nevertheless, note that, 'for the two Parties, the Territory of East Timor and its people has the right to self- determination' and it upheld Portugal's assertion that the principle of self- determination of peoples was 'one of the essential principles of international law'.98
The Australian government portrayed the ICJ decision on the case as a 'win' for Australia.99 Certainly this was true in the sense that the Court accepted Australia's procedural arguments. The outcome also removed some uncertainty about the legal and political position of the Treaty, providing reassurance to the companies exploring the petroleum resources of the Timor Sea. Some aspects of the judgment did, however, raise questions about the justice and consistency of the Australian and Indonesian positions on the status of East Timor. In particular the reaffirmation of the right of the people of East Timor to self- determination could be interpreted as casting doubt on the legality of Indonesian claims to sovereignty in East Timor. The judgment also highlights what some commentators have seen as the ambiguity or even contradiction in Australia's position, which accords de jure recognition of Indonesian sovereignty, while at the same time recognising East Timor's right of self- determination. Indeed, one of the dissenting judgements argued that Australia's signing of the Treaty 'may well be incompatible with the rights of the people of East Timor'.100
From the Portuguese point of view, the judgment could be seen to undermine its claims to still be the administering power in East Timor. Such an interpretation weakens the moral authority of Portugal as a defender of the rights of East Timor against Indonesia. On the other hand, the case brought world attention to the Timor issue. Since this was probably a major part of Portugal's motivation, such an outcome could be seen as a success for the Portuguese in their efforts to place pressure on both Indonesia and Australia to change their stance on East Timor. For Indonesia, international attention on East Timor is inevitably a source of embarrassment, and for Australia the issue creates problems for developing relations with Indonesia by casting doubt on the ethics or even legality of its dealings with the Indonesian government, whether or not they have a direct bearing on East Timor.
A New Influx of Refugees?
In May 1995 a small wooden boat was spotted by Coastwatch north of Darwin. On board were 18 people from East Timor who claimed political asylum, the first instance of East Timorese refugees arriving by boat since the 1970s.101 This incident re- focused official and public attention on the fact that there was an increasing influx of East Timorese seeking asylum in Australia in preceding months. From July to December 1994 about 3500 East Timorese were granted tourist visas by the Australian consulate in Bali and, after entering the country, nearly one third applied for political asylum. The Australian government has three main options to handle the cases of the 'boat people': to have them accepted as refugees by Portugal; to grant them residence in Australia under the Special Assistance Category, (under which numbers of East Timorese from Portugal, Mozambique and Macao have been given residence in Australia); or to process them through the normal refugee determination procedures.
Representatives of the Indonesian government declared that the boat arrival was an aberration, probably timed to put pressure on the Indonesian government prior to the East Timor talks in Austria in June. Whether this is the case or is the start of a new influx of refugees is yet to be seen, but this incident and the entry of the Timorese on tourist visas seems to indicate that the situation in East Timor is deteriorating and that many Timorese want to escape the territory. For Australia there is a problem not only in the domestic political impact of a new and perhaps growing source of refugees but also in the implications for Australia's relations with Indonesia. To repatriate the people to Indonesia would be to place them at risk of persecution or discrimination and would expose the government to domestic and international condemnation. On the other hand, to allow the Timorese to remain in Australia would be an implicit censure of the Indonesian government and could provide encouragement to other people in East Timor to seek refuge in Australia. This was indeed the reaction of the Indonesian government when the Timorese 'boat people' were granted bridging visas which allowed them to be released from detention before their status was determined. Ali Alatas denied that the people were in any way persecuted, indicated that the Indonesian government was monitoring developments closely, and warned that granting the people refugee status would create a 'very, very difficult' precedent.102 The alternative of asylum in Portugal could appear an easy solution, but is often only a temporary measure because many Timorese in Portugal have, in the past, sought and ultimately gained residence in Australia. This solution is also unsatisfactory from both countries' point of view because it suggests recognition of Portugal's claim to sovereignty in East Timor, a suggestion which runs counter to Australia's recognition of the territory's integration into Indonesia.
The Mantiri Affair
The capacity of East Timor to be an irritant in the otherwise strengthening relationship between Australia and Indonesia was graphically underscored by the controversy about the proposed appointment of Lieutenant- General Herman Mantiri to the position of Indonesian Ambassador to Australia in June 1995. Immediately after the announcement of Mantiri's appointment, pro- Timorese groups in Australia drew attention to the fact that the General had spent much of his career commanding troops in East Timor and had defended ABRI's role in the Santa Cruz massacre saying 'we don't regret anything, what happened was quite proper'.103 After the surge of public opposition to the appointment, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Senator Gareth Evans, said that his officials had advised President Suharto of the problems General Mantiri might encounter in Australia, but also defended the appointment on the grounds that the General had not been involved in the massacre and was known as a reformer in East Timor. He also attempted to persuade the General to make a public apology about his statements on the massacre.104 An apology was, however, not forthcoming. As it became clear that the controversy would only continue and would, as Senator Evans suggested, interfere with General Mantiri's effectiveness as Ambassador, the Indonesian government relented and withdrew the nomination. In order to save face and convey their displeasure, Indonesia announced that the position of Ambassador to Australia would remain vacant for an indefinite period.
Observers of these events gave sometimes diametrically opposed interpretations. The proposed appointment of Mantiri was seen by some as a deliberate slight or provocation to Australia, while others saw the General's seniority as an indication of Australia's importance to Indonesia. One Timorese group considered that the appointment of a senior military man was connected to Indonesia's attempts to circumvent restrictions on arms sales placed by the US.105 Despite Alatas' reported advice to Suharto not to appoint Mantiri, the Indonesian government may well have been taken aback by the response in Australia, particularly since Mantiri's views on the Santa Cruz massacre are probably common amongst the top echelons of ABRI and because he is indeed an experienced and well- respected figure in Indonesian ruling circles. But whatever had been the motivation for Mantiri's selection, the affair could only serve to further demonstrate to President Suharto that international opprobrium over its actions in East Timor are continuing and will, if anything, increase in the future. For the Australian government, the affair was highly embarrassing and yet another reminder of the potential for the East Timor issue to be an obstacle to developing relations with Indonesia.
Australia's East Timor Policy
Senator Evans argues that Australia's recognition of East Timor enables the government to engage the Indonesians in dialogue over East Timor and to provide practical assistance to the people of the territory. The government emphasises that it takes every opportunity to encourage the Indonesian government to begin a process of reconciliation with the people of East Timor, including with the resistance forces. Senator Evans has said that the measures suggested to the Indonesians have included a major reduction in troop numbers in the territory, efforts to improve social and economic development, greater recognition of East Timor's distinctive cultural identity and consideration of some form of autonomy. In addition to political dialogue, the Australian government has a program of development assistance to East Timor (a total of over $5 million in 1994- 95), as part of the focus on providing aid to eastern Indonesia.
The overall aim of the government's East Timor policy is to find a balance between responding to the generally pro- East Timor sentiment of Australian public opinion, a pressure sharpened by the effectiveness of the Timor lobby, and managing relations with the Indonesian government in the context of a burgeoning relationship between the two countries. Problems in maintaining such a balance, however, have been increasing in recent times with the Mantiri affair and the issue of Timorese refugees. Even the best lines of communication between Alatas and Evans did not provide sufficient warning to prevent the controversy and friction created by Mantiri's proposed appointment. The refugee issue has perhaps greater potential for damage to the relationship because East Timorese refugees are likely to keep arriving in Australia so long as the conditions which forced them out of their homeland prevail. Each time a refugee is granted a visa - even a temporary one - Indonesia is implicitly told that its policies in East Timor are unacceptable and Australia's recognition of Indonesian rule in the territory appears a little less justifiable.
Faced with resurgent international and domestic concern about East Timor, the Australian government has shifted perceptibly in its stance on the issue. Senator Evans has begun to use rather more forthright language in his public statements, including describing the Indonesian military presence in East Timor as 'oppressive' - a statement which brought a swift although surprisingly low- key response from the Indonesian government.106 Of more significance is that, especially since the ICJ case with Portugal, the government has begun to argue that recognition of Indonesian sovereignty is not incompatible with recognition of East Timor's right to self- determination. This shift in emphasis is understandable given the change in the climate of opinion, but it opens Australia to the charge of attempting to maintain a contradictory policy which neither aids the East Timorese nor placates the Indonesians. As suggested above, problems in the Australia- Indonesia relationship are unlikely to end until there is a resolution to the conflict in East Timor. In this sense, the Australian government has a direct interest in a settlement.
Conclusion: A Search for Solutions
The situation in East Timor today is tense and full of the potential for conflict and violence. Indonesia has not won over most of the Timorese population, resentment against military and civilian outsiders is growing, and an increasingly assertive nationalist movement is facing a military apparatus intent on enforcing its rule. Independence versus Autonomy
In this environment there are signs that some influential figures in Jakarta agree that Indonesia's policies in East Timor have failed and that new approaches should be considered. During 1994 there were suggestions that ideas about liberalising East Timor policy, even including some form of autonomy or special status, were being circulated at high levels of ABRI and the government.
In May, the Governor of East Timor issued a paper proposing that East Timor should be made a daerah istimewa, or special area. This coincided with the publication in Indonesia of the study of East Timor by the Timorese economist, Joao Mariano Saldanha, which advocated special status for the territory and included a discussion of some of the options involved.107 Some ABRI officers gave favourable attention to the book, with Major- General Ruchiatna (responsible for security in the region which includes East Timor) being a guest at its launch, and Saldanha attending a meeting at ABRI headquarters with a new military team focusing on East Timor. Most prominent in his support for special status was Colonel Prabowo Subianto of the elite special forces unit Kopassas, and Suharto's son- in- law.108
Within the East Timorese nationalist movement there appears to be recognition that independence in the near future is not likely and that an extended period of negotiation and compromise with Indonesia would be required before a settlement could be reached. The National Council of Maubere Resistance (CNRM) ('maubere' meaning 'people' in Tetum, the main indigenous language of East Timor), the umbrella body of East Timorese organisations inside and outside East Timor, has put forward a plan to allow for East Timorese self- determination over a period of six or seven years or more. Under the proposal, an initial phase of one to two years would see Indonesia- Portugal talks (with East Timorese representation) under the auspices of the UN, together with a reduction in the Indonesian military presence and a range of measures to improve human rights and development in the territory. A UN Resident Representative would be appointed. During a second phase of five years, East Timor would be granted autonomy under an elected Assembly under UN supervision and assistance. Indonesian troops would be withdrawn and Indonesian civil service numbers reduced. The second phase could be extended by mutual consent between Indonesian and East Timor. The final phase would involve a referendum of the East Timorese population to choose between free association or integration into Indonesia or independence.109
A Beginning of Negotiations?
Although there is no sign that the Indonesian government has taken such proposals at all seriously, there has recently been some progress in UN- sponsored talks on East Timor issues between Indonesia and Portugal and amongst East Timorese representatives. During 1993 and 1994 the UN General Secretary arranged a series of meetings between the Indonesian and Portuguese Foreign Ministers on the East Timor issue. There was no East Timorese representation at these meetings, but in October 1994 Indonesian Foreign Minister, Ali Alatas, and CNRM representative, Jose Ramos Horta, held discussions in New York, a meeting which tacitly acknowledged the importance of the Timorese resistance in any negotiations over East Timor. Some limited 'reconciliation talks' had been organised by the Indonesian Embassy in London in 1993- 94, and at talks in Geneva in January 1995, Indonesia and Portugal agreed to support UN- organised talks between a full range of Timorese representatives from inside and outside East Timor. The 'All- Inclusive Intra- East Timor Dialog' was held in Austria on 4- 6 June 1995 and attended by thirty Timorese. The question of East Timor's status and sovereignty was excluded from the agenda, but discussions ranged over issues such as human rights, security, reducing the role of the military and socio- economic and cultural issues, including freedom of religion.110
Given the scope of the talks, the outcomes were inevitably very limited. The meeting did go some way towards overcoming mutual recriminations between the various Timorese groupings who had become so bitterly divided during the twenty years of frustrated attempts to make progress with the Indonesians. This reconciliation may assist the development of a more united position to present to the Indonesian government. The fact that the Indonesian government was prepared to support the talks and to allow Timorese inside Timor to attend was a tacit admission that East Timor is a special problem requiring the involvement of parties outside Indonesia. At the end of the meeting the delegates issued a Declaration calling on the UN to organise a further dialogue. Ali Alatas reacted cautiously to the Declaration, stating that proposals for further 'Intra- East Timorese' talks would have to be discussed at the next meeting between himself and the Portuguese Foreign Minister and the UN Secretary General in Geneva.111 At the Geneva meeting on 8 July 1995, Alatas accepted the UN proposal for a further meeting of Timorese, but is clearly wary of any direct linkage between the 'Intra- East Timorese' talks and the Indonesia- Portugal talks. Alatas also agreed to the 'Intra- East Timorese' talks only on the basis that the delegates not discuss the political status of East Timor.
The Way to a Settlement
Superficially, the discussion of autonomy within the Indonesian government and the CNRM's willingness to accept autonomy as an interim arrangement could be interpreted as narrowing the gap between the two parties. From the perspective of the Indonesian government, however, there are a number of factors obstructing a change of policy on East Timor. The first is the reality that, having invested twenty years of effort into integrating the territory in the face of internal resistance and international pressure, the Indonesian government is loath to be seen as conceding defeat. In particular, the prestige of ABRI is at stake, including the fact that soldiers' lives have been lost in maintaining control of the territory. At a perhaps more tangible level, the Indonesian government is still preoccupied with concerns about the territorial integrity of the Indonesian archipelago and it fears that granting East Timor autonomy, let alone independence, would create pressures to concede to secessionist forces in Irian Jaya, Aceh and elsewhere.
On the other hand, the profound changes in Indonesia's international and domestic circumstances since 1975 could induce and allow Indonesia to reappraise its approach to East Timor. The perceived threat of communism in Southeast Asia no longer exists and strategic conditions in the region have been transformed, developments which should allay Indonesian concerns about an independent East Timor as a source of instability. Moreover, these changes have reduced the degree of sympathy for Indonesia's position from within the US government, particularly in Congress, and from other Western governments. As Indonesia has stabilised politically and developed economically in the last two decades, it now has an increasing interest in improving its image, both on international diplomatic stage and to foreign investors, external gains which would be facilitated by resolving issues such as East Timor. New internal pressures for political change in Indonesia are also developing as the growing middle class and working class push for greater political freedom. Issues such as human rights, labour rights, democratisation and press freedom inevitably become interlinked with the issue of East Timor. This has become particularly evident with the emergence of the National Human Rights Commission as a significant new actor on the Indonesian political scene.
The key to progress could therefore be to persuade Indonesia that it has an interest in resolving its East Timor problem and that it has more to gain in reconsidering the status of the territory than in maintaining its current policy. It is here that the Australian government, with its close relationship with Indonesia, could play a role, including assisting the Indonesian government to find solutions to its East Timor problem. The Indonesian government has, in the past, given every indication that it has no intention of compromising, a situation which has provided little incentive to the Timorese nationalists to demand anything less than full independence. A way out of this impasse may be found in a formula that would not require major constitutional concessions on Indonesia's part, but that would provide significant change in the day to day circumstances of the people of East Timor. This might, for example, involve making the territory a daerah istimewa (special area), but ensuring that this has more than the titular status it has had in other instances, including attention to issues such as demilitarisation, limiting immigration from outside East Timor and facilitating greater participation in provincial government and administration by East Timorese. Such a settlement might, after some years, even allow a referendum along the lines proposed by the CNRM. A referendum could entail a choice between independence and integration as well as options for some other form of association. The easing of Cold War tensions and growth of economic and even political regionalism in Europe, North America and Asia have facilitated new ideas about sovereignty. More specifically, the example of free association developed in the Pacific between the Cook Islands and New Zealand and in the US Micronesian territories, as well as similar arrangements between Bhutan and India, could provide a model for future relations between East Timor and Indonesia.
Ultimately, however, any change depends on President Suharto himself. He was made very aware of international opposition to Indonesia's policy on East Timor when he encountered significant public hostility during his visit to Europe last year, but he is also known to resist attempts to change his position through pressure. Suharto seems to have been genuinely annoyed at the protests by Timorese during APEC and by what he claimed were foreign attempts to force his hand over the issue. In recent months he and Ali Alatas have made statements repudiating the idea that special status would be considered for East Timor. It may be the case that there will be little substantial progress towards a settlement of the East Timor conflict until Suharto's successor is in power.
Such pessimism may prove unjustified, but apart from the limited outcomes of the Portugal- Indonesia talks and the 'Intra- East Timorese' meeting, there have been few signs that President Suharto is prepared to make any moves towards changing Indonesia's East Timor policies and practices in the foreseeable future. In the absence of such moves, the most likely scenario for East Timor is continuing tension and a cycle of sporadic and perhaps intensifying violence, with clashes between hostile groups on an ethnic and religious basis in urban areas, and between Timorese nationalists and the security forces throughout the territory of East Timor.
1 John Taylor, Indonesia's Forgotten War: The Hidden History of East Timor, London, 1991, pp. 1-10.
2 ibid., pp.10-12.
3 James Dunn, Timor: A People Betrayed, Milton, 1983, pp.22-27.
4 Taylor, op. cit., pp.25-35. Dunn, op. cit., pp.56-79.
5 Bruce Juddery, Canberra Times, 11 June 1975, quoted by Dunn, op. cit., p.117.
6 Taylor, op. cit., pp.46-54. Dunn, op. cit., pp.165-206.
7 For a detailed account of the Balibo events and their handling by the Australian government see Dunn, op. cit., pp.229-252
8 Taylor, op. cit., pp.58-65. Dunn. op. cit., pp.207-282.
9 Australian Council for Overseas Aid, East Timor, 1991, p.6.
10 Republic of Indonesia, Department of Foreign Affairs, East Timor: Building for the Future, 1992, pp.iv-vi. Taylor, op. cit., p.203. Dunn, op. cit., pp.320-322.
11 See for example, Irawan Abidan, Setting the Record Straight on East Timor, Indonesian Embassy, Canberra, 1994, p.4.
12 Hadi Soesastro, 'Equal Treatment for East Timor', Jakarta Post, May 1995.
13 M. Hadi Soesastro, 'East Timor: Questions of Economic Viability', in Hal Hill (ed.) Unity and Diversity: Regional Development in Indonesia since 1970, Oxford, 1989, pp.30-32, 219-21.
14 ibid., pp.219-21.
15 East Timor: Building for the Future, pp.13-14.
16 ibid., pp.14-16.
17 ibid., p.17.
18 Soesastro in Hill (ed.), op. cit., p.213.
19 Taylor, op. cit, pp.92-99.
20 Soesastro in Hill (ed.), op. cit., p.210.
21 Joao Saldanha, The Political Economy of East Timor Development, Jakarta, 1994, pp.272-76.
22 Mubyarto, et.al., East Timor: The Impact of Integration, translated and published by the Indonesian Resources and Information Program (Melbourne), 1991, pp.55-56. The Indonesian government forbad publication of the study and it is only available because it was published by an Australian NGO.
23 Michael Richardson, 'Impressive Development Fails to Win Hearts and Minds', Asia-Pacific Defence Reporter, March-April 1995, p.12.
24 Saldanha, op. cit., pp.167-68.
25 Age, 31 January 1992.
26 Interview with Bishop Belo in the Jakarta montly, Matra, reprinted in Inside Indonesia, September 1990, p.11.
27 Mubyarto, op. cit., p.55.
28 Soesastro in Hill (ed.), op. cit., p.215.
29 Saldanha, op. cit., pp.272-73.
30 Age, 16 May 1995, p.1.
31 Kirsty Sword and Pat Walsh, 'Opening Up': Travellers' Impressions of East Timor 1989-1991, Melbourne, 1991, p.37.
32 Patrick Walters, Australian, 23 May 1995.
33 Special Correspondent, 'Winner Takes All: East Timorese Convert to Indonesian Land Certificates', Inside Indonesia, March 1991, pp.9-11.
34 Age, 16 May 1995, p.1.
35 Mubyarto, op. cit., p.55.
36 Mubyarto, op. cit., p.58.
37 Mubyarto, op. cit., pp.58-62.
38 Sword and Walsh, op. cit., p.41. Mubyarto, op. cit., p.54.
39 Mubyarto, op. cit., p.54.
40 Mubyarto, op. cit., p.62
41 Sydney Morning Herald, 12 July 1994, p.8. Age, 16 July 1994, p.11. Canberra Times, 17 July 1994, p.3.
42 Human Rights Watch/Asia, Indonesia/East Timor: Deteriorating Human Rights in East Timor, February 1995, Vol.7, No.3, p.2.
43 ibid., pp.3-4.
44 ibid., pp.3-4.
45 Amnesty International, Indonesia and East Timor: Political Prisoners and the 'Rule of Law', January 1995, p.7.
46 Human Rights Watch/Asia, op. cit., pp.5-6.
47 AP, 22 July 1995.
48 Press Release of the Indonesian National Human Rights Commission, 1 March 1995, unofficial translation.
49 Australian, 2 March 1995, p.1.
50 Age, 8 September 1995, p.4. Sydney Morning Herald, 9 September 1995, p.24..
51 Age, 8 September 1995, p.4. Media Release, Senator Julian McGauran, 6 September 1995.
52 Sydney Morning Herald, 12 September 1995, p.10. Herald Sun, 10 September 1995, p.32.
53 Far Eastern Economic Review, 2 March 1995, p.18.
54 Pacific News Bulletin, May 1995, p.6.
55 Human Rights Watch/Asia, op. cit., p.10.
56 United Nations Commission on Human Rights, Report of the Special Rapporteur, Mr Bacre Waly Ndiaye, on his mission to Indonesia and East Timor from 3 to 13 July 1994, November 1994, p.26. See also Sword and Walsh, op. cit., David Scott, 'Return to East Timor', Inside Indonesia, September 1994, pp.11-12.
57 UNHCR, Report of the Special Rapporteur, p.23.
58 ibid., p.14
59 ibid., p.21.
61 Age, 16 May 1995, p.1.
62 Reuters, 4 September 1995.
63 Richardson, op. cit., p.12.
64 Far Eastern Economic Review, 2 February 1995.
65 Michael Salla, 'East Timor's Clandestine Resistance to Indonesian Integration', Social Alternatives, April 1994, p.46.
66 This number was cited by the then Governor of East Timor, Mario Carrascalao, to the Australian Parliamentary Delegation to East Timor in 1991.
67 Herb Feith, 'East Timor: Opening up, the Crackdown and the Possibility of a Durable Settlement', in Crouch and Hill, Indonesia Assessment 1992, op. cit., p.66.
68 Taylor, op. cit., p.212.
69 For a vivid journalistic account of the demonstration see Andrew McMillan, Death in Dili, Sydney, 1992.
70 Feith, op. cit., p.66.
71 Salla. op. cit., p.46.
72 Feith, op. cit., p.68.
73 This account is based on Adam Schwarz, Far Eastern Economic Review, 28 November 1991, pp.15-18. For a discussion of the immediate circumstances and implications of the Santa Cruz massacre see Stephen Sherlock, East Timor: A Challenge for Indonesia - and Australia, Parliamentary Research Service Background Paper, March 1992.
74 Geoffrey Gunn, A Critical View of Western Journalism and Scholarship on East Timor, Manilla, 1994, p.176
75 Salla, op. cit., p.46.
76 Taylor, op. cit., pp.
77 Sunday Telegraph, 18 June 1995, p.40.
78 Louise Crow, 'Peacemaking Initiatives for East Timor: The Role of the Catholic Church', paper presented to the Peacemaking Initiatives for East Timor Conference, ANU, July 1995, p.13.
79 For a good exposition of ABRI's view of itself, see the address to the Royal United Services Institute by Colonel Yost F. Mengko, Indonesian Defence Attache to Australia, published in United Service, Vol. 47, No.3, (Summer 1994), pp.19-25. This draws from Lt Gen A Hasnan Habib, 'The Role of the Armed Forces in Indonesia's Political Development', in Harold Crouch and Hal Hill (eds.), Indonesia Assessment 1992: Political Perspectives on the 1990s, Canberra 1992, pp.83-94. The following paragraph is particularly revealing: 'As a socio-political force, ABRI is one among the legitimate sociopolitical forces of Indonesia's plural society. It interacts, works, even competes (fairly) with them in giving substance to Indonesia's freedom, the 1945 Constitution and Pancasila;... As such, it is not an instrument of government; it is not 'government- oriented', but 'people-oriented'... It supports wholeheartedly any government which shares the same commitments and which adheres to the principles of upholding the Unitary Republic, the 1945 Constitution, and Pancasila.' (pp.88-89)
80 Michael Vatikiotis, Indonesian Politics Under Suharto, London, 1993, pp.72-73
81 Adam Schwarz, A Nation in Waiting: Indonesia in the 1990s, Sydney, 1994, pp. 194-96. Feith, op. cit., p.64.
82 Soesastro in Hill (ed.), op. cit., p.212.
83 Feith, op. cit., p.64.
84 Schwarz, op. cit., p.209.
85 Feith, op. cit., p.65.
86 Saldanha, op.cit., p.126.
88 Jakarta Post, 24 February 1995, quoted by Human Rights Watch/Asia, op. cit., p.8.
89 Human Rights Watch/Asia, op. cit., pp.11-12.
90 Report of the National Commission of Inquiry into 12 November 1991 Incident in Dili, (unofficial translation), p.10.
91 United Nations Commission on Human Rights, op. cit., p.14.
92 Jakarta Post, 6 June 1995, p.1.
93 Gough Whitlam, The Whitlam Government 1972-1975, Ringwood, 1975, pp.107- 114. T.B. Millar, Australia in Peace and War, Sydney, 1991, p.347. Dunn, op.cit., pp.140-164.
94 Total trade between Australia and Indonesia was just over $3 billion in 1994. Development assistance to Indonesia exceeded $140 million in 1994- 95.
95 The number of Indonesian tourist visas issued in 1994-95 is estimated to be about 100 000. In the last three years Australia has issued from 3500 to 4000 Indonesian student visas.
96 International Court of Justice, Application of the Republic of Portugal, paras 1-3.
97 Text of Australia's Opening Statement to the ICJ, pp.2-4.
98 Judgement of the ICJ, para 29.
99 Minister for Foreign Affairs, News Release, 30 June 1995, Transcript of Sen. Evans' interview with Graham Dobell, 30 June 1995.
100 Dissenting Opinion of Judge Weeramantry, Part C, vii.
101 Canberra Times, 31 May 1995, p.1. Age, 15 April 1995, p.6.
102 Canberra Times, 23 July 1995, p.6. Australian, 24 July 1995, p.3.
103 Sunday Age, 25 June 1995, p.7.
104 Sydney Morning Herald, 29 June 1995, p.7.
105 Matebian News, June 1995, pp.4-5.
106 Embassy of the Republic of Indonesia, Press Statement, 19 May 1995.
107 Saldanha, op. cit., pp.380-394.
108 John Mc Beth, Far Eastern Economic Review, 6 October 1994, pp.27-28.
109 National Council of Maubere Resistance, An Introduction to East Timor
110 Jakarta Post, 5 June 1995, p.1, Age, 6 June 1995, Canberra Times, 12 June 1995, p.11.
111 Jakarta Post, 7 June 1995, p.2